[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 13 (Monday, January 23, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H488-H492]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CONSIDERATION OF THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 4, 1995, the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Orton] is recognized for
60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
Mr. ORTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the balanced budget
amendment, which will be coming up later this week and possibly
continuing into next week. It is a very critical issue which we will be
facing in the Congress, and I feel it important that we discuss it in
greater detail than we will have time during the formal debate on the
floor of this House to discuss and compare the various amendments which
are going to come before us. I will talk about some of the similarities
and the differences.
{time} 1440
I recognize that right now going on on network television are the
opening statements of the O.J. Simpson trial. It will take someone who
is very dedicated and very interested in the balanced budget issue to
actually be watching at this point in time, but I hope that my
colleagues are watching and that in fact they and others interested in
this debate will get a copy of what I am going to talk about, to
analyze the amendments in depth and in detail prior to our debate
coming up later this week.
There has been a great deal of debate over whether or not we should
balance the budget. I am not going to enter into that debate today. I
personally believe that our country balance its budget, that we cannot
continue with several hundred billion dollar deficits each year, and
that in fact if we fail to balance the budget, at some point in time we
will reach an economic crisis wherein devaluation of our currency or
hyper inflation rates or high interest rates, some economic meachancism
will in fact make up for the problem which we have today in not
balancing our budget. So I am not going to focus on that part of the
debate.
It has also been argued even by those who agree that we must balance
the budget that in fact there are two different ways to do it. One,
requiring in the Constitution by amending the language of our
Constitution that we must balance the budget. The other is to do it
through statutory reform, by changing statutes themselves, changing the
budget process itself, so that in fact we might be able to, through the
regular committee action and floor action in this body and the other
body, that we might be able to agree to a balanced budget.
It is argued that you do not need to amend the Constitution to
balance the budget. In fact, that is correct, you do not. But I also
believe that by requiring in the Constitution that we must balance our
budget, it will give us that additional impetus, the additional force
necessary, the commitment necessary, to actually accomplish that
balanced budget. So I favor a balanced budget amendment to the
Constitution, and this discussion is not going to go through the
arguments of whether we should or should not file a balanced budget
amendment to actually require it.
This is a very serious issue, amending our Constitution. It was
created over 200 years ago, and over that time has served us very well
and has been amended very few times. In fact, now to change the actual
wording in our Constitution is indeed very serious and very critical
that we must do it right.
Our first rule in government should be first to do no wrong, to do no
harm. We must be certain that the changes we place into our
Constitution do not create greater havoc or do greater harm or prevent
us from being able to govern this great Nation.
So really the issues I would like to discuss here today come down
more to the questions of if we do place into our Constitution a
requirement to balance the budget, what wording should we use and how
would in be enforced? What type of enforcement mechanism should we
include in the Constitution to require this Government to balance its
income and outgo, or its outlays and receipts, was we call it in the
various amendments. There are very technical issues and I am going to
attempt over the next little while in plain English to outline a
comparison of the various amendments that have been filed, so that we
can identify where there are similarities and where there are
differences.
I plan on focusing on three principal amendments, all three of which
have been filed as legislation in this Congress. They are the Barton-
Tauzin constitutional amendment, which I believe has the support of the
majority leadership in the body. They are also the Schaefer-Stenholm
amendment, which is the amendment that has been filed by Senator Dole,
Senator Hatch, and Senator Simon in the Senate. And also a balanced
budget amendment which I have filed in this body, and I would like to
compare the three of them.
I would like to analyze the alternative approaches being used in
these three different amendments, the approaches and the mechanisms
used for enforcement. I would like to identify the differences in these
amendments, and there are several. There are some differences in what
numbers we are going to be relying upon in balancing the budget. Some
of these amendments requires or allow us to use or rely upon estimates
of receipts and outlays. Other amendments will require us to deal with
actual receipts and outlays. There are significant differences between
estimates and actual numbers, and I would like to talk about those.
Also, some of these amendments require the
creation of, or do create in the Constitution, a new supermajority
requirement for legislative action, while the other relies upon the
existing constitutional majorities and the existing supermajority
identified in overriding a Presidential veto.
