[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 2 (Thursday, January 5, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S523-S525]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREAN AGREED FRAMEWORK: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US; WHAT 
                           IT MEANS FOR SEOUL
 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, last month my colleague Senator 
Murkowski and I made a factfinding trip to several Asian countries, 
including North and South Korea. In both Pyongyang and Seoul we 
naturally focused much of our attention on the Agreed Framework 
recently concluded between the United States and North Korea. According 
to that document, North Korea is to dismantle its nuclear weapons 
production capability in exchange for assistance--primarily from South 
Korea and Japan--in reconfiguring its energy sector.
  I know that some in this chamber have serious misgivings about our 
deal with North Korea. I understand that; given Pyongyang's record, it 
would be a mistake to treat that government's ``commitments'' with 
anything less than a very healthy skepticism. But I believe that the 
more one looks at the Agreed Framework with North Korea the more one 
sees that the agreement does not depend on trusting Pyongyang. Rather, 
the United States has crafted an agreement that gives us and our 
partners, South Korea and Japan, new levers over North Korea. If the 
North Koreans don't live up to their commitments, they lose out, and 
we're the ones who decide if those obligations are being met.
  When I was in Seoul our talented and hard-working Ambassador there, 
James T. Laney, gave me a memo that spells out very cogently just how 
much we and the South Koreans stand to gain from the Agreed Framework 
with North Korea. The memo does have a shortcoming: like many documents 
produced within the U.S. Government, it is full of acronyms. Let me 
spell some of those out. The DPRK is the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea--North Korea--and the ROK is the Republic of Korea--South 
Korea. The ROKG is the Republic of Korea Government. An LWR is a Light 
Water Reactor, the NPT is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and the 
IAEA is the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  Ambassador Laney also gave me a very interesting statement describing 
the evolving South Korean reaction to the Agreed Framework. No country 
looks more warily at North Korea than South Korea does. So it's worth 
noting that, as details about the agreement became known, the Seoul 
stock market went up more than 20 percent. That's not the reaction of a 
business community that thinks its country has been left more 
vulnerable.
  I respectfully request that Ambassador Laney's memo, ``What the U.S.-
DPRK Agreed Framework Means for Korea,'' and his statement, ``Seoul's 
Second Thoughts,'' be inserted into the Record.
  The material follows:

          What the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework Means for Korea

       South Koreans are nobody's fools when it comes to trusting 
     North Korea. They don't. They are watching like hawks for the 
     first sign of DPRK backsliding or nonperformance regarding 
     the Geneva Agreed Framework. We drew heavily on the ROK's 
     experience and advice to design a Framework that avoids the 
     mistakes of past agreements with the DPRK. The Framework was 
     designed to compel the DPRK to take measurable steps in 
     compliance before getting significant benefits.
       Determined not to be cut out of the game, the South Koreans 
     are trying to promote inter-Korean dialogue. Equally 
     determined to hobble ROK influence (and perhaps unwilling to 
     talk before the succession is completed in Pyongyang), the 
     North Koreans are 
     [[Page S524]] resisting. The recent ROKG initiative to 
     unfreeze private commercial projects in the North was a 
     clever first step which, in tandem with pressure from the 
     U.S., may move Pyongyang back towards substantive dialogue 
     with Seoul. Inter-Korean dialogue is essential because many 
     of Korea's problems can only be solved by the Koreans and 
     because the absence of dialogue generates ROK public fears 
     about progress in U.S.-DPRK relations.


                   origin of the u.s. ``concessions''

