[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 20 (Wednesday, February 1, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E246-E247]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


  HELSINKI COMMISSION HEARING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

                                 ______


                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, February 1, 1995
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Helsinki 
Commission, which I chair, convened its third hearing to hear from Dr. 
Haris Silajdzic, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992 
and 1993, Dr. Silajdzic testified in his previous position as Foreign 
Minister, describing the horrors taking place in his country and, 
knowing they could have been prevented, urgently asking for help. The 
hearing reviewed the tragic situation that still exists in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as the continued relevance of policy options that 
should have been taken by the international community long ago. Having 
to do that was frustrating to me, and I cannot begin to imagine how it 
must frustrate the Prime Minister.
  We must not, though, accept the unacceptable. That is exactly what 
the Serb militants want us to do. It is clear that the people of 
Bosnia, despite their endurance of a third winter of war, are not 
prepared to abandon the defense of their homes, their families, their 
country. Indeed, Bosnia and Herzegovina seems motivated to defend 
international principles, even if they must do so almost completely 
alone.
  In contrast, much to my dismay, the international community has been 
beaten back by the Serb militants in what has become a game of bluff. 
The Serb militants clearly escalate the violence, because they know we 
are unwilling to escalate in response. Our threats against them lack 
any credibility. Officials directing United Nations and NATO efforts 
have failed not only to stop vicious Serb aggression, but also to 
enforce their own Security Council resolutions. Instead, they have 
resorted to mutual recriminations, twisted explanations, and even 
blaming the victims for their fate.
  Last summer, the so-called Contact Group--comprising the United 
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany--offered the 
Bosnian Government and the Serb militants a plan on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, with a deadline for an unconditional answer and warnings of 
repercussions for any side rejecting it. Sarajevo accepted it, in time 
and without condition. The militants effectively rejected it. As 
sanctions were then eased on Serbia in response, the deadline for 
Bosnian Serb acceptance was extended indefinitely. Earlier this month, 
U.S. officials presented this plan as simply a starting point for 
negotiations, and met with the Bosnian Serb leaders in their 
stronghold, Pale. To my dismay, the Secretary of State concluded that 
the ``Bosnian crisis is about Bosnia, but the NATO alliance is far more 
enduring, far more important than the Bosnian crisis.'' I was amazed 
and appalled.
  Let's keep in mind, Mr. Speaker, that the Secretary's comment refers 
to what is, in fact, a well-documented genocide, and these diplomatic 
gestures were made toward those who orchestrated it. Through all the 
complexities of the Balkans that we must consider, one generic fact 
remains--you reward the aggressor, and you get more aggression. It is 
as simple as that.
  The Helsinki Commission, through the leadership of the previous 
cochairs of the Helsinki Commission, noted that calls for a negotiated 
settlement, however correct, are meaningless if accompanied by an 
artificial neutrality and not by severe repercussions for those who 
operate outside acceptable parameters and seek what they want through 
the use of force. Collective partnerships, however desirable, will 
erode if partners allow one of their own to be carved into ethnic 
pieces.
  Enunciating international principles, however promising, is empty if 
countries abandon them for historical affinities and big-power 
politics. Commemorations of the end of World War II a half century ago, 
however appropriate, ring somewhat hollow when genocidal acts that stir 
memories of the Holocaust are allowed to occur. The world's commitment 
to human 
[[Page E247]] rights, however boldly expressed, is questioned when our 
collective consciences are unaffected by the horrors that continue to 
be reported from Bosnia and Herzegovina today.
  At the hearing, Prime Minister Silajdzic expressed his gratitude to 
the U.S. Congress for its strong and consistent support for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through this terrible period. He noted that, 50 years after 
Auschwitz, concentration camps again appeared in Europe, this time in 
Bosnia, and this time the images are brought into our homes directly, 
especially through television. Rather than responding on the basis of 
principle, justice, and order, however, he described realpolitik and 
pragmatism as the order of the day. When a forceful response is 
eliminated, he concluded, the Bosnian Serb militants and their 
supporters in Belgrade are the only ones who benefit.
  Given the current dynamics, the Prime Minister presented a reasonable 
course of action, specifically that the Contact Group meet at the 
ministerial level and set a deadline for a definite and final answer 
from the Serb militants. If the Serbs accept the plan in time, changes 
to the map could be made within 30 days, as long as these changes 
maintain the 51/49 percentage formula and are adopted by consensus. 
Negotiations on constitutional arrangements, international guarantees 
and other items would follow.
  If, on the other hand, the Serbs reject the plan, the response 
adopted last July by the Contact Group foreign ministers should be 
reaffirmed, specifically the tightening of sanctions, the expansion and 
better protection of designated safe havens, including the use of air 
strikes, and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the 
latter, he added that recognition of the right to self-defense is the 
minimum that must be granted to the victims of this aggression.
  I told the Prime Minister that the Helsinki Commission is dedicated 
not necessarily to the defense of his country, but to the promotion of 
principles adopted in Helsinki almost 20 years ago. In reality, 
however, these two different goals have come to mean the same thing. In 
this new Congress, the Commission will remain true to that goal and I, 
therefore, support his suggestions. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that the 
Congress will debate the current policy options.
  As we do consider policy options, I would like to repeat a remark 
made at the hearing by fellow Helsinki Commissioner, Mr. Steny Hoyer. 
He argued that one of the reasons we have allowed aggression and 
genocide to proceed in Bosnia is that some have convinced themselves 
that the conflict there is a civil war--an internal ethnic conflict--
the inevitable result of age-old hatreds. To correct the picture, Mr. 
Hoyer quoted from a recent book, ``Bosnia, a Short History,'' by Noel 
Malcolm, the introduction to which states:

       Paradoxically, the most important reason for studying 
     Bosnia's history is that it enables one to see that the 
     history of Bosnia itself does not explain the origins of this 
     war. Of course, the war could not have happened if Bosnia had 
     not been the peculiar thing that it was, which made it the 
     object of special ambitions and interests. But those 
     ambitions were directed at Bosnia from outside Bosnia's 
     borders. The biggest obstacle to all understanding of the 
     conflict is the assumption that what has happened in that 
     country is the product--natural, spontaneous, and at the same 
     time necessary--of forces lying within Bosnia's own internal 
     history. That is the myth which was carefully propagated by 
     those who caused the conflict, who wanted the world to 
     believe that what they and their gunmen were doing was done 
     not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable historical 
     forces beyond anyone's control. * * * And the world believed 
     them.''

  Why the world believed them, I do not know. Perhaps naive assumptions 
about what was happening as Yugoslavia disintegrated; perhaps a cynical 
realpolitik that cares little about human suffering. Regardless, we 
cannot allow the resulting disaster to continue.


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