[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 22 (Friday, February 3, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H1168-H1191]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
LINE-ITEM VETO ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 55 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 2.
{time} 1103
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2) to give the President item veto authority over
appropriation acts and targeted tax benefits in revenue acts, with Mr.
Boehner in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Thursday,
February 2, 1995, the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] had been disposed of and the bill was open
for amendment at any point.
Are there further amendments to the bill?
amendment offered by mr. spratt
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, amendment No. 20.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Spratt: In section 2(a), insert
``or tax incentive'' after ``tax benefit'' the first place it
appears.
At the end of Section 4, insert the following new
paragraph:
(5) The term ``tax incentive'' means any deduction, credit,
preference, or exemption from gross income, or any deferral
of tax liability, causing tax revenues to be forgone as
inducement for taxpayers to pursue or forbear from certain
actions or activities.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the amendment known as
the Moran-Spratt amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the advocates of H.R. 2 claim that they have found a
way to give the President by statute powers that he does not enjoy
under the Constitution, the power, specifically, of an item veto. They
claim that this power will allow the President to cut out wasteful,
unwarranted, spending in appropriations bills that we adopt every year.
Our amendment simply takes the President's newfound veto power to the
realm of quasi-spending sometimes known as tax expenditures or tax
incentives.
The committee bill already takes a tentative step in this direction.
It delegates to the President the power to rescind targeted tax
benefits, special interest tax provisions that benefit 100 or fewer
taxpayers. But here it stops. It stops, in my opinion, far short of the
right goal.
As to spending, this bill boldly covers virtually every item in 13
different appropriations bills, all with discretionary spending, $540
to $550 billion a year, but with tax expenditures it turns timid. It
stops at a limited-interest tax provisions which are really just the
tip of the iceberg.
Why is this bill so tough on spending and so easy on special interest
tax incentives?
Let me read my colleagues what Newsweek said to explain last week,
reading from Newsweek.
The fine print of the item veto bill reveals that though
the Republicans are tough on spending, they are lax on
special-interest tax giveaways. The vast majority of tax
breaks, worth hundreds of billions of dollars, would remain
immune from the President's veto. Any lobbyist looking for
goodies from the Federal Government in the future could work
through the tax code instead of working through spending
bills.
For some years we all know that has been a favorite recourse. That
has been a practice common here for 20 to 25 years. If we want to give
people an incentive to install solar heat in their homes, we are not so
obvious as to hand them out a subsidy. We allow them a tax credit for
part of the cost.
If we want to promote oil and gas exploration, we do not fork over
subsidies to the drillers. That would never be approved in the House,
appropriating money for the major oil companies. We give them oil
depletion allowances, or we let them expense costs that other
businesses would be required to capitalize. Nobody notices because it
is buried in the Tax Code, and who is to know when we are allowing one
cost to be expensed rather than capitalized that we actually are giving
a subsidy to this particular taxpayer.
Our amendment would give the President the power to police these tax
expenditures, to comb through the Tax Code the way he will be able to
comb through spending appropriation bills and cull out questionable
policies and provisions.
Under our amendment, the President would have the right to rescind
so-called tax incentives or tax expenditures.
What are tax incentives or tax expenditures? Let me read the
definition we use in our amendment for tax incentives. The term ``tax
incentive'' means any deduction, credit, preference, or exemption from
gross income or any deferral of tax liability causing tax revenues to
be forgone as inducement for taxpayers to pursue or forbear from
pursuit of certain activities or actions.
[[Page H1169]] So long as we are going to be tough on spending, as
this bill certainly will be, let us also be tough on tax giveaways.
They amount to the same thing. They have the same bottom line impact on
the deficit.
And for that reason, Mr. Chairman, I urge adoption of the Moran-
Spratt amendment.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, the Spratt-Moran amendment which we are now
considering greatly improves upon the Line-Item Veto Act.
In the Contract on America and every piece of literature touting the
Line-Item Veto Act, the Republicans are quick to claim that this would
give the President the authority to cut out pork spending and targeted
tax benefits. But if you look at the actual legislation, you will see
that it does not give the President the authority to truly cut targeted
tax benefits.
The original Line-Item Veto Act only allowed the President to veto
tax benefits if they benefited five or fewer taxpayers. This is a joke.
There is no law, no pork project, and no tax cut, no program enacted by
this Congress that only benefits five or fewer Americans. This bill was
amended in committee to increase the number up to 100, but it still is
worthless. No omnibus tax bill contains a tax cut for John Doe of
Alexandria, VA, or the Smith family in Fairfax. There are very, very
few tax benefits targeted to any class with less than 100 persons.
Tax bills, however, do contain special interest giveaways. They are
loaded with individual provisions designed to either induce taxpayers
to do a certain activity or discourage taxpayers from doing another.
Just last month, the Senate Budget Committee released a compendium of
tax expenditures that identified $453 billion in individual tax
provisions for fiscal year 1995 alone. We are making a big deal because
this bill may open $10 billion in unauthorized spending each year to a
potential line-item veto. But in the same breath we are passing on an
opportunity to open $453 billion, nine times that amount, to the same
authority.
Many of these individual tax provisions are positive and should be
continued. But in the same vein, many of the items contained in
appropriations bills are justifiable and serve the public interest. But
some of these are questionable. On page 41 of this compendium, CRS
notes the ``Interest Allocation Rules Exception for Certain
Nonfinancial Institutions''. This tax benefit classifies a finance
subsidiary of the Ford Motor Co. as a financial institution and costs
the Federal taxpayers $200 million. What is the rationale for this tax
break? Nobody knows, it was not mentioned in the committee reports on
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. There is no pork project in any
appropriations act that comes close to $200 million annually. On page
29 of this compendium is the ``Exclusion of Income of Foreign Sales
Corporations,'' a tax benefit which allows firms to exclude 15 percent
of income of exports sold through special foreign subsidiaries set up
as paper corporations. This tax benefit costs the Federal taxpayers
$1.1 billion annually.
Some of these individual tax provisions, such as mortgage interest
deductions, are positive and benefit almost every American family. But
some are giveaways that increase our deficit for the benefit of a few
wealthy corporations.
If we are serious about reducing the deficit and are serious about
giving the Executive the ability to cut wasteful spending, we must also
allow him to cut any and all unnecessary and unjustifiable tax
subsidies.
I hope my colleagues will support this amendment.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. Having to oppose
the amendment, I regret, because the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spratt] is certainly one of the most thoughtful, constructive, and
contributing members of the committee. He has given enormous thought to
this issue and to all of the issues involved in this legislation. But I
think that he goes beyond, way beyond what we were attempting to get at
in this bill, which would allow the President to veto very special,
very limited, tax perks for special fat cat friends, ``fat cats'' being
a broad term.
This, I think, is too broad, because it would allow the President to
veto things like the homeowners mortgage deduction, the earned income
tax credit, credits to assist family members in taking care of elderly
and indigent relations.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, this is way outside the scope of what we were
attempting to have as a very targeted, very precise rifle shot attack
on those egregious examples of overreaching which we have unfortunately
seen too many examples of in our Tax Code in recent years.
This is a much broader policy initiative, and I think it is a worthy
one. But I think for the purposes of this legislation, it broadens the
scope of the legislation too much. I must oppose the amendment.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this amendment. This amendment
would make any tax incentive subject to the Presidential line-item
veto. Tax incentives would include any deduction, credit, preference,
or exemption from gross income of any deferral of tax liability. For
example, the mortgage deduction and the exemption for dependents could
be subject to the Presidential line-item veto.
{time} 1110
A very disturbing trend seems to be developing in this debate. The
new Republican majority seem to have two contracts with America, one in
which they protect the tax loopholes of the wealthy and the other under
which they sacrifice the programs for working people on the altar of
deficit reduction.
I think that is wrong. And I think the American people can see
through it. The majority would like us to believe that it is the
middle-income tax cut that they want to protect, but in reality they
are protecting many special interests that feed daily at the Federal
trough of privilege and preferred treatment.
I have here, for example, a list that I would like for my colleague
to know about. One such provision which gets special tax preference
that the President would not be able to veto under this legislation is
a provision favoring the oil and gas industry by repealing the minimum
tax for depletion and intangible drilling costs for independents and
oil drillers. Since we have more than 100 oil drillers in the country,
the President could not veto this bill.
Another provision we have here gave a tax preference for purchasers
of fuels containing alcohol. Since thousands of people can buy gasohol,
the President would not line-item veto that provision, even though one
company, Archer Daniel Midlands, controls about 90 percent of the
gasohol market.
A third benefits purchasers of electric cars and cars powered by
natural gas. Even though this provision really benefits a handful of
carmakers, the President could not veto it since many people could buy
the cars.
Let me cite another example where our Tax Code gives a special tax
benefit or credit to drug companies doing business in Puerto Rico; 24
big companies with receipts exceeding $250 million got a total of $2.6
billion in tax credits from this provision in 1992, but because a total
of 338 companies got benefits from this provision, the President could
not veto it.
You know the Moran-Spratt amendment points out that Republicans like
giving tax breaks to the wealthy, and there is no reason why those tax
expenditures should not be subject to the line-item veto in the same
way spending programs are.
Mr. Chairman, if deficit reduction is the goal, the benefits wealthy
Americans and corporations receive must be on the table, not just
spending programs for the working people in this country.
I urge my colleague to support the Moran-Spratt amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 175,
noes 243, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No 89]
AYES--175
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baesler
Baldacci
Barrett (WI)
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Brewster
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Condit
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
[[Page H1170]] de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
LaFalce
Lantos
Laughlin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lofgren
Lowey
Luther
Maloney
Manton
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McCarthy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torricelli
Traficant
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Ward
Waters
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wyden
Yates
NOES--243
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Boucher
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cardin
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Conyers
Cooley
Costello
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dixon
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gutknecht
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Manzullo
Martinez
Martini
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
McNulty
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Murtha
Myers
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Tate
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--16
Bartlett
Becerra
Collins (GA)
Collins (MI)
Gunderson
Hoyer
Istook
Kelly
Largent
Metcalf
Moakley
Sisisky
Stockman
Towns
Waxman
Woolsey
{time} 1131
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Hoyer for, with Mr. Bartlett of Maryland against.
Mr. Towns for, with Mr. Largent against.
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, I have a few words about the schedule as the day
proceeds.
I would like to mention to all the Members of the body that we are
concerned about the snowstorm that is moving in, especially in the
Midwest. We have a lot of Members who are anxious to travel. We have, I
think it is four amendments we believe that we can move fast. We are
trying to move the amendments as fast as we can. We are hopeful that
with the cooperation of all the Members we might be able to complete
our work today even before the scheduled 3 o'clock departure time. I
think that could be beneficial to a lot of our traveling Members. I
just wanted to bring to every Member's attention that insofar as we can
move the debate and the amendments fast we might be able to alleviate
their travel pressure.
I want to thank all the Members for their attention.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other amendments to be offered to the
bill?
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I would like to ask if the distinguished Chair of the full committee
would engage in a discussion as to the scheduling.
The majority leader asked that we run amendments at this point. I am
not aware of any amendments on the floor at this time. Is it the desire
of the majority leader and the committee to go out if that is not the
case, to go to the substitutes? What is the will here?
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WISE. I yield to the Chair of the full committee.
Mr. CLINGER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, we have been noticed with a number of amendments that
have been published in the Record, and we assumed that they would be
offered in a timely fashion; that is, Ms. Norton has an amendment, Mr.
Obey has an amendment, Ms. Waters has an amendment, Mr. Tauzin. We had
anticipated that those amendments would be coming in due course. Our
objective here would be to complete those amendments today, dispose of
those amendments today, and deal with the substitutes. I know the
gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise] has a substitute which he would
offer on Monday.
Mr. WISE. At this point it is my understanding, and I will defer to
our ranking member, but it is my understanding that none of the Members
are able to offer their amendments at this point or had not expected
to.
So the question then becomes if there is concern about the weather,
is it better to let Members go at this point; if there is concern about
the weather and getting flights to the West and Midwest particularly
before they get socked in, is it better, if the amendments are not
offered, to----
Mr. CLINGER. If there are no amendments to be offered, I would
suggest the gentleman who has a substitute would offer his substitute
at this time and we would deal with that, or else we would move to
final passage. In that event, we will postpone final passage until
Monday.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WISE. I yield to the ranking member.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, if we do not have any amendments here now and if we are
getting ready to go on the substitute, why would we hold final passage
until Monday when we might not be able to get here on Monday?
I have been working here in Washington as long as the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger] has, I believe, and we understand that if
there is a 12-inch snowstorm there is no way we are likely to be able
to get here from wherever we are on Monday.
{time} 1140
So it would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, the thing to do would be to go
on with this legislation today, get it over with, if we possibly can.
There are two options. One is to rise and come back
[[Page H1171]] whenever we can if we are stuck someplace because of the
snow, and the other thing is to complete the bill today.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, in the event the substitute amendment
would be offered, a substitute for the bill would be offered at this
point, would it preclude the offering of other amendments upon the
disposition of the substitute amendment?
The CHAIRMAN. In responding to the gentleman's parliamentary inquiry:
not necessarily.
If the substitute were adopted, that would stop the amendment process
with respect to the original-text substitute.
Mr. CLINGER. I understand.
Mr. WISE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the Chair. What
was the ruling?
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would tell the gentleman that I would
encourage, in view of the fact that there are then no Members presently
on the floor prepared to offer perfecting amendments, but only the
gentleman standing who is prepared to offer a substitute amendment--my
understanding is that if the gentleman's substitute would prevail, it
would preclude consideration of further amendments. On the other hand,
if the gentleman's substitute does not prevail, other amendments would
be in order, and I would encourage the gentleman to present his
substitute amendment.
Mr. WISE. In that case, Mr. Chairman, we will be happy to proceed.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other amendments to the bill?
amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. wise
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a
substitute. It has been printed in the Record and is amendment No. 31.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of
a substitute.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr.
Wise: Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN PROPOSED
RESCISSIONS AND TARGETED TAX BENEFITS.
(a) In General.--Section 1012 of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 683) is amended
to read as follows:
``expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions
``Sec. 1012. (a) Proposed Rescission of Budget Authority or
Repeal of Targeted Tax Benefits.--The President may propose,
at the time and in the manner provided in subsection (b), the
rescission of any budget authority provided in an
appropriation Act or repeal of any targeted tax benefit
provided in any revenue Act. If the President proposes a
rescission of budget authority, he may also propose to reduce
the appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in
section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by
an amount that does not exceed the amount of the proposed
rescission. Funds made available for obligation under this
procedure may not be proposed for rescission again under this
section.
``(b) Transmittal of Special Message.--
``(1) The President may transmit to Congress a special
message proposing to rescind amounts of budget authority or
to repeal any targeted tax benefit and include with that
special message a draft bill that, if enacted, would only
rescind that budget authority or repeal that targeted tax
benefit unless the President also proposes a reduction in the
appropriate discretionary spending limit set forth in section
601(a)(2) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. That bill
shall clearly identify the amount of budget authority that is
proposed to be rescinded for each program, project, or
activity to which that budget authority relates or the
targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed, as the case may
be. A targeted tax benefit may only be proposed to be
repealed under this section during the 10-legislative-day
period commencing on the day after the date of enactment of
the provision proposed to be repealed.
``(2) In the case of an appropriation Act that includes
accounts within the jurisdiction of more than one
subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, the
President in proposing to rescind budget authority under this
section shall send a separate special message and
accompanying draft bill for accounts within the jurisdiction
of each such subcommittee.
``(3) Each special message shall specify, with respect to
the budget authority proposed to be rescinded, the
following--
``(A) the amount of budget authority which he proposes to
be rescinded;
``(B) any account, department, or establishment of the
Government to which such budget authority is available for
obligation, and the specific project or governmental
functions involved;
``(C) the reasons why the budget authority should be
rescinded;
``(D) to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated
fiscal, economic, and budgetary effect (including the effect
on outlays and receipts in each fiscal year) of the proposed
rescission;
``(E) all facts, circumstances, and considerations relating
to or bearing upon the proposed rescission and the decision
to effect the proposed rescission, and to the maximum extent
practicable, the estimated effect of the proposed rescission
upon the objects, purposes, and programs for which the budget
authority is provided; and
``(F) a reduction in the appropriate discretionary spending
limit set forth in section 601(a)(2) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, if proposed by the President.
Each special message shall specify, with respect to the
proposed repeal of targeted tax benefits, the information
required by subparagraphs (C), (D), and (E), as it relates to
the proposed repeal.
``(c) Procedures for Expedited Consideration.--
``(1)(A) Before the close of the second legislative day of
the House of Representatives after the date of receipt of a
special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b),
the majority leader or minority leader of the House of
Representatives shall introduce (by request) the draft bill
accompanying that special message. If the bill is not
introduced as provided in the preceding sentence, then, on
the third legislative day of the House of Representatives
after the date of receipt of that special message, any Member
of that House may introduce the bill.
