[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 17, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H252-H274]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[[Page H252]]
                CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the 
Senate bill (S. 2) to make certain laws applicable to the legislative 
branch of the Federal Government.
  The Clerk read as follows:
                                  S. 2
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Congressional Accountability Act of 1995''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

                            TITLE I--GENERAL

Sec. 101. Definitions.
Sec. 102. Application of laws.

             TITLE II--EXTENSION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS

Part A--Employment Discrimination, Family and Medical Leave, Fair Labor 
    Standards, Employee Polygraph Protection, Worker Adjustment and 
 Retraining, Employment and Reemployment of Veterans, and Intimidation

Sec. 201. Rights and protections under title VII of the Civil Rights 
              Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
              1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and title I of the 
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Sec. 202. Rights and protections under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
              of 1993.
Sec. 203. Rights and protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
              1938.
Sec. 204. Rights and protections under the Employee Polygraph 
              Protection Act of 1988.
Sec. 205. Rights and protections under the Worker Adjustment and 
              Retraining Notification Act.
Sec. 206. Rights and protections relating to veterans' employment and 
              reemployment.
Sec. 207. Prohibition of intimidation or reprisal.

  Part B--Public Services and Accommodations Under the Americans With 
                        Disabilities Act of 1990

Sec. 210. Rights and protections under the Americans with Disabilities 
              Act of 1990 relating to public services and 
              accommodations; procedures for remedy of violations.

           Part C--Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

Sec. 215. Rights and protections under the Occupational Safety and 
              Health Act of 1970; procedures for remedy of violations.

                   Part D--Labor-Management Relations

Sec. 220. Application of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, 
              relating to Federal service labor-management relations; 
              procedures for remedy of violations.

                            Part E--General

Sec. 225. Generally applicable remedies and limitations.

                             Part F--Study

Sec. 230. Study and recommendations regarding General Accounting 
              Office, Government Printing Office, and Library of 
              Congress.

                    TITLE III--OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

Sec. 301. Establishment of Office of Compliance.
Sec. 302. Officers, staff, and other personnel.
Sec. 303. Procedural rules.
Sec. 304. Substantive regulations.
Sec. 305. Expenses.

  TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

Sec. 401. Procedure for consideration of alleged violations.
Sec. 402. Counseling.
Sec. 403. Mediation.
Sec. 404. Election of proceeding.
Sec. 405. Complaint and hearing.
Sec. 406. Appeal to the Board.
Sec. 407. Judicial review of Board decisions and enforcement.
Sec. 408. Civil action.
Sec. 409. Judicial review of regulations.
Sec. 410. Other judicial review prohibited.
Sec. 411. Effect of failure to issue regulations.
Sec. 412. Expedited review of certain appeals.
Sec. 413. Privileges and immunities.
Sec. 414. Settlement of complaints.
Sec. 415. Payments.
Sec. 416. Confidentiality.

                   TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 501. Exercise of rulemaking powers.
Sec. 502. Political affiliation and place of residence.
Sec. 503. Nondiscrimination rules of the House and Senate.
Sec. 504. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 505. Judicial branch coverage study.
Sec. 506. Savings provisions.
Sec. 507. Use of frequent flyer miles.
Sec. 508. Sense of Senate regarding adoption of simplified and 
              streamlined acquisition procedures for Senate 
              acquisitions.
Sec. 509. Severability.
                            TITLE I--GENERAL

     SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

       Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, as 
     used in this Act:
       (1) Board.--The term ``Board'' means the Board of Directors 
     of the Office of Compliance.
       (2) Chair.--The term ``Chair'' means the Chair of the Board 
     of Directors of the Office of Compliance.
       (3) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' means 
     any employee of--
       (A) the House of Representatives;
       (B) the Senate;
       (C) the Capitol Guide Service;
       (D) the Capitol Police;
       (E) the Congressional Budget Office;
       (F) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol;
       (G) the Office of the Attending Physician;
       (H) the Office of Compliance; or
       (I) the Office of Technology Assessment.
       (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes an applicant 
     for employment and a former employee.
       (5) Employee of the office of the architect of the 
     capitol.--The term ``employee of the Office of the Architect 
     of the Capitol'' includes any employee of the Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, or the Senate 
     Restaurants.
       (6) Employee of the capitol police.--The term ``employee of 
     the Capitol Police'' includes any member or officer of the 
     Capitol Police.
       (7) Employee of the house of representatives.--The term 
     ``employee of the House of Representatives'' includes an 
     individual occupying a position the pay for which is 
     disbursed by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, or 
     another official designated by the House of Representatives, 
     or any employment position in an entity that is paid with 
     funds derived from the clerk-hire allowance of the House of 
     Representatives but not any such individual employed by any 
     entity listed in subparagraphs (C) through (I) of paragraph 
     (3).
       (8) Employee of the senate.--The term ``employee of the 
     Senate'' includes any employee whose pay is disbursed by the 
     Secretary of the Senate, but not any such individual employed 
     by any entity listed in subparagraphs (C) through (I) of 
     paragraph (3).
       (9) Employing office.--The term ``employing office'' 
     means--
       (A) the personal office of a Member of the House of 
     Representatives or of a Senator;
       (B) a committee of the House of Representatives or the 
     Senate or a joint committee;
       (C) any other office headed by a person with the final 
     authority to appoint, hire, discharge, and set the terms, 
     conditions, or privileges of the employment of an employee of 
     the House of Representatives or the Senate; or
       (D) the Capitol Guide Board, the Capitol Police Board, the 
     Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of 
     the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, the 
     Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology 
     Assessment.
       (10) Executive director.--The term ``Executive Director'' 
     means the Executive Director of the Office of Compliance.
       (11) General counsel.--The term ``General Counsel'' means 
     the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance.
       (12) Office.--The term ``Office'' means the Office of 
     Compliance.

     SEC. 102. APPLICATION OF LAWS.

       (a) Laws Made Applicable.--The following laws shall apply, 
     as prescribed by this Act, to the legislative branch of the 
     Federal Government:
       (1) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et 
     seq.).
       (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e et seq.).
       (3) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     12101 et seq.).
       (4) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 
     U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
       (5) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 
     2611 et seq.).
       (6) The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 
     U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
       (7) Chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
     management relations) of title 5, United States Code.
       (8) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 
     U.S.C. 2001 et seq.).
       (9) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
       (10) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et 
     seq.).
       (11) Chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and 
     reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.
       (b) Laws Which May Be Made Applicable.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall review provisions of 
     Federal law (including regulations) relating to (A) the terms 
     and conditions of employment (including hiring, promotion, 
     demotion, termination, salary, wages, overtime compensation, 
     benefits, work assignments or reassignments, grievance and 
     disciplinary procedures, protection from discrimination in 
     personnel actions, occupational health and safety, and family 
     and medical and other leave) of employees, and (B) access to 
     public services and accommodations,
       (2) Board report.--Beginning on December 31, 1996, and 
     every 2 years thereafter, the Board shall report on (A) 
     whether or to what 
     [[Page H253]] degree the provisions described in paragraph 
     (1) are applicable or inapplicable to the legislative branch, 
     and (B) with respect to provisions inapplicable to the 
     legislative branch, whether such provisions should be made 
     applicable to the legislative branch. The presiding officers 
     of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall cause 
     each such report to be printed in the Congressional Record 
     and each such report shall be referred to the committees of 
     the House of Representatives and the Senate with 
     jurisdiction.
       (3) Reports of congressional committees.--Each report 
     accompanying any bill or joint resolution relating to terms 
     and conditions of employment or access to public services or 
     accommodations reported by a committee of the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate shall--
       (A) describe the manner in which the provisions of the bill 
     or joint resolution apply to the legislative branch; or
       (B) in the case of a provision not applicable to the 
     legislative branch, include a statement of the reasons the 
     provision does not apply.

     On the objection of any Member, it shall not be in order for 
     the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any 
     such bill or joint resolution if the report of the committee 
     on such bill or joint resolution does not comply with the 
     provisions of this paragraph. This paragraph may be waived in 
     either House by majority vote of that House.
             TITLE II--EXTENSION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS

PART A--EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, FAIR LABOR 
    STANDARDS, EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION, WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND 
 RETRAINING, EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS, AND INTIMIDATION

     SEC. 201. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL 
                   RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
                   EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, THE REHABILITATION ACT 
                   OF 1973, AND TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
                   DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990.

       (a) Discriminatory Practices Prohibited.--All personnel 
     actions affecting covered employees shall be made free from 
     any discrimination based on--
       (1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within 
     the meaning of section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
     (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2);
       (2) age, within the meaning of section 15 of the Age 
     Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a); or
       (3) disability, within the meaning of section 501 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) and sections 102 
     through 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
     (42 U.S.C. 12112-12114).
       (b) Remedy.--
       (1) Civil rights.--The remedy for a violation of subsection 
     (a)(1) shall be--
       (A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e-5(g)); and
       (B) such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if 
     awarded under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981), or as would be appropriate if awarded under sections 
     1977A(a)(1), 1977A(b)(2), and, irrespective of the size of 
     the employing office, 1977A(b)(3)(D) of the Revised Statutes 
     (42 U.S.C. 1981a(a)(1), 1981a(b)(2), and 1981a(b)(3)(D)).
       (2) Age discrimination.--The remedy for a violation of 
     subsection (a)(2) shall be--
       (A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
     1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(c)); and
       (B) such liquidated damages as would be appropriate if 
     awarded under section 7(b) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 626(b)).

     In addition, the waiver provisions of section 7(f) of such 
     Act (29 U.S.C. 626(f)) shall apply to covered employees.
       (3) Disabilities discrimination.--The remedy for a 
     violation of subsection (a)(3) shall be--
       (A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 
     U.S.C. 794a(a)(1)) or section 107(a) of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)); and
       (B) such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if 
     awarded under sections 1977A(a)(2), 1977A(a)(3), 1977A(b)(2), 
     and, irrespective of the size of the employing office, 
     1977A(b)(3)(D) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 
     1981a(a)(2), 1981a(a)(3), 1981a(b)(2), and 1981a(b)(3)(D)).
       (c) Application to General Accounting Office, Government 
     Printing Office, and Library of Congress.--
       (1) Section 717 of the civil rights act of 1964.--Section 
     717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) 
     is amended by--
       (A) striking ``legislative and'';
       (B) striking ``branches'' and inserting ``branch''; and
       (C) inserting ``Government Printing Office, the General 
     Accounting Office, and the'' after ``and in the''.
       (2) Section 15 of the age discrimination in employment act 
     of 1967.--Section 15(a) of the Age Discrimination in 
     Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(a)) is amended by--
       (A) striking ``legislative and'';
       (B) striking ``branches'' and inserting ``branch''; and
       (C) inserting ``Government Printing Office, the General 
     Accounting Office, and the'' after ``and in the''.
       (3) Section 509 of the americans with disabilities act of 
     1990.--Section 509 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
     1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209) is amended--
       (A) by striking subsections (a) and (b) of section 509;
       (B) in subsection (c), by striking ``(c) Instrumentalities 
     of Congress.--'' and inserting ``The General Accounting 
     Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of 
     Congress shall be covered as follows:'';
       (C) by striking the second sentence of paragraph (2);
       (D) in paragraph (4), by striking ``the instrumentalities 
     of the Congress include'' and inserting ``the term 
     `instrumentality of the Congress' means'', by striking ``the 
     Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office'', 
     by inserting ``and'' before ``the Library'', and by striking 
     ``the Office of Technology Assessment, and the United States 
     Botanic Garden'';
       (E) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7) and by 
     inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph:
       ``(5) Enforcement of employment rights.--The remedies and 
     procedures set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act 
     of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) shall be available to any 
     employee of an instrumentality of the Congress who alleges a 
     violation of the rights and protections under sections 102 
     through 104 of this Act that are made applicable by this 
     section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment 
     Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief 
     official of the instrumentality of the Congress.''; and
       (F) by amending the title of the section to read 
     ``INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE CONGRESS''.
       (d) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect 1 year 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 202. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL 
                   LEAVE ACT OF 1993.

       (a) Family and Medical Leave Rights and Protections 
     Provided.--
       (1) In general.--The rights and protections established by 
     sections 101 through 105 of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
     of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2611 through 2615) shall apply to covered 
     employees.
       (2) Definition.--For purposes of the application described 
     in paragraph (1)--
       (A) the term ``employer'' as used in the Family and Medical 
     Leave Act of 1993 means any employing office, and
       (B) the term ``eligible employee'' as used in the Family 
     and Medical Leave Act of 1993 means a covered employee who 
     has been employed in any employing office for 12 months and 
     for at least 1,250 hours of employment during the previous 12 
     months.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy, including liquidated damages, as would 
     be appropriate if awarded under paragraph (1) of section 
     107(a) of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 
     2617(a)(1)).
       (c) Application to General Accounting Office and Library of 
     Congress.--
       (1) Amendments to the family and medical leave act of 
     1993.--
       (A) Coverage.--Section 101(4)(A) of the Family and Medical 
     Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)) is amended by 
     striking ``and'' at the end of clause (ii), by striking the 
     period at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ``; and'', 
     and by adding after clause (iii) the following:
       ``(iv) includes the General Accounting Office and the 
     Library of Congress.''.
       (B) Enforcement.--Section 107 of the Family and Medical 
     Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2617) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(f) General Accounting Office and Library of Congress.--
     In the case of the General Accounting Office and the Library 
     of Congress, the authority of the Secretary of Labor under 
     this title shall be exercised respectively by the Comptroller 
     General of the United States and the Librarian of 
     Congress.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment to title 5, united states code.--
     Section 6381(1)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking ``and'' after ``District of Columbia'' and 
     inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and any 
     employee of the General Accounting Office or the Library of 
     Congress''.
       (d) Regulations.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement the rights and protections 
     under this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the 
     statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except 
     insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown and 
     stated together with the regulation, that a modification of 
     such regulations would be more effective for the 
     implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section.
       (e) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 
     1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
     Subsection (c) shall be effective 1 year after transmission 
     to the Congress of the study under section 230.

     SEC. 203. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR 
                   STANDARDS ACT OF 1938.

       (a) Fair Labor Standards.--
      [[Page H254]]   (1) In general.--The rights and protections 
     established by subsections (a)(1) and (d) of section 6, 
     section 7, and section 12(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
     of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206 (a)(1) and (d), 207, 212(c)) shall 
     apply to covered employees.
       (2) Interns.--For the purposes of this section, the term 
     ``covered employee'' does not include an intern as defined in 
     regulations under subsection (c).
       (3) Compensatory time.--Except as provided in regulations 
     under subsection (c)(3), covered employees may not receive 
     compensatory time in lieu of overtime compensation.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy, including liquidated damages, as would 
     be appropriate if awarded under section 16(b) of the Fair 
     Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216(b)).
       (c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--Except as provided in paragraph 
     (3), the regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall be the 
     same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
     of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in 
     subsection (a) except insofar as the Board may determine, for 
     good cause shown and stated together with the regulation, 
     that a modification of such regulations would be more 
     effective for the implementation of the rights and 
     protections under this section.
       (3) Irregular work schedules.--The Board shall issue 
     regulations for covered employees whose work schedules 
     directly depend on the schedule of the House of 
     Representatives or the Senate that shall be comparable to the 
     provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that apply 
     to employees who have irregular work schedules.
       (d) Application to the Government Printing Office.--Section 
     3(e)(2)(A) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 
     203(e)(2)(A)) is amended--
       (1) in clause (iii), by striking ``legislative or'',
       (2) by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (iv), and
       (3) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (v) and 
     inserting ``, or'' and by adding after clause (v) the 
     following:
       ``(vi) the Government Printing Office;''.
       (e) Effective Date.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall be 
     effective 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 204. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH 
                   PROTECTION ACT OF 1988.

       (a) Polygraph Practices Prohibited.--
       (1) In general.--No employing office, irrespective of 
     whether a covered employee works in that employing office, 
     may require a covered employee to take a lie detector test 
     where such a test would be prohibited if required by an 
     employer under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 3 of the 
     Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2002 
     (1), (2), or (3)). In addition, the waiver provisions of 
     section 6(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 2005(d)) shall apply to 
     covered employees.
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``covered employee'' shall include employees of the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress and the term 
     ``employing office'' shall include the General Accounting 
     Office and the Library of Congress.
       (3) Capitol police.--Nothing in this section shall preclude 
     the Capitol Police from using lie detector tests in 
     accordance with regulations under subsection (c).
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 6(c)(1) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 
     1988 (29 U.S.C. 2005(c)(1)).
       (c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the 
     statutory provisions referred to in subsections (a) and (b) 
     except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause 
     shown and stated together with the regulation, that a 
     modification of such regulations would be more effective for 
     the implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
     This section shall be effective with respect to the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after 
     transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

     SEC. 205. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT 
                   AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT.

       (a) Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Rights.--
       (1) In general.--No employing office shall be closed or a 
     mass layoff ordered within the meaning of section 3 of the 
     Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.C. 
     2102) until the end of a 60-day period after the employing 
     office serves written notice of such prospective closing or 
     layoff to representatives of covered employees or, if there 
     are no representatives, to covered employees.
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``covered employee'' shall include employees of the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress and the term 
     ``employing office'' shall include the General Accounting 
     Office and the Library of Congress.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 5(a) of the Worker 
     Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.C. 
     2104(a)(1), (2), and (4)).
       (c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the 
     statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except 
     insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown and 
     stated together with the regulation, that a modification of 
     such regulations would be more effective for the 
     implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
     This section shall be effective with respect to the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after 
     transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

     SEC. 206. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS RELATING TO VETERANS' 
                   EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT.

       (a) Employment and Reemployment Rights of Members of the 
     Uniformed Services.--
       (1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for an employing 
     office to--
       (A) discriminate, within the meaning of subsections (a) and 
     (b) of section 4311 of title 38, United States Code, against 
     an eligible employee;
       (B) deny to an eligible employee reemployment rights within 
     the meaning of sections 4312 and 4313 of title 38, United 
     States Code; or
       (C) deny to an eligible employee benefits within the 
     meaning of sections 4316, 4317, and 4318 of title 38, United 
     States Code.
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (A) the term ``eligible employee'' means a covered employee 
     performing service in the uniformed services, within the 
     meaning of section 4303(13) of title 38, United States Code, 
     whose service has not been terminated upon occurrence of any 
     of the events enumerated in section 4304 of title 38, United 
     States Code,
       (B) the term ``covered employee'' includes employees of the 
     General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress, and
       (C) the term ``employing office'' includes the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (3) of section 4323(c) of title 
     38, United States Code.
       (c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the 
     statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except to 
     the extent that the Board may determine, for good cause shown 
     and stated together with the regulation, that a modification 
     of such regulations would be more effective for the 
     implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section.
       (d) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.
       (2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
     This section shall be effective with respect to the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after 
     transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

     SEC. 207. PROHIBITION OF INTIMIDATION OR REPRISAL.