       LWR's: When North Korea floated the idea of converting from 
     gas-graphite (GGMR) to the light water system (LWR), U.S. 
     arms-control experts were intrigued. However, we declined its 
     request that we supply LWR's because the DPRK could not pay 
     for them. In mid-1994, the Kim Young-Sam administration 
     indicated that it wished to provide an LWR to the DPRK as an 
     investment in Korea, by Korea, and as an important inducement 
     to the North to settle the nuclear issue on our terms. The 
     LWR ultimately became the centerpiece of the settlement.
       We refused to allow the offer of an LWR project to serve as 
     a reward for North Korea belatedly complying with the NPT. 
     Only on the condition that the DPRK would obtain a clean bill 
     of health from the IAEA before getting any significant 
     components did we use the ROK offer to induce the DPRK to go 
     beyond the requirements of the Treaty and give up its entire 
     graphite-based nuclear program permanently. The South's 
     unique willingness to sponsor a LWR project denies this 
     proposal any precedential value, and North Korea's unenviable 
     position in the world makes it an unlikely role model for 
     would be proliferators.
       Heavy Oil: The second ``trade-off'' was designed to bring 
     the DPRK even further beyond its NPT obligations--to freeze 
     its nuclear program immediately and to dismantle it before 
     the LWR project was even finished. We persuaded the DPRK to 
     stop building and operating nuclear facilities (as was its 
     right under the NPT) and instead take heavy oil (which the 
     North cannot refine into gasoline) for generating substitute 
     electricity. The DPRK renounced all nuclear activity, 
     civilian or military, until the LWR project is completed in 
     the next decade, to be verified by IAEA monitoring.
                        south korean perspective

       War against Non-Proliferation: The U.S. and ROK shared the 
     goal of ending the North Korean nuclear threat and agreed on 
     strategy for accomplishing that. South Korea's overriding 
     concern in dealing with the DPRK nuclear threat was to avoid 
     turning the Korean peninsula into a battlefield. The 
     conventional military threat--unabated despite the Geneva 
     Framework--was a more immediate danger than the nuclear 
     threat in the eyes of many Koreans. During negotiations, we 
     systematically but quietly upgraded our deterrent posture and 
     today the U.S. is in the strongest position militarily that 
     it has ever been with regard to the DPRK. Further South 
     Korean objectives were that a settlement also promote inter-
     Korean relations by engaging North and South in a joint 
     project that will bring about--indeed compel--cooperation 
     (while rendering the North increasingly dependent on the 
     South); give the North nothing of possible detriment to the 
     U.S. security presence or the U.S.-ROK alliance (such as the 
     bilateral Peace Treaty that the DPRK had sought as a first 
     step towards withdrawal of U.S. forces) and avoid giving the 
     DPRK a legally-binding inter-Governmental agreement (but 
     instead describe the unilateral steps the U.S. would take in 
     response to DPRK fulfillments of its commitments). The ROK 
     got what it wanted.


           what south koreans don't like about the settlement

       Zero-Sum Approach: A large and influential minority of 
     Koreans who fled south during the war has traditionally 
     dictated a ``zero-sum'' approach to North Korea. During U.S.-
     DPRK talks there was discomfort at having the ROK's ally 
     engaged in dialogue with its adversary ``over ROK heads''. 
     Exaggerated (and largely uninformed) reports of U.S. 
     ``concessions'' to the North during negotiations generated 
     criticism of the U.S. and heightened unjustified fears. 
     Nevertheless, all Koreans seemed to agree that only the U.S. 
     could negotiate a peaceful settlement with the DPRK. The ROK 
     was unable to sustain its own its own bilateral talks with 
     the North, and flatly opposed the idea of a multilateral 
     approach such as the Russians suggested or the older idea of 
     a U.S.-DPRK-ROK ``trialogue.'' While the sensitive details 
     were withheld from the public, the ROKG was briefed every 
     step of the way in the course of negotiations.
       Special Inspections: When the Geneva Framework was signed, 
     initial South Korean complaints centered around the length of 
     time before Special Inspections, which had become a symbol of 
     DPRK non-compliance. Yet most ROK analysts had judged that 
     Pyongyang would never provide access to the disputed sites 
     which were tangled in DPRK national pride and had become an 
     important source of its negotiating leverage. The ROKG agreed 
     with us that the right of IAEA access was non-negotiable, but 
     the timing could be adjusted because freezing the DPRK's 
     current program took precedence over uncovering more details 
     about its past activities. In the end, the DPRK agreed to 
     permit IAEA access to the disputed (and any other) site by 
     the mid-point in the LWR project.
       No turning back: South Korea has already shifted from 
     analyzing the framework to implementing it. No critic of the 
     agreement believes it is renegotiable or that we would be 
     better off without it. In fact, the Koreans are worried that 
     U.S. domestic debate on the Framework could inadvertently 
     lead to results that threaten their interests. ROK analysts 
     point out that the perceived threat the U.S. might renege on 
     the deal only encourages the North to retain and strengthen 
     its leverage to forestall us. And in the event of any U.S. 
     retreat from the Framework, they fear the DPRK might stop 
     cooperation with the IAEA, expel the inspectors, restart 
     plutonium production, and reprocess its accumulated spent 
     fuel--returning us to the situation that prevailed this 
     summer.
                             Six months ago

