[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

  Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, on several previous occasions, I have made 
public important findings on the probable causes of the serious medical 
problems facing gulf war veterans called gulf war syndrome.
  The evidence available continues to mount indicating that exposure to 
biological and chemical weapons is one cause of these illnesses.
  The Department of Defense steadfastly refuses to acknowledge this 
aspect of the problem. Their blanket denials are not credible. Recent 
American history provides grievous examples of official military cover-
ups and Defense Department mistakes--the poisoning of countless 
thousands of Vietnam veterans by agent orange is just one compelling 
example.
  To my mind, there is no more serious crime than an official military 
cover-up of facts that could prevent more effective diagnosis and 
treatment of sick U.S. veterans.
  Today, I will present additional evidence to show that despite 
repeated automatic denials by the Department of Defense, chemical 
weapons and chemicals agents were present and found in the war zone.
  First, we now have a British report and a U.S. Army report which 
document in detail the discovery of more than 250 gallons of dangerous 
chemical agents. According to the military units that were actually 
there it was mustard gas and another blister agent.
  Second, we have evidence of an Army sergeant, who received official 
Defense Department awards and commendations for injuries from chemical 
weapons in the Kuwaiti theater of operations that the Pentagon now says 
did not exist. It is an astonishing example of the lengths the Defense 
Department is going in order to deny reality.
  Lastly, we have received the laboratory findings from a gas mask, its 
case, and filter, taken from the gulf war battlefield that reveals the 
presence of fragments of biological materials that cause illnesses 
similar to gulf war syndrome.


                 british and united states army reports

  We now have British and United States Army reports that document the 
presence of chemical agents in Kuwait--well inside the Kuwaiti theater 
of operations--well inside areas occupied by United States and British 
forces. They had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the 
occupation of Kuwait. The liquid was tested, and over 20 times the 
presence of chemical agents was confirmed.
  In this specific case, chemical specialists from the British Army 
using a chemical agent monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and 
detector paper--chemical specialists from the United States Army using 
a chemical agent monitor, detector paper, and two mass spectrometers, 
detected chemical mustard agent.
  Further, two sophisticated fox chemical detection vehicles' mass 
spectrometers also identified the presence of phosgene oxime. This was 
a direct sample--not random vapors collected by the vehicle--as in 
previously reported cases.
  A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid blistered 
immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as might be predicted 
from the nature of the agents present.
  The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and to be sent 
forward along with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were 
ordered to give the materials to individuals in unmarked uniforms--
unmarked uniforms. Earlier this year, Captain Johnson after hearing 
that the Department of Defense was denying the presence of chemical 
agents in Kuwait--forwarded the report on this incident through his 
chain of command. But the report was returned to him and not forwarded 
to the Department of Defense.
  The Kuwaiti, United States, and British Governments all received 
reports on this discovery and recovery of bulk chemical agents.
  The Department of the Army originally told my staff that prior to 
releasing Captain Johnson's report they must obtain clearance from the 
Department of Defense, and that an intelligence review must be 
conducted. That would seem to contradict their claim that there is no 
classified information on this subject. They claimed that prior to 
releasing the British report, they had to get the permission of the 
British. However, when I received the British report, it was dated July 
14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared in response to my 
request, in coordination with the Department of Defense. This official 
dissembling and effort to obscure the facts are a continuation of 
Defense Department tactics we have seen before on this issue. The 
serious question remains as to why we were not provided with an 
official report dating from the time of the incident by the Department 
of Defense.

