[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 147 (Tuesday, November 29, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: November 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             A REVITALIZED ACDA IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

                                 ______


                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, November 29, 1994

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to 
voice my strong support for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). It is my firm belief that as the Administration's watchdog on 
arms control issues, ACDA plays an essential role in ensuring our 
national security.
  ACDA has many important roles to fill. It is responsible for leading 
arms control negotiations, implementing and verifying arms control 
agreements, and informing the public on issues of arms control and 
disarmament. In addition to overseeing these vital functions, the 
Director of ACDA serves as principal adviser to the President on arms 
control and nonproliferation. It is in this capacity that he has 
counseled the President on the most important threat to international 
security since the end of the Cold War: the development of nuclear 
weapons by the hermit dictatorship of North Korea.
  About a year and a half ago, the Subcommittee on International 
Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, which I have 
had the honor to chair during the 103rd Congress, held a hearing on the 
future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). At the time, 
ACDA's very existence was in jeopardy. Many argued that, with the end 
of the Cold War, the Agency had outlived its usefulness. They called 
for ACDA's to be abolished or, at a minimum, folded into the State 
Department.
  The President's decision not only to preserve ACDA but to revitalize 
it has been vindicated. ACDA is playing a vital role in stemming the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver 
them. For example: ACDA has initiated negotiations at the Conference on 
Disarmament on a comprehensive and verifiable nuclear test ban (CTB); 
ACDA has led U.S. efforts to bring into effect the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, an agreement of unprecedented scope which would bar its 154 
signatories from acquiring or retaining chemical weapons; and ACDA has 
played an important role in controlling exports of items that might 
contribute to nuclear, chemical or missile proliferation.
  Much, however, remains to be done. Foremost among the challenges 
facing ACDA is securing indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 extension conference. The NPT, with 
nearly 160 members, represents the cornerstone of the international 
nonproliferation regime. ACDA must work not only to achieve an 
indefinite extension of the NPT, but also to strengthen the Treaty's 
provisions so as to prevent their evasion, as in Iraq, and their 
disregard, as in North Korea.
  Progress on negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty over the next 
several months will help to achieve our objectives at the NPT 
conference. So will progress on a global cutoff of the production of 
fissile material--plutonium and highly enriched uranium--for weapon 
purposes or outside of international safeguards. This initiative, 
referred to as the Cutoff Convention, is admirable as far as it goes. 
To fully address the problem of excess fissile material, however, the 
cutoff should be extended to production of plutonium for energy 
purposes as well.
  In short, the ACDA agenda is full, if not overflowing. Far from 
becoming obsolete, ACDA has taken on increasing responsibility in the 
post-Cold War world. With so many issues competing for the attention of 
our foreign policy decisionmakers, it is imperative that ACDA continue 
consistently and forcefully to raise nonproliferation and arms control 
concerns at the highest levels of our Government.
  At a recent hearing before our subcommittee, ACDA Director John Holum 
delivered an excellent statement on these issues. That hearing 
transcript is unfortunately not yet available. Mr. Speaker, I ask that 
Director Holum's statement be included in the Record. I urge my 
colleagues to read it carefully.

   Statement of Hon. John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
                           Disarmament Agency

