Congressional Record, Volume 141 Issue 9 (Tuesday, January 17, 1995)

[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 9 (Tuesday, January 17, 1995)]
[House]
[Pages H252-H274]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[[Page H252]]
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the
Senate bill (S. 2) to make certain laws applicable to the legislative
branch of the Federal Government.
The Clerk read as follows:
S. 2
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Congressional Accountability Act of 1995''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

TITLE I--GENERAL

Sec. 101. Definitions.
Sec. 102. Application of laws.

TITLE II--EXTENSION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS

Part A--Employment Discrimination, Family and Medical Leave, Fair Labor
Standards, Employee Polygraph Protection, Worker Adjustment and
Retraining, Employment and Reemployment of Veterans, and Intimidation

Sec. 201. Rights and protections under title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Sec. 202. Rights and protections under the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993.
Sec. 203. Rights and protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.
Sec. 204. Rights and protections under the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988.
Sec. 205. Rights and protections under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act.
Sec. 206. Rights and protections relating to veterans' employment and
reemployment.
Sec. 207. Prohibition of intimidation or reprisal.

Part B--Public Services and Accommodations Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990

Sec. 210. Rights and protections under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 relating to public services and
accommodations; procedures for remedy of violations.

Part C--Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

Sec. 215. Rights and protections under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970; procedures for remedy of violations.

Part D--Labor-Management Relations

Sec. 220. Application of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code,
relating to Federal service labor-management relations;
procedures for remedy of violations.

Part E--General

Sec. 225. Generally applicable remedies and limitations.

Part F--Study

Sec. 230. Study and recommendations regarding General Accounting
Office, Government Printing Office, and Library of
Congress.

TITLE III--OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

Sec. 301. Establishment of Office of Compliance.
Sec. 302. Officers, staff, and other personnel.
Sec. 303. Procedural rules.
Sec. 304. Substantive regulations.
Sec. 305. Expenses.

TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

Sec. 401. Procedure for consideration of alleged violations.
Sec. 402. Counseling.
Sec. 403. Mediation.
Sec. 404. Election of proceeding.
Sec. 405. Complaint and hearing.
Sec. 406. Appeal to the Board.
Sec. 407. Judicial review of Board decisions and enforcement.
Sec. 408. Civil action.
Sec. 409. Judicial review of regulations.
Sec. 410. Other judicial review prohibited.
Sec. 411. Effect of failure to issue regulations.
Sec. 412. Expedited review of certain appeals.
Sec. 413. Privileges and immunities.
Sec. 414. Settlement of complaints.
Sec. 415. Payments.
Sec. 416. Confidentiality.

TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Sec. 501. Exercise of rulemaking powers.
Sec. 502. Political affiliation and place of residence.
Sec. 503. Nondiscrimination rules of the House and Senate.
Sec. 504. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 505. Judicial branch coverage study.
Sec. 506. Savings provisions.
Sec. 507. Use of frequent flyer miles.
Sec. 508. Sense of Senate regarding adoption of simplified and
streamlined acquisition procedures for Senate
acquisitions.
Sec. 509. Severability.
TITLE I--GENERAL

SEC. 101. DEFINITIONS.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, as
used in this Act:
(1) Board.--The term ``Board'' means the Board of Directors
of the Office of Compliance.
(2) Chair.--The term ``Chair'' means the Chair of the Board
of Directors of the Office of Compliance.
(3) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' means
any employee of--
(A) the House of Representatives;
(B) the Senate;
(C) the Capitol Guide Service;
(D) the Capitol Police;
(E) the Congressional Budget Office;
(F) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol;
(G) the Office of the Attending Physician;
(H) the Office of Compliance; or
(I) the Office of Technology Assessment.
(4) Employee.--The term ``employee'' includes an applicant
for employment and a former employee.
(5) Employee of the office of the architect of the
capitol.--The term ``employee of the Office of the Architect
of the Capitol'' includes any employee of the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, or the Senate
Restaurants.
(6) Employee of the capitol police.--The term ``employee of
the Capitol Police'' includes any member or officer of the
Capitol Police.
(7) Employee of the house of representatives.--The term
``employee of the House of Representatives'' includes an
individual occupying a position the pay for which is
disbursed by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, or
another official designated by the House of Representatives,
or any employment position in an entity that is paid with
funds derived from the clerk-hire allowance of the House of
Representatives but not any such individual employed by any
entity listed in subparagraphs (C) through (I) of paragraph
(3).
(8) Employee of the senate.--The term ``employee of the
Senate'' includes any employee whose pay is disbursed by the
Secretary of the Senate, but not any such individual employed
by any entity listed in subparagraphs (C) through (I) of
paragraph (3).
(9) Employing office.--The term ``employing office''
means--
(A) the personal office of a Member of the House of
Representatives or of a Senator;
(B) a committee of the House of Representatives or the
Senate or a joint committee;
(C) any other office headed by a person with the final
authority to appoint, hire, discharge, and set the terms,
conditions, or privileges of the employment of an employee of
the House of Representatives or the Senate; or
(D) the Capitol Guide Board, the Capitol Police Board, the
Congressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of
the Capitol, the Office of the Attending Physician, the
Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology
Assessment.
(10) Executive director.--The term ``Executive Director''
means the Executive Director of the Office of Compliance.
(11) General counsel.--The term ``General Counsel'' means
the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance.
(12) Office.--The term ``Office'' means the Office of
Compliance.

SEC. 102. APPLICATION OF LAWS.

(a) Laws Made Applicable.--The following laws shall apply,
as prescribed by this Act, to the legislative branch of the
Federal Government:
(1) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et
seq.).
(2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.).
(3) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq.).
(4) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
(5) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C.
2611 et seq.).
(6) The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29
U.S.C. 651 et seq.).
(7) Chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
management relations) of title 5, United States Code.
(8) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29
U.S.C. 2001 et seq.).
(9) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
(10) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et
seq.).
(11) Chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and
reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.
(b) Laws Which May Be Made Applicable.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall review provisions of
Federal law (including regulations) relating to (A) the terms
and conditions of employment (including hiring, promotion,
demotion, termination, salary, wages, overtime compensation,
benefits, work assignments or reassignments, grievance and
disciplinary procedures, protection from discrimination in
personnel actions, occupational health and safety, and family
and medical and other leave) of employees, and (B) access to
public services and accommodations,
(2) Board report.--Beginning on December 31, 1996, and
every 2 years thereafter, the Board shall report on (A)
whether or to what
[[Page H253]] degree the provisions described in paragraph
(1) are applicable or inapplicable to the legislative branch,
and (B) with respect to provisions inapplicable to the
legislative branch, whether such provisions should be made
applicable to the legislative branch. The presiding officers
of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall cause
each such report to be printed in the Congressional Record
and each such report shall be referred to the committees of
the House of Representatives and the Senate with
jurisdiction.
(3) Reports of congressional committees.--Each report
accompanying any bill or joint resolution relating to terms
and conditions of employment or access to public services or
accommodations reported by a committee of the House of
Representatives or the Senate shall--
(A) describe the manner in which the provisions of the bill
or joint resolution apply to the legislative branch; or
(B) in the case of a provision not applicable to the
legislative branch, include a statement of the reasons the
provision does not apply.

On the objection of any Member, it shall not be in order for
the Senate or the House of Representatives to consider any
such bill or joint resolution if the report of the committee
on such bill or joint resolution does not comply with the
provisions of this paragraph. This paragraph may be waived in
either House by majority vote of that House.
TITLE II--EXTENSION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS

PART A--EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS, EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION, WORKER ADJUSTMENT AND
RETRAINING, EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT OF VETERANS, AND INTIMIDATION

SEC. 201. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, THE REHABILITATION ACT
OF 1973, AND TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990.

(a) Discriminatory Practices Prohibited.--All personnel
actions affecting covered employees shall be made free from
any discrimination based on--
(1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within
the meaning of section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-2);
(2) age, within the meaning of section 15 of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a); or
(3) disability, within the meaning of section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) and sections 102
through 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(42 U.S.C. 12112-12114).
(b) Remedy.--
(1) Civil rights.--The remedy for a violation of subsection
(a)(1) shall be--
(A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(g)); and
(B) such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if
awarded under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
1981), or as would be appropriate if awarded under sections
1977A(a)(1), 1977A(b)(2), and, irrespective of the size of
the employing office, 1977A(b)(3)(D) of the Revised Statutes
(42 U.S.C. 1981a(a)(1), 1981a(b)(2), and 1981a(b)(3)(D)).
(2) Age discrimination.--The remedy for a violation of
subsection (a)(2) shall be--
(A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(c)); and
(B) such liquidated damages as would be appropriate if
awarded under section 7(b) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 626(b)).

In addition, the waiver provisions of section 7(f) of such
Act (29 U.S.C. 626(f)) shall apply to covered employees.
(3) Disabilities discrimination.--The remedy for a
violation of subsection (a)(3) shall be--
(A) such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 794a(a)(1)) or section 107(a) of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)); and
(B) such compensatory damages as would be appropriate if
awarded under sections 1977A(a)(2), 1977A(a)(3), 1977A(b)(2),
and, irrespective of the size of the employing office,
1977A(b)(3)(D) of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
1981a(a)(2), 1981a(a)(3), 1981a(b)(2), and 1981a(b)(3)(D)).
(c) Application to General Accounting Office, Government
Printing Office, and Library of Congress.--
(1) Section 717 of the civil rights act of 1964.--Section
717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
is amended by--
(A) striking ``legislative and'';
(B) striking ``branches'' and inserting ``branch''; and
(C) inserting ``Government Printing Office, the General
Accounting Office, and the'' after ``and in the''.
(2) Section 15 of the age discrimination in employment act
of 1967.--Section 15(a) of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a(a)) is amended by--
(A) striking ``legislative and'';
(B) striking ``branches'' and inserting ``branch''; and
(C) inserting ``Government Printing Office, the General
Accounting Office, and the'' after ``and in the''.
(3) Section 509 of the americans with disabilities act of
1990.--Section 509 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209) is amended--
(A) by striking subsections (a) and (b) of section 509;
(B) in subsection (c), by striking ``(c) Instrumentalities
of Congress.--'' and inserting ``The General Accounting
Office, the Government Printing Office, and the Library of
Congress shall be covered as follows:'';
(C) by striking the second sentence of paragraph (2);
(D) in paragraph (4), by striking ``the instrumentalities
of the Congress include'' and inserting ``the term
`instrumentality of the Congress' means'', by striking ``the
Architect of the Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office'',
by inserting ``and'' before ``the Library'', and by striking
``the Office of Technology Assessment, and the United States
Botanic Garden'';
(E) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7) and by
inserting after paragraph (4) the following new paragraph:
``(5) Enforcement of employment rights.--The remedies and
procedures set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16) shall be available to any
employee of an instrumentality of the Congress who alleges a
violation of the rights and protections under sections 102
through 104 of this Act that are made applicable by this
section, except that the authorities of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the chief
official of the instrumentality of the Congress.''; and
(F) by amending the title of the section to read
``INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE CONGRESS''.
(d) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect 1 year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 202. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT OF 1993.

(a) Family and Medical Leave Rights and Protections
Provided.--
(1) In general.--The rights and protections established by
sections 101 through 105 of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2611 through 2615) shall apply to covered
employees.
(2) Definition.--For purposes of the application described
in paragraph (1)--
(A) the term ``employer'' as used in the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 means any employing office, and
(B) the term ``eligible employee'' as used in the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 means a covered employee who
has been employed in any employing office for 12 months and
for at least 1,250 hours of employment during the previous 12
months.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy, including liquidated damages, as would
be appropriate if awarded under paragraph (1) of section
107(a) of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C.
2617(a)(1)).
(c) Application to General Accounting Office and Library of
Congress.--
(1) Amendments to the family and medical leave act of
1993.--
(A) Coverage.--Section 101(4)(A) of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)) is amended by
striking ``and'' at the end of clause (ii), by striking the
period at the end of clause (iii) and inserting ``; and'',
and by adding after clause (iii) the following:
``(iv) includes the General Accounting Office and the
Library of Congress.''.
(B) Enforcement.--Section 107 of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2617) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(f) General Accounting Office and Library of Congress.--
In the case of the General Accounting Office and the Library
of Congress, the authority of the Secretary of Labor under
this title shall be exercised respectively by the Comptroller
General of the United States and the Librarian of
Congress.''.
(2) Conforming amendment to title 5, united states code.--
Section 6381(1)(A) of title 5, United States Code, is amended
by striking ``and'' after ``District of Columbia'' and
inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and any
employee of the General Accounting Office or the Library of
Congress''.
(d) Regulations.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement the rights and protections
under this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except
insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown and
stated together with the regulation, that a modification of
such regulations would be more effective for the
implementation of the rights and protections under this
section.
(e) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
Subsection (c) shall be effective 1 year after transmission
to the Congress of the study under section 230.

SEC. 203. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT OF 1938.

(a) Fair Labor Standards.--
[[Page H254]] (1) In general.--The rights and protections
established by subsections (a)(1) and (d) of section 6,
section 7, and section 12(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206 (a)(1) and (d), 207, 212(c)) shall
apply to covered employees.
(2) Interns.--For the purposes of this section, the term
``covered employee'' does not include an intern as defined in
regulations under subsection (c).
(3) Compensatory time.--Except as provided in regulations
under subsection (c)(3), covered employees may not receive
compensatory time in lieu of overtime compensation.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy, including liquidated damages, as would
be appropriate if awarded under section 16(b) of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216(b)).
(c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--Except as provided in paragraph
(3), the regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall be the
same as substantive regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor to implement the statutory provisions referred to in
subsection (a) except insofar as the Board may determine, for
good cause shown and stated together with the regulation,
that a modification of such regulations would be more
effective for the implementation of the rights and
protections under this section.
(3) Irregular work schedules.--The Board shall issue
regulations for covered employees whose work schedules
directly depend on the schedule of the House of
Representatives or the Senate that shall be comparable to the
provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that apply
to employees who have irregular work schedules.
(d) Application to the Government Printing Office.--Section
3(e)(2)(A) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C.
203(e)(2)(A)) is amended--
(1) in clause (iii), by striking ``legislative or'',
(2) by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (iv), and
(3) by striking the semicolon at the end of clause (v) and
inserting ``, or'' and by adding after clause (v) the
following:
``(vi) the Government Printing Office;''.
(e) Effective Date.--Subsections (a) and (b) shall be
effective 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 204. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH
PROTECTION ACT OF 1988.

(a) Polygraph Practices Prohibited.--
(1) In general.--No employing office, irrespective of
whether a covered employee works in that employing office,
may require a covered employee to take a lie detector test
where such a test would be prohibited if required by an
employer under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 3 of the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2002
(1), (2), or (3)). In addition, the waiver provisions of
section 6(d) of such Act (29 U.S.C. 2005(d)) shall apply to
covered employees.
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the term
``covered employee'' shall include employees of the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress and the term
``employing office'' shall include the General Accounting
Office and the Library of Congress.
(3) Capitol police.--Nothing in this section shall preclude
the Capitol Police from using lie detector tests in
accordance with regulations under subsection (c).
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 6(c)(1) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1988 (29 U.S.C. 2005(c)(1)).
(c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
statutory provisions referred to in subsections (a) and (b)
except insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause
shown and stated together with the regulation, that a
modification of such regulations would be more effective for
the implementation of the rights and protections under this
section.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
This section shall be effective with respect to the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after
transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

SEC. 205. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE WORKER ADJUSTMENT
AND RETRAINING NOTIFICATION ACT.

(a) Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Rights.--
(1) In general.--No employing office shall be closed or a
mass layoff ordered within the meaning of section 3 of the
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.C.
2102) until the end of a 60-day period after the employing
office serves written notice of such prospective closing or
layoff to representatives of covered employees or, if there
are no representatives, to covered employees.
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the term
``covered employee'' shall include employees of the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress and the term
``employing office'' shall include the General Accounting
Office and the Library of Congress.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 5(a) of the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.C.
2104(a)(1), (2), and (4)).
(c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except
insofar as the Board may determine, for good cause shown and
stated together with the regulation, that a modification of
such regulations would be more effective for the
implementation of the rights and protections under this
section.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
This section shall be effective with respect to the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after
transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

SEC. 206. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS RELATING TO VETERANS'
EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT.

(a) Employment and Reemployment Rights of Members of the
Uniformed Services.--
(1) In general.--It shall be unlawful for an employing
office to--
(A) discriminate, within the meaning of subsections (a) and
(b) of section 4311 of title 38, United States Code, against
an eligible employee;
(B) deny to an eligible employee reemployment rights within
the meaning of sections 4312 and 4313 of title 38, United
States Code; or
(C) deny to an eligible employee benefits within the
meaning of sections 4316, 4317, and 4318 of title 38, United
States Code.
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(A) the term ``eligible employee'' means a covered employee
performing service in the uniformed services, within the
meaning of section 4303(13) of title 38, United States Code,
whose service has not been terminated upon occurrence of any
of the events enumerated in section 4304 of title 38, United
States Code,
(B) the term ``covered employee'' includes employees of the
General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress, and
(C) the term ``employing office'' includes the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (3) of section 4323(c) of title
38, United States Code.
(c) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except to
the extent that the Board may determine, for good cause shown
and stated together with the regulation, that a modification
of such regulations would be more effective for the
implementation of the rights and protections under this
section.
(d) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
This section shall be effective with respect to the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after
transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

SEC. 207. PROHIBITION OF INTIMIDATION OR REPRISAL.

(a) In General.--It shall be unlawful for an employing
office to intimidate, take reprisal against, or otherwise
discriminate against, any covered employee because the
covered employee has opposed any practice made unlawful by
this Act, or because the covered employee has initiated
proceedings, made a charge, or testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in a hearing or other proceeding
under this Act.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy available for a violation of
subsection (a) shall be such legal or equitable remedy as may
be appropriate to redress a violation of subsection (a).
[[Page H255]] PART B--PUBLIC SERVICES AND ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

SEC. 210. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 RELATING TO PUBLIC
SERVICES AND ACCOMMODATIONS; PROCEDURES FOR
REMEDY OF VIOLATIONS.