Also the enforcement mechanisms specifically. Some of these, two of
these amendments rely upon future implementing legislation in order to
set up an enforcement mechanism. The other sets up an enforcement
mechanism in the language of the amendment itself.
Also with regard to waiver, two of these amendments allow the
Congress to waive the provisions of this article for any year in which
the country is in war or military conflict. The other provides a more
broad waiver opportunity.
Finally, I would like to outline a possible--rather a probable--
constitutional crisis which in fact may be created under the terms and
implementation of two of these particular amendments. So those are the
things that I would like to talk about.
First of all, let me compare the similarities in these amendments.
The
[[Page H489]] reason I have chosen these three amendments is because
two of them are almost certain to have a vote on the floor of this
House. The Barton-Tauzin amendment is indeed the amendment that the
leadership has indicated we will have a vote on. The Stenholm-Schaefer
amendment, the Committee on Rules will decide today whether to allow a
vote on that amendment, and that amendment I believe should and will
have a vote, because that is the amendment as filed in the other body,
in the Senate. Third is the alternative amendment which I have filed,
and it is obvious the reason I would like to talk about that is to show
the difference between the language in the amendment I have filed and
the language in the amendments that have been filed and almost
certainly will be voted upon.
Now, I will be asking the Committee on Rules later this afternoon to
allow my amendments to be put forward for debate and a vote here on the
floor of the House, and for that purpose I want to outline and explain
the similarities and differences between all three of these amendments
for my colleagues, so that as we look at these amendments in the future
debate, that there will be understanding as to what each amendment does
and does not include.
First of all, the similarities. All three of these amendments provide
for four very basic and substantive things to occur, and each do so
very similarly.
Now, they use slightly different language, but the language is not
opposing or contradictory. Some of it is a little more artful than
others in my opinion, but all three of these provide first that total
outlays shall not exceed total receipts. That is the basic substantive
criteria for the amendment, total outlays shall not exceed total
receipts. Also, all three of these amendments would require that the
President of the United States must submit to the Congress a proposed
budget in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts.
So it is saying that Congress must adopt a balanced budget, it is
saying that the President must submit a balanced budget request to the
Congress.
Third, all three of these agree in the definition of what is total
outlays and total receipts.
{time} 1450
Fourth, all three of them provide that this amendment would go into
effect as of fiscal year 2002, or the second fiscal year following
ratification by the necessary number of States, should that be later
than 2002.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, those issues are really in common with all of
the amendments. Each amendment contains somewhat different language,
but each amendment concurs with those principles.
Now, Mr. Speaker, let us outline the differences in these amendments;
first of all, the issue of estimated receipts and outlays as opposed to
actual receipts and outlays.
Here I would like to refer specifically to the language of the Spratt
amendments. In the Schaefer-Stenholm amendment, section 6, the language
says ``Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate
legislation which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.''
Specifically, in the language of the amendment it allows the Congress,
in implementing a balanced budget, to rely upon estimates of revenue
and estimates of expenditures.
In the Barton-Tauzin amendment, I would like to refer to section 1 of
the Barton-Tauzin amendment. I will read it in its entirety, but the
appropriate language is in the center: ``Prior to each fiscal year
Congress shall, by law, adopt a statement of receipts and outlays for
such fiscal year in which total outlays are not greater than total
receipts. This is a statement of,'' and it's prior to the fiscal year,
so it must be an estimate. ``Congress may, by law, amend that
statement, provided revised outlays are not greater than revised
receipts, and Congress may provide in that statement for a specific
excess of outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to that
subject in which three-fifths of the whole number of each House agree
to such excess.'' So this Barton-Tauzin amendment also states that
Congress would adopt a statement of receipts.
On the other hand, in the Orton amendment, section 3, the Orton
amendment requires that for any fiscal year in which actual outlays
exceed actual receipts, Congress shall provide by law for the repayment
in the ensuing year. Therefore, only the Orton amendment identifies the
determination by Congress of actual outlays and actual receipts to
ensure that the budget is actually balanced.
What happens if we rely on receipts? To be fair, let me read the last
sentence of section 1 of the Barton-Tauzin amendment, which says
``Congress and the President shall ensure that actual outlays do not
exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.''
That is only dealing with actual outlays. What about actual receipts?
