[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 8 (Friday, January 13, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S943-S944]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


             UNPROFOR: END ITS IMPOTENCE OR END ITS MISSION

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I had the opportunity last evening to join 
Senator Dole in meeting with British Gen. Rupert Smith, who will take 
command of the United Nations force, known as UNPROFOR, in Bosnia later 
this month. A few other Senators also had a chance to meet with General 
Smith yesterday.
  Senator Dole and I expressed admiration for General Smith's 
willingness to take on this unenviable task. But we also expressed 
skepticism that UNPROFOR can improve its credibility in order to more 
effectively carry out its limited mission of facilitating humanitarian 
relief and lessening the violence in Bosnia. But the change in command 
in UNPROFOR does at least offer the opportunity to try to adopt 
measures to make UNPROFOR more effective.
  I recall that a year ago, when UNPROFOR's leadership was rotating, 
American military officials responsible for the humanitarian airlift 
and airdrops in Bosnia proposed to take advantage of the situation to 
reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to fulfill its 
mandate in Bosnia.
  They proposed that UNPROFOR end its ```mother may I?' construct of 
operations,'' and they outlined a plan by which UNPROFOR, even with its 
restrictive rules of engagement and limited troops and equipment, could 
use force to more effectively carry out its humanitarian mission and 
curb Serb and other harassment of UNPROFOR. These American military 
officers warned that if such action were not taken, an already bad 
situation would quickly get much worse.
  When he first took command of UNPROFOR in January, Lt. Gen. Michael 
Rose took actions that suggested he might follow this advice. But this 
initial promise faded as General Rose became even more pliable to Serb 
demands than previous UNPROFOR commanders had been. The results have 
been disastrous:
  UNPROFOR has all along had difficulty supplying food, fuel, and 
medical supplies to Bosnian civilians suffering the privations of war. 
Now, UNPROFOR cannot be sure it can supply its own emaciated troops.
  The United Nations declared a weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo 
but refused to enforce it despite routine Serb violations. Now, it has 
effectively become a Serb-declared exclusion zone from which 
humanitarian air flights are blocked at the whim of Serb forces.
  In the past, UNPROFOR had been humiliated by being compelled to 
assist Serbs in the deportation of detained Muslims. Now, UNPROFOR has 
been rendered impotent by having its own forces detained and used as 
human shields against NATO air attacks. Some UNPROFOR troops seem to 
have become willing hostages who engage their Serb captors in sports 
and feasts.
  In short, continued UNPROFOR's submission to Serb demands and threats 
may make it impossible for it to fulfill its mandate. While things 
appear to have improved in recent weeks, with relief flights resumed 
and U.N. forces not held hostage, this has only been at the discretion 
of the Serbs, who can reverse course at any time. All sides in the 
conflict have sought to manipulate UNPROFOR to their own ends, but Serb 
forces have largely succeeded in making UNPROFOR a tool of Serb 
strategy, and the recent improvement should be seen in that light.
  This situation will only get worse over time unless UNPROFOR can gain 
credibility it has never enjoyed.
  Either prompt, dramatic action should be taken to establish 
UNPROFOR's credibility and its ability to do its humanitarian job or 
UNPROFOR should be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The plan proposed last winter by American military officers may have 
worked if implemented then, but it is probably too late toady. Certain 
elements of that plan, however, are still relevant and even more 
critical in light of Croatia's recent announcement not to extend 
UNPROFOR's mandate in that country beyond March 31:
  Discredited UNPROFOR leaders cannot change the situation. Any effort 
to revitalize UNPROFOR must be accompanied by new leaders. General 
Rose, the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, will be replaced on January 24 
by General Smith. Yasushi Akashi, the U.N. Secretary General's 
representative for the former Yugoslavia, must be replaced, as well.
  The U.N.-declared no-fly zones and weapons-exclusion zones in Bosnia, 
now widely flouted, primarily by the Serbs, should be enforced. This 
includes the withdrawal of SAM's from the zone and deactivation of 
SAM's in the surrounding area that threaten NATO aircraft policing the 
zones.
  UNPROFOR should no longer tolerate checkpoints operated by 
belligerents nor should it pay tolls, extortion by belligerents of fuel 
and other humanitarian supplies. If belligerents question whether a 
convoy is going to its declared civilian destination, they should be 
permitted to ride the convoy.
  UNPROFOR should organize is convoys along military lines and reject 
Serb demands that include armored vehicles and similar demands.
  Any use of force or threat of force against UNPROFOR should be met 
with force. While such retaliation must be measured according to its 
objective, it need not be limited to retaliation against the specific 
offending forces, given the targeting difficulties often involved and 
the need for UNPROFOR to acquire the upper hand.
  As for the concern that adopting such an approach would endanger 
UNPROFOR troops now detained by Serbs, the reality is that unless such 
an approach is adopted immediately, all UNPROFOR troops will be 
endangered--whether formally detained or not. Action can either be 
taken to reverse the current situation, or it will only get worse.
  If UNPROFOR refuses to adopt such an approach, it should be withdrawn 
in 
[[Page S944]] as swift and orderly a manner as possible. The United 
States should, of course, provide the necessary assistance to help our 
allies and friends in UNPROFOR withdraw. This may include the temporary 
deployment of ground forces in Bosnia. End the impotence or end the 
mission.
  Any action by any of the belligerents to interfere with the 
withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be met by overwhelming force. Such force 
should not be limited to targeting those belligerent forces directly 
involved in interfering with the withdrawal. Instead, given the 
difficulties often involved in targeting the offending forces and the 
need to dominate the battlefield during a withdrawal, targets could 
include anything of military, political or economic value to the 
belligerents. Nor should we exclude targets outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
given that much of the impetus and sustenance for the conflict has come 
from outside its border.
  Once UNPROFOR has withdrawn, NATO should continue to enforce the 
exclusion zone around Sarajevo to the extent possible without 
excessively endangering allied forces.


