[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 149 (Thursday, December 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: December 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                                 BOSNIA

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, This morning I returned from a trip to NATO 
headquarters and London. While in Brussels, I met with the NATO 
Secretary General Willy Claes, our Supreme Allied Commander George 
Joulwan, the 16 Permanent Representatives to NATO, including our U.S. 
Ambassador to NATO, Robert Hunter, representatives of the countries 
participating in the Partnership For Peace, and the Russian Ambassador 
to NATO.
  I went to Brussels because I am a strong supporter of NATO--I have 
been since the very beginning of the alliance. And, as a staunch 
supporter of NATO I have been extremely concerned about the impact of 
the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the future of NATO. As I told 
those I met with in Brussels, I would like to see NATO expand in the 
near future--As NTO decided to do today. And I believe that there is an 
important role, for NATO in defending against potential instability in 
Europe and the former Soviet Union in the future. However, 
realistically it will be difficult to make progress on these matters 
until we deal with Bosnia.
  I carried the same message to London where I met with former Prime 
Minister, Lady Thatcher, Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, Defense 
Minister Rifkind, and Prime Minister Major. Moreover, I emphasized that 
as I see it, close ties between our Government and that of the United 
Kingdom are as essential to NATO's success in the future, as they have 
been in the past. Our differences over Bosnia should not and will not 
change that fact.
  However, as I see it, NATO's failure to respond adequately to the war 
in Bosnia has undermined its credibility and raised serious questions 
about NATO's continued relevance. It is not that NATO is unable, to act 
decisively, it is that NATO has an unwilling partner--namely, the 
United Nations who can veto air strikes and limit NATO targets. Last 
April, NATO decided ``* * * if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy 
weapons are carried out on any U.N.-designated safe areas * * * these 
weapons and other Bosnian Serb military assets * * * will be subject to 
NATO air strikes.'' That's pretty clear. And it's pretty clear that 
nothing has happened. The bottom line is that because of the so-called 
dual key arrangement, NATO does not have control over its military 
operations in Bosnia--the U.N. protection forces do. In my view this 
U.N. veto over NATO actions sets a dangerous precedent. I recognize the 
need for coordination, but not for subordination.
  Mr. President, I raised these concerns in my meetings at NATO. No one 
disputed the facts as I presented them. Everyone admitted that NATO's 
military actions have not been ``robust,'' because of the U.N. 
straitjacket. I was told however, that the decision had been made 
several years ago to go this route and so NATO was stuck with this 
decision. It seems to me that the worst excuse for sticking with any 
policy, is to say, well that is the way we've been doing it, so we must 
continue to do it this way.