  A July 14, 1994, report prepared by the British Chemical and 
Biological Defense Establishment claimed that ``in their view'' the 
substance was fuming nitric acid.
  But we now have a copy of the British report prepared by the unit 
actually present at the event, written 3 years earlier on August 8, 
1991. I had to find this report myself. It confirms that mustard agent 
was detected, and that the substance was oily, like mustard agent. 
Nitric acid is not oily. In my view, this is an important example of a 
pattern of deliberate misrepresentation of the truth. It is an 
appalling record.
  The U.S. report confirms that not only was mustard agent detected in 
the container using a mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the 
ground. This would appear to eliminate the possible explanation that 
the container held fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so 
concentrated that it reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer 
causing false readings when the material was examined. The mass 
spectrometers in both fox vehicles were also successfully calibrated 
before and after this detection event.
  There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense has handled 
the investigations into reported chemical agent detection events. We 
continue to receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no 
longer in the military--who have been contacted by high ranking 
military officers assigned to work with the Defense Science Board Task 
Force investigating this issue. We have receive complaints from 
veterans that rather than trying to seek other witnesses or corroborate 
their reports, these officers have called to convince them that they 
were mistaken--that their individual experiences and findings were not 
credible--and that their statements made to Congress would be refuted. 
Most recently, an individual associated with this original detection of 
chemical agents in the war zone was contacted by one of these officers. 
This officer specifically told the individual that these findings would 
be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before the Department 
received the report from the British that was eventually forwarded to 
me.
  I ask my colleagues here in the Senate to evaluate these reports only 
on their merits; 21 field tests conducted on this substance were 
positive for mustard agent; both United States and British chemical 
agent monitor readings confirmed eight bars for mustard gas, a maximum 
reading indicating the presence of highly concentrated agent; eight of 
eight mobile mass spectrometer tests, using two separate Fox vehicles 
and liquid agent in a controlled setting identified identical 
substances--mustard agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as 
mustard agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass 
spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard agent were 
present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a chemical injury 
consistent with what would be expected when exposed to these agents, 
particularly to phosgene oxime; and a Department of Defense explanation 
described by the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
variously as ``high unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not 
possible.''


                   ARMY SERGEANT'S ``MYSTERY'' AWARDS

  The second case I would like to share with my colleagues is the story 
of former Sgt. David Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to 
be a cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense says 
none were deployed.
  In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems impossible to 
obtain an explanation from the Department of Defense that is consistent 
with the events as reported by the soldiers present. In August, a 
Pentagon spokesperson stated that whatever chemicals were encountered 
in the bunker must have been left over from earlier fighting between 
Iraq and Iran.
  However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said that he was 
not aware that any chemical weapons crates were discovered by Mr. 
Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and despite the fact that Mr. 
Fisher received a Purple Heart for his injuries from chemical agents. 
Others who were present that date including the Fox vehicle operators, 
one of whom received a bronze star and Colonel Dunn corroborate these 
events. Further, according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker 
complex with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to go 
from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers. Old chemical 
weapons, left over from a previous war, would be stored in a separate 
storage facility; if they were present at an active artillery position, 
they were deployed with the intention of using them.
  What continues to emerge is a deeply troubling pattern of events 
involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars, 
Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and Purple 
Hearts--in the course of comming into contact with weapons that the 
Department of Defense insists were not even present in the theater of 
war. Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they were 
not present. These events I have discussed raise serious concerns about 
the veracity of the Department of Defense's claims as well as their 
motives. I fully expect to find additional ``exceptions'' to the 
Department of Defense assertion that, at no time, were chemical or 
biological weapons ever found in the theater of operations.
  I have no further confidence in the Defense Department's statement on 
this vital matter. The evidence continues to grow that they will go to 
any length to deny the facts surrounding this subject.
  We now know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah, in an 
area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne Corps. The U.N. 
confirms that they were there, and a Defense Department official 
testifying before the Senate Banking Committee confirmed that troops 
were close to this facility--contradicting previous testimony in the 
same hearing by another senior Defense Department official;
  The medical and technical evidence establishes that chemicals were 
found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area that was 
secured by elements of the 3d Armored Division;
  According to official records and scientific evidence, chemicals were 
found in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by 
Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored Cavalry 
Regiment;
  And, according to Marine Corps historical documents, two marines were 
injured by chemical agents in breaching operations during the ground 
war.
  We also know that many of the soldiers that were present during each 
of these events are now ill and others were given medals.
  So what is the truth? Certainly not in the official Defense 
Department statement that all U.S. troops were far from any chemical 
agents. Were there 2, 3, 5, 10, or 100 chemical events like those 
described above? Will Members of Congress and the soldiers have to 
uncover each and every exposure in order to determine the causes of 
these illnesses. And what can be best done to treat these sick, and 
often dying, gulf war veterans?
  We cannot allow the U.S. military establishment or our government to 
turn its back upon hundreds of thousands of Americans and their 
families who answered their country's call and who were almost 
certainly exposed to chemical or biological weapons agents during the 
gulf war. And what of the risk of those same exposures in future wars? 
Is that why the Department of Defense is behaving in this manner--to 
hide their lack of ability to adequately protect our troops from these 
kinds of exposures in future wars?


     new laboratory findings of materials found on the battlefield

  Finally, I have submitted samples for analysis to several renowned 
laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's 
Forensic Science Center. In biological analyses, based on preliminary 
testing using advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique 
DNA sequences were detected for Q-fever and brucella on the inside of a 
gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas mask filter, and under the 
rubber seal of masks submitted to my office for analysis by U.S. 
Persian Gulf war veterans who brought them back from the Middle East.

