[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 147 (Tuesday, November 29, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: November 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING: A STATUS REPORT

  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Speaker, last year in the final days of the first 
session of the 103d Congress I delivered a special order on nuclear 
weapons testing and the international drive to end forever the testing, 
development and proliferation of nuclear weapons on the face of the 
Earth. Tonight, in my last speech before Congress and as a legislator, 
I want to revisit the issue and update America on the 1994 effort to 
achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty and other nonproliferation 
efforts.
  The United States, due largely to congressional efforts, has not 
tested a nuclear bomb anywhere for more than 2 years. President Clinton 
extended the U.S. moratorium through September of 1995, and I commend 
him. Russia, France, and Britain also have refrained from nuclear 
weapons testing during this U.S. moratorium. Only China, in a rogue 
fashion, has tested brazenly nuclear weapons in the face of 
international pressure not to do so. This issue, though quieter than 
the raucous debates of past years, needs the attention of the Congress 
and the American people.
  I am pleased to report the Congress continues to play an active role 
in arms control and proliferation issues. With regards to nuclear 
weapons testing, the House adopted my amendment to the defense 
authorization bill this past June. My amendment applauds the President 
for maintaining the U.S. nuclear testing moratorium and for taking a 
leadership role towards negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. 
It encourages all nuclear powers to refrain from conducting nuclear 
explosions prior to conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and 
finally, it urges the conference on disarmament to make all possible 
progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty by the end of this 
year.
  Importantly, 263 House Members voted for this amendment, the largest 
vote total in support of nuclear moratorium ever recorded in the House.
  Members of the House and Senate communicated with the executive 
branch on a number of key nuclear testing issues including the pace of 
the CTB negotiations, scope of the CTB Treaty, Chinese testing, North 
Korea, hydronuclear testing, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
otherwise known as NPT, and the Nuclear Posture Review.

                             {time}   2040

  Within the Congress, Members also campaigned actively to reduce the 
funding for nuclear weapons testing activities. In the end, the budget 
for nuclear testing was reduced by $20 million for fiscal 1995.
  With this as an introduction, let me now move into the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty talks at the conference on disarmament. For the record, 
I include a fact sheet from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
entitled Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This fact sheet is the 
administration's own progress report on the CTB negotiations, and I am 
making this report a part of the Record at this point.

                     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty


                       The Status of Negotiations

       Negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
     (CTBT) began in January 1994 at the Geneva Conference on 
     Disarmament (CD), the world's only multilateral arms control 
     forum with global representation. The CTBT negotiations are a 
     top priority of the Conference.
       The CD held three negotiating rounds during its 1994 
     session, before formally adjourning September 7. In addition, 
     the Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee agreed to hold 
     intersessional negotiations from November 28 to December 16 
     with the possibility of additional time to be allocated 
     before the 1995 CD session. Bilateral and multilateral 
     consultations will also continue throughout the fall.
       The third round concluded with the creation of a ``rolling 
     text'' which contains both agreed treaty provisions and 
     disputed text marked by brackets.
       Much of the work to date has been accomplished in two 
     working groups established last January. One addresses 
     verification issues and the other addresses legal and 
     institutional issues.
       Although no final decisions have been made, it appears that 
     international verification regime will include, at a minimum, 
     a global network of seismic stations and radionuclide sensors 
     and the right to conduct on-site inspections. The negotiators 
     also are considering the use of other technologies to monitor 
     compliance, including hydroacoustic and infrasound 
     sensors.
       The negotiators are considering ``associated measures,'' 
     such as information exchanges dealing with large chemical 
     explosions, that could contribute to ensuring compliance with 
     the treaty.
        In sum, the basic building blocks for a treaty are in 
     place. The ``rolling text'' will be the basis of a final 
     treaty and thus will greatly advance negotiations during the 
     intersessional period and the 1995 session.


                      U.S. Negotiating Objectives

       The United States is firmly committed to concluding the 
     CTBT. Our objective is to conclude the negotiations at the 
     earliest possible time. In particular, the United States 
     seeks as much progress as possible by the time of the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference next 
     spring.
       The United States believes the treaty should be 
     comprehensive. It should not be a threshold treaty. It should 
     rule out all nuclear explosions anytime, anywhere, including 
     so-called ``peaceful nuclear explosions.''
       The CTBT should be a multilateral treaty open to signature 
     by all nations. The goal is universal adherence.
       The comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions should 
     apply to all treaty parties equally.
       The CTBT should contain robust monitoring and verification 
     measures to provide high confidence that states are complying 
     with their treaty obligations.


