[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 15 (Wednesday, January 25, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1543-S1545]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


    SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 4--RELATIVE TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA

  Mr. MURKOWSKI (for himself, Mr. Simon, Mr. Helms, Mr. Robb, and Mr. 
Thomas) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:
                             S. Con. Res. 4

       Whereas the Agreed Framework Between the United States and 
     the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of October 21, 
     1994, states in Article III, paragraph (2), that ``[t]he DPRK 
     will consistently take steps to implement the North-South 
     Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
     Peninsula'';
       Whereas the Agreed Framework also states the ``[t]he DPRK 
     will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework 
     will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue'';
       Whereas the two agreements entered into between North and 
     South Korea in 1992, namely the North-South Denuclearization 
     Agreement and the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression 
     and Exchanges and Cooperation, provide an existing and 
     detailed framework for dialogue between North and South 
     Korea;
       Whereas the North Korean nuclear program is just one of the 
     lingering threats to peace on the Korean Peninsula; and
       Whereas the reduction of tensions between North and South 
     Korea directly serve United States interests, given the 
     substantial defense commitment of the United States to South 
     Korea and the presence on the Korean Peninsula of United 
     States troops: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
     concurring),

     SECTION 1. STEPS TOWARD NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE ON THE KOREAN 
                   PENINSULA.

       It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) the executive branch should take steps to ensure that 
     the implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United 
     States and North Korea, dated October 21, 1994, is linked to 
     substantive and rapid progress in dialogue between North and 
     South Korea; and
       (2) together with South Korea and other concerned allies, 
     and in keeping with the spirit and letter of the 1992 
     agreements between North and South Korea, the executive 
     branch should develop specific timetables for achieving 
     measures to reduce tensions between North and South Korea, 
     such as--
       (A) holding a North Korea-South Korea summit;
       (B) the prompt dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear 
     reprocessing facility;
       (C) the initiation of mutual nuclear facility inspections 
     by North and South Korea;
       (D) the establishment in both North and South Korea of 
     North-South Liaison Offices;
       (E) the establishment of a North-South joint military 
     commission to discuss steps to reduce tensions between North 
     and South Korea, including--
       (i) the mutual notification and control of major troop 
     movements and major military exercises;
       (ii) the relocation of troops to positions further from the 
     demilitarized zone;
       (iii) exchanges of military personnel and information;
       (iv) the installation of a telephone ``hotline'' between 
     military authorities; and
       (v) phased reductions of armaments and troops, and 
     verification thereof;
       (F) the expansion of trade relations between North and 
     South Korea;
       (G) the promotion of freedom to travel between North and 
     South Korea by citizens of both North and South Korea;
       (H) exchanges and cooperation in science and technology, 
     education, the arts, health, sports, the environment, 
     publishing, journalism, and other fields of mutual interest;
       (I) the establishment of postal and telecommunications 
     services between North and South Korea; and
     [[Page S1544]]   (J) the reconnection of railroads and 
     roadways between North and South Korea.

     SEC. 2. PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY.

       The President should appoint a senior official with 
     appropriate experience to represent him in communicating 
     directly with the North Korean government regarding the steps 
     and measures set forth in section 1, and to consult with 
     South Korea and other concerned allies regarding such 
     communications.

     SEC. 3. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

       The President should report to the Congress, within 90 days 
     after the adoption of this concurrent resolution, regarding 
     the progress made in carrying out sections 1 and 2.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this concurrent resolution--
       (1) the term ``North Korea'' means the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea; and
       (2) the term ``South Korea'' means the Republic of Korea.

     SEC. 5. DELIVERY OF RESOLUTION TO PRESIDENT.

       The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this 
     concurrent resolution to the President.

 Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President. I submit a concurrent resolution 
that expresses the Sense of the Congress regarding the serious issue of 
North Korea-South Korea dialog as part of the United States-North Korea 
Agreed Framework on the nuclear issue. I am joined today by my 
colleagues Senator Simon, Helms, Robb, and Thomas in submitting this 
resolution. Several of our colleagues on the House side have submitted 
a similar resolution today.
  I do not intend at this time to launch into a lengthy critique of the 
agreed framework signed between the United States and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]. I chaired a hearing last week in the 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee to examine the agreement 
in greater detail. Other hearings on the agreed framework are being 
held in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services 
Committee this week. And I believe this body will have an opportunity 
to debate the entire agreement in detail when the administration seeks 
additional funding to carry out the provisions of the agreed framework.
  Today, however, I want to focus on a specific, and critical, element 
of the agreed framework: the necessity of a meaningful North-South 
dialog. Without such a dialog, I am convinced that implementation of 
the agreed framework is unworkable.
  Section III(2) of the agreed framework specifies that ``[t]he DPRK 
will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'' The 
agreed framework goes on to say in section III.(3) that ``[t]he DPRK 
will engage in North-South dialogue, as this agreed framework will help 
create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.'' Yesterday, in 
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher had this to say about these provisions: ``As 
part of the framework, North Korea has pledged to resume dialogue with 
South Korea on matters affecting peace and security on the peninsula. 
We have made clear that resuming North-South dialogue is essential to 
the success of the framework--so important that we were prepared to 
walk away from the framework if North Korea had not been willing to 
meet that condition.''
  I am gratified that the United States negotiators held firm on 
including references to these two North-South issues, but I am greatly 
concerned that the requirements were not spelled out in greater detail 
in the agreement. For instance, what is the time line for progress? At 
what point will the United States stop fulfilling its commitments under 
the agreed framework if there has been progress in North-South 
relations.
  It is this lack of specificity that has led me and my colleagues to 
introduce this resolution. The resolution calls on the executive branch 
to take steps to ensure that the implementation of the agreed framework 
is linked to substantive and rapid progress in the dialogue between 
North and South Korea, including developing timetables for achieving 
measures to reduce tensions between North and South Korea. Although not 
a comprehensive list, positive measures could include: First, hold a 
North-South summit; second, prompt dismantlement of North Korea's 
reprocessing facility; third, initiation of mutual nuclear facility 
inspections; fourth, establishment of North-South Liaison offices; 
fifth, establishment of a North-South joint military commission; sixth, 
expansion of trade relations; seventh, promotion of freedom to travel; 
eighth, exchanges and cooperation in science and technology, education, 
the arts; health, sports, the environment, publishing, journalism, and 
other fields of mutual interest; ninth, establishment of postal and 
telecommunications services; and tenth, reconnection of railroads and 
roadways.
  The resolution also calls on President Clinton to appoint a senior 
official to communicate directly with the North Korean Government 
regarding the steps and measures, and to consult with South Korea and 
other concerned allies regarding such communications. In addition, the 
resolution calls on the President to report to Congress within 90 days 
regarding the progress made in the specific steps.
  Mr. President. I do not need to remind my colleagues that 37,000 
American soldiers stationed on the demilitarized zone remain in harm's 
way. We all received a grim reminder of this when a U.S. helicopter was 
shot down on December 17, 1994, killing one U.S. airman and detaining 
another on false charges of American espionage.
  These American troops are part of the nearly 2 million troops who 
face each other across a heavily fortified demilitarized zone. Three 
decades of on-again, off-again talks between Pyongyang and Seoul have 
produced no significant progress in reducing tensions. Although a 
cease-fire ended the Korean war in 1953, the two sides technically 
remain at war. The agreed framework does not adequately address the 
underlying tensions between North and South Korea. Nor do I believe 
that North and South Korea will simply work everything out without some 
outside assistance. For that reason, I believe that the Clinton 
administration must take specific steps to ensure that North Korea 
lives up to its commitment under the agreed framework.
  I hope this resolution will take us a step in the right 
direction.
 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, there are many trouble spots in the 
world. But there may be no more dangerous border right now than the one 
that divides North and South Korea. Approximately 1 million troops, 
North Korean, South Korean, and United States, are arrayed along either 
side of that 150-mile-long line. And yet, with all that firepower ready 
to use, there is practically no communication across that line. It is 
one of the most hermetic borders in the world, rivalled, perhaps, only 
by those of Albania in its heyday.
  Last December my colleague Senator Frank Murkowski and I saw that 
formidable border with our own eyes, when we crossed the demilitarized 
zone from North to South. And that same month we all saw some of the 
consequences of the lack of communication, when a United States 
helicopter was shot down over North Korea. What in other circumstances 
might have been handled as a routine incident became a protracted war 
of nerves, with the freedom of one U.S. airman and the remains of 
another hanging in the balance. Why? Because there are so few trusted 
channels of communication between North and South.
  When Senator Murkowski and I visited Asia last month, the agreed 
framework between the United States and North Korea was the focus of 
our discussions in both Pyongyang and Seoul. The agreement, while not 
perfect, offers an important opportunity to end North Korea's nuclear 
program. It also--and this is extremely important as well--can open new 
channels of communication between North and South, and thereby reduce 
tensions in northwest Asia.
  The sense of the Senate resolution that I am proud to submit today 
with my colleague Senator Murkowski expands the channels of 
communication envisaged in the agreed framework. The resolution calls 
for the executive branch to establish timetables for a range of 
tension-reducing measures between North and South Korea. Dismantlement 
of North Korea's nuclear reprocessing facility would be a major step, 
but only one step, in that area. Other important measures connecting 
North and South would be: liaison offices; a joint military commission 
with a particular focus on information exchange and threat reduction; 
expanded 
[[Page S1545]] trade relations; freedom of travel between the Koreas; 
scientific, cultural, educational and sports exchanges; postal and 
telecommunications services between North and South; and reconstruction 
of road and rail links between the two countries. The President should 
appoint a senior official to work on all those steps with North and 
South Korea.
  All the measures I just listed add up to communication. Opening North 
Korea to outside influences will not be easy, will not happen 
overnight, and will not bring overnight results. It is an effort, 
though, that we should make, because the payoff in reduced tensions on 
the Korean peninsula could be very great indeed. This resolution aims 
to support the nuclear accord, and build on it in constructive, 
positive ways.


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