There is no guaranty mechanism that the receipts which we project to
receive will actually be received by government, and there is no
mechanism in either of these other two amendments to deal with the
possibility, in fact likelihood, that actual receipts will not match or
mirror estimated receipts.
Just to give some idea of the extent of the problem we are talking
about, I would like to refer you to the Congressional Budget Office
records of the last 14 fiscal years in estimating actual receipts. How
far have they been off?
This chart shows, beginning in 1980 and going through 1993, the
amount by which the Congressional Budget Office estimates of receipts
differed from actual receipts. The zero line is the amount of actual
receipts that came in. The hashed marks here show the amount of
overestimate or underestimate of
receipts from the CBO's projections.
If we look in 1980, CBO forecasted, projected that the Federal
Government would generate almost $40 billion more in revenue than it
actually received in 1980. In 1981 they overestimated receipts by $58
billion; in 1982 by $73 billion; in 1983 by $91 billion.
Look here, in 1990, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that
receipts would actually be $119 billion more than they actually were.
Those are estimates. Those are the Government's best guess at how much
revenue would be coming into the budget during that fiscal year.
We have to estimate at the beginning of the year. That is how we
create the budget. Without the possibility of estimating revenue and
expenditures, we have no budget. That is what the budget is, is an
estimate.
The problem, however, is unless we have some requirement to come back
and match those actual outlays with actual receipts, we do not have a
mechanism that requires a balanced budget. If all we require are
expenditures or outlays to be actual, we still can end up not balancing
the budget because we have overprojected revenues.
Let me show you what would have happened if in fact the Congressional
Budget Office over the last 14 years, if they had projected the actual
receipts. We would have had no deficit. We would have had balance in
what was projected.
We would, indeed, have had an annual deficit each year because the
estimates of expenditures always exceeded the estimates of receipts.
I'm not saying that it is Congressional Budget Office's fault that we
had deficit spending, but the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that expenditures would be a certain level, and estimated that receipts
would be a certain level.
If in fact we had had a balanced budget requirement in 1980, and we
had held receipts to only the amount that we have projected them to be,
as the Barton-Tauzin amendment would do, but did not have a mechanism
for ensuring that receipts reached the level that we had estimated,
this is what would have happened. In that 14 years, we still would have
had a national debt or deficit spending over that period of time of
over a half a trillion dollars.
Therefore, unless we have a mechanism in this amendment to require
somehow the balancing of actual receipts and actual expenditures, there
is no guaranty that these amendments will provide or even require a
balanced budget. That is a critical failing in both the Barton-Tauzin
and the Stenholm-Schaefer amendments.
Neither of them require us going back at the end of the year and
comparing what we spent with what we brought it. Both of them allow us,
in fact, to project receipts and expenditures. Both of them would allow
this kind of overstatement of receipts with
[[Page H490]] no mechanism to require us to go back and do anything
about it.
The Orton amendment, on the other hand, as I read, requires actual
receipts and actual outlays to be compared, and if they are different,
requires Congress to provide by law for the repayment of the actual
outlays over the actual receipts. There are other differences in these
amendments.
The next major difference is the difference of super majority status,
or super majorities. This came about as an effort or an attempt to
create an enforcement mechanism in the balanced budget amendment.
The critics of a balanced budget amendment said ``So you say in the
Constitution that you have to balance the budget, but if all you do is
say it and have no enforcement mechanism, how can the public trust
government, rely upon government, to actually balance the budget as the
Constitution requires?'' And if government simply ignores the
requirement to balance the budget as required, does that not create
public cynicism and distrust of government?
In an effort to make it more difficult to ignore this requirement,
both the Barton-Tauzin and the Stenholm-Schaefer amendments have in
fact created the requirement of constitutional super majorities; in
other words, more than 50 percent, significantly more than 50 percent.
In both these cases 60 percent of the House and Senate would be
required to take certain congressional or legislative action.
{time} 1500
Again I would like to read specifically from the various amendments.
The Barton-Tauzin amendment. First of all, section 1 states,
``Congress may provide in that statement for a specific excess of
outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to that subject in
which three-fifths of the whole number of each House agree to such
excess.''