``(B) The bill shall be referred to the Committee on
Appropriations or the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives, as applicable. The committee shall
report the bill without substantive revision and with or
without recommendation. The bill shall be reported not later
than the seventh legislative day of that House after the date
of receipt of that special message. If that committee fails
to report the bill within that period, that committee shall
be automatically discharged from consideration of the bill,
and the bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
``(C) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member
of the House of Representatives may move to strike any
proposed rescission or rescissions of budget authority or any
proposed repeal of a targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if
supported by 49 other Members.
``(D) A vote on final passage of the bill shall be taken in
the House of Representatives on or before the close of the
10th legislative day of that House after the date of the
introduction of the bill in that House. If the bill is
passed, the Clerk of the House of Representatives shall cause
the bill to be engrossed, certified, and transmitted to the
Senate within one calendar day of the day on which the bill
is passed.
``(2)(A) A motion in the House of Representatives to
proceed to the consideration of a bill under this section
shall be highly privileged and not debatable. An amendment to
the motion shall not be in order, nor shall it be in order to
move to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to
or disagreed to.
``(B) Debate in the House of Representatives on a bill
under this section shall not exceed 4 hours, which shall be
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the
bill. A motion further to limit debate shall not be
debatable. It shall not be in order to move to recommit a
bill under this section or to move to reconsider the vote by
which the bill is agreed to or disagreed to.
``(C) Appeals from decisions of the Chair relating to the
application of the Rules of the House of Representatives to
the procedure relating to a bill under this section shall be
decided without debate.
``(D) Except to the extent specifically provided in the
preceding provisions of this subsection, consideration of a
bill under this section shall be governed by the Rules of the
House of Representatives. It shall not be in order in the
House of Representatives to consider any rescission bill
introduced pursuant to the provisions of this section under a
suspension of the rules or under a special rule.
``(3)(A) A bill transmitted to the Senate pursuant to
paragraph (1)(D) shall be referred to its Committee on
Appropriations or Committee on Finance, as applicable. That
committee shall report the bill without substantive revision
and with or without recommendation. The bill shall be
reported not later than the seventh legislative day of the
Senate after it receives the bill. A committee failing to
report the bill within such period shall be automatically
discharged from consideration of the bill, and the bill shall
be placed upon the appropriate calendar.
``(B) During consideration under this paragraph, any Member
of the Senate may move to strike any proposed rescission or
rescissions of budget authority or any proposed repeal of a
targeted tax benefit, as applicable, if supported by 14 other
Members.
``(4)(A) A motion in the Senate to proceed to the
consideration of a bill under this section shall be
privileged and not debatable. An amendment to the motion
shall not be in
[[Page H1172]] order, nor shall it be in order to move to
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or
disagreed to.
``(B) Debate in the Senate on a bill under this section,
and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith
(including debate pursuant to subparagraph (C)), shall not
exceed 10 hours. The time shall be equally divided between,
and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority
leader or their designees.
``(C) Debate in the Senate on any debatable motion or
appeal in connection with a bill under this section shall be
limited to not more than 1 hour, to be equally divided
between, and controlled by, the mover and the manager of the
bill, except that in the event the manager of the bill is in
favor of any such motion or appeal, the time in opposition
thereto, shall be controlled by the minority leader or his
designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time
under their control on the passage of a bill, allot
additional time to any Senator during the consideration of
any debatable motion or appeal.
``(D) A motion in the Senate to further limit debate on a
bill under this section is not debatable. A motion to
recommit a bill under this section is not in order.
``(d) Amendments and Divisions Prohibited.--Except as
otherwise provided by this section, no amendment to a bill
considered under this section shall be in order in either the
House of Representatives or the Senate. It shall not be in
order to demand a division of the question in the House of
Representatives (or in a Committee of the Whole) or in the
Senate. No motion to suspend the application of this
subsection shall be in order in either House, nor shall it be
in order in either House to suspend the application of this
subsection by unanimous consent.
``(e) Requirement To Make Available for Obligation.--(1)
Any amount of budget authority proposed to be rescinded in a
special message transmitted to Congress under subsection (b)
shall be made available for obligation on the day after the
date on which either House rejects the bill transmitted with
that special message.
``(2) Any targeted tax benefit proposed to be repealed
under this section as set forth in a special message
transmitted by the President shall not be deemed repealed
unless the bill transmitted with that special message is
enacted into law.
``(f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `appropriation Act' means any general or
special appropriation Act, and any Act or joint resolution
making supplemental, deficiency, or continuing
appropriations;
``(2) the term `legislative day' means, with respect to
either House of Congress, any day of session; and
``(3) The term `targeted tax benefit' means any provision
of a revenue or reconciliation Act determined by the
President to provide a Federal tax deduction, credit,
exclusion, preference, or other concession to 100 or fewer
beneficiaries. Any partnership, limited partnership, trust,
or S corporation, and any subsidiary or affiliate of the same
parent corporation, shall be deemed and counted as a single
beneficiary regardless of the number of partners, limited
partners, beneficiaries, shareholders, or affiliated
corporate entities''.
(b) Exercise of Rulemaking Powers.--Section 904 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``and 1017'' and
inserting ``1012, and 1017''; and
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ``section 1017'' and
inserting ``sections 1012 and 1017''; and
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Section 1011 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (2
U.S.C. 682(5)) is amended by repealing paragraphs (3) and (5)
and by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3).
(2) Section 1014 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 685) is amended--
(A) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``or the
reservation''; and
(B) in subsection (e)(1), by striking ``or a reservation''
and by striking ``or each such reservation''.
(3) Section 1015(a) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 686) is amended
by striking ``is to establish a reserve or'', by striking
``the establishment of such a reserve or'', and by striking
``reserve or'' each other place it appears.
(4) Section 1017 of such Act (2 U.S.C. 687) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by striking ``rescission bill
introduced with respect to a special message or'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``rescission bill
or'', by striking ``bill or'' the second place it appears, by
striking ``rescission bill with respect to the same special
message or'', and by striking ``, and the case may be,'';
(C) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``bill or'' each
place it appears;
(D) in subsection (c), by striking ``rescission'' each
place it appears and by striking ``bill or'' each place it
appears;
(E) in subsection (d)(1), by striking ``rescission bill
or'' and by striking ``, and all amendments thereto (in the
case of a rescission bill)'';
(F) in subsection (d)(2)--
(i) by striking the first sentence;
(ii) by amending the second sentence to read as follows:
``Debate on any debatable motion or appeal in connection with
an impoundment resolution shall be limited to 1 hour, to be
equally divided between, and controlled by, the mover and the
manager of the resolution, except that in the event that the
manager of the resolution is in favor of any such motion or
appeal, the time in opposition thereto shall be controlled by
the minority leader or his designee.'';
(iii) by striking the third sentence; and
(iv) in the fourth sentence, by striking ``rescission bill
or'' and by striking ``amendment, debatable motion,'' and by
inserting ``debatable motion'';
(G) in paragraph (d)(3), by striking the second and third
sentences; and
(H) by striking paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of
paragraph (d).
(d) Clerical Amendments.--The item relating to section 1012
in the table of sections for subpart B of title X of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is
amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1012. Expedited consideration of certain proposed rescissions
and targeted tax benefits.''
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, this amendment, or the substitute that is
being offered, is the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm substitute. Some call it
expedited rescission; some would call the Republican version offered by
the full committee enhanced rescission. Both are forms of line-item
veto, and that is the first thing we have to get clear.
There are two goals, it seems to me, with any kind of modified line-
item veto such as we are discussing today. The goals are that the
President be able to line item items in appropriation bills that he or
she thinks should be cut and that the President is entitled to a vote
on those items; second, that all Members be held accountable for
whether or not they voted to sustain the President, whether they voted
to cut.
So, Mr. Chairman, the goals are: the President can veto and the
Congress must vote. Underline the word ``must.'' Second is that all
Members be held accountable so that the public knows how Bob Wise voted
in his district for these cuts and how others voted. In both cases what
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Clinger], the distinguished
chairman, is offering on behalf of the full committee is a form of
line-item veto, and our expedited rescission bill is a form of line-
item veto, and both have that process.
Now the Republican version and the Democratic version, the substitute
version, in both cases the Congress must vote. That is not the present
situation under current law. Under current law the President may issue
a rescission, but if the Congress does not take it up and vote
affirmatively in both Houses, the rescission fails.
Here it is a different process. In both versions, the Republican
version and our substitute, the Congress must take the measure up, and
the Congress must vote. So the President gets his vote.
There is one major difference between the two versions. The
difference is what does it take to sustain the President's veto? In the
case of the Republican version, the full committee version, at the end
of the day, after working our way through the whole process and the
President sends it back, at the end of the day it takes two-thirds of
this body to override a Presidential cut, a Presidential line-item
veto. Under our substitute, which is essentially the same substitute
that passed with 342 votes last year from the House, Republican and
Democrat alike, under our substitute it is a simple majority, a simple
majority. What our substitute does is to say that one-third plus one
does not determine the fate of every line-item veto.
Now there are some other provisions that I think are important. Our
substitute has the option for the President to allocate the moneys
saved by the cutting to deficit reduction, in effect a form of lock
box. That is in our amendment. Our substitute has in it language that
has already been placed in the other version giving 50 Members on the
floor the ability to break out a specific rescission for individual
attention.
Our substitute also has in it the language that I believe is in the
present version, the committee version, that permits the line item-ing
of certain tax benefits to go to a class of 100 taxpayers or less.
So essentially what we are talking about here is whether or not my
colleagues believe a majority ought to be all that is required to
override the President or whether two-thirds. I say to my colleagues,
``I urge you to look at this carefully and think. We don't know who the
President will be in 2 years, or 6 years, or 10 years. Do you want to
have to always be going up
[[Page H1173]] against a President knowing that one-third plus one in
this body can overcome you at every opportunity? You can't even argue
to a majority.''
Now the argument is made that, if a majority passed an overall
appropriation bill, then why is it likely to think that a majority
would be willing to sustain a Presidential veto? In other words, a
majority passed the bill; then the majority is not going to turn around
and take items out of it, and I ask all of my colleagues to consider
how bills, appropriation bills, are passed here. We vote on a total
package. We may not like certain provisions in it, but we vote for it
on the basis that the overall bill is preferable to a few of the items
we disagree with.
However, when confronted with those individual items coming back by
themselves, and particularly----
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from West Virginia has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Wise was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. WISE. But when confronted with individual items coming back in a
Presidential line-item veto or rescission, if my colleagues will, and
knowing that the full public scrutiny is, ``How did you vote on this
controversial area or this controversial project,'' it is very likely
that a majority would sustain that Presidential line-item veto or
rescission. So it really gets down to two-thirds, or really gets down
to whether one wants one-third plus one to run the appropriations
process or one wants a majority vote. I remind my Republican colleagues
and Democratic colleagues that 342 Members voted for this language in
the past Congress.
So, with the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm substitute, Mr. Chairman, the
President can rescind, the President is guaranteed a vote in Congress
within 10 days of it coming to the Congress, and there is total
accountability because the public sees how we vote on each item. I
would ask that my colleagues uphold our substitute and guaranteed
majority rule as opposed to one-third plus one.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WISE. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
{time} 1150
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, as I have reviewed this over the years, as
the House has deliberated on the line-item veto--and last year we came
to the conclusion that basically the substitute the gentleman is now
offering was the one that should become law--the one reason was to
maintain the balance of power.
The gentleman has stated this is his opening remarks, and I would
like to carry that a little further, because I think we really need to
show this to the Members of the House. If the Republican version would
ever become law and be held to be constitutional, the House could very
well have no input at all. No Member of the House would have any input
because with any President, knowing how this total system works, all he
needs is 34 Senators. All he needs is 34 Senators, because both Houses
have to override the veto. Is that correct?
Mr. WISE. The gentleman is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise]
has expired.
(On request of Mr. Volkmer, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Wise was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, since
both Houses have to override, as we have seen in other instances, other
vetoes, those of us who have been here, with such things as the shoe
and textile bill we passed and Reagan vetoed and Bush vetoed, all he
had to do was get 34 Senators. So what we end up with is that the whole
spending policy of this Nation is governed not by you folks, not by me,
not by anybody in this House. As long as we have one President and he
has 34 Senators he can count on, that is it; is that correct?
Mr. WISE. That is exactly correct.
Mr. VOLKMER. So 35 people out of this whole country would make the
decision on spending priorities under the Republican version?
Mr. WISE. That is correct.
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. WISE. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have a
question.
I, too, am uncomfortable about the two-thirds in both Houses having
to override. That is a tremendous transfer of power from the
legislative to the executive branch. But as I read the gentleman's
amendment, in this particular case it appears that either House could
kill the veto; is that correct?
Mr. WISE. Absolutely not. Both Houses have to vote. You have a vote
in both Houses. For instance, if it came to the House and the House
failed to pass the rescission, then obviously it does not go to the
Senate because it has died here.
Mr. DAVIS. So in effect if one House approves the rescission but the
other House does not, in effect one House can kill the rescission?
Mr. WISE. As is the case with any bill.
If I may continue to explain it to the gentleman, the difference
between ours and the Republican version is this: When the President
sends his rescission, it is introduced as a bill in the House. It goes
to committee, it must be acted upon within 7 days, and it must be on
the House floor within 10 days and voted on in the manner of any bill.
The difference here in the Republican version is that the Republican
version requires the Congress to act affirmatively to pass a resolution
of disapproval. Assuming it passes both Houses, it then goes to the
President, who then presumably vetoes it, and it must then be
overridden by two-thirds.
Mr. DAVIS. Let me state my concern to the gentleman and see if he can
help and tell us what happens when you pork up some of these bills.
I will take the grant to Lamar University last year in the crime
bill, which I think Americans looked at and asked, ``Why is that
there?'' with the other kinds of programs that were in the bill. It did
not seem to fit.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise]
has again expired.
(On request of Mr. Davis, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Wise was
allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, if I may continue and if the gentleman will
yield, in that case, that was an appropriation that standing by itself
probably could not have survived.
Mr. WISE. I would be happy to talk some more about it, but as I
recall, in that case it was not even an appropriation.
Mr. DAVIS. I understand that, but to get the principle once again,
that was money that in point of fact both Houses would not have passed
initially. It would not have passed muster. Under this, if it passed
muster in only one House, it would survive a veto; is that correct?
Mr. WISE. Correct. And having been here when that was on the floor,
by the time it got the scrutiny it did--and that is the purpose of the
rescission process, the line item veto--by the time it got the scrutiny
it did, both Houses overwhelmingly defeated it.
Mr. DAVIS. I am still uncomfortable with either House being able to
overturn the President, but I understand the thrust of this.
Mr. WISE. But the gentleman might be equally as uncomfortable with
the fact that one-third plus one in either body can control this whole
process.
Mr. DAVIS. I am not comfortable with it.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I have a great deal of respect for my colleague, the
gentleman from West Virginia, with whom I serve on two committees in
this House, but I have to disagree and strongly oppose the Wise
substitute.
I believe that we need a procedure strong enough to meet the crisis
that we face in our budget situation. If we look at the amount of debt
and the deficits we are running, it would indicate that we need a very
strong tool to try to discipline that process and to try to end this
deficit. Clearly this is not the only thing that will help us reduce
our debt, reduce our deficit, but it is an important tool, and I
believe we should side with a stronger measure.
[[Page H1174]] It is clear that the Clinger bill we are now debating
is prosavings. It leads toward savings, and the Wise substitute is
prospending. It leans more toward spending than savings, and if we
eventually want to get our deficit under control, if we want to finally
deal with the problems we face, I think we need to give the President a
strong tool, not a weak tool, and I would, therefore, urge opposition
to the Wise substitute.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUTE. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman please
inform this body, within the past 12 years how many budgets have been
submitted by the President of the United States that were even within
$100 billion of being balanced?
Mr. BLUTE. Reclaiming my time----
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. No, I asked the gentleman a question.
Mr. BLUTE. And I am attempting to answer.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. How many times has the President of the
United States submitted to the Congress a budget that was even $100
billion within being balanced?
Mr. BLUTE. I would say to the gentleman, reclaiming my time, the same
number of budgets that the Democratic Congress passed that were
balanced.
This is not a partisan issue. It is a bipartisan problem that we all
as a country must face.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BLUTE. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, if a President, when given
total authority--and this is one man who can write a budget all by
himself--cannot submit a balanced budget or even a budget that is
within $100 billion of being balanced, how on Earth do you think he is
going to save us from ourselves? I did not come here to give my job
away. I came here because I was elected to represent the people of
south Mississippi and fulfill the constitutional duties that were given
to me. If I had seen a record from the Presidency, from the Presidents
of the United States, that had showed they are more frugal than us, I
might think otherwise, but the fact is that over the past 40 years the
combined Presidential budget requests have actually exceeded what this
Congress has spent. I do not think those people are capable of saving
us from ourselves.
Mr. BLUTE. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time. I would simply respond
by saying, as somebody from the minority side said yesterday, that we
are facing a new day. There is plenty of blame to go around in the past
about who or what or why we have huge deficits and budgets that are out
of control.
I certainly was not a Member of Congress during that period. I have
been elected, and I think many other Members have been elected to try
to reverse that dangerous trend and try to do something new, something
that will eventually hopefully lead to a more balanced budget. The way
to do that is to support the prosavings Clinger bill and oppose the
Wise substitute.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's substitute.