(a) Entities Subject to This Section.--The requirements of
this section shall apply to--
(1) each office of the Senate, including each office of a
Senator and each committee;
(2) each office of the House of Representatives, including
each office of a Member of the House of Representatives and
each committee;
(3) each joint committee of the Congress;
(4) the Capitol Guide Service;
(5) the Capitol Police;
(6) the Congressional Budget Office;
(7) the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (including
the Senate Restaurants and the Botanic Garden);
(8) the Office of the Attending Physician;
(9) the Office of Compliance; and
(10) the Office of Technology Assessment.
(b) Discrimination in Public Services and Accommodations.--
(1) Rights and protections.--The rights and protections
against discrimination in the provision of public services
and accommodations established by sections 201 through 230,
302, 303, and 309 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (42 U.S.C. 12131-12150, 12182, 12183, and 12189) shall
apply to the entities listed in subsection (a).
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of the application of title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12131 et seq.) under this section, the term ``public entity''
means any entity listed in subsection (a) that provides
public services, programs, or activities.
(c) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (b)
shall be such remedy as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 203 or 308(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12133, 12188(a)), except that, with
respect to any claim of employment discrimination asserted by
any covered employee, the exclusive remedy shall be under
section 201 of this title.
(d) Available Procedures.--
(1) Charge filed with general counsel.--A qualified
individual with a disability, as defined in section 201(2) of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12131(2)), who alleges a violation of subsection (b) by an
entity listed in subsection (a), may file a charge against
any entity responsible for correcting the violation with the
General Counsel within 180 days of the occurrence of the
alleged violation. The General Counsel shall investigate the
charge.
(2) Mediation.--If, upon investigation under paragraph (1),
the General Counsel believes that a violation of subsection
(b) may have occurred and that mediation may be helpful in
resolving the dispute, the General Counsel may request, but
not participate in, mediation under subsections (b) through
(d) of section 403 between the charging individual and any
entity responsible for correcting the alleged violation.
(3) Complaint, hearing, board review.--If mediation under
paragraph (2) has not succeeded in resolving the dispute, and
if the General Counsel believes that a violation of
subsection (b) may have occurred, the General Counsel may
file with the Office a complaint against any entity
responsible for correcting the violation. The complaint shall
be submitted to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to
subsections (b) through (h) of section 405 and any person who
has filed a charge under paragraph (1) may intervene as of
right, with the full rights of a party. The decision of the
hearing officer shall be subject to review by the Board
pursuant to section 406.
(4) Judicial review.--A charging individual who has
intervened under paragraph (3) or any respondent to the
complaint, if aggrieved by a final decision of the Board
under paragraph (3), may file a petition for review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
pursuant to section 407.
(5) Compliance date.--If new appropriated funds are
necessary to comply with an order requiring correction of a
violation of subsection (b), compliance shall take place as
soon as possible, but no later than the fiscal year following
the end of the fiscal year in which the order requiring
correction becomes final and not subject to further review.
(e) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Transportation to implement the statutory provisions referred
to in subsection (b) except to the extent that the Board may
determine, for good cause shown and stated together with the
regulation, that a modification of such regulations would be
more effective for the implementation of the rights and
protections under this section.
(3) Entity responsible for correction.--The regulations
issued under paragraph (1) shall include a method of
identifying, for purposes of this section and for categories
of violations of subsection (b), the entity responsible for
correction of a particular violation.
(f) Periodic Inspections; Report to Congress; Initial
Study.--
(1) Periodic inspections.--On a regular basis, and at least
once each Congress, the General Counsel shall inspect the
facilities of the entities listed in subsection (a) to ensure
compliance with subsection (b).
(2) Report.--On the basis of each periodic inspection, the
General Counsel shall, at least once every Congress, prepare
and submit a report--
(A) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol, or other entity responsible, for
correcting the violation of this section uncovered by such
inspection, and
(B) containing the results of the periodic inspection,
describing any steps necessary to correct any violation of
this section, assessing any limitations in accessibility to
and usability by individuals with disabilities associated
with each violation, and the estimated cost and time needed
for abatement.
(3) Initial period for study and corrective action.--The
period from the date of the enactment of this Act until
December 31, 1996, shall be available to the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol and other entities subject to this
section to identify any violations of subsection (b), to
determine the costs of compliance, and to take any necessary
corrective action to abate any violations. The Office shall
assist the Office of the Architect of the Capitol and other
entities listed in subsection (a) by arranging for
inspections and other technical assistance at their request.
Prior to July 1, 1996, the General Counsel shall conduct a
thorough inspection under paragraph (1) and shall submit the
report under paragraph (2) for the 104th Congress.
(4) Detailed personnel.--The Attorney General, the
Secretary of Transportation, and the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board may, on request of
the Executive Director, detail to the Office such personnel
as may be necessary to advise and assist the Office in
carrying out its duties under this section.
(g) Application of Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
to the Provision of Public Services and Accommodations by the
General Accounting Office, the Government Printing Office,
and the Library of Congress.--Section 509 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209)), as amended
by section 201(c) of this Act, is amended by adding the
following new paragraph:
``(6) Enforcement of rights to public services and
accommodations.--The remedies and procedures set forth in
section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
16) shall be available to any qualified person with a
disability who is a visitor, guest, or patron of an
instrumentality of Congress and who alleges a violation of
the rights and protections under sections 201 through 230 or
section 302 or 303 of this Act that are made applicable by
this section, except that the authorities of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission shall be exercised by the
chief official of the instrumentality of the Congress.''.
(h) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Subsections (b), (c), and (d) shall be
effective on January 1, 1997.
(2) General accounting office, government printing office,
and library of congress.--Subsection (g) shall be effective 1
year after transmission to the Congress of the study under
section 230.

PART C--OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970

SEC. 215. RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970; PROCEDURES FOR
REMEDY OF VIOLATIONS.

(a) Occupational Safety and Health Protections.--
(1) In general.--Each employing office and each covered
employee shall comply with the provisions of section 5 of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 654).
(2) Definitions.--For purposes of the application under
this section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970--
(A) the term ``employer'' as used in such Act means an
employing office;
(B) the term ``employee'' as used in such Act means a
covered employee;
(C) the term ``employing office'' includes the General
Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, and any entity
listed in subsection (a) of section 210 that is responsible
for correcting a violation of this section, irrespective of
whether the entity has an employment relationship with any
covered employee in any employing office in which such a
violation occurs; and
(D) the term ``employee'' includes employees of the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be an order to correct the violation, including such
order as would be appropriate if issued under section 13(a)
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C.
662(a)).
(c) Procedures.--
(1) Requests for inspections.--Upon written request of any
employing office or covered employee, the General Counsel
shall exercise the authorities granted to the Secretary of
Labor by subsections (a), (d), (e), and (f) of section 8 of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 657
(a), (d), (e), and (f)) to inspect and investigate places of
employment under the jurisdiction of employing offices.
[[Page H256]] (2) Citations, notices, and notifications.--
For purposes of this section, the General Counsel shall
exercise the authorities granted to the Secretary of Labor in
sections 9 and 10 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 658 and 659), to issue--
(A) a citation or notice to any employing office
responsible for correcting a violation of subsection (a); or
(B) a notification to any employing office that the General
Counsel believes has failed to correct a violation for which
a citation has been issued within the period permitted for
its correction.
(3) Hearings and review.--If after issuing a citation or
notification, the General Counsel determines that a violation
has not been corrected, the General Counsel may file a
complaint with the Office against the employing office named
in the citation or notification. The complaint shall be
submitted to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to
subsections (b) through (h) of section 405, subject to review
by the Board pursuant to section 406.
(4) Variance procedures.--An employing office may request
from the Board an order granting a variance from a standard
made applicable by this section. For the purposes of this
section, the Board shall exercise the authorities granted to
the Secretary of Labor in sections 6(b)(6) and 6(d) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C.
655(b)(6) and 655(d)) to act on any employing office's
request for a variance. The Board shall refer the matter to a
hearing officer pursuant to subsections (b) through (h) of
section 405, subject to review by the Board pursuant to
section 406.
(5) Judicial review.--The General Counsel or employing
office aggrieved by a final decision of the Board under
paragraph (3) or (4), may file a petition for review with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
pursuant to section 407.
(6) Compliance date.--If new appropriated funds are
necessary to correct a violation of subsection (a) for which
a citation is issued, or to comply with an order requiring
correction of such a violation, correction or compliance
shall take place as soon as possible, but not later than the
end of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the
citation is issued or the order requiring correction becomes
final and not subject to further review.
(d) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--The regulations issued under
paragraph (1) shall be the same as substantive regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement the
statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a) except to
the extent that the Board may determine, for good cause shown
and stated together with the regulation, that a modification
of such regulations would be more effective for the
implementation of the rights and protections under this
section.
(3) Employing office responsible for correction.--The
regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall include a method
of identifying, for purposes of this section and for
different categories of violations of subsection (a), the
employing office responsible for correction of a particular
violation.
(e) Periodic Inspections; Report to Congress.--
(1) Periodic inspections.--On a regular basis, and at least
once each Congress, the General Counsel, exercising the same
authorities of the Secretary of Labor as under subsection
(c)(1), shall conduct periodic inspections of all facilities
of the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Capitol
Guide Service, the Capitol Police, the Congressional Budget
Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the
Office of the Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance,
the Office of Technology Assessment, the Library of Congress,
and the General Accounting Office to report on compliance
with subsection (a).
(2) Report.--On the basis of each periodic inspection, the
General Counsel shall prepare and submit a report--
(A) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
President pro tempore of the Senate, and the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol or other employing office
responsible for correcting the violation of this section
uncovered by such inspection, and
(B) containing the results of the periodic inspection,
identifying the employing office responsible for correcting
the violation of this section uncovered by such inspection,
describing any steps necessary to correct any violation of
this section, and assessing any risks to employee health and
safety associated with any violation.
(3) Action after report.--If a report identifies any
violation of this section, the General Counsel shall issue a
citation or notice in accordance with subsection (c)(2)(A).
(4) Detailed personnel.--The Secretary of Labor may, on
request of the Executive Director, detail to the Office such
personnel as may be necessary to advise and assist the Office
in carrying out its duties under this section.
(f) Initial Period for Study and Corrective Action.--The
period from the date of the enactment of this Act until
December 31, 1996, shall be available to the Office of the
Architect of the Capitol and other employing offices to
identify any violations of subsection (a), to determine the
costs of compliance, and to take any necessary corrective
action to abate any violations. The Office shall assist the
Office of the Architect of the Capitol and other employing
offices by arranging for inspections and other technical
assistance at their request. Prior to July 1, 1996, the
General Counsel shall conduct a thorough inspection under
subsection (e)(1) and shall submit the report under
subsection (e)(2) for the 104th Congress.
(g) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
subsections (a), (b), (c), and (e)(3) shall be effective on
January 1, 1997.
(2) General accounting office and library of congress.--
This section shall be effective with respect to the General
Accounting Office and the Library of Congress 1 year after
transmission to the Congress of the study under section 230.

PART D--LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

SEC. 220. APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 71 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES
CODE, RELATING TO FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS; PROCEDURES FOR REMEDY OF
VIOLATIONS.

(a) Labor-Management Rights.--
(1) In general.--The rights, protections, and
responsibilities established under sections 7102, 7106, 7111
through 7117, 7119 through 7122, and 7131 of title 5, United
States Code, shall apply to employing offices and to covered
employees and representatives of those employees.
(2) Definition.--For purposes of the application under this
section of the sections referred to in paragraph (1), the
term ``agency'' shall be deemed to include an employing
office.
(b) Remedy.--The remedy for a violation of subsection (a)
shall be such remedy, including a remedy under section
7118(a)(7) of title 5, United States Code, as would be
appropriate if awarded by the Federal Labor Relations
Authority to remedy a violation of any provision made
applicable by subsection (a).
(c) Authorities and Procedures for Implementation and
Enforcement.--
(1) General authorities of the board; petitions.--For
purposes of this section and except as otherwise provided in
this section, the Board shall exercise the authorities of the
Federal Labor Relations Authority under sections 7105, 7111,
7112, 7113, 7115, 7117, 7118, and 7122 of title 5, United
States Code, and of the President under section 7103(b) of
title 5, United States Code. For purposes of this section,
any petition or other submission that, under chapter 71 of
title 5, United States Code, would be submitted to the
Federal Labor Relations Authority shall, if brought under
this section, be submitted to the Board. The Board shall
refer any matter under this paragraph to a hearing officer
for decision pursuant to subsections (b) through (h) of
section 405, subject to review by the Board pursuant to
section 406. The Board may direct that the General Counsel
carry out the Board's investigative authorities under this
paragraph.
(2) General authorities of the general counsel; charges of
unfair labor practice.--For purposes of this section and
except as otherwise provided in this section, the General
Counsel shall exercise the authorities of the General Counsel
of the Federal Labor Relations Authority under sections 7104
and 7118 of title 5, United States Code. For purposes of this
section, any charge or other submission that, under chapter
71 of title 5, United States Code, would be submitted to the
General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
shall, if brought under this section, be submitted to the
General Counsel. If any person charges an employing office or
a labor organization with having engaged in or engaging in an
unfair labor practice and makes such charge within 180 days
of the occurrence of the alleged unfair labor practice, the
General Counsel shall investigate the charge and may file a
complaint with the Office. The complaint shall be submitted
to a hearing officer for decision pursuant to subsections (b)
through (h) of section 405, subject to review by the Board
pursuant to section 406.
(3) Judicial review.--Except for matters referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 7123(a) of title 5, United
States Code, the General Counsel or the respondent to the
complaint, if aggrieved by a final decision of the Board
under paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection, may file a
petition for judicial review in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit pursuant to section 407.
(4) Exercise of impasses panel authority; requests.--For
purposes of this section and except as otherwise provided in
this section, the Board shall exercise the authorities of the
Federal Service Impasses Panel under section 7119 of title 5,
United States Code. For purposes of this section, any request
that, under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code, would
be presented to the Federal Service Impasses Panel shall, if
made under this section, be presented to the Board. At the
request of the Board, the Executive Director shall appoint a
mediator or mediators to perform the functions of the Federal
Service Impasses Panel under section 7119 of title 5, United
States Code.
(d) Regulations To Implement Section.--
(1) In general.--The Board shall, pursuant to section 304,
issue regulations to implement this section.
(2) Agency regulations.--Except as provided in subsection
(e), the regulations issued under paragraph (1) shall be the
same as substantive regulations promulgated by the
[[Page H257]] Federal Labor Relations Authority to implement
the statutory provisions referred to in subsection (a)
except--
(A) to the extent that the Board may determine, for good
cause shown and stated together with the regulation, that a
modification of such regulations would be more effective for
the implementation of the rights and protections under this
section; or
(B) as the Board deems necessary to avoid a conflict of
interest or appearance of a conflict of interest.
(e) Specific Regulations Regarding Application to Certain
Offices of Congress.--
(1) Regulations required.--The Board shall issue
regulations pursuant to section 304 on the manner and extent
to which the requirements and exemptions of chapter 71 of
title 5, United States Code, should apply to covered
employees who are employed in the offices listed in paragraph
(2). The regulations shall, to the greatest extent
practicable, be consistent with the provisions and purposes
of chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code and of this Act,
and shall be the same as substantive regulations issued by
the Federal Labor Relations Authority under such chapter,
except--
(A) to the extent that the Board may determine, for good
cause shown and stated together with the regulation, that a
modification of such regulations would be more effective for
the implementation of the rights and protections under this
section; and
(B) that the Board shall exclude from coverage under this
section any covered employees who are employed in offices
listed in paragraph (2) if the Board determines that such
exclusion is required because of--
(i) a conflict of interest or appearance of a conflict of
interest; or
(ii) Congress' constitutional responsibilities.
(2) Offices referred to.--The offices referred to in
paragraph (1) include--
(A) the personal office of any Member of the House of
Representatives or of any Senator;
(B) a standing, select, special, permanent, temporary, or
other committee of the Senate or House of Representatives, or
a joint committee of Congress;
(C) the Office of the Vice President (as President of the
Senate), the Office of the President pro tempore of the
Senate, the Office of the Majority Leader of the Senate, the
Office of the Minority Leader of the Senate, the Office of
the Majority Whip of the Senate, the Office of the Minority
Whip of the Senate, the Conference of the Majority of the
Senate, the Conference of the Minority of the Senate, the
Office of the Secretary of the Conference of the Majority of
the Senate, the Office of the Secretary of the Conference of
the Minority of the Senate, the Office of the Secretary for
the Majority of the Senate, the Office of the Secretary for
the Minority of the Senate, the Majority Policy Committee of
the Senate, the Minority Policy Committee of the Senate, and
the following offices within the Office of the Secretary of
the Senate: Offices of the Parliamentarian, Bill Clerk,
Legislative Clerk, Journal Clerk, Executive Clerk, Enrolling
Clerk, Official Reporters of Debate, Daily Digest, Printing
Services, Captioning Services, and Senate Chief Counsel for
Employment;
(D) the Office of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Office of the Majority Leader of the
House of Representatives, the Office of the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives, the Offices of the Chief
Deputy Majority Whips, the Offices of the Chief Deputy
Minority Whips and the following offices within the Office of
the Clerk of the House of Representatives: Offices of
Legislative Operations, Official Reporters of Debate,
Official Reporters to Committees, Printing Services, and
Legislative Information;
(E) the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Senate,
the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, the Office of the
Legislative Counsel of the House of Representatives, the
Office of the General Counsel of the House of
Representatives, the Office of the Parliamentarian of the
House of Representatives, and the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel;
(F) the offices of any caucus or party organization;
(G) the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of
Technology Assessment, and the Office of Compliance; and
(H) such other offices that perform comparable functions
which are identified under regulations of the Board.
(f) Effective Date.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
subsections (a) and (b) shall be effective on October 1,
1996.
(2) Certain offices.--With respect to the offices listed in
subsection (e)(2), to the covered employees of such offices,
and to representatives of such employees, subsections (a) and
(b) shall be effective on the effective date of regulations
under subsection (e).

PART E--GENERAL

SEC. 225. GENERALLY APPLICABLE REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS.

(a) Attorney's Fees.--If a covered employee, with respect
to any claim under this Act, or a qualified person with a
disability, with respect to any claim under section 210, is a
prevailing party in any proceeding under section 405, 406,
407, or 408, the hearing officer, Board, or court, as the
case may be, may award attorney's fees, expert fees, and any
other costs as would be appropriate if awarded under section
706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k)).
(b) Interest.--In any proceeding under section 405, 406,
407, or 408, the same interest to compensate for delay in
payment shall be made available as would be appropriate if
awarded under section 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(d)).
(c) Civil Penalties and Punitive Damages.--No civil penalty
or punitive damages may be awarded with respect to any claim
under this Act.
(d) Exclusive Procedure.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), no
person may commence an administrative or judicial proceeding
to seek a remedy for the rights and protections afforded by
this Act except as provided in this Act.
(2) Veterans.--A covered employee under section 206 may
also utilize any provisions of chapter 43 of title 38, United
States Code, that are applicable to that employee.
(e) Scope of Remedy.--Only a covered employee who has
undertaken and completed the procedures described in sections
402 and 403 may be granted a remedy under part A of this
title.
(f) Construction.--
(1) Definitions and exemptions.--Except where inconsistent
with definitions and exemptions provided in this Act, the
definitions and exemptions in the laws made applicable by
this Act shall apply under this Act.
(2) Size limitations.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1),
provisions in the laws made applicable under this Act (other
than the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act)
determining coverage based on size, whether expressed in
terms of numbers of employees, amount of business transacted,
or other measure, shall not apply in determining coverage
under this Act.
(3) Executive branch enforcement.--This Act shall not be
construed to authorize enforcement by the executive branch of
this Act.
PART F--STUDY

SEC. 230. STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE,
AND LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

(a) In General.--The Administrative Conference of the
United States shall undertake a study of--
(1) the application of the laws listed in subsection (b)
to--
(A) the General Accounting Office;
(B) the Government Printing Office; and
(C) the Library of Congress; and
(2) the regulations and procedures used by the entities
referred to in paragraph (1) to apply and enforce such laws
to themselves and their employees.
(b) Applicable Statutes.--The study under this section
shall consider the application of the following laws:
(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302 of
title 5, United States Code.
(2) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 621 et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302
of title 5, United States Code.
(3) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq.), and related provisions of section 2302 of
title 5, United States Code.
(4) The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C.
2611 et seq.), and related provisions of sections 6381
through 6387 of title 5, United States Code.
(5) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et
seq.), and related provisions of sections 5541 through 5550a
of title 5, United States Code.
(6) The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29
U.S.C. 651 et seq.), and related provisions of section 7902
of title 5, United States Code.
(7) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.).
(8) Chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
management relations) of title 5, United States Code.
(9) The General Accounting Office Personnel Act of 1980 (31
U.S.C. 731 et seq.).
(10) The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29
U.S.C. 2001 et seq.).
(11) The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.).
(12) Chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and
reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.
(c) Contents of Study and Recommendations.--The study under
this section shall evaluate whether the rights, protections,
and procedures, including administrative and judicial relief,
applicable to the entities listed in paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) and their employees are comprehensive and
effective and shall include recommendations for any
improvements in regulations or legislation, including
proposed regulatory or legislative language.
(d) Deadline and Delivery of Study.--Not later than
December 31, 1996--
(1) the Administrative Conference of the United States
shall prepare and complete the study and recommendations
required under this section and shall submit the study and
recommendations to the Board; and
(2) the Board shall transmit such study and recommendations
(with the Board's comments) to the head of each entity
considered in the study, and to the Congress by delivery to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President pro
tempore of the Senate for referral to the appropriate
committees of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
[[Page H258]] TITLE III--OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE

SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.

