[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 23 (Monday, February 6, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1236-H1257]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              {time}  1610
                           LINE-ITEM VETO ACT

  The Committee resumed its sitting.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania is to be commended for 
his attempt to protect that part of the bill that speaks to the 100 
entities, and I understand that that is a very small attempt to talk 
about fairness in a certain way. Certainly we need to do that.
  We need to say that if there is any tax legislation that will benefit 
as few as 100 entities, then something is wrong with that, because both 
you and I and others know far too well that we have had legislation in 
this Congress that benefited one or two persons, and certainly it is 
usually those who are well connected, the rich and the powerful who 
have influence with a particular elected official who are able to do 
that.
  And I am saying, yes, let us have that measure of protection, but let 
us go a little bit further. I think it is important for us to go a 
little bit further, because it has been documented time and time again 
that the top 1 percent in this society have a disproportionate share of 
the wealth. And as I cited in my opening remarks, the tax income of the 
families in the top 1 percent of income has increased from 7.3 percent 
of all U.S. earnings to 12.3 percent.
  I think we can in this legislation put a stop to that. We are simply 
saying if there is anything that is put together that allows that top 1 
percent to further benefit, if there is anything that is done that 
allows the top 10 percent to have over 50 percent of the tax breaks, 
then we need to give the President the opportunity to veto it, and this 
is no small matter.
  The gentleman from Pennsylvania identifies that this would in some 
way have too great an influence on tax policy. That is precisely what I 
wish it to do. I wish it to do that, because at some point in time we 
must send a signal to the American people that somebody is doing the 
business of the average working person in this Congress. The average 
working man or woman does not have a lobbyist here. They cannot be 
represented but by the people they elect to represent them.
  Sometimes we get a little bit too insulated, and oftentimes when we 
produce tax policy, as we did in 1981 during the Reagan years where we 
allowed the selling of tax credits and major corporations in America 
ended up paying no taxes, if I recall during that time, many of the top 
corporations, Fortune 500 corporations in America, ended up paying no 
taxes. General Motors ended up paying no taxes. They even got a tax 
rebate.
  At the same time, the taxes of the average working person have 
increased, and so I am saying we can take a big step as we give the 
line-item veto to the President of the United States and say:

       Mr. President, it looks fishy if what we have done allows 
     the top 10 percent to get over 50 percent of the tax breaks 
     in anything that we have done. So we want to make sure that 
     we protect against that.

  And we are going to allow this line-item veto to operate under those 
circumstances. I do not think it is too much to ask. I know we do not 
oftentimes think like that. We do not oftentimes think that we can take 
the broad strokes on behalf of just average working Americans, but I am 
saying with this line-item veto, which is rather novel, which is quite 
different, that it is big enough. It is creative enough to allow room 
for some more creativity.
  And I am simply saying that we can broaden the measure of protection 
and not just do a very small thing such as protect against 100 
entities, but we can protect the majority of Americans if we have the 
will to do so.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my amendment be adopted.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss].
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman for 
addressing this amendment, as well, on this subject. It is a subject we 
took up under the Slaughter amendment on these targeted tax credits, 
and how we do it.
  I do not agree with the amendment. I hope the fact they have the 
amendment indicates that perhaps the gentlewoman will support the line-
item veto legislation with or without the amendment.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, all things are 
possible.
  Mr. GOSS. That is good, We are making progress.
  Mr. Chairman, I think there are a couple of things that need to be 
clarified.
  The last time I heard about a change in the tax rate it seems to me 
there was a special top rate including a surtax of up to 39.6 percent 
for the people at the top end of the scale, and actually those cuts 
that I believe the gentlewoman was referring to back in 1981 for the 
rich were cuts for every American who were paying taxes.
  But I am glad that she has brought that up on Reagan's birthday, 
because I think the idea of trying to get spending under control and 
reduce taxation is something President Reagan stood for.
  With regard to the amendment itself particularly, I am a little 
concerned that we have a very vague definition here, ``income 
earners.'' Now, that would presumably excuse coupon clippers from this, 
or people from rents, royalties and other types of income, perhaps 
pensions, that are not earned income under that definition. I am not 
sure where stock options or other things like that would come in.
  Certainly when you start talking about large corporations under the 
definition that is being used in H.R. 2, I would point out that large 
corporations pay an awful lot of wages to blue collar workers who 
depend on those to keep food on the table and shelter over their head. 
So I think maybe it has been mischaracterized a little bit for what it 
would do, and I would, therefore, be opposed to it. But I am glad the 
gentlewoman has an interest in this subject.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. I 
would just simply close.
  I thought it was very important that we try and strike a blow for the 
people. I really do believe that we are at a time in our society when 
people are very unhappy with the way public policy is made, with 
elected officials in general.
  I have watched over the past 10 years or so as we have exported jobs 
of Americans to third world countries for cheap labor; I have watched 
wage earners be able to buy less with their dollars; I am watching 
young people with an inability to purchase their own home, to have a 
down payment, I am watching as the rich get richer basically, and the 
poor get poorer.
  I really do believe that somehow we have to use this forum to begin 
to engage each other in a debate about what are we going to do for the 
average wage earner. What are we going to do to represent their 
interest?
  I know that many people believe that we know best and that somehow 
whatever we do is all right. I do not think so anymore.

[[Page H1237]]

  I think there are a lot of bright people in this body. I think there 
are a lot of well-meaning people in this body. But however bright and 
well meaning we are, we have not done a good job for the average 
working person who is earning less and less, and able to purchase less 
and less, is extremely unhappy. They are unhappy with us because we 
have not been able to represent their interests.
  I would simply ask that we adopt this amendment. This amendment would 
send a signal that we in fact care about those who work every day, and 
that we are not here simply to do the bidding of those who were well 
connected, those who have already a disproportionate share of the 
income, and those who are very powerful.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds just to suggest 
to the gentlewoman that she is a very articulate and forceful and 
powerful advocate for the very people she is concerned about being 
affected by this.

                              {time}  1620

  I am very confident that it is unlikely that any such overreaching in 
terms of tax policy is going to occur which would warrant the President 
having this veto so long as the gentlewoman from California [Ms. 
Waters] is here to defend those interests, which she does so well.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, at a time when many people are decrying our 
Tax Code as too complicated, the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
from California would increase that complexity. How would the President 
determine if a tax credit provided half its benefit to 10 percent of 
the population? In order to accelerate the process, the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight shortened the length of time the 
President had to submit rescissions. Trying to determine who will reap 
what benefits will likely take longer than the deadline allows.
  Mr. Chairman, it is unclear what is meant in this amendment. Does it 
mean that half of the beneficiaries will be in the top 10-percent 
income bracket, or does it mean that half of all the revenues lost 
would be lost to the top 10 percent?
  In addition, the committee accepted an amendment offered by a 
Democrat which broadened the definition of targeted tax breaks to a 
hundred or fewer taxpayers. This House has already resoundingly turned 
back an attempt to alter that and should do likewise with this 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, let us give the President the strongest line-item veto 
possible, one that is narrowly and clearly defined and able to let the 
President get the job done. I ask that the House oppose the 
gentlewoman's amendment
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BLUTE. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman agree that, if we take any steps that 
would give 10 percent in our society 50 percent of the tax breaks, that 
something would be wrong with that, that that would not be fair? Would 
the gentleman agree?
  Mr. BLUTE. I am sorry; would the gentlewoman repeat that?
  Ms. WATERS. If we adopted any measures that would give 10 percent of 
our society 50 percent of the tax breaks, would the gentleman agree 
that that would be unequal and unfair?
  Mr. BLUTE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would only say, reclaiming my time 
from the gentlewoman, that implicit in that argument is that all income 
belongs to the Federal Government and that the Federal Government 
should decide how they will share it with each taxpayer. Tax cuts are 
not Government giveaways. It is simply less taking of people's 
earnings.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth] who has some general comments on the legislation 
we are considering this afternoon.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and 
extend my remarks and that my remarks appear during the general debate.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman 
from Idaho?
  There was no objection.
  Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the line-item 
veto.
  Mr. Chairman, I have heard as a major argument in support of the 
line-item veto, as suggested by former President Ronald Reagan, that we 
should, quote, give the President the same authority that 43 Governors 
use in their States, and whereas I adore Ronald Reagan and I believe he 
was an impetus to believe, have the people believe in America again, we 
must not confuse the powers given to the States with the powers given 
to the Federal Government by the Constitution. There is a distinct 
difference between the authority allowed for State governors and 
authority given to the President.
  The States, according to the 10th amendment, are given more leeway as 
they formulate their own laws. The 10th amendment says that the powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
their people, and therefore individual States may give their Governors 
line item veto authority, but we may not give the President that 
authority delegated only to the Congress because article I, section 1, 
states all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a 
House of Representatives, and this section specifically states that it 
is the Congress that has the power. Since Congress was given this power 
by the Constitution, Congress cannot give this power to the President 
to formulate legislation.
  This violates, this law, H.R. 2, violates the separation of powers. 
This bill gives to the President the ability to form and to shape 
legislation proffered by the Congress by allowing him to cut out parts 
of an appropriations or revenue bill for continued legislative 
consideration while allowing him to approve other parts of the passed 
legislation. The President has no role under article I, section 1, in 
legislating or shaping law.
  The Founding Fathers were correct in instilling the separation of 
powers, and they had reflected on and examined thousands of years of 
world history and have established the negative effect of when the 
ruling powers were allowed to thread upon one another's jurisdiction. 
It was Montesquieu's fundamental contention that men entrusted with 
powers to abuse it would abuse it, and hence it was desirable to divide 
the powers of government first in order to keep to a minimum the powers 
lodged in any one single organ of the government, and, second, in order 
to be able to oppose organ to organ.
  Federalist No. 76, which is stated in the Federalist Papers which the 
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] our Speaker, asked us to read, 
and I read, does state that, without the one separation or the other, 
the former would be unable to defend itself against the depredations of 
power of the latter, and he might gradually be stripped of his 
authorities by successive resolutions.
  I ask this body to be very cautions in this vote to make sure that we 
are not giving powers to the President that the Constitution 
specifically gives only to the Congress.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, just in closing I would urge a no vote on 
this amendment. I think that the amendment, while well intentioned, is 
really irrelevant to this bill. I think the question of the kind of 
outrageous attacks on a bill that might be passed here should clearly 
be thought out in subcommittee, and committee and on the floor of this 
House, but I think it is irrelevant to say that we should give the 
President this line item veto.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February 
3, 1995, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] will be postponed.
  Are there further amendments to the bill?
            [[Page H1238]] amendment offered by mr. clinger

  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Clinger: In section 3(a)(1), 
     strike ``unless'' and all that follows through the period and 
     insert the following: ``unless, during the period described 
     in subsection (b), there is enacted into law a rescission/
     receipts disapproval bill that disapproves the rescission of 
     that amount of budget authority.''.
       In section 4(l), insert ``, as introduced,'' after 
     ``which''.

  Mr. CLINGER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a technical amendment which simply cleans up 
two minor drafting changes omitted when the House adopted the amendment 
offered by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] earlier in this 
debate on this measure. The Thurman amendment permits 50 Members to 
move to strike an individual rescission or tax benefit repeal. This 
amendment corrects H.R. 2 to fully conform the bill to our acceptance 
of the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. 
Thurman]----
  The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would suspend, the chair must inquire 
whether this amendment was included in the order of February 3?
  Mr. CLINGER. Of the unanimous consent request of that evening?
  It was not included in that. I thought I would be permitted to offer 
a strictly technical amendment, I believe it has been approved by both 
sides. There will be no debate on it. I just wanted to offer it at this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to offer the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. An order of the House cannot be superseded by an order 
of the Committee of the Whole.
  The Committee of the Whole may not materially vary an order of the 
House.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. CLINGER. Would it be in order to offer this amendment when we sit 
in the House?
  The CHAIRMAN. In response to the gentleman's inquiry, only a order of 
the House can make this amendment in order, and once we are back in the 
House, the gentleman could inquire of the House whether to make it in 
order to be considered.
  Mr. CLINGER. At that point it would be appropriate to ask unanimous 
consent to have the House consider it in order?
                              {time}  1630

  The CHAIRMAN. For that, the Committee of the Whole would have to 
rise. Then the House would have to move back to the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of the amendment.
  Because the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Clinger] was not in order under the previous order of the House, the 
proceedings are vacated on that amendment.


                    amendment offered by mr. tauzin

  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that is in order.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Tauzin: Section 2 is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       (d) Special Rule.--Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the 
     case of fiscal years 1996 through 2002, the President may 
     only rescind any budget authority or veto any targeted tax 
     benefit under that subsection necessary to reduce the 
     projected deficit for the fiscal year to which that 
     rescission or veto pertains to the level set forth below:

                         Maximum deficit level

Fiscal year:                                     In billions of dollars
  1996.............................................................$174
  1997..............................................................155
  1998..............................................................116
  1999...............................................................71
  2000...............................................................59
  2001...............................................................26
  2002 and thereafter.................................................0

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House, the gentleman from 
Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the other day as we debated the issue of the line-item 
veto itself, I noticed to the Members of the House the likelihood of my 
offering this amendment in the Committee of the Whole. This amendment 
is called the glide path amendment and is offered in an attempt to make 
the line-item veto a more practicable, workable solution to a problem 
that plagues this Congress and has plagued Congresses in years past.
  The graph on my right, as I indicated earlier, is a confusion of 
metaphors, but nevertheless accomplishes the purposes intended. The 
graph at the right indicates the CBO estimates of where this Congress 
needs to be every time we have an appropriation for the next budget 
year if we are in fact to accomplish the purposes of the balanced 
budget amendment recently sent to the Senate, and if we are in fact to 
balance the budget by the year 2002.
  For example, in the next fiscal year, 1996, we are expected to have 
no more than about $174 billion in deficit if we are to be on the path 
that takes us to this balanced budget, as we have dedicated ourselves 
to when we adopted the balanced budget amendment.
  Each year thereafter, the deficit must be reduced pursuant to this 
graph if we are to reach that point by the year 2002.
  Now, if you saw recently in the news the President's announcement of 
his budget plans for the next 5 years, you will be astounded to find 
out that the President is proposing that we stay at $200 billion 
deficit for the next 5 years. His budget plans as outlined just 
yesterday indicate that for the the next fiscal year, 1996, he is 
proposing a $200 billion deficit. For the year 1997, he is proposing a 
$200 billion deficit. For the year 1998, approximately a $200 billion 
deficit. In fact, to use the analogy of this football field, he would 
have us stepping out of bounds a few of those years, running over 
cheerleaders and the bands and everything else on the sideline. We 
would simply never begin to get on this glide path to the line-item 
veto, and that is unfortunate.
  That means, of course, we here in Congress are going to have to do a 
better job than the President yesterday proposed if we are going to 
carry out the promise we made to the American people in a contract 
signed by many Members here to carry out the promise
  of a balanced budget amendment by the year 2002.Now, what the 
glidepath amendment to this bill does is it attempts to make the line-
item veto a very practicable tool to be used by this Congress, the 
Presidency, and the American people, in achieving these numbers.
  Now, why do I suggest it? I suggest it because in three out of the 
four States that have a line-item veto, those States provide that the 
line-item veto is used by the Governor to delete from the budget bill 
approved by the legislature any appropriations he deems necessary to 
reduce their budgets down to a balanced budget.
  The bill as it comes before us today is written very similarly. It 
says in effect that the President of the United States, when we adopt 
the line-item veto later today, would have the authority to strike from 
our budgets each year any appropriation he deems necessary in order to 
reduce the deficit.
  Now, here is the problem. Unlike the States that have that a line-
item veto, we cannot pass a balanced budget for next year. If you 
believe we can, please raise your hand. I do not see any hands. And if 
all the Members were here, I would probably not see many hands.
  The bottom line is we cannot find $200 billion of spending cuts in 
the next years's budget, and everybody knows it. The best we can do is 
get on this glidepath that takes us to a balanced budget by the year 
2002.
  So what authority ought we give the President during this 7 year 
period when Congress should be responsible enough to stay on this 
glidepath not to adopt budgets that give us $200 billion deficits each 
year. It seems to me the practicable way in which to use a line- 
 [[Page H1239]] item veto and to enforce responsibility in this 
Congress is to say that the Presidents should use that line-item veto 
authority to excise from the budget every expenditure that rises above 
this line in order to enforce responsibility in this Congress, to 
ensure that we stay on this glidepath, that we land safely in the year 
2002 with a balanced budget.
  Now, I understand that my friends on the Republican side are not 
going to accept this amendment, and I understand why. They want to 
think about it some more. They want to think whether or not this 
derogates from the contract provisions of a line-item veto, and I 
appreciate that, and for that reason I will not even ask for a recorded 
vote today.
  But I did want to bring it up. I think it is the most practicable way 
to make this thing work, to enforce responsibility in the House, to 
ensure that this House and the other body lives up to the promise of 
the balanced budget amendment and delivers each year a budget that 
meets the CBO estimates, that gets us to the balanced budget by the 
year 2002.
  The amendment also provides once we hit that balanced budget in the 
year 2002, that every year thereafter the President would have a line-
item veto, every year, to excise from the budget any expenditure that 
went above the balanced budget from the year 2002 thereafter. So unlike 
the sunset amendment that came earlier, that I think was an amendment 
to weaken this bill, this amendment actually strengthens it, and makes 
it in fact more workable.
  Now, I want to caution my friends in the Republican Party who have 
signed what I consider to be a pretty dog-gone good Contract With 
America, many of its provisions will find a great deal of support, as 
you did in the last few weeks, from Democrats in this body who have 
long fought for things like unfunded mandates, have long fought for a
 balanced budget amendment, long fought for property rights amendments 
and reform of some of the regulatory processes, long fought for 
lowering the taxes on businesses and workers in America, particularly 
the taxes that act as a disincentive to investment and job creation in 
our society. That is why so many of us have cosponsored so many of the 
features of the contract. We have in fact pursued those bills ourselves 
for many years.