I have very serious reservations about line-item veto authority in
any form. However, I firmly believe the proposed substitute is by far
preferable to the authority in H.R. 2.
H.R. 2 is by Chairman Clinger's own description, the strongest
possible rescission authority there is. Members have equated it during
this debate to the authority of many Governors. However, they are
wrong, and by making that comparison they show how very little they
know about H.R. 2.
The authority in H.R. 2 is so strong that even many proponents of the
line-item veto do not support it. In the Senate, Senator Domenici
supports taking the approach that our colleague, Mr. Wise, takes in the
substitute amendment we are now considering.
In addition, many Members clearly do not understand what H.R. 2
actually does. Throughout this debate, we have heard time and again
that 43 Governors have line-item veto authority, so why should not the
President also have the authority. However, the fact is that only 10 of
those 43 Governors have authority that even comes close at all to the
authority given the President that H.R. 2 provides.
H.R. 2 does not simply let the President veto a particular line of
spending authority in an appropriations bill, as many Governors can do.
As the Congressional Research Service said, H.R. 2 would let a
President reach ``as deep as he likes within an appropriations account
to propose specific rescissions.''
As a result, Dr. Robert Reischauer, Director of the Congressional
Budget Office, testified before our committee that H.R. 2 gives the
President ``greater potential power than a constitutionally approved
item veto.''
The potential for a President to abuse this extraordinary power is
enormous. He could threaten to curtail funds for a particular Federal
court, if he decides they are ruling against him too often. Given the
fact that the executive branch is a party to about 50 percent of all
cases before Federal courts, there are many reasons the President may
want to exert influence over judges.
However, the greatest abuse of power under H.R. 2 is that the
President is assured of being able to make his rescission effective, as
long as he has the support of one-third plus one of the Members in
either the House or the Senate. This makes it highly unlikely that the
Congress would be able to disapprove a Presidential rescission, except
on rare occasions.
The substitute being offered strikes a more responsible balance of
power between the President and the Congress. The substitute does two
very important things. Like under current law, the substitute says a
Presidential rescission cannot go into effect unless the Congress
approves it.
Unlike current law, however, the substitute requires the Congress to
vote on each and every rescission proposed by the President. The
proposal offered by the gentleman would require the appropriations
committees to report a bill implementing a President's proposed
rescission within 7 days, or be discharged from further consideration.
The rescission approval bill would then be considered on the floor
within 10 days.
This is a very reasonable alternative to H.R. 2. It also has a far
better chance of being upheld by the courts. Under the substitute,
Congress must fulfill its constitutional responsibility for
appropriating revenues; the President's rescissions can only become
effective by act of Congress.
However, under H.R. 2 the President can sign appropriations bills and
tax bills into law in a form that Congress never passed. Each Member of
this body should think very hard before voting to give up his
constitutional responsibilities for the Federal purse.
On that point I would note that Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellenger challenged the constitutionality of H.R. 2 in testimony he
gave last week before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Referring to
authority in H.R. 2 that permits the President to veto targeted tax
benefit, Mr. Dellenger said, and I quote:
It does so by purporting to authorize the President to
``veto'' targeted tax benefits after they become law, thus
resulting in their ``repeal''. * * * The use of the terms
``veto'' and ``repeal'' is constitutionally problematic.
Article I, clause 7 of the Constitution provides that the
President only can exercise his ``veto'' power before a
provision becomes law. As for the word ``repeal,'' it
suggests that the President is being given authorization to
change existing law on his own. This arguably would violate
the plain textual provision of Article I, clause 7 of the
Constitution, governing the manner in which federal laws are
to be made and altered.
Clearly, H.R. 2 has major constitutional problems. If you are for the
line-item veto, you should, therefore, vote for the Wise substitute. It
gives the President the authority and flexibility he needs, and it
allows Congress to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities to tax
and appropriate Federal revenues.
I urge my colleagues to support the gentleman's amendment.
{time} 1200
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I must rise in opposition to the amendment by my good
friend, the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise], who is a very
[[Page H1175]] thoughtful and very helpful member of our committee.
President Clinton has asked us to send him the strongest possible
line-item veto. This proposed substitute is not the strongest possible
line-item veto. This amendment would replace what we have from H.R. 2
with little more than a very weak, in my view, nonfunctioning
procedure. There is certainly no guarantee that the procedure would
function, that which exists in current law and which has contributed to
pass very wasteful spending.
An expedited rescissions procedure, which is the procedure
encompassed within the Wise amendment, simply attempts to speed up the
current approval process, but it does not do that very efficiently. In
fact, I think it does it rather poorly.
The amendment would still permit a single House of Congress to kill
the President's rescissions and force the release of moneys, which was
the subject of the dialog with the gentleman from Virginia.
Although an expedited rescission process would at least on its
surface require Congress to vote on the President's rescissions
proposal and therefore improve current law, those assurances are
illusory. The proposed expedited procedures are offered solely under
the rulemaking authority of Congress and can be readily waived.
As we who have served in this body for sometime know, the rules have
been routinely waived on matters of this sort. So there is nothing in
this amendment that would ensure us, provide the absolute assurance
that we would have a vote on these rescissions.
In fact, that happened in 1992 when the requisite number of House
Members sought to discharge appropriations of 96 rescissions. The rules
were waived at that time to prevent the discharge, and Members were
denied a vote on the President's rescissions proposal. In compliance
with law the withheld funds were released, and wasteful spending
occurred.
I think the same sort of event could happen here by virtue of just
allowing the rules to be waived. We would not get the assurance of a
vote.
While an expedited rescissions process attempts to ensure Members'
chance to vote, nothing would prevent the Committee on Rules from once
again waiving House rules and preventing a vote.
I want to commend the gentleman on his attempt at deficit reduction
through the inclusion of a lockbox in this amendment. However, that
benefit will really mean little on the process unlikely to produce
substantial rescissions in the first place.
In other words, the lockbox is a good idea. In other words, we can
get some sort of assurance that if rescissions take place, they will
not then be subject to the authorizing committee using it for some
other purpose, but would in fact go toward deficit reduction. I think
that is a useful contribution.
But if there is no insurance we are actually going to get the
rescissions, and I do not think there is one with this process, the
lockbox really is sort of meaningless.
So because this amendment does little to improve our failed current
system of impoundments and maintains the existing bias against spending
cuts, I urge defeat of the amendment.
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made a couple of points, one of
the same points the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Davis] made. As I
understand it, it is criticizing our approach on the grounds that a
single House, if the President's rescission were defeated in the House,
that it would not even go to the Senate.
But is it not also true that in the gentleman's proposal, one-third
plus one in either House can deny a majority who would want to override
the President's rescission?
Mr. CLINGER. That is right.
Mr. WISE. So the gentleman has a one-House veto, in effect, as well.
Mr. CLINGER. But both Houses would have initially voted by a
majority.
Mr. WISE. That certainly is the case.
Mr. CLINGER. We have a guarantee you get a vote. There is no such
guarantee in the gentleman's amendment, because it could be waived.
Mr. WISE. The President's rescission is handled as a bill with a
guaranteed time within which there must be a vote in the first House it
is introduced. If it is introduced in the House of Representatives, it
has to be on the floor within 10 days, it must be voted on, up or down,
as is the case with any bill. If it fails to get a majority vote, then,
of course, the gentleman is correct, it does not go to the Senate.
As I understand the gentleman, at the end of the day, not the
majority vote that sends it back to the President, but at the end of
the day, assuming the President vetoes the resolution of disapproval,
it is true, is it not, that one-third plus one in either House could
defeat the will of the majority in both Houses?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Clinger] has expired.
(At the request of Mr. Wise and by unanimous consent, Mr. Wise was
allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct. But I think
fundamentally we have a philosophic difference over how tight this
provision should be. What we are saying is we want to make it as
difficult as possible, as difficult as possible, for this House, which
has proven in the past to not be able to restrain itself, to in fact
deny the President the ability to cut spending.
Mr. WISE. If the gentleman will continue to yield for another
question, I just wanted to make sure it was understood that in our
substitute, you cannot be tied up in committee. That if the committee
fails to act within 7 legislative days of having received the package,
then it is automatically discharged and put on the calendar for the
next appropriate time. So there has to be full consideration by the
first House at least.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I am just curious. I just thought I heard the
gentleman say that the reason for this bill in this form was the
inability of the Congress to control appropriated dollars. Is that
accurate?
{time} 1210
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I am suggesting that
the Congress, and I think we can apportion the blame on both sides,
there has been an inability under existing procedures, certainly under
the existing empowerment procedure for us to really effect cuts in
spending, reductions in the deficit.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I am
curious. I heard my friend, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr.
Taylor], speak of this earlier. I am curious what the record is over
the last 40 years in terms of requests for appropriated dollars versus
what the Congress has appropriated.
If I am not wrong, Presidents have traditionally, both historically
and in recent years, whether it be Reagan, Bush or Clinton, they have
all asked for more appropriated dollars than Congress has appropriated.
Am I not right?
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, that may well be true, but I am suggesting
to the gentleman that we are not blameless in this exercise of deficit
reduction. As I indicated to the gentleman, we had an event in 1992,
where an effort was made to try and deal with 1996 rescissions. We were
not able to do that.
The procedures we have now do not let us deal in an expeditious way
with the requests to reduce.
Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, so I
can understand this bill and the rationale for it here, to give
unprecedented power to the President, is that the history is that
Congress has appropriated less money than Presidents have asked for.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Clinger] has expired.
(On request of Mr. Sabo, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Clinger was
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
[[Page H1176]] Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, Congress has passed as much or
more rescissions in total than Presidents have asked for, that in the
budget process we have strict spending limits on appropriated dollars.
I am curious if the gentleman could tell me, clearly, where the large
growth in Federal spending has occurred is entitlement programs. How
does this bill deal with either existing, expanded, or new entitlement
authority?
Mr. CLINGER. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, this bill does not
attempt to solve the problem that the gentleman is referring to. I
think we all recognize that entitlements indeed are a major cause of
the deficit problem we have. But we are, in this bill, approaching
discretionary spending. It is a modest start.
Clearly, the entitlement problem has to be addressed. It cannot be
addressed in this bill, but I would join the gentleman in efforts to
deal with what is clearly the burgeoning problem that we face in this
country and the burgeoning problem that is creating the deficits we
have which are the entitlement problem.
Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Wise amendment, and I know
that my friends on both sides of the aisle who feel very strongly that
for some reason we need a pure line-item veto, pure being defined as
one-third plus one minority control, and there are those on both sides
that feel that, I want to point out again that that is not what we are
voting on in H.R. 2. This is not a pure line-item veto, because it is
not being constitutionally imposed.
I respect those who believe that we need to have stronger language
than what is perceived to be in the modified version that the gentleman
from West Virginia [Mr. Wise] is offering at this moment. I sincerely
respect those who believe that the only way we can make this language
stronger is somehow to give a President one-third plus one minority. I
could not more sincerely or strongly disagree with that.
What some have called a modified line-item veto or what we prefer to
call expedited rescission procedure is the approach that many of us
have always found preferable, both sides of the aisle. Under this
scenario, a President still would be given the
opportunity to propose cuts to individual spending or tax items. That
is not in dispute with me. That is not in dispute with the substitute
before us today. We all agree that any President may go into any bill,
including all of the bills. I believe it ought to be entitlements. I
believe it ought to be tax bills. I believe it ought to be everything.
If we are going to do what we all want to do, and that is make it more
difficult for us to spend money, that is, increase the deficit, we
ought to, in fact, allow the President to have a more major role in
doing so.
The only question is, how much power do you wish to cede to a
President. That is it.
Under our scenario, within 10 legislative days after the President
sent such a rescission package to the Congress, a vote on that package
would be taken. We keep talking about the world as it has been. The
world has changed. We are no longer operating under what we used to do.
I do not anticipate we are going to see supplemental bills this thick
hurting people's hands when they are dropped on the table. That is not
going to happen under the leadership on this side, I do not believe.
If a majority of Members voted to retain fundings--if, in fact, an
individual Member chooses to differ with what a President suggests
ought to be vetoed, I believe very strongly that an individual Member
who differs with the President ought to have the opportunity to get an
up and down vote on that individual item. The base bill was amended
yesterday with the Thurman amendment to provide that that can happen.
If it is a program of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] in
question, if I can get 49 of my colleagues to agree on a separate vote,
it will be taken separately. That is now in both bills.
But if the remainder of the rescissions were approved by a simple
majority of the House, the bill would then be sent to the Senate for
consideration under the same expedited procedure.
I want to put a little historical perspective to this amendment,
because I certainly do not want to stand here and take partisan credit
on behalf of the Democratic side for this amendment. Because expedited
rescission legislation embodies an idea which many Members, both
Democrats and Republicans, have fought hard for over the years. Dan
Quayle first introduced expedited rescission legislation in 1985. Tom
Carper and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey] did yeoman's work in
promoting this legislation. On the Democratic side the gentleman from
South Dakota [Mr. Johnson], Dan Glickman, Tim Penny, the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Payne] have spent years, as have Lynn Martin, Bill
Frenzel, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon], the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Fawell], and others, made meaningful contributions to the
language that we are now debating.
Of course, the language which we voted on last year was the Stenholm-
Penny-Kasich amendment. The deficit reduction prowess of my two cohorts
in that effort is almost legendary and deservedly so. Thanks to effort
of these and other Members, the House overwhelmingly passed expedited
rescission legislation in each of the past 3 years.
I do not in any way intend to imply that all Members have supported
expedited rescission to the exclusion of, or even in preference to, a
pure line-item veto, although this proposal was described a few years
ago by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] as a tremendous
compromise that this House can support overwhelmingly on both sides of
the aisle. My friend from New York has always made it clear that he
prefers the one-third plus one approach. And again, I say to those who
prefer giving the President that much power on any individual item in
the budget, I respect that. But I differ strongly with that view.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Stenholm was allowed to proceed for 5
additional minutes.)
Mr. STENHOLM. What I am saying is that in an overwhelmingly
bipartisan way, Members have stated, through their words and their
votes, that the expedited rescission procedure is a very good one, and
I believe much preferable to the base bill. We must bring greater
accountability to the appropriations process and the tax benefits
process so that individual items may be considered on their individual
merits.
The current rescission process does not make the President or the
Congress accountable. We all agree on that. Congress can ignore the
President's rescissions. The President can blame the Congress, Congress
can blame the President and nothing happens. But my friend from
Massachusetts a moment ago, I believe, misunderstands H.R. 2. Because
under H.R. 2, I will submit to my colleagues, there is not greater
deficit reduction that will occur because under the base bill, if the
President chooses to line-item veto x amount of spending and the
Congress does nothing, that is, lets it take effect, the deficit is not
removed because the caps on spending are not changed under the base
bill.
{time} 1220
Therefore, even though Members say it is much preferable, I believe a
close examination of the language will show that the Wise amendment is
much preferable if Members are interested in getting the deficit down
by removing and lowering the caps.
Another area in which the Wise amendment is much superior to H.R. 2,
if Members are concerned about getting the deficit down, is the fact
that we only, on tax items, say that there is a 10-day period in which
it must be acted upon. Any other spending, the President can do it at
any time during the year, not within a short period of time immediately
following the appropriations process.
If Members are really serious about getting the deficit down, which
this Member is, it seems to me we would want to allow the President to
go into these bills at any time and rescind at any point in time those
spending measures. That seems to be preferable to only having to do it
within a narrow window.
I do not understand how H.R. 2 can be submitted as being stronger
than the
[[Page H1177]] Wise amendment when in both of these cases I think a
fair examination would show that the Wise amendment is in fact much
stronger, if Members are concerned about letting the President go in
and veto the unnecessary spending items that we all agree need to be
done. The general public is fed up with finger pointing.
I guess I would just like to say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the
only area of major disagreement that I have, and I think the debate
last night on the Skelton amendment suddenly focused a lot of people's
attention on what we are talking about, do Members really want to give
any President the right to go into any bill, line item, and then only
have to get one-third plus one of the Members of this body to agree? Is
that really what we want to do? Do we really want to change the
separation of powers to that extent?
What we are saying in this substitute, let us let any President go
into any bill, veto as much as he wishes to do, send it to us, and we
must vote, we cannot duck, we must vote on those particular items. If
it turns out to be one of our favorite programs, then we must get 49 of
our colleagues to stand up and separate, so we vote on that
individually. If it is Charlie Stenholm's favorite project, and I
cannot get 50 percent of my colleagues to agree that money ought to be
spent, it is gone, period, teetotaled.
Therefore, I think it is very important that in this debate we
understand and we read this legislation, because there is a gross
misunderstanding of how strong H.R. 2 is for accomplishing the goals
that we are all saying.
I believe, upon an honest examination, the work of people going back
to Dan Quayle in 1985, and going through a bipartisan effort since
1985, will show that the language in the Wise amendment is much
preferable if Members really and truly want to get on with line item
vetoing individual appropriation bills, out of appropriation bills, and
also going further in the area of tax and even into the area, perhaps
some day, of entitlements, et cetera. That is not in the amendment
before us.