(a) Establishment.--There is established, as an independent
office within the legislative branch of the Federal
Government, the Office of Compliance.
(b) Board of Directors.--The Office shall have a Board of
Directors. The Board shall consist of 5 individuals appointed
jointly by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Majority Leader of the Senate, and the Minority Leaders of
the House of Representatives and the Senate. Appointments of
the first 5 members of the Board shall be completed not later
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Chair.--The Chair shall be appointed from members of
the Board jointly by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Majority Leader of the Senate, and the
Minority Leaders of the House of Representatives and the
Senate.
(d) Board of Directors Qualifications.--
(1) Specific qualifications.--Selection and appointment of
members of the Board shall be without regard to political
affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the
duties of the Office. Members of the Board shall have
training or experience in the application of the rights,
protections, and remedies under one or more of the laws made
applicable under section 102.
(2) Disqualifications for appointments.--
(A) Lobbying.--No individual who engages in, or is
otherwise employed in, lobbying of the Congress and who is
required under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act to
register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or
the Secretary of the Senate shall be eligible for appointment
to, or service on, the Board.
(B) Incompatible office.--No member of the Board appointed
under subsection (b) may hold or may have held the position
of Member of the House of Representatives or Senator, may
hold the position of officer or employee of the House of
Representatives, Senate, or instrumentality or other entity
of the legislative branch, or may have held such a position
(other than the position of an officer or employee of the
General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals Board, an officer
or employee of the Office of Fair Employment Practices of the
House of Representatives, or officer or employee of the
Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices) within 4 years of
the date of appointment.
(3) Vacancies.--A vacancy on the Board shall be filled in
the manner in which the original appointment was made.
(e) Term of Office.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2),
membership on the Board shall be for 5 years. A member of the
Board who is appointed to a term of office of more than 3
years shall only be eligible for appointment for a single
term of office.
(2) First appointments.--Of the members first appointed to
the Board--
(A) 1 shall have a term of office of 3 years,
(B) 2 shall have a term of office of 4 years, and
(C) 2 shall have a term of office of 5 years, 1 of whom
shall be the Chair,

as designated at the time of appointment by the persons
specified in subsection (b).
(f) Removal.--
(1) Authority.--Any member of the Board may be removed from
office by a majority decision of the appointing authorities
described in subsection (b), but only for--
(A) disability that substantially prevents the member from
carrying out the duties of the member,
(B) incompetence,
(C) neglect of duty,
(D) malfeasance, including a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude, or
(E) holding an office or employment or engaging in an
activity that disqualifies the individual from service as a
member of the Board under subsection (d)(2).
(2) Statement of reasons for removal.--In removing a member
of the Board, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President pro tempore of the Senate shall state in
writing to the member of the Board being removed the specific
reasons for the removal.
(g) Compensation.--
(1) Per diem.--Each member of the Board shall be
compensated at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the
annual rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the
Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code, for each day (including travel time) during
which such member is engaged in the performance of the
duties of the Board. The rate of pay of a member may be
prorated based on the portion of the day during which the
member is engaged in the performance of Board duties.
(2) Travel expenses.--Each member of the Board shall
receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States
Code, for each day the member is engaged in the performance
of duties away from the home or regular place of business of
the member.
(h) Duties.--The Office shall--
(1) carry out a program of education for Members of
Congress and other employing authorities of the legislative
branch of the Federal Government respecting the laws made
applicable to them and a program to inform individuals of
their rights under laws applicable to the legislative branch
of the Federal Government;
(2) in carrying out the program under paragraph (1),
distribute the telephone number and address of the Office,
procedures for action under title IV, and any other
information appropriate for distribution, distribute such
information to employing offices in a manner suitable for
posting, provide such information to new employees of
employing offices, distribute such information to the
residences of covered employees, and conduct seminars and
other activities designed to educate employing offices and
covered employees; and
(3) compile and publish statistics on the use of the Office
by covered employees, including the number and type of
contacts made with the Office, on the reason for such
contacts, on the number of covered employees who initiated
proceedings with the Office under this Act and the result of
such proceedings, and on the number of covered employees who
filed a complaint, the basis for the complaint, and the
action taken on the complaint.
(i) Congressional Oversight.--The Board and the Office
shall be subject to oversight (except with respect to the
disposition of individual cases) by the Committee on Rules
and Administration and the Committee on Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on House Oversight of the
House of Representatives.
(j) Opening of Office.--The Office shall be open for
business, including receipt of requests for counseling under
section 402, not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(k) Financial Disclosure Reports.--Members of the Board and
officers and employees of the Office shall file the financial
disclosure reports required under title I of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 with the Clerk of the House of
Representatives.

SEC. 302. OFFICERS, STAFF, AND OTHER PERSONNEL.

(a) Executive Director.--
(1) Appointment and removal.--
(A) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the
Board, shall appoint and may remove an Executive Director.
Selection and appointment of the Executive Director shall be
without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of fitness to perform the duties of the Office. The
first Executive Director shall be appointed no later than 90
days after the initial appointment of the Board of Directors.
(B) Qualifications.--The Executive Director shall be an
individual with training or expertise in the application of
laws referred to in section 102(a).
(C) Disqualifications.--The disqualifications in section
301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of the Executive
Director.
(2) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the compensation of
the Executive Director. The rate of pay for the Executive
Director may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay
prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under
section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(3) Term.--The term of office of the Executive Director
shall be a single term of 5 years, except that the first
Executive Director shall have a single term of 7 years.
(4) Duties.--The Executive Director shall serve as the
chief operating officer of the Office. Except as otherwise
specified in this Act, the Executive Director shall carry out
all of the responsibilities of the Office under this Act.
(b) Deputy Executive Directors.--
(1) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the
Board, shall appoint and may remove a Deputy Executive
Director for the Senate and a Deputy Executive Director for
the House of Representatives. Selection and appointment of a
Deputy Executive Director shall be without regard to
political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to
perform the duties of the office. The disqualifications in
section 301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of a Deputy
Executive Director.
(2) Term.--The term of office of a Deputy Executive
Director shall be a single term of 5 years, except that the
first Deputy Executive Directors shall have a single term of
6 years.
(3) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the compensation of
the Deputy Executive Directors. The rate of pay for a Deputy
Executive Director may not exceed 96 percent of the annual
rate of basic pay prescribed for level V of the Executive
Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) Duties.--The Deputy Executive Director for the Senate
shall recommend to the Board regulations under section
304(a)(2)(B)(i), maintain the regulations and all records
pertaining to the regulations, and shall assume such other
responsibilities as may be delegated by the Executive
Director. The Deputy Executive Director for the House of
Representatives shall recommend to the Board the regulations
under section 304(a)(2)(B)(ii), maintain the regulations and
all records pertaining to the regulations, and shall assume
such other responsibilities as may be delegated by the
Executive Director.
(c) General Counsel.--
(1) In general.--The Chair, subject to the approval of the
Board, shall appoint a General Counsel. Selection and
appointment of the General Counsel shall be without regard to
political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to
perform the duties of the Office. The disqualifications in
section 301(d)(2) shall apply to the appointment of a General
Counsel.
[[Page H259]] (2) Compensation.--The Chair may fix the
compensation of the General Counsel. The rate of pay for the
General Counsel may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay
prescribed for level V of the Executive Schedule under
section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
(3) Duties.--The General Counsel shall--
(A) exercise the authorities and perform the duties of the
General Counsel as specified in this Act; and
(B) otherwise assist the Board and the Executive Director
in carrying out their duties and powers, including
representing the Office in any judicial proceeding under this
Act.
(4) Attorneys in the office of the general counsel.--The
General Counsel shall appoint, and fix the compensation of,
and may remove, such additional attorneys as may be necessary
to enable the General Counsel to perform the General
Counsel's duties.
(5) Term.--The term of office of the General Counsel shall
be a single term of 5 years.
(6) Removal.--
(A) Authority.--The General Counsel may be removed from
office by the Chair but only for--
(i) disability that substantially prevents the General
Counsel from carrying out the duties of the General Counsel,
(ii) incompetence,
(iii) neglect of duty,
(iv) malfeasance, including a felony or conduct involving
moral turpitude, or
(v) holding an office or employment or engaging in an
activity that disqualifies the individual from service as the
General Counsel under paragraph (1).
(B) Statement of reasons for removal.--In removing the
General Counsel, the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall state in
writing to the General Counsel the specific reasons for the
removal.
(d) Other Staff.--The Executive Director shall appoint, and
fix the compensation of, and may remove, such other
additional staff, including hearing officers, but not
including attorneys employed in the office of the General
Counsel, as may be necessary to enable the Office to perform
its duties.
(e) Detailed Personnel.--The Executive Director may, with
the prior consent of the department or agency of the Federal
Government concerned, use on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such
department or agency, including the services of members or
personnel of the General Accounting Office Personnel Appeals
Board.
(f) Consultants.--In carrying out the functions of the
Office, the Executive Director may procure the temporary (not
to exceed 1 year) or intermittent services of consultants.

SEC. 303. PROCEDURAL RULES.

(a) In General.--The Executive Director shall, subject to
the approval of the Board, adopt rules governing the
procedures of the Office, including the procedures of hearing
officers, which shall be submitted for publication in the
Congressional Record. The rules may be amended in the same
manner.
(b) Procedure.--The Executive Director shall adopt rules
referred to in subsection (a) in accordance with the
principles and procedures set forth in section 553 of title
5, United States Code. The Executive Director shall publish a
general notice of proposed rulemaking under section 553(b) of
title 5, United States Code, but, instead of publication of a
general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register, the Executive Director shall transmit such notice
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President pro tempore of the Senate for publication in the
Congressional Record on the first day on which both Houses
are in session following such transmittal. Before adopting
rules, the Executive Director shall provide a comment period
of at least 30 days after publication of a general notice of
proposed rulemaking. Upon adopting rules, the Executive
Director shall transmit notice of such action together with a
copy of such rules to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate
for publication in the Congressional Record on the first day
on which both Houses are in session following such
transmittal. Rules shall be considered issued by the
Executive Director as of the date on which they are published
in the Congressional Record.

SEC. 304. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS.

(a) Regulations.--
(1) In general.--The procedures applicable to the
regulations of the Board issued for the implementation of
this Act, which shall include regulations the Board is
required to issue under title II (including regulations on
the appropriate application of exemptions under the laws made
applicable in title II) are as prescribed in this section.
(2) Rulemaking procedure.--Such regulations of the Board--
(A) shall be adopted, approved, and issued in accordance
with subsection (b); and
(B) shall consist of 3 separate bodies of regulations,
which shall apply, respectively, to--
(i) the Senate and employees of the Senate;
(ii) the House of Representatives and employees of the
House of Representatives; and
(iii) all other covered employees and employing offices.
(b) Adoption by the Board.--The Board shall adopt the
regulations referred to in subsection (a)(1) in accordance
with the principles and procedures set forth in section 553
of title 5, United States Code, and as provided in the
following provisions of this subsection:
(1) Proposal.--The Board shall publish a general notice of
proposed rulemaking under section 553(b) of title 5, United
States Code, but, instead of publication of a general notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, the Board
shall transmit such notice to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate
for publication in the Congressional Record on the first day
on which both Houses are in session following such
transmittal. Such notice shall set forth the recommendations
of the Deputy Director for the Senate in regard to
regulations under subsection (a)(2)(B)(i), the
recommendations of the Deputy Director for the House of
Representatives in regard to regulations under subsection
(a)(2)(B)(ii), and the recommendations of the Executive
Director for regulations under subsection (a)(2)(B)(iii).
(2) Comment.--Before adopting regulations, the Board shall
provide a comment period of at least 30 days after
publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking.
(3) Adoption.--After considering comments, the Board shall
adopt regulations and shall transmit notice of such action
together with a copy of such regulations to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of
the Senate for publication in the Congressional Record on the
first day on which both Houses are in session following such
transmittal.
(4) Recommendation as to method of approval.--The Board
shall include a recommendation in the general notice of
proposed rulemaking and in the regulations as to whether the
regulations should be approved by resolution of the Senate,
by resolution of the House of Representatives, by concurrent
resolution, or by joint resolution.
(c) Approval of Regulations.--
(1) In general.--Regulations referred to in paragraph
(2)(B)(i) of subsection (a) may be approved by the Senate by
resolution or by the Congress by concurrent resolution or by
joint resolution. Regulations referred to in paragraph
(2)(B)(ii) of subsection (a) may be approved by the House of
Representatives by resolution or by the Congress by
concurrent resolution or by joint resolution. Regulations
referred to in paragraph (2)(B)(iii) may be approved by
Congress by concurrent resolution or by joint resolution.
(2) Referral.--Upon receipt of a notice of adoption of
regulations under subsection (b)(3), the presiding officers
of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall refer
such notice, together with a copy of such regulations, to the
appropriate committee or committees of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate. The purpose of the
referral shall be to consider whether such regulations should
be approved, and, if so, whether such approval should be by
resolution of the House of Representatives or of the Senate,
by concurrent resolution or by joint resolution.
(3) Joint referral and discharge in the senate.--The
presiding officer of the Senate may refer the notice of
issuance of regulations, or any resolution of approval of
regulations, to one committee or jointly to more than one
committee. If a committee of the Senate acts to report a
jointly referred measure, any other committee of the Senate
must act within 30 calendar days of continuous session, or be
automatically discharged.
(4) One-house resolution or concurrent resolution.--In the
case of a resolution of the House of Representatives or the
Senate or a concurrent resolution referred to in paragraph
(1), the matter after the resolving clause shall be the
following: ``The following regulations issued by the Office
of Compliance on ____ are hereby approved:'' (the blank space
being appropriately filled in, and the text of the
regulations being set forth).
(5) Joint resolution.--In the case of a joint resolution
referred to in paragraph (1), the matter after the resolving
clause shall be the following: ``The following regulations
issued by the Office of Compliance on ____ are hereby
approved and shall have the force and effect of law:'' (the
blank space being appropriately filled in, and the text of
the regulations being set forth).
(d) Issuance and Effective Date.--
(1) Publication.--After approval of regulations under
subsection (c), the Board shall submit the regulations to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro
tempore of the Senate for publication in the Congressional
Record on the first day on which both Houses are in session
following such transmittal.
(2) Date of issuance.--The date of issuance of regulations
shall be the date on which they are published in the
Congressional Record under paragraph (1).
(3) Effective date.--Regulations shall become effective not
less than 60 days after the regulations are issued, except
that the Board may provide for an earlier effective date for
good cause found (within the meaning of section 553(d)(3) of
title 5, United States Code) and published with the
regulation.
(e) Amendment of Regulations.--Regulations may be amended
in the same manner as is described in this section for the
adoption, approval, and issuance of regulations, except that
the Board may, in its discretion, dispense with publication
of a general notice of proposed rulemaking of minor,
technical, or urgent amendments that satisfy the criteria for
dispensing with publication of such notice pursuant to
section 553(b)(B) of title 5, United States Code.
[[Page H260]] (f) Right To Petition for Rulemaking.--Any
interested party may petition to the Board for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a regulation.
(g) Consultation.--The Executive Director, the Deputy
Directors, and the Board--
(1) shall consult, with regard to the development of
regulations, with--
(A) the Chair of the Administrative Conference of the
United States;
(B) the Secretary of Labor;
(C) the Federal Labor Relations Authority; and
(D) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management; and
(2) may consult with any other persons with whom
consultation, in the opinion of the Board, the Executive
Director, or Deputy Directors, may be helpful.

SEC. 305. EXPENSES.

(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--Beginning in fiscal
year 1995, and for each fiscal year thereafter, there are
authorized to be appropriated for the expenses of the Office
such sums as may be necessary to carry out the functions of
the Office. Until sums are first appropriated pursuant to the
preceding sentence, but for a period not exceeding 12 months
following the date of the enactment of this Act--
(1) one-half of the expenses of the Office shall be paid
from funds appropriated for allowances and expenses of the
House of Representatives, and
(2) one-half of the expenses of the Office shall be paid
from funds appropriated for allowances and expenses of the
Senate,

upon vouchers approved by the Executive Director, except that
a voucher shall not be required for the disbursement of
salaries of employees who are paid at an annual rate. The
Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of
the Senate are authorized to make arrangements for the
division of expenses under this subsection, including
arrangements for one House of Congress to reimburse the other
House of Congress.
(b) Financial and Administrative Services.--The Executive
Director may place orders and enter into agreements for goods
and services with the head of any agency, or major
organizational unit within an agency, in the legislative or
executive branch of the United States in the same manner and
to the same extent as agencies are authorized under sections
1535 and 1536 of title 31, United States Code, to place
orders and enter into agreements.
(c) Witness Fees and Allowances.--Except for covered
employees, witnesses before a hearing officer or the Board in
any proceeding under this Act other than rulemaking shall be
paid the same fee and mileage allowances as are paid
subpoenaed witnesses in the courts of the United States.
Covered employees who are summoned, or are assigned by their
employer, to testify in their official capacity or to produce
official records in any proceeding under this Act shall be
entitled to travel expenses under subchapter I and section
5751 of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

SEC. 401. PROCEDURE FOR CONSIDERATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.

Except as otherwise provided, the procedure for
consideration of alleged violations of part A of title II
consists of--
(1) counseling as provided in section 402;
(2) mediation as provided in section 403; and
(3) election, as provided in section 404, of either--
(A) a formal complaint and hearing as provided in section
405, subject to Board review as provided in section 406, and
judicial review in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit as provided in section 407, or
(B) a civil action in a district court of the United States
as provided in section 408.

In the case of an employee of the Office of the Architect of
the Capitol or of the Capitol Police, the Executive Director,
after receiving a request for counseling under section 402,
may recommend that the employee use the grievance procedures
of the Architect of the Capitol or the Capitol Police for
resolution of the employee's grievance for a specific period
of time, which shall not count against the time available for
counseling or mediation.

SEC. 402. COUNSELING.