  But I want to caution you. If we are going to pass into law, into a 
law that really works for the American people, the provisions of that 
contract, not just to vote on them today, pass them in the House and 
see them die in the Senate, not to just pass them even in the Senate 
and see them vetoed by the President, not even just to pass them and 
see them become law and then fail because we have not written them 
properly, my caution is let us do it right the first time. Make sure 
when we pass a line-item veto it really works for the purposes 
intended, that it works to discipline the Congress, to ensure that we 
follow the promises we made when we adopted the balanced budget 
amendment just a week or so ago, and that we do in fact get on a glide 
path that gets us down safely to a balanced budget by the year 2002.
  This amendment is an attempt to do that. It is offered in a very 
friendly fashion. I will vote for the line-item veto without this 
amendment.

                              {time}  1640

  I only hope that my friends on the other side who believe as I do, as 
strongly as I do, in the line-item veto, in fact, as they saw just 
recently, I even voted against exempting highway funding from the line-
item veto. If they believe as strongly as I do in it, then work to see 
possibly in the process that an amendment like this gets considered, 
perhaps in the conference between the House and the Senate, perhaps 
somewhere along the way, that when we get through we have an amendment, 
a line-item veto probably that really works for the good that we 
intended it for, that it works to discipline this body toward a 
balanced budget by the year 2002 and does not unnecessarily, 
unnecessarily reshape the balance of powers so critical in our 
Constitution.
  Let me make that final point. This grant of a line-item veto 
authority, as the States have given their Governors, as we are about to 
give it to the Presidency, is an extraordinary grant. It says to the 
President, you have more authority, rather than just veto an entire 
bill to take on the entire Congress on a bill, it gives the authority 
to the President to take on every single Member of the House and Senate 
and every line they write in every bill that appropriates money in this 
Nation. And it requires two-thirds of the body to overrule him. That is 
a pretty strong grant of authority, pretty extraordinary.
  I think we can constitutionally do that. But I think we ought to 
limit it to the cases where the Congress has failed to meet its 
responsibility, failed to live up to its obligation to balance our 
accounts, failed to stay, if Members will, on this glide path that gets 
us to a balanced budget and eventually stays in a balanced budget 
posture after the year 2002.
  If we grant this extraordinary authority for that purpose and that 
purpose alone, I think we will have written a good bill today. If we 
create a new authority in the President that has nothing to do with 
congressional responsibility, which allows the President to take on any 
Member of this House and Senate regardless of whether this body has 
been responsible, then perhaps we are going too far and we ought to 
think about that before we finally adopt this bill. Mr. Chairman, I 
reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] is 
recognized for 15 minutes.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss].
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for 
yielding time to me.
  I, too, rise in opposition, but very reluctantly. My good friend, the 
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] I think has explained his 
glidepath on a football field very well. First, that glidepath is so 
steep it pops my ears every time I think of going down it. Then when I 
get to the bottom of it, I see there is not a landing field. I think 
there is probably a brick wall there. And I do jest a bit.
  I want to let the gentleman know, we have given this a lot of 
thought. It is an intriguing idea. It gets away, though, from what we 
are trying to do.
  Basically what the gentleman is saying, that the President loses his 
line-item veto if we happen to hit our reduction targets year by year. 
That seems like a very intriguing proposition. The problem is those 
sort of moving targets. I am not sure exactly who is going to set them.
  I have got a list here, CBO. CBO is always very good and without any, 
usually, challenge to their targets. That causes me some concern that 
somebody might challenge them. Those are the kind of pragmatics I have 
and am a little bit concerned about.
  I guess there are some other points, too, that are more generic. What 
we are trying to do here is get a handle on wasteful spending. And the 
reason we are trying to do that is for two purposes. It is to get rid 
of wasteful spending, spending that is unnecessary, redundant, off 
target, not necessary, out-of-date programs, all of those things. And 
we should encourage the President to do that any time. That should not 
just be relative to the deficit. That is something we should never do. 
We should always give some kind of encouragement.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  While I agree that that is a good idea, that is not what the bill 
does. The bill refers only to deficit-reduction line-item veto 
authority.
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I recognize that. That 
was just an aside. The purpose is the deficit reduction and the problem 
with that is, I am afraid that if we ever did, let us hope we do 
someday get to zero, even in 2002, would that not be wonderful? You 
would be interested to know that my text reads 20002 through a typo. I 
am not even sure that is good enough.
  But I wanted to point out that this is a little bit like the lion 
tamer going into the cage with the lions. Those lions are going to do 
the right thing as 
 [[Page H1240]] long as they know that fellow has got the whip. But the 
minute that tamer puts the whip down, the lion gets a slightly 
different perspective of what his capabilities are relative to the 
fellow who used to have the whip. And I think that is a very important 
point as we go through this process.
  I want to make sure that we keep this whip out there. If we ever do 
get the lion tamed, I want to make sure this lion is never going to get 
in a position where it can get out of the cage or eat the trainer 
again.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume 
to respond.
  Mr. Chairman, I hate to think that we have just confused a metaphor 
with the circus analogy.
  But the point of the matter is that the bill as we have it before us 
today is very much like the bills that came before I think 33 of the 43 
legislatures that have a line-item veto authority. It says in effect 
that the President is going to have this authority to reduce deficit 
spending. That is what this is all about.
  Hopefully we will use it to get rid of wasteful, incorrect spending, 
but the purpose is to reduce the deficit. And my point in this 
amendment, and I hope the gentlemen on the other side will continue to 
consider it as we go through this process, is that if the Congress of 
the United States cannot deliver a balanced budget next year, the 
question ought to be what can be deliver, what ought we deliver? And 
the answer is, we ought to stay on that glidepath. If we do not stay on 
that glidepath, as steep as it looks to my friend, as dangerous as it 
seems, as risky as it may appear, we will never reach the balanced 
budget by the year 2002. We simply have to get on that glidepath, and 
we have to stay on it.
  It seems to me that if we use the line-item veto properly, as other 
States do, to insist that the Congress stay on that glidepath, that 
that will be the most important thing we do to make the line-item veto 
work and to make the balanced budget of the Constitution work, if 
indeed the Senate approves that amendment that we have sent over just 
last week.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly to oppose the amendment 
by my good friend from Louisiana. I believe he has the best intentions 
and is someone who in this House has proven time and time again that he 
is dedicated to reducing our great deficit, to getting the debt 
lowered, and to establishing a balanced budget here in the U.S. 
Government.
  I oppose it because I think it does muddy the procedures that are 
clearly spelled out in this bill. The gentleman's amendment is more 
like a Gramm-Rudman approach that brings an automatic sequestration 
trigger if the budget goes over the CBO time line, but I believe that 
the line-item veto is more important than that and should go beyond 
that. It is a means of bringing the President into the appropriations 
process, as the Founders envisioned, and also as we have added to this 
bill and to the tax benefit issues that may come up in a particular 
bill.
  Whether they are above or below the CBO glidepath or not, it is my 
understanding the Governors in the States that we heard testimony from 
use the line-item veto not just to balance the budget, although that is 
a very important tool to be able to do that, but also
 to go after the type of spending that cannot be justified.

  I just want to use an example, once again, from the State of 
Massachusetts. We had Governor Weld testify about using his line-item 
veto to discipline a deal between the judiciary and the legislative 
appropriators that was not proper, that attempted to set their budgets 
high in exchange for the judiciary saying, using those dollars to hire 
appropriators' political cronies in the court system.
  Those dollars were not dollars that put the budget out of balance, 
but they were improperly spent according to the Governor. The Governor 
was able to use his line-item veto to discipline that process. I think 
the gentleman's amendment is well-intentioned, but I would oppose it on 
those grounds.

                              {time}  1650

  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, just in quick answer to my friend, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], no, the amendment does not act as Gramm-
Rudman did to set caps and have automatic rescissions. It simply says 
that the authority of the President to line item any item of the 
appropriations would occur when the Congress appropriated funds in 
excess of the glidepath numbers set by CBO to take us to that balanced 
budget amendment.
  If, for example, this Congress this year approved the budget that 
President Clinton just submitted yesterday, we would be approving a 
$200 billion deficit for the next fiscal year. Under the glidepath 
amendment I suggested, the President would have the authority to line 
item 26 billion dollars' worth of appropriations out of that bill. He 
certainly could look for all the wasteful spending in $26 billion.
  If we approved his budget for the next 5 years, in each one of those 
successive years his line item authority would be $45 billion in 1997, 
$84 billion in 1998, $129 billion in 1999, and $141 billion in the year 
2000. I want Members to think for a second about what authority and how 
that authority might be used when the President had the authority to 
line item 141 billion dollars' worth of appropriations out of this 
Congress.
  This amendment I am offering, Mr. Chairman, is by no means a 
weakening amendment. This amendment is meant to strengthen, in fact, 
the application, the practicalities of this bill, and to make it work.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to think about this. It may be, by the 
time the Senate gets through with this bill and we get to a conference, 
this may be just the tool to make it work, to get enough of the Members 
of the other body to accept it, and to get a bill on the statute books, 
not just past this House, that really works.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, to close, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume, to say to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin], I 
think this is a very thoughtful and helpful addition to the debate we 
are having on this matter.
  I do think it goes to far. Frankly, there are implications of the 
amendment that I do not fully understand at this point. I think there 
may well be, as we proceed to further consider this matter and move to 
the Senate and so forth, it may well be that something in this nature 
can be done.
  I do think, however, that at the moment it does seem to strike me 
more as a sort of Gramm-Rudman rescission. The gentleman says it is not 
the same, but it seems to me there are implications of that.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yield to me.
  Mr. Chairman, a previous speaker rose to question whether or not we 
can constitutionally pass this line-item veto. I think that argument 
needs to be answered. I would like to try to answer it just for a 
second.
  This Congress could, if we wanted to, instead of appropriating in 13 
appropriation bills or 11 or 3 or 1, we could appropriate in hundreds 
of appropriation bills. We could appropriate every single appropriation 
in a single bill, if we wanted to.
  Clearly, under the Constitution, the President would then have the 
right to veto that appropriation, and we would have a two-thirds 
obligation to override that veto. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we could if we 
wanted to create a line-item veto authority through that mechanism.
  If we can create it that way, my argument to the gentlewoman from 
California, who argued against the constitutionality of what we are 
trying to do today, is that if we could create it that way, we can most 
certainly, under the Constitution, create it the way we are trying to 
create it today.
  I want, last of all, to commend my friend, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger], for the excellent job he did in this bill. 
I will join him in support of the bill.
  [[Page H1241]] I only ask that before we get through with this 
process, that some of the arguments I have made today, the suggestions 
I have made today, be considered in this process, because I want this 
bill eventually to be signed into law and I want it, most of all, to 
work.
  I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. CLINGER. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I share the 
gentleman's desire to get a bill that is ultimately going to be passed 
into law and signed by the President. We appreciate the contributions 
the gentleman from Louisiana has made to all of these budget-cutting, 
deficit-reducing efforts.
  I can certainly commit, from my point of view, to work with the 
gentleman to achieve the goals that are common to both of us. However, 
I would now have to urge a no vote on this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
  The amendment was rejected.


                   amendment offered by mr. traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: At the end, add the 
     following new section:

     SEC. 7. TERMINATION DATE.

       This Act shall cease to be effective on January 1, 1997.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House, the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member 
opposed will be recognized for 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio, who is 
chairing this debate, and I want to commend him, my good friend, for 
the fine job he has done in dispatching the duties of the Chair in 
keeping this debate in order. I think he has done a fine job.
  Mr. Chairman, my amendment says that this line-item veto authority, 
if passed, would sunset in 2 years. Actually, I would like this to 
sunset in 2 weeks. I would not even like to see the Sun shine on the 
line-item veto.
  However, I would just like to say this, Mr. Chairman. I want to warn 
the Congress of the United States, who continues to transfer power from 
the Congress, which is that of the people, to the Presidency, I do not 
want to see President Bill Clinton have a line-item veto.
  It is nothing against President Clinton. I do not want to see any 
President, Democrat or Republican, or Independent, I might add, which I 
see coming down the pike in the future, a third party that I predict 
will in fact surface and ultimately elect a President in our country, 
because of the tremendous problem that we continue to agitate with 
legislation that does not in fact deal with the problems.
  However, Mr. Chairman, in this warning, I would like to say that 
while we make the Presidency much stronger and weaken the government of 
the people, keep in mind that powerful groups out there just have to 
concentrate on electing one political figure in America, the President,
  The way Congress is going, that is where the emphasis will be: Get 
that President, keep that President, control the power, and then get 35 
Senators in lockstep, and be damned with the rest. That is about the 
new constitutional construct of the people's Congress.
  I have heard of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I think 
we are going further and further toward a House of Lords in America, 
where few people really govern. In fact, today few people really 
govern. What we say here today, Mr. Chairman, may not make great shock 
waves in the Congressional Record for the future, but I think there is 
a lot of common sense in that, Mr. Chairman.
  Therefore, I say again, be careful, Congress. If we are just sending 
to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue more and more power, the real powerful 
interest in America do know that, do recognize it, and they are 
concentrating their efforts to elect that one person.
  Mr. Chairman, I would also like to say, as the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Stenholm] readies his notes and some other machination of a line-
item veto authority, which I hate to admit this, I will have to oppose, 
I would say to the gentleman from Texas, because I oppose not just the 
line-item veto, I oppose what it stands for. It stands for the 
transferring of power from the people in the Congress to 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue. That is a cancer, I believe, that should be 
stopped.
  However, what do I know? I am still trying to figure out my taxes. I 
will say this, tough, before I close, trying to take up a couple more 
minutes in a little bit of filibuster for the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Stenholm], because I love him dearly, and I am sure I am going to 
support one of these good initiatives if I should see the light.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say happy birthday to former President Ronald 
Reagan. I want to say that much of the machinations going on with the 
majority party now are directly attributable to Ronald Reagan. I did 
not oppose a lot of his trickle-down programs. In 1986 he threw a lot 
of it out.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say this about Ronald Reagan on his birthday, 
as a Democrat that did not totally agree with some of those policies: 
Never was there a President that was so well respected around the 
world. When Reagan said he was going to do something, by God, he did 
it. I hoped to God that the old Gipper would have taken on trade, 
because he was just the person to make it happen for us.
  So I want to say here, here, President Reagan, Nancy, the best to 
you.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRIFICANT. I yield to my good friend, the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I was going to rise to congratulate the gentleman on 
his wishing Ronald Reagan a happy 84th birthday, because he was in my 
opinion, a great, great President. He had vision and he focused us on 
that vision. It is too bad that he could not accomplish all the things 
he wanted to do.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out to the gentleman that today is 
Ronald Reagan's birthday and we want to pass this line-item veto as a 
birthday present, for not only him but for the American people.

                              {time}  1700

  But, we were also going to hold a special order, which means that a 
few of us were going to get up and talk about Ronald Reagan and what we 
think about him. But because there is a dinner in his honor tonight. If 
and when we finish this bill, some of us are going to that dinner, so 
we are going to postpone that special order tonight. But tomorrow night 
we will be holding that special order in honor of the great President 
Ronald Reagan, and I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this time.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I did not vote on some of those issues with former 
President Reagan, but I have great admiration for former President 
Reagan and I do mean this. He was assertive, and when Ronald Reagan 
said he was going to do something, by God, he did it, and the world 
respected him and I totally respect him.
  To in fact further an opportunity for the majority party to have that 
meeting tonight and to honor President Reagan on his 84th birthday, and 
not to belabor the debate longer so that Members can have a vote, I 
want to say to make everybody happy over there, I would like to see 
this thing sunset in about 2 weeks, maybe not let sunshine in at all.
  But I am going to withdraw my amendment. Happy birthday, former 
President Ronald Reagan.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my great amendment that 
should have been passed without prejudice be withdrawn. Knowing that I 
do no have the votes and do want to honor President Reagan and let the 
Members get out in time, I ask unanimous consent that my great 
amendment be withdrawn.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to 
object, I wanted the opportunity to vote 
 [[Page H1242]] on this amendment because I agree with the gentleman, 
this thing ought not to see the light of day. I wanted to amend it 
maybe to reduce it to 2 days instead of 2 weeks.
  Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of 
objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is withdrawn.


    amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. stenholm

  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     Stenholm:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Line Item Veto Act''.

