[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 13 (Monday, January 23, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H488-H492]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             CONSIDERATION OF THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 4, 1995, the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Orton] is recognized for 
60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.
  Mr. ORTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to discuss the balanced budget 
amendment, which will be coming up later this week and possibly 
continuing into next week. It is a very critical issue which we will be 
facing in the Congress, and I feel it important that we discuss it in 
greater detail than we will have time during the formal debate on the 
floor of this House to discuss and compare the various amendments which 
are going to come before us. I will talk about some of the similarities 
and the differences.

                              {time}  1440

  I recognize that right now going on on network television are the 
opening statements of the O.J. Simpson trial. It will take someone who 
is very dedicated and very interested in the balanced budget issue to 
actually be watching at this point in time, but I hope that my 
colleagues are watching and that in fact they and others interested in 
this debate will get a copy of what I am going to talk about, to 
analyze the amendments in depth and in detail prior to our debate 
coming up later this week.
  There has been a great deal of debate over whether or not we should 
balance the budget. I am not going to enter into that debate today. I 
personally believe that our country balance its budget, that we cannot 
continue with several hundred billion dollar deficits each year, and 
that in fact if we fail to balance the budget, at some point in time we 
will reach an economic crisis wherein devaluation of our currency or 
hyper inflation rates or high interest rates, some economic meachancism 
will in fact make up for the problem which we have today in not 
balancing our budget. So I am not going to focus on that part of the 
debate.
  It has also been argued even by those who agree that we must balance 
the budget that in fact there are two different ways to do it. One, 
requiring in the Constitution by amending the language of our 
Constitution that we must balance the budget. The other is to do it 
through statutory reform, by changing statutes themselves, changing the 
budget process itself, so that in fact we might be able to, through the 
regular committee action and floor action in this body and the other 
body, that we might be able to agree to a balanced budget.
  It is argued that you do not need to amend the Constitution to 
balance the budget. In fact, that is correct, you do not. But I also 
believe that by requiring in the Constitution that we must balance our 
budget, it will give us that additional impetus, the additional force 
necessary, the commitment necessary, to actually accomplish that 
balanced budget. So I favor a balanced budget amendment to the 
Constitution, and this discussion is not going to go through the 
arguments of whether we should or should not file a balanced budget 
amendment to actually require it.
  This is a very serious issue, amending our Constitution. It was 
created over 200 years ago, and over that time has served us very well 
and has been amended very few times. In fact, now to change the actual 
wording in our Constitution is indeed very serious and very critical 
that we must do it right.
  Our first rule in government should be first to do no wrong, to do no 
harm. We must be certain that the changes we place into our 
Constitution do not create greater havoc or do greater harm or prevent 
us from being able to govern this great Nation.
  So really the issues I would like to discuss here today come down 
more to the questions of if we do place into our Constitution a 
requirement to balance the budget, what wording should we use and how 
would in be enforced? What type of enforcement mechanism should we 
include in the Constitution to require this Government to balance its 
income and outgo, or its outlays and receipts, was we call it in the 
various amendments. There are very technical issues and I am going to 
attempt over the next little while in plain English to outline a 
comparison of the various amendments that have been filed, so that we 
can identify where there are similarities and where there are 
differences.
  I plan on focusing on three principal amendments, all three of which 
have been filed as legislation in this Congress. They are the Barton-
Tauzin constitutional amendment, which I believe has the support of the 
majority leadership in the body. They are also the Schaefer-Stenholm 
amendment, which is the amendment that has been filed by Senator Dole, 
Senator Hatch, and Senator Simon in the Senate. And also a balanced 
budget amendment which I have filed in this body, and I would like to 
compare the three of them.
  I would like to analyze the alternative approaches being used in 
these three different amendments, the approaches and the mechanisms 
used for enforcement. I would like to identify the differences in these 
amendments, and there are several. There are some differences in what 
numbers we are going to be relying upon in balancing the budget. Some 
of these amendments requires or allow us to use or rely upon estimates 
of receipts and outlays. Other amendments will require us to deal with 
actual receipts and outlays. There are significant differences between 
estimates and actual numbers, and I would like to talk about those.
  Also, some of these amendments require the
   creation of, or do create in the Constitution, a new supermajority 
requirement for legislative action, while the other relies upon the 
existing constitutional majorities and the existing supermajority 
identified in overriding a Presidential veto.