       Chairman Berman and Chairman Lantos, I am pleased to appear 
     before you and the other Members of the Subcommittee on 
     International Operations and the Subcommittee on 
     International Security, International Organizations and Human 
     Rights.
       Let me take this opportunity to thank you both for playing 
     central roles in strengthening and revitalizing the U.S. Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agency. Chairman Lantos made a great 
     contribution last May when he introduced what ultimately 
     became the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 1994 (the 
     ``Act''). And of course, Chairman Berman's leadership and 
     management skills were crucial to the timely and successful 
     adoption of the Act as part of the State Department 
     Authorization bill for FY 1995.
       With the end of the Cold War, some felt that the need for 
     arms control would recede. The Soviet-American arms race is, 
     indeed, over. But paradoxically, the need for arms control 
     has grown. The bipolar nuclear standoff has been replaced by 
     what President Clinton described in the last State of the 
     Union address as ``rampant arms proliferation, bitter 
     regional conflicts, ethnic and nationalist tensions in many 
     new democracies . . . and fanatics who seek to cripple the 
     world's cities with terror.''
       Thanks to your efforts--and those of Chairman Hamilton, 
     Representatives Gilman, Sabo, Obey, Carr, and Porter and 
     Senators Pell, Simon, Helms, and Hatfield--ACDA today is more 
     capable than ever of fulfilling its distinctive mission.
       The Administration's active and energetic support has been 
     equally important. The President announced his decision as to 
     ACDA's future last July 3. In his radio address that day to 
     the American people, the President declared:
       ``I am . . . taking steps to revitalize the Arms Control 
     and Disarmament Agency, so that it can play an active role in 
     meeting the arms control and nonproliferation challenges of 
     this new era. The work of combatting proliferation of weapons 
     of mass destruction is difficult and unending, but it is an 
     essential part of this task. It must be done.''
       In his letter transmitting ACDA's 1993 Annual Report to the 
     Congress (which I request be included in the hearing record), 
     the President stated: ``A specialized, technically competent, 
     and independent arms control institution remains important to 
     the Nation.'' He also noted that ``the ACDA Director acts as 
     principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State 
     on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.''
       Just as President Kennedy demonstrated leadership by 
     creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961, 
     strengthening and reinvigorating the Agency today 
     demonstrates such leadership by President Clinton.
       The President's determination to strengthen ACDA is shared 
     by the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor. 
     In a July 12, 1993 letter to Chairman Pell of the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Christopher 
     wrote:
       ``The President and I are fully committed to a revitalized 
     ACDA through a combination of strong ACDA leadership, 
     internal agency changes, full participation of ACDA in 
     Executive Branch policy making, and legislative changes. You 
     should also know that I have been working closely with Tony 
     Lake on our approach. . . . ACDA must be a principal player 
     in decision-making and enjoy equal status with the other 
     agencies involved.''
       The executive and legislative branches agree not only on 
     ACDA's revitalization, but also on the following major 
     priorities: eliminating the overarmament of the Cold War; 
     preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
     their means of delivery; pursuing agreements and related 
     policies to serve nonproliferation objectives; applying arms 
     control solutions to regional problems; and establishing 
     norms for the control and transfer of conventional arms.
       Functionally, as you know, ACDA has three main missions. 
     The first is to conduct and support negotiations. The second 
     is to provide arms control advice and advocacy. The third is 
     to implement arms control agreements already negotiated--a 
     burgeoning mission that includes but goes well beyond 
     verification.
       ACDA's revitalization is evident in all three of these 
     areas, and is also reflected in our enhanced policy role, 
     access, and budget. In my testimony today I hope to give you 
     both a progress report and a sense of my priorities after six 
     months as Director.
       First, let me comment briefly on the significant 
     accomplishments of the Act (listed in Appendix 1, which I 
     request be made part of the Record). We are already making 
     use of these important enhancements, which were signed into 
     law by the President less than three months ago on April 30. 
     And they have already proven their value by symbolizing the 
     unequivocal support of both Congress and the Administration 
     for a strong and vital arms control agency--something that 
     has been felt in the Executive Branch interagency process, in 
     our legislative dealings, in our contacts with 
     nongovernmental organizations, and in our innumerable 
     contacts with foreign governments, bodies, and officials.
       When I was initially considering becoming ACDA Director, I 
     heard a great deal about how ACDA was no longer a significant 
     player in the policy community. By virtue of its history in 
     the last decade, the Agency's policy role had in fact been 
     confined. But when I came on board I found a large group of 
     talented and dedicated professionals who have always believed 
     in arms control and in what they are doing to bring it about. 
     The Agency's vast potential was quite apparent to me very 
     early on--for example, as the focal point of the 
     Government's efforts with regard to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, or as a key player in President Clinton's 
     decision to continue U.S. participation in the nuclear 
     testing moratorium.
       So I have to stress that ACDA's revitalization, while 
     central to the national interest, is emphatically not a case 
     of making something from nothing. The gifted, experienced, 
     and committed professionals who have been the core of the 
     Agency for the last three decades have always represented a 
     resource of the highest caliber; the challenge of 
     revitalization has been finding the right ways to take 
     advantage of and support this great national security asset.
       Let me review briefly how our revitalization has been 
     proceeding in terms of the three main missions mentioned 
     earlier.