                       the broader balken context

  Given the Clinton administration's support for keeping UNPROFOR in 
Bosnia, and presumably trying to make it more effective there, the 
administration should work with our allies to reverse Croatia's 
decision to end UNPROFOR's mandate in that country. This might be 
possible if, parallel to adopting the measures I have proposed for 
UNPROFOR in Bosnia, a serious effort were made to revitalize UNPROFOR 
in Croatia, where it has been as much a tool of Serb strategy as in 
Bosnia.
  The Clinton administration has nominally recognized the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], but in response to pressure 
from domestic groups has refused to fulfill this decision by sending an 
ambassador. This is an important foreign policy issue, not a election 
spoil. A professional diplomat should be dispatched forthwith as 
ambassador with a mandate to assist in the reconciliation among ethnic 
groups in that country and between Skopje and Athens.
  Both Presidents Bush and Clinton threatened to use military force 
against Serbia if it should employ blatant force in Kosovo, Serbia's 
Albania-populated province along its southern border with Albania and 
Macedonia. While Serbia has been slowly tightening its grip over the 
once autonomous Kosovo, this American threat remains useful to 
discourage overt and widespread violence. Congress should explicitly 
endorse this threat to make it more credible.
  Mr. President, during our meeting yesterday, General Rose emphasized 
that he was going to have to play the hand he has been dealt, and do so 
with the players who are already at the table, including the Bosnian 
Serb leadership.
  It is true that we have to shape our policy based on the situation as 
it exists today. No one can go back and undue what has happened over 
the last 3 years. But we can learn from the mistakes of the last 3 
years.
  The measures I have proposed would seek to do so. But from what I 
heard from General Smith, I am afraid that UNPROFOR will continue down 
the path it is on. If so, the quagmire that is now up to its waist will 
soon be up to its neck. And at that point, the task of pulling it out 
and bringing it home will be much more difficult and costly.
  With that, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Dole pertaining to the introduction of S. 230 are 
located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills and 
Joint Resolutions.'')


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