  When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings were 
negative. These tests were repeated with identical findings--that is, 
the same identical DNA primer pairs were indicated.
  While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a single primer 
pair analysis, these results can also be indicative of the presence of 
only a single strand--perhaps due to the presence of another 
genetically altered biological warfare-related microorganism.
  We do know that the United States licensed the export of genetic 
materials capable of being used to create these types of genetically-
altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi Atomic Energy 
Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that conducted biological 
warfare-related research--prior to the war. One method of creating 
these genetically altered micro-organisms is by exposing them to 
radiation. The United States also licensed that export of several 
species of brucella to Iraqi governmental agencies. Both Q-fever and 
brucellosis are also endemic to the region.
  This study is far from conclusive but points to the need for further 
research in this area. According to the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, biological studies need further attention. Cultures need to 
be investigated more closely.
  In addition many chemical compounds were present in the samples. The 
scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic Science 
Center believe that additional analysis of more samples may isolate and 
identify chemicals that in combination may be hazardous, chemical 
warfare agent compounds, or biological pathogens on the surface of 
collected items and that more study is warranted.
  While these results are preliminary they are also very important. 
They show that we have the tools to get to the bottom of this problem 
if we simply choose to use them. Let me repeat that. We have the tools 
to get to the bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.
  The human toll continues to rise. Just over 1 year ago, on September 
9, 1993, when the first staff report was prepared by the committee, we 
were only able to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that 
time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf war veterans has already 
registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that point. 
The official Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few 
hundred. But in just over a years time the number of veterans who have 
since been added to these registries has grown by nearly 700 percent. 
Currently it is estimated that there are 29,000 servicemen and women on 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on 
the Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense registry 
is growing at a terrifying rate of about 500 individuals per week. 
These are horrendous statistics that show the true scale of this 
problem and the heartlessness and irresponsibility of a military 
bureaucracy that gives every sign of wanting to protect itself more 
than the health and well-being of our servicemen and women who actually 
go and fight our wars.
  We have also learned that many of the signs and symptoms of illnesses 
initially experienced by the veterans of the Persian Gulf war are now 
being experienced by their spouses and families. This data confirms 
that these illnesses are becoming a major threat to the health and 
well-being of a significant and rapidly growing number of individuals 
and warrants a serious and all out urgent effort by the Government to 
determine the precise causes of the illnesses.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of my 
statement be inserted in the Record, and that excerpts from the staff 
report prepared by the committee on this issue be inserted into the 
Record in the appropriate place at the conclusion of my remarks.
  There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

U.S. Chemical and Biological Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact 
  on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War--Committee Staff 
Report No. 3: Chemical Warfare Agent Identification, Chemical Injuries, 
                           and Other Findings


