[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 22 (Friday, February 3, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E274]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


          WHY WE SHOULD NOT LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO UNILATERALLY

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, February 3, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, on January 11, 1995 three high-level 
administration officials briefed the Congress on the situation in 
Bosnia. Attention was focussed on the impact that unilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo would have on the ground in Bosnia and on our 
relations with our NATO allies, as well as the implications of such 
action for United States military involvement in the conflict.
  Lt. Gen. Wesley Clark, director for strategic plans and policy, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, on this occasion provided a detailed and forceful 
analysis of the probable sequence of events and the dangerous 
consequences for Bosnia and the United States that would result from 
lifting the arms embargo unilaterally: the war will intensify; U.N. 
peacekeepers will leave; United States Armed Forces will be drawn 
directly into the ground war and a deep rift will develop with our NATO 
allies.
  General Clark's remarks at this closed briefing have just been 
declassified. I am inserting them into the Record at this time so my 
colleagues who did not have the opportunity to hear General Clark will 
now have an authoritative analysis of the why the United States should 
not lift the arms embargo unilaterally.
      Congressional Testimony LTG Clark's Remarks, 11 January 1995

       Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that we welcome the 
     opportunity to update you on the current situation on the 
     ground in Bosnia, current operations, options for alleviation 
     the situation, the status of ongoing planning for UNPROFOR 
     withdrawal, and efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR.
       The situation on the ground has stabilized since the 
     signing of the cease fire on 31 December. The heavy fighting 
     has subsided and the skirmish lines have remained steady 
     since the agreement went into force. Sporadic small arms fire 
     remains a threat, however there is an overall improvement in 
     the conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
        [[Page E273]] From the military perspective, I would like 
     to first assure you that we are continuing with a number of 
     ongoing operations in the Balkans including:
       TF Provide Promise (Humanitarian initiative).
       Deny Flight (No Fly Zone Enforcement).
       Sharp Guard (Sanctions Enforcement).
       Able Sentry (Stabilizing Force).
       We have no units on the ground in Bosnia-Hercegovina, but 
     do have 15 personnel in Sarajevo on the UNPROFOR staff. We 
     are also responsible for funding a proportion, 31 percent, of 
     all costs associated with UNPROFOR--this amounted to $271 
     million in Fiscal Year 94.
       I would like to open the discussion of lifting the arms 
     embargo by stating briefly that the Joint Staff has studied 
     the impact of unilaterally lifting the arms embargo, and 
     while I do not intend on going through the full briefing, I 
     would like to cite some of the key findings that may prove 
     relevant today.
       The concept underlying a unilateral lifting of the arms 
     embargo would be to improve the ability of the Federation 
     Armed Forces to counter the strengths of the Bosnian Serb 
     Army. Our analysis indicates that, if the US lifts 
     unilaterally, this is an extremely unlikely outcome. Rather, 
     if the arms embargo is unilaterally lifted, we believe that 
     violence and humanitarian suffering in the region will 
     increase.
       Let me run through what we believe will happen if the US 
     determines unilaterally to lift the arms embargo.
       (1) The Congressional vote would have immediate adverse 
     repercussion among our allies in NATO, most of whom warned us 
     strongly about the risks to their soldiers and the adverse 
     international consequences should the arms embargo be 
     unilaterally lifted.
       (2) Following a Congressional vote, the President would 
     issue a determination that would direct that the embargo be 
     unilaterally lifted despite United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 713. Additionally, restrictions on the issuance of 
     munitions export licenses to Bosnia would be lifted, and the 
     US Government policy to utilize authorities under the Arms 
     Export and Control Act and Foreign Assistance Act would be 
     changed to allow transfer and sale of arms to Bosnia.
       (3) Contributing nations would immediately decide to 
     withdraw their forces before the escalation of violence. We 
     have been assured privately and publicly that they will 
     leave. NATO forces and equipment will immediately begin 
     staging for withdrawal operations. Within weeks of the vote 
     to unilaterally lift the arms embargo and hopefully, before 
     the lift is implemented, the withdrawal operation would 
