[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 23 (Monday, February 6, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1236-H1257]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
{time} 1610
LINE-ITEM VETO ACT
The Committee resumed its sitting.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania is to be commended for
his attempt to protect that part of the bill that speaks to the 100
entities, and I understand that that is a very small attempt to talk
about fairness in a certain way. Certainly we need to do that.
We need to say that if there is any tax legislation that will benefit
as few as 100 entities, then something is wrong with that, because both
you and I and others know far too well that we have had legislation in
this Congress that benefited one or two persons, and certainly it is
usually those who are well connected, the rich and the powerful who
have influence with a particular elected official who are able to do
that.
And I am saying, yes, let us have that measure of protection, but let
us go a little bit further. I think it is important for us to go a
little bit further, because it has been documented time and time again
that the top 1 percent in this society have a disproportionate share of
the wealth. And as I cited in my opening remarks, the tax income of the
families in the top 1 percent of income has increased from 7.3 percent
of all U.S. earnings to 12.3 percent.
I think we can in this legislation put a stop to that. We are simply
saying if there is anything that is put together that allows that top 1
percent to further benefit, if there is anything that is done that
allows the top 10 percent to have over 50 percent of the tax breaks,
then we need to give the President the opportunity to veto it, and this
is no small matter.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania identifies that this would in some
way have too great an influence on tax policy. That is precisely what I
wish it to do. I wish it to do that, because at some point in time we
must send a signal to the American people that somebody is doing the
business of the average working person in this Congress. The average
working man or woman does not have a lobbyist here. They cannot be
represented but by the people they elect to represent them.
Sometimes we get a little bit too insulated, and oftentimes when we
produce tax policy, as we did in 1981 during the Reagan years where we
allowed the selling of tax credits and major corporations in America
ended up paying no taxes, if I recall during that time, many of the top
corporations, Fortune 500 corporations in America, ended up paying no
taxes. General Motors ended up paying no taxes. They even got a tax
rebate.
At the same time, the taxes of the average working person have
increased, and so I am saying we can take a big step as we give the
line-item veto to the President of the United States and say:
Mr. President, it looks fishy if what we have done allows
the top 10 percent to get over 50 percent of the tax breaks
in anything that we have done. So we want to make sure that
we protect against that.
And we are going to allow this line-item veto to operate under those
circumstances. I do not think it is too much to ask. I know we do not
oftentimes think like that. We do not oftentimes think that we can take
the broad strokes on behalf of just average working Americans, but I am
saying with this line-item veto, which is rather novel, which is quite
different, that it is big enough. It is creative enough to allow room
for some more creativity.
And I am simply saying that we can broaden the measure of protection
and not just do a very small thing such as protect against 100
entities, but we can protect the majority of Americans if we have the
will to do so.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my amendment be adopted.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentlewoman for
addressing this amendment, as well, on this subject. It is a subject we
took up under the Slaughter amendment on these targeted tax credits,
and how we do it.
I do not agree with the amendment. I hope the fact they have the
amendment indicates that perhaps the gentlewoman will support the line-
item veto legislation with or without the amendment.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, all things are
possible.
Mr. GOSS. That is good, We are making progress.
Mr. Chairman, I think there are a couple of things that need to be
clarified.
The last time I heard about a change in the tax rate it seems to me
there was a special top rate including a surtax of up to 39.6 percent
for the people at the top end of the scale, and actually those cuts
that I believe the gentlewoman was referring to back in 1981 for the
rich were cuts for every American who were paying taxes.
But I am glad that she has brought that up on Reagan's birthday,
because I think the idea of trying to get spending under control and
reduce taxation is something President Reagan stood for.
With regard to the amendment itself particularly, I am a little
concerned that we have a very vague definition here, ``income
earners.'' Now, that would presumably excuse coupon clippers from this,
or people from rents, royalties and other types of income, perhaps
pensions, that are not earned income under that definition. I am not
sure where stock options or other things like that would come in.
Certainly when you start talking about large corporations under the
definition that is being used in H.R. 2, I would point out that large
corporations pay an awful lot of wages to blue collar workers who
depend on those to keep food on the table and shelter over their head.
So I think maybe it has been mischaracterized a little bit for what it
would do, and I would, therefore, be opposed to it. But I am glad the
gentlewoman has an interest in this subject.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time. I
would just simply close.
I thought it was very important that we try and strike a blow for the
people. I really do believe that we are at a time in our society when
people are very unhappy with the way public policy is made, with
elected officials in general.
I have watched over the past 10 years or so as we have exported jobs
of Americans to third world countries for cheap labor; I have watched
wage earners be able to buy less with their dollars; I am watching
young people with an inability to purchase their own home, to have a
down payment, I am watching as the rich get richer basically, and the
poor get poorer.
I really do believe that somehow we have to use this forum to begin
to engage each other in a debate about what are we going to do for the
average wage earner. What are we going to do to represent their
interest?
I know that many people believe that we know best and that somehow
whatever we do is all right. I do not think so anymore.
[[Page H1237]]
I think there are a lot of bright people in this body. I think there
are a lot of well-meaning people in this body. But however bright and
well meaning we are, we have not done a good job for the average
working person who is earning less and less, and able to purchase less
and less, is extremely unhappy. They are unhappy with us because we
have not been able to represent their interests.
I would simply ask that we adopt this amendment. This amendment would
send a signal that we in fact care about those who work every day, and
that we are not here simply to do the bidding of those who were well
connected, those who have already a disproportionate share of the
income, and those who are very powerful.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds just to suggest
to the gentlewoman that she is a very articulate and forceful and
powerful advocate for the very people she is concerned about being
affected by this.
{time} 1620
I am very confident that it is unlikely that any such overreaching in
terms of tax policy is going to occur which would warrant the President
having this veto so long as the gentlewoman from California [Ms.
Waters] is here to defend those interests, which she does so well.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, at a time when many people are decrying our
Tax Code as too complicated, the amendment offered by the gentlewoman
from California would increase that complexity. How would the President
determine if a tax credit provided half its benefit to 10 percent of
the population? In order to accelerate the process, the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight shortened the length of time the
President had to submit rescissions. Trying to determine who will reap
what benefits will likely take longer than the deadline allows.
Mr. Chairman, it is unclear what is meant in this amendment. Does it
mean that half of the beneficiaries will be in the top 10-percent
income bracket, or does it mean that half of all the revenues lost
would be lost to the top 10 percent?
In addition, the committee accepted an amendment offered by a
Democrat which broadened the definition of targeted tax breaks to a
hundred or fewer taxpayers. This House has already resoundingly turned
back an attempt to alter that and should do likewise with this
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let us give the President the strongest line-item veto
possible, one that is narrowly and clearly defined and able to let the
President get the job done. I ask that the House oppose the
gentlewoman's amendment
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUTE. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. WATERS. Will the gentleman agree that, if we take any steps that
would give 10 percent in our society 50 percent of the tax breaks, that
something would be wrong with that, that that would not be fair? Would
the gentleman agree?
Mr. BLUTE. I am sorry; would the gentlewoman repeat that?
Ms. WATERS. If we adopted any measures that would give 10 percent of
our society 50 percent of the tax breaks, would the gentleman agree
that that would be unequal and unfair?
Mr. BLUTE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would only say, reclaiming my time
from the gentlewoman, that implicit in that argument is that all income
belongs to the Federal Government and that the Federal Government
should decide how they will share it with each taxpayer. Tax cuts are
not Government giveaways. It is simply less taking of people's
earnings.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Idaho [Mrs. Chenoweth] who has some general comments on the legislation
we are considering this afternoon.
Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to revise and
extend my remarks and that my remarks appear during the general debate.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman
from Idaho?
There was no objection.
Mrs. CHENOWETH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the line-item
veto.
Mr. Chairman, I have heard as a major argument in support of the
line-item veto, as suggested by former President Ronald Reagan, that we
should, quote, give the President the same authority that 43 Governors
use in their States, and whereas I adore Ronald Reagan and I believe he
was an impetus to believe, have the people believe in America again, we
must not confuse the powers given to the States with the powers given
to the Federal Government by the Constitution. There is a distinct
difference between the authority allowed for State governors and
authority given to the President.
The States, according to the 10th amendment, are given more leeway as
they formulate their own laws. The 10th amendment says that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
their people, and therefore individual States may give their Governors
line item veto authority, but we may not give the President that
authority delegated only to the Congress because article I, section 1,
states all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, and this section specifically states that it
is the Congress that has the power. Since Congress was given this power
by the Constitution, Congress cannot give this power to the President
to formulate legislation.
This violates, this law, H.R. 2, violates the separation of powers.
This bill gives to the President the ability to form and to shape
legislation proffered by the Congress by allowing him to cut out parts
of an appropriations or revenue bill for continued legislative
consideration while allowing him to approve other parts of the passed
legislation. The President has no role under article I, section 1, in
legislating or shaping law.
The Founding Fathers were correct in instilling the separation of
powers, and they had reflected on and examined thousands of years of
world history and have established the negative effect of when the
ruling powers were allowed to thread upon one another's jurisdiction.
It was Montesquieu's fundamental contention that men entrusted with
powers to abuse it would abuse it, and hence it was desirable to divide
the powers of government first in order to keep to a minimum the powers
lodged in any one single organ of the government, and, second, in order
to be able to oppose organ to organ.
Federalist No. 76, which is stated in the Federalist Papers which the
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] our Speaker, asked us to read,
and I read, does state that, without the one separation or the other,
the former would be unable to defend itself against the depredations of
power of the latter, and he might gradually be stripped of his
authorities by successive resolutions.
I ask this body to be very cautions in this vote to make sure that we
are not giving powers to the President that the Constitution
specifically gives only to the Congress.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, just in closing I would urge a no vote on
this amendment. I think that the amendment, while well intentioned, is
really irrelevant to this bill. I think the question of the kind of
outrageous attacks on a bill that might be passed here should clearly
be thought out in subcommittee, and committee and on the floor of this
House, but I think it is irrelevant to say that we should give the
President this line item veto.
The CHAIRMAN. All time having expired, the question is on the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February
3, 1995, further proceedings on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters] will be postponed.
Are there further amendments to the bill?
[[Page H1238]] amendment offered by mr. clinger
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Clinger: In section 3(a)(1),
strike ``unless'' and all that follows through the period and
insert the following: ``unless, during the period described
in subsection (b), there is enacted into law a rescission/
receipts disapproval bill that disapproves the rescission of
that amount of budget authority.''.
In section 4(l), insert ``, as introduced,'' after
``which''.
Mr. CLINGER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is a technical amendment which simply cleans up
two minor drafting changes omitted when the House adopted the amendment
offered by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. Thurman] earlier in this
debate on this measure. The Thurman amendment permits 50 Members to
move to strike an individual rescission or tax benefit repeal. This
amendment corrects H.R. 2 to fully conform the bill to our acceptance
of the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs.
Thurman]----
The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman would suspend, the chair must inquire
whether this amendment was included in the order of February 3?
Mr. CLINGER. Of the unanimous consent request of that evening?
It was not included in that. I thought I would be permitted to offer
a strictly technical amendment, I believe it has been approved by both
sides. There will be no debate on it. I just wanted to offer it at this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to offer the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. An order of the House cannot be superseded by an order
of the Committee of the Whole.
The Committee of the Whole may not materially vary an order of the
House.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. CLINGER. Would it be in order to offer this amendment when we sit
in the House?
The CHAIRMAN. In response to the gentleman's inquiry, only a order of
the House can make this amendment in order, and once we are back in the
House, the gentleman could inquire of the House whether to make it in
order to be considered.
Mr. CLINGER. At that point it would be appropriate to ask unanimous
consent to have the House consider it in order?
{time} 1630
The CHAIRMAN. For that, the Committee of the Whole would have to
rise. Then the House would have to move back to the Committee of the
Whole for the consideration of the amendment.
Because the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Clinger] was not in order under the previous order of the House, the
proceedings are vacated on that amendment.
amendment offered by mr. tauzin
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment that is in order.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Tauzin: Section 2 is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
(d) Special Rule.--Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the
case of fiscal years 1996 through 2002, the President may
only rescind any budget authority or veto any targeted tax
benefit under that subsection necessary to reduce the
projected deficit for the fiscal year to which that
rescission or veto pertains to the level set forth below:
Maximum deficit level
Fiscal year: In billions of dollars
1996.............................................................$174
1997..............................................................155
1998..............................................................116
1999...............................................................71
2000...............................................................59
2001...............................................................26
2002 and thereafter.................................................0
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House, the gentleman from
Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the other day as we debated the issue of the line-item
veto itself, I noticed to the Members of the House the likelihood of my
offering this amendment in the Committee of the Whole. This amendment
is called the glide path amendment and is offered in an attempt to make
the line-item veto a more practicable, workable solution to a problem
that plagues this Congress and has plagued Congresses in years past.
The graph on my right, as I indicated earlier, is a confusion of
metaphors, but nevertheless accomplishes the purposes intended. The
graph at the right indicates the CBO estimates of where this Congress
needs to be every time we have an appropriation for the next budget
year if we are in fact to accomplish the purposes of the balanced
budget amendment recently sent to the Senate, and if we are in fact to
balance the budget by the year 2002.
For example, in the next fiscal year, 1996, we are expected to have
no more than about $174 billion in deficit if we are to be on the path
that takes us to this balanced budget, as we have dedicated ourselves
to when we adopted the balanced budget amendment.
Each year thereafter, the deficit must be reduced pursuant to this
graph if we are to reach that point by the year 2002.
Now, if you saw recently in the news the President's announcement of
his budget plans for the next 5 years, you will be astounded to find
out that the President is proposing that we stay at $200 billion
deficit for the next 5 years. His budget plans as outlined just
yesterday indicate that for the the next fiscal year, 1996, he is
proposing a $200 billion deficit. For the year 1997, he is proposing a
$200 billion deficit. For the year 1998, approximately a $200 billion
deficit. In fact, to use the analogy of this football field, he would
have us stepping out of bounds a few of those years, running over
cheerleaders and the bands and everything else on the sideline. We
would simply never begin to get on this glide path to the line-item
veto, and that is unfortunate.
That means, of course, we here in Congress are going to have to do a
better job than the President yesterday proposed if we are going to
carry out the promise we made to the American people in a contract
signed by many Members here to carry out the promise
of a balanced budget amendment by the year 2002.Now, what the
glidepath amendment to this bill does is it attempts to make the line-
item veto a very practicable tool to be used by this Congress, the
Presidency, and the American people, in achieving these numbers.
Now, why do I suggest it? I suggest it because in three out of the
four States that have a line-item veto, those States provide that the
line-item veto is used by the Governor to delete from the budget bill
approved by the legislature any appropriations he deems necessary to
reduce their budgets down to a balanced budget.
The bill as it comes before us today is written very similarly. It
says in effect that the President of the United States, when we adopt
the line-item veto later today, would have the authority to strike from
our budgets each year any appropriation he deems necessary in order to
reduce the deficit.
Now, here is the problem. Unlike the States that have that a line-
item veto, we cannot pass a balanced budget for next year. If you
believe we can, please raise your hand. I do not see any hands. And if
all the Members were here, I would probably not see many hands.
The bottom line is we cannot find $200 billion of spending cuts in
the next years's budget, and everybody knows it. The best we can do is
get on this glidepath that takes us to a balanced budget by the year
2002.
So what authority ought we give the President during this 7 year
period when Congress should be responsible enough to stay on this
glidepath not to adopt budgets that give us $200 billion deficits each
year. It seems to me the practicable way in which to use a line-
[[Page H1239]] item veto and to enforce responsibility in this
Congress is to say that the Presidents should use that line-item veto
authority to excise from the budget every expenditure that rises above
this line in order to enforce responsibility in this Congress, to
ensure that we stay on this glidepath, that we land safely in the year
2002 with a balanced budget.
