[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 149 (Thursday, December 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: December 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  OBSERVATIONS ON U.S. ROLE IN AFRICA

 Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today Senator Paul Simon, 
chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senator Harry Reid, 
and I are submitting a report on the our trip to Africa earlier this 
summer. As a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I was exposed firsthand to some of 
the tragedies in Africa, and, for the first time, had an opportunity to 
meet with international actors in the region, as well as reflect on the 
role the United States can play in Africa. I benefited greatly from 
Senator Simon's and Senator Reid's experience and expertise during the 
trip, and thank them for their leadership on these issues.
  The severe problems in Africa today are, by and large, the 
consequences of colonial and post-colonial struggles. In the past 
decades, countries such as Angola have transitioned from colonies to 
battlegrounds for cold war ideological warfare to struggling post-cold 
war democracies. Today, the continent continues to suffer serious 
political problems. The bitter wars in western and southern Africa 
destroy not only entire countries but prevent subregional and 
continental development as well. And clearly, the violence exacerbates 
transnational problems such as the environment, public health, and 
demographics.
  From an economic and political point of view, the United States would 
do well to transcend its historic view that Africa is of marginal 
importance. With almost 700 million people and rich natural resources, 
Africa holds tremendous potential for United States interests. 
Democratic and free market reforms are sweeping almost all 48 countries 
in the continent, which, with political stability and proper land 
management, will create a booming consumer base and labor market for 
the next century. As the United States forges new alliances throughout 
the globe, we would be foolish to leave Africa behind.
  The United States also bears at least partial responsibility for the 
militarization of western and southern Africa during the cold war, 
which has led to the humanitarian disasters in Angola and Liberia. For 
these reasons, the United States has an obligation and an interest to 
help wage peace in Africa.
  In the past, the United States has perceived its policy options in 
Africa very narrowly: We can either send money, including weapons, or 
deploy troops. Today, with a mounting Federal deficit and questionable 
effectiveness of some foreign aid programs, Americans have been 
disinclined to throw money at problems. The use of United States 
military force, especially as part of multilateral operations in places 
like Somalia has been equally unpopular. With the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the United States and Africa can both benefit from an 
expanded and more creative relationship.


                 1. facilitation of peace negotiations

  First, with most of Africa tilting in our direction, the United 
States and other Western leaders have unprecedented opportunities to 
facilitate peace negotiations in decades-old conflicts, as we have seen 
in other parts of the world. In Liberia and Angola particularly, where 
peace negotiations are in their second rounds, the United States can 
set a tone--or create an atmosphere for peace--by persuading all 
parties that peace and regional stability are in everyone's interest. 
The United States has taken an active role in negotiations in both 
these conflicts, and its tenacity has helped push along an often 
frustrating and discouraging process. Hopefully, the conclusion of the 
Lusaka protocols on November 20 signals a new start to the peace 
process in Angola.
  From our discussions in Liberia it was evident that the 
implementation of the Cotonou agreement of 1991, the first peace treaty 
in Liberia, had failed. During this past summer, fighting intensified 
and the humanitarian situation worsened. Nongovernmental organizations 
[NGOs]--the lifeline in many of these areas--are leaving because the 
United Nations cannot protect them. As a step toward perfecting 
Cotonou, Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, the new President of the 
Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], mediated the 
Akosombo accords, consolidating factions of the opposition of the LNTG. 
As followup, he will convene all parties to the Cotonou and Akosombo 
agreements this month to conclude Akosombo II, which hopefully will end 
5 years of civil war and anarchy. With historical United States 
interest and ties to Liberia, the resolution of this war deserves 
higher American priority, and we should stand ready to advance the 
process of reconciliation and cooperation.
  Like Liberia, the Angola peace process appears to be on the verge of 
a breakthrough. During our visit, the U.N.-sponsored Lusaka talks were 
at a standstill: The Angolan Government had accepted a U.N. proposal, 
but UNITA had not. Our delegation explored several ways to accommodate 
as well as pressure Dr. Jones Savimbi, leader of UNITA, to accept the 
agreement. We encouraged the principals to seek South African President 
Nelson Mandela's help to break the stalemate. Since then President 
Mandela has met with Angolan President dos Santos and Zairian President 
Mobutu. Dr. Savimbi did not attend.
  After protracted negotiations, the Angolan Government and the UNITA 
rebel movement initialed the Lusaka protocols on October 31, and, after 
much touch and go, including abominable air strikes by the Government 
against UNITA, signed a peace pact on November 20. In a major 
concession, Dr. Savimbi agreed to abandon control of Huambo, the 
province of his headquarters, in exchange for the vice-presidency and 
control of some diamond-rich areas. The protocols also call for talks 
between the two militaries on the modalities of a ceasefire and 
disarmament, as mandated in the Bicesse accords.
  In spite of these achievements, though, I am somewhat skeptical that 
this is the end of warfare in Angola. Immediately following the 
initialing, the Government sought to consolidate its gains by launching 
aggressive attacks on several UNITA strongholds, forcing UNITA leaders 
to flee. Both sides are heavily armed, and neither trusts the other, or 
feels the other has demonstrated a commitment to peace. The United 
States should use its influence to discourage any further offensive in 
Angola by either side, and clarify that we will not support any 
multilateral aid package to any party that undermines the Lusaka 
protocols or the spirit of the accords. At the same time, we should 
assist to the extent we can in the daunting tasks which lay before 
Angola: No matter what agreement is reached, the road to reconciliation 
will be difficult.
  I also want to mention an important point about United States forces 
joining a United Nations peacekeeping force in Angola. I raised this 
issue during the appropriate meetings in Angola. The unanimous response 
from the President, the Foreign Minister and the United Nations Mission 
[UNAVEM] was that U.S. troops were neither expected nor wanted. In 
fact, President dos Santos has submitted to the United Nations a list 
of countries from which he will request peacekeepers; the United States 
was not included. Furthermore, American pubic opinion would not support 
such a deployment. According to a UNAVEM general, the most effective 
contribution America can make is administrative and financial support, 
an extension of its role in facilitating the peace talks.