  President Clinton assumed office with a ``lift and strike'' policy. 
In the spring of 1993, the White House held serious consultations with 
the congressional leadership on this matter and I told the President I 
would support him--it was the right thing to do. But, in May 1993, the 
administration decided to abandon its push for ``lift and strike'' and 
go along with the European approach of creating and protecting safe 
havens in Bosnia and pursuing a ``negotiated settlement.'' At the U.N. 
Security Council request and pursuant to U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, NATO agreed to protect all six safe havens in Bosnia 
through this use of air power. But while U.N. Security Council members 
make these bold decisions on paper, U.N. commanders block their 
implementation.
  As events in Bihac demonstrate, these U.N. resolutions and NATO 
authorities are meaningless. And whether intentionally or not, the 
failure of U.N. protection forces in Bosnia to permit militarily 
effective air strikes, against Serbian military targets--as decided 
upon by NATO in April of this year--is helping the Serb aggressors. The 
situation all over Bosnia is deteriorating--food convoys are not 
getting through; the U.N. airlift has been suspended; missile attacks 
on Sarajevo are escalating; more peacekeepers have been kidnapped; and 
the war in Bosnia has widened to include Serb forces from the Serb-
occupied area of Croatia known as Krajina. Why is this happening? Is it 
because NATO put a few holes in a runway last week?
  In my view the situation in Bosnia is deteriorating because United 
Nations and NATO's passivity amount to a green light to the Serbs. Far 
from adding to the protection of U.N. peacekeepers, inaction in the 
face of Serbian defiance has made the U.N. peacekeepers more 
vulnerable.
  As I told Prime Minister Major, I understand and appreciate the 
concerns of the British and others who have peacekeepers on the ground. 
I respect the soldiers who are making sacrifices and taking real risks 
on the ground in Bosnia. But, let's face it. The U.N. protection forces 
are unable to protect themselves, and they are even less able to 
protect the Bosnians. So, the idea that the United States should send 
peacekeepers to Bosnia, in the same helpless position and unable to 
effectively carry out their mandate, in order to have a say in Bosnia 
policy is ridiculous. We have done our share in the former Yugoslavia, 
just as we have done our share elsewhere around the globe. This 
argument distracts from the real issue--which is whether or not this 
policy has been a success.
  The European approach was designed to do two things: protect Bosnian 
civilians and bring about a negotiated settlement. We know that it has 
not achieved the first objective, and despite the Bosnian Government's 
signature on the Vance/Owen plan and the Contact Group plan last July, 
there is no peace. There are only two ways to achieve a settlement: by 
pressuring the Serbs, or by making further concessions to them. 
Unfortunately, the international community, and this administration, 
have only been prepared to do the latter.
  Apparently half of Bosnia is not enough for the Serbs to sign up to 
the Contact Group plan. But, it is not only land the Bosnian Serbs 
wants--they want to join Serbia in a ``Greater Serbia.'' And, the 
French have a proposal that may make this a reality. The French want to 
allow the Bosnian Serbs to confederate with Serbia--after all, they 
say, the Bosnians and the Croats have that option now through the 
agreements signed in Washington last spring. The French say this 
proposal provides for ``equality of rights''--equality of rights for 
the aggressors. What about equality of rights for the more than 2 
million people who have lost their homes? What about equality of rights 
for those who were tortured and maimed in concentration camps?
  Mr. President, this policy has failed not only the moral test, but 
has failed by its own standards. British officials say that the war has 
been ``contained.'' Serbs from the U.N. protected areas in Croatia are 
now involved. Furthermore, I don't understand how we contain Serbian 
aggression by legitimizing the results. If Bosnia, as a member state of 
the United Nations, is denied its basic rights--such as the right to 
self-defense--how does this deter Serbian repression of the 2 million 
Albanians in Kosova who do not have the rights accorded to a state? In 
my view, it doesn't. It gives another green light.
  During my meeting in London with Lady Thatcher I discussed NATO and 
U.N. policy toward Bosnia. Lady Thatcher agrees with me not only in 
pronouncing the president policy a miserable failure, but in the 
outlines for a new policy. It is time to return to President Clinton's 
original idea of ``lift and strike'' although it will probably have to 
be ``strike and lift.''
  The Bosnians have the inherent right to self defense--which is 
recognized in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. arms embargo was 
imposed on the former Yugoslavia and extending it to Bosnia is not only 
unjust, but illegal. One way to avoid the issue of illegality of 
denying Bosnia the ability to defend itself in the face of aggression, 
is to redefine the Bosnian War as a ``civil war''--which the Europeans 
have done and the Clinton administration has joined in doing. If the 
war in Bosnia is a civil war, why are Secretary Christopher and the 
British and French Foreign Ministers considering traveling to Belgrade 
this weekend to offer Serbian President Milosevic more concessions? If 
this is a civil war, why were sanctions imposed on Serbia? By 
redefining this war, the United States, its allies, and the United 
Nations, hope to limit their responsibility for the course of the war 
these past 3 years.
  Lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is legally and morally right. The 
practical difficulties of doing so are not to be minimized--the risks 
are there; they were outlined to me by Prime Minister Major quite 
eloquently. But, Bosnia is bleeding right now, despite the presence of 
thousands of peacekeepers. And, in the absence of NATO and U.N. 
resolve, the only alternative to the Bosnians continuing their struggle 
is a disguised surrender. Maybe the Bosnian Government will agree to a 
Greater Serbia. I don't know. They have had few options as they sit at 
the negotiating table with a Serb gun to their head and international 
mediators pressing for a signature at their side.
  However, if the Bosnians do not agree to sign up to a greater Serbia, 
if they want to continue their struggle for survival, those of us in 
the United States Senate who have supported their efforts, such as 
myself and Senator Lieberman will be back in January to work to lift 
the arms embargo. I will ask the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed 
Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee to hold hearings on 
all aspects of U.S. policy towards Bosnia and on options for lifting 
the arms embargo.
  I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues, a most 
compelling editorial by Morton Abramowitz, the president of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who writes in today's 
Washington Post about the risks of writing Bosnia off. And I quote, 
``Wouldn't assisted suicide be best for everybody, Bosnia most of all? 
We're practically there already. . . .''
  He continues, ``Should Bosnia disappear from the map or be left a 
misshapen shadow of itself, its dismembered ghost would haunt the 
region . . . for years to come.'' What then would be the fate of 
multiethnic Macedonia? . . . of Belgrade-oppressed Kosova, with its 95-
percent Albanian population? . . . The more we try to put the partition 
of Bosnia behind us the larger it looms ahead.
  ``Some prefer to think of Bosnia as a terminal case. But Bosnia is 
fighting for its life. It is we, in the west, who are inert and 
insensible. Whose life is it anyway.'' I ask unanimous consent that the 
entire article be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1994]