Now, I understand that my friends on the Republican side are not
going to accept this amendment, and I understand why. They want to
think about it some more. They want to think whether or not this
derogates from the contract provisions of a line-item veto, and I
appreciate that, and for that reason I will not even ask for a recorded
vote today.
But I did want to bring it up. I think it is the most practicable way
to make this thing work, to enforce responsibility in the House, to
ensure that this House and the other body lives up to the promise of
the balanced budget amendment and delivers each year a budget that
meets the CBO estimates, that gets us to the balanced budget by the
year 2002.
The amendment also provides once we hit that balanced budget in the
year 2002, that every year thereafter the President would have a line-
item veto, every year, to excise from the budget any expenditure that
went above the balanced budget from the year 2002 thereafter. So unlike
the sunset amendment that came earlier, that I think was an amendment
to weaken this bill, this amendment actually strengthens it, and makes
it in fact more workable.
Now, I want to caution my friends in the Republican Party who have
signed what I consider to be a pretty dog-gone good Contract With
America, many of its provisions will find a great deal of support, as
you did in the last few weeks, from Democrats in this body who have
long fought for things like unfunded mandates, have long fought for a
balanced budget amendment, long fought for property rights amendments
and reform of some of the regulatory processes, long fought for
lowering the taxes on businesses and workers in America, particularly
the taxes that act as a disincentive to investment and job creation in
our society. That is why so many of us have cosponsored so many of the
features of the contract. We have in fact pursued those bills ourselves
for many years.
But I want to caution you. If we are going to pass into law, into a
law that really works for the American people, the provisions of that
contract, not just to vote on them today, pass them in the House and
see them die in the Senate, not to just pass them even in the Senate
and see them vetoed by the President, not even just to pass them and
see them become law and then fail because we have not written them
properly, my caution is let us do it right the first time. Make sure
when we pass a line-item veto it really works for the purposes
intended, that it works to discipline the Congress, to ensure that we
follow the promises we made when we adopted the balanced budget
amendment just a week or so ago, and that we do in fact get on a glide
path that gets us down safely to a balanced budget by the year 2002.
This amendment is an attempt to do that. It is offered in a very
friendly fashion. I will vote for the line-item veto without this
amendment.
{time} 1640
I only hope that my friends on the other side who believe as I do, as
strongly as I do, in the line-item veto, in fact, as they saw just
recently, I even voted against exempting highway funding from the line-
item veto. If they believe as strongly as I do in it, then work to see
possibly in the process that an amendment like this gets considered,
perhaps in the conference between the House and the Senate, perhaps
somewhere along the way, that when we get through we have an amendment,
a line-item veto probably that really works for the good that we
intended it for, that it works to discipline this body toward a
balanced budget by the year 2002 and does not unnecessarily,
unnecessarily reshape the balance of powers so critical in our
Constitution.
Let me make that final point. This grant of a line-item veto
authority, as the States have given their Governors, as we are about to
give it to the Presidency, is an extraordinary grant. It says to the
President, you have more authority, rather than just veto an entire
bill to take on the entire Congress on a bill, it gives the authority
to the President to take on every single Member of the House and Senate
and every line they write in every bill that appropriates money in this
Nation. And it requires two-thirds of the body to overrule him. That is
a pretty strong grant of authority, pretty extraordinary.
I think we can constitutionally do that. But I think we ought to
limit it to the cases where the Congress has failed to meet its
responsibility, failed to live up to its obligation to balance our
accounts, failed to stay, if Members will, on this glide path that gets
us to a balanced budget and eventually stays in a balanced budget
posture after the year 2002.
If we grant this extraordinary authority for that purpose and that
purpose alone, I think we will have written a good bill today. If we
create a new authority in the President that has nothing to do with
congressional responsibility, which allows the President to take on any
Member of this House and Senate regardless of whether this body has
been responsible, then perhaps we are going too far and we ought to
think about that before we finally adopt this bill. Mr. Chairman, I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] is
recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman for
yielding time to me.
I, too, rise in opposition, but very reluctantly. My good friend, the
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin] I think has explained his
glidepath on a football field very well. First, that glidepath is so
steep it pops my ears every time I think of going down it. Then when I
get to the bottom of it, I see there is not a landing field. I think
there is probably a brick wall there. And I do jest a bit.
I want to let the gentleman know, we have given this a lot of
thought. It is an intriguing idea. It gets away, though, from what we
are trying to do.
Basically what the gentleman is saying, that the President loses his
line-item veto if we happen to hit our reduction targets year by year.
That seems like a very intriguing proposition. The problem is those
sort of moving targets. I am not sure exactly who is going to set them.
I have got a list here, CBO. CBO is always very good and without any,
usually, challenge to their targets. That causes me some concern that
somebody might challenge them. Those are the kind of pragmatics I have
and am a little bit concerned about.
I guess there are some other points, too, that are more generic. What
we are trying to do here is get a handle on wasteful spending. And the
reason we are trying to do that is for two purposes. It is to get rid
of wasteful spending, spending that is unnecessary, redundant, off
target, not necessary, out-of-date programs, all of those things. And
we should encourage the President to do that any time. That should not
just be relative to the deficit. That is something we should never do.
We should always give some kind of encouragement.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
While I agree that that is a good idea, that is not what the bill
does. The bill refers only to deficit-reduction line-item veto
authority.
Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I recognize that. That
was just an aside. The purpose is the deficit reduction and the problem
with that is, I am afraid that if we ever did, let us hope we do
someday get to zero, even in 2002, would that not be wonderful? You
would be interested to know that my text reads 20002 through a typo. I
am not even sure that is good enough.
But I wanted to point out that this is a little bit like the lion
tamer going into the cage with the lions. Those lions are going to do
the right thing as
[[Page H1240]] long as they know that fellow has got the whip. But the
minute that tamer puts the whip down, the lion gets a slightly
different perspective of what his capabilities are relative to the
fellow who used to have the whip. And I think that is a very important
point as we go through this process.
I want to make sure that we keep this whip out there. If we ever do
get the lion tamed, I want to make sure this lion is never going to get
in a position where it can get out of the cage or eat the trainer
again.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume
to respond.
Mr. Chairman, I hate to think that we have just confused a metaphor
with the circus analogy.
But the point of the matter is that the bill as we have it before us
today is very much like the bills that came before I think 33 of the 43
legislatures that have a line-item veto authority. It says in effect
that the President is going to have this authority to reduce deficit
spending. That is what this is all about.
Hopefully we will use it to get rid of wasteful, incorrect spending,
but the purpose is to reduce the deficit. And my point in this
amendment, and I hope the gentlemen on the other side will continue to
consider it as we go through this process, is that if the Congress of
the United States cannot deliver a balanced budget next year, the
question ought to be what can be deliver, what ought we deliver? And
the answer is, we ought to stay on that glidepath. If we do not stay on
that glidepath, as steep as it looks to my friend, as dangerous as it
seems, as risky as it may appear, we will never reach the balanced
budget by the year 2002. We simply have to get on that glidepath, and
we have to stay on it.
It seems to me that if we use the line-item veto properly, as other
States do, to insist that the Congress stay on that glidepath, that
that will be the most important thing we do to make the line-item veto
work and to make the balanced budget of the Constitution work, if
indeed the Senate approves that amendment that we have sent over just
last week.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute].
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly to oppose the amendment
by my good friend from Louisiana. I believe he has the best intentions
and is someone who in this House has proven time and time again that he
is dedicated to reducing our great deficit, to getting the debt
lowered, and to establishing a balanced budget here in the U.S.
Government.
I oppose it because I think it does muddy the procedures that are
clearly spelled out in this bill. The gentleman's amendment is more
like a Gramm-Rudman approach that brings an automatic sequestration
trigger if the budget goes over the CBO time line, but I believe that
the line-item veto is more important than that and should go beyond
that. It is a means of bringing the President into the appropriations
process, as the Founders envisioned, and also as we have added to this
bill and to the tax benefit issues that may come up in a particular
bill.
Whether they are above or below the CBO glidepath or not, it is my
understanding the Governors in the States that we heard testimony from
use the line-item veto not just to balance the budget, although that is
a very important tool to be able to do that, but also
to go after the type of spending that cannot be justified.
I just want to use an example, once again, from the State of
Massachusetts. We had Governor Weld testify about using his line-item
veto to discipline a deal between the judiciary and the legislative
appropriators that was not proper, that attempted to set their budgets
high in exchange for the judiciary saying, using those dollars to hire
appropriators' political cronies in the court system.
Those dollars were not dollars that put the budget out of balance,
but they were improperly spent according to the Governor. The Governor
was able to use his line-item veto to discipline that process. I think
the gentleman's amendment is well-intentioned, but I would oppose it on
those grounds.
{time} 1650
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, just in quick answer to my friend, the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], no, the amendment does not act as Gramm-
Rudman did to set caps and have automatic rescissions. It simply says
that the authority of the President to line item any item of the
appropriations would occur when the Congress appropriated funds in
excess of the glidepath numbers set by CBO to take us to that balanced
budget amendment.
If, for example, this Congress this year approved the budget that
President Clinton just submitted yesterday, we would be approving a
$200 billion deficit for the next fiscal year. Under the glidepath
amendment I suggested, the President would have the authority to line
item 26 billion dollars' worth of appropriations out of that bill. He
certainly could look for all the wasteful spending in $26 billion.
If we approved his budget for the next 5 years, in each one of those
successive years his line item authority would be $45 billion in 1997,
$84 billion in 1998, $129 billion in 1999, and $141 billion in the year
2000. I want Members to think for a second about what authority and how
that authority might be used when the President had the authority to
line item 141 billion dollars' worth of appropriations out of this
Congress.
This amendment I am offering, Mr. Chairman, is by no means a
weakening amendment. This amendment is meant to strengthen, in fact,
the application, the practicalities of this bill, and to make it work.
Mr. Chairman, I ask Members to think about this. It may be, by the
time the Senate gets through with this bill and we get to a conference,
this may be just the tool to make it work, to get enough of the Members
of the other body to accept it, and to get a bill on the statute books,
not just past this House, that really works.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, to close, I yield myself such time as I
may consume, to say to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin], I
think this is a very thoughtful and helpful addition to the debate we
are having on this matter.
I do think it goes to far. Frankly, there are implications of the
amendment that I do not fully understand at this point. I think there
may well be, as we proceed to further consider this matter and move to
the Senate and so forth, it may well be that something in this nature
can be done.
I do think, however, that at the moment it does seem to strike me
more as a sort of Gramm-Rudman rescission. The gentleman says it is not
the same, but it seems to me there are implications of that.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yield to me.
Mr. Chairman, a previous speaker rose to question whether or not we
can constitutionally pass this line-item veto. I think that argument
needs to be answered. I would like to try to answer it just for a
second.
This Congress could, if we wanted to, instead of appropriating in 13
appropriation bills or 11 or 3 or 1, we could appropriate in hundreds
of appropriation bills. We could appropriate every single appropriation
in a single bill, if we wanted to.
Clearly, under the Constitution, the President would then have the
right to veto that appropriation, and we would have a two-thirds
obligation to override that veto. Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we could if we
wanted to create a line-item veto authority through that mechanism.
If we can create it that way, my argument to the gentlewoman from
California, who argued against the constitutionality of what we are
trying to do today, is that if we could create it that way, we can most
certainly, under the Constitution, create it the way we are trying to
create it today.
I want, last of all, to commend my friend, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger], for the excellent job he did in this bill.
I will join him in support of the bill.
[[Page H1241]] I only ask that before we get through with this
process, that some of the arguments I have made today, the suggestions
I have made today, be considered in this process, because I want this
bill eventually to be signed into law and I want it, most of all, to
work.
I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. CLINGER. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I share the
gentleman's desire to get a bill that is ultimately going to be passed
into law and signed by the President. We appreciate the contributions
the gentleman from Louisiana has made to all of these budget-cutting,
deficit-reducing efforts.
I can certainly commit, from my point of view, to work with the
gentleman to achieve the goals that are common to both of us. However,
I would now have to urge a no vote on this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
The amendment was rejected.
amendment offered by mr. traficant
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: At the end, add the
following new section:
SEC. 7. TERMINATION DATE.
This Act shall cease to be effective on January 1, 1997.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House, the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Traficant] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio, who is
chairing this debate, and I want to commend him, my good friend, for
the fine job he has done in dispatching the duties of the Chair in
keeping this debate in order. I think he has done a fine job.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment says that this line-item veto authority,
if passed, would sunset in 2 years. Actually, I would like this to
sunset in 2 weeks. I would not even like to see the Sun shine on the
line-item veto.
However, I would just like to say this, Mr. Chairman. I want to warn
the Congress of the United States, who continues to transfer power from
the Congress, which is that of the people, to the Presidency, I do not
want to see President Bill Clinton have a line-item veto.
It is nothing against President Clinton. I do not want to see any
President, Democrat or Republican, or Independent, I might add, which I
see coming down the pike in the future, a third party that I predict
will in fact surface and ultimately elect a President in our country,
because of the tremendous problem that we continue to agitate with
legislation that does not in fact deal with the problems.
However, Mr. Chairman, in this warning, I would like to say that
while we make the Presidency much stronger and weaken the government of
the people, keep in mind that powerful groups out there just have to
concentrate on electing one political figure in America, the President,
The way Congress is going, that is where the emphasis will be: Get
that President, keep that President, control the power, and then get 35
Senators in lockstep, and be damned with the rest. That is about the
new constitutional construct of the people's Congress.
I have heard of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I think
we are going further and further toward a House of Lords in America,
where few people really govern. In fact, today few people really
govern. What we say here today, Mr. Chairman, may not make great shock
waves in the Congressional Record for the future, but I think there is
a lot of common sense in that, Mr. Chairman.
Therefore, I say again, be careful, Congress. If we are just sending
to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue more and more power, the real powerful
interest in America do know that, do recognize it, and they are
concentrating their efforts to elect that one person.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to say, as the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Stenholm] readies his notes and some other machination of a line-
item veto authority, which I hate to admit this, I will have to oppose,
I would say to the gentleman from Texas, because I oppose not just the
line-item veto, I oppose what it stands for. It stands for the
transferring of power from the people in the Congress to 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue. That is a cancer, I believe, that should be
stopped.
However, what do I know? I am still trying to figure out my taxes. I
will say this, tough, before I close, trying to take up a couple more
minutes in a little bit of filibuster for the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Stenholm], because I love him dearly, and I am sure I am going to
support one of these good initiatives if I should see the light.
Mr. Chairman, I want to say happy birthday to former President Ronald
Reagan. I want to say that much of the machinations going on with the
majority party now are directly attributable to Ronald Reagan. I did
not oppose a lot of his trickle-down programs. In 1986 he threw a lot
of it out.
Mr. Chairman, I want to say this about Ronald Reagan on his birthday,
as a Democrat that did not totally agree with some of those policies:
Never was there a President that was so well respected around the
world. When Reagan said he was going to do something, by God, he did
it. I hoped to God that the old Gipper would have taken on trade,
because he was just the person to make it happen for us.
So I want to say here, here, President Reagan, Nancy, the best to
you.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. TRIFICANT. I yield to my good friend, the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I was going to rise to congratulate the gentleman on
his wishing Ronald Reagan a happy 84th birthday, because he was in my
opinion, a great, great President. He had vision and he focused us on
that vision. It is too bad that he could not accomplish all the things
he wanted to do.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out to the gentleman that today is
Ronald Reagan's birthday and we want to pass this line-item veto as a
birthday present, for not only him but for the American people.
{time} 1700
But, we were also going to hold a special order, which means that a
few of us were going to get up and talk about Ronald Reagan and what we
think about him. But because there is a dinner in his honor tonight. If
and when we finish this bill, some of us are going to that dinner, so
we are going to postpone that special order tonight. But tomorrow night
we will be holding that special order in honor of the great President
Ronald Reagan, and I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this time.