Mr. Chairman, I ask Members again, do they really want to change the
power of the Constitution regarding the separation of powers? That is
the only honest-to-goodness argument my colleagues on this side have,
and some of my friends on this side.
The only honest difference between the two is whether we want one-
third or 50 percent. The rest of it gets pretty hazy. In fact, I will
submit again and again, and be glad to discuss privately, why H.R. 2 is
weaker than Wise if Members in fact want to accomplish the goal of
lowering the caps and lowering expenditures by congressional action.
Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm] who has
very ably explained the complication, the difficulty we have with the
two-thirds vote.
If in fact this Congress appropriated specific funds for a weapons
systems or for a defense appropriations purpose and the President line-
item vetoed that expenditure, the President plus one-third and one vote
would in fact overrun the will and the priorities of this Congress. The
same could be said for any area of the Federal budget.
However, let me say that while all of us are here on the floor today
ostensibly to talk about ways to reduce the size of the Federal budget
deficit, it distresses me that as this discussion has gone on, it has
become very apparent that there are those on the other side, on the
Republican side, who have consistently said ``Let's subject children's
and veterans' and senior citizens' programs to reductions in
spending,'' but have been unwilling to subject special tax favors that
benefit largely the very wealthy contributors to Congress to the same
kind of discipline. I think that is unfortunate.
Here we are again, talking about ways to save money, to reduce the
size of the deficit, when in fact the tax favors contribute as much to
the deficit as any of the spending programs. Therefore, I do see this
as a one-sided debate. Even so, however, I think it is important that
we go forward as best we can.
Mr. Chairman, one of the issues that it seems to me needs greater
stress is this reference to the two-thirds vote as somehow being the
stronger version. The two-thirds vote approach is not the stronger
version, unless we are simply talking about enhancing the power of the
President.
If we are talking about cutting spending, the Wise amendment is the
stronger version. The two-thirds vote results in a massive shift of
authority to the executive branch, of whichever party that President
might be.
It will be used, as has often been the case at the State level, not
to cut spending but in fact to enforce the budget agenda of the
executive. I can imagine President Bush telling Members, individual
Members of Congress, that ``Either you support my increase in foreign
aid, or you will lose every increase in foreign aid, or you will lose
every project in your State.'' I can imagine President Clinton saying
``Support my health care plan, or you will lose every project in your
State.''
It is vote extortion that the two-thirds rule permits and in fact
encourages. Better that we have the majority vote so the President can
lay individual spending items on the table, say ``Congress, if you
think this is a good thing to spend money on, you vote up-or-down. Go
home and tell your constituents that you took a recorded rollcall vote
that you thought that was a good thing to spend money on.''
If the projects in my State are not meritorious enough to gain a
majority vote, they should not be passed, but I do not think that a
two-thirds vote is the proper shift of power. I think that it is
something that this institution will rue for years to come.
The question is, what is pork? I think that is fundamental to this
entire debate. Pork is not something, a budget expenditure, the
Congress favors over the President. A pork item is a project that is
nonmeritorious, that would not stand on its own two legs. It would not
stand a majority vote.
What we are saying is let us cut them out. Let us have an opportunity
for a recorded rollcall vote. Let us put the spotlight on them, so we
reduce that kind of spending, and yet at the same time not give the
authority to the executive branch, whether it be Republican or
Democrat, to extort, to coerce votes out of the legislative branch.
That is what is fundamental in this debate.
Mr. Chairman, what we have here is a debate partly on reducing the
deficit, although I think all of us who have looked at the budget
carefully understand that pork barrel spending, however it is defined,
is a relatively modest part of the problem; although I think we also
would agree that if we can save a dollar, we ought to save a dollar,
and we need to set about doing that.
But the larger issue is congressional accountability: Will Congress
be accountable to the people for its individual spending items? The
Wise amendment does that.
The other approach, the two-thirds vote approach, does not result in
accountability. It simply results in greater authority for the
executive branch to coerce votes for its legislative agenda, rather
than for saving money, and rather than for enforcing congressional
accountability.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Wise amendment, and
encourage bipartisan support for this effort, which I think will be a
very positive step in the direction of greater congressional
accountability, reducing the Federal budget deficit. This is the
approach which passed last year, which stands a chance of passing in
the other Chamber. I think it is a badly needed reform.
Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, this has been a great debate. These are things that we
have needed to talk about for a long time. Going into my eighth year, I
have had the opportunity to vote on a line-item veto two times now.
We have passed it in the House of Representatives, but it was blocked
in the U.S. Senate. I do not think we will ever have a better
opportunity than now. We have our window of opportunity to pass a line-
item veto, but which one are we going to pass? Are we going to pass the
Wise-Stenholm-
[[Page H1178]] Spratt, which I support, or H.R. 2? In my opinion, the
Wise amendment is the best one for us to consider and pass at this
particular time.
Mr. Chairman, it took us all the way from George Washington to Ronald
Reagan to accumulate a national debt of $1 trillion, and in two
administrations, in the Reagan and Bush administrations, we tripled
that debt from $1 trillion to $3 trillion.
{time} 1230
We saw more spending, or more proposed spending than even what the
Congress authorized in those two administrations. We have seen a lot of
irresponsibility not only in the presidential administrations, whether
they be Democrat or Republican, but we have seen it in the U.S.
Congress. All of us are in agreement that we have got to have more
discipline than we have had before. But how do we accomplish that?
In my opinion, the modified line-item veto is the answer to many of
our problems. Every one of us as a Member of Congress has a laundry
list of where we want to cut. Unfortunately, every one of us has a
different list. Therefore, we do not cut anything.
Now we have an opportunity, where if we pass some legislation, it
goes to the President, and then he has to contemplate, ``Well, do I
sign this particular bill or not?'' At least if he finds an area where
we have waste and mismanagement, he can send that particular part of
that legislation back to the U.S. Congress where he does not have to
veto the entire package, and where he can line item and veto a
particular part of the legislation, send it back to us where we can
then make a determination, are we going to pass it and override it with
a simple majority override, or are we going to take a different
direction?
But at least we can focus attention in that particular area, and the
American people are going to come into the picture. Because even with a
simple majority override, the American people are going to speak. They
know. They keep up with us. They watch. They know what we are voting
on, and they will be able to also influence whether we should vote for
an override or not, whether this is waste or mismanagement, and move us
toward a balanced budget.
We have already passed a balanced budget amendment in the House of
Representatives. Now we have an opportunity to pass the line-item veto.
We are doing some great things in the U.S. Congress that I have been
trying to do ever since I have been here, long before I knew what it
meant when we called it a Contract for America. I did not know what a
Contract for America was. Many of those things I will support which I
think are in the best interests of America.
Let us support the Wise-Stenholm-Spratt amendment. That is the best
approach when it comes to having a modified line item veto, and what
the American people need and want to bring about some fiscal discipline
once and for all.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, first I rise in support of the amendment offered by the
gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise], my distinguished colleague.
But I recognize, as everyone in this Chamber recognizes, this amendment
will fail, because that is not the nature of how this House is
presently organized.
So my remarks will go to the result of what will happen here.
We are now in the final hours of our discussion and debate on the
issue of the line-item veto. I would like to place this action in some
kind of stark reality.
Mr. Chairman, what we are about to do today and on Monday is going
to, for the balance of our lifetimes, every single person in this
Chamber for the balance of our lifetimes, we are changing the nature of
American Government. And more people are probably watching a murder
trial at this very moment than are paying attention to what we are
about to do to the very fragile notion of the balance of power that has
made this Government a shining light of democracy throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, first to the issue of vetoes generally.
When the Founding persons, the Framers of the Constitution, the
people who discussed and debated night and day for weeks and months to
come up with our form of government arrived at a discussion of the
power of the President to use a veto, they never, Mr. Chairman,
anticipated that the President would use the veto as an ongoing regular
instrument of governance, but that the President would use the veto
rarely, only on rare occasions when the President really believed that
the fate of the Nation and that the health of the people was in some
way endangered; and that when the President on those few occasions used
the veto, it would require two-thirds of the body of the direct
representatives of the people, the Congress, to overturn that.
When you read the Federalist Papers, you understand that the Framers
did not want the President to use the veto on a regular basis because
it would change the nature of our government.
You ask the American people: What is the basic principle of American
democracy? It is majority rule, 50 percent plus 1. The sad reality is
that many American people are not even aware of the fact that it takes
two-thirds to override a veto. If you do not believe me, call some town
meetings, and you will be shocked at the level of sophistication about
this issue, when people said, ``Wait a minute. You mean it takes two-
thirds to override a veto?''
Absolutely. And if you have a combination, Mr. Chairman, of a
President willing to aggressively use the veto as an instrument of
governance, you can govern this country by what I refer to as the
tyranny of the minority, because with a President willing to
aggressively use the veto, one-third plus 1 can dominate the American
political processes. Dominate it.
Now we are talking about a line item veto which guarantees that veto
will be used as an ongoing instrument of governance. Ongoing. Vetoes
would now be in our lives with even greater flair, greater drama, and
greater impact, giving one-third plus 1, not a simple majority, the
ability to shape policy, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dellums was allowed to proceed for 3
additional minutes.)
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we are now giving the President of the
United States, irrespective of party, power far beyond that
contemplated by the persons who framed the nature of this Government.
Far beyond it.
But we are going to do this. As I understand the symbolism, we are
going to do it by 2 p.m. on Monday, so that you give this legislation
as a gift to a former President.
Here is the greater danger. Once you do it, Mr. Chairman, it is not
going to ever be undone. The American people need to wake up to the
reality that this Government is being changed at such an extraordinary,
fundamental level that any reasonable thinking human being should be
disturbed by what we are about to do.
Let me tell you why we will not change it. Two years from now,
another group of people will come in here. Suppose someone says, ``My
God, we gave the President this enormous power. Let's write a bill to
rescind it.'' Do you think any President will give back power once you
have given it to that President? They will veto it. And guess what?
One-third plus 1 can kill it again.
So understand, Members of the Committee you are changing American
Government for all time. For all time.
Yesterday someone offered an amendment to put a sunset provision in
the bill. Let us stop this madness in 5 years if it does not work.
{time} 1240
Vote that down so you do not even have an instrument to recapture the
beauty and the magnificence that made this Constitution and this
Government as framed by the founding persons, immortalized in the
Federalist Papers by what we are doing here. We are rushing to judgment
because a campaign promise was made.
I believe in making campaign promises. I do not vilify them, but I
have said before, and will repeat again today and tomorrow and after
that, that when we move from campaign promise to legislative initiative
that has this
[[Page H1179]] kind of extraordinary and dramatic potential impact on
the form of this Government, and on the American people's lives, the
fundamental contract to the people is that we enter into a thoughtful
enough processes to look efficaciously at what it is we are doing.
What is so sacrosanct about 100 days when we are about to change the
Government for 100 years? Whatever your politics, left, right, or
center, that is not my argument here. I appreciate this system brings
us here with different values and principles.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dellums was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. DELLUMS. So, Mr. Chairman, we can come and debate and engage each
other substantively on the issues. We do not all have to think alike.
That is frightening and dangerous anyway. What keeps the body politic
honest and flowing healthy is when there are competing ideas. I can
appreciate that.
But the one place where we ought to come together and stand shoulder
to shoulder and hip to hip is any time we contemplate changing the
Government that has brought us over 200 years to this moment.
Mr. Chairman, I know that my colleagues are going to do this thing,
and my only hope, my only hope is that enough American people will
awake even to the reality that their lives have been fundamentally
altered, because their representatives, their responsibilities have
been fundamentally changed, the Constitution has been fundamentally
altered, the balance of power has been fundamentally altered, and if we
ever want to establish an imperial Presidency and impotent Congress,
wait until 2:30 on Monday, and that is exactly what we will have and it
is frightening and disturbing.
I am happy to engage any Member on this floor in a debate on the
critical nature of what we are doing.
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, we have had a constructive debate, and many of the
points that our colleague from California emphasized have been brought
up in the course of amendments.
This side is disappointed that many of those, all of those amendments
really were defeated. Many of them were not even fully considered by
most of this body.
We just killed an amendment, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spratt] and I had to apply the line item veto to tax bills as well as
appropriation bills because those Members who have been around for any
period of time, particularly in the last two terms, are aware that
anything that is in an appropriations bill that could be considered
pork gets subjected not only to the scrutiny of the Committee on
Appropriations, but invariably we have to debate it and vote on it on
this floor.
Not so with tax bills. Tax bills are replete with special provisions.
Newsweek this week pointed out the fact that this is the biggest
loophole, and yet a provision to subject tax bills to the same kind of
scrutiny was killed in committee, and just this morning killed on the
floor.
I offered an amendment to try to protect the separation of powers,
reminding our colleagues that the people that served in this body in
1939, and it was an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress and obviously a
Democratic President, passed a law designed to protect the judiciary.
This line item veto essentially repeals that law.
When President Roosevelt could not pack the Court and the Court would
not go along with his New Deal, he started cutting out bailiffs' money,
he started cutting the money for Court clerks, he took away their
travel funds. He punished them. He used the power of the Presidency,
which, in fact, was too much at that time in the view of the
legislative branch, and so it passed a law saying that the executive
branch has to pass through whatever request is made for the judiciary.
The legislative branch, which does not litigate before the Supreme
Court and thus does not have that conflict of interest, knowing that
the Justice Department brings more than half of the cases before the
Supreme Court and has a clear conflict of interest, it has to pass it
on to the legislative branch, and the legislative Appropriations
Committee does what- ever is necessary.
We are talking about a very small amount of money. We are not talking
about busting the budget, we are not even talking about any courthouse
construction, just small items that allow the Supreme Court to
function. But now all of these items are subject to line-item veto.
That was a mistake. When President Eisenhower called Chief Justice
Warren and suggested to him it was not time to desegregate the schools
and Chief Justice Warren said well, I am going to do what I think is
right, he had that independence because he knew there was no way that
the President, the executive branch could punish him if he did
differently than what the executive branch offered.
But now we are going to repeal that, we are going to give
extraordinary power to the executive branch.
I worked for President Johnson, and for President Nixon, and I was on
the staff of the Senate Committee on Appropriations during the terms of
President Ford and President Carter.
I know that President Ford and President Carter would have observed
the basic principle of separation of powers. They probably would not
have abused the line-item veto. But let me tell my colleagues that
President Nixon would have, in my opinion, and President Johnson,
because he knew where everything was buried or he knew every project
that had gotten through the Senate, every special tax provision, he
would have abused it outrageously.
I think we ought to recognize the threat to the fundamental
principles that our forefathers put into the Constitution, the
fundamental principle of separation of powers.
That is why this kind of amendment is so important, this substitute
amendment, because it preserves some balance. The bill that is
invariably going to get enacted because this side is marching in
lockstep now, does fundamental damage to the basic structure of this
Government.
I would just conclude by saying one last thing.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Moran] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Moran was allowed to proceed for 1\1/2\
additional minutes.)
Mr. MORAN. Mr. Chairman, no one in the 21st century even, which is
about to occur within another 5 years, no one is really going to
remember our faces or our names or even the words that we utter here on
the floor of the House. But they will remember what we did, because it
will affect their lives.
We represent the most prosperous nation on Earth, the freest nation
on Earth, the Nation that has the most respect for human rights, for
civil rights, a legislative body that people all over the world are
coming to study. All these emerging democracies come over here to see
how we operate. We are a model for the world, we are a model for the
20th century. We should be going into the 21st century building upon
our strength and not eroding it, as this bill does.
{time} 1250
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number
of words.
Mr. Chairman, we are in a crisis in this country, and that crisis is
one of fiscal irresponsibility.
We talked about campaign promises, the gentleman from California did,
and he is exactly right, because there are three constituents back in
my district, my three children, that I have a great responsibility to
now.
And we are hearing all sorts of rhetoric from the other side, but
there are really two discussions going on on the other side, and I
would just like to possibly get some clarification on those, the first
of which is that this proposed line-item veto will give two-thirds
majority veto power to the President, and that will be too much power.
But in the campaign, as I ran against a Democrat incumbent, I was told
through the media, through my opponent and from the Democrat Party in
general that the reason why my children have such a burden on them is
because of 12 years of Republican rule, because for 12 years Republican
Presidents spent too much money.
[[Page H1180]] So let us just back up one moment to the Constitution.
The Constitution gives the appropriating powers to the U.S. Congress,
and if the Congress chooses not to appropriate funds, those moneys are
not spent.
So my question is this: As we hear that this will give the President
too much power, is this more power than supposedly Ronald Reagan had,
more power than supposedly George Bush had to control spending and,
therefore, put my children's future in graver risk? Or was it incorrect
on the campaign trail, which at times we all tend to get a little
verbose on the campaign trail, but was it not true that it was the
fault of the appropriating body, according to the Constitution? Was it
the problem of the appropriating body that my children have this debt?
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that anybody who was here at
that time ought to admit that it was a failure of both institutions,
the Congress and the President. But I would make quite clear, if the
gentleman would bear with me, the fact is that since the Impoundment
Act passed, or since the Budget Act passed, in 1974, the Congress has
spent $20 billion less, less, than Presidents asked us to spend.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Reclaiming my time once again, $20 billion less. But
how much more in debt? How many times was the debt limit raised?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hostettler]
has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hostettler was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Mr. Chairman, how many times was the debt limit
raised as a result of a majority vote of this House?