           2. Halting the Proliferation of Conventional Arms

  A second avenue for American leadership is halting the proliferation 
of conventional arms. Wars continue to ravage Angola and Liberia in 
part because regional governments and peacekeepers lack the resolve to 
intercept the arms trade. The smuggling of weapons prospers because, 
among other reasons, corrupt officials will tolerate the sales if they 
will earn a profit; military men with an interest in one side will 
transfer weapons out of ethnic affinities; or, as in the case with 
Liberia, soldiers need additional money to buy food.
  This is an area which the United States can influence. We should work 
more closely with other countries to crack down on arms smuggling by 
sanctioning arms suppliers; raising the issue at the highest levels, 
and publicizing violations of arms embargoes and sales moratoria. Upon 
our return, several Senators wrote letters requesting leaders in 
Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire and Nigeria to crackdown on arms trading, 
but so far no one has come forward willing to work with us. I would 
urge the State Department to leverage the issue.
  We also urged the United Nations to report publicly on ceasefire 
violations, such as arms smuggling, a request supported by the United 
Nations Security Council on July 13. I would further suggest that the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia [UNOMIL] look into halting 
the trade at the point of origin by tightening border controls in Cote 
d'Ivoire and Guines; and at the point of entry by inspecting all 
aircraft destined for Liberia for illegal weapons.


                    3. Lessons of America for Africa

  A third approach the United States can take is offering some of its 
own experiences and successes as possible solutions to problems in 
Africa. While we have not as a nation experienced much of the horrific 
warfare or extreme poverty that has transpired in Africa, some of our 
dilemmas may relate in some way to problems in Africa. One issue in 
which I saw a connection is in the wrenching problem of the widespread 
use of child soldiers.
  According to UNICEF, an estimated 6,000 children under the age of 15 
are combatants in Liberia's civil war. Human Rights Watch/Africa 
reports that children are often conscripted to fight or to monitor 
military checkpoints, and many of them are tortured. This issue 
resonated strongly with representatives of the LNTG when I raised it in 
our meeting. They stressed that children are going into soldiering 
because they have to survive, or there is little else to do.
  I was reminded of a Milwaukee project called ``Hang Tough'' which 
encourages child-gang members to give up their guns and integrate into 
mainstream society. Kids ask, though, ``Hang Tough, for what?'' To 
disarm, a gang member or a child warrior has to be granted safety and 
given a chance. I described to the LNTG the ``midnight basketball'' 
program we have in some areas which offers children a positive 
alternative to roaming the streets at night, dodging bullets, and 
running drugs. In response, someone said that is what was needed in 
Liberia.
  America must urge the warring factions in Liberia to end the 
recruitment of child soldiers in accordance with international human 
rights conventions. And we should support the campaigns of UNICEF and 
the International Red Cross to ban the use of child soldiers. But we 
must also give the children an alternative to professional soldiering 
by which they can still feed and protect themselves. A pilot program 
such as that in Milwaukee may be useful.