                              NEGOTIATION

       Negotiation is the first of ACDA's main missions that I'd 
     like to discuss. Under the direction of the President and 
     Secretary of State, ACDA has primary responsibility for the 
     preparation, conduct and management of U.S. participation in 
     all international negotiations in arms control and 
     disarmament, and when directed by the President, in 
     nonproliferation. These responsibilities include the CTBT, 
     extension of the NPT, the fissible cutoff proposal, Nuclear 
     Weapons Free Zone initiatives, and future strategic weapons 
     negotiations.
       Our top negotiating priority in the coming year is 
     substantively straightforward but politically complex: 
     indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
     The NPT is the institutional framework and legal basis for 
     all our efforts on nuclear nonproliferation--from South Asia 
     to North Korea. Next year's NPT Conference is our one best 
     chance to ensure that this bedrock regime--and all it means 
     to global security--can be counted on forever.
       We're also pushing hard in the Comprehensive Test Ban 
     Treaty negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (``CD'') 
     in Geneva. The negotiations reconvened on May 16, and we are 
     working to achieve a CTBT ``at the earliest possible time,'' 
     as the President has instructed. I am cautiously optimistic 
     that substantial progress in this negotiation will, in fact, 
     create a favorable political climate for the NPT Conference 
     next April.
       A third negotiating priority is the fissile material 
     cutoff. Such a global convention would prohibit the 
     production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives for 
     outside international safeguards. It could bring the 
     unsafeguarded nuclear programs of non-NPT states under some 
     measure of restraint for the first time. And it would 
     likewise halt the production of plutonium and highly-enriched 
     uranium for weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon 
     states.
       Preliminary consultations on a Fissile Cut-off have begun. 
     It will be formerly negotiated at the Conference on 
     Disarmament in Geneva, and we expect that expert-level 
     discussions on verification issues will be held in Vienna, 
     the home of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We enter 
     these talks with initiative, commitment, and serious purpose.
       Ambassador Shannon of Canada has been appointed Special 
     Coordinator in the CD for the fissile cutoff, and he has been 
     consulting widely. The next step is to agree on a negotiating 
     mandate and establishment of an ad hoc committee for this 
     purpose.
       In themselves, the CTBT and the Fissile Cut-off cannot 
     prevent nuclear arms, but they are vitally important steps 
     that would erect additional meaningful fences around nuclear 
     weapons ambitions.