Mr. TRAFICANT. I did not vote on some of those issues with former
President Reagan, but I have great admiration for former President
Reagan and I do mean this. He was assertive, and when Ronald Reagan
said he was going to do something, by God, he did it, and the world
respected him and I totally respect him.
To in fact further an opportunity for the majority party to have that
meeting tonight and to honor President Reagan on his 84th birthday, and
not to belabor the debate longer so that Members can have a vote, I
want to say to make everybody happy over there, I would like to see
this thing sunset in about 2 weeks, maybe not let sunshine in at all.
But I am going to withdraw my amendment. Happy birthday, former
President Ronald Reagan.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my great amendment that
should have been passed without prejudice be withdrawn. Knowing that I
do no have the votes and do want to honor President Reagan and let the
Members get out in time, I ask unanimous consent that my great
amendment be withdrawn.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to
object, I wanted the opportunity to vote
[[Page H1242]] on this amendment because I agree with the gentleman,
this thing ought not to see the light of day. I wanted to amend it
maybe to reduce it to 2 days instead of 2 weeks.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of
objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Ohio?
There was no objection.
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment is withdrawn.
amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. stenholm
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a
substitute.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr.
Stenholm:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Line Item Veto Act''.
TITLE I--LINE ITEM VETO
SEC. 101. LINE ITEM VETO AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding the provisions of part B
of title X of The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, and subject to the provisions of this
section, the President may rescind all or part of the dollar
amount of any discretionary budget authority specified in an
appropriation Act or an accompanying committee report or
joint explanatory statement accompanying a conference report
on that Act or veto any targeted tax benefit which is subject
to the terms of this Act if the President--
(1) determines that--
(A) such rescission or veto would help reduce the Federal
budget deficit;
(B) such rescission or veto will not impair any essential
Government functions; and
(C) such rescission or veto will not harm the national
interest; and
(2) notifies the Congress of such rescission or veto by a
special message not later than ten calendar days (not
including Sundays) after the date of enactment of an
appropriation Act providing such budget authority or a
revenue or reconciliation Act containing a targeted tax
benefit.
(b) Deficit Reduction.--In each special message, the
President may also propose to reduce the appropriate
discretionary spending limit set forth in section 601(a)(2)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by an amount that
does not exceed the total amount of discretionary budget
authority rescinded by that message.
(c) Separate Messages.--The President shall submit a
separate special message for each appropriation Act and for
each revenue or reconciliation Act under this paragraph.
(d) Special Rule.--For any rescission of budget authority,
the President may either submit a special message under this
section or under section 1012 of the Impoundment Control Act
of 1974. Funds proposed to be rescinded under this section
may not be proposed to be rescinded under section 1012 of
that Act.
SEC. 102. LINE ITEM VETO EFFECTIVE UNLESS DISAPPROVED.
(a)(1) Any amount of budget authority rescinded under
section 101 as set forth in a special message by the
President shall be deemed canceled unless, during the period
described in subsection (b), a rescission/receipts
disapproval bill making available all of the amount rescinded
is enacted into law.
(2) Any provision of law vetoed under section 101 as set
forth in a special message by the President shall be deemed
repealed unless, during the period described in subsection
(b), a rescission/receipts disapproval bill restoring that
provision is enacted into law.
(b) The period referred to in subsection (a) is--
(1) a congressional review period of twenty calendar days
of session, beginning on the first calendar day of session
after the date of submission of the special message, during
which Congress must complete action on the rescission/
receipts disapproval bill and present such bill to the
President for approval or disapproval;
(2) after the period provided in paragraph (1), an
additional ten days (not including Sundays) during which the
President may exercise his authority to sign or veto the
rescission/receipts disapproval bill; and
(3) if the President vetoes the rescission/receipts
disapproval bill during the period provided in paragraph (2),
an additional five calendar days of session after the date of
the veto.
(c) If a special message is transmitted by the President
under section 101 and the last session of the Congress
adjourns sine die before the expiration of the period
described in subsection (b), the rescission or veto, as the
case may be, shall not take effect. The message shall be
deemed to have been retransmitted on the first Monday in
February of the succeeding Congress and the review period
referred to in subsection (b) (with respect to such message)
shall run beginning after such first day.
SEC. 103. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this title:
(1) The term ``rescission/receipts disapproval bill'' means
a bill or joint resolution which only disapproves, in whole,
rescissions of discretionary budget authority or only
disapproves vetoes of targeted tax benefits in a special
message transmitted by the President under this Act and--
(A) which does not have a preamble;
(B)(i) in the case of a special message regarding
rescissions, the matter after the enacting clause of which is
as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each rescission of
discretionary budget authority of the President as submitted
by the President in a special message on '', the blank
space being filled in with the appropriate date and the
public law to which the message relates; and
(ii) in the case of a special message regarding vetoes of
targeted tax benefits, the matter after the enacting clause
of which is as follows: ``That Congress disapproves each veto
of targeted tax benefits of the President as submitted by the
President in a special message on '', the blank space
being filled in with the appropriate date and the public law
to which the message relates; and
(C) the title of which is as follows: ``A bill disapproving
the recommendations submitted by the President on '',
the blank space being filled in with the date of submission
of the relevant special message and the public law to which
the message relates.
(2) The term ``calendar days of session'' shall mean only
those days on which both Houses of Congress are in session.
(3) The term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision
of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the
President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit,
exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer
beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust,
or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same
parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single
beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited
partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated
corporate entities.
(4) The term ``appropriation Act'' means any general or
special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution
making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing
appropriations.
SEC. 104. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF LINE ITEM VETOES.
(a) Presidential Special Message.--Whenever the President
rescinds any budget authority as provided in section 101 or
vetoes any provision of law as provided in 101, the President
shall transmit to both Houses of Congress a special message
specifying--
(1) the amount of budget authority rescinded or the
provision vetoed;
(2) any account, department, or establishment of the
Government to which such budget authority is available for
obligation, and the specific project or governmental
functions involved;
(3) the reasons and justifications for the determination to
rescind budget authority or veto any provisions pursuant to
section 101;
(4) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated
fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect of the rescission or
veto; and
(5) all actions, circumstances, and considerations relating
to or bearing upon the rescission or veto and the decision to
effect the rescission or veto, and to the maximum extent
practicable, the estimated effect of the rescission upon the
objects, purposes, and programs for which the budget
authority is provided.
(b) Transmission of Messages to House and Senate.--
(1) Each special message transmitted under section 101
shall be transmitted to the House of Representatives and the
Senate on the same day, and shall be delivered to the Clerk
of the House of Representatives if the House is not in
session, and to the Secretary of the Senate if the Senate is
not in session. Each special message so transmitted shall be
referred to the appropriate committees of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Each such message shall be
printed as a document of each House.
(2) Any special message transmitted under section 101 shall
be printed in the first issue of the Federal Register
published after such transmittal.
(c) Introduction of Rescission/Receipts Disapproval
Bills.--The procedures set forth in subsection (d) shall
apply to any rescission/receipts disapproval bill introduced
in the House of Representatives not later than the third
calendar day of session beginning on the day after the date
of submission of a special message by the President under
section 101.
(d) Consideration in the House of Representatives.--(1) The
committee of the House of Representatives to which a
rescission/receipts disapproval bill is referred shall report
it without amendment, and with or without recommendation, not
later than the eighth calendar day of session after the date
of its introduction. If the committee fails to report the
bill within that period, it is in order to move that the
House discharge the committee from further consideration of
the bill. A motion to discharge may be made only by an
individual favoring the bill (but only after the legislative
day on which a Member announces to the House the Member's
intention to do so). The motion is highly privileged. Debate
thereon shall be limited to not more than one hour, the time
to be divided in the House equally between a proponent and an
opponent. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening
motion. A motion to reconsider the vote
[[Page H1243]] by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed
to shall not be in order.
(2) After a rescission/receipts disapproval bill is
reported or the committee has been discharged from further
consideration, it is in order to move that the House resolve
into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the
Union for consideration of the bill. All points of order
against the bill and against consideration of the bill are
waived. The motion is highly privileged. The previous
question shall be considered as ordered on that motion to its
adoption without intervening motion. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to
shall not be in order. During consideration of the bill in
the Committee of the Whole, the first reading of the bill
shall be dispensed with. General debate shall proceed without
intervening motion, shall be confined to the bill, and shall
not exceed two hours equally divided and controlled by a
proponent and an opponent of the bill. No amendment to the
bill is in order, except any Member may move to strike the
disapproval of any rescission or rescissions of budget
authority or any proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit,
as applicable, if supported by 49 other Members. At the
conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment,
the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House.
The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the
bill and amendments thereto to final passage without
intervening motion.
(3) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the rules of the House of Representatives to
the procedure relating to a bill described in subsection (a)
shall be decided without debate.
(4) It shall not be in order to consider more than one bill
described in subsection (c) or more than one motion to
discharge described in paragraph (1) with respect to a
particular special message.
(5) Consideration of any rescission/receipts disapproval
bill under this subsection is governed by the rules of the
House of Representatives except to the extent specifically
provided by the provisions of this title.
(e) Consideration in the Senate.--
(1) Any rescission/receipts disapproval bill received in
the Senate from the House shall be considered in the Senate
pursuant to the provisions of this title.
(2) Debate in the Senate on any rescission/receipts
disapproval bill and debatable motions and appeals in
connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than ten
hours. The time shall be equally divided between, and
controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or
their designees.
(3) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motions or appeal
in connection with such bill shall be limited to one hour, to
be equally divided between, and controlled by the mover and
the manager of the bill, except that in the event the manager
of the bill is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the
time is in favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in
opposition thereto shall be controlled by the minority leader
or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from
the time under their control on the passage of the bill,
allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration
of any debatable motion or appeal.
(4) A motion to further limit debate is not debatable. A
motion to recommit (except a motion to recommit with
instructions to report back within a specified number of days
not to exceed one, not counting any day on which the Senate
is not in session) is not in order.
(f) Points of Order.--
(1) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any
rescission/receipts disapproval bill that relates to any
matter other than the rescission of budget authority or veto
of the provision of law transmitted by the President under
section 101.
(2) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any
amendment to a rescission/receipts disapproval bill.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) may be waived or suspended in
the Senate only by a vote of three-fifths of the members duly
chosen and sworn.
SEC. 105. REPORTS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
Beginning on January 6, 1996, and at one-year intervals
thereafter, the Comptroller General shall submit a report to
each House of Congress which provides the following
information:
(1) A list of each proposed Presidential rescission of
discretionary budget authority and veto of a targeted tax
benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their dollar value, and an indication of whether each
rescission of discretionary budget authority or veto of a
targeted tax benefit was accepted or rejected by Congress.
(2) The total number of proposed Presidential rescissions
of discretionary budget authority and vetoes of a targeted
tax benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their total dollar value.
(3) The total number of Presidential rescissions of
discretionary budget authority or vetoes of a targeted tax
benefit submitted through special messages for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year and approved
by Congress, together with their total dollar value.
(4) A list of rescissions of discretionary budget authority
initiated by Congress for the fiscal year ending during the
preceding calendar year, together with their dollar value,
and an indication of whether each such rescission was
accepted or rejected by Congress.
(5) The total number of rescissions of discretionary budget
authority initiated and accepted by Congress for the fiscal
year ending during the preceding calendar year, together with
their total dollar value.
(6) A summary of the information provided by paragraphs
(2), (3) and (5) for each of the ten fiscal years ending
before the fiscal year during this calendar year.
SEC. 106. JUDICIAL REVIEW.
(a) Expedited Review.--
(1) Any Member of Congress may bring an action, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground
that any provision of this title violates the Constitution.
(2) A copy of any complaint in an action brought under
paragraph (1) shall be promptly delivered to the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and
each House of Congress shall have the right to intervene in
such action.
(3) Any action brought under paragraph (1) shall be heard
and determined by a three-judge court in accordance with
section 2284 of title 28, United States Code.
Nothing in this section or in any other law shall infringe
upon the right of the House of Representatives to intervene
in an action brought under paragraph (1) without the
necessity of adopting a resolution to authorize such
intervention.
(b) Appeal to Supreme Court.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any order of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia which is issued pursuant
to an action brought under paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
shall be reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Any such appeal shall be taken by a
notice of appeal filed within 10 days after such order is
entered; and the jurisdictional statement shall be filed
within 30 days after such order is entered. No stay of an
order issued pursuant to an action brought under paragraph
(1) of subsection (a) shall be issued by a single Justice of
the Supreme Court.
(c) Expedited Consideration.--It shall be the duty of the
District Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to
expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of
any matter brought under subsection (a).
TITLE II--EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED RESCISSIONS AND TARGETED
TAX BENEFITS
SEC. 201. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED
RESCISSIONS AND TARGETED TAX BENEFITS.
(a) In General.--Section 1012 of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 683) is amended
to read as follows:
``expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions
``Sec. 1012. (a) Proposed Rescission of Budget Authority or
Repeal of Targeted Tax Benefits.--The President may propose,
at the time and in the manner provided in subsection (b), the
rescission of any budget authority provided in an
appropriation Act of repeal of any targeted tax benefit
provided in any revenue Act. If the President proposes a
rescission of budget authority, he may also propose to reduce
the appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in
section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by
an amount that does not exceed the amount of the proposed
rescission. Funds made available for obligation under this
procedure may not be proposed for rescission again under this
section.
``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
``(1) The President may transmit to Congress a special
message proposing to rescind amounts of budget authority or
to repeal any targeted tax benefit and include with that
special message a draft bill that, if enacted, would only
rescind that budget authority or repeal that targeted tax
benefit unless the President also proposes a reduction in the
appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in section
601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. That bill
shall clearly identify the amount of budget authority that is
proposed to be rescinded for each program, project, or
activity to which that budget authority relates to the
targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed, as the case may
be. A targeted tax benefit may only be proposed to be
repealed under this section during the 10-legislative-day
period commencing on the day after the date of enactment of
the provision proposed to be repealed.
``(2) In the case of an appropriation Act that includes
accounts within the jurisdiction of more than one
subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the
President in proposing to rescind budget authority under this
section shall send a separate special message and
accompanying draft bill for accounts within the jurisdiction
of each each subcommittee.
``(3) Each special message shall specify, with respect to
the budget authority proposed to be rescinded, the
following--
``(A) the amount of budget authority which he proposes to
be rescinded;
``(B) any account, department, or establishment of the
Government to which such budget authority is available for
obligation,
[[Page H1244]] and the specific project or governmental
functions involved;
``(C) the reasons why the budget authority should be
rescinded;
``(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated
fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect
on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed
rescission;
``(E) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating
to or bearing upon the proposed rescission and the decision
to effect the proposed rescission, and to the maximum extent
practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed rescission
upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which the budget
authority is provided.
Each special message shall specify, with respect to the
proposed repeal of targeted tax benefits, the information
required by subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), as it relates to
the proposed repeal; and
``(F) a reduction in the appropriate discretionary spending
limit set forth in section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, if proposed by the President.
(4) For any rescission of budget authority, the President
may either submit a special message under this section or
under section 101 of the Line Item Veto Act. Funds proposed
to be rescinded under this section may not be proposed to be
rescinded under section 101 of that Act.
``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
``(1)(A) Before the close of the second legislative day of
the House of Representatives after the date of receipt of a
special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b),
the majority leader or minority leader of the House of
Representatives shall introduce (by request) the draft bill
accompanying that special message. If the bill is not
introduced as provided in the preceding sentence, then, on
the third legislative day of the House of Representatives
after the date of receipt of that special message, any Member
of that House may introduce the bill.
