[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 149 (Thursday, December 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: December 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                 UNITED STATES-NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR DEAL

 Mr. BOND. Mr. President, just over a month ago, the 
administration announced that it had entered into a deal with the North 
Koreans to address the smoldering nuclear crisis on the Korean 
peninsula. At the time the agreement was announced, I had serious 
reservations as to whether it was in our Nation's--or the world's--best 
interests. Having had more time to understand the agreement and to 
gather more information about it, I am now even more concerned that we 
got a bad deal--a deal that will come back to haunt us in the future.
  The problems with this agreement are many. Most important, it grants 
major concessions to the North Koreans while not requiring significant 
reciprocal actions for a decade. The administration agreed to give 
North Korea the two things it has coveted for decades--the prestige of 
diplomatic recognition and the economic boost that will come with a 
lowering of sanctions.
  The lowering of economic sanctions is particularly important to a 
regime that is unable to feed its population to the point that it has 
been forced to lead a national campaign to cut back on the number of 
meals that its citizens eat each day. This move to lower economic 
barriers will significantly relieve pressure on the current leadership 
and give them breathing room they would not otherwise have had.
  Another problem with the agreement is that it leaves North Korea with 
control over the nuclear weapons--which our intelligence services have 
said they have--for at least a decade. That gives them a significant 
amount of leverage in future negotiations, and continues a great threat 
to stability in Northeast Asia.
  Also, the agreement fails to address the conventional military threat 
to South Korea and the tens of thousands of Americans there. North 
Korea will continue to maintain a 1-million-man Army just 30 miles from 
Seoul, along with thousands of artillery pieces and other offensive 
equipment. Withdrawal of at least some of those forces should have been 
a requirement of an agreement.
  And, not insignificantly, the agreement sets the precedent for other 
nations that don't want to live up to their commitments under the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, that they do not have to do so. 
Instead, they can try to bargain their way into a better deal as North 
Korea has done.
  Proponents of the agreement will, of course, argue that we got a good 
deal because once it is fully implemented--10 years from now--nuclear 
weapons will have been eliminated from the peninsula. The problem with 
that argument is that it assumes the agreement will be fully 
implemented and that the North Koreans will live up to their promises. 
Experience would show that those are not safe assumptions.
  The North Koreans have mastered the art of using negotiating tactics 
as a means of delay. Time and again they have made agreements and then 
failed to live up to them. There is no reason to believe that they are 
not once again simply buying time--getting diplomatic recognition, 
getting economic assistance and investment--only to change their minds 
when it comes time to fulfill their side of the bargain. I hope the 
administration is not so naive as to assume that the North is telling 
the truth this time as they have failed to do so many times in the 
past.
  All of these objections occurred to me when I first learned about the 
agreement in October. My concern soared, however, when I learned about 
a side letter that the President had signed along with initial 
agreement.
  It is interesting to note that there was no mention of the side 
letter when the agreement was first announced by the administration. In 
fact, the letter was not released until the following week, giving the 
clear appearance that the administration was trying to avoid scrutiny 
of its contents.
  There are several problems with the letter which is from the 
President to Kim Jong Il, the son of recently deceased dictator Kim Il 
song.
  The letter is addressed to ``His Excellency Kim Jong Il, Supreme 
Leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.'' That is news to 
me. Unless I have missed something, Kim has never been designated the 
leader of the DPRK. Instead, the leadership of the country has remained 
in limbo. It seems particularly ill-advised to have addressed the 
letter in a way that may not be accurate and that may have an impact on 
some internal power struggle of which we are not aware.
  More importantly, in the letter, the President gives his commitment 
that he will use the full powers of the White House to facilitate the 
construction of light-water reactor in the DPRK and the provision of 
interim oil supplies to meet that country's needs. He goes on to 
indicate that if the reactor and oil supplies are not paid for--as 
planned--by other countries such as Japan and South Korea, he will do 
all he can to ensure that the United States pays for them. He does 
mention that such action would be subject to the approval of Congress.
  In my opinion, that is a very significant letter. In it, the 
President commits to pay--with our tax dollars--the billions it will 
cost to build a nuclear reactor, and to pay for the hundreds of 
thousands of tons of oil that the agreement promises over the next 
several years.
  Already there are disputes over who will bear the costs of the deal. 
South Korea's Foreign Minister has stated clearly that his country does 
not intend to pay for the supply of oil to the North over the next 
decade, and already the U.S. taxpayers are picking up the tab for the 
first 50,000 tons.
  I strongly question the idea of using U.S. taxpayer dollars to 
provide economic assistance to North Korea--a country responsible for a 
major war, for the fact that we are forced to station almost 40,000 
troops in Korea, for dozens of acts of terrorism, and for contributing 
to the spread of dangerous weapons throughout the world. I would 
imagine that the majority of this body would share that view.
  It is clear to me that the Korean agreement deserves significantly 
more study. I am pleased that several Members of this body have 
announced the intention to review the agreement, and I certainly intend 
to participate in that review.

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