                             IMPLEMENTATION

       Our second main responsibility is implementation and 
     verification. Realizing the full potential of arms control 
     agreements, including their verification obligations, is one 
     of the central arms control and nonproliferation tasks of the 
     future. Negotiating agreements sets the stage for buttressing 
     our security, but it is in their fulfillment--the largely 
     unsung work of implementation--that weapons which could be 
     used against us are actually averted or taken down. More and 
     more, the biggest part of the job is done after the Rose 
     Garden ceremonies have ended.
       With the advent of the arms control implementation era, 
     ACDA's plate is full and growing fuller. Just a partial 
     listing of the areas in which we are increasingly active 
     includes the following: Our efforts in the Standing 
     Consultative Commission in Geneva to define the difference 
     between strategic defenses, which are strictly limited by the 
     ABM Treaty, and theater defenses, which are not--in a way 
     that preserves the great strategic benefits of the Treaty but 
     still allows us to mount effective defenses against missiles 
     in the hands of an Iraq, Iran or North Korea; leading the 
     push for ratification, entry into force, and effective 
     implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention--which will 
     completely ban an entire category of indiscriminate weapons 
     and break new ground on verification; also regarding chemical 
     weapons, our work with Russia on the Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement and the Wyoming MOU; the Trilateral Agreement on 
     Biological Weapons between the U.S., the U.K., and Russia; 
     fulfilling the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and 
     responding to the Russians' aspirations to exceed treaty 
     limits on the flanks; entry into force and operation of 
     the Open Skies Treaty; resolving issues in the SVC over 
     monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty, and completing 
     work on multilateralizing the Treaty; and intensive work 
     in the JCIC on the START treaties, relating both to 
     preparations for their entry into force and to 
     multilateralizing START I.
       In the area of implementation, compliance, and 
     backstopping, ACDA manages the U.S. role in a great many 
     international bodies. ACDA also has primary responsibility 
     for assuring compliance and conducting periodic reviews of 
     major arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament 
     agreements. And ACDA participates in policy-related and 
     implementation activities with all the leading international 
     arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament entities. 
     (Complete lists of these international agreements and 
     entities are attached hereto as Appendices 2, 3, and 4, which 
     I request be made part of the Record).
       In addition, ACDA's implementation responsibilities extend 
     to such matters as: security assurances; confidence-building 
     measures (CBMs); ``European'' regional security issues such 
     as Balkan arms control and establishment of the CSCE 
     communications network throughout the former Soviet Union; 
     the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM); ongoing industry 
     liaison with chemical and biological industry 
     representatives; liaison with the Chemical Weapons Office of 
     National Authority (ONA), and bilateral and trilateral arms 
     control efforts such as CW destruction agreements; and 
     efforts to support non-proliferation in all these areas. In 
     addition, the Act reinforced ACDA's role regarding the UN 
     Conventional Arms Transfer Register (TIA), and its 
     participation in backstopping for all European arms control 
     negotiations and implementation, as well as the management of 
     treaty review conferences.
       Let me just comment briefly on the challenge and importance 
     of START implementation--addressing the bulk of all the 
     world's weapons of mass destruction that can be delivered 
     with devastating force on our own country. Our work 
     encompasses two main tasks: dealing with the problems of 
     multilateralizing a treaty originally negotiated bilaterally; 
     and preparing for entry into force.
       START was signed in 1991, and START II in January 1993. 
     Some think that means we have taken care of the problem of 
     Soviet heavy missiles and counterforce capabilities, and 
     deeply cut back strategic nuclear forces. Well, not quite. 
     Though reductions are being made, no country is yet legally 
     required to destroy a single missile, bomber or submarine 
     under the START Treaties. They have not entered into force.
       Therefore, we must aggressively pursue efforts in the START 
     Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (or 
     ``JCIC'') to resolve issues that must be worked out prior to, 
     or shortly after, START's entry into force. The U.S. 
     delegation to the JCIC, led by Ambassador Steve Steiner of 
     ACDA, has been making great progress on those issues.
       New and unexpected technical issues can also cause 
     complications. For example, when Russian defense enterprises 
     began modifying ICBM missile designs for civil space launch 
     purposes, this posed the question of their treatment under 
     START obligations and monitoring procedures. If arms control 
     agreements are to make a continuing contribution to the 
     security of the United States and the other parties, then 
     each such agreement must be kept viable through a continuing 
     negotiating effort and through solutions that account for new 
     developments but preserve the original policy objectives of 
     those agreements.
       Agreements of the complexity of the START Treaties, INF, 
     and the Chemical Weapons Convention involve a continuing need 
     to negotiate detailed implementing procedures and carry out 
     obligations regarding notifications and inspections. That 
     reality is detailed in my remarks on the advent of the ``arms 
     control implementation era,'' delivered at an ABA conference 
     earlier this month. I ask that a copy of this speech be 
     included in your hearing record.