       (a) In General.--It shall be unlawful for an employing 
     office to intimidate, take reprisal against, or otherwise 
     discriminate against, any covered employee because the 
     covered employee has opposed any practice made unlawful by 
     this Act, or because the covered employee has initiated 
     proceedings, made a charge, or testified, assisted, or 
     participated in any manner in a hearing or other proceeding 
     under this Act.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy available for a violation of 
     subsection (a) shall be such legal or equitable remedy as may 
     be appropriate to redress a violation of subsection (a).
  [[Page H255]] PART B--PUBLIC SERVICES AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE 
                AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

     SEC. 210. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
                   DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 RELATING TO PUBLIC 
                   SERVICES AND ACCOMMODATIONS; PROCEDURES FOR 
                   REMEDY OF VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Entities Subject to This Section.--The requirements of 
     this section shall apply to--
       (1) each office of the Senate, including each office of a 
     Senator and each committee;
       (2) each office of the House of Representatives, including 
     each office of a Member of the House of Representatives and 
     each committee;
       (3) each joint committee of the Congress;
       (4) the Capitol Guide Service;
       (5) the Capitol Police;
       (6) the Congressional Budget Office;
       (7) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (including 
     the Senate Restaurants and the Botanic Garden);
       (8) the Office of the Attending Physician;
       (9) the Office of Compliance; and
       (10) the Office of Technology Assessment.
       (b) Discrimination in Public Services and Accommodations.--
       (1) Rights and protections.--The rights and protections 
     against discrimination in the provision of public services 
     and accommodations established by sections 201 through 230, 
     302, 303, and 309 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
     1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131-12150, 12182, 12183, and 12189) shall 
     apply to the entities listed in subsection (a).
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of the application of title 
     II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     12131 et seq.) under this section, the term ``public entity'' 
     means any entity listed in subsection (a) that provides 
     public services, programs, or activities.
       (c) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (b) 
     shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 203 or 308(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
     of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12133, 12188(a)), except that, with 
     respect to any claim of employment discrimination asserted by 
     any covered employee, the exclusive remedy shall be under 
     section 201 of this title.
       (d) Available Procedures.--
       (1) Charge filed with general counsel.--A qualified 
     individual with a disability, as defined in section 201(2) of 
     the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     12131(2)), who alleges a violation of subsection (b) by an 
     entity listed in subsection (a), may file a charge against 
     any entity responsible for correcting the violation with the 
     General Counsel within 180 days of the occurrence of the 
     alleged violation. The General Counsel shall investigate the 
     charge.
       (2) Mediation.--If, upon investigation under paragraph (1), 
     the General Counsel believes that a violation of subsection 
     (b) may have occurred and that mediation may be helpful in 
     resolving the dispute, the General Counsel may request, but 
     not participate in, mediation under subsections (b) through 
     (d) of section 403 between the charging individual and any 
     entity responsible for correcting the alleged violation.
       (3) Complaint, hearing, board review.--If mediation under 
     paragraph (2) has not succeeded in resolving the dispute, and 
     if the General Counsel believes that a violation of 
     subsection (b) may have occurred, the General Counsel may 
     file with the Office a complaint against any entity 
     responsible for correcting the violation. The complaint shall 
     be submitted to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to 
     subsections (b) through (h) of section 405 and any person who 
     has filed a charge under paragraph (1) may intervene as of 
     right, with the full rights of a party. The decision of the 
     hearing officer shall be subject to review by the Board 
     pursuant to section 406.
       (4) Judicial review.--A charging individual who has 
     intervened under paragraph (3) or any respondent to the 
     complaint, if aggrieved by a final decision of the Board 
     under paragraph (3), may file a petition for review in the 
     United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
     pursuant to section 407.
       (5) Compliance date.--If new appropriated funds are 
     necessary to comply with an order requiring correction of a 
     violation of subsection (b), compliance shall take place as 
     soon as possible, but no later than the fiscal year following 
     the end of the fiscal year in which the order requiring 
     correction becomes final and not subject to further review.
       (e) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
     Transportation to implement the statutory provisions referred 
     to in subsection (b) except to the extent that the Board may 
     determine, for good cause shown and stated together with the 
     regulation, that a modification of such regulations would be 
     more effective for the implementation of the rights and 
     protections under this section.
       (3) Entity responsible for correction.--The regulations 
     issued under paragraph (1) shall include a method of 
     identifying, for purposes of this section and for categories 
     of violations of subsection (b), the entity responsible for 
     correction of a particular violation.
       (f) Periodic Inspections; Report to Congress; Initial 
     Study.--
       (1) Periodic inspections.--On a regular basis, and at least 
     once each Congress, the General Counsel shall inspect the 
     facilities of the entities listed in subsection (a) to ensure 
     compliance with subsection (b).
       (2) Report.--On the basis of each periodic inspection, the 
     General Counsel shall, at least once every Congress, prepare 
     and submit a report--
       (A) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 
     President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol, or other entity responsible, for 
     correcting the violation of this section uncovered by such 
     inspection, and
       (B) containing the results of the periodic inspection, 
     describing any steps necessary to correct any violation of 
     this section, assessing any limitations in accessibility to 
     and usability by individuals with disabilities associated 
     with each violation, and the estimated cost and time needed 
     for abatement.
       (3) Initial period for study and corrective action.--The 
     period from the date of the enactment of this Act until 
     December 31, 1996, shall be available to the Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol and other entities subject to this 
     section to identify any violations of subsection (b), to 
     determine the costs of compliance, and to take any necessary 
     corrective action to abate any violations. The Office shall 
     assist the Office of the Architect of the Capitol and other 
     entities listed in subsection (a) by arranging for 
     inspections and other technical assistance at their request. 
     Prior to July 1, 1996, the General Counsel shall conduct a 
     thorough inspection under paragraph (1) and shall submit the 
     report under paragraph (2) for the 104th Congress.
       (4) Detailed personnel.--The Attorney General, the 
     Secretary of Transportation, and the Architectural and 
     Transportation Barriers Compliance Board may, on request of 
     the Executive Director, detail to the Office such personnel 
     as may be necessary to advise and assist the Office in 
     carrying out its duties under this section.
       (g) Application of Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 
     to the Provision of Public Services and Accommodations by the 
     General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office, 
     and the Library of Congress.--Section 509 of the Americans 
     with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209)), as amended 
     by section 201(c) of this Act, is amended by adding the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(6) Enforcement of rights to public services and 
     accommodations.--The remedies and procedures set forth in 
     section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
     16) shall be available to any qualified person with a 
     disability who is a visitor, guest, or patron of an 
     instrumentality of Congress and who alleges a violation of 
     the rights and protections under sections 201 through 230 or 
     section 302 or 303 of this Act that are made applicable by 
     this section, except that the authorities of the Equal 
     Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the 
     chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.''.
       (h) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Subsections (b), (c), and (d) shall be 
     effective on January 1, 1997.
       (2) General accounting office, government printing office, 
     and library of congress.--Subsection (g) shall be effective 1 
     year after transmission to the Congress of the study under 
     section 230.

           PART C--OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970

     SEC. 215. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL 
                   SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970; PROCEDURES FOR 
                   REMEDY OF VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Occupational Safety and Health Protections.--
       (1) In general.--Each employing office and each covered 
     employee shall comply with the provisions of section 5 of the 
     Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 654).
       (2) Definitions.--For purposes of the application under 
     this section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
     1970--
       (A) the term ``employer'' as used in such Act means an 
     employing office;
       (B) the term ``employee'' as used in such Act means a 
     covered employee;
       (C) the term ``employing office'' includes the General 
     Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, and any entity 
     listed in subsection (a) of section 210 that is responsible 
     for correcting a violation of this section, irrespective of 
     whether the entity has an employment relationship with any 
     covered employee in any employing office in which such a 
     violation occurs; and
       (D) the term ``employee'' includes employees of the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be an order to correct the violation, including such 
     order as would be appropriate if issued under section 13(a) 
     of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 
     662(a)).
       (c) Procedures.--
       (1) Requests for inspections.--Upon written request of any 
     employing office or covered employee, the General Counsel 
     shall exercise the authorities granted to the Secretary of 
     Labor by subsections (a), (d), (e), and (f) of section 8 of 
     the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 657 
     (a), (d), (e), and (f)) to inspect and investigate places of 
     employment under the jurisdiction of employing offices.
     [[Page H256]]   (2) Citations, notices, and notifications.--
     For purposes of this section, the General Counsel shall 
     exercise the authorities granted to the Secretary of Labor in 
     sections 9 and 10 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
     of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 658 and 659), to issue--
       (A) a citation or notice to any employing office 
     responsible for correcting a violation of subsection (a); or
       (B) a notification to any employing office that the General 
     Counsel believes has failed to correct a violation for which 
     a citation has been issued within the period permitted for 
     its correction.
       (3) Hearings and review.--If after issuing a citation or 
     notification, the General Counsel determines that a violation 
     has not been corrected, the General Counsel may file a 
     complaint with the Office against the employing office named 
     in the citation or notification. The complaint shall be 
     submitted to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to 
     subsections (b) through (h) of section 405, subject to review 
     by the Board pursuant to section 406.
       (4) Variance procedures.--An employing office may request 
     from the Board an order granting a variance from a standard 
     made applicable by this section. For the purposes of this 
     section, the Board shall exercise the authorities granted to 
     the Secretary of Labor in sections 6(b)(6) and 6(d) of the 
     Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 
     655(b)(6) and 655(d)) to act on any employing office's 
     request for a variance. The Board shall refer the matter to a 
     hearing officer pursuant to subsections (b) through (h) of 
     section 405, subject to review by the Board pursuant to 
     section 406.
       (5) Judicial review.--The General Counsel or employing 
     office aggrieved by a final decision of the Board under 
     paragraph (3) or (4), may file a petition for review with the 
     United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
     pursuant to section 407.
       (6) Compliance date.--If new appropriated funds are 
     necessary to correct a violation of subsection (a) for which 
     a citation is issued, or to comply with an order requiring 
     correction of such a violation, correction or compliance 
     shall take place as soon as possible, but not later than the 
     end of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the 
     citation is issued or the order requiring correction becomes 
     final and not subject to further review.
       (d) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under 
     paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations 
     promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the 
     statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except to 
     the extent that the Board may determine, for good cause shown 
     and stated together with the regulation, that a modification 
     of such regulations would be more effective for the 
     implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section.
       (3) Employing office responsible for correction.--The 
     regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall include a method 
     of identifying, for purposes of this section and for 
     different categories of violations of subsection (a), the 
     employing office responsible for correction of a particular 
     violation.
       (e) Periodic Inspections; Report to Congress.--
       (1) Periodic inspections.--On a regular basis, and at least 
     once each Congress, the General Counsel, exercising the same 
     authorities of the Secretary of Labor as under subsection 
     (c)(1), shall conduct periodic inspections of all facilities 
     of the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Capitol 
     Guide Service, the Capitol Police, the Congressional Budget 
     Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the 
     Office of the Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance, 
     the Office of Technology Assessment, the Library of Congress, 
     and the General Accounting Office to report on compliance 
     with subsection (a).
       (2) Report.--On the basis of each periodic inspection, the 
     General Counsel shall prepare and submit a report--
       (A) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 
     President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol or other employing office 
     responsible for correcting the violation of this section 
     uncovered by such inspection, and
       (B) containing the results of the periodic inspection, 
     identifying the employing office responsible for correcting 
     the violation of this section uncovered by such inspection, 
     describing any steps necessary to correct any violation of 
     this section, and assessing any risks to employee health and 
     safety associated with any violation.
       (3) Action after report.--If a report identifies any 
     violation of this section, the General Counsel shall issue a 
     citation or notice in accordance with subsection (c)(2)(A).
       (4) Detailed personnel.--The Secretary of Labor may, on 
     request of the Executive Director, detail to the Office such 
     personnel as may be necessary to advise and assist the Office 
     in carrying out its duties under this section.
       (f) Initial Period for Study and Corrective Action.--The 
     period from the date of the enactment of this Act until 
     December 31, 1996, shall be available to the Office of the 
     Architect of the Capitol and other employing offices to 
     identify any violations of subsection (a), to determine the 
     costs of compliance, and to take any necessary corrective 
     action to abate any violations. The Office shall assist the 
     Office of the Architect of the Capitol and other employing 
     offices by arranging for inspections and other technical 
     assistance at their request. Prior to July 1, 1996, the 
     General Counsel shall conduct a thorough inspection under 
     subsection (e)(1) and shall submit the report under 
     subsection (e)(2) for the 104th Congress.
       (g) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e)(3) shall be effective on 
     January 1, 1997.
       (2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
     This section shall be effective with respect to the General 
     Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after 
     transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

                   PART D--LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

     SEC. 220. APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES 
                   CODE, RELATING TO FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-
                   MANAGEMENT RELATIONS; PROCEDURES FOR REMEDY OF 
                   VIOLATIONS.

       (a) Labor-Management Rights.--
       (1) In general.--The rights, protections, and 
     responsibilities established under sections 7102, 7106, 7111 
     through 7117, 7119 through 7122, and 7131 of title 5, United 
     States Code, shall apply to employing offices and to covered 
     employees and representatives of those employees.
       (2) Definition.--For purposes of the application under this 
     section of the sections referred to in paragraph (1), the 
     term ``agency'' shall be deemed to include an employing 
     office.
       (b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a) 
     shall be such remedy, including a remedy under section 
     7118(a)(7) of title 5, United States Code, as would be 
     appropriate if awarded by the Federal Labor Relations 
     Authority to remedy a violation of any provision made 
     applicable by subsection (a).
       (c) Authorities and Procedures for Implementation and 
     Enforcement.--
       (1) General authorities of the board; petitions.--For 
     purposes of this section and except as otherwise provided in 
     this section, the Board shall exercise the authorities of the 
     Federal Labor Relations Authority under sections 7105, 7111, 
     7112, 7113, 7115, 7117, 7118, and 7122 of title 5, United 
     States Code, and of the President under section 7103(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code. For purposes of this section, 
     any petition or other submission that, under chapter 71 of 
     title 5, United States Code, would be submitted to the 
     Federal Labor Relations Authority shall, if brought under 
     this section, be submitted to the Board. The Board shall 
     refer any matter under this paragraph to a hearing officer 
     for decision pursuant to subsections (b) through (h) of 
     section 405, subject to review by the Board pursuant to 
     section 406. The Board may direct that the General Counsel 
     carry out the Board's investigative authorities under this 
     paragraph.
       (2) General authorities of the general counsel; charges of 
     unfair labor practice.--For purposes of this section and 
     except as otherwise provided in this section, the General 
     Counsel shall exercise the authorities of the General Counsel 
     of the Federal Labor Relations Authority under sections 7104 
     and 7118 of title 5, United States Code. For purposes of this 
     section, any charge or other submission that, under chapter 
     71 of title 5, United States Code, would be submitted to the 
     General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority 
     shall, if brought under this section, be submitted to the 
     General Counsel. If any person charges an employing office or 
     a labor organization with having engaged in or engaging in an 
     unfair labor practice and makes such charge within 180 days 
     of the occurrence of the alleged unfair labor practice, the 
     General Counsel shall investigate the charge and may file a 
     complaint with the Office. The complaint shall be submitted 
     to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to subsections (b) 
     through (h) of section 405, subject to review by the Board 
     pursuant to section 406.
       (3) Judicial review.--Except for matters referred to in 
     paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 7123(a) of title 5, United 
     States Code, the General Counsel or the respondent to the 
     complaint, if aggrieved by a final decision of the Board 
     under paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection, may file a 
     petition for judicial review in the United States Court of 
     Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to section 407.
       (4) Exercise of impasses panel authority; requests.--For 
     purposes of this section and except as otherwise provided in 
     this section, the Board shall exercise the authorities of the 
     Federal Service Impasses Panel under section 7119 of title 5, 
     United States Code. For purposes of this section, any request 
     that, under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, would 
     be presented to the Federal Service Impasses Panel shall, if 
     made under this section, be presented to the Board. At the 
     request of the Board, the Executive Director shall appoint a 
     mediator or mediators to perform the functions of the Federal 
     Service Impasses Panel under section 7119 of title 5, United 
     States Code.
       (d) Regulations To Implement Section.--
       (1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304, 
     issue regulations to implement this section.
       (2) Agency regulations.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (e), the regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall be the 
     same as substantive regulations promulgated by the 
     [[Page H257]] Federal Labor Relations Authority to implement 
     the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) 
     except--
       (A) to the extent that the Board may determine, for good 
     cause shown and stated together with the regulation, that a 
     modification of such regulations would be more effective for 
     the implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section; or
       (B) as the Board deems necessary to avoid a conflict of 
     interest or appearance of a conflict of interest.
       (e) Specific Regulations Regarding Application to Certain 
     Offices of Congress.--
       (1) Regulations required.--The Board shall issue 
     regulations pursuant to section 304 on the manner and extent 
     to which the requirements and exemptions of chapter 71 of 
     title 5, United States Code, should apply to covered 
     employees who are employed in the offices listed in paragraph 
     (2). The regulations shall, to the greatest extent 
     practicable, be consistent with the provisions and purposes 
     of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code and of this Act, 
     and shall be the same as substantive regulations issued by 
     the Federal Labor Relations Authority under such chapter, 
     except--
       (A) to the extent that the Board may determine, for good 
     cause shown and stated together with the regulation, that a 
     modification of such regulations would be more effective for 
     the implementation of the rights and protections under this 
     section; and
       (B) that the Board shall exclude from coverage under this 
     section any covered employees who are employed in offices 
     listed in paragraph (2) if the Board determines that such 
     exclusion is required because of--
       (i) a conflict of interest or appearance of a conflict of 
     interest; or
       (ii) Congress' constitutional responsibilities.
       (2) Offices referred to.--The offices referred to in 
     paragraph (1) include--
       (A) the personal office of any Member of the House of 
     Representatives or of any Senator;
       (B) a standing, select, special, permanent, temporary, or 
     other committee of the Senate or House of Representatives, or 
     a joint committee of Congress;
       (C) the Office of the Vice President (as President of the 
     Senate), the Office of the President pro tempore of the 
     Senate, the Office of the Majority Leader of the Senate, the 
     Office of the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Office of 
     the Majority Whip of the Senate, the Office of the Minority 
     Whip of the Senate, the Conference of the Majority of the 
     Senate, the Conference of the Minority of the Senate, the 
     Office of the Secretary of the Conference of the Majority of 
     the Senate, the Office of the Secretary of the Conference of 
     the Minority of the Senate, the Office of the Secretary for 
     the Majority of the Senate, the Office of the Secretary for 
     the Minority of the Senate, the Majority Policy Committee of 
     the Senate, the Minority Policy Committee of the Senate, and 
     the following offices within the Office of the Secretary of 
     the Senate: Offices of the Parliamentarian, Bill Clerk, 
     Legislative Clerk, Journal Clerk, Executive Clerk, Enrolling 
     Clerk, Official Reporters of Debate, Daily Digest, Printing 
     Services, Captioning Services, and Senate Chief Counsel for 
     Employment;
       (D) the Office of the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives, the Office of the Majority Leader of the 
     House of Representatives, the Office of the Minority Leader 
     of the House of Representatives, the Offices of the Chief 
     Deputy Majority Whips, the Offices of the Chief Deputy 
     Minority Whips and the following offices within the Office of 
     the Clerk of the House of Representatives: Offices of 
     Legislative Operations, Official Reporters of Debate, 
     Official Reporters to Committees, Printing Services, and 
     Legislative Information;
       (E) the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Senate, 
     the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, the Office of the 
     Legislative Counsel of the House of Representatives, the 
     Office of the General Counsel of the House of 
     Representatives, the Office of the Parliamentarian of the 
     House of Representatives, and the Office of the Law Revision 
     Counsel;
       (F) the offices of any caucus or party organization;
       (G) the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of 
     Technology Assessment, and the Office of Compliance; and
       (H) such other offices that perform comparable functions 
     which are identified under regulations of the Board.
       (f) Effective Date.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective on October 1, 
     1996.
       (2) Certain offices.--With respect to the offices listed in 
     subsection (e)(2), to the covered employees of such offices, 
     and to representatives of such employees, subsections (a) and 
     (b) shall be effective on the effective date of regulations 
     under subsection (e).

                            PART E--GENERAL

     SEC. 225. GENERALLY APPLICABLE REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS.

       (a) Attorney's Fees.--If a covered employee, with respect 
     to any claim under this Act, or a qualified person with a 
     disability, with respect to any claim under section 210, is a 
     prevailing party in any proceeding under section 405, 406, 
     407, or 408, the hearing officer, Board, or court, as the 
     case may be, may award attorney's fees, expert fees, and any 
     other costs as would be appropriate if awarded under section 
     706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
     5(k)).
       (b) Interest.--In any proceeding under section 405, 406, 
     407, or 408, the same interest to compensate for delay in 
     payment shall be made available as would be appropriate if 
     awarded under section 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
     (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(d)).
       (c) Civil Penalties and Punitive Damages.--No civil penalty 
     or punitive damages may be awarded with respect to any claim 
     under this Act.
       (d) Exclusive Procedure.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), no 
     person may commence an administrative or judicial proceeding 
     to seek a remedy for the rights and protections afforded by 
     this Act except as provided in this Act.
       (2) Veterans.--A covered employee under section 206 may 
     also utilize any provisions of chapter 43 of title 38, United 
     States Code, that are applicable to that employee.
       (e) Scope of Remedy.--Only a covered employee who has 
     undertaken and completed the procedures described in sections 
     402 and 403 may be granted a remedy under part A of this 
     title.
       (f) Construction.--
       (1) Definitions and exemptions.--Except where inconsistent 
     with definitions and exemptions provided in this Act, the 
     definitions and exemptions in the laws made applicable by 
     this Act shall apply under this Act.
       (2) Size limitations.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), 
     provisions in the laws made applicable under this Act (other 
     than the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act) 
     determining coverage based on size, whether expressed in 
     terms of numbers of employees, amount of business transacted, 
     or other measure, shall not apply in determining coverage 
     under this Act.
       (3) Executive branch enforcement.--This Act shall not be 
     construed to authorize enforcement by the executive branch of 
     this Act.
                             PART F--STUDY

     SEC. 230. STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING GENERAL 
                   ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 
                   AND LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

       (a) In General.--The Administrative Conference of the 
     United States shall undertake a study of--
       (1) the application of the laws listed in subsection (b) 
     to--
       (A) the General Accounting Office;
       (B) the Government Printing Office; and
       (C) the Library of Congress; and
       (2) the regulations and procedures used by the entities 
     referred to in paragraph (1) to apply and enforce such laws 
     to themselves and their employees.
       (b) Applicable Statutes.--The study under this section 
     shall consider the application of the following laws:
       (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (2) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 
     U.S.C. 621 et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (3) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     12101 et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (4) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 
     2611 et seq.), and related provisions of sections 6381 
     through 6387 of title 5, United States Code.
       (5) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et 
     seq.), and related provisions of sections 5541 through 5550a 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (6) The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 
     U.S.C. 651 et seq.), and related provisions of section 7902 
     of title 5, United States Code.
       (7) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.).
       (8) Chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
     management relations) of title 5, United States Code.
       (9) The General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980 (31 
     U.S.C. 731 et seq.).
       (10) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 
     U.S.C. 2001 et seq.).
       (11) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
       (12) Chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and 
     reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.
       (c) Contents of Study and Recommendations.--The study under 
     this section shall evaluate whether the rights, protections, 
     and procedures, including administrative and judicial relief, 
     applicable to the entities listed in paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (a) and their employees are comprehensive and 
     effective and shall include recommendations for any 
     improvements in regulations or legislation, including 
     proposed regulatory or legislative language.
       (d) Deadline and Delivery of Study.--Not later than 
     December 31, 1996--
       (1) the Administrative Conference of the United States 
     shall prepare and complete the study and recommendations 
     required under this section and shall submit the study and 
     recommendations to the Board; and
       (2) the Board shall transmit such study and recommendations 
     (with the Board's comments) to the head of each entity 
     considered in the study, and to the Congress by delivery to 
     the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro 
     tempore of the Senate for referral to the appropriate 
     committees of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
             [[Page H258]] TITLE III--OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

     SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.