                    CTBT and International Security

       A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain development of 
     nuclear weapons capability in proliferant states.
       A CTBT will enhance international security by constraining 
     the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.


                Relationship Between a CTBT and the NPT

       The United States does not accept linkage of the CTBT's 
     completion to extension of the NPT. The NPT is important in 
     its own right and should not be held hostage to negotiations 
     on other issues.
       However, the United States recognizes that progress on a 
     CTBT will be important to our efforts to achieve indefinite 
     and unconditional extension of the NPT at the 1995 Extension 
     Conference.


                            U.S. Moratorium

       The United States has not conducted a nuclear weapon test 
     since September of 1992. In March, the President announced a 
     further extension of our testing moratorium through September 
     1995.
       The extension of the moratorium underlines the importance 
     the United States places on achieving a test ban treaty.
       We welcome the comparable restraint shown by Russia, 
     Britain and France.


                       Continued Chinese Testing

       The United States deeply regrets the latest Chinese nuclear 
     test on June 10, 1994.
       We continue to urge China to refrain from further tests and 
     to join the other nuclear powers in global moratorium as we 
     work to complete the CTBT at the earliest possible time.


             Safety and Reliability of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

       Finally, after a thorough review, the Administration 
     determined that the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal are 
     safe and reliable. Additional nuclear tests conceivably could 
     help the U.S. prepare for a CTBT and provide additional 
     improvements in safety and reliability. However, the 
     President determined that the cost to our nonproliferation 
     objectives of resuming testing would outweigh any possible 
     benefits.
       The United States will continue a variety of programs to 
     maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its 
     weapons.

  Mr. Speaker, let me quote in part from the report:

       In sum, the basic building blocks for a treaty are in 
     place. The rolling text will be the basis of a final treaty 
     and thus will greatly advance negotiations during the 
     intersessional period and the 1995 session.
       The United States is firmly committed to concluding the 
     CTBT. Our objective is to conclude the negotiations at the 
     earliest possible time. In particular, the United States 
     seeks as much progress as possible by the time of the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] Extension Conference next 
     spring.
       The United States believes the treaty should be 
     comprehensive. It should not be a threshold treaty. It should 
     rule out all nuclear explosions anytime, anywhere, including 
     so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.
       The CTBT should contain robust monitoring and verification 
     measures to provide high confidence that States are complying 
     with their treaty obligations.


                    CTBT and International Security

       A CTBT will strengthen the global norm against the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons and constrain development of 
     nuclear weapons capability in proliferant states.
       A CTBT will enhance international security by constraining 
     the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.
       After a thorough review, the administration determined that 
     the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal are safe and 
     reliable. Additional nuclear tests conceivably could help the 
     U.S. prepare for a CTBT and provide additional improvements 
     in safety and reliability. However, the President determined 
     that the cost to our nonproliferation objectives of resuming 
     testing would outweigh any possible benefits.