                                 Advice

       As you know, the need for arms control advice and advocacy 
     is not just what saved ACDA last year, but what first led to 
     its creation in the Kennedy Administration. ACDA grew out of 
     the conviction that the President needs to hear the case for 
     arms control unfiltered--presented by an advisor dedicated to 
     arms control as his or her highest priority.
       This means that arms control considerations--instead of 
     being compromised down or washed out by the time they reach 
     the Cabinet level--are injected into the decisionmaking 
     process at the highest levels. When arms control and 
     nonproliferation issues are on the agenda, the Director of 
     ACDA joins the National Security Advisor, the Secretaries 
     of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, the UN Ambassador, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, and the heads of other affected departments 
     and agencies in meetings of the NSC Principals' Committee.
       The right to go directly to the President with arms control 
     advice is also built in to the ACDA Director's role. 
     Obviously this is a right to be exercised sparingly. But it 
     is a valuable recourse when the interagency process does not 
     adequately reflect our views.
       Fortunately, there has been little need for this, because 
     the access granted to ACDA in the interagency process has 
     been very broad.
       I'm told that in the past ACDA commonly had to fight to 
     gain access to the policy process, and too often was 
     excluded. This is something I have focussed on determinedly. 
     We have been able to work out with a receptive National 
     Security Adviser and staff a very inclusive list of subject 
     areas, meetings, and interagency working groups in which ACDA 
     now is routinely involved. It includes not only subjects on 
     which we have lead negotiating responsibility--such as the 
     ABM/TMD demarcation--but subjects, such as proliferation in 
     South Asia, where others are at the front line. And it 
     includes not only matters where arms control is predominant--
     like the test ban negotiations--but also areas, like China 
     and the Middle East, where arms control is on but does not 
     dominate the agenda.
       As part of this process, the ACDA director and deputy 
     director take part in relevant meetings of the Principals' 
     and Deputies' committees, made up of members of the 
     President's cabinet and their deputies. Thus far I have 
     represented ACDA's perspective at Principals' Committee 
     meetings about once every 10 days.
       The overriding point is institutional, not personal. This 
     Administration is genuinely committed to arms control and 
     nonproliferation and to ACDA's expanded role. And that would 
     be the case no matter who sat in my chair.
       ACDA's revitalization means strengthened ties not just with 
     the White House, but throughout the Executive Branch. We are 
     enjoying a good working relationship with the Departments of 
     State, Defense, Energy, the Joint Chiefs, and the 
     intelligence community. ACDA's views are sought out and 
     considered at the most senior levels of foreign policy 
     formulation. It has been my privilege to articulate ACDA's 
     views and judgments to the president, the National Security 
     Advisor, the Secretary of State, and to a variety of Cabinet 
     and sub-cabinet officials, to members of the Legislative 
     Branch, to foreign officials and to various public interest 
     groups.
       ACDA has vigorously met the challenge of resuming its 
     intended role. Its director is the principal advisor to the 
     President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of 
     State on the full range of arms control, nonproliferation and 
     disarmament matters.
       Perhaps of even more significance to the long-term 
     institutional resurgence of ACDA is the now routine 
     participation of ACDA representatives in all levels of the 
     Washington interagency policy arena. ACDA is represented on 
     the full spectrum of policy formulation and implementation 
     venues. This permits us to have access to formerly restricted 
     channels of communication and documents so that we can fully 
     vet and coordinate our perspectives on relevant issues. We 
     have established closer ties to the Department of State, 
     relative both to the substance of issues and in the use of 
     technology and communications. We are working to pool limited 
     resources and to obtain the most out of our joint endeavors, 
     to achieve U.S. objectives.
       I have insisted, and will continue to insist, on 
     coordination and good process in both directions. So far, 
     ACDA and the other national security agencies are working 
     well together as we work out our respective roles and address 
     a colossal agenda.
       One aspect of ACDA's revitalization is its enhanced role in 
     the Administration's nonproliferation policy-making process. 
     One example is its active participation in the 
     Administration's conventional arms transfer policy review. 
     Another is the enhancement and clarification of its role in 
     decisions on U.S. dual-use exports.