                        TITLE I--LINE ITEM VETO

     SEC. 101. LINE ITEM VETO AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the provisions of part B 
     of title X of The Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
     Control Act of 1974, and subject to the provisions of this 
     section, the President may rescind all or part of the dollar 
     amount of any discretionary budget authority specified in an 
     appropriation Act or an accompanying committee report or 
     joint explanatory statement accompanying a conference report 
     on that Act or veto any targeted tax benefit which is subject 
     to the terms of this Act if the President--
       (1) determines that--
       (A) such rescission or veto would help reduce the Federal 
     budget deficit;
       (B) such rescission or veto will not impair any essential 
     Government functions; and
       (C) such rescission or veto will not harm the national 
     interest; and
       (2) notifies the Congress of such rescission or veto by a 
     special message not later than ten calendar days (not 
     including Sundays) after the date of enactment of an 
     appropriation Act providing such budget authority or a 
     revenue or reconciliation Act containing a targeted tax 
     benefit.
       (b) Deficit Reduction.--In each special message, the 
     President may also propose to reduce the appropriate 
     discretionary spending limit set forth in section 601(a)(2) 
     of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by an amount that 
     does not exceed the total amount of discretionary budget 
     authority rescinded by that message.
       (c) Separate Messages.--The President shall submit a 
     separate special message for each appropriation Act and for 
     each revenue or reconciliation Act under this paragraph.
       (d) Special Rule.--For any rescission of budget authority, 
     the President may either submit a special message under this 
     section or under section 1012 of the Impoundment Control Act 
     of 1974. Funds proposed to be rescinded under this section 
     may not be proposed to be rescinded under section 1012 of 
     that Act.

     SEC. 102. LINE ITEM VETO EFFECTIVE UNLESS DISAPPROVED.

       (a)(1) Any amount of budget authority rescinded under 
     section 101 as set forth in a special message by the 
     President shall be deemed canceled unless, during the period 
     described in subsection (b), a rescission/receipts 
     disapproval bill making available all of the amount rescinded 
     is enacted into law.
       (2) Any provision of law vetoed under section 101 as set 
     forth in a special message by the President shall be deemed 
     repealed unless, during the period described in subsection 
     (b), a rescission/receipts disapproval bill restoring that 
     provision is enacted into law.
       (b) The period referred to in subsection (a) is--
       (1) a congressional review period of twenty calendar days 
     of session, beginning on the first calendar day of session 
     after the date of submission of the special message, during 
     which Congress must complete action on the rescission/
     receipts disapproval bill and present such bill to the 
     President for approval or disapproval;
       (2) after the period provided in paragraph (1), an 
     additional ten days (not including Sundays) during which the 
     President may exercise his authority to sign or veto the 
     rescission/receipts disapproval bill; and
       (3) if the President vetoes the rescission/receipts 
     disapproval bill during the period provided in paragraph (2), 
     an additional five calendar days of session after the date of 
     the veto.
       (c) If a special message is transmitted by the President 
     under section 101 and the last session of the Congress 
     adjourns sine die before the expiration of the period 
     described in subsection (b), the rescission or veto, as the 
     case may be, shall not take effect. The message shall be 
     deemed to have been retransmitted on the first Monday in 
     February of the succeeding Congress and the review period 
     referred to in subsection (b) (with respect to such message) 
     shall run beginning after such first day.

     SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this title:
       (1) The term ``rescission/receipts disapproval bill'' means 
     a bill or joint resolution which only disapproves, in whole, 
     rescissions of discretionary budget authority or only 
     disapproves vetoes of targeted tax benefits in a special 
     message transmitted by the President under this Act and--
       (A) which does not have a preamble;
       (B)(i) in the case of a special message regarding 
     rescissions, the matter after the enacting clause of which is 
     as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each rescission of 
     discretionary budget authority of the President as submitted 
     by the President in a special message on      '', the blank 
     space being filled in with the appropriate date and the 
     public law to which the message relates; and
       (ii) in the case of a special message regarding vetoes of 
     targeted tax benefits, the matter after the enacting clause 
     of which is as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each veto 
     of targeted tax benefits of the President as submitted by the 
     President in a special message on      '', the blank space 
     being filled in with the appropriate date and the public law 
     to which the message relates; and
       (C) the title of which is as follows: ``A bill disapproving 
     the recommendations submitted by the President on      '', 
     the blank space being filled in with the date of submission 
     of the relevant special message and the public law to which 
     the message relates.
       (2) The term ``calendar days of session'' shall mean only 
     those days on which both Houses of Congress are in session.
       (3) The term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision 
     of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the 
     President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit, 
     exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer 
     beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust, 
     or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same 
     parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single 
     beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited 
     partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated 
     corporate entities.
       (4) The term ``appropriation Act'' means any general or 
     special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution 
     making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing 
     appropriations.

     SEC. 104. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF LINE ITEM VETOES.

       (a) Presidential Special Message.--Whenever the President 
     rescinds any budget authority as provided in section 101 or 
     vetoes any provision of law as provided in 101, the President 
     shall transmit to both Houses of Congress a special message 
     specifying--
       (1) the amount of budget authority rescinded or the 
     provision vetoed;
       (2) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such budget authority is available for 
     obligation, and the specific project or governmental 
     functions involved;
       (3) the reasons and justifications for the determination to 
     rescind budget authority or veto any provisions pursuant to 
     section 101;
       (4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of the rescission or 
     veto; and
       (5) all actions, circumstances, and considerations relating 
     to or bearing upon the rescission or veto and the decision to 
     effect the rescission or veto, and to the maximum extent 
     practicable, the estimated effect of the rescission upon the 
     objects, purposes, and programs for which the budget 
     authority is provided.
       (b) Transmission of Messages to House and Senate.--
       (1) Each special message transmitted under section 101 
     shall be transmitted to the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate on the same day, and shall be delivered to the Clerk 
     of the House of Representatives if the House is not in 
     session, and to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is 
     not in session. Each special message so transmitted shall be 
     referred to the appropriate committees of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate. Each such message shall be 
     printed as a document of each House.
       (2) Any special message transmitted under section 101 shall 
     be printed in the first issue of the Federal Register 
     published after such transmittal.
       (c) Introduction of Rescission/Receipts Disapproval 
     Bills.--The procedures set forth in subsection (d) shall 
     apply to any rescission/receipts disapproval bill introduced 
     in the House of Representatives not later than the third 
     calendar day of session beginning on the day after the date 
     of submission of a special message by the President under 
     section 101.
       (d) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--(1) The 
     committee of the House of Representatives to which a 
     rescission/receipts disapproval bill is referred shall report 
     it without amendment, and with or without recommendation, not 
     later than the eighth calendar day of session after the date 
     of its introduction. If the committee fails to report the 
     bill within that period, it is in order to move that the 
     House discharge the committee from further consideration of 
     the bill. A motion to discharge may be made only by an 
     individual favoring the bill (but only after the legislative 
     day on which a Member announces to the House the Member's 
     intention to do so). The motion is highly privileged. Debate 
     thereon shall be limited to not more than one hour, the time 
     to be divided in the House equally between a proponent and an 
     opponent. The previous question shall be considered as 
     ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening 
     motion. A motion to reconsider the vote 
      [[Page H1243]] by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed 
     to shall not be in order.
       (2) After a rescission/receipts disapproval bill is 
     reported or the committee has been discharged from further 
     consideration, it is in order to move that the House resolve 
     into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
     Union for consideration of the bill. All points of order 
     against the bill and against consideration of the bill are 
     waived. The motion is highly privileged. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on that motion to its 
     adoption without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider 
     the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to 
     shall not be in order. During consideration of the bill in 
     the Committee of the Whole, the first reading of the bill 
     shall be dispensed with. General debate shall proceed without 
     intervening motion, shall be confined to the bill, and shall 
     not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by a 
     proponent and an opponent of the bill. No amendment to the 
     bill is in order, except any Member may move to strike the 
     disapproval of any rescission or rescissions of budget 
     authority or any proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit, 
     as applicable, if supported by 49 other Members. At the 
     conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, 
     the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House. 
     The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     bill and amendments thereto to final passage without 
     intervening motion.
       (3) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the 
     application of the rules of the House of Representatives to 
     the procedure relating to a bill described in subsection (a) 
     shall be decided without debate.
       (4) It shall not be in order to consider more than one bill 
     described in subsection (c) or more than one motion to 
     discharge described in paragraph (1) with respect to a 
     particular special message.
       (5) Consideration of any rescission/receipts disapproval 
     bill under this subsection is governed by the rules of the 
     House of Representatives except to the extent specifically 
     provided by the provisions of this title.
       (e) Consideration in the Senate.--
       (1) Any rescission/receipts disapproval bill received in 
     the Senate from the House shall be considered in the Senate 
     pursuant to the provisions of this title.
       (2) Debate in the Senate on any rescission/receipts 
     disapproval bill and debatable motions and appeals in 
     connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten 
     hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and 
     controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or 
     their designees.
       (3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motions or appeal 
     in connection with such bill shall be limited to one hour, to 
     be equally divided between, and controlled by the mover and 
     the manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager 
     of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the 
     time is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in 
     opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader 
     or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from 
     the time under their control on the passage of the bill, 
     allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration 
     of any debatable motion or appeal.
       (4) A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. A 
     motion to recommit (except a motion to recommit with 
     instructions to report back within a specified number of days 
     not to exceed one, not counting any day on which the Senate 
     is not in session) is not in order.
       (f) Points of Order.--
       (1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any 
     rescission/receipts disapproval bill that relates to any 
     matter other than the rescission of budget authority or veto 
     of the provision of law transmitted by the President under 
     section 101.
       (2) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any 
     amendment to a rescission/receipts disapproval bill.
       (3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) may be waived or suspended in 
     the Senate only by a vote of three-fifths of the members duly 
     chosen and sworn.

     SEC. 105. REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.

       Beginning on January 6, 1996, and at one-year intervals 
     thereafter, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to 
     each House of Congress which provides the following 
     information:
       (1) A list of each proposed Presidential rescission of 
     discretionary budget authority and veto of a targeted tax 
     benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal 
     year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with 
     their dollar value, and an indication of whether each 
     rescission of discretionary budget authority or veto of a 
     targeted tax benefit was accepted or rejected by Congress.
       (2) The total number of proposed Presidential rescissions 
     of discretionary budget authority and vetoes of a targeted 
     tax benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal 
     year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with 
     their total dollar value.
       (3) The total number of Presidential rescissions of 
     discretionary budget authority or vetoes of a targeted tax 
     benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal 
     year ending during the preceding calendar year and approved 
     by Congress, together with their total dollar value.
       (4) A list of rescissions of discretionary budget authority 
     initiated by Congress for the fiscal year ending during the 
     preceding calendar year, together with their dollar value, 
     and an indication of whether each such rescission was 
     accepted or rejected by Congress.
       (5) The total number of rescissions of discretionary budget 
     authority initiated and accepted by Congress for the fiscal 
     year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with 
     their total dollar value.
       (6) A summary of the information provided by paragraphs 
     (2), (3) and (5) for each of the ten fiscal years ending 
     before the fiscal year during this calendar year.

     SEC. 106. JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) Expedited Review.--
       (1) Any Member of Congress may bring an action, in the 
     United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
     for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground 
     that any provision of this title violates the Constitution.
       (2) A copy of any complaint in an action brought under 
     paragraph (1) shall be promptly delivered to the Secretary of 
     the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and 
     each House of Congress shall have the right to intervene in 
     such action.
       (3) Any action brought under paragraph (1) shall be heard 
     and determined by a three-judge court in accordance with 
     section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.

     Nothing in this section or in any other law shall infringe 
     upon the right of the House of Representatives to intervene 
     in an action brought under paragraph (1) without the 
     necessity of adopting a resolution to authorize such 
     intervention.
       (b) Appeal to Supreme Court.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, any order of the United States District 
     Court for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant 
     to an action brought under paragraph (1) of subsection (a) 
     shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court 
     of the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a 
     notice of appeal filed within 10 days after such order is 
     entered; and the jurisdictional statement shall be filed 
     within 30 days after such order is entered. No stay of an 
     order issued pursuant to an action brought under paragraph 
     (1) of subsection (a) shall be issued by a single Justice of 
     the Supreme Court.
       (c) Expedited Consideration.--It shall be the duty of the 
     District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme 
     Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to 
     expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of 
     any matter brought under subsection (a).
TITLE II--EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED RESCISSIONS AND TARGETED 
                              TAX BENEFITS

     SEC. 201. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED 
                   RESCISSIONS AND TARGETED TAX BENEFITS.

       (a) In General.--Section 1012 of the Congressional Budget 
     and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 683) is amended 
     to read as follows:


       ``expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions

       ``Sec. 1012. (a) Proposed Rescission of Budget Authority or 
     Repeal of Targeted Tax Benefits.--The President may propose, 
     at the time and in the manner provided in subsection (b), the 
     rescission of any budget authority provided in an 
     appropriation Act of repeal of any targeted tax benefit 
     provided in any revenue Act. If the President proposes a 
     rescission of budget authority, he may also propose to reduce 
     the appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in 
     section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by 
     an amount that does not exceed the amount of the proposed 
     rescission. Funds made available for obligation under this 
     procedure may not be proposed for rescission again under this 
     section.
       ``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
       ``(1) The President may transmit to Congress a special 
     message proposing to rescind amounts of budget authority or 
     to repeal any targeted tax benefit and include with that 
     special message a draft bill that, if enacted, would only 
     rescind that budget authority or repeal that targeted tax 
     benefit unless the President also proposes a reduction in the 
     appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in section 
     601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. That bill 
     shall clearly identify the amount of budget authority that is 
     proposed to be rescinded for each program, project, or 
     activity to which that budget authority relates to the 
     targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed, as the case may 
     be. A targeted tax benefit may only be proposed to be 
     repealed under this section during the 10-legislative-day 
     period commencing on the day after the date of enactment of 
     the provision proposed to be repealed.
       ``(2) In the case of an appropriation Act that includes 
     accounts within the jurisdiction of more than one 
     subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the 
     President in proposing to rescind budget authority under this 
     section shall send a separate special message and 
     accompanying draft bill for accounts within the jurisdiction 
     of each each subcommittee.
       ``(3) Each special message shall specify, with respect to 
     the budget authority proposed to be rescinded, the 
     following--
       ``(A) the amount of budget authority which he proposes to 
     be rescinded;
       ``(B) any account, department, or establishment of the 
     Government to which such budget authority is available for 
     obligation, 
      [[Page H1244]] and the specific project or governmental 
     functions involved;
       ``(C) the reasons why the budget authority should be 
     rescinded;
       ``(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated 
     fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect 
     on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed 
     rescission;
       ``(E) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating 
     to or bearing upon the proposed rescission and the decision 
     to effect the proposed rescission, and to the maximum extent 
     practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed rescission 
     upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which the budget 
     authority is provided.