``(B) The bill shall be referred to the Committee on
Appropriations or the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives, as applicable. The committee shall
report the bill without substantive revision and with or
without recommendation. The bill shall be reported not later
than the seventh legislative day of that House after the date
of receipt of that special message. If that committee fails
to report the bill within that period, that committee shall
be automatically discharged from consideration of the bill,
and the bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
``(C) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member
of the House of Representatives may move to strike any
proposed rescission or rescissions of budget authority or any
proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if
supported by 49 other Members.
``(D) A vote on final passage of the bill shall be taken in
the House of Representatives on or before the close of the
10th legislative day of that House after the date of the
introduction of the bill in that House. If the bill is
passed, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause
the bill to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the
Senate within one calendar day of the day on which the bill
is passed.
``(2)(A) A motion in the House of Representatives to
proceed to the consideration of a bill under this section
shall be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to
the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to
move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to
or disagreed to.
``(B) Debate in the House of Representatives on a bill
under this section shall not exceed 4 hours, which shall be
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the
bill. A motion further to limit debate shall not be
debatable. It shall not be in order to move to recommit a
bill under this section or to move to reconsider the vote by
which the bill is agreed to or disagreed to.
``(C) Appeals from decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the Rules of the House of Representatives to
the procedure relating to a bill under this section shall be
decided without debate.
``(D) Except to the extent specifically provided in the
preceding provisions of this subsection, consideration of a
bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the
House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the
House of Representatives to consider any rescission bill
introduced pursuant to the provisions of this section under a
suspension of the rules or under a special rule.
``(3)(A) A bill transmitted to the Senate pursuant to
paragraph (1)(D) shall be referred to its Committee on
Appropriations or Committee on Finance, as applicable. That
committee shall report the bill without substantive revision
and with or without recommendation. The bill shall be
reported not later than the seventh legislative day of the
Senate after it receives the bill. A committee failing to
report the bill within such period shall be automatically
discharged from consideration of the bill, and the bill shall
be placed upon the appropriate calendar.
``(B) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member
of the Senate may move to strike any proposed rescission or
rescissions of budget authority or any proposed repeal of a
targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 14 other
Members.
``(4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the
consideration of a bill under this section shall be
privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion
shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to move to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to.
``(B) Debate in the Senate on a bill under this section,
and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith
(including debate pursuant to subparagraph (C)), shall not
exceed 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided between,
and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority
leader or their designees.
``(C) Debate in the Senate or any debatable motion or
appeal in connection with a bill under this section shall be
limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the
bill, except that in the event the manager of the bill is in
favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition
thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his
designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time
under their control of the passage of a bill, allot
additional time to any Senator during the consideration of
any debatable motion or appeal.
``(D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a
bill under this section is not debatable. A motion to
recommit a bill under this section is not in order.
``(d) Amendment and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as
otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill
considered under this section shall be in order in either the
House of Representatives or the Senate. It shall not be in
order to demand a division of the question in the House of
Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole) or in the
Senate. No motion to suspend the application of this
subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be
in order in either House to suspend the application of this
subsection by unanimous consent.
``(e) Requirement to Make Available for Obligation.--(1)
Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded in a
special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b)
shall be made available for obligation on the day after the
date on which either House rejects the bill transmitted with
that special message.
``(2) Any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed
under this section as set forth in a special message
transmitted by the President shall not be deemed repealed
unless the bill transmitted with that special message is
enacted into law.
``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `appropriation Act' means any general or
special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution
making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing
appropriations;
``(2) the term `legislative day' means, with respect to
either House of Congress, any day of session;
``(3) the term ``targeted tax benefit'' means any provision
of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the
President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit,
exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer
beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust,
or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same
parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single
beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited
partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated
corporate entities; and
``(4) the term `beneficiary' means any taxpayer or any
corporation, partnership, institution, organization, item of
property, State, or civil subdivision within one or more
States. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust, or S
corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same
parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single
beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited
partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated
corporate entities.''.
(b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and 1017'' and
inserting ``1012, and 1017''; and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and
inserting ``sections 1012 and 1017''; and
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Section 1011 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2
U.S.C. 682(5)) is amended by repealing paragraphs (3) and (5)
and by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3).
(2) Section 1014 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 685) is amended--
(A) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``or the
reservation''; and
(B) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``or a reservation''
and by striking ``or each such reservation''.
(3) Section 1015(a) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 686) is amended
by striking ``is to establish a reserve or'', by striking
``the establishment of such a reserve or'', and by striking
``reserve or'' each other place it appears.
(4) Section 1017 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 687) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``rescission bill
introduced with respect to a special message or'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``rescission bill
or'', by striking ``bill or'' the second place it appears, by
striking ``rescission bill with respect to the same special
message or'', and by striking ``, and the case may be,'';
[[Page H1245]] (C) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``bill
or'' each place it appears;
(D) in subsection (c), by striking ``rescission'' each
place it appears and by striking ``bill or'' each place it
appears;
(E) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``rescission bill
or'' and by striking ``, and all amendments thereto (in the
case of a rescission bill)'';
(F) in subsection (d)(2)--
(i) by striking the first sentence;
(ii) by amending the second sentence to read as follows:
``Debate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with
an impoundment resolution shall be limited to 1 hour, to be
equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the
manager of the resolution, except that in the event that the
manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or
appeal, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by
the minority leader or his designee.'';
(iii) by striking the third sentence; and
(iv) in the fourth sentence, by striking ``rescission bill
or'' and by striking ``amendment, debatable motion,'' and by
inserting ``debatable motion'';
(G) in paragraph (d)(3), by striking the second and third
sentences; and
(H) by striking paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of
paragraph (d).
(d) Clerical Amendments.--The item relating to section 1012
in the table of sections for subpart B of title X of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1012. Expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions
and targeted tax benefits.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of February 3, 1995, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] will be recognized for 30 minutes,
and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the Stenholm-Spratt amendment that I offer at this time
is the same amendment that passed the House of Representatives July 14,
1994, with a 342 to 69 vote, basically the same amendment in my
judgment. We offer it today and it is the same amendment we offered
last week as a substitute, but the will of the House was we should not
substitute majority override for one-third plus one override and I
respect the will of the House. Today we offer this amendment not as a
substitute but as a supplement, amendment to, and I will make the
argument to my friends on the other side that this does not weaken H.R.
2. In fact it strengthens H.R. 2, because in the words of the gentleman
from Florida a moment ago when he was arguing against the Tauzin
amendment, when he was saying we need to be able to get rid of wasteful
spending at any time in any circumstance, regardless of glide path, I
happen to agree with that statement. That is precisely why we offer our
amendment today as a supplement to H.R. 2, because as everyone I know
understands by now, under H.R. 2 it is only during that window of
opportunity of 10 days after an appropriation bill is signed and sent
to the President do we have the opportunity to rescind spending.
Under the modified rescission process that the gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spratt] and I offer today, the President will have the
opportunity to rescind spending at any time during the year.
For example, if after October 1 comes and we see that spending is
getting out of hand and we are on the glide path that we have already
agreed by a 300 vote to 102 I believe the number was the other day on
the balanced budget amendment, that the President would have the
opportunity to go into any appropriation bill and rescind spending as
he can today.
{time} 1710
So there is, it seems to me, a kind of a schizophrenia in the
approach that the gentleman has meant to take by giving two versions. I
do think it is a helpful addition. I think obviously, if the amendment
that we are dealing with here is declared unconstitutional, it is
certainly one we would want to revisit, but I think to include it in
the H.R. 2 provision is premature, and is weakening from that extent,
and so I would have to oppose the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair was mistaken when he recognized the gentleman
from Texas for 15 minutes. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman is recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, how much time did I consume on my opening
remarks?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas consumed 4\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Maryland [Mr. Cardin].
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment. I
would just urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
It accomplishes the purpose for why a line-item veto is needed, and
that is to shine light on an individual appropriation so that it cannot
hide within a massive appropriation bill.
I am a supporter of the line-item veto legislation. I am going to
vote for it. But I think this gives us an alternative in the event that
the traditional two-thirds override is declared to be unconstitutional,
to have on the books a procedure that works and will accomplish the
exact same purpose.
The amount of the vote is not important. It is important to segregate
that appropriation to allow an individual consideration of it so that
it cannot be hidden in a large appropriation bill.
I congratulate my colleague for bringing forward an alternative and
urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Blute], again a prime cosponsor of H.R. 2 and one of
the architects of this measure.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight for his work on this
important bill, and also the chairman of the Committee on Rules for
reporting out an open rule.
I think we have had a very good and long debate on this very
important issue.
I rise in strong opposition to the Stenholm amendment. While I
acknowledge the great leadership of the gentleman from Texas on deficit
reduction, the most recent authoring with the gentleman from Colorado
[Mr. Schaefer] the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, I
believe that this amendment has the intention of weakening the base
bill. If the amendment's sponsors are worried about the
constitutionality of H.R. 2, I believe the CRS, the Congressional
Research Service, American Law Division, wrote a brief last year
confirming that the process involved in H.R. 2 would stand up to
judicial review.
CRS said:
In sum, we generally conclude this bill is an exercise of
delegation which, under the precedents, is permissible.
Further, we conclude that the precedents establish no
constitutional barrier to delegation of power to the
President to set aside or void an Act of Congress.
While getting the thumbs up from the CRS is not the same as getting
the OK from the Supreme Court, precedents show the courts are hesitant
to rebuff Congress' delegation of its power to the Executive.
I urge my colleagues not to buy into this argument, and beyond that,
Mr. Chairman, I think the line-item veto, the strong line-item veto, is
exactly what is needed in our system to check the growth of the deficit
and the debt that has piled up over the years, and I believe by
adopting the Stenholm amendment we are giving the other body an out,
giving them a fall back position that too many unfortunately will see.
Let us give the President the strongest line-item veto we can. He
asked for it. His budget director asked for it. Eleven State Governors
have it, and it works to keep spending under control.
Give the President the strong line-item veto.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I think the question in the debate is: Is
this about illusion or reality, substance or not? This is a tough
amendment. It is fair, and it is constitutional.
I think there are significant constitutional problems with H.R. 2,
and it is likely it may be rescinded by the
[[Page H1246]] Court. So it will be wise to append this to that
legislation so you have a backup, if you believe in line-item authority
for the President.
Remember this is not a panacea. I know we are going to honor Ronald
Reagan on his 84th birthday, but he did send a message to Congress on
March 10, 1988, saying, ``These are the items I would delete if I had
the line-item veto,'' and out of a budget deficit of $150 billion,
Ronald Reagan could only find $1.5.
This is not a panacea for the deficit. We are going to make some
tough choices and decisions right here in this body if we want to get
the deficit under control.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
Rules.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise reluctantly against the amendment offered by my
good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], because without
question his amendment would strengthen existing law, but the fact is
it weakens the bill before us, and it clouds the issue.
Seriously, we have a problem here, ladies and gentleman, and this is
the budget that the President of the United States gave us today. Let
us just look at it. Ronald Reagan at one time dropped a bill on the
floor back in the early 1980's and broke his finger doing it.
This bill before us, this budget, reflects an additional debt
service, debt for this year, and over the 5 years it is another
trillion. As a matter of fact, I think it is $1.4 trillion it is going
to add to the deficit.
So, you know, line item veto is not going to balance the budget. The
balanced budget amendment is not going to balance the budget. Only the
will of this Congress is. But you need the prodding of the balanced
budget amendment. You need the prodding of this legislation, and this
legislation is constitutional.
The Congressional Research Service, as has been stated, says it is.
The Attorney General says it is. There is no question about it.
What the bill before us does, without the Stenholm amendment, is
reverse existing law that allows Congress to reject the President's
requests to cut pork barrel spending without even taking a vote. That
is what the law is today. In other words, Congress can block the
spending cuts requested by a President by doing absolutely nothing.
This line-item veto reverses that procedure by saying that the cuts
go through unless Congress votes to disapprove those spending cuts.
Now, that is real line-item veto, and that is what we need to give
Congress this prod to try to do something about this.
I shudder to think what is going to happen. I hope this Congress,
Republicans and Democrats alike, have got the guts to at least adopt a
budget this year that in 7 years will balance the budget. Otherwise,
this country is going down the drain, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for purposes of
entering into a colloquy with the gentleman from New York, because I
would like to believe that the gentleman misspoke a moment ago when he
said our amendment weakens H.R. 2. Because in all interpretation that
we have received, this strengthens H.R. 2, because we do not get into
anything of the merits of H.R. 2.
In fact, under H.R. 2, would you not agree, that only in the 10-day
window can a President veto under H.R. 2?
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. I will say to my what it does----
Mr. STENHOLM. Yes or no?
Mr. SOLOMON. It continues. No, I do not think it does.
Mr. STENHOLM. I believe you will find it does. Therefore, under our
amendment, we provide the President the other 355 days out of the year
may rescind, and the Congress must vote on individual Presidential
rescissions. So I do not see how you can represent our amendment as
weakening. I believe it must be strengthening.
Mr. SOLOMON. Because it sets up a dual system, and it continues that
dual system, and it gives the President, it gives the Congress another
way out. I do not want him to do that. I want him to have to stick to
this real line-item veto. That is the whole point. I know your
intentions are very well, and I hope we defeat your amendment.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Coleman].
(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 2, the
line-item veto act on constitutional grounds.
In addition, I rise in strong support of the Stenholm amendment which
is an alternative, an expedited rescission bill, which would require
the Congress to vote on proposed Presidential rescissions within a time
certain and can uphold them with simple majorities in the House and the
Senate.
This alternative, as most Members will remember, is very similar to
legislation passed by the House last year but killed by the other body.
This system does not turn the Constitution really upside down, but,
instead, focuses congressional action on disputed items without
disrupting the balance of powers.
{time} 1720
It would have the same impact as the line-item veto because Members
would be certainly less inclined to include special-interest provisions
in either appropriations or tax bills. Nor would Members probably be
willing to risk recorded votes on items identified by a sitting
President as either narrow or parochial.
I would say to my friends that, as we rush forward in passing this
Contract on America, we do need to be aware of putting the Federal
taxpayer into the courthouse and having to pay for the costs of
litigating these many provisions, and this one will be litigated.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], a member of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I spent a lot of time working this over, and
we talked a lot about expedited rescission, and enhanced rescission,
and line-item veto, and the different formats, and what one of those
terms used to mean, and whether one would or would not have to have a
vote under an approval process, and, as I understand it, the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has come up with a very good program which
tries to get the best of two worlds, and I really congratulate him on
that because at first sight this appears to be a very good idea, to be
able to say, ``Well, we can get the tough version, and then in the
outdays of the given year we can go with a simple majority vote,'' and
my understanding is that, if we use that process, it would come under
the rulemaking powers of the House, and there is probably the single
flaw that I see rise now, and maybe the gentleman will disagree with
me. I am afraid that, as was shown in our unfunded mandates discussion
about the rules, the powers of the Committee on Rules, to deal with
different situations, no matter what the plan or the intent is, when
those are delivered to the Committee on Rules, it is very clear in the
history of this House, certainly clear in the history of the Committee
on Rules since I have been on it, and I point out that was under
another regime, that we did some things that people did not think we
could do, and I am not sure we could, but we did them anyway because we
are the Committee on Rules.
Then we get down to this subject on unfunded mandates. As my
colleagues remember, we have points of order, and we go into this long
process of creating a new rule, a new setup, a new process for Members
to be guaranteed a way to get something identified or defended under an
unfunded mandate, to waive a point of order against it, another
elaborate process.
I would certainly admit that the gentleman has an intriguing prospect
here. The concern I have is one that the chairman made, that it binds
the clear-shot vote we had on the Contract With America, line-item
veto, up or down, but I think the gentleman is onto a
[[Page H1247]] point that our current budget process is definitely
weak, should be made better, and in my view in another day I would
rather take this approach on in that process.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Goss] for yielding; he brings up a very good point on the rule.