            4. Improving Quality of Humanitarian Assistance

  Africa has suffered vicious brutality from these wars. After 19 years 
of war, Luanda is barely a functioning capitol. Though the worst of the 
war has not reached inner-Luanda, it bears the scars of a city that has 
been isolated and starved for years. What was once a beautiful urban 
center is today a series of delapidated, nonfunctional buildings. There 
are few young men in the city, and those that remain are either armed, 
or are amputees. Random gunshots are heard all day and night, and 
violent personal crimes are common. Every few blocks you can see and 
smell 4-foot heaps  of garbage, which serve as playgrounds for Angolan 
children. Hospitals are barely supplied, and in the only children's 
hospital in Luanda up to 15 children die a day.

  In response to early warning signs that up to 1,000 people could die 
a day in Luanda, the United Nations, through the World Food Programme, 
established the largest food lift in the history of the world. While 
the humanitarian effort has been successful, I became concerned when I 
learned that, like in other parts of the world, much of the food and 
vaccines are spoiled or rotten by the time they reach refugee camps. In 
our tour of a refugee camp outside of Luanda, we saw vaccines which had 
not been properly refrigerated, and were administered with dirty, 
recycled needles. Bags of rice and wheat were either rotten or infested 
because of weather conditions in Angola. In some cases, it is more 
dangerous to get a spoiled product than to get nothing at all.
  In an effort to maximize the limited supplies sent overseas, we 
should be applying the necessary technology to ensure that food and 
vaccines are administered intact. At the request of officials in the 
camps, we looked into available packaging to preserve the food sent to 
Angola. A time-released pesticide within the bags, as suggested by 
some, is not possible because it would expose consumers directly to 
harmful toxins. I have been able to find no other technologies to 
address this problem.
  The Department of Agriculture maintains that approximately 2 percent 
of the world's food assistance is lost because of infestation and/or 
moisture problems, and that storage problems in-country account for far 
more problems than packaging does. The reports we heard on the ground 
indicated that closer to 25 percent of all food was spoiled even before 
it reached the camps, and that a great deal more was invested while in 
the camps. It is imperative that international food assistance efforts 
include technical assistance for storage in-country and in the camps, 
and that the donor community send only usable food as assistance. It 
makes little sense to get through the logistical nightmare of shipping 
food to crisis areas only to see it spoiled upon distribution.
  Similarly, we have looked into available mechanisms to preserve the 
``cold chain,'' the path by which vaccines reach their destinations. In 
essence, the cold chain depends upon trained personnel setting up a 
system in which vaccines can be transported from cold storage box to 
cold storage box to protect their integrity until they are used. 
Because so many warring countries lack any kind of refrigeration, 
electricity, or easy transport, it becomes a complicated process. In 
fact, WHO estimates that 50 percent of vaccines purchased for 
developing countries become unviable in the cold chain. USAID, UNICEF, 
and WHO are working together to develop technologies to strengthen the 
cold chain, but success is of course intertwined with overall 
development and infrastructure. I will continue to work to apply 
available technologies to our humanitarian assistance 
programs, particularly to war-torn areas, in the hope that we get the 
most for our money.

  These assistance programs are critical to Africa's survival, and 
should continue. However, in some cases, such as Angola, the Government 
should be required to contribute more to internal needs. For example, 
the Government of Angola takes in a reported $3 billion a year in oil 
revenues. While it claims that all of its resources are tied up in the 
war effort, the President recently inaugurated his new $10 million 
place, and the Government just opened up a lavish new central bank in 
the capitol. Similarly, UNITA earns hefty profits from its diamond 
mines. Instead of supplying supporters with basic services, though, 
UNITA invests more in weapons. As peace nears, the international 
community cannot be expected to provide basic services if the 
Government is squandering its money.
  In the same vein, as the President of the Angolan National Assembly 
pointed out, food and medical aid will only save people from dying: It 
will sustain their lives. In peacetime, Angola has the potential not 
only to feed itself, but to generate revenue by feeding other countries 
as well. For this reason, donor countries and aid agencies should 
promote ``food for work'' programs to give Africans the tools to grow 
and sell their own food. The United States can organize such packages 
without being the sole donor.