So there is a three-fifths majority required in order to estimate
that outlays would be greater than receipts. I do not know any
politician who is willing to estimate that outlays would be greater
than receipts and I do not know why Congress would want to estimate
outlays greater than receipts if in fact they have a balanced budget
requirement, but under the provisions of this balanced budget
amendment, they would have to have a three-fifths majority in order to
file a statement, or a budget in which outlays exceeded receipts.
In section 2, the Barton amendment also says, ``No bill to increase
receipts shall become law unless approved by a three-fifths majority of
the whole number of each House of Congress.''
So to raise taxes, it requires a three-fifths majority.
Then finally, in section 6, ``The amount of Federal public debt as of
the first day of the second fiscal year after ratification of this
article shall become a permanent limit on such debt and there shall be
no increase in such amount unless three-fifths of the whole number of
each House of Congress shall have passed a bill approving such increase
and such bill has become law.''
So under Barton it requires a three-fifths majority to project that
your budget would be out of balance, a three-fifths majority to
increase taxes, and a three-fifths majority to increase the debt limit
of the United States.
Under the Stenholm bill, it does the same thing, requiring a three-
fifths majority to estimate that your expenditures would exceed your
receipts, and it requires a three-fifths majority for you to raise the
debt limit but does not require a three-fifths majority to increase
taxes.
There lies the major philosophical difference between those two
amendments which you will see debated on this floor over the coming
days, and it is
an ideological argument. Do you want to require a supermajority of the
body in order to increase revenue? Or do you want to say, no, we will
leave it a constitutional majority, which is 50 percent plus one, and
then the President would have to sign that into law or veto it, thereby
bringing in the constitutional majority necessary for an override of
the veto to ensure that in fact taxes could only be increased with the
agreement of both Houses of Congress and the President in the executive
branch.
But those are the supermajority requirements outlined in both of
these other two constitutional amendments.
In the Orton amendment, it does not set up the requirement
of supermajorities at all. It allows all of the
current actions that are taken in Congress, or the actions under this
amendment to be taken with the standard constitutional majority but it
also requires that in the event Congress does not balance the budget,
in other words, in the event outlays exceed receipts in any particular
year, they must provide by law for it to be paid back. That brings the
President into this activity, thereby bringing into play the
constitutional supermajority necessary to override the President's
veto.
Under the Orton amendment, it does not create a supermajority. It
allows a majority of the House and a majority of the Senate to act in
concert with the President. If the President disagrees with the
Congress, he may veto the legislation, in which case the Congress in
order to enact the legislation over the veto would be required to get
the supermajority necessary to override the veto, which is greater than
three-fifths.
Next there is a difference in waivers. Under the Barton amendment and
the Stenholm amendment, both of these constitutional amendments would
only allow the Congress to waive the requirement of a balanced budget
in a year ``in which a declaration of war is in effect'' or, and now I
am paraphrasing, the United States faces an imminent and serious threat
of international security which would be declared by a joint
resolution.
The Stenholm amendment identifies engaged in a military conflict
which presents a serious threat to the national security.
These are very narrow waiver provisions. In reality, there are many,
many, different forces outside and internal forces which could impact
the U.S. economy, making it detrimental to the United States to require
a balanced budget in any specific year, such as economic depression,
the cyclical events which occur in economies. There are times in which
balancing the budget which would require either substantial decrease in
Federal expenditures or increase in taxes would bring upon economic
calamity.
This can viewed in historic detail by looking back to President
Hoover who at the end of his term in fact did cut spending and
substantially increased taxes which was followed by the economic
depression.
The Orton amendment simply provides that ``the provisions of this
article may be waived for any fiscal year only if Congress so provides
by law by a majority of the whole number of each House. Such waiver
shall be subject to veto by the President.''
Therefore, the Orton amendment relies upon the Constitution as it
currently is drafted and in effect relies upon the requirement of
majorities in both bodies supported by the concurrence of the President
through signature on the legislation in order to waive the requirement
for a balanced budget.
I personally believe that if you have got both Houses of Congress and
the President saying it is necessary to waive the provisions of that
balanced budget amendment for the good of the Nation, then we probably
should have the power to waive it; and if the public disagrees, in the
next election they can say so and they can vote those people out and
vote in people who promise not to do that type of thing.