                             A. Background

       The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
     is responsible for U.S. government legislation and oversight 
     as it effects ``dual use'' exports--those materials and 
     technologies that can be converted to military uses.
       During the Cold War, United States export policy focused 
     primarily on restricting the export of sensitive ``dual use'' 
     materials and technologies to the Soviet Union and its 
     allies. This myopic approach to the non-proliferation of 
     these materials ultimately resulted in the acquisition of 
     unconventional weapons and missile-system technologies by 
     several ``pariah nations'' with aggressive military agendas. 
     For the United States, the reality of the dangers associated 
     with these types of policies were realized during the Persian 
     Gulf War. Recognizing the shortcomings of existing policies, 
     and with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, an inquiry was 
     initiated by the Committee into the contributions that 
     exports from the United States played in the weapons of mass 
     destruction programs that have flourished under the direction 
     of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
       On October 27, 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs held hearings that revealed that the United 
     States had exported chemical, biological, nuclear, and 
     missile-system equipment to Iraq that was converted to 
     military use in Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear 
     weapons program. Many of these weapons--weapons that the U.S. 
     and other countries provided critical materials for--were 
     used against us during the war.
       On June 30, 1993, several veterans testified at a hearing 
     of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. There, they 
     related details of unexplained events that took place during 
     the Persian Gulf War which they believed to be chemical 
     warfare agent attacks. After these unexplained events, many 
     of the veterans present reported symptoms consistent with 
     exposure to a mixed agent attack. Then, on July 29, 1993, the 
     Czech Minister of Defense announced that a Czechoslovak 
     chemical decontamination unit had detected the chemical 
     warfare agent Sarin in areas of northern Saudi Arabia during 
     the early phases of the Gulf War. They had attributed the 
     detections to fallout from coalition bombing of Iraqi 
     chemical warfare agent production facilities.
       In August 1993, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald W. 
     Riegle Jr. began to research the possibility that there may 
     be a connection between the Iraqi chemical, biological, and 
     radiological warfare research and development programs and a 
     mysterious illness which was then being reported by thousands 
     of returning Gulf War veterans. In September 1993, Senator 
     Riegle released a staff report on this issue an introduced an 
     amendment to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense 
     Authorization Act that provided preliminary funding for 
     research of the illnesses and investigation of reported 
     exposures.
       When this first staff report was released by Senator 
     Riegle, the estimates of the number of veterans suffering 
     form these unexplained illnesses varied from hundreds, 
     according to the Department of Defense, to thousands, 
     according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. It is now 
     believed that tens of thousands of U.S. Gulf War veterans are 
     suffering from a myriad of symptoms collectively labelled 
     either Gulf War Syndrome, Persian Gulf Syndrome, or Desert 
     War Syndrome. Hundreds and possibly thousands of servicemen 
     and women still on active duty are reluctant to come forward 
     for fear of losing their jobs and medical care. These Gulf 
     War veterans are reporting muscle and joint pain, memory 
     loss, intestinal and heart problems, fatigue, nasal 
     congestion, urinary urgency, diarrhea, twitching, rashes, 
     sores, and a number of other symptoms.
       They began experiencing these multiple symptoms during and 
     after--often many months after--their tour of duty in the 
     Gulf. A number of the veterans who initially exhibited these 
     symptoms have died since returning from the Gulf. Perhaps 
     most disturbingly, members of veteran's families are now 
     suffering these symptoms to a debilitating degree. The scope 
     and urgency of this crisis demands an appropriate response.
       This investigation into Gulf War Syndrome, which was 
     initiated by the Banking Committee under the direction of 
     Chairman Riegle, has uncovered a large body of evidence 
     linking the symptoms of the syndrome to the exposure of Gulf 
     War participants to chemical and biological warfare agents, 
     chemical and biological warfare pre-treatment drugs, and 
     other hazardous materials and substances. Since the release 
     of the first staff report on September 9, 1993, this inquiry 
     has continued. Thousands of government officials, scientists, 
     and veterans have been interviewed or consulted, and 
     additional evidence has been compiled. This report will 
     detail the findings of this ongoing investigation.
       On February 9, 1994, Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr. 
     disclosed on the U.S. Senate floor that the U.S. government 
     actually licensed the export of deadly microorganisms to 
     Iraq. It was later learned that these microorganisms exported 
     by the United States were identical to those the United 
     Nations inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi 
     biological warfare program.
       Throughout this investigation, the Department of Defense 
     has assured the Committee that our troops were never exposed 
     to chemical or biological agents during the Persian Gulf War. 
     They have repeatedly testified in hearings and have made 
     public statements that, at no time, were chemical and 
     biological agents ever found in the Kuwaiti theater of 
     operations.
       In February of this year, the Chairman wrote a letter 
     asking them to declassify all information on the exposure of 
     U.S. forces to chemical and biological agents.
       Then on May 4, 1994, the Chairman received assurances in a 
     joint letter from Secretary Perry, Secretary Brown, and 
     Secretary Shalala, that ``there is no classified information 
     that would indicate any exposures to or detections of 
     chemical or biological weapons agents.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\Footnotes at end of article.
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       Also in May, Undersecretary of Defense Edwin Dorn in sworn 
     testimony in a hearing before the Committee on Banking, 
     Housing, and Urban Affairs, claimed that all chemical agents 
     were discovered ``a great distance from the Kuwait theater of 
     operations.''\2\
       During the same hearing, another senior Defense Department 
     official was forced to recant part of the statement when 
     confronted with the highly publicized discovery of chemical 
     agents by U.N. inspectors near An Nassiriyah, which was very 
     close to areas in which U.S. forces were deployed.\3\
       In fact, we have received reports from Persian Gulf War 
     veterans that U.S. forces actually secured this chemical 
     weapons storage area.
       Also during the hearing, a joint memorandum for Persian 
     Gulf War veterans from Secretary of Defense Perry and the 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was presented. The 
     memorandum stated, in part ``there is no information, 
     classified or unclassified, that indicated that chemical or 
     biological weapons were used in the Gulf.''\4\
       Then, the Department of Defense announced on June 23, 1994, 
     that the Defense Science Board found that ``there is no 
     evidence that either chemical or biological warfare was 
     deployed at any level, or that there was any exposure of U.S. 
     service members to chemical or biological warfare 
     agents.''\5\
       This report raises serious questions about the integrity of 
     the Department of Defense position. It describes events for 
     which the Department of Defense explanations are inconsistent 
     with the facts as related by the soldiers who were present, 
     and with official government documents prepared by those who 
     were present and with experts who have examined the facts.


