[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 149 (Thursday, December 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: December 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
BOSNIA
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, This morning I returned from a trip to NATO
headquarters and London. While in Brussels, I met with the NATO
Secretary General Willy Claes, our Supreme Allied Commander George
Joulwan, the 16 Permanent Representatives to NATO, including our U.S.
Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, representatives of the countries
participating in the Partnership For Peace, and the Russian Ambassador
to NATO.
I went to Brussels because I am a strong supporter of NATO--I have
been since the very beginning of the alliance. And, as a staunch
supporter of NATO I have been extremely concerned about the impact of
the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the future of NATO. As I told
those I met with in Brussels, I would like to see NATO expand in the
near future--As NTO decided to do today. And I believe that there is an
important role, for NATO in defending against potential instability in
Europe and the former Soviet Union in the future. However,
realistically it will be difficult to make progress on these matters
until we deal with Bosnia.
I carried the same message to London where I met with former Prime
Minister, Lady Thatcher, Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, Defense
Minister Rifkind, and Prime Minister Major. Moreover, I emphasized that
as I see it, close ties between our Government and that of the United
Kingdom are as essential to NATO's success in the future, as they have
been in the past. Our differences over Bosnia should not and will not
change that fact.
However, as I see it, NATO's failure to respond adequately to the war
in Bosnia has undermined its credibility and raised serious questions
about NATO's continued relevance. It is not that NATO is unable, to act
decisively, it is that NATO has an unwilling partner--namely, the
United Nations who can veto air strikes and limit NATO targets. Last
April, NATO decided ``* * * if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy
weapons are carried out on any U.N.-designated safe areas * * * these
weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets * * * will be subject to
NATO air strikes.'' That's pretty clear. And it's pretty clear that
nothing has happened. The bottom line is that because of the so-called
dual key arrangement, NATO does not have control over its military
operations in Bosnia--the U.N. protection forces do. In my view this
U.N. veto over NATO actions sets a dangerous precedent. I recognize the
need for coordination, but not for subordination.
Mr. President, I raised these concerns in my meetings at NATO. No one
disputed the facts as I presented them. Everyone admitted that NATO's
military actions have not been ``robust,'' because of the U.N.
straitjacket. I was told however, that the decision had been made
several years ago to go this route and so NATO was stuck with this
decision. It seems to me that the worst excuse for sticking with any
policy, is to say, well that is the way we've been doing it, so we must
continue to do it this way.
President Clinton assumed office with a ``lift and strike'' policy.
In the spring of 1993, the White House held serious consultations with
the congressional leadership on this matter and I told the President I
would support him--it was the right thing to do. But, in May 1993, the
administration decided to abandon its push for ``lift and strike'' and
go along with the European approach of creating and protecting safe
havens in Bosnia and pursuing a ``negotiated settlement.'' At the U.N.
Security Council request and pursuant to U.N. Security Council
resolutions, NATO agreed to protect all six safe havens in Bosnia
through this use of air power. But while U.N. Security Council members
make these bold decisions on paper, U.N. commanders block their
implementation.
As events in Bihac demonstrate, these U.N. resolutions and NATO
authorities are meaningless. And whether intentionally or not, the
failure of U.N. protection forces in Bosnia to permit militarily
effective air strikes, against Serbian military targets--as decided
upon by NATO in April of this year--is helping the Serb aggressors. The
situation all over Bosnia is deteriorating--food convoys are not
getting through; the U.N. airlift has been suspended; missile attacks
on Sarajevo are escalating; more peacekeepers have been kidnapped; and
the war in Bosnia has widened to include Serb forces from the Serb-
occupied area of Croatia known as Krajina. Why is this happening? Is it
because NATO put a few holes in a runway last week?
In my view the situation in Bosnia is deteriorating because United
Nations and NATO's passivity amount to a green light to the Serbs. Far
from adding to the protection of U.N. peacekeepers, inaction in the
face of Serbian defiance has made the U.N. peacekeepers more
vulnerable.