  I applaud the administration's stated objective of achieving a 
comprehensive test ban treaty at the ``earliest possible date.'' I 
applaud the work of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the 
chief U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Steven Ledogar. I also want to praise 
the resolute leadership of Hazel O'Leary, the Secretary of Energy. The 
Department of Energy under Secretary O'Leary leadership has played a 
vital role in maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons testing moratorium 
and contributed to other worthy non-proliferation objectives.
  I have tremendous respect for our President, especially in this area. 
In less than 2 years, the Clinton administration has eclipsed the 
previous 12 years in progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty.
  At the same time, the administration must do more to bring a CTB to 
fruition. I believe firmly that President Clinton must become involved 
personally in this issue. In short order, President Clinton can provide 
the leadership and the necessary momentum to our international partners 
to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion prior to the NPT 
Review Conference in May of 1995.
  My greatest fear is the administration and our international partners 
at the Conference on Disarmament will fail to take advantage of today's 
opportunity. This is our window of opportunity to end forever nuclear 
weapons testing. I am troubled greatly that 1994's opportunities to 
conclude a CTBT have now passed. The obstacles to a comprehensive test 
ban treaty seem to grow as time erodes.
  No one knows what will happen in Russia. Boris Yeltsin has been a 
strident opponent of renewed nuclear weapons testing. And the Russians 
have negotiated in good faith, in fact, the Russians deserve 
recognition for their advocacy for a CTBT.
  The United States and the world community must recognize that a 
successful CTBT and an indefinite extension of the NPT supports the 
reform and democracy efforts led by President Boris Yeltsin. Delay only 
adds credence to the anti-reform militarists within Russia who seek to 
reverse Russia's historic change. Vladimir Zhironovsky is the most 
vivid reminder of the threat Russia may become once again if Russian 
reform fails. In his 1991 Presidential Campaign, Zhironovsky stated, 
``What price Paris? How about London? Washington? Los Angeles? How much 
are you willing to pay so I don't wipe them from the face of the earth 
with SS-18's. You doubt me? Want to take a chance? Let's get started.'' 
Ominous sounds.
  The United States spend $4 trillion to wage and win the cold war. We 
must not jeopardize this investment by failing to support Russia's 
reform efforts.
  In addition, the United States can ill-afford another arms race. The 
last one nearly bankrupted the United States; the next one surely will.
  Importantly, on November 16, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine voted to 
accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma visited the United States last week to discuss the NPT and other 
nuclear weapons matters with President Clinton.
  At the conference on disarmament, the United States continues to 
insist that all five nuclear powers agree to the text of a CTB before 
they move forward to the full conference. This is not leadership in my 
mind; rather, it is buckpassing.
  It gives intransigent states like France and China a free hand to 
delay the negotiations. France and China have both taken the 
administration's que. The signs are obvious at the negotiations; a 
hesitancy by France and China to discuss a draft treaty, continued 
advocacy for allowable nuclear experimentation under a CTB regime, and 
insistence that a treaty before 1996 is impossible. France and China 
are the two States with ambitions to test nuclear bombs through 1996 
and perhaps even beyond.
  France continues to adhere to a moratorium imposed by President 
Mitterand in April 1992, much to their credit. President Mitterand has 
been a stalwart for peace and he continues to oppose French nuclear 
weapons testing, but his presidency is drawing to a close. The 
adherence hangs in the balance.
  France will select a new President in the spring of 1995. 
Unfortunately, the French election is scheduled just prior to the NPT 
extension conference. The political uncertainty caused by the upcoming 
French election has clouded the prospects for a CTB, and the indefinite 
extension of the NPT.
  The French negotiating position on the Conference on Disarmament can 
be traced to the volatility of the French domestic political situation. 
In spite of this, many analysts believe the French will sign a CTB by 
1996 if put before them.
  However, most analysts also believe the new French Government, if not 
given the constraints, will resume nuclear weapons testing. Estimates 
of the number of tests the French could conduct range from 3 to as many 
as 20.
  In my estimation, France will be condemned widely in the 
international community if they do resume the testing of nuclear bombs. 
All of France's nuclear tests have been conducted in the South Pacific 
far from French soil. Perhaps the French Government and her people 
would feel differently about reckless nuclear experimentation if it 
were conducted on French soil. The nations of the South Pacific have 
all expressed their continued opposition to further French testing.
  I urge the new French Government to follow in the footsteps of 
President Mitterand on this issue. The world will be much safer, for 
the French and President Mitterand's legacy will be complete for 
posterity.
  The French need to understand that if they were to resume testing, 
they will set off a storm of protest throughout the world. Their 
credibility will plummet, but unfortunately, France may do so unless 
the CTB is agreed upon before May 1995.
  As for China, China is the only nation unfortunately to continue 
testing. I believe the international community, however, has placed the 
Chinese tests in the proper perspective.
  Fortunately, China's irresponsible behavior has not threatened the 
nuclear weapons moratorium that is still being observed by the other 
powers.
  China has conducted 40 tests, far the fewest of any of the powers. 
However, China's last three tests have come while the nuclear weapons 
testing moratorium continues to be observed by the other four great 
powers.
  While clearly not aiding the process at the Conference on 
Disarmament, China has made some positive pronouncements. For example, 
China has declared its nuclear weapons program is only for defensive 
purposes, and further that it wants to pursue negotiations on the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons. China also played a vital role in 
mediating the NPT controversy with North Korea.
  I expect China to support proactively the agreement to halt North 
Korea's nuclear exploration.
  It is a tumultuous time for China, no doubt, militarily, socially, 
politically, economically. Change is coming all over China, and this 
change will include new leadership following the death of the very 
elderly Deng Xioping. The internal struggle for Deng's successor is 
already under way. At this time, however, few leaders in China are able 
to counter the influence of the military. Few policymakers are willing 
to control the military into ending China's nuclear weapons testing 
program.