       U.S. pressure: We veered as close to armed conflict on the 
     Korean Peninsula in 1994 as at any point since the 1953 
     Armistice. The U.S. attacked DPRK non-compliance to IAEA 
     requirements in the UNSC and mobilized support for economic 
     sanctions. We took a firm line and--to the great discomfort 
     of many South Koreans--came close to an exodus of U.S. 
     citizens and a massive augmentation to U.S. military forces.
       DPRK defiance: The North Koreans remained intransigent. 
     There was no sign they would capitulate; instead, Pyongyang 
     began to speed up its nuclear program. Experts believed the 
     DPRK could withstand economic sanctions for some time, 
     particularly with Chinese help. The ROK feared that North 
     Korea would lash out in response to sanctions. Predictions 
     included provocations on the DMZ; punitive military attacks 
     on Seoul by commandos, artillery, missiles, and possibly even 
     chemical weapons; terrorist acts in Seoul, Tokyo and 
     Washington; or the extreme scenario of a full-fledged 
     suicidal attack on the ROK. Only when we found a way to 
     return to negotiations did the DPRK begin to reverse its 
     hardline positions.
       Strains on the Alliance: Anti-U.S. feelings were evident in 
     South Korea during this period. A misperception took root 
     that the U.S. was baiting a wounded but dangerous animal--
     gambling with Korean lives and property in defense of its 
     global non-proliferation policy or, less flatteringly, U.S. 
     business interests.


                          Six months from now

       In the Region: The U.S.-ROK alliance is stronger than ever 
     and we are working as partners to see the Framework to a 
     successful conclusion. The DPRK nuclear threat gave birth to 
     a three-way partnership: the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral 
     alliance. North Korean efforts to find a seam to exploit have 
     been frustrated. At the same time, China has been prevented 
     from wielding influence without responsibility or reaping 
     benefits without investment in the settlement.
       Prospects: By mid-1995, KEDO should be operating under U.S. 
     leadership, investing Japanese capital, and overseeing a ROK 
     contractor who will build the LWR project in the DPRK. The 
     ROKG is satisfied with its central role in KEDO and the LWR 
     project. Seoul is encouraged by early DPRK cooperation with 
     the IAEA and the U.S. technical delegation negotiating the 
     stabilization and shipment of the spent fuel. While sensitive 
     to the risk that the opening of U.S.-DPRK liaison offices 
     will reawaken anxieties in the South, the ROKG has taken a 
     constructive position, recognizing that liaison offices will 
     be critical in settling problems during the process of 
     implementing North Korea's agreements.
       Prying loose the shutters: In the weeks since the agreement 
     we have acquired a great deal of information about North 
     Korea and stand to uncover more. U.S. nuclear experts have 
     visited its nuclear installation. IAEA inspectors have 
     gathered significant new information of direct value in 
     evaluating DPRK nuclear capability in the event that 
     Pyongyang decided to abrogate the agreement. DPRK diplomats 
     and negotiators have been exposed to the U.S. and have 
     revealed information about their system and its problems that 
     gives us important clues. Americans are entering the DPRK for 
     a first-hand look. In the process, we are loosening the 
     hermetic seals that have kept out foreign ideas and 
     influences, and bringing that country closer to freedom.
       For South Korea: Since talk of UN sanctions gave way to 
     U.S.-DPRK talks in Geneva, the Korean stock market has shot 
     up: adding some $30-plus billions of wealth to the Korean 
     economy and aiding U.S. investors and businessmen. The South 
     Korean focus has measurably shifted away from a cold war 
     fixation on beating the North--a mindset that spawned anti-
     democratic laws and policies that the U.S. has worked to 
     erase. Instead, the ROKG has adopted measures to spur 
     economic intercourse with the North, promoting trade and 
     investment as a means to reduce tensions on the peninsula and 
     accelerate reform in the DPRK. The South's interest now is in 
     developing the North's resources and integrating it into this 
     prosperous region. Not only can that strategy benefit the 
     U.S. economy, it also gives North Korea a stake in the game 
     that works to our advantage: something to lose from 
     misbehavior.