                          Bosnia: Last Chance

                         (By Morton Abramowitz)

       Do we really want to wake up someday and read this obituary 
     in the morning paper? ``Poor Bosnia--we didn't know her well. 
     Once a multiethnic state in the Balkans, now gone--
     partitioned, annexed, absorbed, confederated--a casualty of 
     post-Cold War ethnic conflict. . . . Survivors include 3 
     million refugees. Awarded (posthumously) the Nuremberg Prize 
     for Justice. In lieu of flowers, please send donations to the 
     Save NATO Fund.''
       If we and our allies are too quick to write Bosnia off, we 
     may end up burying other things besides.
       For more than two years, an increasingly divided West has 
     watched Bosnia bleed. Frustration has mounted because the 
     victim hasn't done us the courtesy of going fast or gently, 
     and we have grown weary of our vigil. No one shows any will 
     to save Bosnia, and no one will help Bosnia try to save 
     itself.
       Lacking a consensus on anything from lifting or not lifting 
     the arms embargo to delivering punishing air strikes or 
     pinpricks, the West has been left with a non-strategy of wait 
     and see and hope that something will turn up. Something 
     always has: Sarajevo market bombings, Gorazde, Bihac. Always 
     more refugees. Yesterday's papers even featured pictures of 
     Serbs forcing Muslims to wear the fez, like Jews forced by 
     the Nazis to wear the Star of David.
       The only thing worse than no consensus is a bad consensus. 
     And this week, a consensus worthy of Dr. Kevorkian has begun 
     to form. Whether it is being reached with agonized 
     reluctance, as in the U.S. case, or harsh realism, as in the 
     British and French, matters little. The effect on Bosnia 
     would be the same: pulling the plug.
       Wouldn't assisted suicide be best for everybody, Bosnia 
     most of all? We're practically there already. A big ``no 
     aggressive measures'' sign long has hung on Bosnia's door, 
     despite all the reassurances to the patient that we will use 
     ``all necessary means.'' Last summer, the five-nation contact 
     group persuaded Bosnia to sign the consent form for an ethnic 
     split of territory one step shy of partition: ``So you lose a 
     limb or two--or three--dismemberment's better than death. 
     Besides, we'll make the Serbs agree--or else.''
       Of course, the ``else'' never occurred. Instead, we relied 
     on Serbian President Milosevic turning against his arch 
     rival, the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. But Karadzic was 
     unimpressed by Milosevic's hollow sticks and ours. So now, 
     we're trying to entice him with juicy carrots.
       Meanwhile, Bosnia has the temerity to keep fighting for its 
     own existence. Only a month ago, the media marveled at the 
     success that the Bosnian army was having in the Bihac pocket, 
     regaining home ground lost to Serbian ethnic cleansing. Now, 
     as resurgent Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb forces converge 
     on the Bihac ``safe area,'' cleansing and burning as they go, 
     the Bosnian army is castigated for having had the nerve to 
     try to take back its own territory.
       The Bihac ``safe zone,'' swelled with refugees from both 
     the prior and current Serb campaigns, reportedly is being hit 
     at a rate of six shells a minute. The unchecked Serb attack 
     on Bihac is also destroying the Bosnian-Croat Federation. 
     Though the West thus far has prevented Zabreb from re-
     entering the war, Croatia now sees that only force, and not 
     the West's intercession, will get back the Krajina.
       There is still time--very little--for the West and the 
     international community to act, not only to preserve Bosnia 
     but also to restore some respect for international 
     institutions, for principles and for something called the 
     Western alliance. That will not come from pressuring Bosnia 
     to surrender--it won't--or agreeing to a Greater Serbia. We 
     and our allies should:
       Recognize that UNPROFOR--now more than ever clearly a 
     hostage--has become more of a hindrance than a help. Withdraw 
     it.
       Since UNPROFOR's withdrawal inevitably giving up the 
     enclaves, evacuate their civilian inhabitants to other, less-
     exposed areas.
       Put the Bosnian Serbs on notice that any interference with 
     the U.N. and civilian withdrawals will be met with massive 
     NATO air attacks.
       Focus on consolidating the Bosnian government and its 
     position in central Bosnia.
       Once UNPROFOR is gone, open up the arms spigot to Bosnia.
       Tell the Bosnian Serbs that if they continue to attack 
     civilian populations, prevent the delivery of humanitarian 
     supplies or fail to engage in any serious negotiations, we 
     will use air power against arms dumps, oil depots and 
     military targets throughout the territory they occupy.
       This is not a great proposal. It has uncertainties and 
     difficulties, particularly with relief supplies. None of the 
     above can work unless we and our NATO allies are prepared to 
     use robust, sustained air power, and even if we are, the 
     desired results are not guaranteed. The Bosnian government 
     may balk at some of it. Civilian populations would have to be 
     moved--safely--en masse. NATO must be persuaded. But it is 
     better in the long term than Western capitulation to Serb 
     aggression.
       Critics will argue that doing the above will only prolong 
     the misery and expand the war. They have said that for three 
     years while Bosnia has hemorrhaged. They have constantly 
     proposed straw-man military options for the infusion of large 
     numbers of ground troops that are not options but excuses for 
     inaction. They do not explain how a Bosnia-less Balkans, or 
     its equivalent, can produce a stable peace.
       Should Bosnia disappear from the map or be left a misshapen 
     shadow of itself, its dismembered ghost would haunt the 
     region and cause the West even bigger headaches--for years to 
     come. What then would be the fate of multiethnic Macedonia? 
     Of the volatile Krajina? Of Belgrade-oppressed Kosovo, with 
     its 95 percent Albanian population? If the Serbs get their 
     Greater Serbia, wouldn't the Albanians of Kosovo be entitled 
     to a Greater Albania? The more we try to put the partition of 
     Bosnia behind us, the larger it looms ahead.
       Some prefer to think of Bosnia as a terminal case. But 
     Bosnia is fighting for its life. It is we in the West who are 
     inert and insensible. Whose life is it anyway?