       (a) Establishment.--There is established, as an independent 
     office within the legislative branch of the Federal 
     Government, the Office of Compliance.
       (b) Board of Directors.--The Office shall have a Board of 
     Directors. The Board shall consist of 5 individuals appointed 
     jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 
     Majority Leader of the Senate, and the Minority Leaders of 
     the House of Representatives and the Senate. Appointments of 
     the first 5 members of the Board shall be completed not later 
     than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (c) Chair.--The Chair shall be appointed from members of 
     the Board jointly by the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and the 
     Minority Leaders of the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate.
       (d) Board of Directors Qualifications.--
       (1) Specific qualifications.--Selection and appointment of 
     members of the Board shall be without regard to political 
     affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the 
     duties of the Office. Members of the Board shall have 
     training or experience in the application of the rights, 
     protections, and remedies under one or more of the laws made 
     applicable under section 102.
       (2) Disqualifications for appointments.--
       (A) Lobbying.--No individual who engages in, or is 
     otherwise employed in, lobbying of the Congress and who is 
     required under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act to 
     register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or 
     the Secretary of the Senate shall be eligible for appointment 
     to, or service on, the Board.
       (B) Incompatible office.--No member of the Board appointed 
     under subsection (b) may hold or may have held the position 
     of Member of the House of Representatives or Senator, may 
     hold the position of officer or employee of the House of 
     Representatives, Senate, or instrumentality or other entity 
     of the legislative branch, or may have held such a position 
     (other than the position of an officer or employee of the 
     General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals Board, an officer 
     or employee of the Office of Fair Employment Practices of the 
     House of Representatives, or officer or employee of the 
     Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices) within 4 years of 
     the date of appointment.
       (3) Vacancies.--A vacancy on the Board shall be filled in 
     the manner in which the original appointment was made.
       (e) Term of Office.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     membership on the Board shall be for 5 years. A member of the 
     Board who is appointed to a term of office of more than 3 
     years shall only be eligible for appointment for a single 
     term of office.
       (2) First appointments.--Of the members first appointed to 
     the Board--
       (A) 1 shall have a term of office of 3 years,
       (B) 2 shall have a term of office of 4 years, and
       (C) 2 shall have a term of office of 5 years, 1 of whom 
     shall be the Chair,

     as designated at the time of appointment by the persons 
     specified in subsection (b).
       (f) Removal.--
       (1) Authority.--Any member of the Board may be removed from 
     office by a majority decision of the appointing authorities 
     described in subsection (b), but only for--
       (A) disability that substantially prevents the member from 
     carrying out the duties of the member,
       (B) incompetence,
       (C) neglect of duty,
       (D) malfeasance, including a felony or conduct involving 
     moral turpitude, or
       (E) holding an office or employment or engaging in an 
     activity that disqualifies the individual from service as a 
     member of the Board under subsection (d)(2).
       (2) Statement of reasons for removal.--In removing a member 
     of the Board, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
     the President pro tempore of the Senate shall state in 
     writing to the member of the Board being removed the specific 
     reasons for the removal.
       (g) Compensation.--
       (1) Per diem.--Each member of the Board shall be 
     compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the 
     annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United 
     States Code, for each day (including travel time) during 
     which such member is engaged in the performance of the 
     duties of the Board. The rate of pay of a member may be 
     prorated based on the portion of the day during which the 
     member is engaged in the performance of Board duties.
       (2)  Travel expenses.--Each member of the Board shall 
     receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code, for each day the member is engaged in the performance 
     of duties away from the home or regular place of business of 
     the member.
       (h) Duties.--The Office shall--
       (1) carry out a program of education for Members of 
     Congress and other employing authorities of the legislative 
     branch of the Federal Government respecting the laws made 
     applicable to them and a program to inform individuals of 
     their rights under laws applicable to the legislative branch 
     of the Federal Government;
       (2) in carrying out the program under paragraph (1), 
     distribute the telephone number and address of the Office, 
     procedures for action under title IV, and any other 
     information appropriate for distribution, distribute such 
     information to employing offices in a manner suitable for 
     posting, provide such information to new employees of 
     employing offices, distribute such information to the 
     residences of covered employees, and conduct seminars and 
     other activities designed to educate employing offices and 
     covered employees; and
       (3) compile and publish statistics on the use of the Office 
     by covered employees, including the number and type of 
     contacts made with the Office, on the reason for such 
     contacts, on the number of covered employees who initiated 
     proceedings with the Office under this Act and the result of 
     such proceedings, and on the number of covered employees who 
     filed a complaint, the basis for the complaint, and the 
     action taken on the complaint.
       (i) Congressional Oversight.--The Board and the Office 
     shall be subject to oversight (except with respect to the 
     disposition of individual cases) by the Committee on Rules 
     and Administration and the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
     of the Senate and the Committee on House Oversight of the 
     House of Representatives.
       (j) Opening of Office.--The Office shall be open for 
     business, including receipt of requests for counseling under 
     section 402, not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (k) Financial Disclosure Reports.--Members of the Board and 
     officers and employees of the Office shall file the financial 
     disclosure reports required under title I of the Ethics in 
     Government Act of 1978 with the Clerk of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 302. OFFICERS, STAFF, AND OTHER PERSONNEL.

       (a) Executive Director.--
       (1) Appointment and removal.--
       (A) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the 
     Board, shall appoint and may remove an Executive Director. 
     Selection and appointment of the Executive Director shall be 
     without regard to political affiliation and solely on the 
     basis of fitness to perform the duties of the Office. The 
     first Executive Director shall be appointed no later than 90 
     days after the initial appointment of the Board of Directors.
       (B) Qualifications.--The Executive Director shall be an 
     individual with training or expertise in the application of 
     laws referred to in section 102(a).
       (C) Disqualifications.--The disqualifications in section 
     301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of the Executive 
     Director.
       (2) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the compensation of 
     the Executive Director. The rate of pay for the Executive 
     Director may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay 
     prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (3) Term.--The term of office of the Executive Director 
     shall be a single term of 5 years, except that the first 
     Executive Director shall have a single term of 7 years.
       (4) Duties.--The Executive Director shall serve as the 
     chief operating officer of the Office. Except as otherwise 
     specified in this Act, the Executive Director shall carry out 
     all of the responsibilities of the Office under this Act.
       (b) Deputy Executive Directors.--
       (1) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the 
     Board, shall appoint and may remove a Deputy Executive 
     Director for the Senate and a Deputy Executive Director for 
     the House of Representatives. Selection and appointment of a 
     Deputy Executive Director shall be without regard to 
     political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to 
     perform the duties of the office. The disqualifications in 
     section 301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of a Deputy 
     Executive Director.
       (2) Term.--The term of office of a Deputy Executive 
     Director shall be a single term of 5 years, except that the 
     first Deputy Executive Directors shall have a single term of 
     6 years.
       (3) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the compensation of 
     the Deputy Executive Directors. The rate of pay for a Deputy 
     Executive Director may not exceed 96 percent of the annual 
     rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive 
     Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (4) Duties.--The Deputy Executive Director for the Senate 
     shall recommend to the Board regulations under section 
     304(a)(2)(B)(i), maintain the regulations and all records 
     pertaining to the regulations, and shall assume such other 
     responsibilities as may be delegated by the Executive 
     Director. The Deputy Executive Director for the House of 
     Representatives shall recommend to the Board the regulations 
     under section 304(a)(2)(B)(ii), maintain the regulations and 
     all records pertaining to the regulations, and shall assume 
     such other responsibilities as may be delegated by the 
     Executive Director.
       (c) General Counsel.--
       (1) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the 
     Board, shall appoint a General Counsel. Selection and 
     appointment of the General Counsel shall be without regard to 
     political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to 
     perform the duties of the Office. The disqualifications in 
     section 301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of a General 
     Counsel.
     [[Page H259]]   (2) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the 
     compensation of the General Counsel. The rate of pay for the 
     General Counsel may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay 
     prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
       (3) Duties.--The General Counsel shall--
       (A) exercise the authorities and perform the duties of the 
     General Counsel as specified in this Act; and
       (B) otherwise assist the Board and the Executive Director 
     in carrying out their duties and powers, including 
     representing the Office in any judicial proceeding under this 
     Act.
       (4) Attorneys in the office of the general counsel.--The 
     General Counsel shall appoint, and fix the compensation of, 
     and may remove, such additional attorneys as may be necessary 
     to enable the General Counsel to perform the General 
     Counsel's duties.
       (5) Term.--The term of office of the General Counsel shall 
     be a single term of 5 years.
       (6) Removal.--
       (A) Authority.--The General Counsel may be removed from 
     office by the Chair but only for--
       (i) disability that substantially prevents the General 
     Counsel from carrying out the duties of the General Counsel,
       (ii) incompetence,
       (iii) neglect of duty,
       (iv) malfeasance, including a felony or conduct involving 
     moral turpitude, or
       (v) holding an office or employment or engaging in an 
     activity that disqualifies the individual from service as the 
     General Counsel under paragraph (1).
       (B) Statement of reasons for removal.--In removing the 
     General Counsel, the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
     and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall state in 
     writing to the General Counsel the specific reasons for the 
     removal.
       (d) Other Staff.--The Executive Director shall appoint, and 
     fix the compensation of, and may remove, such other 
     additional staff, including hearing officers, but not 
     including attorneys employed in the office of the General 
     Counsel, as may be necessary to enable the Office to perform 
     its duties.
       (e) Detailed Personnel.--The Executive Director may, with 
     the prior consent of the department or agency of the Federal 
     Government concerned, use on a reimbursable or 
     nonreimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such 
     department or agency, including the services of members or 
     personnel of the General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals 
     Board.
       (f) Consultants.--In carrying out the functions of the 
     Office, the Executive Director may procure the temporary (not 
     to exceed 1 year) or intermittent services of consultants.

     SEC. 303. PROCEDURAL RULES.

       (a) In General.--The Executive Director shall, subject to 
     the approval of the Board, adopt rules governing the 
     procedures of the Office, including the procedures of hearing 
     officers, which shall be submitted for publication in the 
     Congressional Record. The rules may be amended in the same 
     manner.
       (b) Procedure.--The Executive Director shall adopt rules 
     referred to in subsection (a) in accordance with the 
     principles and procedures set forth in section 553 of title 
     5, United States Code. The Executive Director shall publish a 
     general notice of proposed rulemaking under section 553(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, but, instead of publication of a 
     general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
     Register, the Executive Director shall transmit such notice 
     to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
     President pro tempore of the Senate for publication in the 
     Congressional Record on the first day on which both Houses 
     are in session following such transmittal. Before adopting 
     rules, the Executive Director shall provide a comment period 
     of at least 30 days after publication of a general notice of 
     proposed rulemaking. Upon adopting rules, the Executive 
     Director shall transmit notice of such action together with a 
     copy of such rules to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate 
     for publication in the Congressional Record on the first day 
     on which both Houses are in session following such 
     transmittal. Rules shall be considered issued by the 
     Executive Director as of the date on which they are published 
     in the Congressional Record.

     SEC. 304. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS.

       (a) Regulations.--
       (1) In general.--The procedures applicable to the 
     regulations of the Board issued for the implementation of 
     this Act, which shall include regulations the Board is 
     required to issue under title II (including regulations on 
     the appropriate application of exemptions under the laws made 
     applicable in title II) are as prescribed in this section.
       (2) Rulemaking procedure.--Such regulations of the Board--
       (A) shall be adopted, approved, and issued in accordance 
     with subsection (b); and
       (B) shall consist of 3 separate bodies of regulations, 
     which shall apply, respectively, to--
       (i) the Senate and employees of the Senate;
       (ii) the House of Representatives and employees of the 
     House of Representatives; and
       (iii) all other covered employees and employing offices.
       (b) Adoption by the Board.--The Board shall adopt the 
     regulations referred to in subsection (a)(1) in accordance 
     with the principles and procedures set forth in section 553 
     of title 5, United States Code, and as provided in the 
     following provisions of this subsection:
       (1) Proposal.--The Board shall publish a general notice of 
     proposed rulemaking under section 553(b) of title 5, United 
     States Code, but, instead of publication of a general notice 
     of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, the Board 
     shall transmit such notice to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate 
     for publication in the Congressional Record on the first day 
     on which both Houses are in session following such 
     transmittal. Such notice shall set forth the recommendations 
     of the Deputy Director for the Senate in regard to 
     regulations under subsection (a)(2)(B)(i), the 
     recommendations of the Deputy Director for the House of 
     Representatives in regard to regulations under subsection 
     (a)(2)(B)(ii), and the recommendations of the Executive 
     Director for regulations under subsection (a)(2)(B)(iii).
       (2) Comment.--Before adopting regulations, the Board shall 
     provide a comment period of at least 30 days after 
     publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking.
       (3) Adoption.--After considering comments, the Board shall 
     adopt regulations and shall transmit notice of such action 
     together with a copy of such regulations to the Speaker of 
     the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of 
     the Senate for publication in the Congressional Record on the 
     first day on which both Houses are in session following such 
     transmittal.
       (4) Recommendation as to method of approval.--The Board 
     shall include a recommendation in the general notice of 
     proposed rulemaking and in the regulations as to whether the 
     regulations should be approved by resolution of the Senate, 
     by resolution of the House of Representatives, by concurrent 
     resolution, or by joint resolution.
       (c) Approval of Regulations.--
       (1) In general.--Regulations referred to in paragraph 
     (2)(B)(i) of subsection (a) may be approved by the Senate by 
     resolution or by the Congress by concurrent resolution or by 
     joint resolution. Regulations referred to in paragraph 
     (2)(B)(ii) of subsection (a) may be approved by the House of 
     Representatives by resolution or by the Congress by 
     concurrent resolution or by joint resolution. Regulations 
     referred to in paragraph (2)(B)(iii) may be approved by 
     Congress by concurrent resolution or by joint resolution.
       (2) Referral.--Upon receipt of a notice of adoption of 
     regulations under subsection (b)(3), the presiding officers 
     of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall refer 
     such notice, together with a copy of such regulations, to the 
     appropriate committee or committees of the House of 
     Representatives and of the Senate. The purpose of the 
     referral shall be to consider whether such regulations should 
     be approved, and, if so, whether such approval should be by 
     resolution of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, 
     by concurrent resolution or by joint resolution.
       (3) Joint referral and discharge in the senate.--The 
     presiding officer of the Senate may refer the notice of 
     issuance of regulations, or any resolution of approval of 
     regulations, to one committee or jointly to more than one 
     committee. If a committee of the Senate acts to report a 
     jointly referred measure, any other committee of the Senate 
     must act within 30 calendar days of continuous session, or be 
     automatically discharged.
       (4) One-house resolution or concurrent resolution.--In the 
     case of a resolution of the House of Representatives or the 
     Senate or a concurrent resolution referred to in paragraph 
     (1), the matter after the resolving clause shall be the 
     following: ``The following regulations issued by the Office 
     of Compliance on ____ are hereby approved:'' (the blank space 
     being appropriately filled in, and the text of the 
     regulations being set forth).
       (5) Joint resolution.--In the case of a joint resolution 
     referred to in paragraph (1), the matter after the resolving 
     clause shall be the following: ``The following regulations 
     issued by the Office of Compliance on ____ are hereby 
     approved and shall have the force and effect of law:'' (the 
     blank space being appropriately filled in, and the text of 
     the regulations being set forth).
       (d) Issuance and Effective Date.--
       (1) Publication.--After approval of regulations under 
     subsection (c), the Board shall submit the regulations to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate for publication in the Congressional 
     Record on the first day on which both Houses are in session 
     following such transmittal.
       (2) Date of issuance.--The date of issuance of regulations 
     shall be the date on which they are published in the 
     Congressional Record under paragraph (1).
       (3) Effective date.--Regulations shall become effective not 
     less than 60 days after the regulations are issued, except 
     that the Board may provide for an earlier effective date for 
     good cause found (within the meaning of section 553(d)(3) of 
     title 5, United States Code) and published with the 
     regulation.
       (e) Amendment of Regulations.--Regulations may be amended 
     in the same manner as is described in this section for the 
     adoption, approval, and issuance of regulations, except that 
     the Board may, in its discretion, dispense with publication 
     of a general notice of proposed rulemaking of minor, 
     technical, or urgent amendments that satisfy the criteria for 
     dispensing with publication of such notice pursuant to 
     section 553(b)(B) of title 5, United States Code.
     [[Page H260]]   (f) Right To Petition for Rulemaking.--Any 
     interested party may petition to the Board for the issuance, 
     amendment, or repeal of a regulation.
       (g) Consultation.--The Executive Director, the Deputy 
     Directors, and the Board--
       (1) shall consult, with regard to the development of 
     regulations, with--
       (A) the Chair of the Administrative Conference of the 
     United States;
       (B) the Secretary of Labor;
       (C) the Federal Labor Relations Authority; and
       (D) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and
       (2) may consult with any other persons with whom 
     consultation, in the opinion of the Board, the Executive 
     Director, or Deputy Directors, may be helpful.

     SEC. 305. EXPENSES.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Beginning in fiscal 
     year 1995, and for each fiscal year thereafter, there are 
     authorized to be appropriated for the expenses of the Office 
     such sums as may be necessary to carry out the functions of 
     the Office. Until sums are first appropriated pursuant to the 
     preceding sentence, but for a period not exceeding 12 months 
     following the date of the enactment of this Act--
       (1) one-half of the expenses of the Office shall be paid 
     from funds appropriated for allowances and expenses of the 
     House of Representatives, and
       (2) one-half of the expenses of the Office shall be paid 
     from funds appropriated for allowances and expenses of the 
     Senate,

     upon vouchers approved by the Executive Director, except that 
     a voucher shall not be required for the disbursement of 
     salaries of employees who are paid at an annual rate. The 
     Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of 
     the Senate are authorized to make arrangements for the 
     division of expenses under this subsection, including 
     arrangements for one House of Congress to reimburse the other 
     House of Congress.
       (b) Financial and Administrative Services.--The Executive 
     Director may place orders and enter into agreements for goods 
     and services with the head of any agency, or major 
     organizational unit within an agency, in the legislative or 
     executive branch of the United States in the same manner and 
     to the same extent as agencies are authorized under sections 
     1535 and 1536 of title 31, United States Code, to place 
     orders and enter into agreements.
       (c) Witness Fees and Allowances.--Except for covered 
     employees, witnesses before a hearing officer or the Board in 
     any proceeding under this Act other than rulemaking shall be 
     paid the same fee and mileage allowances as are paid 
     subpoenaed witnesses in the courts of the United States. 
     Covered employees who are summoned, or are assigned by their 
     employer, to testify in their official capacity or to produce 
     official records in any proceeding under this Act shall be 
     entitled to travel expenses under subchapter I and section 
     5751 of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
  TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

     SEC. 401. PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.

       Except as otherwise provided, the procedure for 
     consideration of alleged violations of part A of title II 
     consists of--
       (1) counseling as provided in section 402;
       (2) mediation as provided in section 403; and
       (3) election, as provided in section 404, of either--
       (A) a formal complaint and hearing as provided in section 
     405, subject to Board review as provided in section 406, and 
     judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
     Federal Circuit as provided in section 407, or
       (B) a civil action in a district court of the United States 
     as provided in section 408.

     In the case of an employee of the Office of the Architect of 
     the Capitol or of the Capitol Police, the Executive Director, 
     after receiving a request for counseling under section 402, 
     may recommend that the employee use the grievance procedures 
     of the Architect of the Capitol or the Capitol Police for 
     resolution of the employee's grievance for a specific period 
     of time, which shall not count against the time available for 
     counseling or mediation.

     SEC. 402. COUNSELING.