     commence. The United States has decided in principle to 
     participate in the withdrawal, as described by Mr. Slocombe. 
     Under the best circumstances, there will be little organized 
     threat to the withdrawn UNPROFOR forces or the NATO force, 
     however there would be sniping and intermittent harassment 
     impeding the withdrawal. The withdrawal will take 2 to 4 
     months to accomplish.
       (4) Humanitarian support would fall off. NGO/PVOs also 
     would begin withdrawing as tensions rise and fighting 
     increases. Some of the 248 NGOs/PVOs in country would need to 
     be extracted using the NATO force, lengthening the overall 
     withdrawal process, and further depriving the populace of 
     humanitarian support.
       (5) Bosnian Serb Forces would likely begin an offensive. In 
     a coordinated effort, at some point during or immediately 
     after the withdrawal, we anticipate that Serb forces will 
     attack to split Bosnia, overrun eastern enclaves, and deprive 
     Bosnia of military options. The lifting of the arms embargo 
     has sent a signal to the Serbs that their strength relative 
     to the Bosniaks will only decrease as arms begin to flow to 
     their adversary. They must attack or see their hopes for a 
     greater Serbia vanish. Fighting will escalate. The 
     humanitarian efforts will all but stop as Serbs interdict 
     both governmental and nongovernmental relief organizations at 
     will.
       (6) Bosniak offensive action would also ensue--fighting 
     designed to protect their people, their existing territory, 
     and enhance their credibility as a military. We believe that 
     despite the Bosniaks superiority in manpower and notable 
     ongoing efforts to build up their forces, the outcome would 
     likely follow the outlines of the battles around Bihac * * * 
     some initial Bosniak gains followed by Serb counterattacks to 
     cut off and isolate Bosniak forces.
       (7) Additional arms would begin to flow into Croatia bound 
     for Bosnia.
       (8) Meanwhile, Bosnia would likely appeal for US 
     assistance--unable to defeat Serb heavy weapons, hindered in 
     fighting effectively by trying to absorb the new weapons and 
     build a modern fighting force * * * there will be charges and 
     counter-charges
      of outside intervention * * * and more urgent appeals to 
     Islamic nations.
       (9) If the battlefield situation were to evolve in this 
     manner, the US would confront a profound dilemma * * * stand 
     aside, or intervene. The arguments for direct US military 
     intervention would be strong.
       That the purpose of lifting was to give the Bosniaks the 
     means to defend themselves * * * we cannot allow their defeat 
     and slaughter.
       That US airpower can make a crucial difference * * * and 
     must be applied quickly to forestall a need for US 
     intervention on the ground.
       That others are already helping the other side.
       Of course, there would also be cogent arguments for not 
     intervening:
       That US intervention--even from the air alone will 
     substantially raise the risks of widening the war.
       That there are very real limits on what airpower can 
     accomplish in that terrain * * * if it does not intimidate 
     the Serbs, it may not be able to physically prevent them from 
     seizing the eastern enclaves or other actions.
       That the US determination to unilaterally intervene in the 
     war will further isolate us from our NATO allies.
       That by military intervention, we will further Americanize 
     the conflict.
       (10) While we were debating, regional tensions would 
     continue to rise. The threat of the Serbs would cause all 
     regional parties to lobby for arms for self protection and to 
     take preventive action. The future of the confederation 
     between Bosnia and Croatia would be cast into doubt if the 
     United States does not supply arms to Croatia--and if we do 
     supply weapons, we might raise the probability that the 
     Croats will attempt to regain the Krajina region by force.
       (11) Further widening of the conflict. As the Serbs press 
     the attack, the countries of the region would seek even more 
     intensively to draw in outside support. All parties in the 
     conflict will seek supplies from their benefactors. If the US 
     has lifted unilaterally, it is likely that the Russians or 
     others would begin overt support to Serb forces throughout 
     the region. There would also be more support for the Bosniaks 
     from Islamic nations, including the most radical, anti-
     Western elements. Even within NATO, there would be strong 
     tensions between nations, and in some cases strong support 
     for opposite sides.
       (12) The conflict may spin out of control. The escalation 
     in fighting and the additional weapons flowing into the 
     region would lead to a widening of the war.
       In sum, these are the long-term implications of 
     unilaterally lifting of the arms embargo:
       (1) There would be an Americanization of the war. Explicit 
     U.S. involvement would likely be required, including both 
     U.S. Close Air Support (CAS) to assist the Bosnians and 