(a) In General.--To commence a proceeding, a covered
employee alleging a violation of a law made applicable under
part A of title II shall request counseling by the Office.
The Office shall provide the employee with all relevant
information with respect to the rights of the employee. A
request for counseling shall be made not later than 180 days
after the date of the alleged violation.
(b) Period of Counseling.--The period for counseling shall
be 30 days unless the employee and the Office agree to reduce
the period. The period shall begin on the date the request
for counseling is received.
(c) Notification of End of Counseling Period.--The Office
shall notify the employee in writing when the counseling
period has ended.

SEC. 403. MEDIATION.

(a) Initiation.--Not later than 15 days after receipt by
the employee of notice of the end of the counseling period
under section 402, but prior to and as a condition of making
an election under section 404, the covered employee who
alleged a violation of a law shall file a request for
mediation with the Office.
(b) Process.--Mediation under this section--
(1) may include the Office, the covered employee, the
employing office, and one or more individuals appointed by
the Executive Director after considering recommendations by
organizations composed primarily of individuals experienced
in adjudicating or arbitrating personnel matters, and
(2) shall involve meetings with the parties separately or
jointly for the purpose of resolving the dispute between the
covered employee and the employing office.
(c) Mediation Period.--The mediation period shall be 30
days beginning on the date the request for mediation is
received. The mediation period may be extended for additional
periods at the joint request of the covered employee and the
employing office. The Office shall notify in writing the
covered employee and the employing office when the mediation
period has ended.
(d) Independence of Mediation Process.--No individual, who
is appointed by the Executive Director to mediate, may
conduct or aid in a hearing conducted under section 405 with
respect to the same matter or shall be subject to subpoena or
any other compulsory process with respect to the same matter.

SEC. 404. ELECTION OF PROCEEDING.

Not later than 90 days after a covered employee receives
notice of the end of the period of mediation, but no sooner
than 30 days after receipt of such notification, such covered
employee may either--
(1) file a complaint with the Office in accordance with
section 405, or
(2) file a civil action in accordance with section 408 in
the United States district court for the district in which
the employee is employed or for the District of Columbia.

SEC. 405. COMPLAINT AND HEARING.

(a) In General.--A covered employee may, upon the
completion of mediation under section 403, file a complaint
with the Office. The respondent to the complaint shall be the
employing office--
(1) involved in the violation, or
(2) in which the violation is alleged to have occurred,

and about which mediation was conducted.
(b) Dismissal.--A hearing officer may dismiss any claim
that the hearing officer finds to be frivolous or that fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(c) Hearing Officer.--
(1) Appointment.--Upon the filing of a complaint, the
Executive Director shall appoint an independent hearing
officer to consider the complaint and render a decision. No
Member of the House of Representatives, Senator, officer of
either the House of Representatives or the Senate, head of an
employing office, member of the Board, or covered employee
may be appointed to be a hearing officer. The Executive
Director shall select hearing officers on a rotational or
random basis from the lists developed under paragraph (2).
Nothing in this section shall prevent the appointment of
hearing officers as full-time employees of the Office or the
selection of hearing officers on the basis of specialized
expertise needed for particular matters.
(2) Lists.--The Executive Director shall develop master
lists, composed of--
(A) members of the bar of a State or the District of
Columbia and retired judges of the United States courts who
are experienced in adjudicating or arbitrating the kinds of
personnel and other matters for which hearings may be held
under this Act, and
(B) individuals expert in technical matters relating to
accessibility and usability by persons with disabilities or
technical matters relating to occupational safety and health.

In developing lists, the Executive Director shall consider
candidates recommended by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service or the Administrative Conference of the
United States.
(d) Hearing.--Unless a complaint is dismissed before a
hearing, a hearing shall be--
(1) conducted in closed session on the record by the
hearing officer;
(2) commenced no later than 60 days after filing of the
complaint under subsection (a), except that the Office may,
for good cause, extend up to an additional 30 days the time
for commencing a hearing; and
(3) conducted, except as specifically provided in this Act
and to the greatest extent practicable, in accordance with
the principles and procedures set forth in sections 554
through 557 of title 5, United States Code.
(e) Discovery.--Reasonable prehearing discovery may be
permitted at the discretion of the hearing officer.
(f) Subpoenas.--
(1) In general.--At the request of a party, a hearing
officer may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses
and for the production of correspondence, books, papers,
documents, and other records. The attendance of witnesses and
the production of records may be required from any place
within the United States. Subpoenas shall be served in the
manner provided under rule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(2) Objections.--If a person refuses, on the basis of
relevance, privilege, or other objection, to testify in
response to a question or to produce records in connection
with a proceeding before a hearing officer, the hearing
[[Page H261]] officer shall rule on the objection. At the
request of the witness or any party, the hearing officer
shall (or on the hearing officer's own initiative, the
hearing officer may) refer the ruling to the Board for
review.
(3) Enforcement.--
(A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a
subpoena, the Board may authorize the General Counsel to
apply, in the name of the Office, to an appropriate United
States district court for an order requiring that person to
appear before the hearing officer to give testimony or
produce records. The application may be made within the
judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where
that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any
failure to obey a lawful order of the district court issued
pursuant to this section may be held by such court to be a
civil contempt thereof.
(B) Service of process.--Process in an action or contempt
proceeding pursuant to subparagraph (A) may be served in any
judicial district in which the person refusing or failing to
comply, or threatening to refuse or not to comply, resides,
transacts business, or may be found, and subpoenas for
witnesses who are required to attend such proceedings may run
into any other district.
(g) Decision.--The hearing officer shall issue a written
decision as expeditiously as possible, but in no case more
than 90 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The written
decision shall be transmitted by the Office to the parties.
The decision shall state the issues raised in the complaint,
describe the evidence in the record, contain findings of fact
and conclusions of law, contain a determination of whether a
violation has occurred, and order such remedies as are
appropriate pursuant to title II. The decision shall be
entered in the records of the Office. If a decision is not
appealed under section 406 to the Board, the decision shall
be considered the final decision of the Office.
(h) Precedents.--A hearing officer who conducts a hearing
under this section shall be guided by judicial decisions
under the laws made applicable by section 102 and by Board
decisions under this Act.

SEC. 406. APPEAL TO THE BOARD.

(a) In General.--Any party aggrieved by the decision of a
hearing officer under section 405(g) may file a petition for
review by the Board not later than 30 days after entry of the
decision in the records of the Office.
(b) Parties' Opportunity To Submit Argument.--The parties
to the hearing upon which the decision of the hearing officer
was made shall have a reasonable opportunity to be heard,
through written submission and, in the discretion of the
Board, through oral argument.
(c) Standard of Review.--The Board shall set aside a
decision of a hearing officer if the Board determines that
the decision was--
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not consistent with law;
(2) not made consistent with required procedures; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.
(d) Record.--In making determinations under subsection (c),
the Board shall review the whole record, or those parts of it
cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error.
(e) Decision.--The Board shall issue a written decision
setting forth the reasons for its decision. The decision may
affirm, reverse, or remand to the hearing officer for further
proceedings. A decision that does not require further
proceedings before a hearing officer shall be entered in the
records of the Office as a final decision.

SEC. 407. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BOARD DECISIONS AND ENFORCEMENT.

(a) Jurisdiction.--
(1) Judicial review.--The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit shall have jurisdiction over any
proceeding commenced by a petition of--
(A) a party aggrieved by a final decision of the Board
under section 406(e) in cases arising under part A of title
II,
(B) a charging individual or a respondent before the Board
who files a petition under section 210(d)(4),
(C) the General Counsel or a respondent before the Board
who files a petition under section 215(c)(5), or
(D) the General Counsel or a respondent before the Board
who files a petition under section 220(c)(3).

The court of appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to set
aside, suspend (in whole or in part), to determine the
validity of, or otherwise review the decision of the Board.
(2) Enforcement.--The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall have jurisdiction over any petition
of the General Counsel, filed in the name of the Office and
at the direction of the Board, to enforce a final decision
under section 405(g) or 406(e) with respect to a violation of
part A, B, C, or D of title II.
(b) Procedures.--
(1) Respondents.--(A) In any proceeding commenced by a
petition filed under subsection (a)(1) (A) or (B), or filed
by a party other than the General Counsel under subsection
(a)(1) (C) or (D), the Office shall be named respondent and
any party before the Board may be named respondent by filing
a notice of election with the court within 30 days after
service of the petition.
(B) In any proceeding commenced by a petition filed by the
General Counsel under subsection (a)(1) (C) or (D), the
prevailing party in the final decision entered under section
406(e) shall be named respondent, and any other party before
the Board may be named respondent by filing a notice of
election with the court within 30 days after service of the
petition.
(C) In any proceeding commenced by a petition filed under
subsection (a)(2), the party under section 405 or 406 that
the General Counsel determines has failed to comply with a
final decision under section 405(g) or 406(e) shall be named
respondent.
(2) Intervention.--Any party that participated in the
proceedings before the Board under section 406 and that was
not made respondent under paragraph (1) may intervene as of
right.
(c) Law Applicable.--Chapter 158 of title 28, United States
Code, shall apply to judicial review under paragraph (1) of
subsection (a), except that--
(1) with respect to section 2344 of title 28, United States
Code, service of a petition in any proceeding in which the
Office is a respondent shall be on the General Counsel rather
than on the Attorney General;
(2) the provisions of section 2348 of title 28, United
States Code, on the authority of the Attorney General, shall
not apply;
(3) the petition for review shall be filed not later than
90 days after the entry in the Office of a final decision
under section 406(e); and
(4) the Office shall be an ``agency'' as that term is used
in chapter 158 of title 28, United States Code.
(d) Standard of Review.--To the extent necessary for
decision in a proceeding commenced under subsection (a)(1)
and when presented, the court shall decide all relevant
questions of law and interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions. The court shall set aside a final decision of the
Board if it is determined that the decision was--
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not consistent with law;
(2) not made consistent with required procedures; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.
(e) Record.--In making determinations under subsection (d),
the court shall review the whole record, or those parts of it
cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error.

SEC. 408. CIVIL ACTION.

(a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction over any civil action commenced under
section 404 and this section by a covered employee who has
completed counseling under section 402 and mediation under
section 403. A civil action may be commenced by a covered
employee only to seek redress for a violation for which the
employee has completed counseling and mediation.
(b) Parties.--The defendant shall be the employing office
alleged to have committed the violation, or in which the
violation is alleged to have occurred.
(c) Jury Trial.--Any party may demand a jury trial where a
jury trial would be available in an action against a private
defendant under the relevant law made applicable by this Act.
In any case in which a violation of section 201 is alleged,
the court shall not inform the jury of the maximum amount of
compensatory damages available under section 201(b)(1) or
201(b)(3).

SEC. 409. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REGULATIONS.

In any proceeding brought under section 407 or 408 in which
the application of a regulation issued under this Act is at
issue, the court may review the validity of the regulation in
accordance with the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through
(D) of section 706(2) of title 5, United States Code, except
that with respect to regulations approved by a joint
resolution under section 304(c), only the provisions of
section 706(2)(B) of title 5, United States Code, shall
apply. If the court determines that the regulation is
invalid, the court shall apply, to the extent necessary and
appropriate, the most relevant substantive executive agency
regulation promulgated to implement the statutory provisions
with respect to which the invalid regulation was issued.
Except as provided in this section, the validity of
regulations issued under this Act is not subject to judicial
review.

SEC. 410. OTHER JUDICIAL REVIEW PROHIBITED.

Except as expressly authorized by sections 407, 408, and
409, the compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of
this Act and any action taken pursuant to this Act shall not
be subject to judicial review.

SEC. 411. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO ISSUE REGULATIONS.

In any proceeding under section 405, 406, 407, or 408,
except a proceeding to enforce section 220 with respect to
offices listed under section 220(e)(2), if the Board has not
issued a regulation on a matter for which this Act requires a
regulation to be issued, the hearing officer, Board, or
court, as the case may be, shall apply, to the extent
necessary and appropriate, the most relevant substantive
executive agency regulation promulgated to implement the
statutory provision at issue in the proceeding.

SEC. 412. EXPEDITED REVIEW OF CERTAIN APPEALS.

(a) In General.--An appeal may be taken directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States from any interlocutory or
final judgment, decree, or order of a court upon the
constitutionality of any provision of this Act.
(b) Jurisdiction.--The Supreme Court shall, if it has not
previously ruled on the question, accept jurisdiction over
the appeal
[[Page H262]] referred to in subsection (a), advance the
appeal on the docket, and expedite the appeal to the greatest
extent possible.

SEC. 413. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.

The authorization to bring judicial proceedings under
sections 405(f)(3), 407, and 408 shall not constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity for any other purpose, or of the
privileges of any Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives under article I, section 6, clause 1, of the
Constitution, or a waiver of any power of either the Senate
or the House of Representatives under the Constitution,
including under article I, section 5, clause 3, or under the
rules of either House relating to records and information
within its jurisdiction.

SEC. 414. SETTLEMENT OF COMPLAINTS.

Any settlement entered into by the parties to a process
described in section 210, 215, 220, or 401 shall be in
writing and not become effective unless it is approved by the
Executive Director. Nothing in this Act shall affect the
power of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, to establish rules governing the process by
which a settlement may be entered into by such House or by
any employing office of such House.

SEC. 415. PAYMENTS.

(a) Awards and Settlements.--Except as provided in
subsection (c), only funds which are appropriated to an
account of the Office in the Treasury of the United States
for the payment of awards and settlements may be used for the
payment of awards and settlements under this Act. There are
authorized to be appropriated for such account such sums as
may be necessary to pay such awards and settlements. Funds in
the account are not available for awards and settlements
involving the General Accounting Office, the Government
Printing Office, or the Library of Congress.
(b) Compliance.--Except as provided in subsection (c),
there are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary for administrative, personnel, and similar expenses
of employing offices which are needed to comply with this
Act.
(c) OSHA, Accommodation, and Access Requirements.--Funds to
correct violations of section 201(a)(3), 210, or 215 of this
Act may be paid only from funds appropriated to the employing
office or entity responsible for correcting such violations.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary for such funds.

SEC. 416. CONFIDENTIALITY.

(a) Counseling.--All counseling shall be strictly
confidential, except that the Office and a covered employee
may agree to notify the employing office of the allegations.
(b) Mediation.--All mediation shall be strictly
confidential.
(c) Hearings and Deliberations.--Except as provided in
subsections (d), (e), and (f), all proceedings and
deliberations of hearing officers and the Board, including
any related records, shall be confidential. This subsection
shall not apply to proceedings under section 215, but shall
apply to the deliberations of hearing officers and the Board
under that section.
(d) Release of Records for Judicial Action.--The records of
hearing officers and the Board may be made public if required
for the purpose of judicial review under section 407.
(e) Access by Committees of Congress.--At the discretion of
the Executive Director, the Executive Director may provide to
the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Ethics of the
Senate access to the records of the hearings and decisions of
the hearing officers and the Board, including all written and
oral testimony in the possession of the Office. The Executive
Director shall not provide such access until the Executive
Director has consulted with the individual filing the
complaint at issue, and until a final decision has been
entered under section 405(g) or 406(e).
(f) Final Decisions.--A final decision entered under
section 405(g) or 406(e) shall be made public if it is in
favor of the complaining covered employee, or in favor of the
charging party under section 210, or if the decision reverses
a decision of a hearing officer which had been in favor of
the covered employee or charging party. The Board may make
public any other decision at its discretion.
TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. EXERCISE OF RULEMAKING POWERS.

The provisions of sections 102(b)(3) and 304(c) are
enacted--
(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such
they shall be considered as part of the rules of such House,
respectively, and such rules shall supersede other rules only
to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of
either House to change such rules (so far as relating to such
House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same
extent as in the case of any other rule of each House.

SEC. 502. POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE.

(a) In General.--It shall not be a violation of any
provision of section 201 to consider the--
(1) party affiliation;
(2) domicile; or
(3) political compatibility with the employing office;

of an employee referred to in subsection (b) with respect to
employment decisions.
(b) Definition.--For purposes of subsection (a), the term
``employee'' means--
(1) an employee on the staff of the leadership of the House
of Representatives or the leadership of the Senate;
(2) an employee on the staff of a committee or subcommittee
of--
(A) the House of Representatives;
(B) the Senate; or
(C) a joint committee of the Congress;
(3) an employee on the staff of a Member of the House of
Representatives or on the staff of a Senator;
(4) an officer of the House of Representatives or the
Senate or a congressional employee who is elected by the
House of Representatives or Senate or is appointed by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a Senator (in
addition an employee described in paragraph (1), (2), or
(3)); or
(5) an applicant for a position that is to be occupied by
an individual described in any of paragraphs (1) through (4).

SEC. 503. NONDISCRIMINATION RULES OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE.

The Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate and the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of
Representatives retain full power, in accordance with the
authority provided to them by the Senate and the House, with
respect to the discipline of Members, officers, and employees
for violating rules of the Senate and the House on
nondiscrimination in employment.

SEC. 504. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

(a) Civil Rights Remedies.--
(1) Sections 301 and 302 of the Government Employee Rights
Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1201 and 1202) are amended to read as
follows:

``SEC. 301. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RIGHTS ACT OF 1991.

``(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the
`Government Employee Rights Act of 1991'.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this title is to provide
procedures to protect the rights of certain
government employees, with respect to their public
employment, to be free of discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
disability.
``(c) Definition.--For purposes of this title, the term
`violation' means a practice that violates section 302(a) of
this title.

``SEC. 302. DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES PROHIBITED.

``(a) Practices.--All personnel actions affecting the
Presidential appointees described in section 303 or the State
employees described in section 304 shall be made free from
any discrimination based on--
``(1) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
within the meaning of section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16);
``(2) age, within the meaning of section 15 of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 633a); or
``(3) disability, within the meaning of section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) and sections 102
through 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(42 U.S.C. 12112-14).
``(b) Remedies.--The remedies referred to in sections
303(a)(1) and 304(a)--
``(1) may include, in the case of a determination that a
violation of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) has occurred, such
remedies as would be appropriate if awarded under sections
706(g), 706(k), and 717(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g), 2000e-5(k), 2000e-16(d)), and such
compensatory damages as would be appropriate if awarded under
section 1977 or sections 1977A(a) and 1977A(b)(2) of the
Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1981a(a) and (b)(2));
``(2) may include, in the case of a determination that a
violation of subsection (a)(2) has occurred, such remedies as
would be appropriate if awarded under section 15(c) of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
633a(c)); and
``(3) may not include punitive damages.''.
(2) Sections 303 through 319, and sections 322, 324, and
325 of the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C.
1203-1218, 1221, 1223, and 1224) are repealed, except as
provided in section 506 of this Act.
(3) Sections 320 and 321 of the Government Employee Rights
Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1219 and 1220) are redesignated as
sections 303 and 304, respectively.
(4) Sections 303 and 304 of the Government Employee Rights
Act of 1991, as so redesignated, are each amended by striking
``and 307(h) of this title''.
(5) Section 1205 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1993 (2 U.S.C. 1207a) is repealed, except as provided in
section 506 of this Act.
(b) Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.--Title V of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (2 U.S.C. 60m et seq.)
is repealed, except as provided in section 506 of this Act.
(c) Architect of the Capitol.--
(1) Repeal.--Section 312(e) of the Architect of the Capitol
Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-283; 108 Stat. 1444) is
repealed, except as provided in section 506 of this Act.
(2) Application of general accounting office personnel act
of 1980.--The provisions of sections 751, 753, and 755 of
title 31, United States Code, amended by section 312(e) of
the Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act, shall be
applied and administered as if such section 312(e) (and the
[[Page H263]] amendments made by such section) had not been
enacted.