Mr. OBEY. If the gentleman will yield further, I was here in 1981. I
offered the major alternatives to both the Reagan budget and the
Democratic budget, because I thought that both of them broke the bank.
Our substitute, which a majority of Democrats voted for, borrowed less
and spent less than any other alternative before the body.
I do not think it is useful to get into who shot John in the past.
But if the gentleman wants to do that, the record is clear.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No. But we have today shot John once again in the
past. I am not running in lockstep, as you all know, with this side,
but what we must do is we must give the President the power, since this
body has proven time and time again that it cannot do that. We must
give the President the power that was supposedly given to him,
according to the campaign rhetoric that was there, and if that is the
case, then we will bring fiscal responsibility to this Federal
Government, and we will not continue down the same path. That is why we
need to give this two-thirds power, not because we are giving
overwhelming power to the President, but because we are in a crisis, a
fiscal crisis.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
Hostettler] be allowed 2 more minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana has time remaining.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. Hostettler] be granted an additional 5 minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Maryland?
There was no objection.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, let me
simply say I respect the gentleman. I respect the vote he cast last
week.
But I want to tell you the same story I told in the Committee on
Rules.
The reason that I believe it is so critically important to have
majority rather than two-thirds decide this issue is because I think
the most fundamental threat to the long-term liberty of this country
lies in the unchecked use of Executive power, and I want to give you an
example.
I told the Committee on Rules that when I was in the State
legislature back in 1968 and I was passionately supporting Lyndon
Johnson's reelection, I wrote a letter to the President and simply told
him that, in my judgment, if he did not do something to end the Vietnam
war, that he was going to lose the Wisconsin primary.
Hubert Humphrey came to town. I showed him the letter, and I told him
I was about to send it to LBJ. Hubert said, ``Let me give it to him
myself.'' He said, ``I think you are right on the letter. I would like
to show it to him.'' I said, ``Look, I will mail it anyway, because I
do not want you to get in a crack.'' He took a copy of it and presented
it to the President.
A couple weeks later I get a call from a friend, ``Obey, what is this
job you are being considered for in Washington?'' I said, ``What do you
mean?'' He said, ``Well,'' he said, ``we had a Federal guy by here
asking questions about you.''
To make a long story short, if you had Federal people asking
questions about me, checking me out because I had the temerity to tell
a sitting President he was going to lose his seat because of a very
important public issue, now, if you have that kind of tendency on the
part of any President to use whatever Executive power is around, what
happens the next time we have a Mexican loan bailout before us and you
have a two-thirds requirement to overturn a President's decision? And
that President goes to you, or me, and says, ``If you do not vote for
that proposition, that $40 billion proposition, I am going to yank
every single thing out of your State, and I have got one-third
loyalists in this House, and, baby, you will not get a dime''; it will
destroy the uniqueness of this Congress.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Reclaiming my time, the point is that we are in a
crisis; this body. You, sir, there is no doubt that you have the
responsibility to the Constitution and to your constituents, but this
body as a whole has shown time and time again it does not have that
responsibility.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
What we are trying to do is the Presidents, the early Presidents, had
the right of a two-thirds majority to control that, that a bill came to
them as a single bill. Now we have got hundreds of bills wrapped up
into one. Jefferson and Lincoln and the Presidents had to have a two-
thirds vote to override their veto, and that is all we are asking under
this.
And, second, we have precedents by our Governors having the same kind
of a thing, and it has been very successful.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I would appreciate it if the gentleman from Indiana will stay,
because I think he has brought up a tremendous question, a very, very
important question, and I think it requires some analysis of history.
When you talk about the crisis that we are in, I am not sure that
everyone can appreciate, or whether you appreciate, where we are
relative to where we have been in the past. I know the gentleman from
Indiana probably was not born at the end of the Second World War. I
assume that.
Well, at the end of the Second World War, do you know what the debt
of the United States was? Well, I mean, if we can just have a give and
take.
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Proportionately it was much greater. You are right.
Mr. KANJORSKI. The debt at the end of the Second World War was $350
billion. Do you know what the present value of a 1994 dollar is
relative to a 1945 dollar?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. Substantially higher.
Mr. KANJORSKI. It is about 8 cents. So that means the dollar has
deflated by 12 times. So if you will multiply $350 billion by 12, you
will find today that the debt of the United States is about equal in
amount, in dollar amount, real value amount, as it was when we came out
of the Second World War.
Now, I have been here for 10 years, and I have heard my friends on
the other side talk about debt and dollars and failed to relate real
dollars and real debt.
And I want to point out that the magnificence of what happened from
1945 to 1980 was that this country reduced the real debt of the United
States by more than 60 percent, even
[[Page H1181]] though in 1980 the dollar debt of the United States was
$800 billion. Its real value, relative to 1945 terms, was about $100
billion.
{time} 1300
We brought that down 60 percent under a Democrat-controlled Congress
from 1945 until 1980. Ronald Reagan entered the Presidency and sold the
American people on a campaign that he could double defense
expenditures, he could reduce taxation on the wealthy of this country,
coming down from 70 percent to 28 percent ultimately during his
administration, and he could balance the budget.
He did keep two of those promises. He doubled the defense
expenditures of this country. Even though Russia in every study in the
1980's was shown as ready to collapse, we still doubled our military
expenses. He also cut the income tax on the wealthiest corporations and
the wealthiest individuals from 70 percent to 28 percent. He did make
one little error, one little error: He took the debt of the United
States from $800 billion to $4.2 trillion in his term of administration
of office.
I hear people relating all these dollar terms, you talk about crisis.
I want to make sure that you understand that the debt of the United
States coming out of the Second World War was about $350 billion, about
equal to our debt today. The only difference is that the population of
the United States in 1945 was 120 million people and today the
population of the United States is about 260 million people. The number
of corporations and businesses existing in the United States in 1945
were less than one-fifth of what they are today. So when anyone in
America today, and my conservative friends on that side are talking
about dollars and dollars, 1995 dollars and 1945 dollars, they are
talking about grapefruits and grapes in size. You cannot have an
intelligent, intellectual discussion in finance or economics when you
do not come down to real values. So if you say we are in crisis today
when we have more than twice the population, we have five times as many
eceonomic enterprises in the United States, then I cannot imagine what
terms you would use in a description of 1945.
The fact of the matter is America is the wealthiest nation on Earth
and up until the last 10 to 15 years its population has been benefiting
from the increase in productivity in America, but it has stagnated. It
has stagnated because of many situations, most of which is the advent
of the global market.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KANJORSKI. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. LaHOOD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I am afraid, like a
number of other of his colleagues on that side, has been around here
too long. What he has just said--listen, I am not trying to----
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski] has
expired.
Mr. KANJORSKI. I appreciate that the gentleman does not appreciate my
tenure in office. But I oppose him making an ad hominem attack on the
House floor.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Kanjorski was allowed to proceed for 5
additional minutes.)
Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Chairman, instead of an ad hominem attack on the
floor, let us assume we are both freshmen here.
Mr. LaHOOD. Let me finish here, let me finish.
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, regular order, regular order.
Mr. KANJORSKI. Let us talk about the facts and the figures that have
been discussed.
Mr. LaHOOD. Is the gentleman going to yield?
Mr. KANJORSKI. I am happy to, but I would appreciate that we not get
a personal attack because, quite frankly, I enjoy the individual as he
represents his State and his constituents, and I think the comity of
the House is that we rise here not for personal purposes or political
purposes, but to do the people's business. As long as we talk in terms
of doing the people's business, I am very happy to yield to my friend.
Mr. LaHOOD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First of all, to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski], I
in no way meant to offend him. If I did, I apologize for doing that.
Mr. KANJORSKI. No offense.
Mr. LaHOOD. Here is my point, sir, here is my point. Those of us just
elected in the last election came here with the idea that this
institution has not had the discipline to balance its budget for too
long and for many, many years.
Mr. KANJORSKI. OK, let us stop there, reclaiming my time. Let us go
through the discussion. I will recall my time and respond to that. I
know that the gentleman came here with that intention or that thought
process. What I am indicating to him, unfortunately the facts of the
economic history of the United States do not bear out this case.
Now, if we are really going to talk about what we are doing and what
the fault of the Government is, what the fault of the position of the
United States is, there is nothing wrong with discussing the true facts
and real facts in trying to resolve good policy for the United States
to be fiscally responsible. We want to do that on our side of the
aisle, you want to do it your side of the aisle. But to constantly
discuss grapefruits and grapes because we are talking about 1995
dollars and 1945 dollars or 1960 dollars and trying to lay down some
indictment, as I have heard, 40 years of indictment; well, the 40 years
that you are indicting, my friend, this side of the aisle presided over
a 60-percent real reduction in the debt of the United States and it was
only until the election of a President from your party back in 1980
that that was reversed, and it was reversed on a public relations
gimmick. He promised the American people three facts and did not keep
them.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. KANJORSKI. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. LaHOOD. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, the results of the last election speak volumes. May I
finish, sir? Thank you. The results of the last election speak volumes
in terms of this particular issue. Many of us were elected on the idea
that this institution has not had the discipline to balance its budgets
for whatever reasons. Please let me finish, sir, make my point, and
then you may continue, sir.
We believe the way to bring discipline to the institution is to pass
a balanced budget amendment, to give the President the line-item veto
so that when we have these monumental bills that some have called
Christmas trees, where we all load up with our special projects--and it
has gone on for years on both sides of the aisle, not just your side
but on our side, too--that there is a mechanism in place to deal with
it. That is my point.
Mr. KANJORKSI. I reclaim my time, and I will yield to the gentleman
from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, let me make something very clear: I am going to offer
an amendment here very quickly, I hope, that will enable us to get at
every single project that was adopted last year. But I want to point
out something to the gentleman: There is not a single earmark that was
added under our congressional processes that has added one dime to the
deficit because, as the gentleman very well knows, every subcommittee
that comes out on this floor, every appropriations subcommittee comes
out under a fiscal cap imposed by this institution under the 602(b)
allocation.
The CHAIRMAN. The time is controlled by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Kanjorski], who needs to remain on his feet.
The gentleman may proceed.
Mr. OBEY. As I was trying to say, every single earmark, because of
the fact that every single subcommittee comes to this floor under a
fiscal cap, those earmarks are provided at the expense of other
spending, but do not add one dime to the deficit. If you want to take a
look at the root cause of the deficit--you can argue about the
propriety of those earmarks, and I will share the gentleman's concern
about many of them--but you cannot, with a straight face, suggest that
they have added to the deficit because under the
[[Page H1182]] budget rules, which we all helped write, they do not do
that. They do not do that. They simply come at the expense of other
spending. That may not be good practice, but it does not make the
gentleman's point.
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
My colleagues, let me begin with the obligatory statement that I,
too, support the line-item veto. I happen to support it in the manner
in which it is before us now rather than in the basic bill. That is
what I voted for a year or so ago and most of my colleagues in the
House, both Republicans and Democrats, voted that way likewise.
My colleagues, if Rip Van Winkle fell asleep a couple of hundred
years ago and then reawakened in this gallery anytime during the last
30 days, he would probably believe that he has awakened as a witness to
America's second Constitutional Convention. He probably would not
recognize this as a Congress legislating individual laws, but rather as
a convention either mightily tinkering with or dramatically changing
the basic law of the land. But it is not Rip Van Winkle's ghost I want
to talk about for a couple of minutes; it is James Madison.
On that May 3d day 208 years ago, James Madison entered the city of
Philadelphia, a city of 40,000 people back than, along with several, in
fact, several dozen of his colleagues. Elbridge Gerry, whose descendant
was standing in the corner just a few minutes ago, George Mason,
Colonel Mason, and others. They were attacked by radicals of the day,
led primarily by Patrick Henry.
{time} 1310
Mr. Chairman, their work, when they finished it, the Constitution of
the United States, is perhaps understandably still attacked today. It
is attacked continually by the extreme left, by those who say that it
excludes ordinary individuals from participation in their government.
Likewise, Mr. Chairman, it has been attacked, as it has been
continually during the past 30 days, by the extreme right in this House
because they believe that it has created a strong central government
that stifles liberty.
Those are the same attacks that were leveled against Madison and his
colleagues 200 years ago.
Most Americans understand what the Constitution of the United States
is. It is a basic rule of law. It is not a treaty from which one party
or the other can withdraw at their convenience. It is not a set of
agreements which swing is the political wind and can be altered
according to the latest polling results. It is our principles. It is
the principles that have been duly established and carefully preserved;
yes, on the floor of this House at the cost of the seats of some of the
Members in the past who have fought to preserve it. It is to be changed
in whole or in part with the greatest care and caution.
While I would not be arrogant enough to presume what James Madison
would say were he allowed to stand in the gallery and give us his
thoughts over this last month, I think he would say, ``Be careful. Be
careful because you are tinkering with the political law of gravity,
and when you alter it, you risk throwing out of orbit those items of
stability that have kept America connected, and at peace, and sound and
whole.''
Mr. Chairman, it is not our economic might; it is the simple set of
principles on that piece of paper that continues the stability of this
Nation. It is the center of our political gravity, and James Madison
would probably look on a supermajority required to legislate; yes, even
to overturn the power of a President; as changing that gravitational
pull, one branch of government to the other.
As I said, I would not be arrogant enough to say what James Madison
might say, so let me say to my colleagues what the gentleman from
Montana [Mr. Williams] might say:
Be careful, be careful, be careful.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I traveled to Paris, France,
once in my life--on my own ticket, by the way--and, as a Cajun in
Paris, Mr. Chairman, I discovered something that I have had to remind
myself about frequently in the course of my life. We Cajuns call a
truck a trook. The Parisians call it a camionner. When a Cajun wants to
agree with someone or indicate that someone has said something he
agrees with, he says, ``tu kar ray.'' It is just sort of a Cajun
French-ized expression of ``You're right.'' In French they say, ``Vous
avez raison.''
I came to understand, as I struggled to communicate with my fellow
Frenchmen in ancestry that, while we spoke the same language, we had a
little trouble understanding each other in that same language, and so
it is with the English language. Many of us rise today to support the
concept of a line-item veto. We believe, as our Constitution provides,
that a supermajority of the Members of this body ought to be had to
override a President when he vetoes an act of Congress. That is in our
Constitution right now, and we believe that that extraordinary
authority ought to be extended when this Congress is irresponsible
enough to overspend its budget.
So, Mr. Chairman, this amendment comes before us today, this bill
comes before us today, in its present form that says the President can
use the line-item veto now in extension of the veto authority given to
him by the Constitution. ``The line-item veto to reduce the deficit'';
that is the language in the bill. In short it says, ``If the Congress
is irresponsible and does not balance the budget, the congressional
grant of authority to the President is to use the line-item veto to
enforce responsibility to bring that deficit down.'' The bill does not
say, as do a few States of our Nation, that that authority belongs to
the Governor or this President even when the Congress is responsible.
That is a serious change of law, a serious change of the balance of
power between the Executive and the legislative branch.
I say to my colleagues, ``We have checks and balances in our
Constitution. If you extend the power of the President to line-item
veto anything, even when the Congress has been responsible and balanced
the budget, you no longer have checks and balances. You
got checkmate and imbalance.''
So, Mr. Chairman, I suggest to my colleagues that the question of
whether they want the President to override the--I mean the Congress to
override the line-item veto by a two-thirds majority or by a simple
majority, as in the amendment before us, depends mightily upon whether
or not the bill, in its final form, will remain a bill that gives the
power to the President to line-item-veto items that constitute deficit
spending, or whether my colleagues want to go further and give the
President that power even when the Congress is responsible enough to
balance the budget.
Later on in this debate I am going to suggest to the Congress an
amendment to this bill that would further enforce that notion.
I must apologize. I confused a couple of analogies in this graph.
Bear with me. It is called the glidepath amendment to this bill. It is
called the glidepath amendment because like an airplane coming in for a
landing it follows a glidepath, and that is what we are obliged to do
to get to a balanced budget by the year 2002. If we stay on the
glidepath, on the CBO-projected numbers each year of how much deficit
we are allowed to incur, as we reach the balanced budget amendment date
of the year 2002, Mr. Chairman, we will land safely. As to this
football field, we score the touchdown. Hence my two analogies.
What I am going to suggest to my colleagues, and I hope that all of
us really think about this, is that, if this bill is truly a bill to
enforce responsibility on the Congress, if it is truly a bill as are
the bills that were passed in 33 of the 43 States that give line-item
authority to their Governors, then this amendment is vitally necessary.
Why? Because in the 43 States which give line-item veto authority to
their Governor, three out of four of those States say that authority is
limited to the line-item vetoing of items that constitute deficit
spending. In our case, unlike those 43 States, we cannot, and my
colleagues know it, I know it, produce a balanced budget this year. We
cannot do it without enormously destroying entitlement programs,
[[Page H1183]] many of which, like Social Security, none of us want to
hurt.