                b. recovery of chemical agents in kuwait

              August 1991--Sabahiyah High School for Girls

       The Committee staff has obtained British and U.S. Army 
     reports which document in detail the discovery of more than 
     250 gallons of dangerous chemical agents. According to the 
     units that were presents, mustard gas and another blister 
     agent were found in a storage tank in southeastern Kuwait.
       These chemical agents were recovered in Kuwait, well inside 
     the Kuwait theater of operations, well inside areas occupied 
     by U.S. and British forces. According to the reports, they 
     had been placed there by Iraqi forces during the occupation 
     of Kuwait. The liquid was tested and over 20 times the 
     presence of chemical agents was confirmed.
       The Committee staff has obtained a copy of a recommendation 
     for an Army Commendation Medal that was presented to Sergeant 
     James Warren Tucker for among other things ``participating in 
     the mission that located stores of chemicals agents'' while 
     deployed in Southwest Asia.\6\
       Committee staff has also identified the commander of that 
     unit, Captain Michael F. Johnson, currently with the U.S. 
     Army at The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia--who was 
     awarded a Meritorious Service Medal for his actions.\7\
       These two soldiers and as many as six others from the 54th 
     Chemical Troop of the United States Army's 11th Armored 
     Cavalry Regiment were given Army medals for ``the positive 
     identification of suspected chemical agent,'' according to 
     the citation presented to Captain Johnson.\8\
       We have obtained the actual reports from two NATO countries 
     who were Coalition members during the Persian Gulf War.\9\
       This is a step-by-step analysis of the event as recorded in 
     documents and the testimony of Nuclear Biological and 
     Chemical, or NBC, officers who were there.
       A container suspected of containing chemical agents was 
     located in southeastern Kuwait in an area about 50 kilometers 
     north of Saudi Arabia and 4 kilometers west of the Persian 
     Gulf. The precise coordinates are TN18832039 (Magellan)\10\ 
     Maps showing the precise location in which this container was 
     found is attached.\11\
       According to the British report, on August 5, 1991, several 
     months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, Major J.P. 
     Watkinson of the British Army received orders to investigate 
     a container that was believed to be leaking mustard gas.\12\
       According to the official report prepared by Major 
     Watkinson on 7 August 1991, the request to investigate the 
     leaking container was made by Lt. Colonel Saleh Al Ostath of 
     the Kuwaiti Army and agreed to by Mr. Lucas of the Royal 
     Ordinance Corps.\13\
       Major Watkinson and his unit, the 21st Explosive Ordinance 
     Disposal Squadron, were taken to the site of the Sabahiyah 
     High School for Girls and directed to a metal storage tank 
     with a capacity of approximately 2,000 liters. According to 
     the report, there appeared to be entry and exit bullet holes 
     of approximately 7.62 caliber in the container.\14\
       A photograph of the schoolyard with some of the chemical 
     specialists approaching the tank that contained the chemical 
     agents is attached.\15\
       According to Major Watkinson's report, the container was 
     leaking a brown vapor from both holes. The school was not in 
     use and there were U.S. civilian contractors clearing 
     explosives and rubbish from the area.\16\
       The school security guard told the British that the tank 
     was not there before the war. He first noticed the tank when 
     he returned to the school after the war on March 20, 1991--
     four and a half month prior to these tests. The British 
     report notes that the school was used as an Iraqi defensive 
     position during the war.\17\
       Major Watkinson ordered all personnel to move up wind, and 
     after putting on his chemical protective clothing, approached 
     the container and tested the brown colored vapor with a 
     Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM).\18\
       The Chemical Agent Monitor gave a reading of eight (8) bars 
     on H, for mustard agent--a maximum reading indicating a 
     highly concentrated agent--and no bars on G, indicating no 
     nerve agent present.\19\
       This was the first positive test for chemical mustard agent 
     at this location.
       Distilled mustard is described in the Merck Index, a 
     handbook for chemists, as an oily substance. It is also 
     described as being amber brown in color--remember Watkinson's 
     report describes it as a brown substance.\20\
       A photo and diagram of a Chemical Agent Monitor or CAM in 
     use showing the types of displays that a chemical detection 