       (a) In General.--To commence a proceeding, a covered 
     employee alleging a violation of a law made applicable under 
     part A of title II shall request counseling by the Office. 
     The Office shall provide the employee with all relevant 
     information with respect to the rights of the employee. A 
     request for counseling shall be made not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the alleged violation.
       (b) Period of Counseling.--The period for counseling shall 
     be 30 days unless the employee and the Office agree to reduce 
     the period. The period shall begin on the date the request 
     for counseling is received.
       (c) Notification of End of Counseling Period.--The Office 
     shall notify the employee in writing when the counseling 
     period has ended.

     SEC. 403. MEDIATION.

       (a) Initiation.--Not later than 15 days after receipt by 
     the employee of notice of the end of the counseling period 
     under section 402, but prior to and as a condition of making 
     an election under section 404, the covered employee who 
     alleged a violation of a law shall file a request for 
     mediation with the Office.
       (b) Process.--Mediation under this section--
       (1) may include the Office, the covered employee, the 
     employing office, and one or more individuals appointed by 
     the Executive Director after considering recommendations by 
     organizations composed primarily of individuals experienced 
     in adjudicating or arbitrating personnel matters, and
       (2) shall involve meetings with the parties separately or 
     jointly for the purpose of resolving the dispute between the 
     covered employee and the employing office.
       (c) Mediation Period.--The mediation period shall be 30 
     days beginning on the date the request for mediation is 
     received. The mediation period may be extended for additional 
     periods at the joint request of the covered employee and the 
     employing office. The Office shall notify in writing the 
     covered employee and the employing office when the mediation 
     period has ended.
       (d) Independence of Mediation Process.--No individual, who 
     is appointed by the Executive Director to mediate, may 
     conduct or aid in a hearing conducted under section 405 with 
     respect to the same matter or shall be subject to subpoena or 
     any other compulsory process with respect to the same matter.

     SEC. 404. ELECTION OF PROCEEDING.

       Not later than 90 days after a covered employee receives 
     notice of the end of the period of mediation, but no sooner 
     than 30 days after receipt of such notification, such covered 
     employee may either--
       (1) file a complaint with the Office in accordance with 
     section 405, or
       (2) file a civil action in accordance with section 408 in 
     the United States district court for the district in which 
     the employee is employed or for the District of Columbia.

     SEC. 405. COMPLAINT AND HEARING.

       (a) In General.--A covered employee may, upon the 
     completion of mediation under section 403, file a complaint 
     with the Office. The respondent to the complaint shall be the 
     employing office--
       (1) involved in the violation, or
       (2) in which the violation is alleged to have occurred,

     and about which mediation was conducted.
       (b) Dismissal.--A hearing officer may dismiss any claim 
     that the hearing officer finds to be frivolous or that fails 
     to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
       (c) Hearing Officer.--
       (1) Appointment.--Upon the filing of a complaint, the 
     Executive Director shall appoint an independent hearing 
     officer to consider the complaint and render a decision. No 
     Member of the House of Representatives, Senator, officer of 
     either the House of Representatives or the Senate, head of an 
     employing office, member of the Board, or covered employee 
     may be appointed to be a hearing officer. The Executive 
     Director shall select hearing officers on a rotational or 
     random basis from the lists developed under paragraph (2). 
     Nothing in this section shall prevent the appointment of 
     hearing officers as full-time employees of the Office or the 
     selection of hearing officers on the basis of specialized 
     expertise needed for particular matters.
       (2) Lists.--The Executive Director shall develop master 
     lists, composed of--
       (A) members of the bar of a State or the District of 
     Columbia and retired judges of the United States courts who 
     are experienced in adjudicating or arbitrating the kinds of 
     personnel and other matters for which hearings may be held 
     under this Act, and
       (B) individuals expert in technical matters relating to 
     accessibility and usability by persons with disabilities or 
     technical matters relating to occupational safety and health.

     In developing lists, the Executive Director shall consider 
     candidates recommended by the Federal Mediation and 
     Conciliation Service or the Administrative Conference of the 
     United States.
       (d) Hearing.--Unless a complaint is dismissed before a 
     hearing, a hearing shall be--
       (1) conducted in closed session on the record by the 
     hearing officer;
       (2) commenced no later than 60 days after filing of the 
     complaint under subsection (a), except that the Office may, 
     for good cause, extend up to an additional 30 days the time 
     for commencing a hearing; and
       (3) conducted, except as specifically provided in this Act 
     and to the greatest extent practicable, in accordance with 
     the principles and procedures set forth in sections 554 
     through 557 of title 5, United States Code.
       (e) Discovery.--Reasonable prehearing discovery may be 
     permitted at the discretion of the hearing officer.
       (f) Subpoenas.--
       (1) In general.--At the request of a party, a hearing 
     officer may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses 
     and for the production of correspondence, books, papers, 
     documents, and other records. The attendance of witnesses and 
     the production of records may be required from any place 
     within the United States. Subpoenas shall be served in the 
     manner provided under rule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of 
     Civil Procedure.
       (2) Objections.--If a person refuses, on the basis of 
     relevance, privilege, or other objection, to testify in 
     response to a question or to produce records in connection 
     with a proceeding before a hearing officer, the hearing 
     [[Page H261]] officer shall rule on the objection. At the 
     request of the witness or any party, the hearing officer 
     shall (or on the hearing officer's own initiative, the 
     hearing officer may) refer the ruling to the Board for 
     review.
       (3) Enforcement.--
       (A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a 
     subpoena, the Board may authorize the General Counsel to 
     apply, in the name of the Office, to an appropriate United 
     States district court for an order requiring that person to 
     appear before the hearing officer to give testimony or 
     produce records. The application may be made within the 
     judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where 
     that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any 
     failure to obey a lawful order of the district court issued 
     pursuant to this section may be held by such court to be a 
     civil contempt thereof.
       (B) Service of process.--Process in an action or contempt 
     proceeding pursuant to subparagraph (A) may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person refusing or failing to 
     comply, or threatening to refuse or not to comply, resides, 
     transacts business, or may be found, and subpoenas for 
     witnesses who are required to attend such proceedings may run 
     into any other district.
       (g) Decision.--The hearing officer shall issue a written 
     decision as expeditiously as possible, but in no case more 
     than 90 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The written 
     decision shall be transmitted by the Office to the parties. 
     The decision shall state the issues raised in the complaint, 
     describe the evidence in the record, contain findings of fact 
     and conclusions of law, contain a determination of whether a 
     violation has occurred, and order such remedies as are 
     appropriate pursuant to title II. The decision shall be 
     entered in the records of the Office. If a decision is not 
     appealed under section 406 to the Board, the decision shall 
     be considered the final decision of the Office.
       (h) Precedents.--A hearing officer who conducts a hearing 
     under this section shall be guided by judicial decisions 
     under the laws made applicable by section 102 and by Board 
     decisions under this Act.

     SEC. 406. APPEAL TO THE BOARD.

       (a) In General.--Any party aggrieved by the decision of a 
     hearing officer under section 405(g) may file a petition for 
     review by the Board not later than 30 days after entry of the 
     decision in the records of the Office.
       (b) Parties' Opportunity To Submit Argument.--The parties 
     to the hearing upon which the decision of the hearing officer 
     was made shall have a reasonable opportunity to be heard, 
     through written submission and, in the discretion of the 
     Board, through oral argument.
       (c) Standard of Review.--The Board shall set aside a 
     decision of a hearing officer if the Board determines that 
     the decision was--
       (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
     otherwise not consistent with law;
       (2) not made consistent with required procedures; or
       (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.
       (d) Record.--In making determinations under subsection (c), 
     the Board shall review the whole record, or those parts of it 
     cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule 
     of prejudicial error.
       (e) Decision.--The Board shall issue a written decision 
     setting forth the reasons for its decision. The decision may 
     affirm, reverse, or remand to the hearing officer for further 
     proceedings. A decision that does not require further 
     proceedings before a hearing officer shall be entered in the 
     records of the Office as a final decision.

     SEC. 407. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BOARD DECISIONS AND ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--
       (1) Judicial review.--The United States Court of Appeals 
     for the Federal Circuit shall have jurisdiction over any 
     proceeding commenced by a petition of--
       (A) a party aggrieved by a final decision of the Board 
     under section 406(e) in cases arising under part A of title 
     II,
       (B) a charging individual or a respondent before the Board 
     who files a petition under section 210(d)(4),
       (C) the General Counsel or a respondent before the Board 
     who files a petition under section 215(c)(5), or
       (D) the General Counsel or a respondent before the Board 
     who files a petition under section 220(c)(3).

     The court of appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to set 
     aside, suspend (in whole or in part), to determine the 
     validity of, or otherwise review the decision of the Board.
       (2) Enforcement.--The United States Court of Appeals for 
     the Federal Circuit shall have jurisdiction over any petition 
     of the General Counsel, filed in the name of the Office and 
     at the direction of the Board, to enforce a final decision 
     under section 405(g) or 406(e) with respect to a violation of 
     part A, B, C, or D of title II.
       (b) Procedures.--
       (1) Respondents.--(A) In any proceeding commenced by a 
     petition filed under subsection (a)(1) (A) or (B), or filed 
     by a party other than the General Counsel under subsection 
     (a)(1) (C) or (D), the Office shall be named respondent and 
     any party before the Board may be named respondent by filing 
     a notice of election with the court within 30 days after 
     service of the petition.
       (B) In any proceeding commenced by a petition filed by the 
     General Counsel under subsection (a)(1) (C) or (D), the 
     prevailing party in the final decision entered under section 
     406(e) shall be named respondent, and any other party before 
     the Board may be named respondent by filing a notice of 
     election with the court within 30 days after service of the 
     petition.
       (C) In any proceeding commenced by a petition filed under 
     subsection (a)(2), the party under section 405 or 406 that 
     the General Counsel determines has failed to comply with a 
     final decision under section 405(g) or 406(e) shall be named 
     respondent.
       (2) Intervention.--Any party that participated in the 
     proceedings before the Board under section 406 and that was 
     not made respondent under paragraph (1) may intervene as of 
     right.
       (c) Law Applicable.--Chapter 158 of title 28, United States 
     Code, shall apply to judicial review under paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (a), except that--
       (1) with respect to section 2344 of title 28, United States 
     Code, service of a petition in any proceeding in which the 
     Office is a respondent shall be on the General Counsel rather 
     than on the Attorney General;
       (2) the provisions of section 2348 of title 28, United 
     States Code, on the authority of the Attorney General, shall 
     not apply;
       (3) the petition for review shall be filed not later than 
     90 days after the entry in the Office of a final decision 
     under section 406(e); and
       (4) the Office shall be an ``agency'' as that term is used 
     in chapter 158 of title 28, United States Code.
       (d) Standard of Review.--To the extent necessary for 
     decision in a proceeding commenced under subsection (a)(1) 
     and when presented, the court shall decide all relevant 
     questions of law and interpret constitutional and statutory 
     provisions. The court shall set aside a final decision of the 
     Board if it is determined that the decision was--
       (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
     otherwise not consistent with law;
       (2) not made consistent with required procedures; or
       (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.
       (e) Record.--In making determinations under subsection (d), 
     the court shall review the whole record, or those parts of it 
     cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule 
     of prejudicial error.

     SEC. 408. CIVIL ACTION.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over any civil action commenced under 
     section 404 and this section by a covered employee who has 
     completed counseling under section 402 and mediation under 
     section 403. A civil action may be commenced by a covered 
     employee only to seek redress for a violation for which the 
     employee has completed counseling and mediation.
       (b) Parties.--The defendant shall be the employing office 
     alleged to have committed the violation, or in which the 
     violation is alleged to have occurred.
       (c) Jury Trial.--Any party may demand a jury trial where a 
     jury trial would be available in an action against a private 
     defendant under the relevant law made applicable by this Act. 
     In any case in which a violation of section 201 is alleged, 
     the court shall not inform the jury of the maximum amount of 
     compensatory damages available under section 201(b)(1) or 
     201(b)(3).

     SEC. 409. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS.

       In any proceeding brought under section 407 or 408 in which 
     the application of a regulation issued under this Act is at 
     issue, the court may review the validity of the regulation in 
     accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through 
     (D) of section 706(2) of title 5, United States Code, except 
     that with respect to regulations approved by a joint 
     resolution under section 304(c), only the provisions of 
     section 706(2)(B) of title 5, United States Code, shall 
     apply. If the court determines that the regulation is 
     invalid, the court shall apply, to the extent necessary and 
     appropriate, the most relevant substantive executive agency 
     regulation promulgated to implement the statutory provisions 
     with respect to which the invalid regulation was issued. 
     Except as provided in this section, the validity of 
     regulations issued under this Act is not subject to judicial 
     review.

     SEC. 410. OTHER JUDICIAL REVIEW PROHIBITED.

       Except as expressly authorized by sections 407, 408, and 
     409, the compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of 
     this Act and any action taken pursuant to this Act shall not 
     be subject to judicial review.

     SEC. 411. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO ISSUE REGULATIONS.

       In any proceeding under section 405, 406, 407, or 408, 
     except a proceeding to enforce section 220 with respect to 
     offices listed under section 220(e)(2), if the Board has not 
     issued a regulation on a matter for which this Act requires a 
     regulation to be issued, the hearing officer, Board, or 
     court, as the case may be, shall apply, to the extent 
     necessary and appropriate, the most relevant substantive 
     executive agency regulation promulgated to implement the 
     statutory provision at issue in the proceeding.

     SEC. 412. EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CERTAIN APPEALS.

       (a) In General.--An appeal may be taken directly to the 
     Supreme Court of the United States from any interlocutory or 
     final judgment, decree, or order of a court upon the 
     constitutionality of any provision of this Act.
       (b) Jurisdiction.--The Supreme Court shall, if it has not 
     previously ruled on the question, accept jurisdiction over 
     the appeal 
     [[Page H262]] referred to in subsection (a), advance the 
     appeal on the docket, and expedite the appeal to the greatest 
     extent possible.

     SEC. 413. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.

       The authorization to bring judicial proceedings under 
     sections 405(f)(3), 407, and 408 shall not constitute a 
     waiver of sovereign immunity for any other purpose, or of the 
     privileges of any Senator or Member of the House of 
     Representatives under article I, section 6, clause 1, of the 
     Constitution, or a waiver of any power of either the Senate 
     or the House of Representatives under the Constitution, 
     including under article I, section 5, clause 3, or under the 
     rules of either House relating to records and information 
     within its jurisdiction.

     SEC. 414. SETTLEMENT OF COMPLAINTS.

       Any settlement entered into by the parties to a process 
     described in section 210, 215, 220, or 401 shall be in 
     writing and not become effective unless it is approved by the 
     Executive Director. Nothing in this Act shall affect the 
     power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
     respectively, to establish rules governing the process by 
     which a settlement may be entered into by such House or by 
     any employing office of such House.

     SEC. 415. PAYMENTS.

       (a) Awards and Settlements.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (c), only funds which are appropriated to an 
     account of the Office in the Treasury of the United States 
     for the payment of awards and settlements may be used for the 
     payment of awards and settlements under this Act. There are 
     authorized to be appropriated for such account such sums as 
     may be necessary to pay such awards and settlements. Funds in 
     the account are not available for awards and settlements 
     involving the General Accounting Office, the Government 
     Printing Office, or the Library of Congress.
       (b) Compliance.--Except as provided in subsection (c), 
     there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary for administrative, personnel, and similar expenses 
     of employing offices which are needed to comply with this 
     Act.
       (c) OSHA, Accommodation, and Access Requirements.--Funds to 
     correct violations of section 201(a)(3), 210, or 215 of this 
     Act may be paid only from funds appropriated to the employing 
     office or entity responsible for correcting such violations. 
     There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
     necessary for such funds.

     SEC. 416. CONFIDENTIALITY.

       (a) Counseling.--All counseling shall be strictly 
     confidential, except that the Office and a covered employee 
     may agree to notify the employing office of the allegations.
       (b) Mediation.--All mediation shall be strictly 
     confidential.
       (c) Hearings and Deliberations.--Except as provided in 
     subsections (d), (e), and (f), all proceedings and 
     deliberations of hearing officers and the Board, including 
     any related records, shall be confidential. This subsection 
     shall not apply to proceedings under section 215, but shall 
     apply to the deliberations of hearing officers and the Board 
     under that section.
       (d) Release of Records for Judicial Action.--The records of 
     hearing officers and the Board may be made public if required 
     for the purpose of judicial review under section 407.
       (e) Access by Committees of Congress.--At the discretion of 
     the Executive Director, the Executive Director may provide to 
     the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Ethics of the 
     Senate access to the records of the hearings and decisions of 
     the hearing officers and the Board, including all written and 
     oral testimony in the possession of the Office. The Executive 
     Director shall not provide such access until the Executive 
     Director has consulted with the individual filing the 
     complaint at issue, and until a final decision has been 
     entered under section 405(g) or 406(e).
       (f) Final Decisions.--A final decision entered under 
     section 405(g) or 406(e) shall be made public if it is in 
     favor of the complaining covered employee, or in favor of the 
     charging party under section 210, or if the decision reverses 
     a decision of a hearing officer which had been in favor of 
     the covered employee or charging party. The Board may make 
     public any other decision at its discretion.
                   TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 501. EXERCISE OF RULEMAKING POWERS.

       The provisions of sections 102(b)(3) and 304(c) are 
     enacted--
       (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such 
     they shall be considered as part of the rules of such House, 
     respectively, and such rules shall supersede other rules only 
     to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
       (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change such rules (so far as relating to such 
     House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same 
     extent as in the case of any other rule of each House.

     SEC. 502. POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

       (a) In General.--It shall not be a violation of any 
     provision of section 201 to consider the--
       (1) party affiliation;
       (2) domicile; or
       (3) political compatibility with the employing office;

     of an employee referred to in subsection (b) with respect to 
     employment decisions.
       (b) Definition.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term 
     ``employee'' means--
       (1) an employee on the staff of the leadership of the House 
     of Representatives or the leadership of the Senate;
       (2) an employee on the staff of a committee or subcommittee 
     of--
       (A) the House of Representatives;
       (B) the Senate; or
       (C) a joint committee of the Congress;
       (3) an employee on the staff of a Member of the House of 
     Representatives or on the staff of a Senator;
       (4) an officer of the House of Representatives or the 
     Senate or a congressional employee who is elected by the 
     House of Representatives or Senate or is appointed by a 
     Member of the House of Representatives or by a Senator (in 
     addition an employee described in paragraph (1), (2), or 
     (3)); or
       (5) an applicant for a position that is to be occupied by 
     an individual described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4).

     SEC. 503. NONDISCRIMINATION RULES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE.

       The Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the 
     Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of 
     Representatives retain full power, in accordance with the 
     authority provided to them by the Senate and the House, with 
     respect to the discipline of Members, officers, and employees 
     for violating rules of the Senate and the House on 
     nondiscrimination in employment.

     SEC. 504. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Civil Rights Remedies.--
       (1) Sections 301 and 302 of the Government Employee Rights 
     Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1201 and 1202) are amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``SEC. 301. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RIGHTS ACT OF 1991.

       ``(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the 
     `Government Employee Rights Act of 1991'.
       ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to provide 
     procedures to protect the rights of certain 
     government employees, with respect to their public 
     employment, to be free of discrimination on the basis of 
     race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
     disability.
       ``(c) Definition.--For purposes of this title, the term 
     `violation' means a practice that violates section 302(a) of 
     this title.

     ``SEC. 302. DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES PROHIBITED.

       ``(a) Practices.--All personnel actions affecting the 
     Presidential appointees described in section 303 or the State 
     employees described in section 304 shall be made free from 
     any discrimination based on--
       ``(1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 
     within the meaning of section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 
     1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16);
       ``(2) age, within the meaning of section 15 of the Age 
     Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a); or
       ``(3) disability, within the meaning of section 501 of the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) and sections 102 
     through 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
     (42 U.S.C. 12112-14).
       ``(b) Remedies.--The remedies referred to in sections 
     303(a)(1) and 304(a)--
       ``(1) may include, in the case of a determination that a 
     violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) has occurred, such 
     remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under sections 
     706(g), 706(k), and 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
     (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g), 2000e-5(k), 2000e-16(d)), and such 
     compensatory damages as would be appropriate if awarded under 
     section 1977 or sections 1977A(a) and 1977A(b)(2) of the 
     Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1981a(a) and (b)(2));
       ``(2) may include, in the case of a determination that a 
     violation of subsection (a)(2) has occurred, such remedies as 
     would be appropriate if awarded under section 15(c) of the 
     Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 
     633a(c)); and
       ``(3) may not include punitive damages.''.
       (2) Sections 303 through 319, and sections 322, 324, and 
     325 of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 
     1203-1218, 1221, 1223, and 1224) are repealed, except as 
     provided in section 506 of this Act.
       (3) Sections 320 and 321 of the Government Employee Rights 
     Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1219 and 1220) are redesignated as 
     sections 303 and 304, respectively.
       (4) Sections 303 and 304 of the Government Employee Rights 
     Act of 1991, as so redesignated, are each amended by striking 
     ``and 307(h) of this title''.
       (5) Section 1205 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 
     1993 (2 U.S.C. 1207a) is repealed, except as provided in 
     section 506 of this Act.
       (b) Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.--Title V of the 
     Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (2 U.S.C. 60m et seq.) 
     is repealed, except as provided in section 506 of this Act.
       (c) Architect of the Capitol.--
       (1) Repeal.--Section 312(e) of the Architect of the Capitol 
     Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-283; 108 Stat. 1444) is 
     repealed, except as provided in section 506 of this Act.
       (2) Application of general accounting office personnel act 
     of 1980.--The provisions of sections 751, 753, and 755 of 
     title 31, United States Code, amended by section 312(e) of 
     the Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act, shall be 
     applied and administered as if such section 312(e) (and the 
     [[Page H263]] amendments made by such section) had not been 
     enacted.