As I told Prime Minister Major, I understand and appreciate the
concerns of the British and others who have peacekeepers on the ground.
I respect the soldiers who are making sacrifices and taking real risks
on the ground in Bosnia. But, let's face it. The U.N. protection forces
are unable to protect themselves, and they are even less able to
protect the Bosnians. So, the idea that the United States should send
peacekeepers to Bosnia, in the same helpless position and unable to
effectively carry out their mandate, in order to have a say in Bosnia
policy is ridiculous. We have done our share in the former Yugoslavia,
just as we have done our share elsewhere around the globe. This
argument distracts from the real issue--which is whether or not this
policy has been a success.
The European approach was designed to do two things: protect Bosnian
civilians and bring about a negotiated settlement. We know that it has
not achieved the first objective, and despite the Bosnian Government's
signature on the Vance/Owen plan and the Contact Group plan last July,
there is no peace. There are only two ways to achieve a settlement: by
pressuring the Serbs, or by making further concessions to them.
Unfortunately, the international community, and this administration,
have only been prepared to do the latter.
Apparently half of Bosnia is not enough for the Serbs to sign up to
the Contact Group plan. But, it is not only land the Bosnian Serbs
wants--they want to join Serbia in a ``Greater Serbia.'' And, the
French have a proposal that may make this a reality. The French want to
allow the Bosnian Serbs to confederate with Serbia--after all, they
say, the Bosnians and the Croats have that option now through the
agreements signed in Washington last spring. The French say this
proposal provides for ``equality of rights''--equality of rights for
the aggressors. What about equality of rights for the more than 2
million people who have lost their homes? What about equality of rights
for those who were tortured and maimed in concentration camps?
Mr. President, this policy has failed not only the moral test, but
has failed by its own standards. British officials say that the war has
been ``contained.'' Serbs from the U.N. protected areas in Croatia are
now involved. Furthermore, I don't understand how we contain Serbian
aggression by legitimizing the results. If Bosnia, as a member state of
the United Nations, is denied its basic rights--such as the right to
self-defense--how does this deter Serbian repression of the 2 million
Albanians in Kosova who do not have the rights accorded to a state? In
my view, it doesn't. It gives another green light.
During my meeting in London with Lady Thatcher I discussed NATO and
U.N. policy toward Bosnia. Lady Thatcher agrees with me not only in
pronouncing the president policy a miserable failure, but in the
outlines for a new policy. It is time to return to President Clinton's
original idea of ``lift and strike'' although it will probably have to
be ``strike and lift.''
The Bosnians have the inherent right to self defense--which is
recognized in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. arms embargo was
imposed on the former Yugoslavia and extending it to Bosnia is not only
unjust, but illegal. One way to avoid the issue of illegality of
denying Bosnia the ability to defend itself in the face of aggression,
is to redefine the Bosnian War as a ``civil war''--which the Europeans
have done and the Clinton administration has joined in doing. If the
war in Bosnia is a civil war, why are Secretary Christopher and the
British and French Foreign Ministers considering traveling to Belgrade
this weekend to offer Serbian President Milosevic more concessions? If
this is a civil war, why were sanctions imposed on Serbia? By
redefining this war, the United States, its allies, and the United
Nations, hope to limit their responsibility for the course of the war
these past 3 years.
Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is legally and morally right. The
practical difficulties of doing so are not to be minimized--the risks
are there; they were outlined to me by Prime Minister Major quite
eloquently. But, Bosnia is bleeding right now, despite the presence of
thousands of peacekeepers. And, in the absence of NATO and U.N.
resolve, the only alternative to the Bosnians continuing their struggle
is a disguised surrender. Maybe the Bosnian Government will agree to a
Greater Serbia. I don't know. They have had few options as they sit at
the negotiating table with a Serb gun to their head and international
mediators pressing for a signature at their side.
However, if the Bosnians do not agree to sign up to a greater Serbia,
if they want to continue their struggle for survival, those of us in
the United States Senate who have supported their efforts, such as
myself and Senator Lieberman will be back in January to work to lift
the arms embargo. I will ask the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed
Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee to hold hearings on
all aspects of U.S. policy towards Bosnia and on options for lifting
the arms embargo.