I say to my colleague, ``But if you will read more carefully our
substitute, the substitute specifically states that it shall not be in
order in the House of Representatives to consider any rescission bill
introduced pursuant to the provisions of this section under a special
rule. Furthermore, OMB would continue to withhold the funds from
obligation until the President's plan was voted on, as required by this
legislation----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] has
expired.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 15 seconds to the
gentleman from Florida.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts
for his generosity.
But this, I think, is very important.
Furthermore, OMB could continue to withhold the funds from obligation
until the President's plan was voted on, as required by the legislation
regardless of any attempts by Congress to waive its internal rules. If
Congress used its constitutional authority to set its own rules to
avoid a vote on the President's rescissions, it would give the
President the ability to withhold indefinity the funds in question.
So, Mr. Chairman, we are really strengthening the legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Missouri [Ms.
McCarthy].
Ms. McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Stenholm-Spratt
amendment to H.R. 2. This amendment would expedite the rescission
process, as well as retain the line-item veto language in the bill.
I would like to point out to those Members who are serious about
ending the practice of deficit spending that this amendment makes
sense. By including both rescission and line-item veto language in the
bill, the Stenholm-Spratt amendment guards against the Congress and the
President being without the tools needed to balance the budget.
One strength of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment is that it requires
Congress to vote on rescissions submitted at any point in the year.
Currently, H.R. 2, rescissions submitted by the President 10 days after
signing an appropriations bill would not require congressional action.
Under expedited rescission language, congressional action would be
mandatory, regardless of when the rescission package is sent to
Congress.
The Stenholm-Spratt amendment will provide us with two instruments,
expedited rescission and the line-item veto, to help restore fiscal
integrity to the Federal budget process. If we want Congress to be
accountable and responsible for the money it spends, then the expedited
rescission language in the amendment will make us answerable by forcing
a vote on a Presidential rescission package, something that is not
currently required.
President Clinton supports expedited rescission and the line-item
veto, and I believe we should grant him the choice of either vetoeing
or rescinding frivolous spending and tax breaks. Therefore, I urge
bipartisan support of the Stenholm-Spratt amendment.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from
South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], the coauthor of the amendment today.
(Mr. SPRATT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Stenholm-Spratt
amendment, and I want to stress from the start what this amendment does
not do:
It does not replace H.R. 2, the bill before us. It does not even
weaken H.R. 2. It adds to that bill extra rescission powers, and
broadens the timeframe for the use of those powers, and gives the
President a plus, an option, that H.R. 2 does not give him, the option
of entering any spending saved from any rescission into a so-called
locked box or deficit reduction account.
So, Mr. Chairman, this expedited rescission lock-box amendment is a
supplement and not a substitute to H.R. 2. It would not conflict with,
or weaken, or change one whit the powers that are delegated to the
President under H.R. 2.
The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] and I offer this amendment
for several reasons:
First, I am genuinely concerned that the courts may hold the line-
item veto power which we confer upon the President here under a novel
interpretation of law unconstitutional, unconstitutional because it is
a broad, broad, sweeping delegation of authority with very scant
standards to govern the use of that authority. No court has ever
decided the exact question that we are putting to the courts and will
be putting to the courts here, and virtually everyone in this Chamber
acknowledged that this is a novel question, acknowledged his
uncertainty about how the court would rule when several days ago the
Deal amendment came up, and with very little debate and very little
dispute the Deal amendment--providing for expedited judicial review--
was approved virtually unanimously.
But even in the case of expedited review, it will take months, surely
the rest of this budget year, before we have a definite opinion from
the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of H.R. 2. During that
period of time, Mr. Chairman, we are providing the President this as a
standby, fall-back authority. In case the courts invalidate H.R. 2,
then the President has this authority on the books. He can use it, put
it to good use, because the scope of this, as I point out, is even
broader in many respects than H.R. 2.
And what if the courts find H.R. 2 constitutional? In that case, this
amendment gives the President one more weapon to use to wipe out
unwarranted, unnecessary, or wasteful spending or spending that he
finds we cannot afford given the status of the economy or the state of
the budget in the middle of a fiscal year. The rescission authority we
provide here is not redundant for that reason by any means. Actually,
it is more useful in some respects, in many respects, than H.R. 2 as it
now stands.
I do not need to explain H.R. 2 in detail because this is virtually
the same as the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich expedited rescission bill which
this House passed on July 14, 1994, by an overwhelming vote. By my
count, every single Republican then in the House, 169 in all, voted for
its passage. Three hundred forty-two Members of this House thought
enough of the efficacy and utility of this bill to vote for it then.
Only 69 Members opposed it.
{time} 1730
This amendment, as I said, is broader in scope than H.R. 2 because it
allows the President to rescind appropriations at any time during the
fiscal year. The veto power under H.R. 2, on the other hand, has to be
used within a very narrow window of time, 10 days after a passage of
appropriation bills. Under our amendment in H.R. 2 the President can
only repeal targeted tax benefits within 10 days, but under our bill he
can send spending rescissions up at any time and under our bill he will
be guaranteed an up or down vote on his package in the House within 10
days and a vote in the Senate within 10 more days. And for any Member
who wants a separate vote on any particular item in the package, it is
important to his or her district, then if he can muster 50 Members on
the House floor to support his request, he can have it broken out.
This bill, as I said, also allows the President the authority, the
extra power which the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger]
acknowledged in debate the other day, was a commendable provision, to
put any savings that were realized under a rescission into a lock box.
The lock box was part of a popular bill that many Members subscribed to
in the last session called A to Z. The lock box allows the President to
direct that the discretionary spending account will be lowered to the
extent that we adopt any rescission that he sends up here, lowered by
that
[[Page H1248]] amount so the savings cannot be spent upon something
else.
Once the President has sent his bill up, the rescission message will
be converted to a bill. The bill has to be introduced within 3 days,
the Committee on Appropriations has to act upon it and report it to the
floor, and we have to vote within 7 days. When it leaves here it goes
to the Senate on the same fast track.
So let me sum up, Mr. Chairman, by saying this amendment in no way
weakens, detracts from, or is inconsistent with H.R. 2. It is a plus to
H.R. 2. It is a fall-back alternative if H.R. 2 is found to be
unconstitutional, and at the very least it is a temporary alternative
for the President to use if H.R. 2 is restrained or enjoined pending
the outcome of a challenge in court.
Furthermore, our amendment is broader in scope than H.R. 2 because it
applies throughout the fiscal year, not just for 10 days following the
enactment of an appropriation bill, and, of course, it has the lock box
feature I spoke of earlier. This amendment is a plus for H.R. 2, and I
urge support for its adoption.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to a distinguished new
Member of this body, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Neumann], an
original cosponsor of the line-item veto bill.
Mr. NEUMANN. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in opposition to anything
that would in any way, shape, or form complicate or weaken this line-
item veto bill as we have proposed it here today. The line-item veto
bill needs to maintain its strength so we get at the root of the
problem facing this Nation, which is a debt in the amount of $4.8
trillion.
I was an original cosponsor on the line-item veto bill because I feel
as we look at the debt facing our Nation today, it is time we actually
do something about it, and the only way we are going to do something
about it is if we actually get to the point where we can reduce
spending.
The balanced budget amendment passed last week is important, but as
we move forward, we must look at line-item veto to go with the balanced
budget amendment so we can actually get at the root of the problem, and
that is spending.
Why do we need a line-item veto here? I have the numbers with me
today and can show Members the impact on the children of this Nation if
we do not pass the line-item veto bill today. I do not want to see
anything that weakens it in any way, shape, or form.
Today this Nation stands $4.8 trillion in debt. For the folks that
have not seen this number, it looks like this. The number is very, very
real. We are paying interest on that debt each and everyday, and it
impacts the families in my district and the families all across
America. $4.8 trillion has been borrowed on behalf the American people
in the last 15 years. Something needs to be done about it.
I am a former math teacher. As a former math teacher I like to look
at this number as it relates on an individual basis to each person
across this Nation. If we take that $4.8 trillion and divide it by the
260 million people in the United States of America, each and every
person in the United States of America is responsible for $18,500 of
debt. Again, if we take the $4.8 trillion and divide by the 260 million
people in this Nation, every man, woman and child is responsible for
$18,500 worth of debt. For a family of four in America, from my
district back home in Wisconsin, the Federal Government has borrowed
$74,000 on behalf of the American people. It is not OK, folks, and it
is not OK if we let this continue forward.
For a family of five like my own, the Federal Government has borrowed
$92,500. The real problem is not when we look at just the debt, but
when we look at the interest that has to be paid on the debt. I would
like to point out that this family of four is going to pay
approximately $5,180 in interest alone on the national debt. Just think
about this number for a second. A family of four in our district earns
about $32,000 a year. This family of four is going to pay about $5,100
out of that $32,000 of income to pay just the interest on the national
debt. It does not get any goods or services from the American
Government. That simply pays the interest on the national debt.
Why am I so adamant? Why can I come here and work so hard for the
line-item veto and the balanced budget? Because it is time the American
people do something about this situation. When we start thinking about
a family in our district paying over $5,000 a year to do nothing but
pay the interest on the national debt, you think it is time we get
serious about doing something about the budget, something about
balancing the budget, and in fact I think we should start talking about
paying off the debt.
The day has come where we need to think about how we are going to get
to the balanced budget and then go the next step. How can we get rid of
this atrocious debt that is costing the family of four in my district
over $5,000 a year in just interest? It is time we get past it.
There are two things that are necessary to do that in my opinion. One
is the balanced budget amendment which the House passed not very long
ago, and the other is this line-item veto, a very strong line item veto
needs to be passed. It needs to be passed today.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has 14\1/2\
minutes left, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Blute] has
15\1/2\ minutes left.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I realize there has been considerable confusion and
misinformation about just what this amendment would do. The last chart
in all honesty has nothing to do with this amendment. It has everything
to do with why I too offer this amendment. Because we do want to get
after spending. The Stenholm-Spratt amendment is offered as a
supplement to the line-item veto authority in H.R. 2.
Even though it is presented here as a substitute here at the end of
the debate, it includes all of H.R. 2, as reported. I want to repeat,
this amendment we offer includes all of H.R. 2 as reported. In
addition, this amendment incorporates all of the amendments approved by
the Committee of the Whole only Thursday and Friday of last week,
namely the Clinger, Thurman, Neal, and I will ask the same unanimous
consent request that Mr. Clinger asked to add Obey to my amendment so
it will do what we intended for it to do when we go into the House.
This expedited rescission authority portion of this amendment would
allow the President to propose to cut or eliminate individual spending
items in appropriations bills throughout the year. The President could
earmark some or all of the savings for deficit reduction.
In addition, the President would be able to propose to repeal
targeted tax breaks which benefit a particular taxpayer or class of
taxpayers only within the 10 days of signing the bill.
The House would have 10 legislative days after the President sends up
a rescission package to bring it to the floor. There has been some
debate as to whether or not that 10-day limitation would actually
occur. I believe the answer is clearly yes, it would. First the rules
would not permit consideration of other matters until the rescission
package was dealt with. Second, any appropriation or tax item that was
submitted by the President in effect would be suspended until Congress
acted on the President's package.
Now, just a moment ago we were talking, the gentleman from Wisconsin
was talking about guaranteed cuts, guaranteed deficit reduction.
{time} 1740
I must submit, again, H.R. 2 does not guarantee deficit reduction.
Only with our amendment can we have guaranteed deficit reduction,
because we included the lock box provision. And that was as a result of
last year's debate in which the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] was
very instrumental in changing the language of the amendment that we in
fact bring to Members today.
The line-item veto includes no guarantee that the savings from the
President's rescissions would go to deficit reduction. Congress would
be free to spend the savings from rescissions proposed by the President
on other programs.
Although H.R. 2 allows the President to propose to reduce the
discretionary caps, there is no provision for a vote in Congress to
reduce the spending caps.
[[Page H1249]] In other words, rescissions submitted under the line-
item veto would not save one dime. We believe our substitute provides
for that alternative should we, the Congress and the President, believe
that was important.
The Stenholm-Spratt amendment includes provisions to ensure that the
savings from spending cuts would go to deficit reduction.
Furthermore, under H.R. 2, standing alone, the President would have
the veto option for only the first 10 days after signing a bill.
Although H.R. 2 is intended to increase the ability of the President to
identify and eliminate wasteful and low priority spend, it dramatically
restricts the President's flexibility by setting this artificial 10-day
deadline.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. STENHOLM. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, we had the Congressional Research Service
do some research which I think is extremely helpful in understanding
the importance of this power that we give the President to use this
additional rescission authority throughout the fiscal year.
According to CRS, the Congressional Research Service, 99 percent of
all rescissions sent up here by the President were sent beyond the 10-
day period after the adoption of appropriation bills. That points up
that frequently the rescission authority is not used to knock out pork
barrel stuff, but to try to adjust the budget in midyear when we have
got underfunded accounts for the Veterans Administration, underfunded
accounts for operations and maintenance and defense, and we have to pay
for the supplementary budget authority by rescinding other budget
authority on the books. Then the President has the authority to
formulate his request, send it up here and be guaranteed under our bill
a quick 20-day turnaround.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr Chairman, I would conclude my remarks at this time
by saying that I believe it grossly unfair to categorize our amendment
as being weakening. If we are truly concerned about deficit reduction,
I believe the language of our amendment, as a supplement to, not as a
replacement for, but a supplement to, clearly stands out as being more
able to reduce the deficit because of the language which we put into
our amendment.
As the gentleman said, again, Members have talked about this language
from the standpoint that somehow current law is better. It is not. And
unless we in fact add our amendment, we will have current law 355 days
out of the year but 10 days out of the year, 10 calendar days out of
the year we will have a much improved situation over the current
system.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, let me say that what we have offered here
supplements, does not substitute for or replace, it supplements H.R. 2,
and it does not do it in any sort of redundant or cosmetic way. We give
the President some important additional rescission authority. He can
use this authority pending any court challenge to the constitutionality
of H.R. 2 and he may have well need that authority this budget year
because there is likely to be a constitutional challenge to this bill
if it becomes law.
Second, we give him authority that he can use throughout the budget
year, not just in that narrow period of time 10 days after the adoption
of an appropriations bill.
The Congressional Research Service says, as we were just pointing
out, that 99 percent of all rescissions typically sent up here by
presidents since 1976, 99 percent of them have been sent well beyond
that 10-day period of time.
Our bill covers that additional period of time, when by tradition 99
percent of the rescission bills have been sent up.
Finally, we allow the President to say, we want to take these
savings, put them in a deficit reduction account and not have the money
spent elsewhere during the course of the fiscal year. Three strong
features that add to, do not detract from or conflict in any way,
strengthen this bill and should be adopted to perfect it.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, in summation I would just like to say if Members want
to replace the cumbersome and unworkable process for year-round
authority with teeth, they need to vote for the Stenholm-Spratt
amendment. This amendment has had a proud bipartisan history, despite
the effort recently to portray it as partisan.
Mr. Chairman, I am submitting for the Record some material on past
Republican support for the amendment. I also am submitting two legal
opinions. Finally, I am submitting for the Record a list of some of the
most commonly asked questions about this amendment, along with the
answers that have been prepared.
Mr. Chairman, whether Members think H.R. 2 is constitutional or not,
whether they prefer line item veto authority or expedited rescission
authority, there is a reason for Members to vote for the Stenholm-
Spratt amendment. This amendment provides a rare opportunity in the
legislative process, a win-win scenario.
I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to approve my
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the information to which I
referred.
[From the Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress,
Washington, DC., Feb. 3, 1995]
To The Honorable Nathan Deal, Attention Ed Lorenzen.
From Virginia A. McMurtry, Specialist in American National
Government, James V. Saturno, Specialist on the Congress,
Government Division.