     SEC. 505. JUDICIAL BRANCH COVERAGE STUDY.

       The Judicial Conference of the United States shall prepare 
     a report for submission by the Chief Justice of the United 
     States to the Congress on the application to the judicial 
     branch of the Federal Government of--
       (1) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et 
     seq.);
       (2) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
     2000e et seq.);
       (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
     12101 et seq.);
       (4) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 
     U.S.C. 621 et seq.);
       (5) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 
     2611 et seq.);
       (6) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 
     U.S.C. 651 et seq.);
       (7) chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
     management relations) of title 5, United States Code;
       (8) the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 
     U.S.C. 2001 et seq.);
       (9) the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 
     (29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.);
       (10) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et 
     seq.); and
       (11) chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and 
     reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.

     The report shall be submitted to Congress not later than 
     December 31, 1996, and shall include any recommendations the 
     Judicial Conference may have for legislation to provide to 
     employees of the judicial branch the rights, protections, and 
     procedures under the listed laws, including administrative 
     and judicial relief, that are comparable to those available 
     to employees of the legislative branch under titles I through 
     IV of this Act.

     SEC. 506. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

       (a) Transition Provisions for Employees of the House of 
     Representatives and of the Senate.--
       (1) Claims arising before effective date.--If, as of the 
     date on which section 201 takes effect, an employee of the 
     Senate or the House of Representatives has or could have 
     requested counseling under section 305 of the Government 
     Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1205) or Rule LI of 
     the House of Representatives, including counseling for 
     alleged violations of family and medical leave rights under 
     title V of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, the 
     employee may complete, or initiate and complete, all 
     procedures under the Government Employees Rights Act of 1991 
     and Rule LI, and the provisions of that Act and Rule shall 
     remain in effect with respect to, and provide the exclusive 
     procedures for, those claims until the completion of all such 
     procedures.
       (2) Claims arising between effective date and opening of 
     office.--If a claim by an employee of the Senate or House of 
     Representatives arises under section 201 or 202 after the 
     effective date of such sections, but before the opening of 
     the Office for receipt of requests for counseling or 
     mediation under sections 402 and 403, the provisions of the 
     Government Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1201 et 
     seq.) and Rule LI of the House of Representatives relating to 
     counseling and mediation shall remain in effect, and the 
     employee may complete under that Act or Rule the requirements 
     for counseling and mediation under sections 402 and 403. If, 
     after counseling and mediation is completed, the Office has 
     not yet opened for the filing of a timely complaint under 
     section 405, the employee may elect--
       (A) to file a complaint under section 307 of the Government 
     Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1207) or Rule LI of 
     the House of Representatives, and thereafter proceed 
     exclusively under that Act or Rule, the provisions of which 
     shall remain in effect until the completion of all 
     proceedings in relation to the complaint, or
       (B) to commence a civil action under section 408.
       (3) Section 1205 of the supplemental appropriations act of 
     1993.--With respect to payments of awards and settlements 
     relating to Senate employees under paragraph (1) of this 
     subsection, section 1205 of the Supplemental Appropriations 
     Act of 1993 (2 U.S.C. 1207a) remains in effect.
       (b) Transition Provisions for Employees of the Architect of 
     the Capitol.---
       (1) Claims arising before effective date.--If, as of the 
     date on which section 201 takes effect, an employee of the 
     Architect of the Capitol has or could have filed a charge or 
     complaint regarding an alleged violation of section 312(e)(2) 
     of the Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act (Public 
     Law 103-283), the employee may complete, or initiate and 
     complete, all procedures under section 312(e) of that Act, 
     the provisions of which shall remain in effect with respect 
     to, and provide the exclusive procedures for, that claim 
     until the completion of all such procedures.
       (2) Claims arising between effective date and opening of 
     office.--If a claim by an employee of the Architect of the 
     Capitol arises under section 201 or 202 after the effective 
     date of those provisions, but before the opening of the 
     Office for receipt of requests for counseling or mediation 
     under sections 402 and 403, the employee may satisfy the 
     requirements for counseling and mediation by exhausting the 
     requirements prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol in 
     accordance with section 312(e)(3) of the Architect of the 
     Capitol Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-283). If, after 
     exhaustion of those requirements the Office has not yet 
     opened for the filing of a timely complaint under section 
     405, the employee may elect--
       (A) to file a charge with the General Accounting Office 
     Personnel Appeals Board pursuant to section 312(e)(3) of the 
     Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-
     283), and thereafter proceed exclusively under section 312(e) 
     of that Act, the provisions of which shall remain in effect 
     until the completion of all proceedings in relation to the 
     charge, or
       (B) to commence a civil action under section 408.
       (c) Transition Provision Relating To Matters Other Than 
     Employment Under Section 509 of the Americans With 
     Disabilities Act of 1990.--With respect to matters other than 
     employment under section 509 of the Americans with 
     Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209), the rights, 
     protections, remedies, and procedures of section 509 of such 
     Act shall remain in effect until section 210 of this Act 
     takes effect with respect to each of the entities covered by 
     section 509 of such Act.

     SEC. 507. USE OF FREQUENT FLYER MILES.

       (a) Limitation on the Use of Travel Awards.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, or any rule, 
     regulation, or other authority, any travel award that accrues 
     by reason of official travel of a Member, officer, or 
     employee of the Senate shall be considered the property of 
     the office for which the travel was performed and may not be 
     converted to personal use.
       (b) Regulations.--The Committee on Rules and Administration 
     of the Senate shall have authority to prescribe regulations 
     to carry out this section.
       (c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
       (1) the term ``travel award'' means any frequent flyer, 
     free, or discounted travel, or other travel benefit, whether 
     awarded by coupon, membership, or otherwise; and
       (2) the term ``official travel'' means travel engaged in 
     the course of official business of the Senate.

     SEC. 508. SENSE OF SENATE REGARDING ADOPTION OF SIMPLIFIED 
                   AND STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES FOR 
                   SENATE ACQUISITIONS.

       It is the sense of the Senate that the Committee on Rules 
     and Administration of the Senate should review the rules 
     applicable to purchases by Senate offices to determine 
     whether they are consistent with the acquisition 
     simplification and streamlining laws enacted in the Federal 
     Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355).

     SEC. 509. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act or the application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance is held to be 
     invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of the 
     provisions of the remainder to any person or circumstance 
     shall not be affected thereby.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Thomas] will be recognized for 20 minutes and the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas].
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], chairman of the Committee on Economic 
and Educational Opportunities, be permitted to control 10 minutes of 
the 20 minutes which are controlled on this side and to yield that time 
in such blocks as he may determine.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling].
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks, and to include extraneous material.)
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of the bill 
before us because it is truly one of the most important initiatives 
this Congress will pass this year. Before I go any further, I want to 
thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Fawell] for the many hours over 
the many years, going back to 1990, that he has also spent in trying to 
help bring this day about, as well as our staff members, Randy Johnson 
and Gary Vischer. Its enactment, like the unfunded mandate legislation 
we will be considering later, will create a long-needed institutional 
brake, a yellow flag, on the passage of requirements this institution 
has too easily in the past imposed on employers. As importantly, the 
bill will finally extend the same workplace protections enjoyed by 
others to our own employees. Indeed, now that we are forced to comply 
with these laws, we might even learn from experience and better 
identify with the problems of 
[[Page H264]] compliance endured by our constituents. In fact, I can 
guarantee it. Proposals for future workplace requirements and reform of 
existing laws will gather a lot closer attention by every Member of 
this body after enactment of this legislation. And it's about time. 
This bill, a product of compromise in negotiations between the House 
and Senate, is not absolutely perfect, but it is a major step forward.
  Indeed, the only shadow cast over today is that it took so long in 
coming. As I have noted in the past, the hypocrisy of Congress in 
exempting itself from the laws it imposes on others is so obvious that 
one wonders how it so long escaped criticism, but I am gratified that 
those of us who have long fought--particularly in my committee--for 
strong congressional coverage with enforcement in the courts now have 
ample company.
  But others will also comment on the virtues of this legislation, so 
let me set out, in the short time I have, a few general principles 
which I hope will provide guidance for the new
 Office of Compliance and the courts, to amplify the legislative 
history developed in the Senate.

  First, as questions concerning the constitutionality of the bill have 
been, and will be, raised, I am submitting for the Record an April 10, 
1991, analysis prepared by CRS at my request which concluded that 
legislation allowing congressional employees to bring lawsuits in court 
would likely be upheld and does not pose a serious constitutional 
question. Second, where there is any doubt on the matter, the office 
and the courts should apply the law in question as it is applied to 
private sector employers. Third, where the case law is divided in 
interpreting the relevant law, the Board and the courts should apply to 
the Congress the most rigorous interpretations, not the least rigorous. 
For example, where ambiguities in existing law have led some courts to 
interpret a particular damage provision expansively, while others have 
read that ambiguity in a more restrictive manner, the Board and the 
courts should apply the former interpretation under this act. The 
Congress should not be allowed to escape the problems created by its 
own failure to draft laws properly and, perhaps, through this approach 
we will be forced to revisit and clarify existing laws which, because 
of a lack of clarity, are creating confusion and litigation.
  Let me make a few, more specific points. Although the bill is not 
entirely clear on this issue, the Board should be considered empowered 
to issue regulations under section 201 relating to protections against 
discrimination, subject, of course, to the general limitations on the 
Board's regulatory authority. The power of hearing officers to dismiss 
frivolous cases should be exercised only in the clearest situation 
where there is absolutely no merit to the claim being brought and 
assuming all relevant facts in favor of the employee. The counseling 
required under title IV should be truly employee friendly, informative 
but not coercive. Last, I expect that the protections for 
confidentiality will apply only where expressly stated; thus, for 
example, the report required under section 215 concerning the General 
Counsel's inspection of congressional facilities for OSHA violations 
would be made available to the public. We must not wrap proceedings 
under this law in a vail of secrecy, for to do so would be to lose the 
trust of the public.
  Mr. Speaker, I would have included punitive damages and personal 
liability to the list of available remedies but will not here press the 
issue, for the legislation overall marks a giant step forward in 
disciplining this institution--in forcing us to slow down and more 
thoroughly consider the effect of the laws we impose on others, for now 
we will have to live by those same laws. I believe that after all of us 
are long gone, the positive impact of this initiative will remain.
                                              Library of Congress,


                               Congressional Research Service,

                                   Washington, DC, April 10, 1991.
     To: Honorable William F. Goodling, attention: Randy Johnson.
     From: American Law Division.
     Subject: Constitutionality of authorizing private causes of 
         actions by employees of Members of Congress against their 
         employers.
       This memorandum is in response to your inquiry with regard 
     to whether the speech or debate clause of the Constitution, 
     or, perhaps, some other constitutional provision, would be 
     violated should Congress, in providing protections to 
     employees, either those working for individual Members and 
     for congressional committees or those working for the 
     institution, by forbidding discrimination of the basis of 
     race, color, sex, religion, or other prescribed grounds, 
     authorize the employees to sue in federal court for alleged 
     discrimination.
       Implicated directly by any such proposal would indeed be 
     the speech or debate clause assurance that Members of 
     Congress ``shall not be questioned in any other Place'' for 
     things said or done in the legislative process. Article I, 
     Sec. 6, cl. 1. Additionally, a general separation of powers 
     issue might be raised. As we understand the likely proposal, 
     it would not include any authority for the Equal Employment 
     Opportunity Commission, an executive branch agency, to police 
     the employment relations of the legislative branch, which 
     would in itself raise speech or debate and separation of 
     powers questions.
       This issue has occasioned much debate in Congress and out 
     in recent years. It is not possible to make a definitive 
     determination on the basis of the constitutional text and its 
     history, structure, and purposes, and the judicial precedents 
     are not dispositive. However, the text as informed by the 
     interpretive judicial decisions does rather strongly suggest 
     that the courts would sustain the validity of the enactment 
     should Congress choose to take the step.
       Although the following discussion is anchored in the 
     judicial precedents, one must begin by acknowledging that it 
     is the responsibility of each branch to make an independent 
     interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution and that, 
     while the decision in any particular instance may be 
     reviewable by the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, each 
     branch owes to the others a respect for the reading of the 
     Constitution developed in the court of governing. United 
     States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). Even, therefore, 
     if the Supreme Court's decisions were more directly 
     declaratory of the law than they in fact are,
      Congress in acting on any measure may proceed on a different 
     understanding of the metes and bounds of the Constitution.


                        Speech or Debate Clause

       The speech or debate clause has a long lineage from the 
     struggles of Parliament with the Crown in England, United 
     States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966), and in our 
     scheme of things is designed to protect the independence and 
     integrity of the legislature and to reinforce the principle 
     of separation of powers. Ibid.; United States v. Brewster, 
     408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). The protection of the clause is not 
     limited to words spoken in debate. ``Committee reports, 
     resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered, as 
     are `things generally done in a session of the House by one 
     of its members in relation to the business before it.''' 
     Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting 
     Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)). Thus, so 
     long as legislators are ``acting in the sphere of legitimate 
     legislative activity,'' they are ``protected not only from 
     the consequence of litigation's results but also from the 
     burden of defending themselves.'' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 
     U.S. 367, 376-377 (1972).
       Not only is the Member protected when the clause applies, 
     but his aides receive equal coverage. In Gravel v. United 
     States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-617 (1972), the Court accepted the 
     contentions urged on it by the Senate: ``that it is literally 
     impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern 
     legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in 
     session and matters of legislative concern constantly 
     proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their 
     legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; 
     that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the 
     Members' performance that they must be treated as the 
     latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so recognized, 
     the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause * * * will 
     inevitably be diminished and frustrated.'' Therefore, the 
     Court held ``that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not 
     only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct 
     of the latter would be a protected legislative act if 
     performed by the Member himself.'' Id., 618. See also Doe v. 
     McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
       But the scope of the meaning of ``legislative activity'' 
     has its limits. ``The heart of the clause is speech or debate 
     in either House, and insofar as the clause is construed to 
     reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the 
     deliberative and communicative processes by which Members 
     participate in committee and House proceedings with respect 
     to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed 
     legislation or with respect to other matters which the 
     Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either 
     House.'' Gravel, supra, 408 U.S., 625. Immunity from civil 
     suit, both in law and equity, and from criminal action based 
     on the performance of legislative duties flows from a 
     determination that a challenged act is within the definition 
     of legislative activity. Gravel, for example, held that a 
     grand jury could validly inquire into the processes by which 
     a Member obtained classified information and into the 
     arrangements for subsequent private republication of these 
     documents, since neither action involved protected conduct, 
     id., 626, and republication by a Member of allegedly 
     defamatory remarks outside the legislative body, here through 
     newsletters and
      press releases, was held unprotected, because it was not 
     essential to the 
     [[Page H265]] legislative process. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 
     441 U.S. 111 (1979). In Doe v. McMillan, supra, the Court 
     held that Members and their aides were absolutely immune from 
     liability for conducting an investigation and preparing a 
     report, allegedly libelous, but that the Public Printer and 
     the Superintendent of Documents could be held liable for 
     distributing the report to the public beyond the channels of 
     communication within Congress. Id., 412 U.S., 320-324.
       Thus, a Member is immune when he is ``acting in the sphere 
     of legitimate legislative activity.'' Tenney v. Brandhove, 
     supra, 341 U.S., 376-377. His aides and presumably others 
     acting at his direction are immune when he is. But when he 
     acts outside the legislative sphere, he is not immune and 
     neither are his aides or others directed by him. Doe v. 
     McMillan, supra, 315-316.

   Are Employment Decisions Immunized by the Speech or Debate Clause?