  Also the enforcement mechanisms specifically. Some of these, two of 
these amendments rely upon future implementing legislation in order to 
set up an enforcement mechanism. The other sets up an enforcement 
mechanism in the language of the amendment itself.
  Also with regard to waiver, two of these amendments allow the 
Congress to waive the provisions of this article for any year in which 
the country is in war or military conflict. The other provides a more 
broad waiver opportunity.
  Finally, I would like to outline a possible--rather a probable--
constitutional crisis which in fact may be created under the terms and 
implementation of two of these particular amendments. So those are the 
things that I would like to talk about.
  First of all, let me compare the similarities in these amendments. 
The 
[[Page H489]] reason I have chosen these three amendments is because 
two of them are almost certain to have a vote on the floor of this 
House. The Barton-Tauzin amendment is indeed the amendment that the 
leadership has indicated we will have a vote on. The Stenholm-Schaefer 
amendment, the Committee on Rules will decide today whether to allow a 
vote on that amendment, and that amendment I believe should and will 
have a vote, because that is the amendment as filed in the other body, 
in the Senate. Third is the alternative amendment which I have filed, 
and it is obvious the reason I would like to talk about that is to show 
the difference between the language in the amendment I have filed and 
the language in the amendments that have been filed and almost 
certainly will be voted upon.
  Now, I will be asking the Committee on Rules later this afternoon to 
allow my amendments to be put forward for debate and a vote here on the 
floor of the House, and for that purpose I want to outline and explain 
the similarities and differences between all three of these amendments 
for my colleagues, so that as we look at these amendments in the future 
debate, that there will be understanding as to what each amendment does 
and does not include.
  First of all, the similarities. All three of these amendments provide 
for four very basic and substantive things to occur, and each do so 
very similarly.
  Now, they use slightly different language, but the language is not 
opposing or contradictory. Some of it is a little more artful than 
others in my opinion, but all three of these provide first that total 
outlays shall not exceed total receipts. That is the basic substantive 
criteria for the amendment, total outlays shall not exceed total 
receipts. Also, all three of these amendments would require that the 
President of the United States must submit to the Congress a proposed 
budget in which total outlays do not exceed total receipts.
  So it is saying that Congress must adopt a balanced budget, it is 
saying that the President must submit a balanced budget request to the 
Congress.
  Third, all three of these agree in the definition of what is total 
outlays and total receipts.
                              {time}  1450