So the waiver is the third major difference.
The fourth has to do with enforcement, the enforcement mechanism
itself.
Under the Barton version of the amendment, section 8 reads,
``Congress shall enforce and implement with appropriate legislation.''
That legislation is not currently even drafted. It is contemplated to
be future legislation.
Under the Stenholm version of the bill, section 6 reads, ``The
Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate
legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.''
Again, that legislation implementing the balanced budget, telling the
country how we are going to enforce this amendment, has not yet been
drafted.
The theory is that we will first pass the constitutional amendment
requiring us to do it, we will then somehow
[[Page H491]] find the wisdom and the courage to come back and actually
do it.
Under the Orton version of the amendment, it is a fairly simple
enforcement mechanism which relies upon the current balance of powers
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branch, and it states
simply under section 3, ``For any fiscal year in which actual outlays
exceed actual receipts, the Congress shall provide by law for the
repayment in the ensuing fiscal year of such excess outlays.''
{time} 1510
If Congress fails to provide by law for repayment, within 15 days
after Congress adjourns to end a session there shall be a sequestration
of all outlays to eliminate a budget deficit.
This is a very, very hard enforcement mechanism, but it places the
burden squarely on the shoulders of the Congress and the President to
either find a way to balance the budget, and state it by statutory law,
or to say to the public we cannot find a way; we believe it would be
detrimental to the public to balance the budget and here is why.
If Congress neither balances the budget nor waives the balanced
budget requirement, the Constitution would place in it a hard sequester
enforcement mechanism that simply cuts spending across the board to
balance the budget in the next fiscal year, to pay back the deficit
that we incurred, probably through estimating rosy scenarios, as has
been done in past years.
If we want to ensure to the public that in fact the Government will
balance its budget, I submit the Orton amendment is the only amendment
which has been filed which contains an enforcement mechanism to require
Government to accomplish what is set forth in this article. So there is
a significant difference in enforcement.
Finally, I told you I wanted to outline the possibility or even
probability of a constitutional crisis if in fact we adopt either the
Stenholm-Schaefer or the Barton-Tauzin amendment, and it is my opinion
that one or the other will be adopted. By the way, before I explain the
crisis, let me say I have in two Congresses in the past supported and
voted for the Stenholm-Schaefer language, which is the same language
which has been proposed in the Senate, and it is, in fact, my intention
to vote for the best balanced budget amendment that we can get through
this House, this time. What I am attempting to do is to raise the
debate to these issues which I believe must be addressed in order to
develop the best constitutional amendment.
Let me point out a scenario which I believe can and will lead to
constitutional crisis if we do not change the language of these
amendments before adoption. Assume the following facts: Let us assume
that we pass the amendment. The year 2003 rolls around, the amendment
is in place, it is part of the Constitution. Let us assume that it is
the Barton-Tauzin amendment which has been passed. We follow the
amendment to the letter.
The amendment requires us to set forth a statement, a proposed budget
in which outlays do not exceed receipts. We do that. We identify
through our priorities where we are going to cut, where we are going to
increase, and that statement of outlays and expenditures is in balance.
We go along and we revise those statements of outlays and
expenditures through the year, if necessary. It is in balance and, in
fact, Congress and the President have ``insured that actual outlays do
not exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.'' They have kept a
padlock on the purse strings, they have not spent 1 cent more than
outlined in the projected budget.
But, the fiscal year ends September 30, the new fiscal year begins
October 1. On September 10 or September 1 we discover, the Treasury
Department tells us we over estimated revenues, because of a cyclical
down turn in the economy, because unemployment went higher, because
something happened, dumping from a foreign country into our markets, we
lost employees,
we have lost revenue. Some unforeseen occurrence has taken place, and
revenues do not match what we had estimated.
Let us say that the budget in 2003 is the same as the budget this
year, approximately $1.5 trillion. We estimate $1.5 trillion of
expenditures; we estimate $1.5 trillion of receipts. We only spend $1.5
trillion, but we only bring in $1.49 trillion. We are short $100
billion of revenue, or we are short $100 million of revenue, or we are
short $100,000 of revenue. It does not matter. So long as the revenue
is less than the receipts or the expenditures, we are not in balance,
we are now in violation.