     ground forces for ensuring humanitarian aid flows and for 
     filling the vacuum created by UNPROFOR withdrawal, unless we 
     wish to see the Bosnian state partitioned between Serbia and 
     Croatia.
       (2) Damage to NATO would be extensive and perhaps 
     irreparable. There would be a significant impact on our 
     alliance relationships that would impair our cooperation 
     within NATO and undermine 45 years of alliance cooperation. 
     Loss of access to key NATO basing, infrastructure, or 
     overflights is a virtual certainty. NATO relevance will be 
     thrown into doubt the very time we are seeking to establish 
     NATO as the central foundation for a new European security 
     architecture.
       (3) Unilateral lift would also have a detrimental impact on 
     our national credibility both within our alliance and at the 
     United Nations. The long-term impact of our non-compliance 
     with a United Nations Security Council Resolution would call 
     into question our reliability, motives and ability to 
     exercise global leadership. Other sanctions efforts, such as 
     Iraq and Libya, would be weakened as well.
       (4) A dangerous East-West confrontation becomes a real 
     possibility, as does a geographic widening of the war.
       (5) Finally, unilateral lift is unlikely to provide any 
     reasonable solution to the problem on the ground in Bosnia.
       The focus of the scenario that I have developed applies 
     primarily to a unilateral lift of the arms embargo. If this 
     were to be a multilateral effort, many of these problems 
     would be obviated.
       In the event that the embargo is lifted or that the 
     UNPROFOR mission is determined no longer to be viable, 
     UNPROFOR will have to withdraw. NATO has already made the 
     determination to support this effort. As a result, NATO 
     planning to support UNPROFOR withdrawal is ongoing.
       Planning for withdrawal of UNPROFOR began in July, when it 
     was recognized that UNPROFOR would be unable to execute such 
     a complex and difficult operation without substantial 
     assistance from NATO. The current status is that a NATO 
     concept plan was presented to the Military Committee in 
     Brussels and sent back to SACEUR for detailed planning. The 
     detailed plans have been completed in draft by Allied Command 
     Europe and briefed to SACEUR.
       The essence of the plans, as we understand them, is to 
     provide additional combat brigades, with supporting elements 
     to assist UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Some portion of the force 
     will, in all likelihood, need to be stationed in Bosnia prior 
     to the commencement of the withdrawal. The operation would be 
     conducted under NATO control, with appropriate rules of 
     engagement to facilitate force protection as well as mission 
     accomplishment.
       As previously stated, the President has expressed our 
     commitment to participate in such an operation, subject to a 
     detailed review of the plans, and consultation with Congress.
       However, we continue to believe that the option with the 
     greatest chance of long-term success is to encourage UNPROFOR 
     to remain in Bosnia-Hercegovina until a negotiated settlement 
     can be reached. To this end, an information meeting of Chiefs 
     of Defense from the NATO nations, the Russian 
     [[Page E274]] Federation, NATO staff, UN Secretariat and the 
     Commander of UNPROFOR was held in The Hague from 19-20 
     December in which participants formulated a number of 
     military recommendations to enhance UNPROFOR's effectiveness.
       The results of the meeting were unanimous. There was ``a 
     unified resolve to continue UNPROFOR's mission in order to 
     help alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in 
     conflicts areas of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the 
     meeting recognized the important role UNPROFOR is playing in 
     creating the conditions favorable to the eventual achievement 
     of a negotiated settlement.''
       The meeting's specific recommendations cover various steps 
     for improving the capabilities, effectiveness and the freedom 
     of movement of UNPROFOR and reducing its vulnerability. These 
     include measures:
       Enhancing the effectiveness and self-defense capabilities 
     of UNPROFOR. Examples include equipment, communications 
     enhancements and the improvement of liaison between UNPROFOR 
     and the warring parties.
       Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo 
     and the enclaves.
       Finally, the meeting reaffirmed the crucial important of 
     maintaining UNPROFOR's impartial mission until a negotiated 
     settlement can be reached.
       At this time, capitals are examining potential national 
     contributions that could be made with an aim towards an 
     improvement in UNPROFOR's effectiveness.
       Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to speak with 
     you today, and I would be happy to entertain your questions 
     at this time.
Vol. 141


WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1995

No. 22


House of Representatives