Congressional Record, Volume 141 Issue 23 (Monday, February 6, 1995)

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 23 (Monday, February 6, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1269-H1270]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

DISENFRANCHISING CONGRESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, during the debate earlier today on the line-
item veto, Members were not permitted to strike the requisite number of
words and speak before the vote. And therefore I want to take this
opportunity to put my thoughts out in terms of the vote that just
happened.
I voted against the line-item veto. I must say, Mr. Speaker, that I
believe we in this Congress are going to rue the day that we voted for
the line-item veto, and as was said many times by many colleagues, this
line-item veto, in my opinion, is nothing more than an unconstitutional
ceding of power to the executive branch.
I believe that in order for a line-item veto to be put forward we
need a constitutional change, and therefore, a constitutional
amendment, and surely when there is a legal challenge to the line-item
veto I believe it will ultimately be declared unconstitutional without
a constitutional amendment.
Congress is granted the power of the purse. I do not believe Congress
has the right to cede that power to the Executive.
This to me has nothing to do with partisan politics, it has nothing
to do with Congress being controlled by the Democrats or the
Republicans or the President being a Democrat or a Republican. It
simply to me reflects the very serious nature that I feel about our
Constitution. I feel it is a very sacred document and I do not think
any vote of Congress ought to be allowed to alter that.
Much is said today about this being President Reagan's birthday and
the gesture of passing this on his birthday, but I must say with all
due respect to President Reagan, he was President for 8 years, and
while he talked about the importance of a line-item veto in terms of
bringing the budget deficit down, he never once in his 8 years as
President submitted a balanced budget to Congress. President Bush in 4
years in the Presidency never submitted a balanced budget to Congress.
So I think this fervor that people are rushing toward in terms of
both the balanced budget amendment and the line-item veto is a bit
misplaced.
What also scares me, Mr. Speaker, is that now if this becomes law,
and the Senate concurs, two-thirds will have to pass something to
override the President's veto.
I think that is very, very dangerous. It means simply that the
President, plus one-third, plus one, of either House, would have
control not just over entire spending bills, but each detail within
them. To me that is a huge increase in Presidential power, and an
increase in Presidential power, I might add, not just to affect the
composition of spending, but also to punish and reward.
Simply put, the President might send to the Senate certain nominees
to be confirmed and might make it very, very clear that unless his
putting forth the line-item veto was sustained, that Congress would be
in big trouble in terms of the confirmation. In other words, unless the
Senate confirmed the Presidential appointments, the President might
line-item veto certain appropriations.
So the President could use the line-item veto not only to stop
spending, but can use it as a wedge over the heads of Congress to say
if you do not do what I want, I am going to line-item veto what you
want.
When there are negotiations between the executive
branch and the legislative branch, Mr. Speaker, everyone knows how
negotiations go, be they labor-management negotiations or any other
kind. Baseball is now on strike and owners and players in negotiations
whenever there is a settlement there is give and take on each side,
each side gives a little, each side accepts a little bit of the other
person's side, and they come out with a final document that may not be
to everyone's liking, but it is a compromise document.

Now if the President has a line-item veto, what will happen I fear is
when Congress and the President sit down and each gives a little, the
little that the Congress gives to the President will be sustained, and
the little that the President gives to the Congress will be line-item
vetoed, altering the balance.
I want to just read in conclusion the first paragraph from the
editorial of the Washington Post last week entitled ``Disenfranchising
Congress,'' and I will put the entire editorial in the Record, but I
want to just conclude by reading this first paragraph. It says,

I am sorry to say, Mr. Speaker I think with the passage of this, it
is a very sad day for out country and I believe that those of us who
voted no will be proven right in the future.
The text of the article referred to is as follows:

Disenfranchising Congress

The version of the line-item veto now on the floor of the
House is dangerous legislation. Too little attention has been
paid to what it would do. It would likely do very little to
reduce unnecessary spending and the deficit, the stated
purpose. It would, however, transfer an enormous amount of
power from Congress to the president, which the president
could use for other purposes. It would also greatly
strengthen congressional minorities at the expense of
majority rule. That threatens to become a pattern; the
balanced budget amendment to the Constitution that the House
approved last week would also disenfranchise the majority.
There's a better way to give the president line-item veto
authority, which Reps. Bob Wise, Charles Stenholm and John
Spratt are offering as an amendment, and which Budget
Committee Chairman Pete Domenici supports in the Senate. The
House should adopt this benign version.
[[Page H1270]] A president now can't choose among the items
in an appropriations bill. He must sign or veto the whole
thing; then he can ask Congress to rescind the items he
regards as ill-advised; but Congress is free to ignore him. A
line-item veto would let him pluck out offending items and
force separate votes on them. But there are different ways of
doing that.
The proposal on the House floor would give him what is
known as enhanced rescission authority. He'd sign an
appropriations bill, then announce his intention not to
spend--in effect to impound--some of the money in it. The
money couldn't be spent unless Congress next passed a
separate bill within a set time ordering him to do so, and he
could veto the bill. Two-thirds votes of both houses would be
required to override the veto; the president plus one-third
plus one of either house would thus have control over not
just entire bills but each detail within them. That's a huge
increase in presidential power not just to affect the
composition and level of spending but to punish and reward.
The alternative, called expedited rescission authority,
would not upset the present balance of powers to the same
degree. It's the same system as now, except that Congress
couldn't ignore a rescission request but would have to vote
on it within a certain time. If it passed, the money wouldn't
be spent; if it failed, that would be the end of it. The
president's only new power would be to turn a spotlight on a
disputed item and force Congress to cast an explicit majority
vote to adopt it. That's fair enough, and all you need.
In purely fiscal terms, the line-item veto is more a symbol
than anything else. Presidents Reagan and Bush both suggested
they could reduce the deficit significantly if given the
power to cut the pork out of spending bills, and President
Clinton has asked for the power as well. But domestic
appropriations are only a sixth of the budget and already
under tight control; the pork in the budget amounts to much
less than the mythology surrounding federal spending would
suggest. Congress makes a huge mistake if on the basis of
mythology it disturbs the traditional balance of power
between the elected branches to the extent that this bill
would do.

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