     Each special message shall specify, with respect to the 
     proposed repeal of targeted tax benefits, the information 
     required by subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), as it relates to 
     the proposed repeal; and
       ``(F) a reduction in the appropriate discretionary spending 
     limit set forth in section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional 
     Budget Act of 1974, if proposed by the President.
       (4) For any rescission of budget authority, the President 
     may either submit a special message under this section or 
     under section 101 of the Line Item Veto Act. Funds proposed 
     to be rescinded under this section may not be proposed to be 
     rescinded under section 101 of that Act.
       ``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
       ``(1)(A) Before the close of the second legislative day of 
     the House of Representatives after the date of receipt of a 
     special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b), 
     the majority leader or minority leader of the House of 
     Representatives shall introduce (by request) the draft bill 
     accompanying that special message. If the bill is not 
     introduced as provided in the preceding sentence, then, on 
     the third legislative day of the House of Representatives 
     after the date of receipt of that special message, any Member 
     of that House may introduce the bill.
       ``(B) The bill shall be referred to the Committee on 
     Appropriations or the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
     House of Representatives, as applicable. The committee shall 
     report the bill without substantive revision and with or 
     without recommendation. The bill shall be reported not later 
     than the seventh legislative day of that House after the date 
     of receipt of that special message. If that committee fails 
     to report the bill within that period, that committee shall 
     be automatically discharged from consideration of the bill, 
     and the bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
       ``(C) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member 
     of the House of Representatives may move to strike any 
     proposed rescission or rescissions of budget authority or any 
     proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if 
     supported by 49 other Members.
       ``(D) A vote on final passage of the bill shall be taken in 
     the House of Representatives on or before the close of the 
     10th legislative day of that House after the date of the 
     introduction of the bill in that House. If the bill is 
     passed, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause 
     the bill to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the 
     Senate within one calendar day of the day on which the bill 
     is passed.
       ``(2)(A) A motion in the House of Representatives to 
     proceed to the consideration of a bill under this section 
     shall be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to 
     the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to 
     move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to 
     or disagreed to.
       ``(B) Debate in the House of Representatives on a bill 
     under this section shall not exceed 4 hours, which shall be 
     divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the 
     bill. A motion further to limit debate shall not be 
     debatable. It shall not be in order to move to recommit a 
     bill under this section or to move to reconsider the vote by 
     which the bill is agreed to or disagreed to.
       ``(C) Appeals from decisions of the Chair relating to the 
     application of the Rules of the House of Representatives to 
     the procedure relating to a bill under this section shall be 
     decided without debate.
       ``(D) Except to the extent specifically provided in the 
     preceding provisions of this subsection, consideration of a 
     bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the 
     House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the 
     House of Representatives to consider any rescission bill 
     introduced pursuant to the provisions of this section under a 
     suspension of the rules or under a special rule.
       ``(3)(A) A bill transmitted to the Senate pursuant to 
     paragraph (1)(D) shall be referred to its Committee on 
     Appropriations or Committee on Finance, as applicable. That 
     committee shall report the bill without substantive revision 
     and with or without recommendation. The bill shall be 
     reported not later than the seventh legislative day of the 
     Senate after it receives the bill. A committee failing to 
     report the bill within such period shall be automatically 
     discharged from consideration of the bill, and the bill shall 
     be placed upon the appropriate calendar.
       ``(B) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member 
     of the Senate may move to strike any proposed rescission or 
     rescissions of budget authority or any proposed repeal of a 
     targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 14 other 
     Members.
       ``(4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the 
     consideration of a bill under this section shall be 
     privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion 
     shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to 
     reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
     disagreed to.
       ``(B) Debate in the Senate on a bill under this section, 
     and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith 
     (including debate pursuant to subparagraph (C)), shall not 
     exceed 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided between, 
     and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority 
     leader or their designees.
       ``(C) Debate in the Senate or any debatable motion or 
     appeal in connection with a bill under this section shall be 
     limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided 
     between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the 
     bill, except that in the event the manager of the bill is in 
     favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition 
     thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his 
     designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time 
     under their control of the passage of a bill, allot 
     additional time to any Senator during the consideration of 
     any debatable motion or appeal.
       ``(D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a 
     bill under this section is not debatable. A motion to 
     recommit a bill under this section is not in order.
       ``(d) Amendment and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as 
     otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill 
     considered under this section shall be in order in either the 
     House of Representatives or the Senate. It shall not be in 
     order to demand a division of the question in the House of 
     Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole) or in the 
     Senate. No motion to suspend the application of this 
     subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be 
     in order in either House to suspend the application of this 
     subsection by unanimous consent.
       ``(e) Requirement to Make Available for Obligation.--(1) 
     Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded in a 
     special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b) 
     shall be made available for obligation on the day after the 
     date on which either House rejects the bill transmitted with 
     that special message.
       ``(2) Any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed 
     under this section as set forth in a special message 
     transmitted by the President shall not be deemed repealed 
     unless the bill transmitted with that special message is 
     enacted into law.
       ``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) the term `appropriation Act' means any general or 
     special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution 
     making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing 
     appropriations;
       ``(2) the term `legislative day' means, with respect to 
     either House of Congress, any day of session;
       ``(3) the term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision 
     of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the 
     President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit, 
     exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer 
     beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust, 
     or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same 
     parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single 
     beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited 
     partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated 
     corporate entities; and
       ``(4) the term `beneficiary' means any taxpayer or any 
     corporation, partnership, institution, organization, item of 
     property, State, or civil subdivision within one or more 
     States. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust, or S 
     corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same 
     parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single 
     beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited 
     partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated 
     corporate entities.''.
       (b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the 
     Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and 1017'' and 
     inserting ``1012, and 1017''; and
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and 
     inserting ``sections 1012 and 1017''; and
       (c) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Section 1011 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 
     U.S.C. 682(5)) is amended by repealing paragraphs (3) and (5) 
     and by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3).
       (2) Section 1014 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 685) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``or the 
     reservation''; and
       (B) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``or a reservation'' 
     and by striking ``or each such reservation''.
       (3) Section 1015(a) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 686) is amended 
     by striking ``is to establish a reserve or'', by striking 
     ``the establishment of such a reserve or'', and by striking 
     ``reserve or'' each other place it appears.
       (4) Section 1017 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 687) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a), by striking ``rescission bill 
     introduced with respect to a special message or'';
       (B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``rescission bill 
     or'', by striking ``bill or'' the second place it appears, by 
     striking ``rescission bill with respect to the same special 
     message or'', and by striking ``, and the case may be,'';
       [[Page H1245]] (C) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``bill 
     or'' each place it appears;
       (D) in subsection (c), by striking ``rescission'' each 
     place it appears and by striking ``bill or'' each place it 
     appears;
       (E) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``rescission bill 
     or'' and by striking ``, and all amendments thereto (in the 
     case of a rescission bill)'';
       (F) in subsection (d)(2)--
       (i) by striking the first sentence;
       (ii) by amending the second sentence to read as follows: 
     ``Debate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with 
     an impoundment resolution shall be limited to 1 hour, to be 
     equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the 
     manager of the resolution, except that in the event that the 
     manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or 
     appeal, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by 
     the minority leader or his designee.'';
       (iii) by striking the third sentence; and
       (iv) in the fourth sentence, by striking ``rescission bill 
     or'' and by striking ``amendment, debatable motion,'' and by 
     inserting ``debatable motion'';
       (G) in paragraph (d)(3), by striking the second and third 
     sentences; and
       (H) by striking paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of 
     paragraph (d).
       (d) Clerical Amendments.--The item relating to section 1012 
     in the table of sections for subpart B of title X of the 
     Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
     amended to read as follows:

``Sec. 1012. Expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions 
              and targeted tax benefits.''.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of February 3, 1995, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] will be recognized for 30 minutes, 
and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, the Stenholm-Spratt amendment that I offer at this time 
is the same amendment that passed the House of Representatives July 14, 
1994, with a 342 to 69 vote, basically the same amendment in my 
judgment. We offer it today and it is the same amendment we offered 
last week as a substitute, but the will of the House was we should not 
substitute majority override for one-third plus one override and I 
respect the will of the House. Today we offer this amendment not as a 
substitute but as a supplement, amendment to, and I will make the 
argument to my friends on the other side that this does not weaken H.R. 
2. In fact it strengthens H.R. 2, because in the words of the gentleman 
from Florida a moment ago when he was arguing against the Tauzin 
amendment, when he was saying we need to be able to get rid of wasteful 
spending at any time in any circumstance, regardless of glide path, I 
happen to agree with that statement. That is precisely why we offer our 
amendment today as a supplement to H.R. 2, because as everyone I know 
understands by now, under H.R. 2 it is only during that window of 
opportunity of 10 days after an appropriation bill is signed and sent 
to the President do we have the opportunity to rescind spending.
  Under the modified rescission process that the gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spratt] and I offer today, the President will have the 
opportunity to rescind spending at any time during the year.
  For example, if after October 1 comes and we see that spending is 
getting out of hand and we are on the glide path that we have already 
agreed by a 300 vote to 102 I believe the number was the other day on 
the balanced budget amendment, that the President would have the 
opportunity to go into any appropriation bill and rescind spending as 
he can today.

                              {time}  1710

  So there is, it seems to me, a kind of a schizophrenia in the 
approach that the gentleman has meant to take by giving two versions. I 
do think it is a helpful addition. I think obviously, if the amendment 
that we are dealing with here is declared unconstitutional, it is 
certainly one we would want to revisit, but I think to include it in 
the H.R. 2 provision is premature, and is weakening from that extent, 
and so I would have to oppose the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was mistaken when he recognized the gentleman 
from Texas for 15 minutes. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman is recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, how much time did I consume on my opening 
remarks?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas consumed 4\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Cardin].
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment. I 
would just urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  It accomplishes the purpose for why a line-item veto is needed, and 
that is to shine light on an individual appropriation so that it cannot 
hide within a massive appropriation bill.
  I am a supporter of the line-item veto legislation. I am going to 
vote for it. But I think this gives us an alternative in the event that 
the traditional two-thirds override is declared to be unconstitutional, 
to have on the books a procedure that works and will accomplish the 
exact same purpose.
  The amount of the vote is not important. It is important to segregate 
that appropriation to allow an individual consideration of it so that 
it cannot be hidden in a large appropriation bill.
  I congratulate my colleague for bringing forward an alternative and 
urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], again a prime cosponsor of H.R. 2 and one of 
the architects of this measure.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight for his work on this 
important bill, and also the chairman of the Committee on Rules for 
reporting out an open rule.
  I think we have had a very good and long debate on this very 
important issue.
  I rise in strong opposition to the Stenholm amendment. While I 
acknowledge the great leadership of the gentleman from Texas on deficit 
reduction, the most recent authoring with the gentleman from Colorado 
[Mr. Schaefer] the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, I 
believe that this amendment has the intention of weakening the base 
bill. If the amendment's sponsors are worried about the 
constitutionality of H.R. 2, I believe the CRS, the Congressional 
Research Service, American Law Division, wrote a brief last year 
confirming that the process involved in H.R. 2 would stand up to 
judicial review.
  CRS said:

       In sum, we generally conclude this bill is an exercise of 
     delegation which, under the precedents, is permissible. 
     Further, we conclude that the precedents establish no 
     constitutional barrier to delegation of power to the 
     President to set aside or void an Act of Congress.

  While getting the thumbs up from the CRS is not the same as getting 
the OK from the Supreme Court, precedents show the courts are hesitant 
to rebuff Congress' delegation of its power to the Executive.
  I urge my colleagues not to buy into this argument, and beyond that, 
Mr. Chairman, I think the line-item veto, the strong line-item veto, is 
exactly what is needed in our system to check the growth of the deficit 
and the debt that has piled up over the years, and I believe by 
adopting the Stenholm amendment we are giving the other body an out, 
giving them a fall back position that too many unfortunately will see.
  Let us give the President the strongest line-item veto we can. He 
asked for it. His budget director asked for it. Eleven State Governors 
have it, and it works to keep spending under control.
  Give the President the strong line-item veto.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I think the question in the debate is: Is 
this about illusion or reality, substance or not? This is a tough 
amendment. It is fair, and it is constitutional.
  I think there are significant constitutional problems with H.R. 2, 
and it is likely it may be rescinded by the 
 [[Page H1246]] Court. So it will be wise to append this to that 
legislation so you have a backup, if you believe in line-item authority 
for the President.
  Remember this is not a panacea. I know we are going to honor Ronald 
Reagan on his 84th birthday, but he did send a message to Congress on 
March 10, 1988, saying, ``These are the items I would delete if I had 
the line-item veto,'' and out of a budget deficit of $150 billion, 
Ronald Reagan could only find $1.5.
  This is not a panacea for the deficit. We are going to make some 
tough choices and decisions right here in this body if we want to get 
the deficit under control.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly against the amendment offered by my 
good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], because without 
question his amendment would strengthen existing law, but the fact is 
it weakens the bill before us, and it clouds the issue.
  Seriously, we have a problem here, ladies and gentleman, and this is 
the budget that the President of the United States gave us today. Let 
us just look at it. Ronald Reagan at one time dropped a bill on the 
floor back in the early 1980's and broke his finger doing it.
  This bill before us, this budget, reflects an additional debt 
service, debt for this year, and over the 5 years it is another 
trillion. As a matter of fact, I think it is $1.4 trillion it is going 
to add to the deficit.
  So, you know, line item veto is not going to balance the budget. The 
balanced budget amendment is not going to balance the budget. Only the 
will of this Congress is. But you need the prodding of the balanced 
budget amendment. You need the prodding of this legislation, and this 
legislation is constitutional.
  The Congressional Research Service, as has been stated, says it is. 
The Attorney General says it is. There is no question about it.
  What the bill before us does, without the Stenholm amendment, is 
reverse existing law that allows Congress to reject the President's 
requests to cut pork barrel spending without even taking a vote. That 
is what the law is today. In other words, Congress can block the 
spending cuts requested by a President by doing absolutely nothing.
  This line-item veto reverses that procedure by saying that the cuts 
go through unless Congress votes to disapprove those spending cuts.
  Now, that is real line-item veto, and that is what we need to give 
Congress this prod to try to do something about this.
  I shudder to think what is going to happen. I hope this Congress, 
Republicans and Democrats alike, have got the guts to at least adopt a 
budget this year that in 7 years will balance the budget. Otherwise, 
this country is going down the drain, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for purposes of 
entering into a colloquy with the gentleman from New York, because I 
would like to believe that the gentleman misspoke a moment ago when he 
said our amendment weakens H.R. 2. Because in all interpretation that 
we have received, this strengthens H.R. 2, because we do not get into 
anything of the merits of H.R. 2.
  In fact, under H.R. 2, would you not agree, that only in the 10-day 
window can a President veto under H.R. 2?
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. SOLOMON. I will say to my what it does----
  Mr. STENHOLM. Yes or no?
  Mr. SOLOMON. It continues. No, I do not think it does.
  Mr. STENHOLM. I believe you will find it does. Therefore, under our 
amendment, we provide the President the other 355 days out of the year 
may rescind, and the Congress must vote on individual Presidential 
rescissions. So I do not see how you can represent our amendment as 
weakening. I believe it must be strengthening.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Because it sets up a dual system, and it continues that 
dual system, and it gives the President, it gives the Congress another 
way out. I do not want him to do that. I want him to have to stick to 
this real line-item veto. That is the whole point. I know your 
intentions are very well, and I hope we defeat your amendment.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Coleman].
  (Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2, the 
line-item veto act on constitutional grounds.
  In addition, I rise in strong support of the Stenholm amendment which 
is an alternative, an expedited rescission bill, which would require 
the Congress to vote on proposed Presidential rescissions within a time 
certain and can uphold them with simple majorities in the House and the 
Senate.
  This alternative, as most Members will remember, is very similar to 
legislation passed by the House last year but killed by the other body.
  This system does not turn the Constitution really upside down, but, 
instead, focuses congressional action on disputed items without 
disrupting the balance of powers.