  Fourth, all three of them provide that this amendment would go into 
effect as of fiscal year 2002, or the second fiscal year following 
ratification by the necessary number of States, should that be later 
than 2002.
  Therefore, Mr. Speaker, those issues are really in common with all of 
the amendments. Each amendment contains somewhat different language, 
but each amendment concurs with those principles.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, let us outline the differences in these amendments; 
first of all, the issue of estimated receipts and outlays as opposed to 
actual receipts and outlays.
  Here I would like to refer specifically to the language of the Spratt 
amendments. In the Schaefer-Stenholm amendment, section 6, the language 
says ``Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate 
legislation which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.'' 
Specifically, in the language of the amendment it allows the Congress, 
in implementing a balanced budget, to rely upon estimates of revenue 
and estimates of expenditures.
  In the Barton-Tauzin amendment, I would like to refer to section 1 of 
the Barton-Tauzin amendment. I will read it in its entirety, but the 
appropriate language is in the center: ``Prior to each fiscal year 
Congress shall, by law, adopt a statement of receipts and outlays for 
such fiscal year in which total outlays are not greater than total 
receipts. This is a statement of,'' and it's prior to the fiscal year, 
so it must be an estimate. ``Congress may, by law, amend that 
statement, provided revised outlays are not greater than revised 
receipts, and Congress may provide in that statement for a specific 
excess of outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to that 
subject in which three-fifths of the whole number of each House agree 
to such excess.'' So this Barton-Tauzin amendment also states that 
Congress would adopt a statement of receipts.
  On the other hand, in the Orton amendment, section 3, the Orton 
amendment requires that for any fiscal year in which actual outlays 
exceed actual receipts, Congress shall provide by law for the repayment 
in the ensuing year. Therefore, only the Orton amendment identifies the 
determination by Congress of actual outlays and actual receipts to 
ensure that the budget is actually balanced.
  What happens if we rely on receipts? To be fair, let me read the last 
sentence of section 1 of the Barton-Tauzin amendment, which says 
``Congress and the President shall ensure that actual outlays do not 
exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.''
  That is only dealing with actual outlays. What about actual receipts? 
There is no guaranty mechanism that the receipts which we project to 
receive will actually be received by government, and there is no 
mechanism in either of these other two amendments to deal with the 
possibility, in fact likelihood, that actual receipts will not match or 
mirror estimated receipts.
  Just to give some idea of the extent of the problem we are talking 
about, I would like to refer you to the Congressional Budget Office 
records of the last 14 fiscal years in estimating actual receipts. How 
far have they been off?
  This chart shows, beginning in 1980 and going through 1993, the 
amount by which the Congressional Budget Office estimates of receipts 
differed from actual receipts. The zero line is the amount of actual 
receipts that came in. The hashed marks here show the amount of 
overestimate or underestimate of
 receipts from the CBO's projections.

  If we look in 1980, CBO forecasted, projected that the Federal 
Government would generate almost $40 billion more in revenue than it 
actually received in 1980. In 1981 they overestimated receipts by $58 
billion; in 1982 by $73 billion; in 1983 by $91 billion.
  Look here, in 1990, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that 
receipts would actually be $119 billion more than they actually were. 
Those are estimates. Those are the Government's best guess at how much 
revenue would be coming into the budget during that fiscal year.
  We have to estimate at the beginning of the year. That is how we 
create the budget. Without the possibility of estimating revenue and 
expenditures, we have no budget. That is what the budget is, is an 
estimate.
  The problem, however, is unless we have some requirement to come back 
and match those actual outlays with actual receipts, we do not have a 
mechanism that requires a balanced budget. If all we require are 
expenditures or outlays to be actual, we still can end up not balancing 
the budget because we have overprojected revenues.
  Let me show you what would have happened if in fact the Congressional 
Budget Office over the last 14 years, if they had projected the actual 
receipts. We would have had no deficit. We would have had balance in 
what was projected.
  We would, indeed, have had an annual deficit each year because the 
estimates of expenditures always exceeded the estimates of receipts. 
I'm not saying that it is Congressional Budget Office's fault that we 
had deficit spending, but the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that expenditures would be a certain level, and estimated that receipts 
would be a certain level.
  If in fact we had had a balanced budget requirement in 1980, and we 
had held receipts to only the amount that we have projected them to be, 
as the Barton-Tauzin amendment would do, but did not have a mechanism 
for ensuring that receipts reached the level that we had estimated, 
this is what would have happened. In that 14 years, we still would have 
had a national debt or deficit spending over that period of time of 
over a half a trillion dollars.
  Therefore, unless we have a mechanism in this amendment to require 
somehow the balancing of actual receipts and actual expenditures, there 
is no guaranty that these amendments will provide or even require a 
balanced budget. That is a critical failing in both the Barton-Tauzin 
and the Stenholm-Schaefer amendments.
  Neither of them require us going back at the end of the year and 
comparing what we spent with what we brought it. Both of them allow us, 
in fact, to project receipts and expenditures. Both of them would allow 
this kind of overstatement of receipts with 
[[Page H490]] no mechanism to require us to go back and do anything 
about it.
  The Orton amendment, on the other hand, as I read, requires actual 
receipts and actual outlays to be compared, and if they are different, 
requires Congress to provide by law for the repayment of the actual 
outlays over the actual receipts. There are other differences in these 
amendments.
  The next major difference is the difference of super majority status, 
or super majorities. This came about as an effort or an attempt to 
create an enforcement mechanism in the balanced budget amendment.
  The critics of a balanced budget amendment said ``So you say in the 
Constitution that you have to balance the budget, but if all you do is 
say it and have no enforcement mechanism, how can the public trust 
government, rely upon government, to actually balance the budget as the 
Constitution requires?'' And if government simply ignores the 
requirement to balance the budget as required, does that not create 
public cynicism and distrust of government?
  In an effort to make it more difficult to ignore this requirement, 
both the Barton-Tauzin and the Stenholm-Schaefer amendments have in 
fact created the requirement of constitutional super majorities; in 
other words, more than 50 percent, significantly more than 50 percent. 
In both these cases 60 percent of the House and Senate would be 
required to take certain congressional or legislative action.