{time} 1320
So it will take us time. We all know it. That is why we passed the
balanced budget amendment that gives us this glidepath to the touchdown
at the year 2002.
If we know that and are honest and realistic about it, what is the
responsibility of the Congress during the years in which we work toward
that touchdown of a balanced budget? The responsibility is to stay
under those CBO numbers. If we do not, we will not reach this goal. If
we do, we have been responsible according to the balanced budget
amendment we passed.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin]
has expired.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3
additional minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Louisiana?
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, and I
probably will not object. Let me just take this opportunity to say to
my good friend that I know we have been on this amendment for a number
of hours now. We wanted to try to rise by 3 o'clock. There is a
snowstorm coming. It is hitting out in the Midwest right now in the
Chicago area and heaven knows where else.
We have a number of amendments we have to get through, no matter what
time it takes. I will say to my good friend, the gentleman is debating
his amendment which is going to come up a little later. We just have to
move it. Participation on this side is necessary, but let us be as
brief as we can and get to final passage of this amendment.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SOLOMON. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, I am not yet debating this amendment. I am
saying if we do not adopt this amendment later, we ought to vote for
the majority override that is before us.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Louisiana?
There was no objection.
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is if you are going to pass
a bill that gives the President line-item veto, even when this Congress
has been responsible, you are creating all of the problems that many
have risen to the mike and spoken about today and yesterday. You are
creating the problems of a President who has the authority to cajole,
coerce, in some cases even politically blackmail Members of this body,
even when the Congress has been responsible.
Now, if you want to give this Congress the same power legislators
have to protect against that, and at the same time you want to use a
line-item veto as a tool to enforce congressional responsibility, to
enforce the balanced budget amendment we recently adopted, this kind of
an amendment will do it.
On the other hand, if this bill is changed, as it may be changed, to
go beyond deficit line-item reduction by line-item veto, to go beyond
that point, then maybe you better consider the majority override. That
is my point today.
I will support a two-thirds majority override as long as the line-
item veto is like the three-quarters of our States provide, designed to
protect against irresponsibility on the part of the legislature,
designed to guarantee line-item veto authority to the Governor or the
President for any deficit spending beyond the area of responsibility,
as in this case beyond the CBO numbers and eventually beyond the
balanced budget requirements of the Constitution.
This will come up later. But I caution you, if this bill is changed
from a deficit reduction line-item veto into something else, and I am
told that amendment may be offered later, then I suggest that the
majority override is the right way to go. Perhaps we should get some
signal on that before we vote on the amendment pending before us.
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, the question is, majority rule, or minority rule?
This is my voting card. Each of us is privileged to possess one of
these. We worked hard for it. It represents a sacred trust, not just
between us and our constituents, but between us and all who have come
before us in this body and all who will follow.
I was not elected, figuratively or literally speaking, to clip about
one-sixth off of this voting card, walk down Pennsylvania Avenue, and
throw it over the White House fence. That would be an incredible breach
of the sacred trust that every Member of this body should try to honor.
Our responsibility is to the Congresses of the future and to the
future generations who will be looking to the Congresses of the future
to provide the principal protection against overreaching by Presidents
of the United States.
The gentleman from Montana and the gentleman from Wisconsin have
given us real reasons to worry about that. This is not some illusory or
academic point. The threats to liberty in this country have not arisen
here, and they will not. But we should be mindful of the risk that we
run by a wholesale transfer of power to the executive branch.
The issue here ought to be one of accountability. The amendment
offered by the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise] meets that
purpose. It will put us all on record when we need to be put on record
with regard to particular items of spending.
But what we do not need to do in the cause of that accountability is
commit an outrage against the Constitution in a wholesale transfer of
power, entrusted to us by the Constitution, to the President of the
United States.
Let me give one further example of what is really involved here. The
budgets sent to this Congress by President Reagan, among other things,
proposed, for example, a zeroing out of direct student loans, a zeroing
out of aid to public libraries, a zeroing out of Federal-State
vocational rehabilitation programs, a zeroing out of college work
study, a zeroing out of funding for education for individuals with
disabilities.
Had that President had this power, those programs would be gone,
because that President would have had the support of a loyal and true
one-third plus one, if not in this body, then across the building in
the Senate.
This is not some imaginary worry. That is what is at issue here. And
if we are to honor the Constitution and to honor our responsibilities
and to adhere to our oath of office, the amendment offered by the
gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise] meets that responsibility and
does not violate the Constitution.
The committee's bill represents a profound breach of our oath and our
duty to ourselves and to the Constitution.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Mr. Chairman, I rise as one who supported the constitutional
amendment to balance the budget. It was the constitutional amendment
that did not require, however, an extraordinary majority to pay for
what we buy, unlike spending.
The gentleman from Illinois rose and said that he was elected and he
thought the American public had responded to a fundamental issue that
this body had been fiscally irresponsible. I believe that many voters
have been misled to come to that conclusion, and I think it is a
fundamental misunderstanding of the facts of the last 14 years in
which, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania pointed out, we quadrupled
the national debt.
We did so because the President of the United States wanted to buy
his priorities, and the Congress of the United States wanted to buy its
priorities. And neither the President nor the Congress made choices to
bring within revenues its spending objectives.
The gentleman from Illinois again posited that we were here because
of congressional irresponsibility
and that this rescission bill obviously was a response to that.
It is important for us to remember that for the past 20 years
Presidents have asked for $72 billion in rescissions. This Congress
over the last 20 years has rescinded $92 billion, more than the
Presidents have asked.
So I suggest to the gentleman from Illinois, to the Congress, and to
the American public, in fact this Congress
[[Page H1184]] has been willing to do more than Presidents have asked
in terms of rescissions.
Now, rescissions are just another way of line-item vetoes, but it
does not carry the muscle, which is what the gentleman wants to add.
{time} 1330
But his facts do not support it, or at least the facts do not support
it.
I want to say also to my friend from New York, who is a very good
friend of mine, we agree on much, disagree on some. He wants to move
this bill along quickly. I respectfully suggest to him, this bill is
not a birthday present. My friend from California referenced that. This
is a very fundamental proposition that this Congress is considering.
The minority for the last 40 years in this House is now the majority,
but I suggest to them they have not come to grips with majority rule
because they, for two previous occasions in their rule on tax increases
and on their constitutional amendment, suggest that it ought to be the
minority, not the majority, that controls.
And this is the third time that they have proposed that the majority
should not rule. That is unfortunate, in a country, as the gentleman
from California so eloquently stated, that is the beacon for majorities
throughout this world.
Katherin Drinker Bowen wrote of the miracle in Philadelphia in 1787,
when the Founding Fathers came together and, like us, had differences.
And I am sure that they had great suspicions of what the people might
do. In fact, the U.S. Senate was juxtapositioned to the House of
Representatives to try to leaven what the people's House might do in
fits of passion.
But the fact of the matter is, the Stenholm-Spratt-Wise amendment
responds to the concerns of the American public.
What were they? To some degree the gentleman is right. They believed
that somehow we were out of control in terms of pork barrel projects.
In fact, pork barrel projects are a relatively small portion of the
budget, as any fair analysis of the budget will show. But they were
concerned about that.
I remember the Lawrence Welk house, the birthplace of Lawrence Welk.
Somebody had put in $500,000 to rehabilitate that house and set it
aside as a national landmark. Most of us did not know it was in the
bill. The American public found out about it and were outraged. We took
it out.
I suggest to my colleagues, that is the reason that the line-item
veto got a life.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Hoyer was allowed to proceed for 2
additional minutes.)
Mr. HOYER. The American public wanted to say, Mr. President, if you
see some projects in there that are not wise policy or not needed or
inappropriate to be in appropriations bills, then take them out, Mr.
President.
Now, the President of the United States said, ``I don't have that
authority. I would have to veto the entire bill.''
And I think that was a good rationale. That is why I am supporting
Wise-Stenholm-Spratt, because it says a President can, in fact, take
that project out, take that expenditure out and highlight it to the
American public and send it back to the House of Representatives in the
full light of day, in the open so that the American public can look at
each one of us on this floor, 435 of us, and say, I do not believe that
was justified or, yes, it was justified and ask us, again, in an
accelerated way to vote on that item.
I think that accomplishes what the American public wants without, as
the gentleman from California and so many others on this floor have
articulated so well, undermining the very critical balance of power
between the executive and the legislative branches of government.
Since 1789, no other government in the world, no other form of
government in the world has stood as long and as well since that magic
day in 1789, when this form of government was adopted and began.
Let us not in an attempt to respond to that relatively pointed
concern skew the balance between the President and the Congress to
undermine the people's House, the U.S. Senate and, more importantly,
the power of the American people.
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the
requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, in the rush to pass bad legislation, in an attempt to,
so-called, save the budget, again, I want to remind my colleagues that
this House for the past 40 years has spent less money than the
Presidents have asked us to spend. It has been brought to our attention
that things get buried in bills that were never intended to be there.
Well, who wrote the bills? And who is in power now? And who can change
the system?
For the freshmen, it has not happened yet, but later on this year
they will be given the chance to vote on the VA and the HUD
appropriation together. I have a lot of veterans in my district; I
support them. I do not particularly care for the HUD programs, but they
are lumped together. So rather than approaching it and saying, maybe we
should separate the bills and have more than just 13 appropriations
bills, that let us solve the problem, we are saying, no, we are not
smart enough, we are going to give it to the President of the United
States.
Well, let me give my colleagues a for instance, since I am talking to
my Republican colleagues, how would they like the idea of Bill Clinton
on his own deciding whether or not we are going to build any more B-2's
at $1 billion apiece? How would they like President Bill Clinton to
say, I am going to veto the 20 B-2's in this year's defense budget and
that frees up almost $20 billion and if you American people will stick
with me, we will spend it on health care? Do they really think they are
going to find two-thirds of the Members of this body to stand up to the
senior citizens lobby and all the other lobbyists that will be asking
for more health care? Because B-2's are built in one congressional
district. There are folks that need health care in 435.
Aircraft carriers are built in one congressional district. They cost
$4 billion apiece. Do we want to give Bill Clinton the authority to
say, if we just kill the next aircraft carrier, I can expand health
care by $4 billion. Once again, are we going to pit the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Sisisky] against 434 other Congressmen, whose people are
going to say, give us more health care?
What Members are asking this body to do is to give the President of
the United States the authority to dismantle the Defense Department
line by line.
The Stenholm approach makes sense, because it makes sense that if a
majority in this body thinks it makes sense to build an aircraft
carrier, then a majority can put that carrier back in the budget. If a
majority thinks it makes sense to put an amphibious assault ship in the
budget, then we can put it back in.
But I can tell my colleagues right now, if they search their heart of
hearts, they know that there are not two-thirds of the Members of this
body who will stand up to the senior citizens lobby or any other lobby
when it comes down between a defense program and themselves.
And what we have ensured by the passage of this, if we do not include
the Stenholm amendment, is the dismantling of the American military
industrial base and, in turn, the dismantling of the world's greatest
fighting force.
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise].
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
I would just like to say this that this has been a very full debate.
I just want to signal to Members, it is my belief, while we are under
the 5-minute rule and talking with our side, it is my belief that the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spratt], who is one of the
cosponsors of the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm amendment, will be the
concluding speaker, and Members probably should expect to vote within
the next 5 to 10 minutes.
In conclusion, I would also like to say that please remember, I want
to make sure that we focus on the fact that the Wise-Spratt-Stenholm
substitute is a majority rule substitute, not a one-third plus one.
[[Page H1185]] I think that is very significant and needs to be the
point that is remembered.
{time} 1350
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this is a creditable substitute. Three
hundred and forty-two Members of this House said so resoundingly by
voting for it. One hundred and sixty-nine of those who cast their votes
``aye'' were Republicans.
How did this provision, this substitute, attract 342 votes, three-
fourths of the House? First of all, it works, and second, it is
constitutional.
Let me take the second point first. Mr. Chairman, this bill, everyone
will admit, is clearly constitutional. That ought to be an important
consideration for any bill brought to this floor. We certainly cannot
say as much for H.R. 2 as it is presently written.
Last night, Mr. Chairman, the last action we took was to vote on an
amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia, Nathan Deal, which
will provide expedited review by courts of the constitutionality of
this particular legislation. We would not put, and we rarely put such
provisions in legislation, except when we have grave and urgent doubts
about its constitutionality. Therefore, it is tantamount to admitting
that we have abiding doubts about the validity of H.R. 2, its
constitutionality. We know we are pushing the envelope. We are taking
the delegation of powers doctrine to its outer limits in passing this
bill.
Mr. Chairman, we know it, because we do not even know the answers to
these basic questions. We will not until the Supreme Court has spoken.
Therefore, what we have done, all the huffing and puffing, all the
touting we have put into this particular piece of legislation may come
to naught, Mr. Chairman, in the immediate future, because there could
be a constitutional court challenge to it.
It could be enjoined. It will not even by used by this President.
Then it could ultimately be rendered unconstitutional by the court. We
do not know if the President can repeal or undo or disenact a spending
law or a targeted tax benefit.
It was strongly suggested by the Supreme Court that it took an act of
Congress signed by the President to repeal or undo or disenact a law
that we have passed, but we are here saying he can do it without our
intercession.
We know that Congress can delegate broad powers to the Congress, to
the President, to carry out laws that we pass, to enact and execute
policies and purposes that we have laid down legislatively. We know we
can give him broad discretion to carry out the law, but can we give
him, as we purport to do here, the power to cancel out our own purposes
as stated in law?
We know we can tell him that he can execute our purposes and
policies, but can he eradicate them, erase the, simply thwart them? We
do not know the answers to these questions, but we do know this. The
substitute before us is constitutional.
Furthermore, and this is vitally important, it works. It gives the
President all of the powers to comb through spending legislation and
taxing legislation and to cull and clean out things that he disagrees
with, that he thinks are unnecessary, unwise, unwarranted. H.R. 2 does
this, but so does this bill, just as much.
Second, Mr. Chairman, this gives some additional scope to the
President that H.R. 2 does not give him. This substitute goes even
further. For example, it allows the President to take rescissions that
he sends up and assign them to a deficit reduction account, a lockbox.
In the last election, in the last few months of the last session of
Congress, one of the hot and topical issues here was a bill called A to
Z. It had a feature in it called a lockbox. You could make spending
cuts and have those spending cuts assigned to a permanent reduction in
the discretionary spending limit.
For those who supported A to Z, for those who support the concept of
a deficit reduction account, a lockbox account, here is you change to
vote for it. It is in this bill. As Chairman Clinger admitted, it is a
plus for this bill that is not included in H.R. 2.
There is another huge advantage to this amendment, this substitute.
It actually has a scope that is far broader than H.R. 2. That is
because, Mr. Chairman, in H.R. 2 there is a very narrow time window for
the President to act, 10 days.
This bill literally goes backward and forward. It allows the
President to wield the additional item veto authority we are giving
him, or rescission authority we are conferring upon him, at any time
during the fiscal year, backward or forward at any time, and it will be
guaranteed a vote within 10 days in this House and 10 days in the
Senate when he sends it up here. Therefore, this particular substitute
should not be diminished. It is a powerful tool for subjecting or
resubjecting all discretionary spending, all targeted tax benefits, to
public scrutiny.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Spratt] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Spratt was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, this substitute moves cautiously, more
cautiously, constitutionally, than does H.R. 2, I will admit that,
because it leans toward the fundamental concept of our Government,
majority rule over minority rule, but it takes us a long stride forward
without stepping off a cliff and not knowing where we are going to
land.
If we pass this substitute, we can give the President of the United
States significant new powers to cull spending, to cut our targeted tax
benefits, without tilting the balance of powers between the Congress
and the President. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support it for
those reasons.
(Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Wise-Stenholm
substitute, and I associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Stenholm].
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to associate myself with the
remarks of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Stenholm], an author of this
amendment. He has very lucidly analyzed the essential elements of this
proposal.
I take to the floor this afternoon as a former teacher of history and
civics. A constitutionalist, if you will.
We all recognize the genius of the Framers. The Constitution they
crafted has stood the test of time. And the foundation of that genius
has been the separation of powers and the checks and balances of our
three branches of government.
They did not want a king or a dictator or an oligarchy--rule of a few
or the minority--controlling purse strings of this Nation unilaterally.
So they developed a delicate system of checks and balances. A clear
separation of powers. A balance of powers.
I am concerned that H.R. 2 would do serious damage to that balance of
power and the principle of majority rule by granting important new
powers to the President. And with those new powers come tremendous
opportunity for mischief.
The underlying bill here would allow any President, operating in
league with 34 Senators, to strip any provision from a bill.
To my Republican colleagues and at the risk of offending my
Democratic friends. Can you imagine this power in the hands of a crafty
and strong-willed President like Lyndon Johnson?
Mr. Chairman, we are not discussing a genuine line-item veto here
today. If we were, we would be debating an amendment to the U.S.
Constitution--requiring a two-thirds vote of the House and the Senate
and three-quarters of the States. This is a dramatic change, a
potential rewrite of the balance of powers and should be subjected to
that higher standard of deliberation.