What happens? First of all it takes a three-fifths majority to waive
this and to cut or lower our estimate of expenditures or raise our
estimates of revenues. But estimates are not going to do us any good in
September of the fiscal year if we have already spent the money. There
is not any money we can cut. It was spent through the fiscal year. In
fact, it says you cannot raise revenue without a three-fifths majority.
It would not do us any good to raise revenue anyway, because in
September of the fiscal year we could not get a bill passed and
implemented, signed and gear up the Internal Revenue Service to go out
and collect more money. Therefore, what happens is, the Government is
in deficit spending, not because we spent more than we thought, but
because we did not bring in the revenue we thought, and section 6 comes
into play.
Section 6 says the amount of Federal public debt, as of the first of
the second fiscal year after ratification of this article shall become
a permanent limit on such debt and there shall be no increase in such
amount unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House of
Congress shall have passed a bill approving such increase and such bill
has become law.
What you have done is, the only option that the Federal Government
has at the end of that fiscal year is to increase the debt limit, if
they have overestimated revenues, and those revenues do not come in,
and we have seen the likelihood of overestimating revenues. This chart
shows that in every year but 1 in the last 14 years we overestimated
revenues.
So if we follow history and overestimate revenues, only spent the
amount we said we would spend, we have not balanced the budget, we
cannot borrow more money to make up that difference, unless three-
fifths of the House and the Senate vote. If my math is correct, that
only takes 40 Members of the Senate or 178 Members of the House to make
up 40 percent.
Therefore, what you have done by creating a super majority
requirement is you have placed control of that decision in the hands of
a minority of Members in this body or the other body. In other words,
40 percent could hold the 60 percent hostage for some other action or
refuse to allow the debt limit to be increased.
People say, ``Oh, well, so what? So you do not allow the debt limit
to be increased; you just cannot borrow more money.'' If I go to the
bank, my bank tells me, ``Sorry, you have hit your debt limit. We are
not going to loan you any more money.'' Why should we not do that with
the Government?
The problem, is, the Government has Treasury notes, Treasury bills,
and so on, which are actually out there, people have purchased them.
Over 80 percent of the money we have borrowed has come from we, the
people of the United States.
{time} 1520
It is from our savings and checking accounts, et cetera.
Those T-bills come due. We have already spent the money of the fiscal
year. We brought in less than we thought.
If we do not increase the debt limit and borrow that $100 billion or
$100,000 or whatever the difference is, we are in technical default.
So what happens if the Government is in technical default? You just
go in, file chapter 11 bankruptcy, your creditors will give you some
time to work it out, and pay it back, and all is well? No. If the
Government goes into technical default, the most likely scenario is an
immediate devaluation of the dollar which causes an immediate spiraling
of inflation, an immediate increase in interest rates, would cause
turmoil not only in the stock market in this country, the stock market
and financial markets would cause turmoil throughout the entire world.
It is not a feasible alternative to force the U.S. Government into
bankruptcy, into technical default on its loans. Therefore, the
Congress would be required to act to increase that
debt
[[Page H492]] limit, and if you get 40 percent of either body refusing
to increase the debt limit, unless you deal with this specific issue,
now you have placed control of the Government in the hands of the few
rather than in the hand of the majority.
This could happen on either side of the aisle. You could have some
from the right-hand side of the political spectrum, those who believe
that we have been spending far too little on national defense, those
who believe that, in fact, the budget should be spending more on
national defense; they could group together and get 40 percent of
either body and say, ``We will not agree to increase the debt limit of
the United States unless we not only borrow what we have to borrow to
cover last year's expenditures, we want to borrow more. We want another
$200 billion, and we want a $200 billion supplemental appropriation
today passed before we agree to increase the debt limit, in order to
put $200 billion more into national defense.''
You could get 40 percent of the people from the left-hand side of the
political spectrum who believe that we are not spending enough on job
training and education and welfare benefits or retirement benefits who
may come to the floor of this House or the other house and say,
``Sorry, we have not spent enough on these programs. I am not going to
vote to increase the national debt and prevent the country from going
into technical bankruptcy and default unless we also borrow enough
money, and you give me a supplemental appropriation right now to
increase welfare payments or retirement benefits or health care,'' or
any of the other benefits that they feel very strongly about.