     specialist would observe is attached.\21\
       A 8-bar reading indicates a highly concentrated agent. 
     These monitors are still in use by both U.S. and British 
     forces.
       Watkinson then tested the vapor with one color detector 
     paper and nothing happened. He used three color detector 
     paper and it turned pink indicating the presence of mustard 
     agent.\22\ This was the second positive test for mustard 
     agent.
       On a second visit to the container, according to the 
     report, he inserted a wire with one of the bullet holes, and 
     according to his report, ``wiped the oily substance on both 
     types of detector paper.''\23\
       Again the oily nature of the substance indicates a property 
     that is consistent with the properties of mustard agent.
       The one color paper turned brown and the three colored 
     paper turned pink, the latter again indicating the presence 
     of mustard agent. This was the third positive test for 
     mustard agent. Major Watkinson then sealed both in the 
     container with masking tape.\24\
       On yet a third visit to the container, the holes were 
     uncovered and the vapor was tested using an M18A2 chemical 
     detector kit. This test was repeated six times. On four of 
     the tests the color indicator immediately turned blue 
     indicating mustard (or ``H'') agent.\25\
       For the remaining two tests, the color indicator went 
     yellow but later turned blue.\26\ There were the fourth 
     through the ninth positive tests for mustard agent.
       Another wire dip test was conducted using the three color 
     detector paper from the M18A2 kit and the paper turned 
     pinkish/orange indicating mustard agent for the tenth time. 
     The bullet holes were resealed using industrial silicone 
     filler and plaster of paris bandages. The container was 
     checked with the Chemical Agent Monitor for leaks and the 
     area was secured.\27\
       On August 7, 1991, the Commander of the 11th Armored 
     Cavalry Regiment was asked to send two FOX chemical 
     reconnaissance vehicles, in support of the Kuwaiti Ministry 
     of Defense and the Royal Ordinance Corps, to assist Major 
     Watkinson in confirming the presence of a chemical agent.\28\
       Since this was a joint and combined live agent chemical 
     detection mission, involving both U.S. and British forces, 
     detailed rehearsals occurred to ensure that no mistakes were 
     made. The unit then travelled to the Sabahiyah High School 
     for Girls in southeastern Kuwait.\29\
       On August 8, 1991, one FOX team moved to the area near the 
     container and began to conduct point surveys inserting the 
     detection probe of the FOX vehicle into the ground to a depth 
     of about four centimeters. The mass spectrometer showed 
     microdoses of chemical mustard agent in the ground.\30\ This 
     was the eleventh confirmation'
       At the same time another collection team in full chemical 
     protective clothing walked to the container, estimated to 
     contain between 800-1000 liters, or about 250 gallons of 
     liquid, with Chemical Agent Monitors and other assorted 
     chemical detection equipment. This team removed the storage 
     container's seals and there was a discharge of pressurized 
     vapor into the air.\31\
       Captain Johnson's report confirms that he saw a light 
     copper to amber colored vapor exit from the hole.\32\ Again, 
     mustard agent is described as an amber brown liquid.\33\
       Tests were conducted with both the Chemical Agent Monitor 
     and chemical detection paper. The detection paper confirmed 
     the presence of chemical mustard agent; the twelfth 
     confirmation. The Chemical Agent Monitor registered eight 
     bars, again confirming highly concentrated mustard agent. 
     This was the thirteenth confirmation of mustard agent by the 
     specialists present.\34\
       Captain Johnson's unit then inserted a medical syringe with 
     a catheter tube into the container to extract liquid agent 
     for detection paper, Chemical Agent Monitor, and FOX 
     testing.\35\
       The sample was placed into a metal dish. By the time a 
     ground team member moved to the rear of the Fox to the probe, 
     there was not enough liquid available to get a reliable 
     reading.\36\
       Another attempt was made and the ground team extracted a 
     larger sample of liquid and placed it into the metal dish. 
     The dish was moved to the FOX probe and the liquid was drawn 
     for analysis--not random vapors--not oil fumes--but the 
     actual liquid chemical agent. Within six seconds, the mass 
     spectrometer detected and identified the liquid as highly 
     concentrated mustard agent.\37\ Both four point and full 
     spectrum readings were obtained, according to Captain 
     Johnson, in each of the mass spectrometer analyses.\38\ This 
     therefore was the fourteenth (4 point) and fifteenth (full 