                              {time}  2050

  In my conversations with the Chinese, I have urged their government 
to join the United States in leading the international community away 
from reliance on nuclear weapons. I want to again urge the Chinese to 
stop immediately their nuclear weapons testing program. China will gain 
important international respect if they take this course of action. 
Again, the window of opportunity to obtain an agreement remains 
precariously open under the current Chinese regime. Will the window 
remain open after Deng's death, we should not wait to see.
  In this time of political uncertainty in both France and China, I 
believe the administration must ensure that the Conference on 
Disarmament produces a CTBT for France and China to agree to at some 
point. The comprehensive test ban treaty is much too important to allow 
the French and Chinese to dictate the pace of negotiations or whether 
there will be an agreement. Realistically, the Clinton administration 
has at most 8 to 10 months to work with the international community to 
secure a comprehensive test ban treaty.
  The administration refuses to set a deadline for conclusion of a 
comprehensive test ban treaty. This, in my view, is a flawed 
negotiating position. It is now time for President Clinton to set a 
date for conclusion of CTBT talks. A date for conclusion will spur the 
parties into action, just as occurred during negotiation of the Uruguay 
round of the GATT. Parties to the GATT successfully reached agreement 
by the U.S. deadline of December 15, 1993. I renew my call to the 
administration and our partners at the Conference on Disarmament to 
place talks on a comprehensive test ban treaty on a fast track with a 
date certain for conclusion of the negotiations. This request is not 
unusual and comes with a precedent. The precedent is the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty. After a series of failed discussions with the Soviet Union 
in 1962 and 1963, President Kennedy negotiated the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty with Moscow in 10 days. President Kennedy's success occurred in 
the shadow of the Cuban missile crisis and the U-2 incident--in the 
height of the cold war. Today's crises pale in comparison to the 
climate faced by Kennedy and Khrushchev.
  The Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in May is the 
obvious deadline for the United States to support conclusion of CTBT 
negotiations. This deadline will likely secure two important arms 
control successes for the Clinton administration. First, the end of 
nuclear weapons testing for all ages. The CTBT will demonstrate the 
commitment of the nuclear weapons states to the NPT, particularly 
article VI, which obligates the nuclear powers to pursue 
denuclearization. The CTBT will pave the way for the second 
administration arms control success; the indefinite extension of the 
NPT.
  On August 4, ACDA Director John Holum stated, ``The United States 
seeks a CTB that will bring an end to all nuclear explosions. No 
thresholds. No exceptions.'' I support strongly this statement. 
Unfortunately, this statement does not appear to be supported by all 
elements of the administration. Specifically, the National Security 
Council, the Department of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories 
have advocated for either the right to conduct small nuclear 
experiments or a clause in the CTBT allowing the United States to opt 
out of the treaty after a fixed period of time. These proposals face 
strident congressional opposition. The nuclear weapons labs have a 
history of subverting arms control treaties and agreements. After all, 
fewer nuclear weapons and reduced nuclear experimentation mean smaller 
budgets at America's bomb factories. The current efforts to delay or 
foil CTBT negotiations send the wrong message to our international 
partners and threaten both a CTBT and the indefinite extension of the 
NPT.