I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues, a most
compelling editorial by Morton Abramowitz, the president of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who writes in today's
Washington Post about the risks of writing Bosnia off. And I quote,
``Wouldn't assisted suicide be best for everybody, Bosnia most of all?
We're practically there already. . . .''
He continues, ``Should Bosnia disappear from the map or be left a
misshapen shadow of itself, its dismembered ghost would haunt the
region . . . for years to come.'' What then would be the fate of
multiethnic Macedonia? . . . of Belgrade-oppressed Kosova, with its 95-
percent Albanian population? . . . The more we try to put the partition
of Bosnia behind us the larger it looms ahead.
``Some prefer to think of Bosnia as a terminal case. But Bosnia is
fighting for its life. It is we, in the west, who are inert and
insensible. Whose life is it anyway.'' I ask unanimous consent that the
entire article be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1994]
Bosnia: Last Chance
(By Morton Abramowitz)
Do we really want to wake up someday and read this obituary
in the morning paper? ``Poor Bosnia--we didn't know her well.
Once a multiethnic state in the Balkans, now gone--
partitioned, annexed, absorbed, confederated--a casualty of
post-Cold War ethnic conflict. . . . Survivors include 3
million refugees. Awarded (posthumously) the Nuremberg Prize
for Justice. In lieu of flowers, please send donations to the
Save NATO Fund.''
If we and our allies are too quick to write Bosnia off, we
may end up burying other things besides.
For more than two years, an increasingly divided West has
watched Bosnia bleed. Frustration has mounted because the
victim hasn't done us the courtesy of going fast or gently,
and we have grown weary of our vigil. No one shows any will
to save Bosnia, and no one will help Bosnia try to save
itself.
Lacking a consensus on anything from lifting or not lifting
the arms embargo to delivering punishing air strikes or
pinpricks, the West has been left with a non-strategy of wait
and see and hope that something will turn up. Something
always has: Sarajevo market bombings, Gorazde, Bihac. Always
more refugees. Yesterday's papers even featured pictures of
Serbs forcing Muslims to wear the fez, like Jews forced by
the Nazis to wear the Star of David.
The only thing worse than no consensus is a bad consensus.
And this week, a consensus worthy of Dr. Kevorkian has begun
to form. Whether it is being reached with agonized
reluctance, as in the U.S. case, or harsh realism, as in the
British and French, matters little. The effect on Bosnia
would be the same: pulling the plug.
Wouldn't assisted suicide be best for everybody, Bosnia
most of all? We're practically there already. A big ``no
aggressive measures'' sign long has hung on Bosnia's door,
despite all the reassurances to the patient that we will use
``all necessary means.'' Last summer, the five-nation contact
group persuaded Bosnia to sign the consent form for an ethnic
split of territory one step shy of partition: ``So you lose a
limb or two--or three--dismemberment's better than death.
Besides, we'll make the Serbs agree--or else.''
Of course, the ``else'' never occurred. Instead, we relied
on Serbian President Milosevic turning against his arch
rival, the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. But Karadzic was
unimpressed by Milosevic's hollow sticks and ours. So now,
we're trying to entice him with juicy carrots.
Meanwhile, Bosnia has the temerity to keep fighting for its
own existence. Only a month ago, the media marveled at the
success that the Bosnian army was having in the Bihac pocket,
regaining home ground lost to Serbian ethnic cleansing. Now,
as resurgent Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb forces converge
on the Bihac ``safe area,'' cleansing and burning as they go,
the Bosnian army is castigated for having had the nerve to
try to take back its own territory.
The Bihac ``safe zone,'' swelled with refugees from both
the prior and current Serb campaigns, reportedly is being hit
at a rate of six shells a minute. The unchecked Serb attack
on Bihac is also destroying the Bosnian-Croat Federation.
Though the West thus far has prevented Zabreb from re-
entering the war, Croatia now sees that only force, and not
the West's intercession, will get back the Krajina.