SEC. 505. JUDICIAL BRANCH COVERAGE STUDY.

The Judicial Conference of the United States shall prepare
a report for submission by the Chief Justice of the United
States to the Congress on the application to the judicial
branch of the Federal Government of--
(1) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et
seq.);
(2) title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.);
(3) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12101 et seq.);
(4) the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 621 et seq.);
(5) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C.
2611 et seq.);
(6) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29
U.S.C. 651 et seq.);
(7) chapter 71 (relating to Federal service labor-
management relations) of title 5, United States Code;
(8) the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29
U.S.C. 2001 et seq.);
(9) the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(29 U.S.C. 2101 et seq.);
(10) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701 et
seq.); and
(11) chapter 43 (relating to veterans' employment and
reemployment) of title 38, United States Code.

The report shall be submitted to Congress not later than
December 31, 1996, and shall include any recommendations the
Judicial Conference may have for legislation to provide to
employees of the judicial branch the rights, protections, and
procedures under the listed laws, including administrative
and judicial relief, that are comparable to those available
to employees of the legislative branch under titles I through
IV of this Act.

SEC. 506. SAVINGS PROVISIONS.

(a) Transition Provisions for Employees of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate.--
(1) Claims arising before effective date.--If, as of the
date on which section 201 takes effect, an employee of the
Senate or the House of Representatives has or could have
requested counseling under section 305 of the Government
Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1205) or Rule LI of
the House of Representatives, including counseling for
alleged violations of family and medical leave rights under
title V of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, the
employee may complete, or initiate and complete, all
procedures under the Government Employees Rights Act of 1991
and Rule LI, and the provisions of that Act and Rule shall
remain in effect with respect to, and provide the exclusive
procedures for, those claims until the completion of all such
procedures.
(2) Claims arising between effective date and opening of
office.--If a claim by an employee of the Senate or House of
Representatives arises under section 201 or 202 after the
effective date of such sections, but before the opening of
the Office for receipt of requests for counseling or
mediation under sections 402 and 403, the provisions of the
Government Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1201 et
seq.) and Rule LI of the House of Representatives relating to
counseling and mediation shall remain in effect, and the
employee may complete under that Act or Rule the requirements
for counseling and mediation under sections 402 and 403. If,
after counseling and mediation is completed, the Office has
not yet opened for the filing of a timely complaint under
section 405, the employee may elect--
(A) to file a complaint under section 307 of the Government
Employees Rights Act of 1991 (2 U.S.C. 1207) or Rule LI of
the House of Representatives, and thereafter proceed
exclusively under that Act or Rule, the provisions of which
shall remain in effect until the completion of all
proceedings in relation to the complaint, or
(B) to commence a civil action under section 408.
(3) Section 1205 of the supplemental appropriations act of
1993.--With respect to payments of awards and settlements
relating to Senate employees under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, section 1205 of the Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1993 (2 U.S.C. 1207a) remains in effect.
(b) Transition Provisions for Employees of the Architect of
the Capitol.---
(1) Claims arising before effective date.--If, as of the
date on which section 201 takes effect, an employee of the
Architect of the Capitol has or could have filed a charge or
complaint regarding an alleged violation of section 312(e)(2)
of the Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act (Public
Law 103-283), the employee may complete, or initiate and
complete, all procedures under section 312(e) of that Act,
the provisions of which shall remain in effect with respect
to, and provide the exclusive procedures for, that claim
until the completion of all such procedures.
(2) Claims arising between effective date and opening of
office.--If a claim by an employee of the Architect of the
Capitol arises under section 201 or 202 after the effective
date of those provisions, but before the opening of the
Office for receipt of requests for counseling or mediation
under sections 402 and 403, the employee may satisfy the
requirements for counseling and mediation by exhausting the
requirements prescribed by the Architect of the Capitol in
accordance with section 312(e)(3) of the Architect of the
Capitol Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-283). If, after
exhaustion of those requirements the Office has not yet
opened for the filing of a timely complaint under section
405, the employee may elect--
(A) to file a charge with the General Accounting Office
Personnel Appeals Board pursuant to section 312(e)(3) of the
Architect of the Capitol Human Resources Act (Public Law 103-
283), and thereafter proceed exclusively under section 312(e)
of that Act, the provisions of which shall remain in effect
until the completion of all proceedings in relation to the
charge, or
(B) to commence a civil action under section 408.
(c) Transition Provision Relating To Matters Other Than
Employment Under Section 509 of the Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990.--With respect to matters other than
employment under section 509 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12209), the rights,
protections, remedies, and procedures of section 509 of such
Act shall remain in effect until section 210 of this Act
takes effect with respect to each of the entities covered by
section 509 of such Act.

SEC. 507. USE OF FREQUENT FLYER MILES.

(a) Limitation on the Use of Travel Awards.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, or any rule,
regulation, or other authority, any travel award that accrues
by reason of official travel of a Member, officer, or
employee of the Senate shall be considered the property of
the office for which the travel was performed and may not be
converted to personal use.
(b) Regulations.--The Committee on Rules and Administration
of the Senate shall have authority to prescribe regulations
to carry out this section.
(c) Definitions.--As used in this section--
(1) the term ``travel award'' means any frequent flyer,
free, or discounted travel, or other travel benefit, whether
awarded by coupon, membership, or otherwise; and
(2) the term ``official travel'' means travel engaged in
the course of official business of the Senate.

SEC. 508. SENSE OF SENATE REGARDING ADOPTION OF SIMPLIFIED
AND STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES FOR
SENATE ACQUISITIONS.

It is the sense of the Senate that the Committee on Rules
and Administration of the Senate should review the rules
applicable to purchases by Senate offices to determine
whether they are consistent with the acquisition
simplification and streamlining laws enacted in the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355).

SEC. 509. SEVERABILITY.

If any provision of this Act or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance is held to be
invalid, the remainder of this Act and the application of the
provisions of the remainder to any person or circumstance
shall not be affected thereby.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California [Mr. Thomas] will be recognized for 20 minutes and the
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] will be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas].
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], chairman of the Committee on Economic
and Educational Opportunities, be permitted to control 10 minutes of
the 20 minutes which are controlled on this side and to yield that time
in such blocks as he may determine.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling].
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GOODLING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks, and to include extraneous material.)
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise in support of the bill
before us because it is truly one of the most important initiatives
this Congress will pass this year. Before I go any further, I want to
thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Fawell] for the many hours over
the many years, going back to 1990, that he has also spent in trying to
help bring this day about, as well as our staff members, Randy Johnson
and Gary Vischer. Its enactment, like the unfunded mandate legislation
we will be considering later, will create a long-needed institutional
brake, a yellow flag, on the passage of requirements this institution
has too easily in the past imposed on employers. As importantly, the
bill will finally extend the same workplace protections enjoyed by
others to our own employees. Indeed, now that we are forced to comply
with these laws, we might even learn from experience and better
identify with the problems of
[[Page H264]] compliance endured by our constituents. In fact, I can
guarantee it. Proposals for future workplace requirements and reform of
existing laws will gather a lot closer attention by every Member of
this body after enactment of this legislation. And it's about time.
This bill, a product of compromise in negotiations between the House
and Senate, is not absolutely perfect, but it is a major step forward.
Indeed, the only shadow cast over today is that it took so long in
coming. As I have noted in the past, the hypocrisy of Congress in
exempting itself from the laws it imposes on others is so obvious that
one wonders how it so long escaped criticism, but I am gratified that
those of us who have long fought--particularly in my committee--for
strong congressional coverage with enforcement in the courts now have
ample company.
But others will also comment on the virtues of this legislation, so
let me set out, in the short time I have, a few general principles
which I hope will provide guidance for the new
Office of Compliance and the courts, to amplify the legislative
history developed in the Senate.

First, as questions concerning the constitutionality of the bill have
been, and will be, raised, I am submitting for the Record an April 10,
1991, analysis prepared by CRS at my request which concluded that
legislation allowing congressional employees to bring lawsuits in court
would likely be upheld and does not pose a serious constitutional
question. Second, where there is any doubt on the matter, the office
and the courts should apply the law in question as it is applied to
private sector employers. Third, where the case law is divided in
interpreting the relevant law, the Board and the courts should apply to
the Congress the most rigorous interpretations, not the least rigorous.
For example, where ambiguities in existing law have led some courts to
interpret a particular damage provision expansively, while others have
read that ambiguity in a more restrictive manner, the Board and the
courts should apply the former interpretation under this act. The
Congress should not be allowed to escape the problems created by its
own failure to draft laws properly and, perhaps, through this approach
we will be forced to revisit and clarify existing laws which, because
of a lack of clarity, are creating confusion and litigation.
Let me make a few, more specific points. Although the bill is not
entirely clear on this issue, the Board should be considered empowered
to issue regulations under section 201 relating to protections against
discrimination, subject, of course, to the general limitations on the
Board's regulatory authority. The power of hearing officers to dismiss
frivolous cases should be exercised only in the clearest situation
where there is absolutely no merit to the claim being brought and
assuming all relevant facts in favor of the employee. The counseling
required under title IV should be truly employee friendly, informative
but not coercive. Last, I expect that the protections for
confidentiality will apply only where expressly stated; thus, for
example, the report required under section 215 concerning the General
Counsel's inspection of congressional facilities for OSHA violations
would be made available to the public. We must not wrap proceedings
under this law in a vail of secrecy, for to do so would be to lose the
trust of the public.
Mr. Speaker, I would have included punitive damages and personal
liability to the list of available remedies but will not here press the
issue, for the legislation overall marks a giant step forward in
disciplining this institution--in forcing us to slow down and more
thoroughly consider the effect of the laws we impose on others, for now
we will have to live by those same laws. I believe that after all of us
are long gone, the positive impact of this initiative will remain.
Library of Congress,

Congressional Research Service,

Washington, DC, April 10, 1991.
To: Honorable William F. Goodling, attention: Randy Johnson.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Constitutionality of authorizing private causes of
actions by employees of Members of Congress against their
employers.
This memorandum is in response to your inquiry with regard
to whether the speech or debate clause of the Constitution,
or, perhaps, some other constitutional provision, would be
violated should Congress, in providing protections to
employees, either those working for individual Members and
for congressional committees or those working for the
institution, by forbidding discrimination of the basis of
race, color, sex, religion, or other prescribed grounds,
authorize the employees to sue in federal court for alleged
discrimination.
Implicated directly by any such proposal would indeed be
the speech or debate clause assurance that Members of
Congress ``shall not be questioned in any other Place'' for
things said or done in the legislative process. Article I,
Sec. 6, cl. 1. Additionally, a general separation of powers
issue might be raised. As we understand the likely proposal,
it would not include any authority for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, an executive branch agency, to police
the employment relations of the legislative branch, which
would in itself raise speech or debate and separation of
powers questions.
This issue has occasioned much debate in Congress and out
in recent years. It is not possible to make a definitive
determination on the basis of the constitutional text and its
history, structure, and purposes, and the judicial precedents
are not dispositive. However, the text as informed by the
interpretive judicial decisions does rather strongly suggest
that the courts would sustain the validity of the enactment
should Congress choose to take the step.
Although the following discussion is anchored in the
judicial precedents, one must begin by acknowledging that it
is the responsibility of each branch to make an independent
interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution and that,
while the decision in any particular instance may be
reviewable by the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, each
branch owes to the others a respect for the reading of the
Constitution developed in the court of governing. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). Even, therefore,
if the Supreme Court's decisions were more directly
declaratory of the law than they in fact are,
Congress in acting on any measure may proceed on a different
understanding of the metes and bounds of the Constitution.

Speech or Debate Clause

The speech or debate clause has a long lineage from the
struggles of Parliament with the Crown in England, United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966), and in our
scheme of things is designed to protect the independence and
integrity of the legislature and to reinforce the principle
of separation of powers. Ibid.; United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). The protection of the clause is not
limited to words spoken in debate. ``Committee reports,
resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered, as
are `things generally done in a session of the House by one
of its members in relation to the business before it.'''
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)). Thus, so
long as legislators are ``acting in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity,'' they are ``protected not only from
the consequence of litigation's results but also from the
burden of defending themselves.'' Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376-377 (1972).
Not only is the Member protected when the clause applies,
but his aides receive equal coverage. In Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-617 (1972), the Court accepted the
contentions urged on it by the Senate: ``that it is literally
impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern
legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in
session and matters of legislative concern constantly
proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their
legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants;
that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the
Members' performance that they must be treated as the
latters' alter ego; and that if they are not so recognized,
the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause * * * will
inevitably be diminished and frustrated.'' Therefore, the
Court held ``that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not
only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct
of the latter would be a protected legislative act if
performed by the Member himself.'' Id., 618. See also Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
But the scope of the meaning of ``legislative activity''
has its limits. ``The heart of the clause is speech or debate
in either House, and insofar as the clause is construed to
reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect
to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House.'' Gravel, supra, 408 U.S., 625. Immunity from civil
suit, both in law and equity, and from criminal action based
on the performance of legislative duties flows from a
determination that a challenged act is within the definition
of legislative activity. Gravel, for example, held that a
grand jury could validly inquire into the processes by which
a Member obtained classified information and into the
arrangements for subsequent private republication of these
documents, since neither action involved protected conduct,
id., 626, and republication by a Member of allegedly
defamatory remarks outside the legislative body, here through
newsletters and
press releases, was held unprotected, because it was not
essential to the
[[Page H265]] legislative process. Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
441 U.S. 111 (1979). In Doe v. McMillan, supra, the Court
held that Members and their aides were absolutely immune from
liability for conducting an investigation and preparing a
report, allegedly libelous, but that the Public Printer and
the Superintendent of Documents could be held liable for
distributing the report to the public beyond the channels of
communication within Congress. Id., 412 U.S., 320-324.
Thus, a Member is immune when he is ``acting in the sphere
of legitimate legislative activity.'' Tenney v. Brandhove,
supra, 341 U.S., 376-377. His aides and presumably others
acting at his direction are immune when he is. But when he
acts outside the legislative sphere, he is not immune and
neither are his aides or others directed by him. Doe v.
McMillan, supra, 315-316.

Are Employment Decisions Immunized by the Speech or Debate Clause?

It has been strongly contended that the employment
decisions of Members with respect to their aides, at least
with respect to those aides who are essential to the
performance of those legislative activities that are
protected by the clause, fall fully within the protection of
the speech or debate clause and ``shall not be questioned in
any other Place.'' As we will see, that position has support
in the case law, but a recent decision by the Supreme Court
suggests the conclusion that a Member's hiring and firing
practices are not legislative within the meaning of the
clause.
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), a divided Court
held that a female aide of a Member, discharged because the
Member preferred a male for the job, had a cause of action
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to sue
the Member for monetary damages.\1\ Because the lower court
had not passed on the contention that the speech or debate
clause precluded the suit, the Supreme Court declined to do
so at that stage. Id., 235-236 n. 11. The Court did hold
that, inasmuch as the clause embodied for Members of Congress
the concerns of the separation of powers doctrine for
purposes of immunity from suit, it was the only source of
immunity, not other principles of separation as well. Ibid.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting along with Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, argued that separation of powers in
combination with the speech or debate clause, both sharing
common roots, did not permit the suit to go forward, id.,
249, and Justice Stewart, dissenting, thought the speech or
debate clause issued was ``far from frivolous'' and would
have remanded so the court of appeals could decide it. Id.,
251.\2\
\1\In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court held that a person,
alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment search and seizure
protection, in the absence of a statutory remedial cause of
action, could sue the individual officers for damages under
an implied cause of action premised directly upon the
constitutional provision in question. Davis v. Passman
extended this ruling, by basing the implication of a cause of
action upon the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, which
contains an equal protection component, when the Federal
Government or someone acting under its authority performs an
allegedly discriminatory act.
\2\The case was settled after the Supreme Court remanded it
for further proceedings, and no speech or debate clause
resolution was reached.
In two decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit attempted to formulate a
standard to permit determination of applicability or
nonapplicability of the clause to congressional employment
decisions. The discharge of the manager of the House of
Representatives' restaurants was the issue of Walker v.
Jones, 733 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1036
(1984). Essentially, the court thought inquiry should focus
on whether an employee's duties could be viewed ``as work
that significantly informs or influences the shaping of our
nation's laws'' or whether an employee's duties were
``peculiar to a Congress member's work qua legislator,''
``intimately cognate . . . to the legislative process.'' Id.,
931. Under that standard, the clause did not apply to the
employee. In Browning v. Clerk, U.S. House of
Representatives, 789 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 479
U.S. 996 (1986), the discharge of an Official Reporter for
the House of Representatives was challenged. The court held
the congressional defendants to be immune under the speech or
debate clause. The standard was ``whether the employee's
duties were directly related to the due functioning of the
legislative process.'' Id., 929 (emphasis in original). If
the employee's duties are ``such that they are directly
assisting members of Congress in the `discharge of their
functions,' personnel decisions affecting them are
correspondingly legislative and shielded from judicial
scrutiny.'' Ibid.
Requiring reconsideration of this developing case law,
however, is Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988). The case
unanimously held that a state court judge did not have
judicial immunity in a suit for damages brought by a
probation officer whom he had fired. The Court explained that
in determining whether immunity attaches to a particular
official action it applies a ``functional'' approach. ``Under
that approach, we examine the nature of the functions with
which a particular official or class of officials has been
lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate the effect that
exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have
on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Officials who
seek exemption from personal liability have the burden of
showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding
considerations of public policy . . .'' Id., 224. Thus, it is
``the nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it, that inform[s] our immunity
analysis.'' Id., 229.
Judges have absolute immunity from liability for the
performance of judicial functions. Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. (80 U.S.) 335 (1872); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). But when a
judge acts in an administrative or a legislative capacity, he
enjoys no judicial immunity. In the Court's view, ``Judge
White was acting in an administrative capacity when he
demoted and discharged Forrester. Those acts . . . may have
been quite important in providing the necessary conditions of
a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however,
were not themselves
judicial or adjudicative.'' Supra, 484 U.S., 229. Employment
decisions, like many others, the Court continued, ``are
often crucial to the efficient operation of public
institutions,'' ibid., yet they are not entitled to
absolute immunity, ``even though they may be essential to
the very functioning of the courts* * *.'' Id., 228.
Forrester v. White was, of course, not a case governed by
the speech or debate clause; it was brought under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1983, which affords persons who have been denied their
constitutional rights under color of state law a cause of
action against state and local defendants. And, yet, the
Court has, when passing on questions of legislative immunity
in Sec. 1983 actions, looked to speech and debate principles,
emphasizing that the clause itself is but a part of the much
larger common-law principle of legislative freedom of speech.
Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 372-379; Supreme Court
of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980).
Indeed, the Court has said that ``we generally have equated
the legislative immunity to which state legislators are
entitled under Sec. 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under
the Constitution.'' Id., 733. See also Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-503, 505, 506
(1975); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85; United
States v. Johnson, supra, 383 U.S., 180. If, therefore,
Forrester v. White bears on the question of congressional
immunity for employment decisions, it strongly suggests that
for such decisions Members of Congress do not have immunity.
The D.C. Circuit in Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165 (D.C.Cir.
1989), has read Forrester to apply to legislative immunity
and has held that a legislator's employment decisions are not
entitled to legislative immunity. Gross, too, is a Sec. 1983
case brought against a member of the City Council of the
District of Columbia, but the court took the two previous
decisions in the Circuit, Walker and Browning, to have stated
the doctrinal standards, which must be modified in the light
of Forrester. See also Rateree v. Rockett, 852 F.2d 946, 950
(7th Cir. 1988)(dictum). The Gross court, however, reserved
the question ``whether special considerations applicable to
members of Congress, such as separation-of-powers concerns,
continue to justify the absolute immunity standard for
congressional personnel decisions adopted in Browning.''
Supra, 876 F.2d, 172.
Ambiguity on this point clouds any analysis of Forrester.
The Court observes at one point that it follows its
``functional'' approach in all cases, save for those that are
governed ``by express constitutional or statutory
enactment.'' Forrester v. White, supra, 484 U.S., 224.
Paramount of the express constitutional provisions, it then
notes, is the legislative immunity created by the speech or
debate clause. ``Even here, however, the Court has been
careful not to extend the scope of the protection further
than its purposes require.'' Ibid. The Court then refers to
Davis v. Passman, supra, for its holding that except for
speech or debate clause immunity, a Member of Congress may be
liable for his employment decisions. Ibid., But when, later
in the opinion, the Court observed that, no less than a
judge's ability to hire and fire employees as bearing on his
ability to carry out his judicial functions is the similar
ability of executive branch officials to hire and fire, and
executive officials have no such immunity as the judge was
claiming, the Court made no reference at all to employment
decisions by legislators. Id., 229.
Some conflicting lines of precedent thus exist. Staffs of
Members are so essential to the functioning of the
legislative process that under Gravel they are entitled to
the same speech or debate immunity that the Members have.
This suggests that the clause could very well protect the
Members' discretion in choosing to hire or to keep or not
keep any person they want on their staffs. At the same time,
the Forrester decision forecloses this mode of analysis for
judges (as well as those executive officers with some measure
of immunity). It is simply not relevant that the employee or
aide is essential to the execution of the official's function
or crucial to the efficient operation of his office. What is
relevant is whether the function for which the judge is being
questioned is judicial or adjudicative; if it is
administrative, or legislative, judicial immunity does not
attach.
Legislative immunity could be similarly analyzed. When the
Member is engaged in legislative activity, he and his
assisting aides are entitled to speech or debate immunity;
when the Member, or an aide deputized by him, is engaged in
an administrative function, such as hiring or firing staff,
neither has speech or debate immunity. The conceptual
difficulty is that in being ``careful not to extend the scope
of the protection
[[Page H266]] [of the speech or debate clause] further than
its purposes require,'' Forrester, 484 U.S., 224 the Court
has construed the application of the clause to depend upon
the connection of the acts challenged to the legislative
process. In the context of Gravel, the ``purposes'' served by
the clause required coverage of aides. But hiring and firing
an aide is not legislating, anymore than discharging the
probation officer was a judicial act of Judge White. A
tension exists here, but on the strength of Forrester, a
persuasive argument can be made that the speech or debate
clause does not encompass employment decisions.
In any event, certain employees of the institution, such as
the manager of the House of Representatives restaurant
involved in Walker v. Jones, supra, have only a tenuous
relationship to the legislative function. Under the
precedents preceding Forrester, it appears that Congress
could have provided a judicial remedy for them. Similarly,
not all personal aides of Members assist in the legislative
function as explicated by the Court. Some deal with
constituent relations; some do casework and other activities
with the executive branch and the like. Even if, therefore,
employment decisions concerning aides assisting the Member
exclusively in the legislative function were immune, the same
decisions with respect to other employees would not be.
Difficulties of application, it is safe to say, would be
great.
Certainly, an express decision made legislatively by
Congress that employment decisions of Members can be placed
outside coverage of the speech or debate clause would be a
determination by the body most familiar with the issue that
should be entitled to special deference by the courts when
they are called upon to pass on the question of the validity
of congressional coverage under an appropriate statute.
May Congress Waive Speech or Debate Immunity From Suit?