                              {time}  1500

  Again I would like to read specifically from the various amendments.
  The Barton-Tauzin amendment. First of all, section 1 states, 
``Congress may provide in that statement for a specific excess of 
outlays over receipts by a vote directed solely to that subject in 
which three-fifths of the whole number of each House agree to such 
excess.''
  So there is a three-fifths majority required in order to estimate 
that outlays would be greater than receipts. I do not know any 
politician who is willing to estimate that outlays would be greater 
than receipts and I do not know why Congress would want to estimate 
outlays greater than receipts if in fact they have a balanced budget 
requirement, but under the provisions of this balanced budget 
amendment, they would have to have a three-fifths majority in order to 
file a statement, or a budget in which outlays exceeded receipts.
  In section 2, the Barton amendment also says, ``No bill to increase 
receipts shall become law unless approved by a three-fifths majority of 
the whole number of each House of Congress.''
  So to raise taxes, it requires a three-fifths majority.
  Then finally, in section 6, ``The amount of Federal public debt as of 
the first day of the second fiscal year after ratification of this 
article shall become a permanent limit on such debt and there shall be 
no increase in such amount unless three-fifths of the whole number of 
each House of Congress shall have passed a bill approving such increase 
and such bill has become law.''
  So under Barton it requires a three-fifths majority to project that 
your budget would be out of balance, a three-fifths majority to 
increase taxes, and a three-fifths majority to increase the debt limit 
of the United States.
  Under the Stenholm bill, it does the same thing, requiring a three-
fifths majority to estimate that your expenditures would exceed your 
receipts, and it requires a three-fifths majority for you to raise the 
debt limit but does not require a three-fifths majority to increase 
taxes.
  There lies the major philosophical difference between those two 
amendments which you will see debated on this floor over the coming 
days, and it is
 an ideological argument. Do you want to require a supermajority of the 
body in order to increase revenue? Or do you want to say, no, we will 
leave it a constitutional majority, which is 50 percent plus one, and 
then the President would have to sign that into law or veto it, thereby 
bringing in the constitutional majority necessary for an override of 
the veto to ensure that in fact taxes could only be increased with the 
agreement of both Houses of Congress and the President in the executive 
branch.

