[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 1 (Wednesday, January 4, 1995)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E21-E22]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


               BASE AND CANAL RIGHTS IN PANAMA POST 2000

                                 ______


                          HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

                              of illinois

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, January 4, 1995
  Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, 80 years ago, the United States completed 
construction of one of the engineering marvels of its or any age, a 
multilock, 51-mile-long interoceanic ship canal across the Isthmus of 
Panama. Since then, this manmade waterway has served the maritime 
nations of the world almost without interruption, enabling them to ship 
their goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific and vice versa much faster 
and cheaper than would have otherwise been possible. Even with the 
advent of the supertanker and large container ships, the Panama Canal 
remains a vital link in world commerce through which 15 percent of 
America's trade, and 5 percent of the world's, passes. In fact, a 
number of ships today--Panamax vessels they are called--are being built 
to specifications that will enable them to just clear the canal when 
fully loaded.
  Credit for this outstanding operating record should go not only to 
those who have run the canal all these years but also to those who have 
provided security for it. For the 63 years prior to the signing of the 
Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and during the 17 years since, the Armed 
Forces of the United States have stood watch over the canal from a 
series of military bases located in a 10-mile-wide strip of territory 
adjacent to the canal. From those bases, they have been in a position 
to deal effectively not only with immediate threats to the canal 
itself, but also with other problems that could have eroded hemispheric 
peace and security if left untended. An excellent example of the two 
combined came just a few weeks ago when Cuban refugees sent to Panama 
pending a determination of their status went on a rampage that had to 
be quelled by United States military personnel.
  The collapse of communism and the rise of the supertanker 
notwithstanding, there is good reason to believe that a smoothly 
operating, properly protected canal will be even more significant to 
the United States, Panama, Latin America and the rest of the world in 
the future. Several good reasons in fact. The conclusion of the NAFTA 
and the GATT agreements, not to mention the recent decision by the 
Summit of the Americas Conference in Miami to strive for an inter-
American free trade zone by the year 2005, signal clearly a reduction 
in tariff and nontariff barriers throughout the region and the world. 
As they fall, the shipment of goods will inevitably rise as will the 
utility of the only vessel shortcut from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
and back. That being the case, the strategic significance of the Panama 
Canal, as one of the world's great maritime chokepoints, will continue 
to grow, a fact that will not be lost on terrorist groups or renegade 
nations determined to achieve their objectives by whatever means 
necessary. With the weapons they have, or can acquire, either might 
exert, or try to exert, leverage if there is even the slightest 
perception that the Canal is open to mischief as well as commerce.
  So long as United States military personnel can be stationed in 
Panama and respond to any attacks on, or threats against, the canal, no 
such perception should exist. But, under the terms of the Panama Canal 
Treaty of 1977, which is still in effect, the United States is 
scheduled to remove all its military personnel from Panama and turn 
over their bases to Panama by December 31, 1999. After that date, 
Panama will have the sole responsibility for not only operating but 
also defending the canal, a big task for a small nation. Unless, of 
course, an agreement is reached between the United States and Panama 
that will first, allow the United States to lease its military bases in 
Panama past the turn of the century, second, permit United States 
military forces to operate out of those bases, and third, enable the 
United States to guarantee the regular operation of the canal.
  The successful negotiation of such an agreement would be of 
particular benefit to Panama, as well as being of considerable 
assistance to the United States and the rest of the hemisphere. At 
present, some 6,000 jobs and $200-600 million in additional income for 
Panama are tied directly to the United States military establishment in 
what was formerly known as the Canal Zone. Remove that establishment 
and most of that money and those jobs will disappear, as will the 
prospect of lease payments that would otherwise result from the 
continued American use of its bases in the zone. Also lost would be an 
opportunity for Panama to forgo the cost of a military establishment, 
something it could safely do if the agreement provided that the United 
States would view an attack upon Panama in the same light as an attack 
upon itself. Compromised as well would be the possibility of a broader
 business understanding, under which the United States might lease the 
canal as well as its current military bases in exchange for such 
considerations as additional lease and/or dividend payments, trade 
concessions and/or an acceleration of prior U.S. treaty commitments. In 
short, Panama has even more to gain, relatively speaking, from a base 
rights/canal defense arrangement than does either the United States or 
its hemispheric neighbors, which may explain why public opinion polls 
taken there the past 2 years have consistently shown that at least two-
thirds of those polled favor such an arrangement.

  Significantly, strong support for a 21st century base rights/canal 
defense agreement also exists in the United States. In fact, a 
nationwide poll taken last March demonstrated a level of support nearly 
as high in this country as has been evidenced in Panama. That being the 
case, one would think that serious negotiations to reach such an 
agreement would have gotten underway by now, especially since the time 
by which it should take effect is fast approaching. But, instead of 
moving forward to start these negotiations, governments in both the 
United States and Panama have been more inclined to hold back, 
preferring the other to take the lead. Understandable as that may be 
from the standpoint of national pride, the problem is time is of the 
essence if an agreement is to be reached before the impending United 
States withdrawal of its remaining military forces from Panama is, for 
all practical purposes, irreversible. Under terms of the 1977 Panama 
Canal Treaty, the United States departure from Panama must be complete 
by December 31, 1999 which means that, absent an
 understanding well before then, we must proceed with the systematic 
removal of our military forces and equipment before that time. Put 
simply, any further delay in opening negotiations, however well 
intended, not only dims their prospects but also the prospects for the 
continued safe and dependable operation of the canal itself.

  Under those circumstances, it seems to me that Congress is in a 
particularly good position--a unique position in fact--to address their 
problem and help get these important negotiations started. If it were 
to pass a resolution advising the President to enter into such 
negotiations, then the question of whether the President or the 
Government of Panama should be the first to call for talks would be 
moot. Neither would be in the position of having initiated the request 
for negotiations, meaning that the latter should then be able to 
proceed with dispatch. Inaction by Congress, on the other hand, 
promises no such advantages. At best, it is likely to mean opportunity 
delayed or diminished. At worst, it could result in opportunity denied.
  Not wishing to share responsibility for either outcome, I am 
introducing today a sense-of-Congress resolution calling upon the 
President to enter into negotiations for a base rights/canal defense 
agreement with Panama. Specifically, the resolution calls for an 
agreement that would allow our military forces to be stationed in 
Panama after the turn of the century and would give those forces the 
right to act independently in order to guarantee the security and 
assure the regular operation of the 
[[Page E22]] Panama Canal. In almost every respect, this resolution is 
identical to House Concurrent Resolution 17, which I introduced in the 
103d Congress and which was cosponsored by no less than 85 of my 
colleagues. The only significant differences is that the passage of 
time has made its enactment all the more imperative. That being the 
case, I urge my colleagues join me as soon as possible as cosponsors of 
this resolution. Without being too specific, it provides the direction 
necessary to bring about a canal security arrangement that is not only 
needed but in the best interests of all concerned.


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