                              {time}  1720

  It would have the same impact as the line-item veto because Members 
would be certainly less inclined to include special-interest provisions 
in either appropriations or tax bills. Nor would Members probably be 
willing to risk recorded votes on items identified by a sitting 
President as either narrow or parochial.
  I would say to my friends that, as we rush forward in passing this 
Contract on America, we do need to be aware of putting the Federal 
taxpayer into the courthouse and having to pay for the costs of 
litigating these many provisions, and this one will be litigated.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], a member of the Committee on Rules.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I spent a lot of time working this over, and 
we talked a lot about expedited rescission, and enhanced rescission, 
and line-item veto, and the different formats, and what one of those 
terms used to mean, and whether one would or would not have to have a 
vote under an approval process, and, as I understand it, the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has come up with a very good program which 
tries to get the best of two worlds, and I really congratulate him on 
that because at first sight this appears to be a very good idea, to be 
able to say, ``Well, we can get the tough version, and then in the 
outdays of the given year we can go with a simple majority vote,'' and 
my understanding is that, if we use that process, it would come under 
the rulemaking powers of the House, and there is probably the single 
flaw that I see rise now, and maybe the gentleman will disagree with 
me. I am afraid that, as was shown in our unfunded mandates discussion 
about the rules, the powers of the Committee on Rules, to deal with 
different situations, no matter what the plan or the intent is, when 
those are delivered to the Committee on Rules, it is very clear in the 
history of this House, certainly clear in the history of the Committee 
on Rules since I have been on it, and I point out that was under 
another regime, that we did some things that people did not think we 
could do, and I am not sure we could, but we did them anyway because we 
are the Committee on Rules.
  Then we get down to this subject on unfunded mandates. As my 
colleagues remember, we have points of order, and we go into this long 
process of creating a new rule, a new setup, a new process for Members 
to be guaranteed a way to get something identified or defended under an 
unfunded mandate, to waive a point of order against it, another 
elaborate process.
  I would certainly admit that the gentleman has an intriguing prospect 
here. The concern I have is one that the chairman made, that it binds 
the clear-shot vote we had on the Contract With America, line-item 
veto, up or down, but I think the gentleman is onto a 
 [[Page H1247]] point that our current budget process is definitely 
weak, should be made better, and in my view in another day I would 
rather take this approach on in that process.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Goss] for yielding; he brings up a very good point on the rule.
  I say to my colleague, ``But if you will read more carefully our 
substitute, the substitute specifically states that it shall not be in 
order in the House of Representatives to consider any rescission bill 
introduced pursuant to the provisions of this section under a special 
rule. Furthermore, OMB would continue to withhold the funds from 
obligation until the President's plan was voted on, as required by this 
legislation----
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has 
expired.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the 
gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 
for his generosity.
  But this, I think, is very important.
  Furthermore, OMB could continue to withhold the funds from obligation 
until the President's plan was voted on, as required by the legislation 
regardless of any attempts by Congress to waive its internal rules. If 
Congress used its constitutional authority to set its own rules to 
avoid a vote on the President's rescissions, it would give the 
President the ability to withhold indefinity the funds in question.
  So, Mr. Chairman, we are really strengthening the legislation.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms. 
McCarthy].
  Ms. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Stenholm-Spratt 
amendment to H.R. 2. This amendment would expedite the rescission 
process, as well as retain the line-item veto language in the bill.
  I would like to point out to those Members who are serious about 
ending the practice of deficit spending that this amendment makes 
sense. By including both rescission and line-item veto language in the 
bill, the Stenholm-Spratt amendment guards against the Congress and the 
President being without the tools needed to balance the budget.
  One strength of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment is that it requires 
Congress to vote on rescissions submitted at any point in the year. 
Currently, H.R. 2, rescissions submitted by the President 10 days after 
signing an appropriations bill would not require congressional action. 
Under expedited rescission language, congressional action would be 
mandatory, regardless of when the rescission package is sent to 
Congress.
  The Stenholm-Spratt amendment will provide us with two instruments, 
expedited rescission and the line-item veto, to help restore fiscal 
integrity to the Federal budget process. If we want Congress to be 
accountable and responsible for the money it spends, then the expedited 
rescission language in the amendment will make us answerable by forcing 
a vote on a Presidential rescission package, something that is not 
currently required.
  President Clinton supports expedited rescission and the line-item 
veto, and I believe we should grant him the choice of either vetoeing 
or rescinding frivolous spending and tax breaks. Therefore, I urge 
bipartisan support of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], the coauthor of the amendment today.
  (Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Stenholm-Spratt 
amendment, and I want to stress from the start what this amendment does 
not do:
  It does not replace H.R. 2, the bill before us. It does not even 
weaken H.R. 2. It adds to that bill extra rescission powers, and 
broadens the timeframe for the use of those powers, and gives the 
President a plus, an option, that H.R. 2 does not give him, the option 
of entering any spending saved from any rescission into a so-called 
locked box or deficit reduction account.
  So, Mr. Chairman, this expedited rescission lock-box amendment is a 
supplement and not a substitute to H.R. 2. It would not conflict with, 
or weaken, or change one whit the powers that are delegated to the 
President under H.R. 2.
  The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] and I offer this amendment 
for several reasons:
  First, I am genuinely concerned that the courts may hold the line-
item veto power which we confer upon the President here under a novel 
interpretation of law unconstitutional, unconstitutional because it is 
a broad, broad, sweeping delegation of authority with very scant 
standards to govern the use of that authority. No court has ever 
decided the exact question that we are putting to the courts and will 
be putting to the courts here, and virtually everyone in this Chamber 
acknowledged that this is a novel question, acknowledged his 
uncertainty about how the court would rule when several days ago the 
Deal amendment came up, and with very little debate and very little 
dispute the Deal amendment--providing for expedited judicial review--
was approved virtually unanimously.
  But even in the case of expedited review, it will take months, surely 
the rest of this budget year, before we have a definite opinion from 
the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of H.R. 2. During that 
period of time, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the President this as a 
standby, fall-back authority. In case the courts invalidate H.R. 2, 
then the President has this authority on the books. He can use it, put 
it to good use, because the scope of this, as I point out, is even 
broader in many respects than H.R. 2.
  And what if the courts find H.R. 2 constitutional? In that case, this 
amendment gives the President one more weapon to use to wipe out 
unwarranted, unnecessary, or wasteful spending or spending that he 
finds we cannot afford given the status of the economy or the state of 
the budget in the middle of a fiscal year. The rescission authority we 
provide here is not redundant for that reason by any means. Actually, 
it is more useful in some respects, in many respects, than H.R. 2 as it 
now stands.
  I do not need to explain H.R. 2 in detail because this is virtually 
the same as the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich expedited rescission bill which 
this House passed on July 14, 1994, by an overwhelming vote. By my 
count, every single Republican then in the House, 169 in all, voted for 
its passage. Three hundred forty-two Members of this House thought 
enough of the efficacy and utility of this bill to vote for it then. 
Only 69 Members opposed it.
                              {time}  1730

  This amendment, as I said, is broader in scope than H.R. 2 because it 
allows the President to rescind appropriations at any time during the 
fiscal year. The veto power under H.R. 2, on the other hand, has to be 
used within a very narrow window of time, 10 days after a passage of 
appropriation bills. Under our amendment in H.R. 2 the President can 
only repeal targeted tax benefits within 10 days, but under our bill he 
can send spending rescissions up at any time and under our bill he will 
be guaranteed an up or down vote on his package in the House within 10 
days and a vote in the Senate within 10 more days. And for any Member 
who wants a separate vote on any particular item in the package, it is 
important to his or her district, then if he can muster 50 Members on 
the House floor to support his request, he can have it broken out.
  This bill, as I said, also allows the President the authority, the 
extra power which the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] 
acknowledged in debate the other day, was a commendable provision, to 
put any savings that were realized under a rescission into a lock box. 
The lock box was part of a popular bill that many Members subscribed to 
in the last session called A to Z. The lock box allows the President to 
direct that the discretionary spending account will be lowered to the 
extent that we adopt any rescission that he sends up here, lowered by 
that 
 [[Page H1248]] amount so the savings cannot be spent upon something 
else.
  Once the President has sent his bill up, the rescission message will 
be converted to a bill. The bill has to be introduced within 3 days, 
the Committee on Appropriations has to act upon it and report it to the 
floor, and we have to vote within 7 days. When it leaves here it goes 
to the Senate on the same fast track.
  So let me sum up, Mr. Chairman, by saying this amendment in no way 
weakens, detracts from, or is inconsistent with H.R. 2. It is a plus to 
H.R. 2. It is a fall-back alternative if H.R. 2 is found to be 
unconstitutional, and at the very least it is a temporary alternative 
for the President to use if H.R. 2 is restrained or enjoined pending 
the outcome of a challenge in court.
  Furthermore, our amendment is broader in scope than H.R. 2 because it 
applies throughout the fiscal year, not just for 10 days following the 
enactment of an appropriation bill, and, of course, it has the lock box 
feature I spoke of earlier. This amendment is a plus for H.R. 2, and I 
urge support for its adoption.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to a distinguished new 
Member of this body, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann], an 
original cosponsor of the line-item veto bill.
  Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in opposition to anything 
that would in any way, shape, or form complicate or weaken this line-
item veto bill as we have proposed it here today. The line-item veto 
bill needs to maintain its strength so we get at the root of the 
problem facing this Nation, which is a debt in the amount of $4.8 
trillion.
  I was an original cosponsor on the line-item veto bill because I feel 
as we look at the debt facing our Nation today, it is time we actually 
do something about it, and the only way we are going to do something 
about it is if we actually get to the point where we can reduce 
spending.
  The balanced budget amendment passed last week is important, but as 
we move forward, we must look at line-item veto to go with the balanced 
budget amendment so we can actually get at the root of the problem, and 
that is spending.
  Why do we need a line-item veto here? I have the numbers with me 
today and can show Members the impact on the children of this Nation if 
we do not pass the line-item veto bill today. I do not want to see 
anything that weakens it in any way, shape, or form.
  Today this Nation stands $4.8 trillion in debt. For the folks that 
have not seen this number, it looks like this. The number is very, very 
real. We are paying interest on that debt each and everyday, and it 
impacts the families in my district and the families all across 
America. $4.8 trillion has been borrowed on behalf the American people 
in the last 15 years. Something needs to be done about it.
  I am a former math teacher. As a former math teacher I like to look 
at this number as it relates on an individual basis to each person 
across this Nation. If we take that $4.8 trillion and divide it by the 
260 million people in the United States of America, each and every 
person in the United States of America is responsible for $18,500 of 
debt. Again, if we take the $4.8 trillion and divide by the 260 million 
people in this Nation, every man, woman and child is responsible for 
$18,500 worth of debt. For a family of four in America, from my 
district back home in Wisconsin, the Federal Government has borrowed 
$74,000 on behalf of the American people. It is not OK, folks, and it 
is not OK if we let this continue forward.
  For a family of five like my own, the Federal Government has borrowed 
$92,500. The real problem is not when we look at just the debt, but 
when we look at the interest that has to be paid on the debt. I would 
like to point out that this family of four is going to pay 
approximately $5,180 in interest alone on the national debt. Just think 
about this number for a second. A family of four in our district earns 
about $32,000 a year. This family of four is going to pay about $5,100 
out of that $32,000 of income to pay just the interest on the national 
debt. It does not get any goods or services from the American 
Government. That simply pays the interest on the national debt.
  Why am I so adamant? Why can I come here and work so hard for the 
line-item veto and the balanced budget? Because it is time the American 
people do something about this situation. When we start thinking about 
a family in our district paying over $5,000 a year to do nothing but 
pay the interest on the national debt, you think it is time we get 
serious about doing something about the budget, something about 
balancing the budget, and in fact I think we should start talking about 
paying off the debt.
  The day has come where we need to think about how we are going to get 
to the balanced budget and then go the next step. How can we get rid of 
this atrocious debt that is costing the family of four in my district 
over $5,000 a year in just interest? It is time we get past it.
  There are two things that are necessary to do that in my opinion. One 
is the balanced budget amendment which the House passed not very long 
ago, and the other is this line-item veto, a very strong line item veto 
needs to be passed. It needs to be passed today.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has 14\1/2\ 
minutes left, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute] has 
15\1/2\ minutes left.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I realize there has been considerable confusion and 
misinformation about just what this amendment would do. The last chart 
in all honesty has nothing to do with this amendment. It has everything 
to do with why I too offer this amendment. Because we do want to get 
after spending. The Stenholm-Spratt amendment is offered as a 
supplement to the line-item veto authority in H.R. 2.
  Even though it is presented here as a substitute here at the end of 
the debate, it includes all of H.R. 2, as reported. I want to repeat, 
this amendment we offer includes all of H.R. 2 as reported. In 
addition, this amendment incorporates all of the amendments approved by 
the Committee of the Whole only Thursday and Friday of last week, 
namely the Clinger, Thurman, Neal, and I will ask the same unanimous 
consent request that Mr. Clinger asked to add Obey to my amendment so 
it will do what we intended for it to do when we go into the House. 
This expedited rescission authority portion of this amendment would 
allow the President to propose to cut or eliminate individual spending 
items in appropriations bills throughout the year. The President could 
earmark some or all of the savings for deficit reduction.
  In addition, the President would be able to propose to repeal 
targeted tax breaks which benefit a particular taxpayer or class of 
taxpayers only within the 10 days of signing the bill.
  The House would have 10 legislative days after the President sends up 
a rescission package to bring it to the floor. There has been some 
debate as to whether or not that 10-day limitation would actually 
occur. I believe the answer is clearly yes, it would. First the rules 
would not permit consideration of other matters until the rescission 
package was dealt with. Second, any appropriation or tax item that was 
submitted by the President in effect would be suspended until Congress 
acted on the President's package.
  Now, just a moment ago we were talking, the gentleman from Wisconsin 
was talking about guaranteed cuts, guaranteed deficit reduction.

                              {time}  1740

  I must submit, again, H.R. 2 does not guarantee deficit reduction. 
Only with our amendment can we have guaranteed deficit reduction, 
because we included the lock box provision. And that was as a result of 
last year's debate in which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] was 
very instrumental in changing the language of the amendment that we in 
fact bring to Members today.
  The line-item veto includes no guarantee that the savings from the 
President's rescissions would go to deficit reduction. Congress would 
be free to spend the savings from rescissions proposed by the President 
on other programs.
  Although H.R. 2 allows the President to propose to reduce the 
discretionary caps, there is no provision for a vote in Congress to 
reduce the spending caps. 
 [[Page H1249]] In other words, rescissions submitted under the line-
item veto would not save one dime. We believe our substitute provides 
for that alternative should we, the Congress and the President, believe 
that was important.
  The Stenholm-Spratt amendment includes provisions to ensure that the 
savings from spending cuts would go to deficit reduction.
  Furthermore, under H.R. 2, standing alone, the President would have 
the veto option for only the first 10 days after signing a bill. 
Although H.R. 2 is intended to increase the ability of the President to 
identify and eliminate wasteful and low priority spend, it dramatically 
restricts the President's flexibility by setting this artificial 10-day 
deadline.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, we had the Congressional Research Service 
do some research which I think is extremely helpful in understanding 
the importance of this power that we give the President to use this 
additional rescission authority throughout the fiscal year.
  According to CRS, the Congressional Research Service, 99 percent of 
all rescissions sent up here by the President were sent beyond the 10-
day period after the adoption of appropriation bills. That points up 
that frequently the rescission authority is not used to knock out pork 
barrel stuff, but to try to adjust the budget in midyear when we have 
got underfunded accounts for the Veterans Administration, underfunded 
accounts for operations and maintenance and defense, and we have to pay 
for the supplementary budget authority by rescinding other budget 
authority on the books. Then the President has the authority to 
formulate his request, send it up here and be guaranteed under our bill 
a quick 20-day turnaround.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr Chairman, I would conclude my remarks at this time 
by saying that I believe it grossly unfair to categorize our amendment 
as being weakening. If we are truly concerned about deficit reduction, 
I believe the language of our amendment, as a supplement to, not as a 
replacement for, but a supplement to, clearly stands out as being more 
able to reduce the deficit because of the language which we put into 
our amendment.
  As the gentleman said, again, Members have talked about this language 
from the standpoint that somehow current law is better. It is not. And 
unless we in fact add our amendment, we will have current law 355 days 
out of the year but 10 days out of the year, 10 calendar days out of 
the year we will have a much improved situation over the current 
system.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
  Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, let me say that what we have offered here 
supplements, does not substitute for or replace, it supplements H.R. 2, 
and it does not do it in any sort of redundant or cosmetic way. We give 
the President some important additional rescission authority. He can 
use this authority pending any court challenge to the constitutionality 
of H.R. 2 and he may have well need that authority this budget year 
because there is likely to be a constitutional challenge to this bill 
if it becomes law.
  Second, we give him authority that he can use throughout the budget 
year, not just in that narrow period of time 10 days after the adoption 
of an appropriations bill.
  The Congressional Research Service says, as we were just pointing 
out, that 99 percent of all rescissions typically sent up here by 
presidents since 1976, 99 percent of them have been sent well beyond 
that 10-day period of time.
  Our bill covers that additional period of time, when by tradition 99 
percent of the rescission bills have been sent up.
  Finally, we allow the President to say, we want to take these 
savings, put them in a deficit reduction account and not have the money 
spent elsewhere during the course of the fiscal year. Three strong 
features that add to, do not detract from or conflict in any way, 
strengthen this bill and should be adopted to perfect it.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, in summation I would just like to say if Members want 
to replace the cumbersome and unworkable process for year-round 
authority with teeth, they need to vote for the Stenholm-Spratt 
amendment. This amendment has had a proud bipartisan history, despite 
the effort recently to portray it as partisan.
  Mr. Chairman, I am submitting for the Record some material on past 
Republican support for the amendment. I also am submitting two legal 
opinions. Finally, I am submitting for the Record a list of some of the 
most commonly asked questions about this amendment, along with the 
answers that have been prepared.
  Mr. Chairman, whether Members think H.R. 2 is constitutional or not, 
whether they prefer line item veto authority or expedited rescission 
authority, there is a reason for Members to vote for the Stenholm-
Spratt amendment. This amendment provides a rare opportunity in the 
legislative process, a win-win scenario.
  I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to approve my 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the information to which I 
referred.

  [From the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 
                     Washington, DC., Feb. 3, 1995]

     To The Honorable Nathan Deal, Attention Ed Lorenzen.
     From Virginia A. McMurtry, Specialist in American National 
         Government, James V. Saturno, Specialist on the Congress, 
         Government Division.
     Subject: Submission dates of Presidents' rescission request.