  But those are the supermajority requirements outlined in both of 
these other two constitutional amendments.
  In the Orton amendment, it does not set up the requirement 
of supermajorities at all. It allows all of the 
current actions that are taken in Congress, or the actions under this 
amendment to be taken with the standard constitutional majority but it 
also requires that in the event Congress does not balance the budget, 
in other words, in the event outlays exceed receipts in any particular 
year, they must provide by law for it to be paid back. That brings the 
President into this activity, thereby bringing into play the 
constitutional supermajority necessary to override the President's 
veto.
  Under the Orton amendment, it does not create a supermajority. It 
allows a majority of the House and a majority of the Senate to act in 
concert with the President. If the President disagrees with the 
Congress, he may veto the legislation, in which case the Congress in 
order to enact the legislation over the veto would be required to get 
the supermajority necessary to override the veto, which is greater than 
three-fifths.
  Next there is a difference in waivers. Under the Barton amendment and 
the Stenholm amendment, both of these constitutional amendments would 
only allow the Congress to waive the requirement of a balanced budget 
in a year ``in which a declaration of war is in effect'' or, and now I 
am paraphrasing, the United States faces an imminent and serious threat 
of international security which would be declared by a joint 
resolution.
  The Stenholm amendment identifies engaged in a military conflict 
which presents a serious threat to the national security.
  These are very narrow waiver provisions. In reality, there are many, 
many, different forces outside and internal forces which could impact 
the U.S. economy, making it detrimental to the United States to require 
a balanced budget in any specific year, such as economic depression, 
the cyclical events which occur in economies. There are times in which 
balancing the budget which would require either substantial decrease in 
Federal expenditures or increase in taxes would bring upon economic 
calamity.
  This can viewed in historic detail by looking back to President 
Hoover who at the end of his term in fact did cut spending and 
substantially increased taxes which was followed by the economic 
depression.
  The Orton amendment simply provides that ``the provisions of this 
article may be waived for any fiscal year only if Congress so provides 
by law by a majority of the whole number of each House. Such waiver 
shall be subject to veto by the President.''
  Therefore, the Orton amendment relies upon the Constitution as it 
currently is drafted and in effect relies upon the requirement of 
majorities in both bodies supported by the concurrence of the President 
through signature on the legislation in order to waive the requirement 
for a balanced budget.
  I personally believe that if you have got both Houses of Congress and 
the President saying it is necessary to waive the provisions of that 
balanced budget amendment for the good of the Nation, then we probably 
should have the power to waive it; and if the public disagrees, in the 
next election they can say so and they can vote those people out and 
vote in people who promise not to do that type of thing.
  So the waiver is the third major difference.
  The fourth has to do with enforcement, the enforcement mechanism 
itself.
  Under the Barton version of the amendment, section 8 reads, 
``Congress shall enforce and implement with appropriate legislation.'' 
That legislation is not currently even drafted. It is contemplated to 
be future legislation.
  Under the Stenholm version of the bill, section 6 reads, ``The 
Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate 
legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.''
  Again, that legislation implementing the balanced budget, telling the 
country how we are going to enforce this amendment, has not yet been 
drafted.
  The theory is that we will first pass the constitutional amendment 
requiring us to do it, we will then somehow 
[[Page H491]] find the wisdom and the courage to come back and actually 
do it.
  Under the Orton version of the amendment, it is a fairly simple 
enforcement mechanism which relies upon the current balance of powers 
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branch, and it states 
simply under section 3, ``For any fiscal year in which actual outlays 
exceed actual receipts, the Congress shall provide by law for the 
repayment in the ensuing fiscal year of such excess outlays.''