                      Maintaining U.S. Leadership

       Like us, the ROKG is watching the DPRK's performance and is 
     keeping its powder dry. Seoul is not about to let North Korea 
     evade the terms of the settlement, which the ROKG has 
     embraced as a blueprint for solving the nuclear threat and 
     for transforming the DPRK. The leaders of the U.S., the ROK, 
     [[Page S525]] and Japan stood shoulder-to-shoulder in Jakarta 
     and promised to make the Framework succeed. The UN Security 
     Council formally welcomed and endorsed it. The IAEA has 
     blessed it and has begun performing its part. For the U.S. to 
     abrogate that settlement would precipitate a crisis, not only 
     with the DPRK, but a crisis of confidence in U.S. leadership 
     throughout Asia. It would compound the difficulty of any 
     effort by the U.S. to employ UNSC sanctions against the North 
     in response to the renewed DPRK nuclear activity that would 
     surely follow. If, on the other hand, the DPRK balks at 
     living up to its commitment, the U.S. retains the full range 
     of options in deterring, coercing, or punishing the North 
     Koreans.
       Implementation of the terms of the Framework, as the North 
     Koreans repeatedly pointed out, will compel the DPRK 
     systematically to strip itself of a nuclear capability. But 
     far from achieving its major objective--normalization and an 
     end to the U.S. embargo--North Korea faces precisely the same 
     set of requirements that has confronted it for years. 
     Pyongyang must make significant progress in accounting for 
     and returning MIA remains, towards ending weapons and 
     ballistic missile sales to the Middle East, in reducing the 
     conventional military threat, in improving human rights 
     practices, and the rest of the broad agenda of U.S. concerns. 
     The South Koreans, who share these concerns and have many 
     more of their own, believe that the significant leverage the 
     U.S. retains will be an important tool for influencing DPRK 
     behavior in the non-nuclear area.
                                                                    ____