       It has been strongly contended that the employment 
     decisions of Members with respect to their aides, at least 
     with respect to those aides who are essential to the 
     performance of those legislative activities that are 
     protected by the clause, fall fully within the protection of 
     the speech or debate clause and ``shall not be questioned in 
     any other Place.'' As we will see, that position has support 
     in the case law, but a recent decision by the Supreme Court 
     suggests the conclusion that a Member's hiring and firing 
     practices are not legislative within the meaning of the 
     clause.
       In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a divided Court 
     held that a female aide of a Member, discharged because the 
     Member preferred a male for the job, had a cause of action 
     under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to sue 
     the Member for monetary damages.\1\ Because the lower court 
     had not passed on the contention that the speech or debate 
     clause precluded the suit, the Supreme Court declined to do 
     so at that stage. Id., 235-236 n. 11. The Court did hold 
     that, inasmuch as the clause embodied for Members of Congress 
     the concerns of the separation of powers doctrine for 
     purposes of immunity from suit, it was the only source of 
     immunity, not other principles of separation as well. Ibid. 
     Chief Justice Burger, dissenting along with Justices Powell 
     and Rehnquist, argued that separation of powers in 
     combination with the speech or debate clause, both sharing 
     common roots, did not permit the suit to go forward, id., 
     249, and Justice Stewart, dissenting, thought the speech or 
     debate clause issued was ``far from frivolous'' and would 
     have remanded so the court of appeals could decide it. Id., 
     251.\2\
     \1\In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Bureau of 
     Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court held that a person, 
     alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
     protection, in the absence of a statutory remedial cause of 
     action, could sue the individual officers for damages under 
     an implied cause of action premised directly upon the 
     constitutional provision in question. Davis v. Passman 
     extended this ruling, by basing the implication of a cause of 
     action upon the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, which 
     contains an equal protection component, when the Federal 
     Government or someone acting under its authority performs an 
     allegedly discriminatory act.
     \2\The case was settled after the Supreme Court remanded it 
     for further proceedings, and no speech or debate clause 
     resolution was reached.
       In two decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for 
     the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to formulate a 
     standard to permit determination of applicability or 
     nonapplicability of the clause to congressional employment 
     decisions. The discharge of the manager of the House of 
     Representatives' restaurants was the issue of Walker v. 
     Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1036 
     (1984). Essentially, the court thought inquiry should focus 
     on whether an employee's duties could be viewed ``as work 
     that significantly informs or influences the shaping of our 
     nation's laws'' or whether an employee's duties were 
     ``peculiar to a Congress member's work qua legislator,'' 
     ``intimately cognate . . . to the legislative process.'' Id., 
     931. Under that standard, the clause did not apply to the 
     employee. In Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of 
     Representatives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 479 
     U.S. 996 (1986), the discharge of an Official Reporter for 
     the House of Representatives was challenged. The court held 
     the congressional defendants to be immune under the speech or 
     debate clause. The standard was ``whether the employee's 
     duties were directly related to the due functioning of the 
     legislative process.'' Id., 929 (emphasis in original). If 
     the employee's duties are ``such that they are directly 
     assisting members of Congress in the `discharge of their 
     functions,' personnel decisions affecting them are 
     correspondingly legislative and shielded from judicial 
     scrutiny.'' Ibid.
       Requiring reconsideration of this developing case law, 
     however, is Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). The case 
     unanimously held that a state court judge did not have 
     judicial immunity in a suit for damages brought by a 
     probation officer whom he had fired. The Court explained that 
     in determining whether immunity attaches to a particular 
     official action it applies a ``functional'' approach. ``Under 
     that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with 
     which a particular official or class of officials has been 
     lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that 
     exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have 
     on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Officials who 
     seek exemption from personal liability have the burden of 
     showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding 
     considerations of public policy . . .'' Id., 224. Thus, it is 
     ``the nature of the function performed, not the identity of 
     the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity 
     analysis.'' Id., 229.
       Judges have absolute immunity from liability for the 
     performance of judicial functions. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 
     Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 
     (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). But when a 
     judge acts in an administrative or a legislative capacity, he 
     enjoys no judicial immunity. In the Court's view, ``Judge 
     White was acting in an administrative capacity when he 
     demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts . . . may have 
     been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of 
     a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however, 
     were not themselves
      judicial or adjudicative.'' Supra, 484 U.S., 229. Employment 
     decisions, like many others, the Court continued, ``are 
     often crucial to the efficient operation of public 
     institutions,'' ibid., yet they are not entitled to 
     absolute immunity, ``even though they may be essential to 
     the very functioning of the courts* * *.'' Id., 228.
       Forrester v. White was, of course, not a case governed by 
     the speech or debate clause; it was brought under 42 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 1983, which affords persons who have been denied their 
     constitutional rights under color of state law a cause of 
     action against state and local defendants. And, yet, the 
     Court has, when passing on questions of legislative immunity 
     in Sec. 1983 actions, looked to speech and debate principles, 
     emphasizing that the clause itself is but a part of the much 
     larger common-law principle of legislative freedom of speech. 
     Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 372-379; Supreme Court 
     of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980). 
     Indeed, the Court has said that ``we generally have equated 
     the legislative immunity to which state legislators are 
     entitled under Sec. 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under 
     the Constitution.'' Id., 733. See also Eastland v. United 
     States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-503, 505, 506 
     (1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85; United 
     States v. Johnson, supra, 383 U.S., 180. If, therefore, 
     Forrester v. White bears on the question of congressional 
     immunity for employment decisions, it strongly suggests that 
     for such decisions Members of Congress do not have immunity.
       The D.C. Circuit in Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165 (D.C.Cir. 
     1989), has read Forrester to apply to legislative immunity 
     and has held that a legislator's employment decisions are not 
     entitled to legislative immunity. Gross, too, is a Sec. 1983 
     case brought against a member of the City Council of the 
     District of Columbia, but the court took the two previous 
     decisions in the Circuit, Walker and Browning, to have stated 
     the doctrinal standards, which must be modified in the light 
     of Forrester. See also Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950 
     (7th Cir. 1988)(dictum). The Gross court, however, reserved 
     the question ``whether special considerations applicable to 
     members of Congress, such as separation-of-powers concerns, 
     continue to justify the absolute immunity standard for 
     congressional personnel decisions adopted in Browning.'' 
     Supra, 876 F.2d, 172.
       Ambiguity on this point clouds any analysis of Forrester. 
     The Court observes at one point that it follows its 
     ``functional'' approach in all cases, save for those that are 
     governed ``by express constitutional or statutory 
     enactment.'' Forrester v. White, supra, 484 U.S., 224. 
     Paramount of the express constitutional provisions, it then 
     notes, is the legislative immunity created by the speech or 
     debate clause. ``Even here, however, the Court has been 
     careful not to extend the scope of the protection further 
     than its purposes require.'' Ibid. The Court then refers to 
     Davis v. Passman, supra, for its holding that except for 
     speech or debate clause immunity, a Member of Congress may be 
     liable for his employment decisions. Ibid., But when, later 
     in the opinion, the Court observed that, no less than a 
     judge's ability to hire and fire employees as bearing on his 
     ability to carry out his judicial functions is the similar 
     ability of executive branch officials to hire and fire, and 
     executive officials have no such immunity as the judge was
      claiming, the Court made no reference at all to employment 
     decisions by legislators. Id., 229.
       Some conflicting lines of precedent thus exist. Staffs of 
     Members are so essential to the functioning of the 
     legislative process that under Gravel they are entitled to 
     the same speech or debate immunity that the Members have. 
     This suggests that the clause could very well protect the 
     Members' discretion in choosing to hire or to keep or not 
     keep any person they want on their staffs. At the same time, 
     the Forrester decision forecloses this mode of analysis for 
     judges (as well as those executive officers with some measure 
     of immunity). It is simply not relevant that the employee or 
     aide is essential to the execution of the official's function 
     or crucial to the efficient operation of his office. What is 
     relevant is whether the function for which the judge is being 
     questioned is judicial or adjudicative; if it is 
     administrative, or legislative, judicial immunity does not 
     attach.
       Legislative immunity could be similarly analyzed. When the 
     Member is engaged in legislative activity, he and his 
     assisting aides are entitled to speech or debate immunity; 
     when the Member, or an aide deputized by him, is engaged in 
     an administrative function, such as hiring or firing staff, 
     neither has speech or debate immunity. The conceptual 
     difficulty is that in being ``careful not to extend the scope 
     of the protection 
     [[Page H266]] [of the speech or debate clause] further than 
     its purposes require,'' Forrester, 484 U.S., 224 the Court 
     has construed the application of the clause to depend upon 
     the connection of the acts challenged to the legislative 
     process. In the context of Gravel, the ``purposes'' served by 
     the clause required coverage of aides. But hiring and firing 
     an aide is not legislating, anymore than discharging the 
     probation officer was a judicial act of Judge White. A 
     tension exists here, but on the strength of Forrester, a 
     persuasive argument can be made that the speech or debate 
     clause does not encompass employment decisions.
       In any event, certain employees of the institution, such as 
     the manager of the House of Representatives restaurant 
     involved in Walker v. Jones, supra, have only a tenuous 
     relationship to the legislative function. Under the 
     precedents preceding Forrester, it appears that Congress 
     could have provided a judicial remedy for them. Similarly, 
     not all personal aides of Members assist in the legislative 
     function as explicated by the Court. Some deal with 
     constituent relations; some do casework and other activities 
     with the executive branch and the like. Even if, therefore, 
     employment decisions concerning aides assisting the Member 
     exclusively in the legislative function were immune, the same 
     decisions with respect to other employees would not be. 
     Difficulties of application, it is safe to say, would be 
     great.
       Certainly, an express decision made legislatively by 
     Congress that employment decisions of Members can be placed 
     outside coverage of the speech or debate clause would be a 
     determination by the body most familiar with the issue that 
     should be entitled to special deference by the courts when 
     they are called upon to pass on the question of the validity 
     of congressional coverage under an appropriate statute.
        May Congress Waive Speech or Debate Immunity From Suit?

       Even if it is eventually determined, either by Congress or 
     by the courts, that employment decisions are encompassed by 
     the clause, the validity of judicial cognizance of questions 
     arising from the relationship could still be defended on the 
     basis that Congress may waive the protection of the clause by 
     an express provision of law and give jurisdiction of an issue 
     to the courts. Absent clearly applicable case law, we can, at 
     this point, but speculate about how the Supreme Court might 
     eventually resolve the question.
       Twice now, the Court has reserved the issue, in the context 
     of criminal prosecutions of Members. ``[W]ithout intimating 
     any view thereon, we expressly leave open for consideration 
     when the case arises a prosecution which * * * is founded 
     upon a narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress in the 
     exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of 
     its members.'' Johnson, supra, 383 U.S., 185. See also 
     Brewster, supra, 408 U.S., 529 n. 18. But in the latter case, 
     three dissenters reached the issue and would have ruled that 
     Congress may not authorize the courts to try Members for 
     conduct protected by the speech or debate clause. Id., 529, 
     540-549 (Justices Brennan and Douglas), 551, 562-563 
     (Justices White, Brennan, and Douglas). Both Johnson and 
     Brewster were criminal cases, the paradigmatic kind of 
     executive invasion of legislative privilege with which the 
     parliamentary proponents of legislative integrity and the 
     Framers were concerned. It may be that with respect to civil 
     cases, especially civil cases in which the plaintiff is a 
     private citizen, the concern is of a lesser nature, see Gross 
     v. Winter, supra, 876 F.2d, 172-173 n. 11, but the clause 
     clearly applies to both criminal and civil suits, and the 
     Court, with one exception not relevant in this context, has 
     indicated no difference of treatment based on the nature of 
     the cause of action. See Supreme Court of Virginia, supra, 
     446 U.S., 733 (noting United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 
     (1980)).
       Facially, the clause seems to make jurisdiction over 
     Members for conduct covered by the clause exclusive with the 
     respective House of each Member. That is, ``for any Speech or 
     Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any 
     other Place.'' That exclusivity is the necessary conclusion 
     from the plain language of the clause is hardly compelling. 
     It merits mention that Congress is given by the Constitution, 
     Article I, Sec. 5, cl 2, the power to punish its Members for 
     disorderly behavior and even to expel a Member by a two-
     thirds vote of the respective House. This power to punish is 
     a complementary authority to speech or debate immunity, 
     inasmuch as the drive of the English Parliament for 
     legislative freedom included the successful assertion of the 
     power to punish members for offenses for which they were 
     immune to executive prosecution. Colonial and state 
     legislatures in this country and the Federal Congress all 
     claimed the same power as part of the same consideration. See 
     Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 (1821); Watkins v. 
     United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188-199 (1957); United States v. 
     Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-446 (1965); Powell v. McCormack, 
     supra, 395 U.S., 522-548. As the Court has observed, 
     Congress' power to punish Members, even to expulsion, is 
     quite broad, extending ``to all cases where the offence is 
     such as in the judgment of the Senate [and, no doubt, the 
     House of Representatives] is inconsistent with the trust and 
     duty of a
      member.'' In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897). In 
     exercising its powers under this grant of authority, the 
     Senate or the House of Representatives ``acts as a 
     judicial tribunal'' and its powers to adjudge ``is in no 
     wise inferior under like circumstances to that exercised 
     by a court of justice,'' Barry v. United States ex rel. 
     Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).
       In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), a Senator 
     convicted for accepting money to influence an executive 
     department, conduct not protected by the speech or debate 
     clause, argued that the statute under which he was charged 
     conflicted with the provision of Article I, Sec. 5, cls. 1 & 
     2, making each House the sole judge of the qualifications of 
     its Members and giving each House the authority to punish its 
     Members for disorderly behavior. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 
     supra, 103 U.S., 183 (The Constitution ``is not wholly silent 
     as to the authority of the separate branches of Congress to 
     inflict punishment. It authorizes each House to punish its 
     own members.'') (emphasis added). Rejecting the contention, 
     the Court observed: ``While the framers of the Constitution 
     intended that each Department should keep within its 
     appointed sphere of public action, it was never contemplated 
     that the authority of the Senate to admit to a seat in its 
     body one who had been duly elected as a Senator, or its power 
     to expel him after being admitted, should, in any degree, 
     limit or restrict the authority of Congress to enact such 
     statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as the public 
     interests required for carrying into effect the powers 
     granted to it. In order to promote the efficiency of the 
     public service and enforce integrity in the conduct of such 
     public affairs as are committed to the several Departments, 
     Congress, having a choice of means, may prescribe such 
     regulations to those ends as its wisdom may suggest, if they 
     be not forbidden by the fundamental law.'' Id., 202 U.S., 
     367. That is, Congress, though the Senate had the power to 
     punish the Member itself, could enact legislation providing 
     for his trial in the courts of the United States.
       Similarly, though each House has the power, pursuant to the 
     legislative power of inquiry, to punish contempts by 
     witnesses before it or one of its committees, Anderson v. 
     Dunn, supra; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); McGrain 
     v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 
     U.S. 125 (1935), it may also provide for trial and punishment 
     before the federal courts. In 1857, because imprisonment 
     could extend no further than the adjournment of the House 
     which ordered it and because contempt trials before the bar 
     of the charging House were time consuming, Congress enacted a 
     statute providing for criminal process in the federal courts 
     with prescribed penalties for contempt of Congress. Act of 
     January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. With only minor 
     modifications, this statute is now 2 U.S.C. Sec. 192.
       Holding that the purpose of this statute is merely 
     supplementary of the power retained by Congress, the Supreme 
     Court has rejected all constitutional challenges to it. ``We 
     grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either of its 
     Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for 
     contempt, in cases to which the power of either House 
     properly extended; but because Congress, by the Act of 1857, 
     sought to aid each of the Houses in the discharge of its 
     constitutional functions, it does not follow that any 
     delegation of the power in
      each to punish for contempt was involved.'' In re Chapman, 
     supra, 166 U.S., 671-672.
       The lesson of these cases is that Congress' power under 
     Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18, to enact all laws which are 
     ``necessary and proper'' to execute its powers, includes the 
     power to enact laws which implement and execute the powers of 
     each House to govern itself. Congress regularly, pursuant to 
     its authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings,'' 
     enacts legislation binding both Houses to observance of 
     procedural and substantive matters. The Legislative 
     Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, 60 Stat. 834, 84 Stat. 
     1175, contained extensive provisions affecting one House or 
     the other as well as both bodies, and the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, 99 Stat. 
     1037, made similar extensive provisions. Of course, each 
     House retained the power to make unilateral changes, pursuant 
     to the authorization to determine the rules of proceedings, 
     but as to the power to enact legislation for both Houses 
     there was no doubt.
       Establishing that there is no necessary exclusivity simply 
     because the Constitution imposes a power or duty on Congress, 
     or on one House thereof, merely addresses one half of the 
     equation, however. The provisions discussed above involved 
     delegations or authorizations to each House, whereas the 
     speech or debate clause appears on its face to be directed to 
     the protection of the individual Senator or Representative. 
     It has been observed by the Court that ``[t]he immunities of 
     the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the 
     Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of 
     Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the 
     legislative process by insuring the independence of 
     individual legislators.'' United States v. Brewster, supra, 
     408 U.S., 507. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 103 
     U.S., 203.
       Practice by the House of Representatives considers the 
     response of a Member to a subpoena or other legal process to 
     raise a question related to the dignity of the House and the 
     integrity of its proceedings. ``The rules and precedents of 
     the House require that no Member, official, staff member, or 
     employee of the House may, either voluntarily or in obedience 
     to a subpena, testify regarding official functions, 
     documents, or activities of the House without the consent of 
     the House 
     [[Page H267]] being first obtained.'' 3 Deschler's Precedents 
     of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. 94-661 
     (1979), ch. 11, Sec. 14. See In re Grand Jury Investigation 
     (Eilberg), 587 F.2d 589, 592-593 (3d Cir. 1978) (House 
     acquiescence to grand jury subpoena). This practice reflects 
     the institutional interest of the House in the protection of 
     the clause and might, without more, support enactment of 
     legislation based on Congress' necessary and proper power.
       Personal interest, a purely individual interest divorced 
     from the institutional interest, in the protection of the 
     clause has also been recognized, though. In Coffin, v. 
     Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808), speaking of the Massachusetts 
     equivalent of the federal clause, Chief Justice Parsons said: 
     ``In considering this article, it appears to me that the 
     privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the 
     house as an organized body, as of each individual member
      composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even 
     against the declared will of the house. For he does not 
     hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house; but 
     derives it from the will of the people, expressed in the 
     constitution, which is paramount to the will of either or 
     both branches of the legisalture. In this respect the 
     privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached 
     to each member by another part of the constitution, by 
     which he is exempted from arrests on mesne (or original) 
     process, during his going to, returning from, or attending 
     the general court. Of these privileges, thus secured to 
     each member, he cannot be deprived, by a resolve of the 
     house, or by an act of the legislature.'' The significance 
     of this particular case is that the Supreme Court has 
     pronounced it to be perhaps ``the most authoritative case 
     in this country on the construction of the provision in 
     regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies * * *.'' 
     Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 103 U.S., 204. See also 
     Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 373-374; United 
     States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S., 513-517. While the 
     Court has quoted these lines in a case only tangentially, 
     if that, relevant to the question, Spallone v. United 
     States, 110 S.Ct. 625, 634 (1990), its explanation of the 
     reasons underlining the clause gives weight to the 
     personal protection accorded individual Members as well as 
     to the institutional interest. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S. 
     501; Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 372-373.
       To be sure, there were instances in English history in 
     which Parliament contrived to deny the protection of the 
     privilege to Members. For example, John Wilkes was denied his 
     parliamentary privilege and thereafter convicted in court for 
     seditious libel, Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., 527-
     531, but this case was such a cause celebre, here as well in 
     England, that adoption of its particular approach silently 
     into the speech or debate clause is unlikely, to say the 
     least.
       It thus must be concluded that the power of Congress to 
     waive the clause by expressly making Members subject to 
     judicial process for covered conduct is unsettled. It is not, 
     however, foreclosed as a possibility, inasmuch as the 
     exclusivity argument has not been accepted in other contexts 
     involving Article I, Sec. Sec. 5 and 6. But the function of 
     the clause as a protection of institutional interests through 
     a protection of the individual legislators personal rights 
     does weigh considerably against the possibility of 
     institutional waiver. If Congress should enact a statute, 
     making the determination that it can waive, again the fact 
     that the body for whom the protections of the clause were 
     intended has reasoned that its institutional interests would 
     not be adversely affected by judicial exercise of the power 
     would doubtlessly be given substantial deference by the 
     courts. That the clause protects the individual interests of 
     each Member, even though in the long run the protection is to 
     further the institutional interest of the legislative body, 
     would perhaps require some balancing by the courts. 
     Acceptance of such a statute would appear, however, at this 
     stage, to be problematic.
       One should note, however, that when the employment decision 
     is that of either the House of Representatives or the Senate, 
     as an institution, as in the employment of restaurant workers 
     elevator operators, and the like, or even of employees more 
     closely associated with the legislative process, such as the
      Official Reporter before the court in Browning, the ability 
     to waive immunity against the institution might be more 
     easily answered.


                          Separation of Powers

       Additionally, a general separation of powers issue may be 
     independently raised. It is true that in Davis v. Passman, 
     supra, 442 U.S., 228-229 n. 11, the Court stated that unless 
     the speech or debate clause protected Members, they were not 
     protected generally by the separation of powers doctrine. The 
     Gross v. Winter court did, however, pause to consider whether 
     an absolute immunity for Members making employment decisions 
     might be justified under the doctrine of separation of 
     powers, regardless of the inapplicability of the speech or 
     debate clause. Supra, 876 F.2d, 172.
       Briefly, the Court has adopted in its separation of powers 
     decision-making a standard that evaluates whether there is 
     encroachment and aggrandizement. That is, does the action of 
     one branch toward another threaten to ``impermissibly 
     undermine'' the powers of the other or threaten to ``disrupt 
     the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by] 
     prevent[ing] the [branch acted upon] from accomplishing its 
     constitutionally assigned functions.'' Morrison v. Olson, 487 
     U.S. 654, 693-696 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488 
     U.S. 361, 380-384 (1989). See also United States v. Nixon, 
     418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); Nixon v. Administrator of General 
     Services, 433 U.S. 425, 422-443 (1977). Without intending to 
     treat the issue superficially, we must observe that Congress 
     has given the federal courts cognizance of employment 
     discrimination in the executive branch of the Federal 
     Government, and much litigation has ensued without 
     suggestions that this extension of employment discrimination 
     law has upset the balance of the separation of powers. 
     Therefore, by parity of concern, it would seem evident that 
     if the speech or debate clause is no impediment to judicial 
     causes of action for the employees of congressional Members, 
     the doctrine of separation of powers will present no barrier.