                              {time}  1510

  If Congress fails to provide by law for repayment, within 15 days 
after Congress adjourns to end a session there shall be a sequestration 
of all outlays to eliminate a budget deficit.
  This is a very, very hard enforcement mechanism, but it places the 
burden squarely on the shoulders of the Congress and the President to 
either find a way to balance the budget, and state it by statutory law, 
or to say to the public we cannot find a way; we believe it would be 
detrimental to the public to balance the budget and here is why.
  If Congress neither balances the budget nor waives the balanced 
budget requirement, the Constitution would place in it a hard sequester 
enforcement mechanism that simply cuts spending across the board to 
balance the budget in the next fiscal year, to pay back the deficit 
that we incurred, probably through estimating rosy scenarios, as has 
been done in past years.
  If we want to ensure to the public that in fact the Government will 
balance its budget, I submit the Orton amendment is the only amendment 
which has been filed which contains an enforcement mechanism to require 
Government to accomplish what is set forth in this article. So there is 
a significant difference in enforcement.
  Finally, I told you I wanted to outline the possibility or even 
probability of a constitutional crisis if in fact we adopt either the 
Stenholm-Schaefer or the Barton-Tauzin amendment, and it is my opinion 
that one or the other will be adopted. By the way, before I explain the 
crisis, let me say I have in two Congresses in the past supported and 
voted for the Stenholm-Schaefer language, which is the same language 
which has been proposed in the Senate, and it is, in fact, my intention 
to vote for the best balanced budget amendment that we can get through 
this House, this time. What I am attempting to do is to raise the 
debate to these issues which I believe must be addressed in order to 
develop the best constitutional amendment.
  Let me point out a scenario which I believe can and will lead to 
constitutional crisis if we do not change the language of these 
amendments before adoption. Assume the following facts: Let us assume 
that we pass the amendment. The year 2003 rolls around, the amendment 
is in place, it is part of the Constitution. Let us assume that it is 
the Barton-Tauzin amendment which has been passed. We follow the 
amendment to the letter.
  The amendment requires us to set forth a statement, a proposed budget 
in which outlays do not exceed receipts. We do that. We identify 
through our priorities where we are going to cut, where we are going to 
increase, and that statement of outlays and expenditures is in balance.
  We go along and we revise those statements of outlays and 
expenditures through the year, if necessary. It is in balance and, in 
fact, Congress and the President have ``insured that actual outlays do 
not exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.'' They have kept a 
padlock on the purse strings, they have not spent 1 cent more than 
outlined in the projected budget.
  But, the fiscal year ends September 30, the new fiscal year begins 
October 1. On September 10 or September 1 we discover, the Treasury 
Department tells us we over estimated revenues, because of a cyclical 
down turn in the economy, because unemployment went higher, because 
something happened, dumping from a foreign country into our markets, we 
lost employees,
 we have lost revenue. Some unforeseen occurrence has taken place, and 
revenues do not match what we had estimated.

  Let us say that the budget in 2003 is the same as the budget this 
year, approximately $1.5 trillion. We estimate $1.5 trillion of 
expenditures; we estimate $1.5 trillion of receipts. We only spend $1.5 
trillion, but we only bring in $1.49 trillion. We are short $100 
billion of revenue, or we are short $100 million of revenue, or we are 
short $100,000 of revenue. It does not matter. So long as the revenue 
is less than the receipts or the expenditures, we are not in balance, 
we are now in violation.
  What happens? First of all it takes a three-fifths majority to waive 
this and to cut or lower our estimate of expenditures or raise our 
estimates of revenues. But estimates are not going to do us any good in 
September of the fiscal year if we have already spent the money. There 
is not any money we can cut. It was spent through the fiscal year. In 
fact, it says you cannot raise revenue without a three-fifths majority.
  It would not do us any good to raise revenue anyway, because in 
September of the fiscal year we could not get a bill passed and 
implemented, signed and gear up the Internal Revenue Service to go out 
and collect more money. Therefore, what happens is, the Government is 
in deficit spending, not because we spent more than we thought, but 
because we did not bring in the revenue we thought, and section 6 comes 
into play.
  Section 6 says the amount of Federal public debt, as of the first of 
the second fiscal year after ratification of this article shall become 
a permanent limit on such debt and there shall be no increase in such 
amount unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House of 
Congress shall have passed a bill approving such increase and such bill 
has become law.
  What you have done is, the only option that the Federal Government 
has at the end of that fiscal year is to increase the debt limit, if 
they have overestimated revenues, and those revenues do not come in, 
and we have seen the likelihood of overestimating revenues. This chart 
shows that in every year but 1 in the last 14 years we overestimated 
revenues.
  So if we follow history and overestimate revenues, only spent the 
amount we said we would spend, we have not balanced the budget, we 
cannot borrow more money to make up that difference, unless three-
fifths of the House and the Senate vote. If my math is correct, that 
only takes 40 Members of the Senate or 178 Members of the House to make 
up 40 percent.
  Therefore, what you have done by creating a super majority 
requirement is you have placed control of that decision in the hands of 
a minority of Members in this body or the other body. In other words, 
40 percent could hold the 60 percent hostage for some other action or 
refuse to allow the debt limit to be increased.
  People say, ``Oh, well, so what? So you do not allow the debt limit 
to be increased; you just cannot borrow more money.'' If I go to the 
bank, my bank tells me, ``Sorry, you have hit your debt limit. We are 
not going to loan you any more money.'' Why should we not do that with 
the Government?
  The problem, is, the Government has Treasury notes, Treasury bills, 
and so on, which are actually out there, people have purchased them. 
Over 80 percent of the money we have borrowed has come from we, the 
people of the United States.