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, finally, Mr. President, I would like to call 
attention to a letter I received from Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of 
Pakistan who supports our efforts to lift the arms embargo. Pakistan is 
one of many countries who would be willing and able to assist Bosnia if 
the arms embargo were lifted. The United States would not be alone. 
Recently, 96 countries in the U.N. General Assembly voiced their 
support for lifting the arms embargo. I ask unanimous consent that the 
Prime Minister's letter to me be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                               Prime Minister,

                                      Pakistan, November 29, 1994.
     Senator Robert Dole,
     Embassy of the United States,
     London.
       My Dear Senator Dole: I had hoped we would be able to meet 
     during your visit to London and I would be able to offer 
     personally my felicitations on the remarkable victory 
     achieved by the Republican Party in the recent elections and 
     your own elevation in the new Congress to the position of 
     Senate majority leader. Unfortunately it appears that our 
     schedules make this difficult and I must therefore be content 
     with congratulating you through this note.
       I recall with great pleasure our meeting during my visit to 
     the United States in 1989 and the clear manifestation of your 
     views on America's foreign policy and what it objectives 
     should be. Under your guidance the Senate will now move 
     purposefully to mould and promote these objectives. A matter 
     of immediate concern in Bosnia. Like you I have been deeply 
     concerned about the situation in Bihac. The United States, 
     Pakistan and other like-minded countries must work together 
     to ensure that Serbian aggression is not rewarded and the 
     dismemberment of a member state of the United Nations is not 
     tolerated. The consequences of temerity, particularly the 
     repercussions in other parts of the world, are too horrible 
     to contemplate and must weigh heavily with all of us.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                   Benazir Bhutto.

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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