I will support the substitute offered by the gentleman from West
Virginia [Mr. Wise]. While not perfect, it will prevent a minority of
either Chamber from imposing its will and is perfectly consistent with
our serious purposes while focusing responsibility, on the record, and
accountability of the public on our spending policies.
The Wise substitute establishes an improved expedited recessions
process that will allow each and every Member of Congress to stand up
and publicly act on spending and taxing decisions. If that Member can
convince 50-percent, plus one, of his or her colleagues of the merit of
that item, the Member wins. If not, the President wins and the item is
stricken.
From a practical point of view, let me say this to my Republican
colleagues. Do we want to give a Democratic President the power to
strike items from spending and tax bills when he can simply round up 34
Democratic votes
[[Page H1186]] in the Senate to prevail? Not that the President would
do this, but what if he decided to strike only Republican priorities
from a defense bill, or a tax bill, or an education bill, or a health
care bill. He could succeed with the assistance of 34 Democratic
Senators.
Also to my Republican colleagues, this line-item veto is virtually
the only proposal in our Contract With America that President Clinton
agrees with. Isn't that a sobering thought? Doesn't that tell you
something sobering about the balance of powers and why Presidents want
that power?
I would add that I am not the only Republican with similar concerns
about this potential shift of power. The Senator from New Mexico, the
chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, Pete Domenici, has expressed
the same misgivings and has offered an amendment similar to the one we
debate at this time. And he's not alone. It was Senator Dan Quayle who
proposed this expedited recession measure a decade ago.
Mr. Chairman, do we actually want to grant the President the power to
thwart the will of this institution, no, of this separate-but-equal
branch of United States Government? I don't think so.
Vote for the Wise substitute.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Wise-
Stenholm-Spratt substitute amendment to H.R. 2. I am voting for this
plan because I believe it represents an improvement to the current
rescissions process, while preserving the balance of powers that our
Founding Fathers so carefully laid out in the Constitution.
The Wise-Stenholm-Spratt amendment requires that questionable
spending items stand alone for an up-or-down vote. Projects would have
to stand on their own merit and port would have no place to hide. If
our goal is truly to eliminate unnecessary spending, I view this as a
fundamental improvement to the way we do business.
Under current law, the President has the authority to request the
rescission of specific line items. It is Congress' part of the process
that is under scrutiny. Once a Presidential rescission is received by
the Congress, we have the option of voting. If nothing is done within
45 days, the rescission dies. The Wise-Stenholm-Spratt substitute would
fix this problem by requiring Congress to vote on Presidential
rescissions within 10 days after their receipt. As a result, the
President's hand would be strengthened to control spending, and
Congress would be held accountable for our spending decisions.
I do want to caution, however, that the line-item veto issue is
somewhat of a red herring. Proponents of a straight line-item veto say
that we need it to eliminate wasteful spending. It sounds great, except
for the fact that it is not true. The fact is that the Congress
rescinds more spending on average than President's request. Indeed,
between the years 1974 and 1995, $73 billion in Presidential
rescissions have been requested, yet $93 billion worth of rescissions
have been passed by the Congress.
Also, there is a fundamental danger in going too far to fix a system
that can be improved, but is not broken. The line-item veto legislation
encompassed in H.R. 2 goes too far. This bill would require a two-
thirds supermajority of Congress to override Presidential line-item
vetoes, thereby abrogating majority rule and investing all power in one
individual, the President. As a legislator, I am not willing to provide
a Democratic or Republican President with power that our Founding
Fathers felt were unnecessary.
The Constitution assigned the power of the purse to the people's
elected representatives in the Congress. Requiring a supermajority to
override Presidential budgetary decisions would be a direct affront to
this fundamental principle. It is not wise public policy to amass such
discretionary power in one official.
Let's keep the power with the people and pass the Wise-Stenholm-
Spratt substitute amendment to H.R. 2.
Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Wise-Stenholm-
Spratt substitute. I voted for this measure last year and it passed the
House by a wide margin. This procedure will achieve the same thing the
line-item veto bill does, but it does so without providing a great
shift in power to the executive branch.
I agree the President should have the authority to strike out
wasteful and unnecessary spending items in one bill or another, but
Congress is still charged with the responsibility of setting spending
priorities and I think we should have the chance to vote on these
proposed veto items. This amendment requires Congress to vote, on the
record, on these proposed cuts. I think that provides a powerful
incentive to prevent Members from putting special projects and other
pork barrel spending items in these bills in the first place, because
they know that the House and Senate could be asked to vote up or down
on those items.
There is some question about whether the base provisions of this
line-item veto bill are constitutional because they shift too much
power to the executive branch. This substitute provides a much more
workable alternative that will be a strong tool in controlling Federal
spending in the future.
I urge support for the Stenholm-Wise-Spratt substitute.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the substitute.
Since the 104th Congress began its work on January 4, we have spent
much of our time considering the impact of Government spending on the
American people. We will likely spend much of the next 2 years doing
the same thing. In repeated polls and town hall meetings, the public
has been very clear that they want to eliminate wasteful spending that
only helps a small segment of the population. The public does not want
to see narrow special interests control Government spending.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that the President should have the
power to rescind wasteful spending. But it's also important that once
the President flags wasteful line-items and targeted tax benefits, that
Congress shares the role of acting on wasteful spending and acting
quickly. Several appropriation bills can reach the President's desk at
the same time. The President should be able to offer a package of
rescissions at anytime and Congress should then act to quickly approve
or disapprove of that package.
The approach offered by this substitute preserves the balance of
power between the executive branch and the legislative branch, and that
is what the public wants. The public wants an efficient government that
moves quickly to eliminate wasteful spending. The public does not want
a single person or one-third of Congress to be able to protect targeted
spending.
I believe it is ironic that at a time when most of the public does
not want Washington controlled by a select few with narrow interests,
and our colleagues from the other side of the aisle keep talking about
spreading power beyond the beltway, that they keep reverting to
procedures within Congress that give enormous power to a minority of
our Members. Let us do something that makes sense. I urge my colleagues
to support the substitute.
Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Wise-
Stenholm-Spratt expedited rescission substitute. There's a valuable
goal in the line-item veto--to eliminate the practice of burying
wasteful spending projects in legislative packages where your only
choice is to vote for the entire bill or nothing at all.
But the line-item veto would also give the President excessive power
to influence every aspect of the legislative agenda and therefore shift
the constitutional balance of power.
Expedited rescission, on the other hand, accomplishes the goal of the
line-item veto without fundamentally changing the separation of powers
designed by our Founding Fathers. If we pass expedited rescission,
everyone in this room is going to have to go on record for or against
pet projects. Pork is pork, and I for one have faith that Congress will
recognize this when voting on specific spending proposals as expedited
rescission would require.
Why should we question the Constitution's wisdom when we can
eliminate pork barrel spending with expedited rescission? I strongly
encourage my colleagues to support the Wise-Stenholm-Spratt substitute.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute offered by the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. Wise].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 167,
noes 246, not voting 21, as follows:
[Roll No 90]
AYES--167
Ackerman
Baldacci
Barcia
Beilenson
Bentsen
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant (TX)
Burton
Cardin
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Conyers
Costello
Cramer
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Doggett
Dooley
Doyle
Durbin
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Flake
Foglietta
Ford
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Holden
Hoyer
Jackson-Lee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (MA)
Kennedy (RI)
Kennelly
Kildee
LaFalce
Lantos
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lincoln
Lipinski
Lofgren
Lowey
Maloney
[[Page H1187]] Manton
Markey
Mascara
Matsui
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Myers
Nadler
Neal
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Peterson (FL)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Rivers
Roemer
Rose
Roukema
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torricelli
Towns
Tucker
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--246
Abercrombie
Allard
Andrews
Archer
Armey
Bachus
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Barr
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Barton
Bass
Bateman
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bono
Brownback
Bryant (TN)
Bunn
Bunning
Burr
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Chabot
Chambliss
Chapman
Chenoweth
Christensen
Chrysler
Clinger
Coble
Coburn
Combest
Condit
Cooley
Cox
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Cremeans
Cubin
Cunningham
Davis
Deal
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Ehrlich
Emerson
English
Ensign
Evans
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Flanagan
Foley
Forbes
Fowler
Fox
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frelinghuysen
Frisa
Funderburk
Gallegly
Ganske
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Graham
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Gutknecht
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Hefley
Heineman
Herger
Hilleary
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Hostettler
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Kleczka
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
LoBiondo
Longley
Lucas
Luther
Manzullo
Martinez
Martini
McCarthy
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McIntosh
McKeon
Meehan
Metcalf
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Minge
Mink
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Murtha
Myrick
Nethercutt
Neumann
Ney
Norwood
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Portman
Pryce
Quillen
Quinn
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Riggs
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Royce
Salmon
Sanford
Saxton
Scarborough
Schaefer
Schiff
Seastrand
Sensenbrenner
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Solomon
Souder
Spence
Stump
Talent
Tate
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Torkildsen
Torres
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Waldholtz
Walker
Walsh
Wamp
Ward
Watt (NC)
Watts (OK)
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
White
Whitfield
Wicker
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--21
Ballenger
Bartlett
Becerra
Brewster
Collins (GA)
Collins (MI)
Danner
de la Garza
DeLay
Deutsch
Fields (TX)
Gibbons
Istook
Johnston
Kelly
Largent
Moakley
Sisisky
Stockman
Waters
Waxman
{time} 1404
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Moakley for, with Mr. Deutsch against.
Mr. Becerra for, with Mr. Largent against.
Mr. Gibbons for, with Ms. Waters against.
Mr. Johnston for, with Miss Collins of Michigan against.
Mr. WARD changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Ms. KAPTUR and Mr. STEARNS changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, it was necessary for me to undergo
important dental surgery today and, in doing so, I missed two recorded
votes on amendments to H.R. 2, the Line Item Veto Act.
Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on the Wise amendment.
In addition, had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on the
Spratt amendment.
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to speak out of order.)
legislative program
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I ask to proceed out of order for the
purpose of inquiring about the schedule for next week and the rest of
the day.
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. Perhaps, Mr. Majority Leader, I could first ask about
the schedule for the rest of today so Members will know when we are
probably going to be leaving.
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. ARMEY. We have one or possibly two more amendments we expect to
be able to complete today. We are going to try to do that.
In any event, the Members should be advised that we will rise at 3
o'clock today, and hopefully with those amendments completed.
Mr. GEPHARDT. As I understand it, there is an Obey amendment and an
Orton amendment that are likely to come next. Would these two gentleman
be assured that if we do not finish their amendment by 3 o'clock that
we could finish it when we come back on Monday?
Mr. ARMEY. They would, absolutely.
Mr. GEPHARDT. I thank the gentleman. Perhaps I could inquire about
next week's schedule.
Mr. ARMEY. Again, if the gentleman will yield, let me first announce
the meeting times for the House next week.
On Monday the House will meet at 12:30 for morning hour. Legislative
business will begin at 2 o'clock and votes will occur immediately.
Let me also further advise all of the Members that they should expect
that every Monday for the remainder of February we would keep to this
schedule of 12:30 for morning hour and legislative business convening
at 2 o'clock and votes likely to occur immediately, except for
Presidents Day.
On Tuesday the House will meet at 10:30 for morning hour. Legislative
business will begin at 12 o'clock.
On Wednesday the House will meet at 11 o'clock. On Thursday and
Friday the House will meet at 10 o'clock.
On Monday we will return to complete consideration of H.R. 2, the
line-item veto.
On Tuesday, subject to a rule, we will take up consideration of H.R.
665, the Victim Restitution Act. Depending upon how that legislation
proceeds, we will also consider H.R. 666, the Exclusionary Rule Reform
Act, subject again to a rule.
On Wednesday and the balance of the week we will, again, subject to
rules being granted, consider H.R. 668, the Criminal Alien Deportation
Act, and H.R. 667, the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act.
Again, we would expect to be able to keep our 3 o'clock departure
time for the following Friday.
Mr. GEPHARDT. There are two questions or concerns that are being
expressed by a lot of Members on this side. The first is by Members on
the west coast who have been afforded the opportunity in the past to
get here by 5 o'clock on Monday, and if the gentleman is saying we are
going to be starting at 2 o'clock on every Monday in February, this
really is a difficulty for many of them on being able to get here. I
was wondering if perhaps we could plan to work later on Monday to
accommodate their schedules?
Mr. ARMEY. I appreciate that observation and there is no doubt the
concerns for the west coast Members have been taken into consideration.
Nevertheless, we do have a big change and a heavy schedule. Hard work
is required and, in our judgment, it is necessary to begin at 2 o'clock
on Mondays whenever possible through February to complete that work.
The only solace I can offer is that the contract period is for a
finite period of time, 100 days. When the 100 days is passed, certainly
we would be able to give much more consideration to the west coast
commuters.
[[Page H1188]]
{time} 1410
Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman
yielding.
I simply wanted to say it is not really a question of hard work. I
think the Members want to be able to spend some of their time working
hard in their districts. There are many of us who are going to have to
leave and really give up our Sunday efforts in the district, and I know
that will not necessarily be the impact on many of our colleagues.
So I wanted to see whether or not we could continue the practice that
got us to this point which we felt was fair and equitable to the people
west of the Rockies.
Mr. ARMEY. Well, I appreciate the gentleman's point. The fact of the
matter is we have many Members who wish to talk on each and every
amendment. We want to afford every opportunity for that. That takes a
lot of time. Still, nevertheless, we have a clear timetable. Committees
have worked very hard. You ask the members of the committees to get
their work out of committee in time, so it can make the queue line for
the floor schedule, and when we have bills on the floor, we really must
move those bills off so we can make room for the next bill.
Perhaps if we could find ways for some of us who have so many very
important things to say on each and every one of these amendments to
say it less often or more quickly we can compress the time requirements
and get on.
Mr. FAZIO of California. I think the issue here is that when people
feel the need to talk, and I am sure that there will be occasions when
all of us in both parties will feel that need, one group of people is
paying the price. One group, those of both parties who have the
furthest to come, are going to be the ones to pay the price.
I am saying the gentleman is perhaps, from his partisan standpoint,
correct. But why do we burden one group of Members because of the
propensity of others of both parties from all across the country to
speak at some length?
Mr. ARMEY. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield.
Mr. ARMEY. Let me first admire the deftness of the gentleman from
California in translating a discussion about geography to one of
partisan politics. You are to be admired for your deftness.
Let me acknowledge we all are aware, of course, there are no big
talkers from the west coast. So if perhaps we can get some of our east
coast talkers to be as respectful of time concerns of the Members as
the west coast talkers are, but the fact is we do have a big
legislative agenda. We do have a queuing order for each of the
committees.
Each of the committees must be considered, and that means we must
move the work off the floor.
Mr. FAZIO of California. What the gentleman is saying, I gather, is
that we have a 100-day schedule. We have to meet it. And those people
who are sacrificed simply have to live with it. Is that correct?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I would like to ask the majority leader another
question. There is also a concern on this side, and I assume by many on
your side, about the issue of predictability of schedule at night. I
know that Members on both sides are sincere about making this a family-
friendly Congress, and we have a bipartisan group that is meeting to
try to see if we can reach solutions in that area.
A couple of times in the last 2 weeks we have thought that we were
going to leave by a certain time in the evening, and then it ran well
past that. I realize you are trying to get a schedule completed.
But do you believe that it might be useful to perhaps reconvene the
family-friendly task force with you and myself to see if we can find
some solutions to this? Members tell their families they are going to
be home by a certain time, are able to meet them at a certain time, and
they are not able to do that, and it is causing a good deal of
difficulty.
Mr. ARMEY. If the gentleman will yield, I think the gentleman from
Missouri makes an extremely important point, and I can tell you I would
be more than happy for the two of us to get together with some of the
people from that task force to see if we can encourage circumstances
that will allow us to all get home to our families earlier in the
evening.
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Roybal-
Allard].
Ms. ROYBAL-ALLARD. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The question I
have is, understanding the necessity and the urgency to get the work
done, would it be possible to have the work continue from 2 o'clock on,
but to wait until at least 5 o'clock and bunch the votes so that those
of us who are on the west coast can at least be here for the votes?
Mr. ARMEY. The gentlewoman makes a very reasonable request.
Unfortunately, within the context of the rules, you cannot, as it were,
roll the votes when you are in the Committee of the Whole, so if we are
going to meet and work in the Committee of the Whole, we must be
prepared to vote immediately.
Mr. GEPHARDT. It is my understanding that we might entertain an idea
of that kind in future rules, and if we are trying to avoid 2 o'clock
startups for the rest of February, we would certainly be willing to do
that. We could also do it by unanimous consent on Monday, and I do not
know whether we could achieve that, but it would be worth a try, and we
would offer to try to do that.
Mr. ARMEY. The gentleman is very generous and very respectful of all
the rights of all the Members, and I would be happy to sit down and see
what we can work out.
Mr. GEPHARDT. I would say to the gentleman we could offer such
unanimous-consent requests later today before we finish at 3 o'clock,
and I will try to work with the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon]
and the majority leader in that regard.
Mr. ARMEY. If the gentleman will yield, I appreciate again the
generosity of the gentleman from Missouri. The distinguished chairman
of the Committee on Rules just tells me that at this point in this
context that is not a workable alternative, and we will have to stay
with the schedule.