                              {time}  1520

  It is from our savings and checking accounts, et cetera.
  Those T-bills come due. We have already spent the money of the fiscal 
year. We brought in less than we thought.
  If we do not increase the debt limit and borrow that $100 billion or 
$100,000 or whatever the difference is, we are in technical default.
  So what happens if the Government is in technical default? You just 
go in, file chapter 11 bankruptcy, your creditors will give you some 
time to work it out, and pay it back, and all is well? No. If the 
Government goes into technical default, the most likely scenario is an 
immediate devaluation of the dollar which causes an immediate spiraling 
of inflation, an immediate increase in interest rates, would cause 
turmoil not only in the stock market in this country, the stock market 
and financial markets would cause turmoil throughout the entire world.
  It is not a feasible alternative to force the U.S. Government into 
bankruptcy, into technical default on its loans. Therefore, the 
Congress would be required to act to increase that
 debt 
[[Page H492]] limit, and if you get 40 percent of either body refusing 
to increase the debt limit, unless you deal with this specific issue, 
now you have placed control of the Government in the hands of the few 
rather than in the hand of the majority.
  This could happen on either side of the aisle. You could have some 
from the right-hand side of the political spectrum, those who believe 
that we have been spending far too little on national defense, those 
who believe that, in fact, the budget should be spending more on 
national defense; they could group together and get 40 percent of 
either body and say, ``We will not agree to increase the debt limit of 
the United States unless we not only borrow what we have to borrow to 
cover last year's expenditures, we want to borrow more. We want another 
$200 billion, and we want a $200 billion supplemental appropriation 
today passed before we agree to increase the debt limit, in order to 
put $200 billion more into national defense.''
  You could get 40 percent of the people from the left-hand side of the 
political spectrum who believe that we are not spending enough on job 
training and education and welfare benefits or retirement benefits who 
may come to the floor of this House or the other house and say, 
``Sorry, we have not spent enough on these programs. I am not going to 
vote to increase the national debt and prevent the country from going 
into technical bankruptcy and default unless we also borrow enough 
money, and you give me a supplemental appropriation right now to 
increase welfare payments or retirement benefits or health care,'' or 
any of the other benefits that they feel very strongly about.
  You might also have some people who care more about getting a highway 
or a bridge built in their district who demand more appropriations for 
pork-barrel spending, for a clock tower in their State or some other 
type of spending which the rest of this body would not go along with 
but for the fact a gun is being held to the head of the country.
  I say to my colleagues and suggest going back and reviewing the 
Federalist Papers wherein Madison, the draftsman of our Constitution, 
and Hamilton, and Jefferson, and Jay debated and discussed among 
themselves and others the wisdom of creating supermajority requirements 
to act in this or the other legislative body. They concluded, and I 
believe rightly so, that supermajorities should be used very, very 
limited, only to situations of overriding a veto or adopting a treaty 
or expelling Members from the body, instances wherein the Constitution 
requires supermajorities.
  And so I submit that if, in fact, we include the language of 
supermajorities and specifically the language of a supermajority 
requirement to increase the debt ceiling, that, in fact, you are 
inviting a constitutional crisis. You are inviting just the exact 
scenario that those supporters of a balanced budget amendment in this 
body have fought so hard against. You are inviting the types of 
calamity that we must avoid.
  Now, I am going to be asking the Committee on Rules to make in order 
two specific amendments. First is the constitutional amendment which I 
have filed as a separate, freestanding amendment. It also has been 
filed, and I believe is identified in the Record, as an amendment to 
the balanced budget amendment in the form of a substitute. It is that 
amendment which I have outlined which does not create constitutional 
supermajorities but relies upon the current majority and the veto of 
the President in order to enforce the provisions of a balanced budget. 
It broadly allows waiver, but again with the Congress and the President 
agreeing to that waiver by law.
  It does not create provisions for a supermajority to either increase 
spending or revenues or to increase the debt limit.
  It is the simplest version which I know of which has been filed in as 
plain English as we could put it and the only version of the 
constitutional amendments filed, to my knowledge, which has in it a 
real enforcement mechanism in the body of the amendment itself. Others 
rely upon future legislation to enforce.
  So I will be asking for that amendment to be made in order so that we 
can come here to the floor of the House and debate that amendment and 
the provisions in it.
  I will also be asking to be made in order a substitute which in 
essence is the wording of the Stenholm-Schaefer amendment, but deleting 
two particular provisions, deleting from their section 6 the words that 
allow the Congress to rely upon estimates of outlays and receipts, and 
also deleting entirely section 2 of that particular amendment which 
creates the constitutional supermajority of three-fifths in order to 
increase the debt limit.
  It is my hope that the Committee on Rules will allow these amendments 
in the nature of a substitute to be brought forward. I have agreed many 
times with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle over the last 4 
years that I have been selected as a Member of this body wherein they 
came to the floor of this House and complained that the then Democratic 
Rules Committee was being unfair, was not allowing the system to work, 
was not allowing this body to work its will on legislation, was not 
allowing full, free and open debate on the issues, was not allowing us 
to draft the best legislation we could possibly draft, and they called 
for open rules. They said:

       You put us in the majority, and when we bring legislation 
     to the floor, it will come under an open rule, so that any 
     Member of this body can come to the well of this floor and 
     propose amendments to perfect the language of the 
     legislation, to make it better, to use the brilliance and the 
     genius of our system, free and open debate, so that the will 
     of the people can be determined in this body.

  That was their pledge.
  They are now in power. They have an opportunity to keep that pledge. 
And I would urge them to do so by providing an open rule of debate on 
this very critical and important constitutional amendment. I cannot 
conceive of a more critical piece of legislation to consider in this or 
any other Congress than amending the very words of the Constitution 
itself.
  I cannot conceive of bringing that type of legislation to the floor 
of this body under a closed rule preventing free and open debate, 
preventing us to raise these questions.

                              {time}  1530

  I would ask anyone who would support a closed rule to come to the 
floor of this House and explain to the people how they are going to 
avoid the very constitutional crisis I have just outlined. It is 
necessary to bring these issues to the floor for full and open debate 
in order to work the will of the people, in order to get the best 
legislation we can possibly get.
  So I thank my colleagues for their patience, their listening to these 
issues, and I thank them for their consideration of the balanced budget 
amendment, which I support, and I thank them for their consideration of 
the amendments which I hope to propose and encourage this body to 
proceed very cautiously as we contemplate and move toward amending the 
very language which is the foundation of our system, the Constitution 
of the United States.

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