                    Congressional Instrumentalities
       Whether a constitutional problem would arise from 
     application of employment discrimination laws, with judicial 
     remedies, to the instrumentalities of Congress\3\ is a 
     question that may be quickly disposed of. In the course of 
     its legislative provision of remedies against employment 
     discrimination, beginning in 1972, Congress has extended to 
     the Library of Congress and to those units in the legislative 
     branch which have positions in the competitive service the 
     guarantees and judicial remedies of title VII of the Civil 
     Rights Act of 1964 (as amended in 1972), 42 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 2000e-16(b), and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
     Act of 1967 (as amended in 1978), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a(a). The 
     General Accounting Office, which is a legislative branch 
     agency for some purposes and an executive branch agency for 
     others,\4\ is covered by these two Acts and by the 
     Rehabilitation Act of 1973.\5\ However, the Americans With 
     Disabilities Act of July 26, 1990, P.L. 101-336, Sec. 509(c), 
     104 Stat. 375, in applying the Act to these 
     instrumentalities, provided for administrative enforcement by 
     the agencies only.\6\
     \3\For purposes of this memorandum, the instrumentalities of 
     Congress include the Architect of the Capitol, the 
     Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, 
     the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the 
     Office of Technology Assessment, and the United States 
     Botanic Garden. Americans With Disabilities Act of July 26, 
     1990, P.L. 101-336, Sec. 509(c)(4), 104 Stat. 375.
     \4\See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
     \5\These Acts apply to ``executive agencies'' as defined in 5 
     U.S.C. Sec. 105, which specifies that, for purposes of title 
     5, ``executive agency'' includes an ``independent 
     establishment,'' which in turn is defined by 5 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 104(2) to include GAO.
     \6\The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 
     Sec. 16(c), 101st Congress, would have limited enforcement of 
     the Act and of Title VII to administrative enforcement within 
     each agency.
       To be sure, some employees of some of these agencies in 
     working with Members and the staffs of Members certainly 
     participate in the legislative process in the sense of the 
     term that the Supreme Court has used in interpreting the 
     speech or debate clause. Employees of the Congressional 
     Research Service of the Library of Congress and of the 
     Congressional Budget Office do so participate, and there is 
     authority that for actions CRS employees, for instance, take 
     in the performance of the legislative function they are 
     immune under the speech or debate clause. See Webser v. Sun 
     Co., Inc., 561 F.Supp. 1184 (D.D.C. 1983), vacated and 
     remanded, 731 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir. 1984), on further appeal, 790 
     F.2d F.2d 157 (D.C.Cir. 1986). Other members of the Library 
     of Congress staff perform other functions not related to the 
     legislative process. See, e.g., Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 
     F.2d 294, 298-301 (4th Cir. 1978)(position of Register of 
     Copyrights). Similarly, it is questionable that, for 
     instance, employees of the United States Botanic Garden 
     participate in the legislative function as defined by the 
     Supreme Court.
       If Congress should adopt the reasoning of an earlier 
     portion of the memorandum to the effect that employment 
     decisions are administrative functions not so inextricably 
     tied to the legislative function as to implicate the speech 
     or debate clause, the issue is easily settled. But even if 
     the personal staffs of Members, or at least the legislative 
     affairs employees of the Members' personal staffs, are 
     determined to be covered by the speech or debate clause that 
     they may not be authorized to seek judicial relief for 
     proscribed practices, it does not follow that the employees 
     of congressional instrumentalities are likewise covered. 
     Those who do not assist Members in the carrying out of their 
     legislative responsibilities would seem clearly to be outside 
     the scope of the clause. Those who do assist Members in the 
     carrying out of their legislative responsibilities may well 
     be immune for their actions while so assisting, but what is 
     the legislative function of the employment decisions of the 
     agencies who hire, fire, and oversee their employment that 
     gives those decisions legislative immunity?
       A more compelling reason exists for doubting that the 
     clause would require that employees of these agencies be 
     remitted to purely administrative remedies. The speech or 
     debate clause provides that for their performance of their 
     legislative functions the Members of Congress are not to be 
     questioned in any other place. A challenge to an agency 
     decision respecting the employment rights of an employee 
     would be a suit against the agency. The Library of Congress 
     or the Government Printing Office would be sued, not a Member 
     or Members, not the House of Representatives or the Senate. 
     There is no facile attempt at word play in this distinction. 
[[Page H268]] 
       Thus, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, although Congress 
     could not be sued for ordering the arrest of Kilbourn, nor 
     could any Member be sued for voting for the resolution, the 
     Sergeant at Arms who carried out the legislative directive to 
     take Kilbourn into custody was suable and liable. In Doe v. 
     McMillan, supra, neither the Members nor the committee staff 
     who carried out the investigation and the subsequent 
     preparation and publication of the report on the 
     investigation could be sued, but the two officers, the Public 
     Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, who carried out 
     the congressional directive to distribute the report outside 
     Congress were suable. In Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 
     U.S., 503-506, the Court held that it was proper to name 
     several officers and employees of the House of 
     Representatives as defendants in order that the act of the 
     House in excluding the Member-elect could be challenged.
       That Members of Congress are immune for the act of voting 
     for a measure that may be unconstitutional does not mean that 
     the enacted measure may not be challenged in court, such as 
     by suing one charged with its enforcement for a declaration 
     of invalidity. Congressional actions may be challenged, even 
     if the congressional actors may not be. See e.g., Powell v. 
     McCormack, supra. Thus, it would seem to follow that the 
     actions of a legislative agency proceeding under general 
     congressional direction could be challenged without 
     implicating the strictures of the speech or debate clause. At 
     the least, with the existence of an enacted policy against 
     employment discrimination, the employing agency would, at the 
     least, be acting ultra vires were it to make decisions on the 
     prohibited grounds.


                               Conclusion

       First, application to Congress of the employment protection 
     provisions of federal civil rights laws, at least in the 
     context of authorizing judicial remedies, could raise 
     problems under the speech or debate clause. Under one 
     possible analysis, some employees would be sufficiently 
     removed from the legislative process so that decisions about 
     them may well not implicate the clause at all, whereas other 
     employees are so integral to the legislative process that 
     their employment would be covered. But if the Supreme Court's 
     Forrester decision provides the appropriate mode of analysis, 
     an employment decision of a Member with respect to all staff 
     would be an administrative decision not entitled to speech or 
     debate clause protection. Especially if Congress should 
     conclude that Forrester is the correct analysis, in the 
     course of extending the laws, it seems likely that the courts 
     may well defer to that determination.
       Second, if it is concluded that the speech or debate clause 
     applies to the employment decisions of Members, an argument 
     exists that Congress may expressly waive the protection and 
     subject Members to suit. Little actual authority exists for 
     the proposition, but there is little on the other side 
     either. The matter is largely one of deductions from basic 
     principles and analogies. But the argument from general 
     principles in favor of waiver is significantly weaker than 
     the argument that the clause does not apply in the first 
     place.
       Third, it would appear that regardless of the conclusion 
     with respect to the personal staffs of Members, the employees 
     of a number of agencies associated with Congress would be 
     sufficiently removed from the legislative process that the 
     clause would not apply. With respect to other such employees, 
     who are more involved in the legislative process, the fact 
     that the employment decisions are made by the agencies 
     themselves and not by Congress or an individual Member could 
     bring the decisions outside the scope of the clause.

                                            Johnny H. Killian,

                                                Senior Specialist,
                                      American Constitutional Law.

                              {time}  1140

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today with mixed feelings. On the one hand, I 
want to tell the House I am pleased that the House is moving forward on 
legislation we have been working on for many years only to see it 
thwarted, frankly, in the Senate by Republican politics. Yet today in a 
bipartisan fashion we are on the floor in what will hopefully be the 
final stages in this legislative drama.
  However, the legislation before us today is new to the House. 
Although this bill has been the subject of extensive debate in the 
Senate, it has not had one hearing in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. The American public, I am told today in a 1-minute, 
voted for reform, voted to open up this institution, and voted for 
democratization in debate and extensive analysis of programs. There was 
not one hearing in the House of Representatives during the 104th 
Congress on this bill.
  It was first brought up on this floor just 13 days ago in a different 
form under a completely closed rule. Today a new version is before us, 
with little if any opportunity for review and no chance for amendment. 
If this is the new wind blowing through the House of Representatives, 
then it is a wind that blows little good.
  H.R. 1 was the first piece of legislation to move through the new 
House of Representatives. It did so under a process in which no Member 
could suggest changes. Today it is back, as I have said, in a new 
version. It is again brought to the floor of this House under a 
completely closed process.
  This should be, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, a day of pride for this 
House. It should be a day of joy, but instead it is a day of sadness 
for a Congress that started out with such anticipation of a new day. 
Instead, on day 6 of the 104th Congress we can clearly declare power 
and muscle are the rule of order of this House, not the rule of 
democracy.
  Having said that, having expressed the concern of this side of the 
aisle about the process, let me talk about the substance. S. 2, as I 
said, will finally bring into place a process which many of us fought 
for for a long time. It will provide protection and antidiscrimination 
laws to congressional employees and employees of other legislative-
branch agencies. My good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
Shays], a Republican, has been a leader in this effort with Mr. Swett, 
a Democrat from New Hampshire. Mr. Shays is to be commended for his 
tenacity, for his courage in the light of stiff opposition from time to 
time, and for his tireless efforts in bringing this bill before us 
today. He has performed a service for this House and for this country.
  I believe that S. 2 is an improvement, very frankly, over the House 
bill. S. 2 spells out the rights, protections, remedies, and procedures 
provided to congressional employees. The bill establishes an 
independent nonpartisan Office of Compliance to develop the regulations 
applying the laws to Congress and to resolve complaints. It will be 
composed of a five-member board of directors whose board is selected on 
a bipartisan, bicameral basis similar to the old rules for the House 
administrative officer. Former Members of Congress and current staff 
are prohibited from serving on the board. No Member of the House or 
Senate nor any House or Senate employee can serve as hearing officer on 
a complaint.
  Most importantly, any party aggrieved by a board decision can seek 
judicial review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
and employees can bring suit directly in Federal district court after 
mediation and counseling if that is allowed under the applicable 
statute. This is an important new right for congressional employees, 
and I am pleased that we are finally moving forward on this effort.

                              {time}  1150

  This is an important new right for congressional employees. I am 
pleased that we are finally moving forward on this effort.
  As I have said on the floor, Mr. Speaker, many times, of all the talk 
of reform, of all the speechifying, the one reform that my 
constituents, and I gainsay every representative's constituents, have 
always asked for, and the one reform that I have always thought was 
justified and real, this is it, covering Congress by the same laws we 
ask others to live under.
  Congress should live under the laws it passes, and, my colleagues, in 
most cases, civil rights, the ADA, fair labor standards, family and 
medical leave, to name a few, it has, let me repeat that, this House 
has lived under those statutes. S. 2, however, improves congressional 
coverage and provides an outside remedy for employees, a critical 
addition to present protections.
  This is a change whose time has not only come but is overdue. I am 
proud to be on the floor today with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
Shays] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] and others, and
 the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], Members on our side. I 
regret that Mr. Sweet is not here because he fought very hard. And 
through his leadership and that of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
Shays], this similar legislation passed the House, as I said earlier, 
and was killed in the Senate.

  I would urge today my colleagues to support this legislation in spite 
of the heavy-handed procedural railroad on 
[[Page H269]] which this bill comes to the floor today.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  The gentleman from Maryland indicates that the bill that we have 
before us has not had a single hearing on the House side. Yet he 
commends its content to be superior than the bill that we examined on 
the House side.
  The chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational 
Opportunities lamented the fact that it has taken us so long to get 
here. I think it might be useful for a minute or two to visit the 
chronology of how we got here today.
  Way back on July 28, 1994, the Committee on House Administration 
voted 19 to 0 to pass essentially what we have in front of us onto the 
House, with the hope that in July, having moved out of committee, by 
the end of the second session of the 103d Congress, this would have 
passed the House and the Senate and moved to the President for his 
signature.
  As Members will recall, very little went through the entire 
legislative process in the 103d Congress, and this is one of them.
  It is true that on August 10, the House voted 427 to 4 to adopt what 
is essentially in the measure that we have today. There were four 
Members of the minority, then the majority, who voted against it. 
Having sent that position over to the Senate and the Senate's failure 
to consider the position, on October 7, the House decided to take it 
upon itself to impose the structure of what would have been legislation 
on the House through the rules process.
  At that time the vote was 348 to 3. The three votes in opposition to 
the measure were clearly not substantive opposition. The Members on our 
side of the aisle were in fact protesting the failure of the then 
majority to move any significant reforms in the 103d Congress. 
Notwithstanding that, we imposed this on ourselves through the House 
rules.
  The only substantive difference in S. 2 from H.R. 1, I believe, is 
the addition of the Veterans Reemployment Act to the list of bills 
under which Congress will now operate. In addition to that, we were 
able to work out the very real concerns of the Senate over a single 
shared structure so that the Office of Compliance would fit the needs 
of the House and the Senate with our different size and procedures, 
history and tradition. That has been resolved in this bill.
  So we stand on the brink of living up to what this majority said we 
were going to do in the contract and on January 4.
  I think it is interesting to note that this House voted out of 
committee, on July 28, 1994, in essence this measure. On August 10, 
1994, it was voted out of the House and nothing happened. In this 
Congress, in the 104th Congress, Republicans and Democrats joining 
together on the opening day of the session, 429 to 0, passed this 
measure. And then here today, despite the rhetoric, I think Members 
will find the votes will once again be overwhelmingly in favor of 
Congress placing itself under the laws that the rest of the Nation has 
to live with.
  We will do it in a timeframe that is certainly appropriate. The 
timeframe should have been honored in the 103d. The then majority could 
not deliver. The timeframe is being honored in the 104th, and the 
current majority will deliver.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HOYER, Mr. Speaker, just to review history for 1 second, this 
legislation passed the House in August 1993. It was because of 
Republican opposition to procedure in the Senate that it failed to go 
forward.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes and 30 seconds to my good friend, the 
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett].
  Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, this is an important bill, and 
I am proud to be a cosponsor of this bill as it passes the House of 
Representatives today. Although I am happy that the bill is passing, 
because I think it sets an important precedent, at the same time it 
sets a very embarrassing and disappointing precedent. Let me explain.
  When this bill was considered by the Congress in the 103d Congress, 
it included not only the language that we have in the bill today, but 
it also prohibited Members of the House of Representatives from using 
frequent-flier miles that they have accrued for official use, 
prohibited them from being used for personal use. This is the type of 
reform that Americans think is common sense. Of course, no Member of 
Congress should be able to use the miles that he or she has accrued 
with taxpayer dollars, be allowed to accrue those miles and use them 
for personal use.
  When it passed the 103d Congress, no one batted an eyelash. No calls 
of germaneness were made. It was included in the provisions of the 
bill. But when we got to the floor in the 104th Congress, there was a 
gag rule in effect. This provision, which was included in the bill last 
year, was not included this year. It was gagged, and we were not 
permitted to bring it as an amendment.
  The Senate looked at it a little differently. And the Senate decided 
that it made sense. It made sense for the Senate to prohibit its 
Members from using frequent-flier miles for personal use. But out of 
respect for this Chamber, it decided that it would not impose the same 
law on the House of Representatives.
  So the irony we are faced with today is that we have a law based on 
the premise, a good premise, which I support, which says that any law 
that applies to members of the general population should also apply to 
Members of Congress.
  That is a step forward, But at the same time, for the first time that 
I can discover in the history of this country, we are going to pass a 
law that says that a law that applies to the Members of the U.S. Senate 
does not apply to the Members of the House of Representatives.
  Why are we doing that? Why do we have a higher standard for the 
Members of the U.S. Senate than we do for the Members of the U.S. House 
of Representatives?
  I would argue that the reason we do is because the new leadership 
does not want to have a higher standard for the Members of the House of 
Representatives. In fact, the new Speaker has labeled this reform a 
Mickey Mouse reform, a Mickey Mouse reform to save taxpayers hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. Well, I think the Speaker is correct in 
drawing on Walt Disney for his analogy, but I think a more apt 
character to draw on would be Goofy, because it is simply goofy to 
argue that Members of the House of Representatives can use taxpayer-
funded travel to accrue frequent-flier miles and use them for personal 
vacations to Florida, Hawaii, France, anywhere in the world.
                              {time}  1200

  The very first piece of legislation that will become law after the 
Republicans have gained control of the House in 40 years is going to 
set a lower standard of conduct for the Members of the House of 
Representatives than the U.S. Senate. I will vote for this bill because 
I agree with the underlying premise of the main portion of the bill, 
but it is embarrassing and disappointing with the precedent we are 
setting today.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would tell the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett] 
that we are in the process of reviewing all of the rules and 
regulations in the House of Representatives, and at the end of the last 
Congress we committed to review all of them, including these.
  Perhaps from a historical point of view the gentleman from Wisconsin 
also needs to know that rather than this being the first time in the 
history that the laws applied differently to the House and Senate, he 
needs to know that there was a period of time in which the actual 
compensation to Members of the Senate and the House was different under 
the law.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], one Member who was more responsible than 
anyone in the House today for this being in front of us.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I want to just say very clearly that this is 
no one person's bill. I mean that very sincerely, because in fact there 
are more 
[[Page H270]] fingerprints on this bill from Members of both sides of 
the aisle.
  I would like to take this time first to thank the gentleman from 
Maryland Steny Hoyer, for stepping in and taking the place of Dick 
Swett, who was not returned to office, who has worked on the Democratic 
side with me working on the Republican side, on this issue, and to 
thank him and his staff for doing such an excellent job in helping to 
draft this legislation and the legislation that passed the House 
earlier in this session.
  Also I would thank both the chairman of the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight and to the new empowerment committee, both the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], because they have been working on this 
issue for years and years and years.
  Without their work, and particularly, with no disrespect to the 
Members, but their extraordinary staff, who have weighed in 
tremendously on this issue, have had an amazing contribution.
  I see the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], as well, who over 
a year ago said to me that he had a conversation with the former 
Speaker encouraging him to move forward with congressional 
accountability, and that, frankly, was the major movement that brought 
this bill forward. Without the effort of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], done behind the scenes, without a lot of 
credit, this bill also would not move forward, so I think I need to 
thank the prior Speaker, and thank the present Speaker for working on 
this issue.
  In a summary form, and I would like to then just briefly touch on the 
concern of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett], because it is 
valid, I would like to just make the point that when we passed our 
House congressional accountability last year, the strength of the 
legislation was that we applied all of the laws we imposed on the 
private sector onto Congress, and that we applied all the 
instrumentalities that are part of what makes up Congress: the Library 
of Congress, the GAO, the Architect's Office, and so on. Additionally, 
very importantly, we gave people full access to the court, with all the 
rights of going to civil action, de novo
 review, as well as being able to have judicial review.

  That was the strength of what we did. We also set up this Office of 
Compliance so that we dealt with the separation of powers, but gave 
this Office of Compliance independence.
  The weakness in our bill, if there was a weakness, was that we did it 
by regulation, in that we asked the Office of Compliance to then get us 
under all the laws by regulation, rather than by law, even though in 
the end we saw we are under the law, but the actual process was going 
to be determined by the Office of Compliance through regulation. So the 
strength was all the laws, all the instrumentalities, full access to 
the court, but we did it by regulation.
  The Senate last year passed legislation on congressional 
accountability, admittedly very late, and ultimately it never even had 
a debate on the floor of the Senate; but what they did was, they did 
not include all the laws, all the instrumentalities, or give full 
access to court in their legislation. That was the weakness of their 
legislation. The strength was they went directly to law.
  So after this, the defeat, or actually the failure of the Senate to 
deal with this issue, Republicans and Democrats in both Chambers got 
together to say what could we do to get the strength of the Senate bill 
and the strength of the House bill, and we actually did what I think 
you have a sense of, what I have spoken to already.
  We took all the laws, all the instrumentalities, full access to the 
court, the House version, took the language of the Senate going fully 
to law, rather than regulation, and put them together. That is the bill 
we have before us.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a bill that clearly has the support of most 
Members of Congress. It is one of those odd occasions when the House 
and Senate get together, and instead of taking the weaknesses of their 
two bills, took the strengths of their two bills.
  But addressing the point made by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
Barrett] about frequent flyer mileage, I am partly, if not totally, 
responsible for the fact that it is not part of this legislation, and 
it is not part of this legislation because frequent flyer is not 
connected to the issues that were central to the whole concept.
  What applies to the private sector should apply to us, and frequent 
flyer did not match that test. It is an important issue. It is an issue 
that I think will be dealt with either by the House Oversight 
Committee, or actually by a law of Congress, and I believe the 
gentleman will be dealt with because of his tenacity and his conviction 
that it is important.
  This day and age, in this Congress, as we go through this process, 
the gentleman will find, notwithstanding the opening day, there will be 
open rule. He will be able to offer this amendment countless times on 
germaneness, and I believe that it will be passed by this Chamber, if 
it is not dealt with sooner by one of the committees of Congress.
  Frequent flyer should not be used to go on vacations. I totally agree 
with the gentleman. I have signed onto the gentleman's resolution and 
told him I agree with him. I understand his point on this legislation, 
because there appears to be certainly a contrast. The Senate has it in 
theirs and we do not have it in ours.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficiant].
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I want to talk about some headlines we 
have not read dealing with security of Members of Congress and the 
Senate and the White House, able services provided by our Capitol 
Police.
  Mr. Speaker, I want to stand in support of this bill, because for the 
first time we have an opportunity to treat our Capitol Police like 
every other Federal law enforcement agency, giving them the right to 
have a collective bargaining opportunity.
  The morale in the department is a joke. There has been age 
discrimination, race discrimination, sex discrimination, and quite 
frankly, I brought it to the attention, time after time, of the former 
Democrat leadership, and they did nothing with it.
  However, let me say this about this bill, it allows for a 2-year 
period before the Capitol Police is allowed to in fact bargain in good 
faith like this under the collective bargaining agreement. I plan to 
write to the Speaker, and I ask Members to join with me, that that be 
waived and the Capitol Police be treated like every other Federal law 
enforcement agency in our country.
  This is an indictment on the Congress of the United States of 
America. I want to say again, think of the headlines we could have read 
that we have not read. Good men and women, not patronage positions 
anymore, but well-trained, who put their lives on the line every day 
and deal with some real security problems, have been treated as second-
class citizens.
  I am going to support this bill. I am going to write to the Speaker. 
I am gong to ask Members to join forces with me and sign on to that 
letter, that that 2-year period holding back that opportunity that is 
granted in this bill be waived, and there be an immediate 
implementation of that opportunity for the Capitol Police when this is 
enacted.
  All this talk about the Senate, quite frankly, in the first 
Constitution the Senate was appointed by State legislators, and 
actually I thought it was better for the country. We would have had 
somebody looking out for the States' rights, and we would not have had 
a 50-percent fast track vote on GATT and NAFTA.
  For all those concerned about the Senate, I agree with the gentleman 
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], that I think we can take care of those 
inequities. I am sure that is not the intention of the gentleman from 
Connecticut and others.
  I ask that Members support me in helping the Capitol Police. They 
have earned it. They have deserved it. I ask the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Thomas] to give me a hand with that.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  [[Page H271]] Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased 
that we are moving forward with this bill, and I appreciate the 
generosity of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], who has been 
the major force behind it. I was glad to be able to work with him.
  I was pleased that he also graciously mentioned, as I have said 
before, the former Speaker of this body, who did move it after he was 
persuaded that it was the right thing to do.
  However, I am troubled by some aspects of it. This bill that we 
passed last year was totally bipartisan. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Traficant] who preceded me talked about a problem in the bill.
  I do not see any reason why the law enforcement people ought to have 
to wait 2 years. The problem is that we were not able to address it, 
because at no point has this bill been subject to amendment on the 
floor of the House. There is no reason for that.
                              {time}  1210