There is still time--very little--for the West and the
international community to act, not only to preserve Bosnia
but also to restore some respect for international
institutions, for principles and for something called the
Western alliance. That will not come from pressuring Bosnia
to surrender--it won't--or agreeing to a Greater Serbia. We
and our allies should:
Recognize that UNPROFOR--now more than ever clearly a
hostage--has become more of a hindrance than a help. Withdraw
it.
Since UNPROFOR's withdrawal inevitably giving up the
enclaves, evacuate their civilian inhabitants to other, less-
exposed areas.
Put the Bosnian Serbs on notice that any interference with
the U.N. and civilian withdrawals will be met with massive
NATO air attacks.
Focus on consolidating the Bosnian government and its
position in central Bosnia.
Once UNPROFOR is gone, open up the arms spigot to Bosnia.
Tell the Bosnian Serbs that if they continue to attack
civilian populations, prevent the delivery of humanitarian
supplies or fail to engage in any serious negotiations, we
will use air power against arms dumps, oil depots and
military targets throughout the territory they occupy.
This is not a great proposal. It has uncertainties and
difficulties, particularly with relief supplies. None of the
above can work unless we and our NATO allies are prepared to
use robust, sustained air power, and even if we are, the
desired results are not guaranteed. The Bosnian government
may balk at some of it. Civilian populations would have to be
moved--safely--en masse. NATO must be persuaded. But it is
better in the long term than Western capitulation to Serb
aggression.
Critics will argue that doing the above will only prolong
the misery and expand the war. They have said that for three
years while Bosnia has hemorrhaged. They have constantly
proposed straw-man military options for the infusion of large
numbers of ground troops that are not options but excuses for
inaction. They do not explain how a Bosnia-less Balkans, or
its equivalent, can produce a stable peace.
Should Bosnia disappear from the map or be left a misshapen
shadow of itself, its dismembered ghost would haunt the
region and cause the West even bigger headaches--for years to
come. What then would be the fate of multiethnic Macedonia?
Of the volatile Krajina? Of Belgrade-oppressed Kosovo, with
its 95 percent Albanian population? If the Serbs get their
Greater Serbia, wouldn't the Albanians of Kosovo be entitled
to a Greater Albania? The more we try to put the partition of
Bosnia behind us, the larger it looms ahead.
Some prefer to think of Bosnia as a terminal case. But
Bosnia is fighting for its life. It is we in the West who are
inert and insensible. Whose life is it anyway?
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, finally, Mr. President, I would like to call
attention to a letter I received from Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of
Pakistan who supports our efforts to lift the arms embargo. Pakistan is
one of many countries who would be willing and able to assist Bosnia if
the arms embargo were lifted. The United States would not be alone.
Recently, 96 countries in the U.N. General Assembly voiced their
support for lifting the arms embargo. I ask unanimous consent that the
Prime Minister's letter to me be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Prime Minister,
Pakistan, November 29, 1994.
Senator Robert Dole,
Embassy of the United States,
London.
My Dear Senator Dole: I had hoped we would be able to meet
during your visit to London and I would be able to offer
personally my felicitations on the remarkable victory
achieved by the Republican Party in the recent elections and
your own elevation in the new Congress to the position of
Senate majority leader. Unfortunately it appears that our
schedules make this difficult and I must therefore be content
with congratulating you through this note.
I recall with great pleasure our meeting during my visit to
the United States in 1989 and the clear manifestation of your
views on America's foreign policy and what it objectives
should be. Under your guidance the Senate will now move
purposefully to mould and promote these objectives. A matter
of immediate concern in Bosnia. Like you I have been deeply
concerned about the situation in Bihac. The United States,
Pakistan and other like-minded countries must work together
to ensure that Serbian aggression is not rewarded and the
dismemberment of a member state of the United Nations is not
tolerated. The consequences of temerity, particularly the
repercussions in other parts of the world, are too horrible
to contemplate and must weigh heavily with all of us.
Yours sincerely,
Benazir Bhutto.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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