[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 17 (Friday, January 27, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E199]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


                      AN AGREEMENT WORTH PRESERVING

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, January 27, 1995
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, as you know, North Korea's efforts to 
acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal constitute one of the most serious 
national security threats facing the United States today.
  Last October, Ambassador-at-Large Robert l. Gallucci negotiated an 
agreement with North Korea that holds out the promise of freezing and 
eventually eliminating North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The 
Congress may face no more pressing national security issue in all of 
1995 then whether to permit the implementation of this accord.
  Unfortunately, there exists considerable confusion about this 
agreement, and the press has contained a number of erroneous statements 
as to what this agreement does and does not permit.
  Six months ago, we were on the verge of a confrontation with North 
Korea--a confrontation no one wanted, and which held little possibility 
of addressing our concerns about North Korea's nuclear program. Today, 
however, as a result of the Geneva agreement. Pyongyang has frozen its 
nuclear program and agreed to a step-by-step process that will 
eventually eliminate that program.
  North Korea in already taken a number of significant steps under the 
accord, in advance in any United States concessions. The North has 
already shut down its only operating reactor. It has already halted 
construction on two new reactors. It has already sealed its 
reprocessing facility and stopped construction on a new reprocessing 
line. It has already refrained from reprocessing its spent fuel rods, 
which would have given the North enough plutonium for four or five 
nuclear weapons. And it has already admitted IAEA inspectors and U.S. 
technicians into its nuclear facilities.
  By accepting the record, Pyongyang has agreed not only to resume IAEA 
inspections of its nuclear facilities, but to go beyond its obligations 
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. It has agreed, for 
instance, to forego reprocessing the spent fuel it presently possesses, 
and to shut down its reprocessing facility--even though the NPT permits 
reprocessing. And without reprocessing, the North will not be able to 
obtain the plutonium required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
  Mr. Speaker, this agreement is not based on trust. It is not based on 
promises. It is based solely on North Korea's performance. The United 
States retains its ability, both through IAEA inspections and through 
its own national means, to verify if the North is abiding by its 
commitments. And if, at any time, we conclude that Pyongyang is not 
living up to its end of the bargain, we can back out of the deal.
  The alternative to this agreement is not a better agreement, The only 
real alternatives are to return to the United Nations to ask for 
economic sanctions that no one believes will succeed, or an escalation 
to war.
  But with this agreement, we have an accord that diminishes tensions 
on the Korean peninsula. An accord that protects our security interests 
and those of our allies. An accord that advances our global 
nonprofliferation objectives. An accord that obligates other to pick up 
the overwhelming bulk of the financial costs.
  Mr. Speaker, this is what I call a good bargain. I urge my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle to inform themselves about this agreement 
and to support its implementation.


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