                               Innovation

       Another aspect of ACDA's advisory role is innovation. We 
     are looking not just at what arms control can do better, but 
     at what arms control can do for the first time.
       ACDA will be examining such matters as the need for new 
     arms control restraint regimes, the potential merits of 
     citizen verification, and ways to foster greater cooperation 
     between the U.S. Government and industry in arms-control 
     related areas. Such cooperation worked well during the 
     negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and 
     continues to work well in the CWC ratification phase. 
     Cooperation with industry will also be important to future 
     arms control agreements, including a CTBT.
       Let me discuss briefly just one initiative in which ACDA 
     will play a leading role. We're becoming increasingly 
     involved in conventional weapons generally, and land mines 
     specifically. If we set our priorities according to weapons' 
     actual versus potential harm, this would quickly work its way 
     to the top of the list. Nuclear weapons haven't killed 
     anyone on purpose since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But in the 
     time we will spend in this room together, it's likely that 
     somewhere in the world, a noncombatant civilian--most 
     likely a farmer at work or a child at play--will be killed 
     or maimed by a land mine.
       More than a hundred million land mines are in place today. 
     Most sit and wait for years until someone--anyone--steps on 
     them. And over 2 million additional mines are being emplaced 
     every year--about 25 times as many as are being removed.
       But it's not that hard to make land mines that are both 
     self-destructing and self-inerting within a few days of 
     emplacement. It seems to me that we'd accomplish a great deal 
     if we succeeded in globalizing a norm to make all land-mines 
     self-eliminating in this way.


                               management

       As the end of the Cold War has changed arms control, it 
     must also change ACDA. As a complement to our revitalization 
     by the Congress and the Administration, we have undertaken an 
     in-house process of self-improvement that is well underway. 
     It is dedicated to the proposition that our Agency must make 
     the very best use of its people and resources if its 
     influence is to transcend its size.
       There are two broad parts to this process. First, ACDA's 
     Management Assessment has involved broad and active initial 
     consultations within the Agency as to how we can make most 
     effective use of our resources, empower our employees, 
     improve morale, and remove barriers to top performance. 
     Virtually every employee in the Agency took part in these 
     discussions. The results were tabulated, and our senior staff 
     then met to consider them, absorb data, and discuss issues. 
     We have designed and are now implementing an action plan to 
     help the agency run more effectively and smoothly. Our 
     Strategic Planning Working Group has begun addressing near 
     term solutions for the FY 96 budget cycle. Then it will 
     assist in developing our vision for the future--in light of 
     changes in the world, the needs of our ``customers'' within 
     and without the Administration, and our Congressional 
     mandate.
       The second element of this process is an assessment of the 
     ``lines of business'' of our various bureaus and offices--a 
     comprehensive examination of everything ACDA does and should 
     be doing. We entered it with no preconceptions about 
     protecting turf or enshrined ways of doing things. It may 
     well be that we ought to do less in some areas in order to do 
     certain core things better.
       Two principles have guided my approach to this effort. One 
     is that we must fulfill as best we can the arms control 
     missions defined as priorities for us by Congress and the 
     Administration. The second is that we ought to be guided as 
     well by the concept of value added.
       ACDA should not duplicate everything DoD does in defense, 
     or State does in diplomacy, or Commerce does as to exports. 
     We should instead concentrate on matters where we can bring 
     something unique to the table--whether it is our expertise, 
     our capacity for innovation, or our distinct point of view. A 
     highly-disciplined focus is how a small agency can make a big 
     difference. Mindless turf-grabbing is a bureaucratic reflex 
     that I intend to avoid.