Even if it is eventually determined, either by Congress or
by the courts, that employment decisions are encompassed by
the clause, the validity of judicial cognizance of questions
arising from the relationship could still be defended on the
basis that Congress may waive the protection of the clause by
an express provision of law and give jurisdiction of an issue
to the courts. Absent clearly applicable case law, we can, at
this point, but speculate about how the Supreme Court might
eventually resolve the question.
Twice now, the Court has reserved the issue, in the context
of criminal prosecutions of Members. ``[W]ithout intimating
any view thereon, we expressly leave open for consideration
when the case arises a prosecution which * * * is founded
upon a narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress in the
exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of
its members.'' Johnson, supra, 383 U.S., 185. See also
Brewster, supra, 408 U.S., 529 n. 18. But in the latter case,
three dissenters reached the issue and would have ruled that
Congress may not authorize the courts to try Members for
conduct protected by the speech or debate clause. Id., 529,
540-549 (Justices Brennan and Douglas), 551, 562-563
(Justices White, Brennan, and Douglas). Both Johnson and
Brewster were criminal cases, the paradigmatic kind of
executive invasion of legislative privilege with which the
parliamentary proponents of legislative integrity and the
Framers were concerned. It may be that with respect to civil
cases, especially civil cases in which the plaintiff is a
private citizen, the concern is of a lesser nature, see Gross
v. Winter, supra, 876 F.2d, 172-173 n. 11, but the clause
clearly applies to both criminal and civil suits, and the
Court, with one exception not relevant in this context, has
indicated no difference of treatment based on the nature of
the cause of action. See Supreme Court of Virginia, supra,
446 U.S., 733 (noting United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360
(1980)).
Facially, the clause seems to make jurisdiction over
Members for conduct covered by the clause exclusive with the
respective House of each Member. That is, ``for any Speech or
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.'' That exclusivity is the necessary conclusion
from the plain language of the clause is hardly compelling.
It merits mention that Congress is given by the Constitution,
Article I, Sec. 5, cl 2, the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior and even to expel a Member by a two-
thirds vote of the respective House. This power to punish is
a complementary authority to speech or debate immunity,
inasmuch as the drive of the English Parliament for
legislative freedom included the successful assertion of the
power to punish members for offenses for which they were
immune to executive prosecution. Colonial and state
legislatures in this country and the Federal Congress all
claimed the same power as part of the same consideration. See
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 (1821); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188-199 (1957); United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-446 (1965); Powell v. McCormack,
supra, 395 U.S., 522-548. As the Court has observed,
Congress' power to punish Members, even to expulsion, is
quite broad, extending ``to all cases where the offence is
such as in the judgment of the Senate [and, no doubt, the
House of Representatives] is inconsistent with the trust and
duty of a
member.'' In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-670 (1897). In
exercising its powers under this grant of authority, the
Senate or the House of Representatives ``acts as a
judicial tribunal'' and its powers to adjudge ``is in no
wise inferior under like circumstances to that exercised
by a court of justice,'' Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).
In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906), a Senator
convicted for accepting money to influence an executive
department, conduct not protected by the speech or debate
clause, argued that the statute under which he was charged
conflicted with the provision of Article I, Sec. 5, cls. 1 &
2, making each House the sole judge of the qualifications of
its Members and giving each House the authority to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson,
supra, 103 U.S., 183 (The Constitution ``is not wholly silent
as to the authority of the separate branches of Congress to
inflict punishment. It authorizes each House to punish its
own members.'') (emphasis added). Rejecting the contention,
the Court observed: ``While the framers of the Constitution
intended that each Department should keep within its
appointed sphere of public action, it was never contemplated
that the authority of the Senate to admit to a seat in its
body one who had been duly elected as a Senator, or its power
to expel him after being admitted, should, in any degree,
limit or restrict the authority of Congress to enact such
statutes, not forbidden by the Constitution, as the public
interests required for carrying into effect the powers
granted to it. In order to promote the efficiency of the
public service and enforce integrity in the conduct of such
public affairs as are committed to the several Departments,
Congress, having a choice of means, may prescribe such
regulations to those ends as its wisdom may suggest, if they
be not forbidden by the fundamental law.'' Id., 202 U.S.,
367. That is, Congress, though the Senate had the power to
punish the Member itself, could enact legislation providing
for his trial in the courts of the United States.
Similarly, though each House has the power, pursuant to the
legislative power of inquiry, to punish contempts by
witnesses before it or one of its committees, Anderson v.
Dunn, supra; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294
U.S. 125 (1935), it may also provide for trial and punishment
before the federal courts. In 1857, because imprisonment
could extend no further than the adjournment of the House
which ordered it and because contempt trials before the bar
of the charging House were time consuming, Congress enacted a
statute providing for criminal process in the federal courts
with prescribed penalties for contempt of Congress. Act of
January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. With only minor
modifications, this statute is now 2 U.S.C. Sec. 192.
Holding that the purpose of this statute is merely
supplementary of the power retained by Congress, the Supreme
Court has rejected all constitutional challenges to it. ``We
grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either of its
Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for
contempt, in cases to which the power of either House
properly extended; but because Congress, by the Act of 1857,
sought to aid each of the Houses in the discharge of its
constitutional functions, it does not follow that any
delegation of the power in
each to punish for contempt was involved.'' In re Chapman,
supra, 166 U.S., 671-672.
The lesson of these cases is that Congress' power under
Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 18, to enact all laws which are
``necessary and proper'' to execute its powers, includes the
power to enact laws which implement and execute the powers of
each House to govern itself. Congress regularly, pursuant to
its authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings,''
enacts legislation binding both Houses to observance of
procedural and substantive matters. The Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, 60 Stat. 834, 84 Stat.
1175, contained extensive provisions affecting one House or
the other as well as both bodies, and the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, 99 Stat.
1037, made similar extensive provisions. Of course, each
House retained the power to make unilateral changes, pursuant
to the authorization to determine the rules of proceedings,
but as to the power to enact legislation for both Houses
there was no doubt.
Establishing that there is no necessary exclusivity simply
because the Constitution imposes a power or duty on Congress,
or on one House thereof, merely addresses one half of the
equation, however. The provisions discussed above involved
delegations or authorizations to each House, whereas the
speech or debate clause appears on its face to be directed to
the protection of the individual Senator or Representative.
It has been observed by the Court that ``[t]he immunities of
the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the
Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of
Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the
legislative process by insuring the independence of
individual legislators.'' United States v. Brewster, supra,
408 U.S., 507. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 103
U.S., 203.
Practice by the House of Representatives considers the
response of a Member to a subpoena or other legal process to
raise a question related to the dignity of the House and the
integrity of its proceedings. ``The rules and precedents of
the House require that no Member, official, staff member, or
employee of the House may, either voluntarily or in obedience
to a subpena, testify regarding official functions,
documents, or activities of the House without the consent of
the House
[[Page H267]] being first obtained.'' 3 Deschler's Precedents
of the United States House of Representatives, H. Doc. 94-661
(1979), ch. 11, Sec. 14. See In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Eilberg), 587 F.2d 589, 592-593 (3d Cir. 1978) (House
acquiescence to grand jury subpoena). This practice reflects
the institutional interest of the House in the protection of
the clause and might, without more, support enactment of
legislation based on Congress' necessary and proper power.
Personal interest, a purely individual interest divorced
from the institutional interest, in the protection of the
clause has also been recognized, though. In Coffin, v.
Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808), speaking of the Massachusetts
equivalent of the federal clause, Chief Justice Parsons said:
``In considering this article, it appears to me that the
privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the
house as an organized body, as of each individual member
composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even
against the declared will of the house. For he does not
hold this privilege at the pleasure of the house; but
derives it from the will of the people, expressed in the
constitution, which is paramount to the will of either or
both branches of the legisalture. In this respect the
privilege here secured resembles other privileges attached
to each member by another part of the constitution, by
which he is exempted from arrests on mesne (or original)
process, during his going to, returning from, or attending
the general court. Of these privileges, thus secured to
each member, he cannot be deprived, by a resolve of the
house, or by an act of the legislature.'' The significance
of this particular case is that the Supreme Court has
pronounced it to be perhaps ``the most authoritative case
in this country on the construction of the provision in
regard to freedom of debate in legislative bodies * * *.''
Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, 103 U.S., 204. See also
Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 373-374; United
States v. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S., 513-517. While the
Court has quoted these lines in a case only tangentially,
if that, relevant to the question, Spallone v. United
States, 110 S.Ct. 625, 634 (1990), its explanation of the
reasons underlining the clause gives weight to the
personal protection accorded individual Members as well as
to the institutional interest. Brewster, supra, 408 U.S.
501; Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, 341 U.S., 372-373.
To be sure, there were instances in English history in
which Parliament contrived to deny the protection of the
privilege to Members. For example, John Wilkes was denied his
parliamentary privilege and thereafter convicted in court for
seditious libel, Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395 U.S., 527-
531, but this case was such a cause celebre, here as well in
England, that adoption of its particular approach silently
into the speech or debate clause is unlikely, to say the
least.
It thus must be concluded that the power of Congress to
waive the clause by expressly making Members subject to
judicial process for covered conduct is unsettled. It is not,
however, foreclosed as a possibility, inasmuch as the
exclusivity argument has not been accepted in other contexts
involving Article I, Sec. Sec. 5 and 6. But the function of
the clause as a protection of institutional interests through
a protection of the individual legislators personal rights
does weigh considerably against the possibility of
institutional waiver. If Congress should enact a statute,
making the determination that it can waive, again the fact
that the body for whom the protections of the clause were
intended has reasoned that its institutional interests would
not be adversely affected by judicial exercise of the power
would doubtlessly be given substantial deference by the
courts. That the clause protects the individual interests of
each Member, even though in the long run the protection is to
further the institutional interest of the legislative body,
would perhaps require some balancing by the courts.
Acceptance of such a statute would appear, however, at this
stage, to be problematic.
One should note, however, that when the employment decision
is that of either the House of Representatives or the Senate,
as an institution, as in the employment of restaurant workers
elevator operators, and the like, or even of employees more
closely associated with the legislative process, such as the
Official Reporter before the court in Browning, the ability
to waive immunity against the institution might be more
easily answered.

Separation of Powers

Additionally, a general separation of powers issue may be
independently raised. It is true that in Davis v. Passman,
supra, 442 U.S., 228-229 n. 11, the Court stated that unless
the speech or debate clause protected Members, they were not
protected generally by the separation of powers doctrine. The
Gross v. Winter court did, however, pause to consider whether
an absolute immunity for Members making employment decisions
might be justified under the doctrine of separation of
powers, regardless of the inapplicability of the speech or
debate clause. Supra, 876 F.2d, 172.
Briefly, the Court has adopted in its separation of powers
decision-making a standard that evaluates whether there is
encroachment and aggrandizement. That is, does the action of
one branch toward another threaten to ``impermissibly
undermine'' the powers of the other or threaten to ``disrupt
the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by]
prevent[ing] the [branch acted upon] from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions.'' Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 693-696 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 380-384 (1989). See also United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U.S. 425, 422-443 (1977). Without intending to
treat the issue superficially, we must observe that Congress
has given the federal courts cognizance of employment
discrimination in the executive branch of the Federal
Government, and much litigation has ensued without
suggestions that this extension of employment discrimination
law has upset the balance of the separation of powers.
Therefore, by parity of concern, it would seem evident that
if the speech or debate clause is no impediment to judicial
causes of action for the employees of congressional Members,
the doctrine of separation of powers will present no barrier.

Congressional Instrumentalities
Whether a constitutional problem would arise from
application of employment discrimination laws, with judicial
remedies, to the instrumentalities of Congress\3\ is a
question that may be quickly disposed of. In the course of
its legislative provision of remedies against employment
discrimination, beginning in 1972, Congress has extended to
the Library of Congress and to those units in the legislative
branch which have positions in the competitive service the
guarantees and judicial remedies of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (as amended in 1972), 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2000e-16(b), and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (as amended in 1978), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633a(a). The
General Accounting Office, which is a legislative branch
agency for some purposes and an executive branch agency for
others,\4\ is covered by these two Acts and by the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.\5\ However, the Americans With
Disabilities Act of July 26, 1990, P.L. 101-336, Sec. 509(c),
104 Stat. 375, in applying the Act to these
instrumentalities, provided for administrative enforcement by
the agencies only.\6\
\3\For purposes of this memorandum, the instrumentalities of
Congress include the Architect of the Capitol, the
Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office,
the Government Printing Office, the Library of Congress, the
Office of Technology Assessment, and the United States
Botanic Garden. Americans With Disabilities Act of July 26,
1990, P.L. 101-336, Sec. 509(c)(4), 104 Stat. 375.
\4\See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
\5\These Acts apply to ``executive agencies'' as defined in 5
U.S.C. Sec. 105, which specifies that, for purposes of title
5, ``executive agency'' includes an ``independent
establishment,'' which in turn is defined by 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 104(2) to include GAO.
\6\The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104,
Sec. 16(c), 101st Congress, would have limited enforcement of
the Act and of Title VII to administrative enforcement within
each agency.
To be sure, some employees of some of these agencies in
working with Members and the staffs of Members certainly
participate in the legislative process in the sense of the
term that the Supreme Court has used in interpreting the
speech or debate clause. Employees of the Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress and of the
Congressional Budget Office do so participate, and there is
authority that for actions CRS employees, for instance, take
in the performance of the legislative function they are
immune under the speech or debate clause. See Webser v. Sun
Co., Inc., 561 F.Supp. 1184 (D.D.C. 1983), vacated and
remanded, 731 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir. 1984), on further appeal, 790
F.2d F.2d 157 (D.C.Cir. 1986). Other members of the Library
of Congress staff perform other functions not related to the
legislative process. See, e.g., Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579
F.2d 294, 298-301 (4th Cir. 1978)(position of Register of
Copyrights). Similarly, it is questionable that, for
instance, employees of the United States Botanic Garden
participate in the legislative function as defined by the
Supreme Court.
If Congress should adopt the reasoning of an earlier
portion of the memorandum to the effect that employment
decisions are administrative functions not so inextricably
tied to the legislative function as to implicate the speech
or debate clause, the issue is easily settled. But even if
the personal staffs of Members, or at least the legislative
affairs employees of the Members' personal staffs, are
determined to be covered by the speech or debate clause that
they may not be authorized to seek judicial relief for
proscribed practices, it does not follow that the employees
of congressional instrumentalities are likewise covered.
Those who do not assist Members in the carrying out of their
legislative responsibilities would seem clearly to be outside
the scope of the clause. Those who do assist Members in the
carrying out of their legislative responsibilities may well
be immune for their actions while so assisting, but what is
the legislative function of the employment decisions of the
agencies who hire, fire, and oversee their employment that
gives those decisions legislative immunity?
A more compelling reason exists for doubting that the
clause would require that employees of these agencies be
remitted to purely administrative remedies. The speech or
debate clause provides that for their performance of their
legislative functions the Members of Congress are not to be
questioned in any other place. A challenge to an agency
decision respecting the employment rights of an employee
would be a suit against the agency. The Library of Congress
or the Government Printing Office would be sued, not a Member
or Members, not the House of Representatives or the Senate.
There is no facile attempt at word play in this distinction.
[[Page H268]]
Thus, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, although Congress
could not be sued for ordering the arrest of Kilbourn, nor
could any Member be sued for voting for the resolution, the
Sergeant at Arms who carried out the legislative directive to
take Kilbourn into custody was suable and liable. In Doe v.
McMillan, supra, neither the Members nor the committee staff
who carried out the investigation and the subsequent
preparation and publication of the report on the
investigation could be sued, but the two officers, the Public
Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, who carried out
the congressional directive to distribute the report outside
Congress were suable. In Powell v. McCormack, supra, 395
U.S., 503-506, the Court held that it was proper to name
several officers and employees of the House of
Representatives as defendants in order that the act of the
House in excluding the Member-elect could be challenged.
That Members of Congress are immune for the act of voting
for a measure that may be unconstitutional does not mean that
the enacted measure may not be challenged in court, such as
by suing one charged with its enforcement for a declaration
of invalidity. Congressional actions may be challenged, even
if the congressional actors may not be. See e.g., Powell v.
McCormack, supra. Thus, it would seem to follow that the
actions of a legislative agency proceeding under general
congressional direction could be challenged without
implicating the strictures of the speech or debate clause. At
the least, with the existence of an enacted policy against
employment discrimination, the employing agency would, at the
least, be acting ultra vires were it to make decisions on the
prohibited grounds.