       In response to your request for figures on the dates of 
     submission to Congress of rescission requests from the 
     President under the Impoundment Control Act since 1974, we 
     have prepared the attached table.
       The table provides the number of rescission requests, by 
     month, for each fiscal year. The actual unit of analysis is 
     the individual rescission, not rescission messages as we 
     initially discussed. If five separate rescission requests 
     were included in a single message during a given month, the 
     number entered on the table would be five. This provides a 
     more accurate way for considering the transmission of 
     rescission proposals, since under current law there is no 
     requirement for the President either to combine or to 
     separate rescissions transmitted at the same time. The number 
     of rescissions included in a single message have varied 
     considerably, even within the same Administration.
       As indicated in the notes accompanying the table, the End-
     of-Year Cumulative Reports on Rescissions and Deferrals, 
     prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, provided the 
     source. Actually, for one year, Fiscal Year 1990, OMB 
     prepared no end-of-year report. In this instance we used the 
     monthly cumulative report for September, 1990, which happened 
     to include a complete listing of rescissions for that year.
       We hope that this information proves useful to you. If we 
     can be of further assistance, you may reach Ginger at 7-8678, 
     or Jim at 7-2381.

                                  PRESIDENTIAL RESCISSION REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY MONTH, FISCAL YEAR 1976-94                                  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year\1\        Oct.      Nov.      Dec.      Jan.      Feb.      Mar.      Apr.       May      June      July      Aug.      Sep.      Total 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976..................         0         6        13        17         0         0         0         0         0      \2\6         0      \3\4        46
1977..................         0         0         0         9         0         0         0         1         0     \4\10         0      \5\1        21
1978..................         0         0         0         3         0         0         0         1         1         1         0         1         7
1979..................         0         1         0        10         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0        11
1980..................         1         0         0         2         0         1        53         2         0         0         0         0        59
1981..................         0         0         0        34         0       120         0         0        10         1         0         0       165
1982..................         2         1         0         0        22         1         0         0         1         3         1         0        31
1983..................         0         0         1         0        19         0         0         0         0         1         0         0        21
1984..................         0         0         1         0         8         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         9
1985..................         0         0         0         0       241         0         0         2         0         0         0         1       244
1986..................         0         0         0         0        77         3         3         0         0         0         0         0        83
1987..................         0         0         0        73         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0        73


                                                                                                                                                        
[[Page H1250]]
                             PRESIDENTIAL RESCISSION REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY MONTH, FISCAL YEAR 1976-94--Continued                            
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year\1\        Oct.      Nov.      Dec.      Jan.      Feb.      Mar.      Apr.       May      June      July      Aug.      Sep.      Total 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1988..................         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0
1989..................         0         0         0         6         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         0         6
1990..................         0         0         0         0         0         0         3         8         0         0         0         0        11
1991..................         0         0         0         0        26         0         1         0         2         1         0         0        30
1992..................         0         0         0         0         1        98        29         0         0         0         0         0       128
1993..................         7         0         2         0         3         0         1         0         6         0         0         0        19
1994..................         0        38         0         0        27         0         0         0         0         0         0         0        65
                       ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...........        10        46        17       154       424       223        90        14        20        23         1         7     1,029
                       =================================================================================================================================
Percent...............      0.97      4.47      1.65     14.97     41.21     21.67      8.75      1.36      1.94      2.24      0.10      0.68      100 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Although the Impoundment Control Act became effective upon enactment (July 12, 1974), the fiscal year calendar change did not begin until Oct. 1,    
  1975, for FY 1976. In addition to the rescission messages listed there were also eight rescission messages in July 1975 concerning spending for FY    
  1976 and the transition quarter (July-Sept. 1975).                                                                                                    
\2\Of the five rescission requests received in July 1976 one concerned spending for FY 1977.                                                            
\3\Of the four rescission requests received in September 1976, three concerned spending for FY 1977.                                                    
\4\Of the ten rescission requests received in July 1977, four concerned spending for FY 1978.                                                           
\5\the rescission requests received in September 1977 concerned spending in FY 1978, and was later reclassified as a deferral by the Comptroller        
  General.                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                                                        
Source: Office of Management and Budget End-of-Year Cumulative Report on Rescissions and Deferrals for each FY1976-94.                                  

            Republican Support for Expedited Rescission


                             99th Congress

                            Bills introduced

       S. Con. Res. 65--The Porkbusters Resolution of 1985. 
     Introduced by Senator Dan Quayle (R-IN) on September 17, 
     1985. Required Congress to vote on resolutions approving 
     Presidential rescissions by a majority vote within fifteen 
     days after the rescission was submitted.
       H.R. 3675--a bill providing the President with modified 
     rescission authority while preserving the authority of 
     Congress in the budget process. Introduced by Rep. Ralph 
     Regula (R-OH) on November 1, 1985. Required Congressional 
     votes on Presidential rescissions within 45 days.

                          Floor consideration

       On September 19, 1985, Senator Quayle offered the text of 
     S. Con. Res. 65 as an amendment to the Omnibus Reconciliation 
     Act of 1986. The amendment was ruled non-germane and defeated 
     on a procedural motion of 34-62.


                             100th Congress

                            Bills introduced

       S. Con. Res. 16--a bill providing for expedited 
     consideration of a bill or joint resolution approving a 
     Presidential rescission. Introduced by Senator Quayle on 
     February 5, 1987. The bill was cosponsored by two 
     Republicans.
       H. Con. Res. 119--similar to S. Con. Res. 16. Introduced by 
     Rep. Lynn Martin (R-NY) on May 8, 1987. Cosponsored by 15 
     Republicans.
       H.R. 3129--Line-item Rescission Act of 1987. Introduced by 
     Rep. Tim Johnson (D-SD) on August 6, 1987. Cosponsored by 20 
     Republicans, including Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and Rep. 
     Dan Coats (R-IN).

                          Floor consideration

       Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX) attempted to add an amendment to the 
     FY88 Long-term Continuing Resolution granting the President 
     enhanced rescission authority over funds included in the CR. 
     Under the amendment, a simple majority of Congress could 
     overturn the rescission. The effort was unsuccessful.

                             Notable quotes

       Senator Dan Quayle (February 5, 1987, S3136 Congressional 
     Record)
       ``The Pork-Buster Resolution is based on a simple, 
     fundamental premise. Before the taxpayers' money can be 
     spent, the President and a majority of both the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives should be required to agree 
     those funds should be spent. Congress should be made--and 
     held--accountable to the American people on rescissions that 
     a President believes are appropriate. By using the rulemaking 
     power of each House, the Pork-Buster Resolution would require 
     expedited consideration of Presidential rescission 
     messages.''
       Rep. Dick Armey (Dear Colleague dated November 2, 1987)
       ``Enhanced rescission authority will involve the 
     Administration and the Congress in a meaningful deficit 
     reduction process in a manner that ensures both institution's 
     prerogatives are protected.''
       Rep. Dick Armey (November 5, 1987, H30961 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``I will go to the Rules Committee and I will request a 
     rule that will allow me to amend that long-term continuing 
     resolution to include in it enhanced rescission authority 
     that would allow the President to examine that large omnibus 
     spending bill line item by line item and make line-item 
     vetoes, as it were, with a simple majority override capacity 
     remaining for the House.''


                             101st Congress

                            Bills introduced

       H.R. 235--Line-item Rescission Act of 1989. Introduced by 
     Rep. Tim Johnson (D-SD) on January 3, 1989. Cosponsored by 9 
     Republicans.
       H.R. 962--Current Level Rescission Act of 1989. Introduced 
     by Rep. Dick Armey on February 9, 1989 and cosponsored by 105 
     Republicans. Provided for expedited consideration of 
     Presidential rescissions if the rescission did not reduce any 
     program below its prior-year level.
       H.R. 3800--a bill providing for expedited consideration of 
     certain Presidential rescission. Introduced by Rep. Tom 
     Carper (D-DE) along with Reps. Armey, Johnson, Martin, Dan 
     Glickman (D-KN), Bill Frenzel (R-MN) and others as a 
     bipartisan consensus expedited rescission bill on November 
     21, 1987. Cosponsored by 65 Republicans.

                             Notable quotes

       Rep. Dick Armey and Rep. Tim Johnson (Dear Colleague dated 
     March 1, 1989)
       ``The Current Level Enhanced Rescission Act is a realistic, 
     rational proposal that protects Congress' own spending 
     priorities and restores the President's role in fighting the 
     deficit.''
                             102d congress

                            Bills introduced

       H.R. 2164--a bill providing for expedited consideration of 
     certain Presidential rescissions. Introduced by Rep. Carper 
     on May 1, 1991. Cosponsored by 108 Republicans. Required 
     votes in Congress on Presidential rescissions within ten days 
     of their submission. Limited the amount that the President 
     could rescind authorized programs to 25%. Established the new 
     procedure for two years.
       H.R. 5700--Expedited Consideration of Proposed Rescissions 
     Act of 1992. Introduced by Rep. Solomon on July 28, 1992. 
     Identical to H.R. 2164 except that it eliminated the 
     distinction between authorized and unauthorized programs 
     included in H.R. 2164.

                          Floor consideration

       July 30, 1992--Rep. Solomon attempted to defeat the 
     previous question on the Commerce, Justice and State 
     Appropriations bill so that he could offer a motion to make 
     in order what he described as ``a slightly different line-
     item veto rescission amendment'' which consisted of the text 
     of his expedited rescission bill. Reps. Bob McEwan (R-OH), 
     David Dreier (R-CA), John Duncan (R-TN) and Bob Walker (R-PA) 
     spoke in support of Solomon's motion. The effort failed on a 
     vote of 240-176.
       October 3, 1992--The House passed H.R. 2164, the expedited 
     rescission bill introduced by Rep. Tom Carper, by a vote of 
     312-197. It was supported by 154 of 159 Republicans voting.

                             Notable quotes

       Rep. Dick Armey (May 5, Rules Committee Hearing on H.R. 
     4990):
       ``I think the President's authority should be enhanced, 
     perhaps enhanced in the way Mr. Solomon suggests, but even 
     enhancing it a little bit in the way Mr. Carper will later 
     recommend. That would be an improvement.''
       Rep. Harris Fawell (R-IL) (May 5, Rules Committee Hearing)
       ``When Tom Carper comes up in reference to his enhanced 
     rescission bill, it isn't everything I would want, but I 
     could support it. It does valuable things. It moves us down 
     that road.''
       Rep. Jerry Solomon (May 7, 1992, H3029 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``We moved to make in order an amendment by Mr. Carper, a 
     Democrat, and Mr. Stenholm, a Democrat, to provide for 
     expedited rescission procedures for the next two years, 
     similar in concept to my line item veto bill, but watered 
     down considerably. Still, it is a strong step in the right 
     direction.''
       Rep. Bob McEwan (July 30, 1992, H6988 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``The Solomon amendment would mandate that Congress 
     consider legislation approving the President's rescissions 
     within twenty days. If either House fails to pass the bill, 
     then the money would be obligated. Mr. Speaker, in the name 
     of fiscal responsibility, the House must be given the 
     opportunity to at least consider the Solomon amendment.''
       Rep. Jerry Solomon (July 30, 1992, H6992 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``If we defeat the previous question, I will offer the 
     Carper line-item rescission amendment that simply requires 
     Congress to vote up or down on the President's request not to 
     spend the money. This requires only a simple majority vote.''
       Rep. Jerry Solomon (July 30, 1992, H6992 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``For those of you who really believe in the line-item 
     veto, we have reached a tremendous compromise here that you 
     can vote for. It should be something that this House can 
     support overwhelmingly on both sides of the aisle.''
       Rep. Harris Fawell (October 2, 1992, H10811 Congressional 
     Record):
       [[Page H1251]] ``(H.R. 2164) is at least the first step of 
     a 1,000 mile journey toward hopefully someday being able to 
     balance the federal budget.''
       Rep. Jerry Solomon (October 2, 1992 H10813 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``I favor the bill before us today (H.R. 2164) because it 
     is an improvement over the current rescission process * * *. 
     It is a step in the right direction.''
                             103d congress

                            Bills introduced

       H.R. 1013--Expedited Consideration of Proposed Rescissions 
     Act of 1993. Introduced by Rep. Charlie Stenholm (D-TX) on 
     February 18, 1993. Cosponsored by 33 Republicans. Required 
     the President to submit rescissions within a three-day window 
     after signing an appropriations bill. The expedited 
     rescission authority would have a 2 year sunset. Does not 
     include targeted tax credit.
       H.R. 1578--Expedited Rescissions Act of 1993. Introduced by 
     Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) on April 1, 1993. Required the 
     President to submit rescissions within a three-day window 
     after signing an appropriations bill. The expedited 
     rescission authority would have a two year sunset. Does not 
     include targeted tax credit. A framework would be established 
     for consideration of an appropriations committee alternative 
     if the President's package was defeated.
       H.R. 4600--Expedited Rescissions Act of 1994. Introduced by 
     Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) on June 17, 1994. Applies only to 
     appropriations, may be used only within 3-day window after an 
     appropriations bill passes, applies only to the 103rd 
     Congress.
       H.R. 4434--Common Cents Budget Reform Act of 1994. 
     Introduced by Reps. Stenholm (D-TX), Penny (D-MN), and Kasich 
     (R-OH). Cosponsored by 14 Republicans. Guarantees a vote on 
     every rescission bill submitted by the President. The 
     President can designate any portion of the savings for 
     deficit reduction. The President can submit a special message 
     repealing a targeted tax credit within 10 days after a bill 
     is enacted. The President can submit a special message to 
     rescind appropriations at any time. Permanently extends 
     authority.

                          Floor consideration

       July 14, 1994--The House passed the Stenholm substitute to 
     H.R. 4600 on final passage by a vote of 342-69. The Stenholm 
     substitute was agreed to by a vote of 298-121. The Solomon 
     substitute failed 205-218. All 169 Republicans present and 
     voting voted yes on final passage, and all 170 Republicans 
     present and voting voted yes on the Stenholm substitute.

                             Notable quotes

       Rep. John Kasich (July 14, 1994, H5728 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``This (Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment), ladies and 
     gentlemen of the House, represents the most significant 
     movement on trying to control the deficit through the use of 
     the line-item veto that we have voted on and have a chance to 
     pass in this House since I have been a Member of the House * 
     * *. This (Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment), is precisely 
     what the American people have been calling for * * *. It will 
     bring real change.''
       Rep. Jim Kolbe (July 14, 1994, H5715 Congressional Record):
       ``Let us not let the opportunity to support tough budget 
     reform slip away again, Support the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich 
     amendment to H.R. 4600.''
       Rep. Rick Lazio (July 14, 1994, H5711 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``We have significantly strengthened the process (existing 
     rescission process) by adopting the Penny-Kasich-Stenholm 
     amendment, for which I voted.''
       Rep. Harris Fawell (July 14, 1994, H5710 Congressional 
     Record):
       ``Should this substitute (Michel-Solomon) fail, I then will 
     support the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich substitute, because it is a 
     vast improvement over the enhanced rescission power we 
     presently have.''
                                                                    ____