                      Budget and Personnel Matters

       Let me comment briefly on the cross-cutting matters of 
     budgets--our own and others--and personnel. Such matters are 
     among the best barometers of revitalization's success.
       The Administration's commitment to a strong and vital ACDA 
     is reflected in our budget. At a time when budgets throughout 
     the executive branch are being cut, the President proposed 
     for ACDA an increase in both human and financial resources. 
     We are grateful for the support of the President and OMB in 
     the budget process, and also for the strong advocacy on our 
     behalf by Secretary of State Christopher.
       We also have a strong interest in the adequacy of other 
     agencies' budgets, as they directly affect our mission. 
     Specifically, as I have said, arms control implementation is 
     becoming a mammoth mission. It is complicated by the fact 
     that, to verify compliance, we depend heavily on physical and 
     analytical resources controlled by other agencies.
       One example of this is the COBRA DANE radar system, located 
     in the Aleutian Islands, which is used to verify key 
     provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. With the 
     demise of the former Soviet Union, a number of national 
     collection assets have been reoriented to other areas of the 
     world or disestablished. In this vein, there were suggestions 
     to discontinue operations of the COBRA DANE radar system. But 
     we have been able to work with the Department of Defense and 
     the Central Intelligence Agency to retain this important 
     verification asset.
       This case, however, points up a long-term systemic danger 
     to the arms control implementation and verification mission. 
     With the NPT, CWC, CFE, Open Skies, INF, and START Treaties--
     as well as a global test ban, fissile material cutoff, and 
     other initiatives to come--we are piling up arms control 
     implementation and verification requirements. But 
     verification depends on radars, sensors, satellites, on-site 
     inspectors, and other assets owned and operated entirely by 
     other agencies, not by ACDA.
       And most agencies of the government are cutting their 
     budgets, to attack more than a decade of deficits and thereby 
     rescue the economy. Deep cuts are expected from agencies like 
     Defense, Energy, and Intelligence, whose missions have 
     changed in the aftermath of the Cold War.
       All of those agencies quite reasonably will apply their own 
     standards of cost-effectiveness to their budgets--balancing 
     defense or intelligence requirements against arms control 
     verification.
       You can see the tension. Already it has occupied a 
     considerable amount of my time as Director of ACDA. In the 
     months ahead it could well become a preoccupation.

                            R&D Coordination

       A related cross-cutting interagency issue is the important 
     challenge of coordinating the development and implementation 
     of programs and projects to support arms control 
     verification. Historically, coordination has been spotty at 
     best. So this is an issue that I believe has benefitted from 
     timely congressional interest. The Act this year 
     significantly strengthened ACDA's role in coordinating 
     research and development (``R&D'') on arms control, 
     nonproliferation, and disarmament. It also called on ACDA to 
     prepare a report on all such research and development 
     conducted by executive branch agencies.
       Accordingly, ACDA has taken an active role in working 
     toward a more effective process for coordinating arms control 
     and nonproliferation R&D. With the support of the National 
     Security Advisor, ACDA drafted a Presidential Review 
     Directive, issued on May 25, toward that end, and it is now 
     being worked interagency. In the meantime, ACDA also 
     significantly revised the format of future reports on 
     completed R&D studies to include assessments of the 
     relationship of these projects to national arms control 
     priorities.

                               Personnel

       Great interest has been expressed--and rightly so--as to 
     when ACDA may be graced with its full complement of 
     presidential appointments. Obviously I share this interest.
       My personnel search was prompt and aggressive. I recruited 
     broadly, reviewed scores of resumes, and personally 
     interviewed at least fifty candidates. Within about six weeks 
     of coming on board, I submitted a full slate of eight PAS 
     candidates to the White House. All were substantively very 
     well qualified for the positions for which they were 
     proposed. The President blessed them all in two weeks' time--
     one week of which, incidentally, he was in Brussels at the 
     NATO summit and in Moscow and Kiev finalizing the trilateral 
     accords.
       As you know, we have named most of the PAS appointees 
     publicly. Assistant Director designees Amy Sands, Lawrence 
     Scheinman, and Michael Nacht are all superbly qualified, 
     highly respected, and deeply experienced in their respective 
     fields. Confirmation of Thomas Graham Jr. will officially 
     place the task of NPT extension into just the right hands. 
     And if confirmed, our Chief Science Advisor designee, James 
     Sweeney, will greatly help both sides understand one another 
     when science and policy intersect. I am delighted that their 
     confirmation hearing before your colleagues on the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee is being held tomorrow.
       The remaining appointments will be made public soon. Their 
     qualifications--and my enthusiasm for them--are equally 
     strong. There is good reason to be hopeful that the process 
     will be completed in the next two months.