  We are told that we should compare the way the House is going to be 
run now with the way it was run.
  This bill came to the floor in August of last year. As the gentleman 
from California pointed out, the bill passed the committee in July, it 
very soon thereafter came to the floor, and 14 amendments were made in 
order. Indeed, I know of no one who had an amendment who was turned 
away. Eight of those amendments allowed either exclusively or jointly 
Republican authors.
  We had a bill that allowed 14 amendments and I know of no one who was 
turned down. This year it has twice come to the floor in a nonamendable 
fashion and it has flaws. One of those flaws is the frequent-flier 
mileage.
  The gentleman from Connecticut says that it does not fit because this 
only applies to the private sector. But the private sector is not 
covered by the Freedom of Information Act. There is language in here 
that studies how to apply the Freedom of Information Act to Congress. I 
think we are going to find that it does not work. I am told by the 
gentleman from Maryland that was dropped. But it was in the bill when 
it came out of the house.
  The fact is that the longer we delay on frequent-flier miles, the 
more Members of Congress will use frequent-flier miles in a way they 
should not do them and the taxpayer will be cheated of those frequent-
flier miles.
  The House voted on this last year. Because we did bring it forward in 
an open amendatory process, the gentlewoman's offering amendment was 
adopted.
  There is no reason to allow this to continue, the frequent-flier 
abuse, other than an apparent quirk on the part of the Speaker.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
West Virginia [Mr. Wise].
  Mr. WISE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I 
introduced a bill a number of years ago called ``what's good for the 
goose is good for the gander'' which had exactly this same attitude 
toward it.
  Let us talk, though, about the principle by which it comes which is 
of some concern. We are all delighted it is here, we are all going to 
vote for it.
  There has been talk about muscle. I just wish there had been a little 
less muscle applied to this bill and a little more deliberation--it 
would have gotten to the same point probably almost as quickly--and a 
little more muscle last year when this bill passed the House, at least 
once, I believe twice, went over to the Senate where it died on 
Republican filibusters. So we could have, I think accommodated those 
needs.
  I also regret, though, that when this bill came up on the House floor 
just a week ago, it was not made in order to allow an amendment to it 
or add the accompanying bill which has passed this House at least once, 
and I believe twice, which is lobby reform, to apply to Members of 
Congress the lobbying reform that is so important, as applying the 
rules concerning the private sector with employees.
  Why could we have not also passed since it had already passed using 
the same principle that has been enunciated that if you took it up last 
year, you ought to be able to take it up without a hearing, ram it 
through this year, why could we have not taken up the lobbying reform 
bill in the same capacity? All those questions hang out there.
  At any rate, I rise in strong support for this legislation.
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
  Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, when the average American 
learns that Congress does not have to live under all of the laws and 
regulations that all of our citizens live under, they are appalled. 
They understand how difficult it is for a Congress to effectively 
legislate when they live isolated from the effects of the laws and the 
regulations that those laws produce.
  At the first day of the last Congress, I submitted legislation that 
would apply to Congress all the laws and the regulations that they have 
applied to all of the rest of us and exempted themselves from. Several 
others submitted similar legislation. They were all combined in the 
Shays-Swett bill which passed the last Congress. Unfortunately, that 
died because of lack of action by the Senate.
  So I was very pleased when at about 2 in the morning on the first 
long legislative day of this Congress that we passed that bill. We are 
now met today to discuss a bill from the Senate that embodies all of 
the essential features of the bill that we passed in the last Congress 
and again on that first long day of this Congress.
  I am very pleased to rise in strong support of this bill. This is a 
great victory for the American people, because what it means is that 
from henceforth they are going to have a Congress that lives under the 
laws and the regulations that they passed, that all of the rest of the 
country has to live under, and the Congress is going to be much more 
effective in passing laws and in producing regulations through those 
laws when they have to live under all of the laws and regulations that 
they produce.
  This bill does not do all that we need to do in reforming the 
Congress and producing congressional reliability but it certainly takes 
the first long, long step in the right direction.
  I am very pleased today to rise in strong support of this 
legislation.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from 
Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Speaker, one thing that a new Member is clear to 
do and that is to do her homework. I guess in doing my homework, even 
though just starting in the 104th Congress, I realize it was the 
Democratic Congress that raised this issue of congressional 
accountability for a number of terms, particularly in the last 
Congress, and I think it is very important to indicate how important 
this measure is but to indicate as well that the Democrats led out on 
this issue.
  It is important to realize that we too must follow the laws of the 
land of the United States of America.
  Calling the roll, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII, the 
Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination, Family and Medical 
Leave, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Federal Labor Management 
Relations Act, Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Worker Adjustment and 
Retraining Notification.
  As a local elected official there was no doubt that we had to comply 
with all those laws. They why not the U.S. Congress? I am certainly 
rising in support of this, but I ask clearly as we move toward making a 
determination by way of a vote that we too should be able to comply 
with the laws on frequent-flier miles.
  I ask that we really raise that issue, that we realize that we must 
be truthful in what we do here in the U.S. Congress, and that we go all 
the way when we talk about congressional accountability.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from the 
District of Columbia [Ms. Norton].
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I have a special interest in this bill as a 
former member of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. I 
want to 
[[Page H272]] commend the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] for 
his tenacity on this bipartisan matter and to give the House credit for 
what it did last term in passing this bill and the Senate, finally, 
credit for catching up with the House.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill, to be sure, affects Members. When I chaired 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, what really bothered me 
was that thousands of employees here were also exempted, and that is 
really what the gravemen of this bill is. It should affect Members, but 
where the complaints are going to be filed most often are against staff 
who supervise others.
  There is an important difference in this bill from legislation 
affecting the private sector. The Senate has removed the demographic 
section. I want Members to know that every private and public employer 
has to submit demographics on its employees. The House should remove 
this notion that it is exempt from our knowing whether or not we are in 
fact hiring fairly in committees.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I intend to vote for this 
bill, but the American people should note that there is nobody who has 
gotten on the floor today who has not expressed some reservation about 
the content of this bill. The reason for that is the process by which 
this bill is here. In that sense, it is business as usual and the 
American people ought to know that it is business as usual.
  We come here without the ability to amend this bill even though as 
soon as this bill is debated, we will be off for the rest of the day. 
Last week we were in committee debating a balanced budget amendment and 
marking it up. At the end of the day, at 6, despite the fact that it 
was Wednesday afternoon and we were going home, we adjourned for the 
day. Still we cannot take the time to debate these issues that are 
important to the American people.

                              {time}  1220

  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself my remaining 30 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, clearly we have a concern about the procedure, but more 
importantly than the procedure is the substance. The gentlewoman from 
the District of Columbia mentioned we are now extending to all our 
employees protections that we believe are appropriate for the employees 
of the American employers.
  We believe this legislation is important. That is why under 
Democratic leadership we passed it last year, with the Shays-Swett 
bill, and that is why on this bill the overwhelming majority, if not 
unanimously, we will support this bill this year.
  Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining time to the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Thomas].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dreier). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Thomas] is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, we began this process on January 4 and we moved the 
legislation to the Senate. We are considering today, on January 17, 
Senate bill 2, the Senate version of this legislation.
  There will be no conference committee. This legislation will move 
directly to the President. The President has said that he will sign it 
into law. This process has taken 2 weeks.
  For people to fully understand the impact or maybe I should say the 
weight of today's decision, this is simply the text of the laws, 
without any annotation or explanation, that are now going to be applied 
to the Congress that are already applied to the private sector.
  I would tell my colleagues that S. 2 passed in the Senate 89 to 1. I 
believe the House should do the Senate one better. I would ask that the 
House pass S. 2.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it has long been known that Congress has a bad 
habit of passing laws without understanding the full impact they have 
on the American public--then it exempts itself from those same laws. In 
the 102d and 103d Congresses, I introduced a resolution to eliminate 
the special treatment that this institution has granted itself. Last 
Congress, I voted in favor of the Congressional Accountability Act 
which the House passed--but the Senate failed to approve.
  During the final hours before adjournment of the 103d Congress, the 
House passed a watered-down version of the compliance bill as an 
amendment to the rules of the House. Although I am a strong advocate of 
congressional compliance, I felt compelled to vote against that weak-
kneed resolution--which, to me, was nothing more than status quo 
dressed up to look like reform. Today we have an opportunity to move 
forward with real reform. I support S. 2, the Congressional 
Accountability Act, and I intend to vote for it. Congress is not, and 
should not be, above the law. It is time to move this institution into 
the real world of the laws that we expect the private sector to abide 
by.
  Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I am a strong supporter of S. 2, the 
Congressional Accountability Act. Unfortunately, I will not be present 
today to vote for this important measure--I am attending to the urgent 
needs of communities in my district that have been devastated by the 
recent flooding in northern California. If I were here, I would be 
proud to vote for the Congressional Accountability Act for the third 
time. In my absence, I submit this statement of support for the bill 
for the Record.
  S. 2 fulfills our responsibility to grant the same protections and 
workplace standards that all other working Americans enjoy to our own 
employees in Congress. The Congressional Accountability Act continues 
the recent trend of Congress living by the rules we ask the rest of 
America to live by.
  In recent years, we have enacted several major employee protection 
laws--the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
and the Family and Medical Leave Act. In each case, we applied the 
requirements of these laws to Congress just like they applied to the 
private sector. In addition, House rules provide House employees with 
protections afforded under the Fair Labor Standards Act and specify 
that House personnel actions shall be made ``free from discrimination 
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including marital 
or parental status), disability, or age.''
  S. 2 continues our efforts to bring Congress into compliance with 
other significant employee protection statutes. The Congressional 
Accountability Act will also require Congress to comply with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Federal Labor Management 
Relations Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
  This legislation establishes an independent, nonpartisan Office of 
Compliance within the legislative branch to develop the regulations 
applying laws to Congress, and to resolve complaints. The Office, which 
would replace the existing House and Senate Offices of Fair Employment 
Practices, would be composed of a five-member Board of Directors, an 
Executive Director, a General Counsel, two Deputy Directors, and 
additional staff as may be required.
  This act represents a positive change in how Congress treats its own 
employees. I strongly support this legislation and urge my colleagues 
to vote for this landmark congressional reform bill.
  Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 2, the Congressional 
Accountability Act. It is high time that laws applied to the private 
sector workplace are made applicable to Congress as well. As chairman 
of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, I am particularly pleased 
that S. 2 would provide for the enforcement of recently enacted 
veterans' employment and reemployment rights under Public Law 103-353 
(October 13, 1994).
  The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 
[USERRA] only allows aggrieved legislative branch employees the remedy 
of applying to the Office of Personnel Management [OPM] for a position 
in the executive branch, with an ensured offer of employment. Executive 
branch employees under USERRA have extensive enforcement rights 
including legal representation, Merit Systems Protection Board [MSPB] 
adjudication, and judicial review.
  Now, under title II, section 206 of S. 2, eligible congressional 
employees could avail themselves of the extensive enforcement and 
dispute resolution procedures established in the new Office of 
Compliance, as well as judicial review.
  Mr. Speaker, I am also pleased to see that the bill would require a 
study and recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the 
application of the workplace laws included in S. 2 to the General 
Accounting Office [GAO], Government Printing Office [GPO], and the 
Library of Congress. The study and recommendations would be due to the 
[[Page H273]] Speaker of the House no later than December 31, 1996.
  I commend Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Armey for keeping 
their commitment to the American people in making the Accountability 
Act the first order of business of the House with H.R. 1. The Senate 
has added provisions in its version, S. 2. I especially wish to state 
my appreciation to Mr. Shays, who has led the House's effort on 
accountability, as well as to his staff for their openness and 
accessibility in crafting this legislation. Mr. Speaker, I urge my 
colleagues to favorably consider S. 2.
  Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to commend the majority leadership 
for bringing this bill, S. 2, the Senate version of the Congressional 
Accountability Act, which the House passed on January 4, to the floor 
today. Consideration of this legislation can be directly traced to you 
and the new leadership in Congress who were committed to place this 
long overdue type of legislation on the front burner.
  This bill, however, is far from perfect. And the full specifics as to 
the exact manner in which the eleven ``place of employment'' labor laws 
shall be applied to congressional employers do not, in many cases, 
correspond to the manner in which these laws apply to the private 
sector. In certain instances this is understandable, as in cases where 
the constitutional requirement of separation of powers proscribes 
executive agency enforcement of rules against the legislative branch. 
But, all in all, the fox--Congress--is still very much in charge of the 
chicken coop--employer and employee place of employment laws--and 
clearly Members of Congress are being treated in many instances with 
kid gloves when one looks at the matter from the perspective of the 
private sector.
  For example, our private sector constituents would jump at the 
opportunity to live under the requirements contained in the section of 
the bill applying OSHA to Congress. There are no fines which are levied 
with a citation, as is the case in the private sector. The general 
counsel issues a citation and if the counsel determines that a 
violation has not been corrected, he may file a complaint with the 
Office of Compliance against the employing office. This, again, is a 
far cry from the realities with which our businessmen and women must 
contend. No civil penalties. No criminal penalties. If only Congress 
could be so understanding of private employers.
  With regard to the OSHA section of S. 2, specifically section 215, it 
is my understanding from the House authors of the legislation, Mr. 
Shays and Mr. Goodling, that the report required under this section 
concerning the general counsel's inspection of facilities for OSHA 
violations will be made available to the public. I strongly agree with 
this perspective, especially in light of the fact that there is no 
requirement in the bill that the general counsel file a complaint with 
the Office of Compliance against an employing office.
  Mr. Speaker, there are positive aspects to the legislation.
   It does move clearly toward the concept that congressional employees 
should have the right, in instances of violations of place of 
employment labor laws by Members of Congress, to the same basic 
employee protections as possessed by employees in the private sector. 
And, significantly, this includes the right of congressional employees 
to seek a full de novo jury trial in Federal court, complete with 
general damages, court costs, and recovery of attorneys fees. It should 
be noted, however, that apparently no Member of Congress may be 
personally sued, that is, such a suit would be against an employee's 
employing office, a term of new art which avoids naming any Member of 
Congress as the specific responding party to such a law suit.

  The bill does not allow, however, for such employees to obtain 
punitive damages against their congressional employers. In addition, 
there apparently is no personal liability of Members of Congress as to 
any damages, legal fees, or court costs awarded to any employee filing 
a claim against an employing office. This is not too analogous to what 
is facing the private sector employers who can generally be held 
personally liable for those types of damages under civil rights law, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans With 
Disabilities Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I do recognize, however, that this bill is the result of 
a compromise with the other body. In the final analysis, although the 
version of the bill before us today is geared to treat Congress more 
favorably than the private sector, it is still much better than what we 
have now, where Congress almost totally escapes the effects of place of 
employment labor laws which have been nonuniformly and haphazardly 
applied by Congress upon the private place of employment and quite 
often with provisions for disproportionate damages. So, it is indeed a 
step in the right direction, a first step, but a very meaningful step 
nonetheless.
  I will support the legislation today, but more must be done to 
either: First, have these laws really apply to Congress in the same 
fashion in which they now apply to the private sector, or second, 
alleviate the often harsh, haphazard, rigid, and unreasonable fashion 
in which place of employment laws apply to the private sector. In fact, 
we might not be dealing with this issue today, if we had, in the first 
place, simply written our place of employment labor laws for the 
private sector with as much compassion as we have with this 
legislation. I stand ready to work with the leadership on both sides of 
the aisle to achieve either result, which should bring about a more 
uniform, flexible, understandable, and more understanding employment 
policy for America in the 21st century.
  There is no doubt that as we have to do unto ourselves we learn 
better how to do unto others.
  Ms. DUNN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, for too long, Congress has lived 
by a double-standard, passing dozens of laws, imposing hundreds of 
regulations on the private sector while at the same time exempting 
itself from those same laws and regulations.
  How long has Congress enjoyed the double standard? Fifty-seven years 
later, Congress will finally be held accountable to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, requiring a minimum wage and overtime pay for 
congressional staff; 31 years later, Congress will at last adhere to 
title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
and 25 years later, Congress will comply with the Occupational Health 
and Safety Act of 1970, making our U.S. Capitol and the House and 
Senate Office Buildings safer places to work and visit.
  There is a whole host of other laws with which Congress must now 
comply: the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act to name few more.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a sensible bill that accomplishes more than just 
apply all laws to Congress. While Congress still has a long, 
challenging journey ahead if we are to restore the public's confidence 
and faith in this institution, passing this congressional compliance 
legislation is a major step in that direction. Today, as we send this 
bill to be signed into law by President Clinton, we legislators will 
prove to the citizens of this Nation that we are committed to turning 
this place upside down, shaking it by its ankles, and accomplishing 
this long overdue reform.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support for S. 2, 
the Congressional Accountability Act. This piece of legislation will 
finally submit to Congress to the same laws it imposes on others. How 
can we expect to understand the implications of legislation we write if 
we aren't required to follow its rules? That, Mr. Speaker, is a glaring 
example of Congress being out of touch with middle America.
  This initiative represents years of hard work in a bipartisan manner. 
Not only do I fully endorse this bill this Congress, I was also a 
cosponsor of similar legislation, H.R. 349, last year and fully 
supported H.R. 4822 when it passed the House overwhelmingly in August 
1994. Unfortunately, efforts to pass legislation in the Senate died at 
the end of the 103d Congress.
  For far too long, Congress has been writing and passing legislation 
that affects everyone but itself. It is evident that Congress must set 
the example and live under the rules it imposes on others. No longer 
will congressional employees be subject to discrimination, bad working 
environments, or other working related ills that other employees are 
protected from under our national laws. Our employees will have the 
avenues to address grievances in the workplace like any other American 
employee. They will have employee rights that have been denied to them 
for far too long.
  I believe that this is a responsible, bipartisan bill and urge its 
immediate adoption.
  Mr. RADANOVICH. Mr. Speaker, the lesson that what is sauce for the 
goose also should be for the gander is learned from early childhood. 
Yet, it seems to have been no more than a fantasy for Congress.
  Today, I hope this House by its vote will make a simple declaration, 
saying that if we think it worthy that American business is required to 
operate under these several sets of workplace rules, then we on Capitol 
Hill are willing to be regulated by them as well.
  There are two benefits to be derived from securing final passage of 
S. 2, the Congressional Accountability Act that embodies the spirit and 
most of the substance of H.R. 1, which we passed on the day we began 
this 104th Congress.
  The first value of this reform in the way we do business is that 
those men and women we employ here and in our district offices should 
not be prejudiced with respect to redress of employment wrongs simply 
because they are on our payrolls.
  The second significance of the Shays Act was well related by the Wall 
Street Journal editorial of January 4 that called H.R. 1 a 
[[Page H274]] ``very potent reform'' and went on to observe that 
``forcing Members to live under the laws they pass may also have a 
useful, modifying effect on what Congress decides to pass.''
  Mr. Speaker, all of us, I'm sure, have received--and welcome--
thousands of constituent communications imploring us to keep faith with 
provisions of the Contract With America. Even before this Congress 
began, one of my constituents, Mel Cellini of Madera, CA, shared with 
me a copy of his letter to Speaker Gingrich. Noting Mr. Cellini's 
statement that there must be a change in the fact that ``Congress has 
exempted itself from mandates imposed on the rest of society.'' I take 
pleasure in making the text of his letter a part of my statement of 
support for our passage of the Congressional Accountability Act.
  The letter follows:

                                                 December 4, 1994.
     Hon. Newt Gingrich,
     Speaker of the House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Sir: My wife and I are approaching 50 years of age. We 
     have been increasingly disillusioned with the operation of 
     the federal government. The future our two children face is 
     of great concern to the two of us. As long as I can remember 
     the federal government has continued to intrude into our 
     lives via control and taxation. The programs have not only 
     been intrusive, but also quite expensive.
       Now one child is in college and the other will soon be 
     going to college. Our dismay with the evaporation of the 
     American dream has been discussed in our family. It is hard 
     to relate to the dream sine all we hear from the media are 
     the issues of why we need to contribute and do more for those 
     that refuse to help themselves.
       Congress has exempted itself from mandates imposed on the 
     rest of society. This must change.
       I backed our local Republican candidate with the fervor 
     that this was our last chance. Yes, George Radanovich won. I 
     truly believe this is a new dawn. The opportunity for a 
     refocused government is here. Just Make Sure the Government 
     Is Out of Our Lives and Our Pocketbook.
       Please, do not back down on the ten point contract that the 
     Republicans agreed to fulfill in the First 100 days.
       Finally, ignore the personal attacks the media is doing to 
     you. We are behind you `all the way.' I can hardly wait for 
     the 1995 congress to begin.
       Again, Congratulations, and thank you.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Mel Cellini.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] that the House suspend the rules 
and pass the Senate bill, S. 2.
  The question was taken.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5, rule 
I, and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this 
motion will be postponed.

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