     spectrum) confirmation of mustard agent.
       Further analysis by the system also indicated the presence 
     of traces phosgene, a non-persistent choking agent, and 
     phosgene oxime, a blister agent. Another test was conducted 
     to validate the findings. Again the Fox vehicle confirmed the 
     presence of mustard agent for the sixteenth and seventeenth 
     time, and again phosgene, and phosgene oxime were 
     confirmed.\39\
       Captain Johnson ordered yet another mass spectrometer test, 
     utilizing the second FOX vehicle. The team in the second 
     vehicle was not informed of the findings of the first 
     vehicle, to rule out any possibility of biased readings from 
     the team in the second vehicle. The team in the second FOX 
     vehicle repeated the test and reported the same findings 
     except that this time the reported levels of phosgene oxime 
     were much higher. They also performed a second test to 
     confirm their results. Again both 4-point and full spectrum 
     analysis was conducted during each of these tests.\40\ These 
     were the eighteenth through twenty-first confirmations.
       While the Chemical Agent Monitor and many other chemical 
     detection kits available to military forces only detect H, or 
     mustard agents, and G and V nerve agents, the FOX chemical 
     reconnaissance vehicle accurately detects 60 known chemical 
     agents using a computerized mobile mass spectrometer.\41\
       It is capable of identifying the individual component 
     chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen, chlorine, and so 
     forth; their molecular composition; and their molecular 
     weight. This provides a scientific means to precisely 
     identify substances.
       In response to a request by the Committee for an 
     explanation from the Department of Defense, Dr. Theodore 
     Prociv, Deputy Assistant for Chemical and Biological Matters 
     (Atomic Energy), replied on July 26 that the Department of 
     Defense analysis of the FOX tapes revealed that the ions 
     matched in three of four categories for a mustard agent, but 
     matched nitric acid in all four categories.\42\
       Committee staff solicited an opinion from the National 
     Institute of Standards and Technology regarding the accuracy 
     of this explanation.\43\
       On September 6, in response to several specific questions, 
     Dr. Stephen Stein, of the Institute, replied that ``HD 
     [mustard] has no major peaks in common with those expected to 
     arise directly from fuming nitric acid,'' and that it is 
     ``highly unlikely that a properly functioning mass 
     spectrometer would produce any of the major peaks of nitric 
     acid or nitrogen oxides from HD.'' Furthermore, ``if fuming 
     red nitric acid did not decompose prior to detection 
     (ionization) there would be no possibility of mistaking it 
     for HD.''\44\
       The commander of the unit said that the tests were run 
     using both the four principle mass peaks and full spectrum 
     analysis on the substance in question. The tests were run 
     twice each by two FOX vehicles. The mass spectrometers were 
     checked for calibration before and after each test, with no 
     problems noted.
       Each of the four tests identified identical substances--
     namely; mustard agent and phosgene oxime. When asked 
     specifically, ``how likely is it that under these 
     circumstances that the computer algorithm identified nitric 
     acid as these substances,'' Dr. Stein responded that ``if 
     fuming red nitric acid did not react prior to detection, 
     there is no likelihood that either the four peak analysis or 
     the full spectrum analysis would lead to false identification 
     of mustard.''\45\
       And, ``if nitric acid did react, the reaction products 
     might generate a large number of peaks. Some of these might 
     fortuitously be those characteristic of HD or other chemical 
     agents and therefore might produce a false positive 4-peak 
     identification of HD. A robust full spectrum matching 
     algorithm, however, would not be expected to falsely identify 
     mustard.''\46\
       The ground collection team then extracted a larger sample 
     from the container and prepared it for transport from the 
     area for further testing and evaluation.\47\
       According to Captain Johnson's report and other eyewitness 
     testimony, a member of the British team was injured while 
     collecting a sample of the chemical agent. Some of the liquid 
     agent made contact with the soldiers left wrist. The soldier 
     immediately reacted to the liquid and was in severe pain and 
     was believed to be going into shock.\48\
       The injured soldier was quickly taken to a decontamination 
     site and covered with decontamination powder and cut out of 
     his chemical protective clothing.\49\ A photograph of the 