Subject: Submission dates of Presidents' rescission request.
In response to your request for figures on the dates of
submission to Congress of rescission requests from the
President under the Impoundment Control Act since 1974, we
have prepared the attached table.
The table provides the number of rescission requests, by
month, for each fiscal year. The actual unit of analysis is
the individual rescission, not rescission messages as we
initially discussed. If five separate rescission requests
were included in a single message during a given month, the
number entered on the table would be five. This provides a
more accurate way for considering the transmission of
rescission proposals, since under current law there is no
requirement for the President either to combine or to
separate rescissions transmitted at the same time. The number
of rescissions included in a single message have varied
considerably, even within the same Administration.
As indicated in the notes accompanying the table, the End-
of-Year Cumulative Reports on Rescissions and Deferrals,
prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, provided the
source. Actually, for one year, Fiscal Year 1990, OMB
prepared no end-of-year report. In this instance we used the
monthly cumulative report for September, 1990, which happened
to include a complete listing of rescissions for that year.
We hope that this information proves useful to you. If we
can be of further assistance, you may reach Ginger at 7-8678,
or Jim at 7-2381.
PRESIDENTIAL RESCISSION REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY MONTH, FISCAL YEAR 1976-94
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year\1\ Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976.................. 0 6 13 17 0 0 0 0 0 \2\6 0 \3\4 46
1977.................. 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 0 \4\10 0 \5\1 21
1978.................. 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 7
1979.................. 0 1 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
1980.................. 1 0 0 2 0 1 53 2 0 0 0 0 59
1981.................. 0 0 0 34 0 120 0 0 10 1 0 0 165
1982.................. 2 1 0 0 22 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 31
1983.................. 0 0 1 0 19 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 21
1984.................. 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
1985.................. 0 0 0 0 241 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 244
1986.................. 0 0 0 0 77 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 83
1987.................. 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 73
[[Page H1250]]
PRESIDENTIAL RESCISSION REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS BY MONTH, FISCAL YEAR 1976-94--Continued
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year\1\ Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1988.................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989.................. 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
1990.................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 0 0 0 0 11
1991.................. 0 0 0 0 26 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 30
1992.................. 0 0 0 0 1 98 29 0 0 0 0 0 128
1993.................. 7 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 6 0 0 0 19
1994.................. 0 38 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total........... 10 46 17 154 424 223 90 14 20 23 1 7 1,029
=================================================================================================================================
Percent............... 0.97 4.47 1.65 14.97 41.21 21.67 8.75 1.36 1.94 2.24 0.10 0.68 100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Although the Impoundment Control Act became effective upon enactment (July 12, 1974), the fiscal year calendar change did not begin until Oct. 1,
1975, for FY 1976. In addition to the rescission messages listed there were also eight rescission messages in July 1975 concerning spending for FY
1976 and the transition quarter (July-Sept. 1975).
\2\Of the five rescission requests received in July 1976 one concerned spending for FY 1977.
\3\Of the four rescission requests received in September 1976, three concerned spending for FY 1977.
\4\Of the ten rescission requests received in July 1977, four concerned spending for FY 1978.
\5\the rescission requests received in September 1977 concerned spending in FY 1978, and was later reclassified as a deferral by the Comptroller
General.
Source: Office of Management and Budget End-of-Year Cumulative Report on Rescissions and Deferrals for each FY1976-94.
Republican Support for Expedited Rescission
99th Congress
Bills introduced
S. Con. Res. 65--The Porkbusters Resolution of 1985.
Introduced by Senator Dan Quayle (R-IN) on September 17,
1985. Required Congress to vote on resolutions approving
Presidential rescissions by a majority vote within fifteen
days after the rescission was submitted.
H.R. 3675--a bill providing the President with modified
rescission authority while preserving the authority of
Congress in the budget process. Introduced by Rep. Ralph
Regula (R-OH) on November 1, 1985. Required Congressional
votes on Presidential rescissions within 45 days.
Floor consideration
On September 19, 1985, Senator Quayle offered the text of
S. Con. Res. 65 as an amendment to the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1986. The amendment was ruled non-germane and defeated
on a procedural motion of 34-62.
100th Congress
Bills introduced
S. Con. Res. 16--a bill providing for expedited
consideration of a bill or joint resolution approving a
Presidential rescission. Introduced by Senator Quayle on
February 5, 1987. The bill was cosponsored by two
Republicans.
H. Con. Res. 119--similar to S. Con. Res. 16. Introduced by
Rep. Lynn Martin (R-NY) on May 8, 1987. Cosponsored by 15
Republicans.
H.R. 3129--Line-item Rescission Act of 1987. Introduced by
Rep. Tim Johnson (D-SD) on August 6, 1987. Cosponsored by 20
Republicans, including Rep. Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and Rep.
Dan Coats (R-IN).
Floor consideration
Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX) attempted to add an amendment to the
FY88 Long-term Continuing Resolution granting the President
enhanced rescission authority over funds included in the CR.
Under the amendment, a simple majority of Congress could
overturn the rescission. The effort was unsuccessful.
Notable quotes
Senator Dan Quayle (February 5, 1987, S3136 Congressional
Record)
``The Pork-Buster Resolution is based on a simple,
fundamental premise. Before the taxpayers' money can be
spent, the President and a majority of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives should be required to agree
those funds should be spent. Congress should be made--and
held--accountable to the American people on rescissions that
a President believes are appropriate. By using the rulemaking
power of each House, the Pork-Buster Resolution would require
expedited consideration of Presidential rescission
messages.''
Rep. Dick Armey (Dear Colleague dated November 2, 1987)
``Enhanced rescission authority will involve the
Administration and the Congress in a meaningful deficit
reduction process in a manner that ensures both institution's
prerogatives are protected.''
Rep. Dick Armey (November 5, 1987, H30961 Congressional
Record):
``I will go to the Rules Committee and I will request a
rule that will allow me to amend that long-term continuing
resolution to include in it enhanced rescission authority
that would allow the President to examine that large omnibus
spending bill line item by line item and make line-item
vetoes, as it were, with a simple majority override capacity
remaining for the House.''
101st Congress
Bills introduced
H.R. 235--Line-item Rescission Act of 1989. Introduced by
Rep. Tim Johnson (D-SD) on January 3, 1989. Cosponsored by 9
Republicans.
H.R. 962--Current Level Rescission Act of 1989. Introduced
by Rep. Dick Armey on February 9, 1989 and cosponsored by 105
Republicans. Provided for expedited consideration of
Presidential rescissions if the rescission did not reduce any
program below its prior-year level.
H.R. 3800--a bill providing for expedited consideration of
certain Presidential rescission. Introduced by Rep. Tom
Carper (D-DE) along with Reps. Armey, Johnson, Martin, Dan
Glickman (D-KN), Bill Frenzel (R-MN) and others as a
bipartisan consensus expedited rescission bill on November
21, 1987. Cosponsored by 65 Republicans.
Notable quotes
Rep. Dick Armey and Rep. Tim Johnson (Dear Colleague dated
March 1, 1989)
``The Current Level Enhanced Rescission Act is a realistic,
rational proposal that protects Congress' own spending
priorities and restores the President's role in fighting the
deficit.''
102d congress
Bills introduced
H.R. 2164--a bill providing for expedited consideration of
certain Presidential rescissions. Introduced by Rep. Carper
on May 1, 1991. Cosponsored by 108 Republicans. Required
votes in Congress on Presidential rescissions within ten days
of their submission. Limited the amount that the President
could rescind authorized programs to 25%. Established the new
procedure for two years.
H.R. 5700--Expedited Consideration of Proposed Rescissions
Act of 1992. Introduced by Rep. Solomon on July 28, 1992.
Identical to H.R. 2164 except that it eliminated the
distinction between authorized and unauthorized programs
included in H.R. 2164.
Floor consideration
July 30, 1992--Rep. Solomon attempted to defeat the
previous question on the Commerce, Justice and State
Appropriations bill so that he could offer a motion to make
in order what he described as ``a slightly different line-
item veto rescission amendment'' which consisted of the text
of his expedited rescission bill. Reps. Bob McEwan (R-OH),
David Dreier (R-CA), John Duncan (R-TN) and Bob Walker (R-PA)
spoke in support of Solomon's motion. The effort failed on a
vote of 240-176.
October 3, 1992--The House passed H.R. 2164, the expedited
rescission bill introduced by Rep. Tom Carper, by a vote of
312-197. It was supported by 154 of 159 Republicans voting.
Notable quotes
Rep. Dick Armey (May 5, Rules Committee Hearing on H.R.
4990):
``I think the President's authority should be enhanced,
perhaps enhanced in the way Mr. Solomon suggests, but even
enhancing it a little bit in the way Mr. Carper will later
recommend. That would be an improvement.''
Rep. Harris Fawell (R-IL) (May 5, Rules Committee Hearing)
``When Tom Carper comes up in reference to his enhanced
rescission bill, it isn't everything I would want, but I
could support it. It does valuable things. It moves us down
that road.''
Rep. Jerry Solomon (May 7, 1992, H3029 Congressional
Record):
``We moved to make in order an amendment by Mr. Carper, a
Democrat, and Mr. Stenholm, a Democrat, to provide for
expedited rescission procedures for the next two years,
similar in concept to my line item veto bill, but watered
down considerably. Still, it is a strong step in the right
direction.''
Rep. Bob McEwan (July 30, 1992, H6988 Congressional
Record):
``The Solomon amendment would mandate that Congress
consider legislation approving the President's rescissions
within twenty days. If either House fails to pass the bill,
then the money would be obligated. Mr. Speaker, in the name
of fiscal responsibility, the House must be given the
opportunity to at least consider the Solomon amendment.''
Rep. Jerry Solomon (July 30, 1992, H6992 Congressional
Record):
``If we defeat the previous question, I will offer the
Carper line-item rescission amendment that simply requires
Congress to vote up or down on the President's request not to
spend the money. This requires only a simple majority vote.''
Rep. Jerry Solomon (July 30, 1992, H6992 Congressional
Record):
``For those of you who really believe in the line-item
veto, we have reached a tremendous compromise here that you
can vote for. It should be something that this House can
support overwhelmingly on both sides of the aisle.''
Rep. Harris Fawell (October 2, 1992, H10811 Congressional
Record):
[[Page H1251]] ``(H.R. 2164) is at least the first step of
a 1,000 mile journey toward hopefully someday being able to
balance the federal budget.''
Rep. Jerry Solomon (October 2, 1992 H10813 Congressional
Record):
``I favor the bill before us today (H.R. 2164) because it
is an improvement over the current rescission process * * *.
It is a step in the right direction.''
103d congress
Bills introduced
H.R. 1013--Expedited Consideration of Proposed Rescissions
Act of 1993. Introduced by Rep. Charlie Stenholm (D-TX) on
February 18, 1993. Cosponsored by 33 Republicans. Required
the President to submit rescissions within a three-day window
after signing an appropriations bill. The expedited
rescission authority would have a 2 year sunset. Does not
include targeted tax credit.
H.R. 1578--Expedited Rescissions Act of 1993. Introduced by
Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) on April 1, 1993. Required the
President to submit rescissions within a three-day window
after signing an appropriations bill. The expedited
rescission authority would have a two year sunset. Does not
include targeted tax credit. A framework would be established
for consideration of an appropriations committee alternative
if the President's package was defeated.
H.R. 4600--Expedited Rescissions Act of 1994. Introduced by
Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) on June 17, 1994. Applies only to
appropriations, may be used only within 3-day window after an
appropriations bill passes, applies only to the 103rd
Congress.
H.R. 4434--Common Cents Budget Reform Act of 1994.
Introduced by Reps. Stenholm (D-TX), Penny (D-MN), and Kasich
(R-OH). Cosponsored by 14 Republicans. Guarantees a vote on
every rescission bill submitted by the President. The
President can designate any portion of the savings for
deficit reduction. The President can submit a special message
repealing a targeted tax credit within 10 days after a bill
is enacted. The President can submit a special message to
rescind appropriations at any time. Permanently extends
authority.
Floor consideration
July 14, 1994--The House passed the Stenholm substitute to
H.R. 4600 on final passage by a vote of 342-69. The Stenholm
substitute was agreed to by a vote of 298-121. The Solomon
substitute failed 205-218. All 169 Republicans present and
voting voted yes on final passage, and all 170 Republicans
present and voting voted yes on the Stenholm substitute.
Notable quotes
Rep. John Kasich (July 14, 1994, H5728 Congressional
Record):
``This (Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment), ladies and
gentlemen of the House, represents the most significant
movement on trying to control the deficit through the use of
the line-item veto that we have voted on and have a chance to
pass in this House since I have been a Member of the House *
* *. This (Stenholm-Penny-Kasich amendment), is precisely
what the American people have been calling for * * *. It will
bring real change.''
Rep. Jim Kolbe (July 14, 1994, H5715 Congressional Record):
``Let us not let the opportunity to support tough budget
reform slip away again, Support the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich
amendment to H.R. 4600.''
Rep. Rick Lazio (July 14, 1994, H5711 Congressional
Record):
``We have significantly strengthened the process (existing
rescission process) by adopting the Penny-Kasich-Stenholm
amendment, for which I voted.''
Rep. Harris Fawell (July 14, 1994, H5710 Congressional
Record):
``Should this substitute (Michel-Solomon) fail, I then will
support the Stenholm-Penny-Kasich substitute, because it is a
vast improvement over the enhanced rescission power we
presently have.''
____
Questions and Answers Regarding Expedited Rescission Authority
How does the Wise and Stenholm-Spratt substitutes differ
from H.R. 1578 and H.R. 4600, the versions of expedited
rescission reported by the Rules Committee in the 103rd
Congress?
Both substitutes incorporate several changes from earlier
expedited rescission legislation made by the Stenholm-Penny-
Kasich amendment to H.R. 4600 on July 14, 1994. The Stenholm-
Penny-Kasich amendment made several changes to respond to
concerns raised by many members and significantly strengthen
the legislation. The President would be able to single out
newly enacted targeted tax benefits as well as appropriated
items for individual votes. Unlike H.R. 1578 and H.R. 4600,
which required the President to submit rescissions within a
three-day window after signing an appropriations bill, the
President would be able to submit a rescission package for
expedited consideration at any point in the year. The
President would have the option of earmarking savings from
proposed rescissions to deficit reduction, which no other
expedited rescission or line-item veto proposal would permit.
The new expedited rescission authority would be established
permanently instead of being sunsetted after two years.
Members would have the ability to obtain separate votes on
individual items in a rescission package that have
significant support. The Wise and Stenholm substitutes
explicitly prevent the President's rescissions from being
considered under a special rule which would waive the
requirements of the section. Finally, the prerogative of the
Appropriations Committee to move their own rescission bill
would be preserved without creating a cumbersome new
procedure.
How is the procedure under expedited rescission different
from the existing procedure for considering Presidential
rescissions under Title X of the Budget Control and
Impoundment Act?
Under Title X of the Budget Control and Impoundment Act,
the President may propose to rescind all or part of any item
at any time during the fiscal year. If Congress does not take
action on the proposed rescission within 45 days of
continuous session, the funds must be released for
obligation. Congress routinely ignores Presidential
rescissions. The discharge procedure for forcing a floor vote
on Presidential rescissions is cumbersome and has never been
used. Most Presidential rescission messages have died without
a floor vote.
Congress has approved just 34.5% of the individual
rescissions proposed by the President since 1974 (350 of 1012
rescissions submitted), representing slightly more than 30%
of the dollar volume of proposed rescissions. Nearly a third
of the Presidential rescissions approved came in 1981.
Excluding 1981, Congress has approved less than 20% of the
dollar volume in Presidential rescissions. Although Congress
has initiated $65 billion in rescissions on its own, it has
ignored nearly $48 billion in Presidential rescissions
submitted under Title X of the Budget Control and Impoundment
Act without any vote at all on the merits of the rescissions.