     Questions and Answers Regarding Expedited Rescission Authority

       How does the Wise and Stenholm-Spratt substitutes differ 
     from H.R. 1578 and H.R. 4600, the versions of expedited 
     rescission reported by the Rules Committee in the 103rd 
     Congress?
       Both substitutes incorporate several changes from earlier 
     expedited rescission legislation made by the Stenholm-Penny-
     Kasich amendment to H.R. 4600 on July 14, 1994. The Stenholm-
     Penny-Kasich amendment made several changes to respond to 
     concerns raised by many members and significantly strengthen 
     the legislation. The President would be able to single out 
     newly enacted targeted tax benefits as well as appropriated 
     items for individual votes. Unlike H.R. 1578 and H.R. 4600, 
     which required the President to submit rescissions within a 
     three-day window after signing an appropriations bill, the 
     President would be able to submit a rescission package for 
     expedited consideration at any point in the year. The 
     President would have the option of earmarking savings from 
     proposed rescissions to deficit reduction, which no other 
     expedited rescission or line-item veto proposal would permit. 
     The new expedited rescission authority would be established 
     permanently instead of being sunsetted after two years. 
     Members would have the ability to obtain separate votes on 
     individual items in a rescission package that have 
     significant support. The Wise and Stenholm substitutes 
     explicitly prevent the President's rescissions from being 
     considered under a special rule which would waive the 
     requirements of the section. Finally, the prerogative of the 
     Appropriations Committee to move their own rescission bill 
     would be preserved without creating a cumbersome new 
     procedure.
       How is the procedure under expedited rescission different 
     from the existing procedure for considering Presidential 
     rescissions under Title X of the Budget Control and 
     Impoundment Act?
       Under Title X of the Budget Control and Impoundment Act, 
     the President may propose to rescind all or part of any item 
     at any time during the fiscal year. If Congress does not take 
     action on the proposed rescission within 45 days of 
     continuous session, the funds must be released for 
     obligation. Congress routinely ignores Presidential 
     rescissions. The discharge procedure for forcing a floor vote 
     on Presidential rescissions is cumbersome and has never been 
     used. Most Presidential rescission messages have died without 
     a floor vote.
       Congress has approved just 34.5% of the individual 
     rescissions proposed by the President since 1974 (350 of 1012 
     rescissions submitted), representing slightly more than 30% 
     of the dollar volume of proposed rescissions. Nearly a third 
     of the Presidential rescissions approved came in 1981. 
     Excluding 1981, Congress has approved less than 20% of the 
     dollar volume in Presidential rescissions. Although Congress 
     has initiated $65 billion in rescissions on its own, it has 
     ignored nearly $48 billion in Presidential rescissions 
     submitted under Title X of the Budget Control and Impoundment 
     Act without any vote at all on the merits of the rescissions.
       In 1992, the threat that there would be an attempt to 
     utilize the Title X discharge procedure to force votes on 128 
     rescissions submitted by President Bush provided the impetus 
     for the Appropriations Committee to report a bill rescinding 
     more than $8 billion. However, this was an exception. Most 
     rescission messages are ignored. Expedited rescission would 
     change that and force Congress to react to Presidential 
     messages by voting on them, increasing the likelihood that 
     unnecessary spending would be eliminated.
       Could Congress thwart the provisions of expedited 
     rescission legislation by reporting a rule that waives the 
     requirements of this proposal?
       No. The substitute specifically states that ``It shall not 
     be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any 
     rescission bill introduced pursuant to the provisions of this 
     section . . . under a special rule.'' Furthermore, OMB could 
     continue to withhold the funds from obligation until the 
     President's plan was voted on as required by this legislation 
     regardless of any attempts by Congress to waive its internal 
     rules. If Congress used its Constitutional authority to set 
     its own rules to avoid a vote on the President's rescissions, 
     it would give the President the ability to indefinitely 
     impound the funds.
       How does expedited rescission legislation ensure that a 
     Presidential rescission is voted on by Congress?
       Expedited rescission legislation establishes several 
     procedural requirements ensuring that Congress cannot simply 
     ignore a rescission message. A rescission bill would be 
     introduced by request by either the Majority or Minority 
     Leader. If the Appropriations Committee does not report out 
     the rescission bill as required within ten days, the bill is 
     automatically discharged from the committee and placed on the 
     appropriate calendar. Once the bill is either reported by or 
     discharged from the Appropriations Committee, any individual 
     member may make a highly privileged motion to proceed to 
     consideration of the bill. Although a motion to adjourn would 
     take precedence, the House could not prevent a vote on a 
     rescission message by adjourning because only legislative 
     days are counted toward the ten day clock. Action is also 
     promoted by providing for a highly privileged motion to 
     proceed to consideration and limiting debate and preventing 
     amendments to a rescission bill. This proposal ensures that 
     there will be a vote on a rescission bill so long as one 
     member is willing to stand up on the House floor and make a 
     motion to proceed.
       The substitute includes language to discourage the House 
     from avoiding a vote on the President's package, by making 
     the release of funds by OMB contingent on Congress voting on 
     and defeating the President's package.
       Under current law, OMB withholds funds from apportionment 
     until Congress acts on a rescission message. Funds included 
     in a rescission message would be frozen in the pipeline until 
     Congress either votes to rescind them or to release them for 
     obligation. The substitute provides that the funds must be 
     released for obligation upon defeat of the President's 
     rescission bill in either House. This is different from the 
     requirement in Section 1012 of the Impoundment Control Act of 
     1974, which states ``Any amount of budget authority proposed 
     to be rescinded . . . shall be made available for obligation, 
     unless, within the prescribed 45 day period, the Congress has 
     completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part 
     of the amount proposed to be rescinded.'' By specifically 
     providing that the funds would be released upon defeat of the 
     President's package and not providing for any other 
     circumstances in which OMB must release the funds, the 
     language of the Wise and Stenholm-Spratt substitutes clearly 
     provide that OMB will be required to release the funds 
      [[Page H1252]] only when Congress votes on and rejects the 
     rescission bill.
       Similarly, the amendment provides that any tax benefits 
     proposed to be repealed be ``deemed to have been repealed 
     unless . . . either House rejects the bill transmitted with 
     that special message.''
       How would the motion to strike individual items from a 
     package of rescissions work?
       A member would be able to make a motion to strike an 
     individual item in the rescission bill if 49 members support 
     the motion. This procedure would be similar to existing 
     procedures to call for recorded votes or the procedure for 
     discharging rescission bills under Title X of the Impoundment 
     Control Act in which the members supporting the motion would 
     stand and be counted. If the requisite number of members 
     supported a motion to strike, the motion would be debated 
     under the five minute rule and the House would vote on the 
     motion. If the motion was supported by a majority of members, 
     the item would be struck from the bill. The House would vote 
     on final passage of the rescission bill after disposing of 
     any motion to strike.
       If 50 members feel strongly enough about an individual item 
     to coordinate the actions necessary to obtain a motion to 
     strike, they deserve to have the opportunity to make their 
     case to the full House. They would still have to convince a 
     majority of the House that their project was justified.
       Wouldn't the motion to strike deprive the President of a 
     vote on his rescissions?
       No. Congress would vote on the merits of each rescission 
     either as part of the overall package or on a motion to 
     strike. While there might not be one vote on the entire 
     package if a motion to strike succeeded, Congress would have 
     voted on the merits of individual rescissions when it voted 
     on the motions to strike items from the package.
       The motion to strike increases the chance of passing 
     rescissions submitted by the President by providing a safety 
     valve to take ``killer'' items out of a rescission package to 
     avoid the entire package from being defeated because of one 
     item with strong support. If there is a strong core of 
     support within Congress for an individual item, there would 
     be a high likelihood that the supporters of that item could 
     form an alliance to defeat the entire bill. Although the 
     President would presumably make political judgements to avoid 
     including items that would sink the entire package, the 
     administration will not always be aware of all traps that may 
     lie with an individual spending program or tax provision. 
     This safety valve would prevent a political miscalculation 
     from sinking the entire bill.
       What types of tax provisions would be subject to the new 
     rescission process?
       The provision for expedited consideration of proposals to 
     repeal tax items would be restricted to targeted tax 
     benefits. ``Targeted tax benefits'' are defined as provisions 
     which provide a deduction, credit, exclusion, preference, or 
     other concession to 100 or fewer taxpayers. The rescission 
     authority would apply to narrowly drawn tax items, the so-
     called ``tax pork'', which are slipped into tax bills to 
     benefit special interests. It will not apply to broader tax 
     breaks that apply to a larger number of taxpayers such as a 
     capital gains tax reduction or middle class tax cut.
       Wouldn't the ability to repeal tax items create uncertainty 
     in the tax code?
       No. The substitute provides for swift consideration of 
     proposals to repeal tax provisions so that taxpayers would 
     know the final disposition of any tax provision within a 
     reasonable period of time following the passage of a tax 
     bill. The President must submit a proposal to repeal a tax 
     provision within ten business days after signing a tax bill. 
     Congress would be required to act within twenty legislative 
     days.
       Could the President propose to rewrite tax provisions?
       No. The President would only be able to propose legislative 
     language necessary to repeal individual tax provisions for 
     expedited consideration. Legislation submitted by the 
     President to rewrite a tax provision would not be subject to 
     the expedited procedures of this amendment.
       Doesn't this legislation constitute an unconstitutional 
     legislative veto?
       No. This legislation was carefully crafted to comply with 
     the Constitutional requirements established by the courts by 
     I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the case that declared 
     legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. Legislative 
     vetoes allow one or both Houses of Congress (or a 
     Congressional committee) to stop executive actions by passing 
     a resolution that is not presented to the President. The 
     Chada court held that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional 
     because they allow Congress to exercise legislative power 
     without complying with Constitutional requirements for 
     bicameral passage of legislation and presentment of 
     legislation to the President for signature or veto. For 
     example, allowing the House (or Congress as a whole) to block 
     a Presidential rescission by passing a motion of disapproval 
     without sending the bill to the President for signature or 
     veto would violate the Chada test. This substitute meets the 
     Chada tests of bicameralism and presentment by requiring that 
     both chambers of Congress pass a motion enacting the 
     rescission and send it to the President for signature or 
     veto, before the funds are rescinded. The substitute does not 
     provide for legislative review of a preceding executive 
     action, but expedited consideration of an executive proposal. 
     Thus, it represents a so-called ``report and wait'' provision 
     that the court approved in Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312 
     U.S. 1 (1941) and reaffirmed in Chada.
       If a majority of Congress has voted for items as part of an 
     appropriations or tax bill, wouldn't the same majority vote 
     to preserve the items when they were rescinded?
       Just as President's often sign appropriations bills (or 
     other bills for that matter) that include individual items 
     that he does not support, Congress often passes 
     appropriations bills without passing judgment on individual 
     items. Expedited rescission legislation would force the 
     President and Congress to examine spending items on their 
     individual merit and not as part of an overall package. Many 
     items included in an omnibus appropriations bill would not be 
     able to receive majority support in Congress if they were 
     forced to stand on their own individual merits. Members who 
     voted for an appropriations or tax bill may be willing to 
     vote to eliminate individual items that had been in the 
     omnibus bill.
       Isn't requiring an additional vote on items that have 
     already been approved by Congress a waste of time?
       As was stated above, the fact that an item was included in 
     an omnibus appropriations or tax bill does not necessarily 
     imply that a majority of Congress supported that individual 
     item. For example, when Congress passed the Agricultural 
     Appropriations Bill in 1990, the majority of the members did 
     not endorse spending on Lawrence Welk's home. Requiring a 
     second vote on individual items included in an omnibus 
     appropriation bill is not an unreasonable response to 
     realities of the legislative process.
       Doesn't providing the President expedited rescission 
     authority alter the balance of power between Congress and the 
     President?
       No. The approach of expedited rescission legislation 
     strikes a balance between protecting Congress' control of the 
     purse and providing the accountability in the appropriations 
     process. Unlike line-item veto legislation, this substitute 
     would preserve the Constitutional power of Congressional 
     majorities to control spending decisions. Expedited 
     rescission authority increases the accountability of both 
     sides, but does not give the President undue leverage in the 
     appropriations process because funding for a program will 
     continue if a majority of either House disagree with him.
       Since the rescission process would apply only to the 
     relatively small amount of spending in discretionary programs 
     and a limited number of small tax breaks, isn't this just a 
     political gimmick that won't have a significant impact on the 
     deficit?
       The authors of this proposal have never claimed that this 
     proposal would balance the budget. However, it will be a 
     useful tool in helping the President and Congress identify 
     and eliminate as much as $10 billion in wasteful or low-
     priority spending each year. Furthermore, the existence of 
     expedited rescission authority will have a cleansing effect 
     on the Appropriations process which will prevent many 
     wasteful programs from being included in the Appropriations 
     bills in the first place. Many of the special interest tax 
     provisions that would be subject to expedited rescission have 
     a considerable cost. It will help ensure that the federal 
     government spends its scarce resources in the most effective 
     way possible and does not divert resources to low-priority 
     programs. Perhaps most importantly, by increasing the 
     accountability of the budget process, it will help restore 
     some credibility to the federal government's handling of 
     taxpayer money with the public. This credibility is necessary 
     if Congress and the President are to gain public support for 
     the tough choices of cutting benefits or raising taxes 
     necessary to balance the budget.
       Would this proposal apply to entitlement programs funded 
     through the appropriations process such as unemployment 
     insurance and food stamps?
       No. Although other versions of expedited rescission 
     legislation would have allowed a President to propose to 
     rescind spending for entitlement programs funded through the 
     regular appropriations bills (as is the case with 
     unemployment insurance and other income support programs), 
     this was changed to clarify that the expedited rescission 
     process does not apply to any entitlement programs.
       Doesn't the expedited rescission process violate the 
     legislative prerogative by requiring action under a specific 
     timetable and preventing amendments to a rescission bill?
       The expedited procedure for consideration of rescission 
     messages in this substitute is similar to fast track 
     procedures for trade agreements or for base closure reports, 
     which have worked relatively well. In fact, the scope of the 
     legislation that would be subject to expedited consideration 
     is much more confined under this procedure than in either 
     trade agreements or base closings.
       Wouldn't allowing the President to submit rescissions 
     throughout the year give the President undue ability to 
     dictate the legislative calendar?
       The substitute preserves the flexibility of Congressional 
     leaders to develop the legislative schedule while ensuring 
     that the President's package is voted on in a timely fashion. 
     It provides that the time allowed for consideration of the 
     bill before a vote is required be counted in legislative days 
     instead of calendar days, ensuring that the House will be in 
     session for ten days after receiving the message before a 
     vote is required. The House could vote on the package any 
     point within the ten legislative days for consideration.
       [[Page H1253]] Could the President propose to lower the 
     spending level of an item, or would he have to eliminate the 
     entire item?
       The President could propose to rescind the budget authority 
     for all or part of any program in an appropriations bill. 
     Consequently the President could, if he so chose, submit a 
     rescission that simply lowered the budget authority for a 
     certain program without eliminating it entirely. In 
     comparison, most line-item veto proposals require the 
     President to propose to eliminate an entire line item in an 
     appropriations bill.
       Would this proposal allow the President to strike 
     legislative language from appropriations bills?
       No. It specifically allows a President to rescind only 
     budget authority provided in an appropriations act and 
     requires that the draft bill submitted by the President have 
     only the effect of canceling budget authority. Legislative 
     language, including limitation riders, would not be subject 
     to this procedure.
       Could the President propose to increase budget authority 
     for a program?
       No. The substitute specifically provides that the President 
     may propose to eliminate or reduce budget authority provided 
     in an appropriations bill. It does not allow the President to 
     propose an increase in budget authority.
       What happens if the President submits a rescission message 
     after Congress recesses for the year?
       The House has ten legislative days to consider the 
     rescission message. Since the time allowed for consideration 
     of the rescission message only counts days that Congress is 
     in session, Congress would not be required to vote on a 
     rescission message until after it returns from recess. 
     However, the funds would not be released for apportionment 
     for proposed rescissions until Congress votes on and defeats 
     a Presidential rescission bill. Congressional leaders would 
     have to decide whether to reconvene Congress to consider the 
     rescission message or to leave the message pending while 
     Congress is in recess. Congress could delay adjourning sine 
     die until the time period in which the President could submit 
     a rescission has expired so that it can reconvene to consider 
     a rescission message if it is submitted after Congress 
     completes all other business. If the funds included in a 
     rescission message are considered by Congress to be 
     important, Congress would have to return to session to vote 
     on the message. If a rescission message is submitted after 
     the first session of the 103rd Congress has adjourned for the 
     year, or if Congress adjourns before the period for 
     consideration of a rescission message expires, the rescission 
     message would remain pending at the beginning of the second 
     session of the 103rd Congress. The House still would be 
     required to vote on the rescission message by the tenth 
     legislative day after the rescission package was submitted.
                                                                    ____

                                   Congressional research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                   Washington, DC, March 31, 1993.
     To: Hon. Charles W. Stenholm.
     From: American Law Division.
     Subject: Validity of the Approval Mechanism in the 
         ``Expedited Consideration Rescissions Act of 1993''.
       Under H.R. 1013, the Expedited Consideration of Proposed 
     Rescissions Act of 1993, as modified, the Budget and 
     Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. 681 et seq., would 
     be amended to provide for a fast-track process for 
     considering and voting on presidential proposals embodied in 
     a bill or joint resolution to rescind budget authority 
     provided in an appropriations act. If the President submits 
     rescission proposals within three days after enactment of an 
     appropriations measure, a legislative process is triggered 
     whereby a House floor vote may be had within 10 legislative 
     days after receipt of the proposal, and a Senate floor vote 
     will be held within 10 days after transmittal of the House-
     passed measure. The resultant legislative action is subject 
     to the President's veto.
       You inquire whether the proposed rescission process 
     embodies a legislative veto proscribed under the Supreme 
     Court's ruling in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and 
     subsequent cases,\1\ or is otherwise violative of the 
     constitutionally mandated lawmaking process prescribed by 
     Article I, rec. 7. For the reasons set forth below, we do not 
     believe it is.
     \1\Process Gas Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 
     1216 (1983)(one-House veto of rules invalid); United States 
     Senate v. F.T.C. 463 U.S. 1216 (1987)(two-House veto of rules 
     invalid).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The constitutional defect of the legislative veto disclosed 
     by the Chadha Court was that Congress sought to exercise its 
     legislative power without complying with the constitutionally 
     mandated requirements for lawmaking: bicameral passage and 
     presentation to the President for his signature or veto. 
     There, and in two subsequent cases, the Court found unlawful 
     legislative actions which sought to accomplish the reversal 
     of exercises of executive actions taken pursuant to lawfully 
     delegated authority without presentation to the President. 
     But the Court carefully noted in Chadha that it was not 
     casting doubt on so-called ``report and wait'' provisions 
     which it had previously approved in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 
     312 U.S. 1 (1941). Under such provisions a proposed executive 
     action does not become effective unless a specified 
     contingency occurs, i.e., a set period of time passes without 
     congressional action preventing it from going into effect or 
     Congress takes affirmative legislative action approving its 
     effectiveness.
       H.R. 1013, as modified, utilizes both methods of contingent 
     legislation. For all rescission recommendations a 
     presidential proposal does not become effective unless it is 
     approved by a bill or joint resolution with 10 legislative 
     days of continuous session after the date on which the bill 
     or joint resolution is received by the House, and an 
     additional 10 legislative days after it is transmitted by the 
     House to the Senate for consideration. Rescission proposals 
     cannot become effective unless affirmatively enacted into 
     law. Both methods comply with Chadha since the legislative 
     action to be taken meets the constitutional requirements of 
     bicameralism and presentment. Moreover, under the proposed 
     contingency scheme, the Executive has not been delegated any 
     legislative authority at all; he has been directed to 
     recommend and that proposal has no legal effect unless 
     Congress gives it such effect through further legislation. 
     Thus it is a classic reporting provision of the type approved 
     in Sibbach. Similar report and wait mechanisms requiring 
     affirmative legislative action have been enacted several 
     times since Chadha. See, e.g., Reorganization Act Amendments 
     of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, sec. 3(a)(1), 98 Stat. 3192 
     (1984); Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1916-1918, 1935-1937 
     (1984)(proscription on use of intelligence agency funds for 
     Nicaragua); Pub. L. No. 98-441, 98 Stat. 1701 
     (1984)(obligating funds for MX missile).