                             Public Affairs

       Part of ACDA's charge, of course, is to be a forceful 
     public advocate and authoritative source of information for 
     arms control.
       As you know, ACDA's organic act from the beginning has 
     always mandated ``the dissemination and coordination of 
     public information concerning arms control and disarmament.'' 
     To this end, we have established two new components in our 
     office of Public Information: a Public Diplomacy Division and 
     a Publications and Media Division.
       The Publications and Media Division produces a range of 
     materials, including press releases, fact sheets, brochures, 
     ACDA News, News Roundup, Special Edition, reports compendiums 
     of treaties and agreements, historical documents, ACDA 
     Newsletter, Current Articles, and a journal, Studies in Arms 
     Control and Nonproliferation. It also handles press contacts 
     and the ACDA Speakers Bureau. This division fills thousands 
     of information requests each year. Responding to this 
     increasing demand, we recently established a toll-free number 
     (1-800-581-ACDA) for publications requests and inaugurated an 
     Electronic Bulletin Board.
       I am particularly proud of the ACDA Annual Report for 1993, 
     which many have said is the most useful such document in 
     years. It inaugurated a new format and contained fuller 
     descriptions of our activities and priorities than ever 
     before. I am gratified by the response the Report has 
     received already, and look forward to presenting you with an 
     even more useful such document next year.
       In the past six months our public information activity has 
     expanded considerably, often breaking new ground for the 
     Agency. For example, we have inaugurated and are conducting 
     an active public diplomacy effort, coordinating an 
     interagency working group on the subject and conducting 
     substantial public outreach in the academic and NGO 
     communities. And preparations are underway for significant 
     outreach and recruitment efforts that will take me to 
     visit a number of historically black colleges in coming 
     months.
       The priority I have placed on public outreach and education 
     has meant an active schedule of public speaking for me as 
     well as other top Agency officials. I have already made more 
     than a dozen major speeches--not only to Washington 
     audiences, but also at the UN in New York, at Notre Dame, at 
     the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and in England and 
     Japan.


                               CONCLUSION

       We have all seen the world change dramatically in recent 
     years. The post-Soviet era truly has brought a sea change in 
     the global security environment. The aftermath of the bipolar 
     arms race remains a great issue that we continue to address 
     in implementing the START, INF, and ABM treaties. But we are 
     also dealing with a series of new challenges that have 
     emerged from the shadow of the old superpower standoff--
     challenges on which the President and leading voices in the 
     Congress have spoken out.
       All this means that the business of national security 
     agencies has changed not only in the United States, but 
     worldwide. India, Egypt, Malta and several other countries 
     have begun to set up national entities which are based on the 
     ACDA model. Germany has had an arms control commissioner for 
     some time. At their summit May 30-31, Frances and Germany 
     reportedly discussed opening their proposed bilateral 
     armaments agency to other members of the Western European 
     Union. In short, the ACDA model of a specialized arms control 
     agency is becoming more widely known and emulated throughout 
     the global arms control community.
       The months and years to come will continue to be a time of 
     profound rethinking and reorientation about how ACDA's 
     authority and resources can best be deployed to fulfill a 
     growing mission in a world transformed. We must preserve our 
     achievements--and be willing to reconsider old ways of 
     thinking about global security. We must realize the promise 
     of our strategic treaties--and begin looking beyond them to 
     other steps that could increase stability and reduce reliance 
     on nuclear weapons.
       ACDA is working to meet all the challenges I've laid out 
     today, and at the same time, to rethink and redesign how we 
     are structured and operate. The Arms Control and 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1994 is an integral part of this 
     ongoing process--representing not just a great achievement, 
     but a practical tool for the future. My testimony today has 
     suggested some of my further thinking on these matters.
       I appreciate the attention and commitment this Committee 
     has devoted to arms control issues; these precious resources 
     are the true coin of the realm in our deliberative democracy 
     today. I am keenly aware of how important to our mission your 
     support has been and continues to be. And I fully expect that 
     future such sessions will continue and deepen ACDA's dialogue 
     with the Congress, which has demonstrated for more than three 
     decades a unique appreciation for the necessity, importance 
     and role of an agency dedicated to arms control.
       With that, I'll be happy to take your questions.

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