You might also have some people who care more about getting a highway
or a bridge built in their district who demand more appropriations for
pork-barrel spending, for a clock tower in their State or some other
type of spending which the rest of this body would not go along with
but for the fact a gun is being held to the head of the country.
I say to my colleagues and suggest going back and reviewing the
Federalist Papers wherein Madison, the draftsman of our Constitution,
and Hamilton, and Jefferson, and Jay debated and discussed among
themselves and others the wisdom of creating supermajority requirements
to act in this or the other legislative body. They concluded, and I
believe rightly so, that supermajorities should be used very, very
limited, only to situations of overriding a veto or adopting a treaty
or expelling Members from the body, instances wherein the Constitution
requires supermajorities.
And so I submit that if, in fact, we include the language of
supermajorities and specifically the language of a supermajority
requirement to increase the debt ceiling, that, in fact, you are
inviting a constitutional crisis. You are inviting just the exact
scenario that those supporters of a balanced budget amendment in this
body have fought so hard against. You are inviting the types of
calamity that we must avoid.
Now, I am going to be asking the Committee on Rules to make in order
two specific amendments. First is the constitutional amendment which I
have filed as a separate, freestanding amendment. It also has been
filed, and I believe is identified in the Record, as an amendment to
the balanced budget amendment in the form of a substitute. It is that
amendment which I have outlined which does not create constitutional
supermajorities but relies upon the current majority and the veto of
the President in order to enforce the provisions of a balanced budget.
It broadly allows waiver, but again with the Congress and the President
agreeing to that waiver by law.
It does not create provisions for a supermajority to either increase
spending or revenues or to increase the debt limit.
It is the simplest version which I know of which has been filed in as
plain English as we could put it and the only version of the
constitutional amendments filed, to my knowledge, which has in it a
real enforcement mechanism in the body of the amendment itself. Others
rely upon future legislation to enforce.
So I will be asking for that amendment to be made in order so that we
can come here to the floor of the House and debate that amendment and
the provisions in it.
I will also be asking to be made in order a substitute which in
essence is the wording of the Stenholm-Schaefer amendment, but deleting
two particular provisions, deleting from their section 6 the words that
allow the Congress to rely upon estimates of outlays and receipts, and
also deleting entirely section 2 of that particular amendment which
creates the constitutional supermajority of three-fifths in order to
increase the debt limit.
It is my hope that the Committee on Rules will allow these amendments
in the nature of a substitute to be brought forward. I have agreed many
times with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle over the last 4
years that I have been selected as a Member of this body wherein they
came to the floor of this House and complained that the then Democratic
Rules Committee was being unfair, was not allowing the system to work,
was not allowing this body to work its will on legislation, was not
allowing full, free and open debate on the issues, was not allowing us
to draft the best legislation we could possibly draft, and they called
for open rules. They said:
You put us in the majority, and when we bring legislation
to the floor, it will come under an open rule, so that any
Member of this body can come to the well of this floor and
propose amendments to perfect the language of the
legislation, to make it better, to use the brilliance and the
genius of our system, free and open debate, so that the will
of the people can be determined in this body.
That was their pledge.
They are now in power. They have an opportunity to keep that pledge.
And I would urge them to do so by providing an open rule of debate on
this very critical and important constitutional amendment. I cannot
conceive of a more critical piece of legislation to consider in this or
any other Congress than amending the very words of the Constitution
itself.
I cannot conceive of bringing that type of legislation to the floor
of this body under a closed rule preventing free and open debate,
preventing us to raise these questions.
{time} 1530
I would ask anyone who would support a closed rule to come to the
floor of this House and explain to the people how they are going to
avoid the very constitutional crisis I have just outlined. It is
necessary to bring these issues to the floor for full and open debate
in order to work the will of the people, in order to get the best
legislation we can possibly get.
So I thank my colleagues for their patience, their listening to these
issues, and I thank them for their consideration of the balanced budget
amendment, which I support, and I thank them for their consideration of
the amendments which I hope to propose and encourage this body to
proceed very cautiously as we contemplate and move toward amending the
very language which is the foundation of our system, the Constitution
of the United States.
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