Conclusion

First, application to Congress of the employment protection
provisions of federal civil rights laws, at least in the
context of authorizing judicial remedies, could raise
problems under the speech or debate clause. Under one
possible analysis, some employees would be sufficiently
removed from the legislative process so that decisions about
them may well not implicate the clause at all, whereas other
employees are so integral to the legislative process that
their employment would be covered. But if the Supreme Court's
Forrester decision provides the appropriate mode of analysis,
an employment decision of a Member with respect to all staff
would be an administrative decision not entitled to speech or
debate clause protection. Especially if Congress should
conclude that Forrester is the correct analysis, in the
course of extending the laws, it seems likely that the courts
may well defer to that determination.
Second, if it is concluded that the speech or debate clause
applies to the employment decisions of Members, an argument
exists that Congress may expressly waive the protection and
subject Members to suit. Little actual authority exists for
the proposition, but there is little on the other side
either. The matter is largely one of deductions from basic
principles and analogies. But the argument from general
principles in favor of waiver is significantly weaker than
the argument that the clause does not apply in the first
place.
Third, it would appear that regardless of the conclusion
with respect to the personal staffs of Members, the employees
of a number of agencies associated with Congress would be
sufficiently removed from the legislative process that the
clause would not apply. With respect to other such employees,
who are more involved in the legislative process, the fact
that the employment decisions are made by the agencies
themselves and not by Congress or an individual Member could
bring the decisions outside the scope of the clause.

Johnny H. Killian,

Senior Specialist,
American Constitutional Law.

{time} 1140

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today with mixed feelings. On the one hand, I
want to tell the House I am pleased that the House is moving forward on
legislation we have been working on for many years only to see it
thwarted, frankly, in the Senate by Republican politics. Yet today in a
bipartisan fashion we are on the floor in what will hopefully be the
final stages in this legislative drama.
However, the legislation before us today is new to the House.
Although this bill has been the subject of extensive debate in the
Senate, it has not had one hearing in the U.S. House of
Representatives. The American public, I am told today in a 1-minute,
voted for reform, voted to open up this institution, and voted for
democratization in debate and extensive analysis of programs. There was
not one hearing in the House of Representatives during the 104th
Congress on this bill.
It was first brought up on this floor just 13 days ago in a different
form under a completely closed rule. Today a new version is before us,
with little if any opportunity for review and no chance for amendment.
If this is the new wind blowing through the House of Representatives,
then it is a wind that blows little good.
H.R. 1 was the first piece of legislation to move through the new
House of Representatives. It did so under a process in which no Member
could suggest changes. Today it is back, as I have said, in a new
version. It is again brought to the floor of this House under a
completely closed process.
This should be, in my opinion, Mr. Speaker, a day of pride for this
House. It should be a day of joy, but instead it is a day of sadness
for a Congress that started out with such anticipation of a new day.
Instead, on day 6 of the 104th Congress we can clearly declare power
and muscle are the rule of order of this House, not the rule of
democracy.
Having said that, having expressed the concern of this side of the
aisle about the process, let me talk about the substance. S. 2, as I
said, will finally bring into place a process which many of us fought
for for a long time. It will provide protection and antidiscrimination
laws to congressional employees and employees of other legislative-
branch agencies. My good friend, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.
Shays], a Republican, has been a leader in this effort with Mr. Swett,
a Democrat from New Hampshire. Mr. Shays is to be commended for his
tenacity, for his courage in the light of stiff opposition from time to
time, and for his tireless efforts in bringing this bill before us
today. He has performed a service for this House and for this country.
I believe that S. 2 is an improvement, very frankly, over the House
bill. S. 2 spells out the rights, protections, remedies, and procedures
provided to congressional employees. The bill establishes an
independent nonpartisan Office of Compliance to develop the regulations
applying the laws to Congress and to resolve complaints. It will be
composed of a five-member board of directors whose board is selected on
a bipartisan, bicameral basis similar to the old rules for the House
administrative officer. Former Members of Congress and current staff
are prohibited from serving on the board. No Member of the House or
Senate nor any House or Senate employee can serve as hearing officer on
a complaint.
Most importantly, any party aggrieved by a board decision can seek
judicial review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and employees can bring suit directly in Federal district court after
mediation and counseling if that is allowed under the applicable
statute. This is an important new right for congressional employees,
and I am pleased that we are finally moving forward on this effort.

{time} 1150

This is an important new right for congressional employees. I am
pleased that we are finally moving forward on this effort.
As I have said on the floor, Mr. Speaker, many times, of all the talk
of reform, of all the speechifying, the one reform that my
constituents, and I gainsay every representative's constituents, have
always asked for, and the one reform that I have always thought was
justified and real, this is it, covering Congress by the same laws we
ask others to live under.
Congress should live under the laws it passes, and, my colleagues, in
most cases, civil rights, the ADA, fair labor standards, family and
medical leave, to name a few, it has, let me repeat that, this House
has lived under those statutes. S. 2, however, improves congressional
coverage and provides an outside remedy for employees, a critical
addition to present protections.
This is a change whose time has not only come but is overdue. I am
proud to be on the floor today with the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.
Shays] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] and others, and
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], Members on our side. I
regret that Mr. Sweet is not here because he fought very hard. And
through his leadership and that of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.
Shays], this similar legislation passed the House, as I said earlier,
and was killed in the Senate.

I would urge today my colleagues to support this legislation in spite
of the heavy-handed procedural railroad on
[[Page H269]] which this bill comes to the floor today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The gentleman from Maryland indicates that the bill that we have
before us has not had a single hearing on the House side. Yet he
commends its content to be superior than the bill that we examined on
the House side.
The chairman of the Committee on Economic and Educational
Opportunities lamented the fact that it has taken us so long to get
here. I think it might be useful for a minute or two to visit the
chronology of how we got here today.
Way back on July 28, 1994, the Committee on House Administration
voted 19 to 0 to pass essentially what we have in front of us onto the
House, with the hope that in July, having moved out of committee, by
the end of the second session of the 103d Congress, this would have
passed the House and the Senate and moved to the President for his
signature.
As Members will recall, very little went through the entire
legislative process in the 103d Congress, and this is one of them.
It is true that on August 10, the House voted 427 to 4 to adopt what
is essentially in the measure that we have today. There were four
Members of the minority, then the majority, who voted against it.
Having sent that position over to the Senate and the Senate's failure
to consider the position, on October 7, the House decided to take it
upon itself to impose the structure of what would have been legislation
on the House through the rules process.
At that time the vote was 348 to 3. The three votes in opposition to
the measure were clearly not substantive opposition. The Members on our
side of the aisle were in fact protesting the failure of the then
majority to move any significant reforms in the 103d Congress.
Notwithstanding that, we imposed this on ourselves through the House
rules.
The only substantive difference in S. 2 from H.R. 1, I believe, is
the addition of the Veterans Reemployment Act to the list of bills
under which Congress will now operate. In addition to that, we were
able to work out the very real concerns of the Senate over a single
shared structure so that the Office of Compliance would fit the needs
of the House and the Senate with our different size and procedures,
history and tradition. That has been resolved in this bill.
So we stand on the brink of living up to what this majority said we
were going to do in the contract and on January 4.
I think it is interesting to note that this House voted out of
committee, on July 28, 1994, in essence this measure. On August 10,
1994, it was voted out of the House and nothing happened. In this
Congress, in the 104th Congress, Republicans and Democrats joining
together on the opening day of the session, 429 to 0, passed this
measure. And then here today, despite the rhetoric, I think Members
will find the votes will once again be overwhelmingly in favor of
Congress placing itself under the laws that the rest of the Nation has
to live with.
We will do it in a timeframe that is certainly appropriate. The
timeframe should have been honored in the 103d. The then majority could
not deliver. The timeframe is being honored in the 104th, and the
current majority will deliver.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOYER, Mr. Speaker, just to review history for 1 second, this
legislation passed the House in August 1993. It was because of
Republican opposition to procedure in the Senate that it failed to go
forward.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes and 30 seconds to my good friend, the
gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett].
Mr. BARRETT of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, this is an important bill, and
I am proud to be a cosponsor of this bill as it passes the House of
Representatives today. Although I am happy that the bill is passing,
because I think it sets an important precedent, at the same time it
sets a very embarrassing and disappointing precedent. Let me explain.
When this bill was considered by the Congress in the 103d Congress,
it included not only the language that we have in the bill today, but
it also prohibited Members of the House of Representatives from using
frequent-flier miles that they have accrued for official use,
prohibited them from being used for personal use. This is the type of
reform that Americans think is common sense. Of course, no Member of
Congress should be able to use the miles that he or she has accrued
with taxpayer dollars, be allowed to accrue those miles and use them
for personal use.
When it passed the 103d Congress, no one batted an eyelash. No calls
of germaneness were made. It was included in the provisions of the
bill. But when we got to the floor in the 104th Congress, there was a
gag rule in effect. This provision, which was included in the bill last
year, was not included this year. It was gagged, and we were not
permitted to bring it as an amendment.
The Senate looked at it a little differently. And the Senate decided
that it made sense. It made sense for the Senate to prohibit its
Members from using frequent-flier miles for personal use. But out of
respect for this Chamber, it decided that it would not impose the same
law on the House of Representatives.
So the irony we are faced with today is that we have a law based on
the premise, a good premise, which I support, which says that any law
that applies to members of the general population should also apply to
Members of Congress.
That is a step forward, But at the same time, for the first time that
I can discover in the history of this country, we are going to pass a
law that says that a law that applies to the Members of the U.S. Senate
does not apply to the Members of the House of Representatives.
Why are we doing that? Why do we have a higher standard for the
Members of the U.S. Senate than we do for the Members of the U.S. House
of Representatives?
I would argue that the reason we do is because the new leadership
does not want to have a higher standard for the Members of the House of
Representatives. In fact, the new Speaker has labeled this reform a
Mickey Mouse reform, a Mickey Mouse reform to save taxpayers hundreds
of thousands of dollars. Well, I think the Speaker is correct in
drawing on Walt Disney for his analogy, but I think a more apt
character to draw on would be Goofy, because it is simply goofy to
argue that Members of the House of Representatives can use taxpayer-
funded travel to accrue frequent-flier miles and use them for personal
vacations to Florida, Hawaii, France, anywhere in the world.
{time} 1200

The very first piece of legislation that will become law after the
Republicans have gained control of the House in 40 years is going to
set a lower standard of conduct for the Members of the House of
Representatives than the U.S. Senate. I will vote for this bill because
I agree with the underlying premise of the main portion of the bill,
but it is embarrassing and disappointing with the precedent we are
setting today.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would tell the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett]
that we are in the process of reviewing all of the rules and
regulations in the House of Representatives, and at the end of the last
Congress we committed to review all of them, including these.
Perhaps from a historical point of view the gentleman from Wisconsin
also needs to know that rather than this being the first time in the
history that the laws applied differently to the House and Senate, he
needs to know that there was a period of time in which the actual
compensation to Members of the Senate and the House was different under
the law.
Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], one Member who was more responsible than
anyone in the House today for this being in front of us.
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Speaker, I want to just say very clearly that this is
no one person's bill. I mean that very sincerely, because in fact there
are more
[[Page H270]] fingerprints on this bill from Members of both sides of
the aisle.
I would like to take this time first to thank the gentleman from
Maryland Steny Hoyer, for stepping in and taking the place of Dick
Swett, who was not returned to office, who has worked on the Democratic
side with me working on the Republican side, on this issue, and to
thank him and his staff for doing such an excellent job in helping to
draft this legislation and the legislation that passed the House
earlier in this session.
Also I would thank both the chairman of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight and to the new empowerment committee, both the
gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] and the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Goodling], because they have been working on this
issue for years and years and years.
Without their work, and particularly, with no disrespect to the
Members, but their extraordinary staff, who have weighed in
tremendously on this issue, have had an amazing contribution.
I see the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], as well, who over
a year ago said to me that he had a conversation with the former
Speaker encouraging him to move forward with congressional
accountability, and that, frankly, was the major movement that brought
this bill forward. Without the effort of the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], done behind the scenes, without a lot of
credit, this bill also would not move forward, so I think I need to
thank the prior Speaker, and thank the present Speaker for working on
this issue.
In a summary form, and I would like to then just briefly touch on the
concern of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barrett], because it is
valid, I would like to just make the point that when we passed our
House congressional accountability last year, the strength of the
legislation was that we applied all of the laws we imposed on the
private sector onto Congress, and that we applied all the
instrumentalities that are part of what makes up Congress: the Library
of Congress, the GAO, the Architect's Office, and so on. Additionally,
very importantly, we gave people full access to the court, with all the
rights of going to civil action, de novo
review, as well as being able to have judicial review.

That was the strength of what we did. We also set up this Office of
Compliance so that we dealt with the separation of powers, but gave
this Office of Compliance independence.
The weakness in our bill, if there was a weakness, was that we did it
by regulation, in that we asked the Office of Compliance to then get us
under all the laws by regulation, rather than by law, even though in
the end we saw we are under the law, but the actual process was going
to be determined by the Office of Compliance through regulation. So the
strength was all the laws, all the instrumentalities, full access to
the court, but we did it by regulation.
The Senate last year passed legislation on congressional
accountability, admittedly very late, and ultimately it never even had
a debate on the floor of the Senate; but what they did was, they did
not include all the laws, all the instrumentalities, or give full
access to court in their legislation. That was the weakness of their
legislation. The strength was they went directly to law.
So after this, the defeat, or actually the failure of the Senate to
deal with this issue, Republicans and Democrats in both Chambers got
together to say what could we do to get the strength of the Senate bill
and the strength of the House bill, and we actually did what I think
you have a sense of, what I have spoken to already.
We took all the laws, all the instrumentalities, full access to the
court, the House version, took the language of the Senate going fully
to law, rather than regulation, and put them together. That is the bill
we have before us.
Mr. Speaker, this is a bill that clearly has the support of most
Members of Congress. It is one of those odd occasions when the House
and Senate get together, and instead of taking the weaknesses of their
two bills, took the strengths of their two bills.
But addressing the point made by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr.
Barrett] about frequent flyer mileage, I am partly, if not totally,
responsible for the fact that it is not part of this legislation, and
it is not part of this legislation because frequent flyer is not
connected to the issues that were central to the whole concept.
What applies to the private sector should apply to us, and frequent
flyer did not match that test. It is an important issue. It is an issue
that I think will be dealt with either by the House Oversight
Committee, or actually by a law of Congress, and I believe the
gentleman will be dealt with because of his tenacity and his conviction
that it is important.
This day and age, in this Congress, as we go through this process,
the gentleman will find, notwithstanding the opening day, there will be
open rule. He will be able to offer this amendment countless times on
germaneness, and I believe that it will be passed by this Chamber, if
it is not dealt with sooner by one of the committees of Congress.
Frequent flyer should not be used to go on vacations. I totally agree
with the gentleman. I have signed onto the gentleman's resolution and
told him I agree with him. I understand his point on this legislation,
because there appears to be certainly a contrast. The Senate has it in
theirs and we do not have it in ours.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Traficiant].
(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, I want to talk about some headlines we
have not read dealing with security of Members of Congress and the
Senate and the White House, able services provided by our Capitol
Police.
Mr. Speaker, I want to stand in support of this bill, because for the
first time we have an opportunity to treat our Capitol Police like
every other Federal law enforcement agency, giving them the right to
have a collective bargaining opportunity.
The morale in the department is a joke. There has been age
discrimination, race discrimination, sex discrimination, and quite
frankly, I brought it to the attention, time after time, of the former
Democrat leadership, and they did nothing with it.
However, let me say this about this bill, it allows for a 2-year
period before the Capitol Police is allowed to in fact bargain in good
faith like this under the collective bargaining agreement. I plan to
write to the Speaker, and I ask Members to join with me, that that be
waived and the Capitol Police be treated like every other Federal law
enforcement agency in our country.
This is an indictment on the Congress of the United States of
America. I want to say again, think of the headlines we could have read
that we have not read. Good men and women, not patronage positions
anymore, but well-trained, who put their lives on the line every day
and deal with some real security problems, have been treated as second-
class citizens.
I am going to support this bill. I am going to write to the Speaker.
I am gong to ask Members to join forces with me and sign on to that
letter, that that 2-year period holding back that opportunity that is
granted in this bill be waived, and there be an immediate
implementation of that opportunity for the Capitol Police when this is
enacted.
All this talk about the Senate, quite frankly, in the first
Constitution the Senate was appointed by State legislators, and
actually I thought it was better for the country. We would have had
somebody looking out for the States' rights, and we would not have had
a 50-percent fast track vote on GATT and NAFTA.
For all those concerned about the Senate, I agree with the gentleman
from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], that I think we can take care of those
inequities. I am sure that is not the intention of the gentleman from
Connecticut and others.
I ask that Members support me in helping the Capitol Police. They
have earned it. They have deserved it. I ask the gentleman from
California [Mr. Thomas] to give me a hand with that.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
[[Page H271]] Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased
that we are moving forward with this bill, and I appreciate the
generosity of the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays], who has been
the major force behind it. I was glad to be able to work with him.
I was pleased that he also graciously mentioned, as I have said
before, the former Speaker of this body, who did move it after he was
persuaded that it was the right thing to do.
However, I am troubled by some aspects of it. This bill that we
passed last year was totally bipartisan. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr.
Traficant] who preceded me talked about a problem in the bill.
I do not see any reason why the law enforcement people ought to have
to wait 2 years. The problem is that we were not able to address it,
because at no point has this bill been subject to amendment on the
floor of the House. There is no reason for that.
{time} 1210