  Of particular interest to me is the proposal to conduct small 
hydronuclear tests. Hydronuclear tests use a variety of 
techniques to slow down the normal course of the chain reaction in a 
nuclear weapon, thereby obtaining a small by still measurable nuclear 
yield of a few pounds or less of TNT equivalent.
  Presumably, if we conduct such tests, other nations will assume they 
have the right to conduct them as well. I am not convinced that 
Hydronuclear tests will ever be necessary to safely maintain our 
nuclear arsenal. I also believe other nations will see U.S. 
hydronuclear tests as inconsistent with the current nuclear weapons 
testing moratorium, and more seriously, with U.S. efforts to negotiate 
a comprehensive test ban treaty and extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
[NPT]. On balance, the security benefits of hydronuclear tests pale in 
comparison to their costs in terms of possible damage to U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts.
  I believe adamantly that hydronuclear experiments are 
covered by section 507, the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment--of the 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992, Public Law 
102-377. The provisions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment cover 
all underground tests of U.S. nuclear weapons, including hydronuclear 
tests. If the administration decides to violate Public Law 102-377, I 
am positive this matter will be taken immediately to Federal court as 
well as to the court of public opinion.
  There are a number of important reasons why a comprehensive test ban 
treaty is in the interests of the United States. Perhaps the most 
important reason is the fact a CTBT will give the United States the 
legal authority to go after rouge states who pursue the development of 
nuclear weapons. The NPT and the North Korean situation demonstrate 
visibly the importance of a CTBT. The NPT gave the United States and 
the international community the legal authority to challenge North 
Korea. The CTBT will give the United States and the international 
community a legal right to combat nations states with nuclear 
aspirations. A CTBT, just like the NPT, will be an instrument of peace.
  President Clinton committed the United States to a comprehensive test 
ban treaty ``at the earliest possible time'' following a fundamental 
assessment of the U.S. nuclear stockpile by the Department of Defense 
and the Department of Energy. The administration determined that the 
U.S. nuclear stockpile is safe, reliable, and fully able to provide 
strategic deterrence.
  The threat of nuclear proliferation may be greater than ever. With 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the world has been saturated with 
stories of nuclear materials available on the black market. 
Additionally, without the cold war balancing act, nations are examining 
their own national security needs in the face of one super power, the 
United States. Many states now view nuclear weapons as necessary to 
deter the United States.
  That is just a thought. Will it turn to reality? It depends on 
whether or not the world moves quickly and adopts a CTBT.
  In my time in Congress, I have supported a number of free trade 
initiatives. I argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty is an 
economic stimulant as well. A successful CTBT will deter millions of 
dollars from nuclear exploration in both the short term and long term. 
This will give individual nations who may consider the expensive 
nuclear option at some point the economic freedom to invest 
infrastructure, education and health care.
  Mr. Speaker, the coming year will be one of monumental importance to 
arms control and the United States. 1995 will be the year of the 50th 
Anniversary. The United Nations, the instrument of international 
cooperation and cooperative action will celebrate its 50th year. In 
August, the United States will commemorate the 50th occasion of the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the world's only use of nuclear 
weapons.
  Another significant anniversary on tap for 1995 is the 25th 
anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's [NPT] entry into 
force. Importantly, the NPT is up for renewal beginning next April in 
New York. The United States and other nuclear powers argue for 
indefinite extension of the NPT. Within the nonnuclear states a variety 
of opinions exist. However, it is safe to say many nonnuclear states 
oppose long-term or indefinite extension of the NPT.
  The primary reason is the question whether the United States and 
other nuclear powers are living up to article VI of the NPT, which 
requires a good-faith effort at the cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at the earliest possible date.
  The CTBT depends on whether we are meeting that legal obligation. 
There are a number of other reasons for certain states to object to an 
indefinite extension of the NPT. Some states argue that the NPT further 
legitimizes the position of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers and 
that indefinite extension of the NPT will foster complacency among the 
nuclear powers and reduce the likelihood for large-scale reductions in 
nuclear stockpiles.

                              {time}  2100

  Other States remain concerned about the so-called de facto nuclear 
weapon states and threshold States, states viewed as likely to have 
nuclear weapons or sufficient technology to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. They argue that we must bring de facto and threshold States 
into the NPT regime prior to an indefinite extension of the treaty.
  Mr. Speaker, few American policy makers debate the notion that the 
NPT and the CTBT are important tools for the United States to fight 
global proliferation of nuclear weapons. In a recent speech at the 
Conference on Disarmament, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director 
John Holum summarized, in my mind, why thousands of Americans lobby the 
Federal Government so passionately about arms control. Director John 
Holum stated, and I quote:

       From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind has 
     been struggling to recapture the ferocious beast unleashed 
     there. Since then, thousands of women and men of good will 
     and intellect have pursued--passionately, painstakingly--the 
     compelling mission of our age. Working together, let us 
     rededicate ourselves to that mission: to shepherd this beast 
     back into its cage--to bring what was unleashed in a blinding 
     blast of heat in the New Mexico desert to a fitting end in 
     the cool atmosphere of reason in Geneva--to ensure that the 
     first half-century of nuclear explosions is the last.

  Arms control negotiations are never easy. However, as I conclude 
tonight, the United States is at a crucial crossroads. The proverbial 
ball is squarely in President Bill Clinton's court. The administration 
has pursued admirably, if not with total conviction, the President's 
stated nonproliferation objectives. 1995 will be remembered as the year 
of President Bill Clinton's historic arms control successes or of 
failed and lost opportunities to ease the threat of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear proliferation and experimentation. Mr. President, the choice is 
yours.
  Arms control, a CTBT, and NPT extension, all can occur. I am 
convinced the American people want these. I know that world citizens 
want this. I know most leaders in the world want it. President Clinton, 
I know personally, wants it. The question for all of us is: How much do 
we want it? How much will we grab for it, secure it, such that we will 
make this a high agenda priority for all of us, for all of us so that 
we can live in a safe world, insure a safe world for our children and 
their children?
  Mr. Speaker, this is my last speech before this great body. I leave 
with many fond memories, many friendships. I know there are many 
Members in this body who will continue this fight. I urge them to take 
up this matter. I urge my friend, the President, to make some phone 
calls tomorrow to President Mitterrand, to Boris Yeltsin, and say, 
``Let's resolve this issue before Christmas.''

                          ____________________