In 1992, the threat that there would be an attempt to
utilize the Title X discharge procedure to force votes on 128
rescissions submitted by President Bush provided the impetus
for the Appropriations Committee to report a bill rescinding
more than $8 billion. However, this was an exception. Most
rescission messages are ignored. Expedited rescission would
change that and force Congress to react to Presidential
messages by voting on them, increasing the likelihood that
unnecessary spending would be eliminated.
Could Congress thwart the provisions of expedited
rescission legislation by reporting a rule that waives the
requirements of this proposal?
No. The substitute specifically states that ``It shall not
be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any
rescission bill introduced pursuant to the provisions of this
section . . . under a special rule.'' Furthermore, OMB could
continue to withhold the funds from obligation until the
President's plan was voted on as required by this legislation
regardless of any attempts by Congress to waive its internal
rules. If Congress used its Constitutional authority to set
its own rules to avoid a vote on the President's rescissions,
it would give the President the ability to indefinitely
impound the funds.
How does expedited rescission legislation ensure that a
Presidential rescission is voted on by Congress?
Expedited rescission legislation establishes several
procedural requirements ensuring that Congress cannot simply
ignore a rescission message. A rescission bill would be
introduced by request by either the Majority or Minority
Leader. If the Appropriations Committee does not report out
the rescission bill as required within ten days, the bill is
automatically discharged from the committee and placed on the
appropriate calendar. Once the bill is either reported by or
discharged from the Appropriations Committee, any individual
member may make a highly privileged motion to proceed to
consideration of the bill. Although a motion to adjourn would
take precedence, the House could not prevent a vote on a
rescission message by adjourning because only legislative
days are counted toward the ten day clock. Action is also
promoted by providing for a highly privileged motion to
proceed to consideration and limiting debate and preventing
amendments to a rescission bill. This proposal ensures that
there will be a vote on a rescission bill so long as one
member is willing to stand up on the House floor and make a
motion to proceed.
The substitute includes language to discourage the House
from avoiding a vote on the President's package, by making
the release of funds by OMB contingent on Congress voting on
and defeating the President's package.
Under current law, OMB withholds funds from apportionment
until Congress acts on a rescission message. Funds included
in a rescission message would be frozen in the pipeline until
Congress either votes to rescind them or to release them for
obligation. The substitute provides that the funds must be
released for obligation upon defeat of the President's
rescission bill in either House. This is different from the
requirement in Section 1012 of the Impoundment Control Act of
1974, which states ``Any amount of budget authority proposed
to be rescinded . . . shall be made available for obligation,
unless, within the prescribed 45 day period, the Congress has
completed action on a rescission bill rescinding all or part
of the amount proposed to be rescinded.'' By specifically
providing that the funds would be released upon defeat of the
President's package and not providing for any other
circumstances in which OMB must release the funds, the
language of the Wise and Stenholm-Spratt substitutes clearly
provide that OMB will be required to release the funds
[[Page H1252]] only when Congress votes on and rejects the
rescission bill.
Similarly, the amendment provides that any tax benefits
proposed to be repealed be ``deemed to have been repealed
unless . . . either House rejects the bill transmitted with
that special message.''
How would the motion to strike individual items from a
package of rescissions work?
A member would be able to make a motion to strike an
individual item in the rescission bill if 49 members support
the motion. This procedure would be similar to existing
procedures to call for recorded votes or the procedure for
discharging rescission bills under Title X of the Impoundment
Control Act in which the members supporting the motion would
stand and be counted. If the requisite number of members
supported a motion to strike, the motion would be debated
under the five minute rule and the House would vote on the
motion. If the motion was supported by a majority of members,
the item would be struck from the bill. The House would vote
on final passage of the rescission bill after disposing of
any motion to strike.
If 50 members feel strongly enough about an individual item
to coordinate the actions necessary to obtain a motion to
strike, they deserve to have the opportunity to make their
case to the full House. They would still have to convince a
majority of the House that their project was justified.
Wouldn't the motion to strike deprive the President of a
vote on his rescissions?
No. Congress would vote on the merits of each rescission
either as part of the overall package or on a motion to
strike. While there might not be one vote on the entire
package if a motion to strike succeeded, Congress would have
voted on the merits of individual rescissions when it voted
on the motions to strike items from the package.
The motion to strike increases the chance of passing
rescissions submitted by the President by providing a safety
valve to take ``killer'' items out of a rescission package to
avoid the entire package from being defeated because of one
item with strong support. If there is a strong core of
support within Congress for an individual item, there would
be a high likelihood that the supporters of that item could
form an alliance to defeat the entire bill. Although the
President would presumably make political judgements to avoid
including items that would sink the entire package, the
administration will not always be aware of all traps that may
lie with an individual spending program or tax provision.
This safety valve would prevent a political miscalculation
from sinking the entire bill.
What types of tax provisions would be subject to the new
rescission process?
The provision for expedited consideration of proposals to
repeal tax items would be restricted to targeted tax
benefits. ``Targeted tax benefits'' are defined as provisions
which provide a deduction, credit, exclusion, preference, or
other concession to 100 or fewer taxpayers. The rescission
authority would apply to narrowly drawn tax items, the so-
called ``tax pork'', which are slipped into tax bills to
benefit special interests. It will not apply to broader tax
breaks that apply to a larger number of taxpayers such as a
capital gains tax reduction or middle class tax cut.
Wouldn't the ability to repeal tax items create uncertainty
in the tax code?
No. The substitute provides for swift consideration of
proposals to repeal tax provisions so that taxpayers would
know the final disposition of any tax provision within a
reasonable period of time following the passage of a tax
bill. The President must submit a proposal to repeal a tax
provision within ten business days after signing a tax bill.
Congress would be required to act within twenty legislative
days.
Could the President propose to rewrite tax provisions?
No. The President would only be able to propose legislative
language necessary to repeal individual tax provisions for
expedited consideration. Legislation submitted by the
President to rewrite a tax provision would not be subject to
the expedited procedures of this amendment.
Doesn't this legislation constitute an unconstitutional
legislative veto?
No. This legislation was carefully crafted to comply with
the Constitutional requirements established by the courts by
I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the case that declared
legislative veto provisions unconstitutional. Legislative
vetoes allow one or both Houses of Congress (or a
Congressional committee) to stop executive actions by passing
a resolution that is not presented to the President. The
Chada court held that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional
because they allow Congress to exercise legislative power
without complying with Constitutional requirements for
bicameral passage of legislation and presentment of
legislation to the President for signature or veto. For
example, allowing the House (or Congress as a whole) to block
a Presidential rescission by passing a motion of disapproval
without sending the bill to the President for signature or
veto would violate the Chada test. This substitute meets the
Chada tests of bicameralism and presentment by requiring that
both chambers of Congress pass a motion enacting the
rescission and send it to the President for signature or
veto, before the funds are rescinded. The substitute does not
provide for legislative review of a preceding executive
action, but expedited consideration of an executive proposal.
Thus, it represents a so-called ``report and wait'' provision
that the court approved in Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941) and reaffirmed in Chada.
If a majority of Congress has voted for items as part of an
appropriations or tax bill, wouldn't the same majority vote
to preserve the items when they were rescinded?
Just as President's often sign appropriations bills (or
other bills for that matter) that include individual items
that he does not support, Congress often passes
appropriations bills without passing judgment on individual
items. Expedited rescission legislation would force the
President and Congress to examine spending items on their
individual merit and not as part of an overall package. Many
items included in an omnibus appropriations bill would not be
able to receive majority support in Congress if they were
forced to stand on their own individual merits. Members who
voted for an appropriations or tax bill may be willing to
vote to eliminate individual items that had been in the
omnibus bill.
Isn't requiring an additional vote on items that have
already been approved by Congress a waste of time?
As was stated above, the fact that an item was included in
an omnibus appropriations or tax bill does not necessarily
imply that a majority of Congress supported that individual
item. For example, when Congress passed the Agricultural
Appropriations Bill in 1990, the majority of the members did
not endorse spending on Lawrence Welk's home. Requiring a
second vote on individual items included in an omnibus
appropriation bill is not an unreasonable response to
realities of the legislative process.
Doesn't providing the President expedited rescission
authority alter the balance of power between Congress and the
President?
No. The approach of expedited rescission legislation
strikes a balance between protecting Congress' control of the
purse and providing the accountability in the appropriations
process. Unlike line-item veto legislation, this substitute
would preserve the Constitutional power of Congressional
majorities to control spending decisions. Expedited
rescission authority increases the accountability of both
sides, but does not give the President undue leverage in the
appropriations process because funding for a program will
continue if a majority of either House disagree with him.
Since the rescission process would apply only to the
relatively small amount of spending in discretionary programs
and a limited number of small tax breaks, isn't this just a
political gimmick that won't have a significant impact on the
deficit?
The authors of this proposal have never claimed that this
proposal would balance the budget. However, it will be a
useful tool in helping the President and Congress identify
and eliminate as much as $10 billion in wasteful or low-
priority spending each year. Furthermore, the existence of
expedited rescission authority will have a cleansing effect
on the Appropriations process which will prevent many
wasteful programs from being included in the Appropriations
bills in the first place. Many of the special interest tax
provisions that would be subject to expedited rescission have
a considerable cost. It will help ensure that the federal
government spends its scarce resources in the most effective
way possible and does not divert resources to low-priority
programs. Perhaps most importantly, by increasing the
accountability of the budget process, it will help restore
some credibility to the federal government's handling of
taxpayer money with the public. This credibility is necessary
if Congress and the President are to gain public support for
the tough choices of cutting benefits or raising taxes
necessary to balance the budget.
Would this proposal apply to entitlement programs funded
through the appropriations process such as unemployment
insurance and food stamps?
No. Although other versions of expedited rescission
legislation would have allowed a President to propose to
rescind spending for entitlement programs funded through the
regular appropriations bills (as is the case with
unemployment insurance and other income support programs),
this was changed to clarify that the expedited rescission
process does not apply to any entitlement programs.
Doesn't the expedited rescission process violate the
legislative prerogative by requiring action under a specific
timetable and preventing amendments to a rescission bill?
The expedited procedure for consideration of rescission
messages in this substitute is similar to fast track
procedures for trade agreements or for base closure reports,
which have worked relatively well. In fact, the scope of the
legislation that would be subject to expedited consideration
is much more confined under this procedure than in either
trade agreements or base closings.
Wouldn't allowing the President to submit rescissions
throughout the year give the President undue ability to
dictate the legislative calendar?
The substitute preserves the flexibility of Congressional
leaders to develop the legislative schedule while ensuring
that the President's package is voted on in a timely fashion.
It provides that the time allowed for consideration of the
bill before a vote is required be counted in legislative days
instead of calendar days, ensuring that the House will be in
session for ten days after receiving the message before a
vote is required. The House could vote on the package any
point within the ten legislative days for consideration.
[[Page H1253]] Could the President propose to lower the
spending level of an item, or would he have to eliminate the
entire item?
The President could propose to rescind the budget authority
for all or part of any program in an appropriations bill.
Consequently the President could, if he so chose, submit a
rescission that simply lowered the budget authority for a
certain program without eliminating it entirely. In
comparison, most line-item veto proposals require the
President to propose to eliminate an entire line item in an
appropriations bill.
Would this proposal allow the President to strike
legislative language from appropriations bills?
No. It specifically allows a President to rescind only
budget authority provided in an appropriations act and
requires that the draft bill submitted by the President have
only the effect of canceling budget authority. Legislative
language, including limitation riders, would not be subject
to this procedure.
Could the President propose to increase budget authority
for a program?
No. The substitute specifically provides that the President
may propose to eliminate or reduce budget authority provided
in an appropriations bill. It does not allow the President to
propose an increase in budget authority.
What happens if the President submits a rescission message
after Congress recesses for the year?
The House has ten legislative days to consider the
rescission message. Since the time allowed for consideration
of the rescission message only counts days that Congress is
in session, Congress would not be required to vote on a
rescission message until after it returns from recess.
However, the funds would not be released for apportionment
for proposed rescissions until Congress votes on and defeats
a Presidential rescission bill. Congressional leaders would
have to decide whether to reconvene Congress to consider the
rescission message or to leave the message pending while
Congress is in recess. Congress could delay adjourning sine
die until the time period in which the President could submit
a rescission has expired so that it can reconvene to consider
a rescission message if it is submitted after Congress
completes all other business. If the funds included in a
rescission message are considered by Congress to be
important, Congress would have to return to session to vote
on the message. If a rescission message is submitted after
the first session of the 103rd Congress has adjourned for the
year, or if Congress adjourns before the period for
consideration of a rescission message expires, the rescission
message would remain pending at the beginning of the second
session of the 103rd Congress. The House still would be
required to vote on the rescission message by the tenth
legislative day after the rescission package was submitted.
____
Congressional research Service,
The Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, March 31, 1993.
To: Hon. Charles W. Stenholm.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Validity of the Approval Mechanism in the
``Expedited Consideration Rescissions Act of 1993''.
Under H.R. 1013, the Expedited Consideration of Proposed
Rescissions Act of 1993, as modified, the Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. 681 et seq., would
be amended to provide for a fast-track process for
considering and voting on presidential proposals embodied in
a bill or joint resolution to rescind budget authority
provided in an appropriations act. If the President submits
rescission proposals within three days after enactment of an
appropriations measure, a legislative process is triggered
whereby a House floor vote may be had within 10 legislative
days after receipt of the proposal, and a Senate floor vote
will be held within 10 days after transmittal of the House-
passed measure. The resultant legislative action is subject
to the President's veto.
You inquire whether the proposed rescission process
embodies a legislative veto proscribed under the Supreme
Court's ruling in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and
subsequent cases,\1\ or is otherwise violative of the
constitutionally mandated lawmaking process prescribed by
Article I, rec. 7. For the reasons set forth below, we do not
believe it is.
\1\Process Gas Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S.
1216 (1983)(one-House veto of rules invalid); United States
Senate v. F.T.C. 463 U.S. 1216 (1987)(two-House veto of rules
invalid).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The constitutional defect of the legislative veto disclosed
by the Chadha Court was that Congress sought to exercise its
legislative power without complying with the constitutionally
mandated requirements for lawmaking: bicameral passage and
presentation to the President for his signature or veto.
There, and in two subsequent cases, the Court found unlawful
legislative actions which sought to accomplish the reversal
of exercises of executive actions taken pursuant to lawfully
delegated authority without presentation to the President.
But the Court carefully noted in Chadha that it was not
casting doubt on so-called ``report and wait'' provisions
which it had previously approved in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1 (1941). Under such provisions a proposed executive
action does not become effective unless a specified
contingency occurs, i.e., a set period of time passes without
congressional action preventing it from going into effect or
Congress takes affirmative legislative action approving its
effectiveness.
H.R. 1013, as modified, utilizes both methods of contingent
legislation. For all rescission recommendations a
presidential proposal does not become effective unless it is
approved by a bill or joint resolution with 10 legislative
days of continuous session after the date on which the bill
or joint resolution is received by the House, and an
additional 10 legislative days after it is transmitted by the
House to the Senate for consideration. Rescission proposals
cannot become effective unless affirmatively enacted into
law. Both methods comply with Chadha since the legislative
action to be taken meets the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. Moreover, under the proposed
contingency scheme, the Executive has not been delegated any
legislative authority at all; he has been directed to
recommend and that proposal has no legal effect unless
Congress gives it such effect through further legislation.
Thus it is a classic reporting provision of the type approved
in Sibbach. Similar report and wait mechanisms requiring
affirmative legislative action have been enacted several
times since Chadha. See, e.g., Reorganization Act Amendments
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, sec. 3(a)(1), 98 Stat. 3192
(1984); Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1916-1918, 1935-1937
(1984)(proscription on use of intelligence agency funds for
Nicaragua); Pub. L. No. 98-441, 98 Stat. 1701
(1984)(obligating funds for MX missile).