                        Seoul's Second Thoughts

       With the new leadership in Congress taking a hard look at 
     the recent Geneva Agreement Framework between the United 
     States and North Korea, it seems worthwhile to ask how South 
     Koreans view it, since they are the ones that will be most 
     affected by it and the ones who will carry the largest share 
     of the cost.
       It is true that, despite the closeness of U.S.-ROK 
     consultation in both Geneva and Seoul throughout the course 
     of the negotiations, and although the outcome met our joint 
     objectives and priorities, the settlement was initially 
     greeted with criticism and even some dismay in Seoul. Just 
     before the completion of the Geneva talks, President Kim 
     Young Sam himself voiced some caustic comments about American 
     foreign policy in an interview with the New York Times. The 
     real issue behind the criticism, however, was the pain that 
     Koreans felt because they were not at the table in 
     negotiations that were of such paramount importance to their 
     nation. Still, it is interesting to see how much Seoul's 
     early criticisms (most of which, like President Kim's 
     interview, came before the agreement was final--let alone 
     public) parallel the more recent comments by the new 
     Republican leadership in Congress. ``We gave away too much.'' 
     ``We are waiting too long to find out about the past.'' ``How 
     can we trust the North Koreans to keep their word?''
       Here in Seoul, however, after a few weeks of close 
     inspection and vigorous public debate, public opinion has 
     shifted unmistakably in favor of implementing the agreement, 
     and there is no serious thought of turning the clock back. In 
     fact, President Kim recently announced a policy of 
     encouraging economic ventures in the North. While North Korea 
     pretends to spurn this initiative, its officials already have 
     begun to welcome South Korean business trips to Pyongyang. 
     The opportunity of doing business in the North has been a 
     lure to the South for several years. Furthermore, since the 
     U.S. and North Korea agreed to return to negotiations six 
     months ago, the investment climate in Seoul has improved 
     remarkably, and the Seoul stock market has shot up more than 
     20% for an apprecitation of some 28 billion dollars in the 
     equity market. These economic indictors speak worlds about 
     the way business views the reduction in tensions.
       Partly as a gesture of reconciliation but also shrewdly 
     assessing the future, President Kim, in a major policy speech 
     last August, offered to build Light Water Reactors for the 
     North. Even those who have complained that Seoul is having to 
     carry too large a share of the financial burden acknowledge 
     that the Light Water Reactor can be viewed as a long-term 
     investment in Korea's future. And while everyone would prefer 
     to have the secrets of the past unlocked now, the fact is 
     that the agreement requires the North to open up all of its 
     nuclear facilities before the core nuclear components will be 
     installed in the first Light Water Reactor. Meanwhile, the 
     production of weapons-grade plutonium has been stopped, dead.
       Only a few months ago, the United States was headed 
     resolutely towards U.N. sanctions, which the North had 
     declared would be ``an act of war.'' During the previous six 
     months, the United States had enhanced its military 
     capability significantly by the introduction of Patriot 
     Missiles, Apache Helicopters and Counter-Fire Radars to check 
     the enormous strength of the North Korean artillery along the 
     DMZ. Our resolve to defend the Republic of Korea and our 
     preparations for any eventuality did not go unnoticed by the 
     North. We discouraged North Korean adventurism while 
     encouraging them to negotiate.
       While many South Koreans preferred the status quo, 
     sustained through mutual deterrence for 40 years, the fact is 
     it had been irrevocably shattered by the aggressive nuclear 
     program of the North, leading to a situation totally 
     unacceptable to the United States, the Republic of Korea, and 
     the the international community. Washington and Seoul agreed 
     that we had to act, either by inducing the North Koreans to 
     relinquish their nuclear program through negotiations, or by 
     forcing them to give it up. Mindful of the risks, we were 
     prepared to pursue the latter course if negotiations did not 
     work. Since the North had already isolated itself from the 
     world, the effect of sanctions would have been limited. And 
     with more than a million men under arms near the DMZ, the 
     provocation of a weak and possibly unsteady regime could well 
     have brought nightmarish results. No South Korean wanted to 
     take that chance.
       Those here who have claimed that we have rewarded North 
     Korea's bad behavior have been reminded that the agreement 
     calls not only for North Korea to meet all of the NPT 
     conditions, but to go far beyond them: no further 
     construction of new reactors and no reprocessing; and in the 
     end, the demolition of all the facilities associated with the 
     present program. We tend to overlook how much the North is 
     actually giving up--years of enormous investment in their 
     ultimate and prized symbol of independence. United States 
     technicians have even visited the nuclear site at Youngbyon, 
     an event unthinkable a few months ago.
       Of course the jury is still out on whether this agreement 
     will finally work. After all, North Korea has been an enemy 
     for more than forty years, and as long as its nuclear and 
     conventional threat remains, we will continue to be prepared 
     and wary. The settlement is driven by performance, not by 
     trust. But the International Atomic Energy Agency has 
     confirmed that Pyongyang has taken the first steps in the 
     agreement, and South Korea and the Northeast Asia region are 
     breathing a little easier now with the reduction of tensions 
     and the prospect of opening up the North.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the calling 
of the quorum be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Before I start the business of closing, I ask unanimous 
consent that Senator D'Amato be added as a cosponsor of S. 2.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________