                  5. Supporting Regional Institutions

  While development assistance for basic needs such as nutrition, 
education, family planning and immunizations are critical, these 
programs will lack sustainability unless the political systems in 
Africa can guarantee stability. As the saying goes, it is more hopeful 
if African solutions can be found for African conflicts.
  To operationalize this, we should concentrate on strengthening 
regional and subregional institutions, such as the OAU, the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development [IGAAD], 
Southern Africa Development Community [SADC], and the Economic 
Community of West African States [ECOWAS]. These organizations could 
provide a framework for Africans--rather than the United Nations or 
individual nations--to engage in preventive diplomacy, and resolve 
their own conflicts, on their own terms, before they explode. As 
regionalism overtakes the globe, the development of such institutions 
will be an important factor in the growth of areas such as Asia and the 
Middle East. Likewise, regional organizations can potentially 
facilitate peace and growth in Africa, and minimize the cost to the 
international community.
  While the OAU may have been ineffective in the past, it is worthwhile 
and timely to enhance the organization's conflict resolution 
capabilities. Indeed, with a tightly stretched United Nations and 
``crises fatigue'' by the international community, there is no other 
option. We discussed these issues in Tunisia, and encouraged President 
Ben Ali to take an activist approach in restructuring the OAU for its 
new responsibilities. The African Conflict Resolution Act, introduced 
by Congressman Harry Johnston, chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
African Affairs and enacted last month, is the kind of creative and 
experimental approach which integrates African and American interests.


                6. advancing human rights and democracy

  While democracy and human rights are completely absent in war-torn 
Angola and Liberia, other African countries are making real attempts to 
incorporate these concepts into their government. The United States 
should support these movements, while emphasizing the links between 
human rights and economic development.
  In Cote D'Ivoire, where the Government is transitioning to a market 
economy while building democracy, human rights are being sacrificed for 
the Government's policy of economic austerity. For example, during 
unofficial meetings in Abidjan with human rights activists and a member 
of Parliament, our delegation discovered that human rights has become 
the underlying theme of the student movement. Upon learning of 18 
students who were missing after protesting cuts in student subsidies, 
the delegation conveyed the importance of police accountability in a 
democracy, and urged the Ivorian Government to inform the families of 
the whereabouts of those arrested. Within days after our visit, the 
U.S. Embassy in Abidjan told us that the 18 students were released from 
police custody.
  Cote D'Ivoire should be commended for its efforts to reconstruct the 
country. But the United States should continue to press for the 
protection of human rights throughout all phases of development. This 
will not only strengthen democracy, but ensure the success of economic 
reforms.
  Our policy in Tunisia should be the same. Tunisia has made 
significant gains in women's rights, family planning, and protection of 
religious beliefs. However, it has administered an often oppressive 
policy toward human rights activists. The Government justifies its 
crackdown by citing legitimate concerns about Islamic fundamentalism 
dominating its political and military system. With Algeria to its west 
and Libya to its east, Tunisia is trapped between two countries which 
do not support its new direction. Further, internal support for 
religious extremism is potentially threatening to the regime.
  Tunisia is on the verge of becoming a fully developed country. 
However, its economic prosperity could be sacrificed if it is not 
followed up by political freedom. I believe that it is in the interest 
of the United States to support Tunisia's continued reforms, assist in 
its struggle against violent extremism, and support its integration 
into the international economy. To do this most effectively, we should 
encourage human rights reform as well. As one Tunisian official said, 
the moderate government is truly Islamic in its values, while the 
extremists, in many cases, are using religion as a political tool to 
defeat Western influence in the Arab world. While we have been unable 
to design a policy to combat violent Islamism in the world, I believe 
that democracy is one of our most potent weapons against extremism.

  With the end of the cold war and its emergence as the strongest power 
in the world, the United States has new responsibilities and new 
opportunities. Through creative approaches to diplomacy, we potentially 
have the ability to influence events which will determine whether the 
majority of Africa joins the international community, or whether it 
destroys itself in the aftermath of its post-colonial struggles. Beyond 
a moral imperative to assist Africa in its transition, the United 
States has a great deal to gain from a properous Africa. If we 
strategize wisely, the investment we make today can be small, but 
garner significant advantages later.

                          ____________________