Morton Rosenberg,
Specialist in American
Public Law.
____
Congressional Research Service,
The Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1993.
To: Hon. Charles Stenholm.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Application of Rescission Authority to ``Tax
Expenditures.
This memorandum provides, at your request, quick analysis
of whether the same constitutional principles that govern
application of rescission authority to appropriated funds
apply as well to rescission of ``tax expenditures.'' We
understand as well that the requested context for analysis is
H.R. 1013, a bill entitled ``Expedited Consideration of
Proposed Rescissions Act of 1993.'' It is proposed that
language be added to that bill adding ``tax expenditures'' as
a category within which the President may trigger expedited
congressional consideration of proposed rescission
legislation.
Some background may be helpful. The same constitutional
principles govern application of rescission authority to
``appropriations'' and to ``tax expenditures.'' These
governing principles are set out in previously prepared
memoranda enclosed for your review: ``Constitutionality of
Granting President Enhanced Budget Rescission Authority,''
June 27, 1989; and ``Adequacy of Standards in Bill Granting
President Enhanced Budget Rescission Authority,'' July 21,
1989, both by Johnny H. Killian, Senior Specialist in
American Constitutional Law, CRS. The basic issue raised by
actual conferral of rescission authority on the President
involves delegation of legislative authority, and whether
there are adequate standards set forth in the law so that it
can be determined whether the executive has complied with the
legislative will. In 1989 the Supreme Court held in Skinner
v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 223, that the same
principles govern delegation of taxing authority that govern
delegation of Congress' other authority.
``[T]he delegation of discretionary authority under
Congress' taxing power is subject to no constitutional
scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other
nondelegation challenges. Congress may wisely choose to be
more circumspect in delegating authority under the Taxing
Clause than under other of its enumerated powers, but this is
not a heightened degree of prudence required by the
Constitution.''
We note, however, that no constitutional delegation issues
are posed by H.R. 1013 or the proposed amendment. Instead,
the bill merely provides for expedited congressional
consideration of presidential proposals that Congress enact
legislation authorizing rescission of ``any budget authority
provided in an appropriations Act.'' No authority to
effectuate a rescission, to exercise a line-item veto, or
otherwise to nullify statutory enactments would be conferred
on the President by the bill. Inclusion of ``tax
expenditures'' along with budget authority as a category
about which the President may propose legislation that will
receive expedited consideration does nothing to change this
basic fact that the bill contains no delegation of rescission
or taxing authority.
With or without a delegation of authority, the principal
constitutional distinction between the categories of budget
authority and tax expenditures is the requirement of Art. I,
Sec. 7, cl. 1 that all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives. A bill providing
for ``tax expenditures'' (currently defined in 2 U.S.C.
Sec. 622(3) as ``revenue losses attributable to provisions of
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction . . . or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability'') might also include measures for raising
revenues,
[[Page H1254]] and a bill providing for repeal of tax
expenditures could be considered to be a bill for raising
revenues.
A further point. The President has the power conferred by
Art. II. Sec. 3 of the Constitution to ``recommend to
[Congress'] consideration such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient,'' and Congress of course cannot
prevent the President from proposing consideration of
legislation, including legislation that would rescind budget
authority or repeal tax expenditures. In conferring authority
to propose rescissions that will be subject to expedited
consideration by the Congress, the bill also restricts the
President's authority to make a second such request and does
not explicitly tie that restriction to operation of the
expedited procedures. The bill would add a new section 1013
to the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, and subsection (a) would provide in part that ``[f]unds
made available for obligation under this procedure may not be
proposed for rescission again under this section or section
1012.'' A reasonable implication of ``proposed . . . under
this section or section 1012'' is that a proposal may be
submitted independently of the cited authority, and that the
only restriction is that the expedited procedures authorized
by the new section or in connection with existing section
1012 would not be operative. Thus, while the language can and
should be interpreted to avoid any constitutional issue that
would be created by interference with the President's
authority under the Constitution to make recommendations to
Congress, a more direct statement tying the restriction to
operation of the expedited procedures could eliminate any
basis for question.
George Costello,
Legislative Attorney,
American Law Division.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss].
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to the distinguished
gentleman who brought this point forward that we have been watching and
listening very carefully. We agree, at least I agree and I think others
do, too, that what he is proposing does strengthen the present
expedited rescission process, which is extremely weak. It never
requires a vote; doing nothing spends the money. That is too much
temptation for almost anybody to overcome, and I think we are proof
that that temptation is true and is not overcomeable.
I think the gentleman has some good ideas. We have gone back and
taken a look at section 904 of the Budget Act and matched that up with
the gentleman's title II section under the requirement to make
available for obligation and his reliance on the antideficiency
process. I believe there is some area to work in there. I do not think
it is quite right.
I would like to state to the gentleman I hope to work with him in
cleaning up the budget process. We would like to take a clear shot at
this one for the tough two-thirds disapproval vote, which is primarily
our main concern. We are worried about the confusion. I do think the
gentleman has some good ideas which are worthy of further attention as
we clean up the budget process.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I want to commend the Committee on Rules
for giving us an open rule in which we had a very, I think, thorough
debate on a whole range of issues surrounding the line item veto
authority. With regard to the Stenholm-Spratt amendment, I would only
say that it complicates matters and that H.R. 2 freestanding is the
strongest line item veto authority that we could give the President.
President Clinton asked for the strongest version, his budget director
asked for the strongest version, and this bill is the strongest version
that we could give the President to help him reduce the deficit and
discipline the budget process.
I would also say that the Congressional Research Service has issued a
report on its constitutionality. But the larger issue, Mr. Chairman, is
that the line item veto has been kicking around up here on Capitol Hill
for a very, very long time. We have an opportunity tonight to give the
President this tool and to do something tangible about our Federal
budget deficit and about the expenditures in our yearly budgeting
process.
I urge this House to tonight pass the line item veto authority for
the President, send it over to the other body, and ultimately to give
the President this important tool.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment.
The President should have the power to rescind wasteful spending. But
it is also important that once the President flags wasteful line-items
and targeted tax benefits, that Congress should share the role of
acting on wasteful spending and acting quickly. The balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches must be preserved. One
should not be given greater power to identify and rescind government
spending. The framers of our Constitution did not foresee the need to
give greater rescission power to one or the other, nor should we.
In practice, several appropriation bills can reach the President's
desk at the same time. The President should be given the flexibility to
offer a package of rescissions at anytime and Congress should then act
to quickly approve or disapprove of that package. We have already
rejected a substitute that would have provided greater flexibility for
rescinding funds while not tipping the balance of power. I urge my
colleagues not to reject this kind
of common sense a second time. The approach offered by this amendment
preserves the balance of power between the executive and legislative
branches, and that is what the public wants. The public wants an
efficient government that moves quickly to eliminate wasteful spending.
The public does not want a single person or one-third of Congress to be
able to protect targeted spending.
I believe it's ironic that at a time when most of the public does not
want Washington controlled by a select few with narrow interests, and
our colleagues from the other side of the aisle keep talking about
spreading power beyond the beltway, that they keep reverting to
procedures within Congress that give enormous power to a minority of
our Members. Let's do something that makes sense. I urge my colleagues
to support this amendment.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of February 3, 1995,
further proceedings on the amendment in the nature of a substitute
offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] will be postponed.
The point of order of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
{time} 1750
announcement by the chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February
3, 1995, proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which
further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
The amendment offered by the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Orton], the
amendment offered by the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters], and
the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.
amendment offered by mr. orton
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from Utah [Mr. Orton] for a recorded vote on which further proceedings
were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
recorded vote
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This is a 15-minute vote, to be followed by several 5-
minute votes.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 65,
noes 360, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 91]
AYES--65
Andrews
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Browder
Brownback
Bryant (TX)
Coleman
Condit
Dellums
Doggett
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards
Eshoo
Fawell
Fazio
Furse
Gibbons
Gutierrez
Hoyer
Inglis
Johnson (SD)
Kasich
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
McHale
Meehan
Miller (CA)
Minge
Obey
Orton
Pallone
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Rivers
Rohrabacher
Royce
Sabo
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shays
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (MI)
Spratt
Stenholm
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
[[Page H1255]] Visclosky
Wilson
Wolf
Wyden
Yates
Zimmer
NOES--360
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Baldacci
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Conyers
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Danner
Davis
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doolittle
Dornan
Doyle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Farr
Fattah
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Filner
Flake
Flanagan
Foglietta
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Goss
Graham
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Istook
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kelly
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaFalce
LaHood
Lantos
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Martini
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDermott
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Metcalf
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nadler
Neal
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Salmon
Sanders
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Scott
Seastrand
Shadegg
Shaw
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stark
Stearns
Stockman
Stokes
Studds
Stump
Stupak
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thompson
Thornberry
Thornton
Thurman
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--9
Becerra
Bryant (TN)
Ford
Frost
Jefferson
McDade
Mollohan
Tucker
Watts (OK)
{time} 1808
Ms. JACKSON-LEE and Messrs. FATTAH, FOGLIETTA, and LEWIS of Georgia
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. SKAGGS, McHALE, INGLIS of South Carolina, Ms. ESHOO, Mrs.
MALONEY, and Ms. PELOSI changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
announcement by the chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the order of the House of Friday, February
3, 1995, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5
minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device
will be taken on each further amendment on which the Chair has
postponed further proceedings.
amendment offered by ms. waters
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentlewoman
from California [Ms. Waters] for a recorded vote on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 144,
noes 280, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 92]
AYES--144
Abercrombie
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conyers
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Doyle
Durbin
Engel
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hamilton
Hastings (FL)
Hilliard
Hinchey
Jackson-Lee
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
LaFalce
Lantos
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Luther
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Mascara
McCarthy
McDermott
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Pelosi
Pomeroy
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Rivers
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Schroeder
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Slaughter
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Taylor (MS)
Thompson
Thurman
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Velazquez
Vento
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Watt (NC)
Waxman
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--280
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Borski
Boucher
Brownback
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
de la Garza
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dicks
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Harman
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hefner
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kelly
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lowey
Lucas
Maloney
Manzullo
Martini
Matsui
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
[[Page H1256]] Molinari
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Richardson
Riggs
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Sawyer
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Schumer
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stockman
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas
Thornberry
Thornton
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Upton
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--10
Becerra
Bryant (TN)
Chenoweth
Ford
Frost
Jacobs
Jefferson
McDade
Tucker
Watts (OK)
{time} 1818
Messrs. MARTINEZ, CRAMER, MOLLOHAN, TAYLOR of Mississippi, and WYDEN
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. stenholm
The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] for a recorded vote on which further
proceedings were postponed and on which the noes prevailed by voice
vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
recorded vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 156,
noes 266, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 93]
AYES--156
Ackerman
Baldacci
Barcia
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Cardin
Chapman
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Condit
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hefner
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
LaFalce
Lantos
Laughlin
Levin
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Minge
Moakley
Montgomery
Moran
Nadler
Neal
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Pastor
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torricelli
Towns
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waxman
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--266
Abercrombie
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brown (FL)
Brownback
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clay
Clayton
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Conyers
Cooley
Cox
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
DeLay
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
Engel
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutknecht
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hilliard
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Largent
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martinez
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Moorhead
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oberstar
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stockman
Stokes
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Traficant
Upton
Velazquez
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Waters
Watt (NC)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--12
Becerra
Bryant (TN)
Crane
Ford
Frost
Gekas
Jefferson
McDade
Morella
Peterson (MN)
Tucker
Watts (OK)
{time} 1825
Mr. RANGEL changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2.
(Mrs. MINK of Hawaii asked and was given permission to revise and
extend her remarks.)
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 2 on
constitutional grounds. The issue is the principle of separation of
powers. The line-item veto power that H.R. 2 grants to the President
violates this principle. The Constitution states that all legislative
power resides in the Congress, article I, section 1. It provides only
that a bill can be returned unsigned by the President which then to
become law must have a two-thirds vote of approval, article I, section
7. Further the Constitution states that it is the Congress that has the
power to collect taxes, pay debts, and to provide for the general
welfare, article I, section 8. Finally and most importantly the
Constitution states that ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury
but in consequence of appropriations made by law.''
No bill passed by this Congress can alter the clear meaning and
intent of the Constitution. Only a constitutional amendment can change
that. H.R. 2 is a simple bill. It is not a constitutional amendment. If
the proponents of this idea were serious, they would propose a
Constitutional amendment and not try to circumvent the constitution.
Why didn't the committee go the constitutional amendment route? I
have to assume that it is because they realize that the people of this
country are not prepared to give any President even more power than he
already possesses, and because the idea of giving one-third of the
House and the Senate the power to kill a duly enacted appropriations
item was a subversion of the basic concept of majority rule.
The legislative process would be seriously skewed if the line
item veto were interjected. [[Page H1257]] Items could be added
knowing that the President could remove them. Majority will would be
compromised. The President could use the veto power to punish Members
who did not go along with the White House on key votes. Small States
would be especially vulnerable.
During the course of this debate an expedited judicial review
amendment was accepted. This acknowledges the very point that I make.
That this bill is incompatible with the Constitution of the United
States.
Further, this bill would grant power to the President to item veto
targeted tax benefits. Another word to describe what a targeted tax
benefit is a tax loophole. The bill initially allowed the President
veto power only over tax loopholes which affected five or fewer people.
The committee extended this veto power to tax loopholes affecting 100
or less taxpayers. We should not be protecting any special tax loophole
no matter what the size of the group receiving this selective treatment
under the Tax Code. No matter how we stand on this issue of the line-
item veto, we ought not be protecting a group of taxpayers merely
because there are more than 100 of them in the group. If it is a bad
loophole, the President ought to have the power to veto it no matter
whether if affects 100 or 5,000 taxpayers or more. This selective
treatment of targeted tax benefits by number of taxpayers who enjoy it,
is clearly inequitable and should be stricken from the bill to allow
the President power to strike any and all of them.
I do not understand the rationale of those who argue that the line-
item veto is needed to balance the budget. The record will show that
the Congress has systematically underspent the President's budget
recommendations. Further, the Congress has exceeded the President's
rescissions submitted to the Congress after the appropriations bills
have been signed into law. Over the past 20 years the President has
proposed $72 billion in rescissions and the Congress has passed $92
billion in rescissions, $20 billion more than the President.
Finally, the most egregious power granted to the President under this
bill is not only that he can veto any item in an appropriations bill,
but he can reduce any discretionary budget authority. This is
tantamount to Congress abdicating the power to appropriate. The
Constitution clearly grants to Congress the legislative power to
appropriate. Only the Congress can by majority vote decide against
funding a project and only Congress can cut the funding of a project or
of a department.
If the Congress, for instance, votes by a majority vote to fund the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, or Head Start, it is inconceivable
that we would allow the President to not only rescind this decision or
veto it, but to also reduce the funding which then can only be reversed
by a two-thirds vote. What this means is that one-third of the House
and the Senate will ultimately decide what gets funded and what does
not.
The foundations of our democracy will be shattered. However you feel
about congressional funding decisions, there is no justification for
enlarging the power of the President to appropriate money as well as to
rescind. The tyranny of one-third of the Congress in combination with
the White House could cut funding of programs that a clear majority of
the people of this country support.
If we are to submit our spending bills to this inordinate executive
power, then surely it should only be by constitutional amendment.
If this measure went to the States for ratification as a
constitutional amendment, it clearly would fail to receive the three-
fourths vote of 38 States. Thirteen small States could see the
handwriting on the wall, and not vote to ratify. I suspect this is why
the line-item veto is not being proposed as a constitutional amendment.
It simply would not be ratified.
I urge H.R. 2 be voted down. It is an unwarranted invasion of the
most important legislative powers granted to the Congress by the
Constitution.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed
to.
____________________