We are told that we should compare the way the House is going to be
run now with the way it was run.
This bill came to the floor in August of last year. As the gentleman
from California pointed out, the bill passed the committee in July, it
very soon thereafter came to the floor, and 14 amendments were made in
order. Indeed, I know of no one who had an amendment who was turned
away. Eight of those amendments allowed either exclusively or jointly
Republican authors.
We had a bill that allowed 14 amendments and I know of no one who was
turned down. This year it has twice come to the floor in a nonamendable
fashion and it has flaws. One of those flaws is the frequent-flier
mileage.
The gentleman from Connecticut says that it does not fit because this
only applies to the private sector. But the private sector is not
covered by the Freedom of Information Act. There is language in here
that studies how to apply the Freedom of Information Act to Congress. I
think we are going to find that it does not work. I am told by the
gentleman from Maryland that was dropped. But it was in the bill when
it came out of the house.
The fact is that the longer we delay on frequent-flier miles, the
more Members of Congress will use frequent-flier miles in a way they
should not do them and the taxpayer will be cheated of those frequent-
flier miles.
The House voted on this last year. Because we did bring it forward in
an open amendatory process, the gentlewoman's offering amendment was
adopted.
There is no reason to allow this to continue, the frequent-flier
abuse, other than an apparent quirk on the part of the Speaker.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
West Virginia [Mr. Wise].
Mr. WISE. I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this legislation. I
introduced a bill a number of years ago called ``what's good for the
goose is good for the gander'' which had exactly this same attitude
toward it.
Let us talk, though, about the principle by which it comes which is
of some concern. We are all delighted it is here, we are all going to
vote for it.
There has been talk about muscle. I just wish there had been a little
less muscle applied to this bill and a little more deliberation--it
would have gotten to the same point probably almost as quickly--and a
little more muscle last year when this bill passed the House, at least
once, I believe twice, went over to the Senate where it died on
Republican filibusters. So we could have, I think accommodated those
needs.
I also regret, though, that when this bill came up on the House floor
just a week ago, it was not made in order to allow an amendment to it
or add the accompanying bill which has passed this House at least once,
and I believe twice, which is lobby reform, to apply to Members of
Congress the lobbying reform that is so important, as applying the
rules concerning the private sector with employees.
Why could we have not also passed since it had already passed using
the same principle that has been enunciated that if you took it up last
year, you ought to be able to take it up without a hearing, ram it
through this year, why could we have not taken up the lobbying reform
bill in the same capacity? All those questions hang out there.
At any rate, I rise in strong support for this legislation.
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland [Mr. Bartlett].
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, when the average American
learns that Congress does not have to live under all of the laws and
regulations that all of our citizens live under, they are appalled.
They understand how difficult it is for a Congress to effectively
legislate when they live isolated from the effects of the laws and the
regulations that those laws produce.
At the first day of the last Congress, I submitted legislation that
would apply to Congress all the laws and the regulations that they have
applied to all of the rest of us and exempted themselves from. Several
others submitted similar legislation. They were all combined in the
Shays-Swett bill which passed the last Congress. Unfortunately, that
died because of lack of action by the Senate.
So I was very pleased when at about 2 in the morning on the first
long legislative day of this Congress that we passed that bill. We are
now met today to discuss a bill from the Senate that embodies all of
the essential features of the bill that we passed in the last Congress
and again on that first long day of this Congress.
I am very pleased to rise in strong support of this bill. This is a
great victory for the American people, because what it means is that
from henceforth they are going to have a Congress that lives under the
laws and the regulations that they passed, that all of the rest of the
country has to live under, and the Congress is going to be much more
effective in passing laws and in producing regulations through those
laws when they have to live under all of the laws and regulations that
they produce.
This bill does not do all that we need to do in reforming the
Congress and producing congressional reliability but it certainly takes
the first long, long step in the right direction.
I am very pleased today to rise in strong support of this
legislation.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from
Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
(Ms. JACKSON-LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Ms. JACKSON-LEE. Mr. Speaker, one thing that a new Member is clear to
do and that is to do her homework. I guess in doing my homework, even
though just starting in the 104th Congress, I realize it was the
Democratic Congress that raised this issue of congressional
accountability for a number of terms, particularly in the last
Congress, and I think it is very important to indicate how important
this measure is but to indicate as well that the Democrats led out on
this issue.
It is important to realize that we too must follow the laws of the
land of the United States of America.
Calling the roll, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII, the
Americans With Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination, Family and Medical
Leave, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Federal Labor Management
Relations Act, Employee Polygraph Protection Act, Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification.
As a local elected official there was no doubt that we had to comply
with all those laws. They why not the U.S. Congress? I am certainly
rising in support of this, but I ask clearly as we move toward making a
determination by way of a vote that we too should be able to comply
with the laws on frequent-flier miles.
I ask that we really raise that issue, that we realize that we must
be truthful in what we do here in the U.S. Congress, and that we go all
the way when we talk about congressional accountability.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from the
District of Columbia [Ms. Norton].
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I have a special interest in this bill as a
former member of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. I
want to
[[Page H272]] commend the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] for
his tenacity on this bipartisan matter and to give the House credit for
what it did last term in passing this bill and the Senate, finally,
credit for catching up with the House.
Mr. Speaker, this bill, to be sure, affects Members. When I chaired
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, what really bothered me
was that thousands of employees here were also exempted, and that is
really what the gravemen of this bill is. It should affect Members, but
where the complaints are going to be filed most often are against staff
who supervise others.
There is an important difference in this bill from legislation
affecting the private sector. The Senate has removed the demographic
section. I want Members to know that every private and public employer
has to submit demographics on its employees. The House should remove
this notion that it is exempt from our knowing whether or not we are in
fact hiring fairly in committees.
Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt].
Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I intend to vote for this
bill, but the American people should note that there is nobody who has
gotten on the floor today who has not expressed some reservation about
the content of this bill. The reason for that is the process by which
this bill is here. In that sense, it is business as usual and the
American people ought to know that it is business as usual.
We come here without the ability to amend this bill even though as
soon as this bill is debated, we will be off for the rest of the day.
Last week we were in committee debating a balanced budget amendment and
marking it up. At the end of the day, at 6, despite the fact that it
was Wednesday afternoon and we were going home, we adjourned for the
day. Still we cannot take the time to debate these issues that are
important to the American people.

{time} 1220

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself my remaining 30 seconds.
Mr. Speaker, clearly we have a concern about the procedure, but more
importantly than the procedure is the substance. The gentlewoman from
the District of Columbia mentioned we are now extending to all our
employees protections that we believe are appropriate for the employees
of the American employers.
We believe this legislation is important. That is why under
Democratic leadership we passed it last year, with the Shays-Swett
bill, and that is why on this bill the overwhelming majority, if not
unanimously, we will support this bill this year.
Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, I yield my remaining time to the gentleman
from California [Mr. Thomas].
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Dreier). The gentleman from California
[Mr. Thomas] is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Speaker, we began this process on January 4 and we moved the
legislation to the Senate. We are considering today, on January 17,
Senate bill 2, the Senate version of this legislation.
There will be no conference committee. This legislation will move
directly to the President. The President has said that he will sign it
into law. This process has taken 2 weeks.
For people to fully understand the impact or maybe I should say the
weight of today's decision, this is simply the text of the laws,
without any annotation or explanation, that are now going to be applied
to the Congress that are already applied to the private sector.
I would tell my colleagues that S. 2 passed in the Senate 89 to 1. I
believe the House should do the Senate one better. I would ask that the
House pass S. 2.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it has long been known that Congress has a bad
habit of passing laws without understanding the full impact they have
on the American public--then it exempts itself from those same laws. In
the 102d and 103d Congresses, I introduced a resolution to eliminate
the special treatment that this institution has granted itself. Last
Congress, I voted in favor of the Congressional Accountability Act
which the House passed--but the Senate failed to approve.
During the final hours before adjournment of the 103d Congress, the
House passed a watered-down version of the compliance bill as an
amendment to the rules of the House. Although I am a strong advocate of
congressional compliance, I felt compelled to vote against that weak-
kneed resolution--which, to me, was nothing more than status quo
dressed up to look like reform. Today we have an opportunity to move
forward with real reform. I support S. 2, the Congressional
Accountability Act, and I intend to vote for it. Congress is not, and
should not be, above the law. It is time to move this institution into
the real world of the laws that we expect the private sector to abide
by.
Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I am a strong supporter of S. 2, the
Congressional Accountability Act. Unfortunately, I will not be present
today to vote for this important measure--I am attending to the urgent
needs of communities in my district that have been devastated by the
recent flooding in northern California. If I were here, I would be
proud to vote for the Congressional Accountability Act for the third
time. In my absence, I submit this statement of support for the bill
for the Record.
S. 2 fulfills our responsibility to grant the same protections and
workplace standards that all other working Americans enjoy to our own
employees in Congress. The Congressional Accountability Act continues
the recent trend of Congress living by the rules we ask the rest of
America to live by.
In recent years, we have enacted several major employee protection
laws--the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and the Family and Medical Leave Act. In each case, we applied the
requirements of these laws to Congress just like they applied to the
private sector. In addition, House rules provide House employees with
protections afforded under the Fair Labor Standards Act and specify
that House personnel actions shall be made ``free from discrimination
based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including marital
or parental status), disability, or age.''
S. 2 continues our efforts to bring Congress into compliance with
other significant employee protection statutes. The Congressional
Accountability Act will also require Congress to comply with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Federal Labor Management
Relations Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
This legislation establishes an independent, nonpartisan Office of
Compliance within the legislative branch to develop the regulations
applying laws to Congress, and to resolve complaints. The Office, which
would replace the existing House and Senate Offices of Fair Employment
Practices, would be composed of a five-member Board of Directors, an
Executive Director, a General Counsel, two Deputy Directors, and
additional staff as may be required.
This act represents a positive change in how Congress treats its own
employees. I strongly support this legislation and urge my colleagues
to vote for this landmark congressional reform bill.
Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of S. 2, the Congressional
Accountability Act. It is high time that laws applied to the private
sector workplace are made applicable to Congress as well. As chairman
of the House Veterans' Affairs Committee, I am particularly pleased
that S. 2 would provide for the enforcement of recently enacted
veterans' employment and reemployment rights under Public Law 103-353
(October 13, 1994).
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
[USERRA] only allows aggrieved legislative branch employees the remedy
of applying to the Office of Personnel Management [OPM] for a position
in the executive branch, with an ensured offer of employment. Executive
branch employees under USERRA have extensive enforcement rights
including legal representation, Merit Systems Protection Board [MSPB]
adjudication, and judicial review.
Now, under title II, section 206 of S. 2, eligible congressional
employees could avail themselves of the extensive enforcement and
dispute resolution procedures established in the new Office of
Compliance, as well as judicial review.
Mr. Speaker, I am also pleased to see that the bill would require a
study and recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the
application of the workplace laws included in S. 2 to the General
Accounting Office [GAO], Government Printing Office [GPO], and the
Library of Congress. The study and recommendations would be due to the
[[Page H273]] Speaker of the House no later than December 31, 1996.
I commend Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Armey for keeping
their commitment to the American people in making the Accountability
Act the first order of business of the House with H.R. 1. The Senate
has added provisions in its version, S. 2. I especially wish to state
my appreciation to Mr. Shays, who has led the House's effort on
accountability, as well as to his staff for their openness and
accessibility in crafting this legislation. Mr. Speaker, I urge my
colleagues to favorably consider S. 2.
Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to commend the majority leadership
for bringing this bill, S. 2, the Senate version of the Congressional
Accountability Act, which the House passed on January 4, to the floor
today. Consideration of this legislation can be directly traced to you
and the new leadership in Congress who were committed to place this
long overdue type of legislation on the front burner.
This bill, however, is far from perfect. And the full specifics as to
the exact manner in which the eleven ``place of employment'' labor laws
shall be applied to congressional employers do not, in many cases,
correspond to the manner in which these laws apply to the private
sector. In certain instances this is understandable, as in cases where
the constitutional requirement of separation of powers proscribes
executive agency enforcement of rules against the legislative branch.
But, all in all, the fox--Congress--is still very much in charge of the
chicken coop--employer and employee place of employment laws--and
clearly Members of Congress are being treated in many instances with
kid gloves when one looks at the matter from the perspective of the
private sector.
For example, our private sector constituents would jump at the
opportunity to live under the requirements contained in the section of
the bill applying OSHA to Congress. There are no fines which are levied
with a citation, as is the case in the private sector. The general
counsel issues a citation and if the counsel determines that a
violation has not been corrected, he may file a complaint with the
Office of Compliance against the employing office. This, again, is a
far cry from the realities with which our businessmen and women must
contend. No civil penalties. No criminal penalties. If only Congress
could be so understanding of private employers.
With regard to the OSHA section of S. 2, specifically section 215, it
is my understanding from the House authors of the legislation, Mr.
Shays and Mr. Goodling, that the report required under this section
concerning the general counsel's inspection of facilities for OSHA
violations will be made available to the public. I strongly agree with
this perspective, especially in light of the fact that there is no
requirement in the bill that the general counsel file a complaint with
the Office of Compliance against an employing office.
Mr. Speaker, there are positive aspects to the legislation.
It does move clearly toward the concept that congressional employees
should have the right, in instances of violations of place of
employment labor laws by Members of Congress, to the same basic
employee protections as possessed by employees in the private sector.
And, significantly, this includes the right of congressional employees
to seek a full de novo jury trial in Federal court, complete with
general damages, court costs, and recovery of attorneys fees. It should
be noted, however, that apparently no Member of Congress may be
personally sued, that is, such a suit would be against an employee's
employing office, a term of new art which avoids naming any Member of
Congress as the specific responding party to such a law suit.

The bill does not allow, however, for such employees to obtain
punitive damages against their congressional employers. In addition,
there apparently is no personal liability of Members of Congress as to
any damages, legal fees, or court costs awarded to any employee filing
a claim against an employing office. This is not too analogous to what
is facing the private sector employers who can generally be held
personally liable for those types of damages under civil rights law,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans With
Disabilities Act.
Mr. Speaker, I do recognize, however, that this bill is the result of
a compromise with the other body. In the final analysis, although the
version of the bill before us today is geared to treat Congress more
favorably than the private sector, it is still much better than what we
have now, where Congress almost totally escapes the effects of place of
employment labor laws which have been nonuniformly and haphazardly
applied by Congress upon the private place of employment and quite
often with provisions for disproportionate damages. So, it is indeed a
step in the right direction, a first step, but a very meaningful step
nonetheless.
I will support the legislation today, but more must be done to
either: First, have these laws really apply to Congress in the same
fashion in which they now apply to the private sector, or second,
alleviate the often harsh, haphazard, rigid, and unreasonable fashion
in which place of employment laws apply to the private sector. In fact,
we might not be dealing with this issue today, if we had, in the first
place, simply written our place of employment labor laws for the
private sector with as much compassion as we have with this
legislation. I stand ready to work with the leadership on both sides of
the aisle to achieve either result, which should bring about a more
uniform, flexible, understandable, and more understanding employment
policy for America in the 21st century.
There is no doubt that as we have to do unto ourselves we learn
better how to do unto others.
Ms. DUNN of Washington. Mr. Speaker, for too long, Congress has lived
by a double-standard, passing dozens of laws, imposing hundreds of
regulations on the private sector while at the same time exempting
itself from those same laws and regulations.
How long has Congress enjoyed the double standard? Fifty-seven years
later, Congress will finally be held accountable to the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, requiring a minimum wage and overtime pay for
congressional staff; 31 years later, Congress will at last adhere to
title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
and 25 years later, Congress will comply with the Occupational Health
and Safety Act of 1970, making our U.S. Capitol and the House and
Senate Office Buildings safer places to work and visit.
There is a whole host of other laws with which Congress must now
comply: the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act to name few more.
Mr. Speaker, this is a sensible bill that accomplishes more than just
apply all laws to Congress. While Congress still has a long,
challenging journey ahead if we are to restore the public's confidence
and faith in this institution, passing this congressional compliance
legislation is a major step in that direction. Today, as we send this
bill to be signed into law by President Clinton, we legislators will
prove to the citizens of this Nation that we are committed to turning
this place upside down, shaking it by its ankles, and accomplishing
this long overdue reform.
Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. Speaker, today I rise in strong support for S. 2,
the Congressional Accountability Act. This piece of legislation will
finally submit to Congress to the same laws it imposes on others. How
can we expect to understand the implications of legislation we write if
we aren't required to follow its rules? That, Mr. Speaker, is a glaring
example of Congress being out of touch with middle America.
This initiative represents years of hard work in a bipartisan manner.
Not only do I fully endorse this bill this Congress, I was also a
cosponsor of similar legislation, H.R. 349, last year and fully
supported H.R. 4822 when it passed the House overwhelmingly in August
1994. Unfortunately, efforts to pass legislation in the Senate died at
the end of the 103d Congress.
For far too long, Congress has been writing and passing legislation
that affects everyone but itself. It is evident that Congress must set
the example and live under the rules it imposes on others. No longer
will congressional employees be subject to discrimination, bad working
environments, or other working related ills that other employees are
protected from under our national laws. Our employees will have the
avenues to address grievances in the workplace like any other American
employee. They will have employee rights that have been denied to them
for far too long.
I believe that this is a responsible, bipartisan bill and urge its
immediate adoption.
Mr. RADANOVICH. Mr. Speaker, the lesson that what is sauce for the
goose also should be for the gander is learned from early childhood.
Yet, it seems to have been no more than a fantasy for Congress.
Today, I hope this House by its vote will make a simple declaration,
saying that if we think it worthy that American business is required to
operate under these several sets of workplace rules, then we on Capitol
Hill are willing to be regulated by them as well.
There are two benefits to be derived from securing final passage of
S. 2, the Congressional Accountability Act that embodies the spirit and
most of the substance of H.R. 1, which we passed on the day we began
this 104th Congress.
The first value of this reform in the way we do business is that
those men and women we employ here and in our district offices should
not be prejudiced with respect to redress of employment wrongs simply
because they are on our payrolls.
The second significance of the Shays Act was well related by the Wall
Street Journal editorial of January 4 that called H.R. 1 a
[[Page H274]] ``very potent reform'' and went on to observe that
``forcing Members to live under the laws they pass may also have a
useful, modifying effect on what Congress decides to pass.''
Mr. Speaker, all of us, I'm sure, have received--and welcome--
thousands of constituent communications imploring us to keep faith with
provisions of the Contract With America. Even before this Congress
began, one of my constituents, Mel Cellini of Madera, CA, shared with
me a copy of his letter to Speaker Gingrich. Noting Mr. Cellini's
statement that there must be a change in the fact that ``Congress has
exempted itself from mandates imposed on the rest of society.'' I take
pleasure in making the text of his letter a part of my statement of
support for our passage of the Congressional Accountability Act.
The letter follows:

December 4, 1994.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Sir: My wife and I are approaching 50 years of age. We
have been increasingly disillusioned with the operation of
the federal government. The future our two children face is
of great concern to the two of us. As long as I can remember
the federal government has continued to intrude into our
lives via control and taxation. The programs have not only
been intrusive, but also quite expensive.
Now one child is in college and the other will soon be
going to college. Our dismay with the evaporation of the
American dream has been discussed in our family. It is hard
to relate to the dream sine all we hear from the media are
the issues of why we need to contribute and do more for those
that refuse to help themselves.
Congress has exempted itself from mandates imposed on the
rest of society. This must change.
I backed our local Republican candidate with the fervor
that this was our last chance. Yes, George Radanovich won. I
truly believe this is a new dawn. The opportunity for a
refocused government is here. Just Make Sure the Government
Is Out of Our Lives and Our Pocketbook.
Please, do not back down on the ten point contract that the
Republicans agreed to fulfill in the First 100 days.
Finally, ignore the personal attacks the media is doing to
you. We are behind you `all the way.' I can hardly wait for
the 1995 congress to begin.
Again, Congratulations, and thank you.
Sincerely,
Mel Cellini.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from California [Mr. Thomas] that the House suspend the rules
and pass the Senate bill, S. 2.
The question was taken.
Mr. THOMAS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5, rule
I, and the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this
motion will be postponed.

____________________