                                             Morton Rosenberg,

                                            Specialist in American
     Public Law.
                                                                    ____

                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                   Washington, DC, March 30, 1993.
     To: Hon. Charles Stenholm.
     From: American Law Division.
     Subject: Application of Rescission Authority to ``Tax 
         Expenditures.
       This memorandum provides, at your request, quick analysis 
     of whether the same constitutional principles that govern 
     application of rescission authority to appropriated funds 
     apply as well to rescission of ``tax expenditures.'' We 
     understand as well that the requested context for analysis is 
     H.R. 1013, a bill entitled ``Expedited Consideration of 
     Proposed Rescissions Act of 1993.'' It is proposed that 
     language be added to that bill adding ``tax expenditures'' as 
     a category within which the President may trigger expedited 
     congressional consideration of proposed rescission 
     legislation.
       Some background may be helpful. The same constitutional 
     principles govern application of rescission authority to 
     ``appropriations'' and to ``tax expenditures.'' These 
     governing principles are set out in previously prepared 
     memoranda enclosed for your review: ``Constitutionality of 
     Granting President Enhanced Budget Rescission Authority,'' 
     June 27, 1989; and ``Adequacy of Standards in Bill Granting 
     President Enhanced Budget Rescission Authority,'' July 21, 
     1989, both by Johnny H. Killian, Senior Specialist in 
     American Constitutional Law, CRS. The basic issue raised by 
     actual conferral of rescission authority on the President 
     involves delegation of legislative authority, and whether 
     there are adequate standards set forth in the law so that it 
     can be determined whether the executive has complied with the 
     legislative will. In 1989 the Supreme Court held in Skinner 
     v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 223, that the same 
     principles govern delegation of taxing authority that govern 
     delegation of Congress' other authority.
       ``[T]he delegation of discretionary authority under 
     Congress' taxing power is subject to no constitutional 
     scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other 
     nondelegation challenges. Congress may wisely choose to be 
     more circumspect in delegating authority under the Taxing 
     Clause than under other of its enumerated powers, but this is 
     not a heightened degree of prudence required by the 
     Constitution.''
       We note, however, that no constitutional delegation issues 
     are posed by H.R. 1013 or the proposed amendment. Instead, 
     the bill merely provides for expedited congressional 
     consideration of presidential proposals that Congress enact 
     legislation authorizing rescission of ``any budget authority 
     provided in an appropriations Act.'' No authority to 
     effectuate a rescission, to exercise a line-item veto, or 
     otherwise to nullify statutory enactments would be conferred 
     on the President by the bill. Inclusion of ``tax 
     expenditures'' along with budget authority as a category 
     about which the President may propose legislation that will 
     receive expedited consideration does nothing to change this 
     basic fact that the bill contains no delegation of rescission 
     or taxing authority.
       With or without a delegation of authority, the principal 
     constitutional distinction between the categories of budget 
     authority and tax expenditures is the requirement of Art. I, 
     Sec. 7, cl. 1 that all bills for raising revenue shall 
     originate in the House of Representatives. A bill providing 
     for ``tax expenditures'' (currently defined in 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 622(3) as ``revenue losses attributable to provisions of 
     the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, 
     exemption, or deduction . . . or which provide a special 
     credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
     liability'') might also include measures for raising 
     revenues, 
      [[Page H1254]] and a bill providing for repeal of tax 
     expenditures could be considered to be a bill for raising 
     revenues.
       A further point. The President has the power conferred by 
     Art. II. Sec. 3 of the Constitution to ``recommend to 
     [Congress'] consideration such measures as he shall judge 
     necessary and expedient,'' and Congress of course cannot 
     prevent the President from proposing consideration of 
     legislation, including legislation that would rescind budget 
     authority or repeal tax expenditures. In conferring authority 
     to propose rescissions that will be subject to expedited 
     consideration by the Congress, the bill also restricts the 
     President's authority to make a second such request and does 
     not explicitly tie that restriction to operation of the 
     expedited procedures. The bill would add a new section 1013 
     to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
     1974, and subsection (a) would provide in part that ``[f]unds 
     made available for obligation under this procedure may not be 
     proposed for rescission again under this section or section 
     1012.'' A reasonable implication of ``proposed . . . under 
     this section or section 1012'' is that a proposal may be 
     submitted independently of the cited authority, and that the 
     only restriction is that the expedited procedures authorized 
     by the new section or in connection with existing section 
     1012 would not be operative. Thus, while the language can and 
     should be interpreted to avoid any constitutional issue that 
     would be created by interference with the President's 
     authority under the Constitution to make recommendations to 
     Congress, a more direct statement tying the restriction to 
     operation of the expedited procedures could eliminate any 
     basis for question.

                                              George Costello,

                                             Legislative Attorney,
                                            American Law Division.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss].
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to the distinguished 
gentleman who brought this point forward that we have been watching and 
listening very carefully. We agree, at least I agree and I think others 
do, too, that what he is proposing does strengthen the present 
expedited rescission process, which is extremely weak. It never 
requires a vote; doing nothing spends the money. That is too much 
temptation for almost anybody to overcome, and I think we are proof 
that that temptation is true and is not overcomeable.
  I think the gentleman has some good ideas. We have gone back and 
taken a look at section 904 of the Budget Act and matched that up with 
the gentleman's title II section under the requirement to make 
available for obligation and his reliance on the antideficiency 
process. I believe there is some area to work in there. I do not think 
it is quite right.
  I would like to state to the gentleman I hope to work with him in 
cleaning up the budget process. We would like to take a clear shot at 
this one for the tough two-thirds disapproval vote, which is primarily 
our main concern. We are worried about the confusion. I do think the 
gentleman has some good ideas which are worthy of further attention as 
we clean up the budget process.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, in closing, I want to commend the Committee on Rules 
for giving us an open rule in which we had a very, I think, thorough 
debate on a whole range of issues surrounding the line item veto 
authority. With regard to the Stenholm-Spratt amendment, I would only 
say that it complicates matters and that H.R. 2 freestanding is the 
strongest line item veto authority that we could give the President. 
President Clinton asked for the strongest version, his budget director 
asked for the strongest version, and this bill is the strongest version 
that we could give the President to help him reduce the deficit and 
discipline the budget process.
  I would also say that the Congressional Research Service has issued a 
report on its constitutionality. But the larger issue, Mr. Chairman, is 
that the line item veto has been kicking around up here on Capitol Hill 
for a very, very long time. We have an opportunity tonight to give the 
President this tool and to do something tangible about our Federal 
budget deficit and about the expenditures in our yearly budgeting 
process.
  I urge this House to tonight pass the line item veto authority for 
the President, send it over to the other body, and ultimately to give 
the President this important tool.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. 
The President should have the power to rescind wasteful spending. But 
it is also important that once the President flags wasteful line-items 
and targeted tax benefits, that Congress should share the role of 
acting on wasteful spending and acting quickly. The balance of power 
between the executive and legislative branches must be preserved. One 
should not be given greater power to identify and rescind government 
spending. The framers of our Constitution did not foresee the need to 
give greater rescission power to one or the other, nor should we.
  In practice, several appropriation bills can reach the President's 
desk at the same time. The President should be given the flexibility to 
offer a package of rescissions at anytime and Congress should then act 
to quickly approve or disapprove of that package. We have already 
rejected a substitute that would have provided greater flexibility for 
rescinding funds while not tipping the balance of power. I urge my 
colleagues not to reject this kind
 of common sense a second time. The approach offered by this amendment 
preserves the balance of power between the executive and legislative 
branches, and that is what the public wants. The public wants an 
efficient government that moves quickly to eliminate wasteful spending. 
The public does not want a single person or one-third of Congress to be 
able to protect targeted spending.

  I believe it's ironic that at a time when most of the public does not 
want Washington controlled by a select few with narrow interests, and 
our colleagues from the other side of the aisle keep talking about 
spreading power beyond the beltway, that they keep reverting to 
procedures within Congress that give enormous power to a minority of 
our Members. Let's do something that makes sense. I urge my colleagues 
to support this amendment.
  Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of February 3, 1995, 
further proceedings on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] will be postponed.
  The point of order of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

                             {time}   1750


                      announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February 
3, 1995, proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which 
further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
  The amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Orton], the 
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters], and 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.
                     amendment offered by mr. orton

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from Utah [Mr. Orton] for a recorded vote on which further proceedings 
were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.


                             recorded vote

  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This is a 15-minute vote, to be followed by several 5-
minute votes.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 65, 
noes 360, not voting 9, as follows:
                             [Roll No. 91]

                                AYES--65

     Andrews
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TX)
     Coleman
     Condit
     Dellums
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Furse
     Gibbons
     Gutierrez
     Hoyer
     Inglis
     Johnson (SD)
     Kasich
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     McHale
     Meehan
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Obey
     Orton
     Pallone
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Rivers
     Rohrabacher
     Royce
     Sabo
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     [[Page H1255]] Visclosky
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wyden
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--360

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Flake
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Istook
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDermott
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Becerra
     Bryant (TN)
     Ford
     Frost
     Jefferson
     McDade
     Mollohan
     Tucker
     Watts (OK)

                              {time}  1808

  Ms. JACKSON-LEE and Messrs. FATTAH, FOGLIETTA, and LEWIS of Georgia 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Messrs. SKAGGS, McHALE, INGLIS of South Carolina, Ms. ESHOO, Mrs. 
MALONEY, and Ms. PELOSI changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
                      announcement by the chairman

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February 
3, 1995, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 
minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device 
will be taken on each further amendment on which the Chair has 
postponed further proceedings.


                    amendment offered by ms. waters

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentlewoman 
from California [Ms. Waters] for a recorded vote on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 144, 
noes 280, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 92]

                               AYES--144

     Abercrombie
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hamilton
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Jackson-Lee
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Mascara
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pomeroy
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Rivers
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--280

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brownback
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Costello
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Martini
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     [[Page H1256]] Molinari
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Becerra
     Bryant (TN)
     Chenoweth
     Ford
     Frost
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     McDade
     Tucker
     Watts (OK)

                              {time}  1818

  Messrs. MARTINEZ, CRAMER, MOLLOHAN, TAYLOR of Mississippi, and WYDEN 
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
    amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. stenholm

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] for a recorded vote on which further 
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice 
vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The Clerk redesignated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This is a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 156, 
noes 266, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 93]

                               AYES--156

     Ackerman
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Cardin
     Chapman
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Condit
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Eshoo
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Jackson-Lee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Levin
     Lincoln
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Moakley
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Nadler
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Pastor
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--266

     Abercrombie
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brown (FL)
     Brownback
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Cox
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Stump
     Talent
     Tate
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Becerra
     Bryant (TN)
     Crane
     Ford
     Frost
     Gekas
     Jefferson
     McDade
     Morella
     Peterson (MN)
     Tucker
     Watts (OK)

                              {time}  1825

  Mr. RANGEL changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2.
  (Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend her remarks.)
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2 on 
constitutional grounds. The issue is the principle of separation of 
powers. The line-item veto power that H.R. 2 grants to the President 
violates this principle. The Constitution states that all legislative 
power resides in the Congress, article I, section 1. It provides only 
that a bill can be returned unsigned by the President which then to 
become law must have a two-thirds vote of approval, article I, section 
7. Further the Constitution states that it is the Congress that has the 
power to collect taxes, pay debts, and to provide for the general 
welfare, article I, section 8. Finally and most importantly the 
Constitution states that ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury 
but in consequence of appropriations made by law.''
  No bill passed by this Congress can alter the clear meaning and 
intent of the Constitution. Only a constitutional amendment can change 
that. H.R. 2 is a simple bill. It is not a constitutional amendment. If 
the proponents of this idea were serious, they would propose a 
Constitutional amendment and not try to circumvent the constitution.
  Why didn't the committee go the constitutional amendment route? I 
have to assume that it is because they realize that the people of this 
country are not prepared to give any President even more power than he 
already possesses, and because the idea of giving one-third of the 
House and the Senate the power to kill a duly enacted appropriations 
item was a subversion of the basic concept of majority rule.
  The legislative process would be seriously skewed if the line
item veto were interjected.  [[Page H1257]] Items could be added 
knowing that the President could remove them. Majority will would be 
compromised. The President could use the veto power to punish Members 
who did not go along with the White House on key votes. Small States 
would be especially vulnerable.
  During the course of this debate an expedited judicial review 
amendment was accepted. This acknowledges the very point that I make. 
That this bill is incompatible with the Constitution of the United 
States.
  Further, this bill would grant power to the President to item veto 
targeted tax benefits. Another word to describe what a targeted tax 
benefit is a tax loophole. The bill initially allowed the President 
veto power only over tax loopholes which affected five or fewer people. 
The committee extended this veto power to tax loopholes affecting 100 
or less taxpayers. We should not be protecting any special tax loophole 
no matter what the size of the group receiving this selective treatment 
under the Tax Code. No matter how we stand on this issue of the line-
item veto, we ought not be protecting a group of taxpayers merely 
because there are more than 100 of them in the group. If it is a bad 
loophole, the President ought to have the power to veto it no matter 
whether if affects 100 or 5,000 taxpayers or more. This selective 
treatment of targeted tax benefits by number of taxpayers who enjoy it, 
is clearly inequitable and should be stricken from the bill to allow 
the President power to strike any and all of them.
  I do not understand the rationale of those who argue that the line-
item veto is needed to balance the budget. The record will show that 
the Congress has systematically underspent the President's budget 
recommendations. Further, the Congress has exceeded the President's 
rescissions submitted to the Congress after the appropriations bills 
have been signed into law. Over the past 20 years the President has 
proposed $72 billion in rescissions and the Congress has passed $92 
billion in rescissions, $20 billion more than the President.
  Finally, the most egregious power granted to the President under this 
bill is not only that he can veto any item in an appropriations bill, 
but he can reduce any discretionary budget authority. This is 
tantamount to Congress abdicating the power to appropriate. The 
Constitution clearly grants to Congress the legislative power to 
appropriate. Only the Congress can by majority vote decide against 
funding a project and only Congress can cut the funding of a project or 
of a department.
  If the Congress, for instance, votes by a majority vote to fund the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, or Head Start, it is inconceivable 
that we would allow the President to not only rescind this decision or 
veto it, but to also reduce the funding which then can only be reversed 
by a two-thirds vote. What this means is that one-third of the House 
and the Senate will ultimately decide what gets funded and what does 
not.
  The foundations of our democracy will be shattered. However you feel 
about congressional funding decisions, there is no justification for 
enlarging the power of the President to appropriate money as well as to 
rescind. The tyranny of one-third of the Congress in combination with 
the White House could cut funding of programs that a clear majority of 
the people of this country support.
  If we are to submit our spending bills to this inordinate executive 
power, then surely it should only be by constitutional amendment.
  If this measure went to the States for ratification as a 
constitutional amendment, it clearly would fail to receive the three-
fourths vote of 38 States. Thirteen small States could see the 
handwriting on the wall, and not vote to ratify. I suspect this is why 
the line-item veto is not being proposed as a constitutional amendment. 
It simply would not be ratified.
  I urge H.R. 2 be voted down. It is an unwarranted invasion of the 
most important legislative powers granted to the Congress by the 
Constitution.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended.
  The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed 
to.


                          ____________________