Mr. GEPHARDT. I will be happy to talk further with the gentleman.
I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I certainly support the majority leader's view
that we have got a tough work schedule. But many of us have families
back in our districts. I just checked with the Parliamentarian, and I
have been informed that, by unanimous consent, even when the Committee
of the Whole is sitting in this House, you can roll the votes until a
later time, and so while we may not be able to do that on Monday, I
wish that the majority leader would take that into consideration for
those of us that have families back in the districts that we have not
seen for a long time, if we could get back a few hours later, it would
help us.
So I would just say that if there were unanimous consent, for
instance, on a Monday, maybe not this next Monday, but on a Monday, we
could roll the votes until 5 o'clock, and then we could still conduct
the business in the Committee of the Whole.
Mr. GEPHARDT. The last question has to do with the corrections. I
have read a report that there would be a corrections day, and I would
just like to ask under what process would this legislation be
considered, and would there be hearings and markups prior to floor
consideration of these ideas?
Mr. ARMEY. If the gentleman would yield, corrections day is an
innovation that is being discussed by the Speaker. We are not at this
point ready to announce such an innovation in the calendar, and we
would certainly, as we develop the notion into a new innovation in the
calendar, we would welcome every opportunity to work with the minority
in terms of defining the best parliamentary procedures for a new
innovation like corrections day. So I think this is really something
that we can be excited about, but we are not at the point yet where any
announcement is ready to be made.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
If I might direct a question at the majority leader, two questions,
relative to the crime bill next week or the
[[Page H1189]] crime bills. The gentleman mentioned the first four
bills, but he did not mention 729, the Effective Death Penalty Act, or
I believe it is H.R. 728, the Block Grants Act. Is it the intention of
the majority to bring those up the following week? They would not be on
the floor this next week? Is that correct?
Mr. ARMEY. If the gentleman will yield further, let me say to my
friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer], yes, you are exactly
right. That is our intention.
Mr. SCHUMER. The second question, if I might, if the gentleman from
Missouri would continue to yield to me, will the crime bill be
considered under an open and unrestricted rule? I understand the
chairman of the Committee on Rules, my good friend from New York, Mr.
Solomon, made an announcement regarding the rules this morning, but I
believe it would be useful to clarify the majority's intention for the
Members.
As you know, the crime bills have been divided. One crime bill was
divided into six, which limits the amount of amendments, and we were
told by the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
Hyde], and the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Florida
[Mr. McCollum], that it was the intention of the majority, and this is
while we marked up the bills in committee, to bring those six bills
under an open rule, that anything that was germane to the relatively
narrow scope of each of those six bills would be available.
{time} 1420
I would appreciate an answer, either from the chairman of the
Committee on Rules or the majority leader.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SOLOMON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, let me just say that it is the intention of the Rules
Committee to be as open and as fair and as accountable as we possibly
can. We have every intention of proceeding with open rules. There could
come a time when on the fifth and sixth bills in the crime package, at
which time we might have to, because of time constraints we might have
to limit the time of debate. That would not mean we would veer away
from the 5-minute rule. It means that any amendment would be in order.
If I could just briefly, for instance, if we were going to take up H.R.
729, the effective death penalty bill, it would be 1 hour on the rule,
1 hour general debate and perhaps 6 hours of amendments, 4 hours of
walking time. That is about 12 hours on that bill.
Mr. SCHUMER. If it is on all six bills, the majority's intention, the
Rules Committee intends to allow all amendments to be offered that are
germane to each of those bills, is that correct?
Mr. SOLOMON. Within that timeframe, the gentleman is correct.
Mr. SCHUMER. The question I have is what does ``within that
timeframe'' mean? Does it mean that after a certain point of time we
cannot offer any amendments at all? Does it mean we would be able to
offer those amendments and not debate them? Or does it mean that we
could offer those amendments and have a limited amount of time to
debate them? And then do the House's business and see where the votes
are that way?
Mr. SOLOMON. If the gentleman would yield further, that decision has
not been made. But if we were going to limit the time for consideration
of amendments, we also have a priority, prefiling offer to you, and I
would suggest to the gentleman if you have significant amendments that
you ought to prefile those amendments. Within the 6 hours or whatever
time we arrive at, you certainly would have ample opportunity to debate
those amendments, absolutely.
Mr. SCHUMER. If the gentleman will continue to yield, what are those
prefling requirements? That is the question I would have.
Mr. SOLOMON. There are no prefiling requirements at all. It is not a
requirement.
It might include a provision giving priority and recognition to
Members who prefile their amendments. You do not have to come and
testify, you do not have to prefile.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that the chairman of the Rules
Committee, he said the first four bills would not be restricted and the
last two might. I believe that the sixth bill, the one that would redo
the program and do the block grants is in fact one of the most
important and in fact took the longest time in the Judiciary Committee.
So I would hope that they would not be subjected to that kind of
restriction simply, because it would not make sense just because that
is the number in which they were ordered to take a more important bill
and restrict it more just because it comes later rather than earlier
on.
Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. SCHUMER. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, the first three bills, two of the three are completely
noncontroversial, the third has very little controversy to it. The
whole meat of the thrust of the crime bill we are debating is the
fourth, fifth, and sixth bills. So I would ask the Rules Committee and
the majority to do whatever they can to make those as open as possible.
To only allow 6 hours of debate on the final bill, H.R. 728, which took
up more time in committee to debate than the first four put together,
would not be fair at all.
I would ask, given the commitments in the contract and everywhere
else, that the rules be as open as possible. The Senate, as I
understand it, and the gentleman can check me if I am wrong, the Senate
is not going to get these bills for a month or two. We were told we
would have this week and next week to finish the six bills, and I do
not see why such a limitation as the gentleman is proposing would be
necessary.
Mr. SOLOMON. I would just say to the gentleman that we would be more
open and more fair than we have ever been when a crime package has been
brought to this floor, and you can count on that.
Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. VOLKMER. I thank the leader for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I inquire of the gentleman from New York, with whom we
visited on this issue before, it was my understanding from the
gentleman of New York--and you correct me if I am wrong--that on three
bills, the bill on the block grant, on what we have passed, called the
prevention programs, on the prison construction bill, and then on the
habeas corpus bill, those three bills that the gentleman from New
York--I cannot remember the exact words, and you correct me if I am
wrong--this morning said that on those we do in one day. In other
words, you would have a rule, discussion, debate, and then amendments.
And when the time came to end on that day on that bill, that any
amendments pending thereafter would no longer be in order. Is that
correct?
Mr. SOLOMON. Over about a 12-hour period.
Mr. VOLKMER. Over whatever period. So that is basically a closed
rule. It is; gentleman, it is a closed rule, gentleman. And you are
telling people that even if you have an amendment in the Record by that
time, if we would take 3 hours on a substitute and 4 hours on several
amendments and there are other Members who have amendments that they
feel are just as important as the other ones, you are saying that when
the time runs out you do not get to offer your amendment, ``I don't
care who you are, I don't care how strongly you feel on your idea, you
are not going to get to express your viewpoint.'' That is what I want
you to think about.
Mr. SOLOMON. We will be glad to take the views of the gentleman into
consideration. I have been pleading on this floor all day to expedite
this bill. We want to make sure that we are going to be able to finish
these six crime bills because of the time constraints.
[[Page H1190]] Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. WOLF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I was in my office and heard the debate, and I ran
over. As somebody who was asked by Mr. Gingrich to be head of the
Family Friendly Caucus, let me just make a coupe of comments and
observations.
One, I would hope that the votes would be rolled. To ask somebody
from California to come in by 2, I live here and I do not have to fly.
I am a half-hour from home. Frankly, I am tired. I just think that
somehow we all know the ways of working these rules. There ought not be
votes until 5 o'clock. No one should have to leave their family.
Second, if I may say two more things, second, we need--and I would
ask Mr. Armey when we are finished and Mr. Gephardt--I heard your
exchange about meeting on. Monday, I ask to determine a set hour, so
that at a certain hour, whether it be midnight you told you wife or
your kids or whether it be 7 o'clock, there are certain and set hours.
Third, speaking from this side, perhaps we cannot have open rules.
Perhaps what we need are fair rules, whereby we give the leadership
whatever amendments they see fit but it cannot continue to go on.
Because one Member the other night said to me, and I am not going to
say who, ``I thought you said we were going to have a family friendly
Congress.'' Then when I got back to my office, that Member was getting
up and objecting and tying the place up.
I cannot make this a family friendly Congress, but we can, all work
together, make it a family friendly Congress.
So we do not want to manipulate the rules. I think if we can develop
a better spirit we can do it. First, no votes before 5, second, let us
get a set time; or third, frankly, we are probably going to have to do
away with the open rules and have rules, what I would call fair rules,
so that we can then have set times. I hope we can do it.
Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, and this would
be the last statement: I want to commend the gentleman from Virginia
[Mr. Wolf]. When I was majority leader, he talked to me a lot about his
concerns, which are sincere, about family life, personal life in this
institution. I want to work, and I believe our Members want to work,
with your Members, Mr. Majority Leader, to see if we can do that.
Obviously, we have had some bad experiences early here with a lot of
amendments, and we are going to go through a shakedown period here. But
I think the minority is sincere in wanting to find an accommodation
with regard to the kind of amendments, the time limits on amendments,
so that we can make a more predictable schedule.
Before we leave today, I would like to sit down with the majority
leader and chairman of the Committee on Rules and see if we can find a
way as a start to begin our meeting on Monday at 5 o'clock and roll
vote. I will talk to them in a moment.
Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I will.
Mr. ARMEY. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I point out to the chair it has taken us over 15
minutes to announce the schedule. That I suppose as much as anything
else validates the need for the kind of schedule that I announced.
I want to thank the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Gephardt] for his
kind offer, and certainly we will try to find a way to work around
that.
As the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] said, with a bit of
cooperation from all of us we can all have a more family friendly life.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEPHARDT. I yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I am all for--if you want to complain about how far you
have to go--I am leaving tonight. I will have to stay overnight in Los
Angeles, get home tomorrow; leave Sunday night. I do not mind.
{time} 1430
We are doing the business of Congress here.
Now the Constitution of the United States is being messed with here.
I say to my colleagues, ``Now you want to be family friendly? I'm all
for family friendly, but don't anybody come and tell this Member that
in the name of family friendly that we are not going to do our business
in a proper fashion. Every Member here is entitled and obligated to
take his or her concerns to this floor under the rules, and I don't
want to see 1 second of one Member's obligation and duty compromised in
any way, shape, or form.''
Is this the 100-day rule, which is not in this Constitution, but in
the contract that they signed and I did not sign? I say to my
colleagues, ``If it takes a thousand days, 10,000 days, that's what it
takes to protect the Constitution of the United States, and that's what
we take.''
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last
word.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to engage in a colloquy with the gentleman
from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
Mr. Chairman, I noted that the majority leader said that we were
going to take up some amendments and that, regardless of where we were,
we are going to be out of here, we are going to rise, at 3 o'clock. My
concern is that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] may not have
sufficient time to offer his amendment with the proper responses, so I
want to ask Mr. Obey if he feels he can offer his amendment along with
the time that it will take to get a vote on that and be finished at 3
o'clock or if he feels his time would be compromised and the quality of
his debate would be compromised by doing so.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I cannot tell how much time it is going to
take. I do feel a requirement to explain why I am doing this because so
many Members have been asking me that. But it really is not up to me to
determine how much time it is going to take. I just do not know.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, if it would be helpful, I would like the
gentleman to know that we have examined the gentleman's amendment, and
if it would assist the gentleman from Wisconsin in determining how much
time might be involved in consideration of his amendment, I would
inform the gentleman that we think it is an excellent addition to what
we are trying to do here, which is to get at those elements of pork,
wherever they may exist and wherever they exist every year.
Mr. Chairman, we will support the amendment that will be offered by
the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I only intend to take about 4 minutes to
explain my amendment, and I do not know of anybody else who wants to
speak.
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. OBEY
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment. It is No. 15.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Obey: At the end of section 2, add
the following new subsection:
(d) Special Rule for FY 1995 Appropriation Measures.--
Notwithstanding subsection (a)(2), in the case of any
unobligated discretionary budget authority provided by any
appropriation Act for fiscal year 1995, the President may
rescind all or part of that discretionary budget authority
under the terms of this Act if the President notifies the
Congress of such rescission by a special message not later
than ten calendar days (not including Sundays) after the date
of enactment of this Act.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, as Members know, what I am doing is trying to
ensure that, if we are going to pass this misguided proposal, that at
least we will be able to give the President the ability to reach any
and all projects in the 13 appropriation bills which passed last year.
I have in my hand a packet tagged by subcommittee which is entitled
``Questionable Fiscal '95 Projects by Subcommittee,'' and I know that a
number
[[Page H1191]] of Members do not like the fact that this is being
offered. But I am offering it because I basically believe this bill is
flawed.
First of all, I think it is based on the assumption that the Congress
spends more than the President, and in fact history will show that in
this last decade we have spent considerably less than the President has
asked for. When you take a look at specific Presidential requests for
rescissions, since 1974, Mr. Chairman, Presidents have asked this
Congress to rescind $73 billion in appropriations. This Congress has
actually rescinded $93 billion in appropriations, 27 percent more than
the President asked us to cut. Those are not my numbers. Those are the
General Accounting Office's numbers.
We rescinded double the amount of spending that President Bush wanted
us to rescind, and to date we have rescinded 33 percent more in
spending than President Clinton has asked us to.
So, I think that record should be cleared up, and, as the ranking
Democrat on the Committee on Appropriations, I feel an obligation to do
so.
I say to my colleagues, I think, if you really want to get at
spending, for instance, you will consider the Orton amendment, which
comes next, which if it is not adopted will leave a huge loophole in
the item veto process because it will apply only to appropriations and
not contract authority, something which I think would be a national
joke.
But I am also offering this for a second reason, because I simply
believe it is fundamentally wrong for us to be making decisions based
upon what one-third plus one in this place thinks ought to be public
policy. I believe that this vehicle, as it stands now, is a disgraceful
and gutless granting of gigantic Executive power by this institution,
and I am ashamed, I am ashamed to see that kind of willing power
transfer. Because I think this institution's primary responsibility
under the Constitution is to protect the American people from the
excessive abuse of Executive power. And in my view, as it stands now,
this proposal invites the President to use his powers that are being
granted under this proposal to greatly expand his ability to leverage
additional spending into each and every bill that goes through this
place.
Mr. Chairman, I will explain more when we debate the amendment to be
offered by Mr. Stenholm on Monday what I mean by that.
But if, nonetheless, this institution is hell bent on that kind of a
reckless transfer of power, then I think we ought to make it apply to
every single project which right now Members of this body and Members
of the other body think are safely beyond the reach of Presidential
veto, and that is why I am offering this, so that the President will
have a 10-day window after the passage of this misguided proposal
during which he can examine each and every tidbit in every
appropriation bill last year.
{time} 1440
Now, I think we did a good job on the Committee on Appropriations
last year. We eliminated some 40 programs. We cut 408 programs below
the previous year's spending level. And the earmarks that were provided
were substantially reduced below the level of the previous year.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] has
expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Obey was allowed to proceed for 1
additional minute.)
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me nonetheless that the record
obviously is not perfect. We had to accept many ``suggestions'' from
the other body, for instance. So I think if this is going to go into
effect, Members ought not to be allowed to assume that their own
specific projects are beyond presidential reach. We ought to know in
concrete terms just what is at risk.
So I offer this amendment in that spirit and would hope that it would
be accepted and adopted by this House.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support to the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, as I indicated before the gentleman offered his
amendment, we have examined the amendment and want to commend the
gentleman, frankly, on his willingness to open up his own
appropriations bills for this line-item veto, appropriations bills
which were dealt with last year.
I think when the former chairman of the committee recognizes the need
of a line-item veto and admits the benefits it provides in eliminating
unnecessary spending, we should take note and thank him for his very
good work in this regard.
I think I would ask the gentleman, if he has indicated he knows where
the bodies are buried and where the skeletons are, that we would have
that list as promptly as possible and perhaps we could rescind or
eliminate that spending and save the President the need to exercise the
line-item veto.
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CLINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. OBEY. I think all you have to do is take a look at every
appropriations report, because they are fairly well spelled out. I am
not suggesting that most of them are bad items. I think the vast
majority of them are infinitely defensible and, in fact, in the
national interest. But I just want Members to have very specific and
concrete understandings beforehand of the kind of power the President
is going to have.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time.
As I say, Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to accept the amendment, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, is it the Chair's understanding that a
ruling was arrived at or an understanding was arrived at with respect
to the votes on Monday and the 2 o'clock versus 5 o'clock time? Because
that is not clear to me.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole is not in a
position to rule on that question.
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry. How
might I go about making that inquiry? My understanding is that issue
was not settled.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman should inquire of the leadership who
makes those decisions.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having assumed the
chair, Mr. Boehner, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 2) to give the President item veto
authority over appropriation acts and targeted tax benefits in revenue
acts, had come to no resolution thereon.
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