     British soldier on the FOX vehicle and his clothing laying 
     in a pile beside the vehicle is attached.\50\
       Dr. Prociv in his July 26, 1994 letter to the Committee 
     reported that the injured soldiers clothing had been found by 
     the British government to have been burned by fuming nitric 
     acid in tests conducted at Porton Down.\51\ Previously, in 
     response to direct questioning by Committee Staff, Captain 
     Johnson stated that the contaminated suit was burned, that 
     is, incinerated, at the site.\52\
       The decontamination team then doused the soldier with a 
     decontamination solution. Within one minute, a small blister 
     was observed forming on his left wrist the size of a pinhead. 
     About five minutes later, the blister had already reached the 
     size of a U.S. fifty cent piece coin. Medics on the scene 
     screened the victim for residual liquid contamination and 
     sent him to the hospital for further treatment. After the 
     casualty was evacuated, the rest of the unit and equipment 
     was decontaminated.\53\
       According to Military Chemical and Biological Agents: 
     Chemical and Toxicological Properties, mustard agents acting 
     alone may take hours to form blisters, but phosgene oxime 
     acts within 30 seconds leaving a blanched area and 
     immediately forms a red rash-like ring. With phosgene oxime, 
     instant death from systemic shock or trauma is possible from 
     exposure.\54\
       The reported reaction of the British casualty was as might 
     have been predicted when exposed to the identified agents. 
     The fate of this inured British soldier is unknown.
       After completing their testing, the U.S. FOX team leaders 
     were ordered to remove the tapes from the mass spectrometer 
     of the FOX vehicles by Lieutenant Colonel Killgore, the 
     chemical officer for Task Force Vicotry.\55\ These tapes are 
     the paper records of the chemical breakdown of the liquid or 
     vapors and are produced by the mobile mass spectrometer in 
     the FOX vehicle.
       The tapes and the collected samples were reportedly turned 
     over to personnel wearing desert camouflage uniforms with no 
     rank or distinguishing patches.\56\ Captain Johnson does not 
     know what happened to the tapes or samples as he was ordered 
     from the scene after his unit's mission was completed.\57\
       Dr. Prociv in his written response to the Committee stated 
     that these were U.N. personnel. According to Lt. Colonel 
     Killgore, while they were United Nations personnel, they were 
     assigned to the U.N. team from the British Chemical and 
     biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down--British 
     Ministry of Defence employees.\58\ In a subsequent inquiry, 
     the U.N. could produce no written records of the findings of 
     the U.N. team at the site.
       Conclusions--
       Chemical mustard agent was detected by: chemical 
     specialists from the British Army using a Chemical Agent 
     Monitor, M18A2 chemical agent detector, and detector paper; 
     and, chemical specialists from the United States Army using a 
     Chemical Agent Monitor, detector paper, and two mass 
     spectrometers.
       Phosgene oxime was detected by: two sophisticated FOX 
     vehicles' mass spectrometers.
       These were direct samples--not random vapors collected by 
     the vehicle--as in previously reported cases.
       As cited above, mass spectrometry is capable of identifying 
     the individual chemical elements, such as sulfur, hydrogen, 
     chlorine, and so forth; their molecular composition; and, 
     their molecular weight. This provides a means to precisely 
     identify substances. This was not an intake of random fumes 
     by a moving vehicle in heavy smoke, it was a direct analysis 
     of liquid agent drawn from the container.
       This was not the only confirmation of the identity of the 
     chemical agents present--the results were confirmed by nearly 
     every detector deployed with U.S. and British forces--in a 
     controlled setting.
       A British soldier who came into contact with the liquid 
     blistered immediately and appeared to be going into shock--as 
     might be predicted from the nature of the agents present.
       The tapes were ordered removed from the vehicle and forward 
     with a sample of the chemical agents. The soldiers were 
     ordered to given the materials to individuals in unmarked 
     uniforms and Captain Johnson, who earlier this year, after 
     hearing that the Department of Defense was denying the 
     presence of chemical agents in Kuwait, forwarded the report 
     on this incident through his chain of command, and had the 
     report returned to him. It was not forwarded to the 
     Department of Defense.
       The Kuwaiti, U.S., and British governments all received 
     reports on this recovery of bulk chemical agents.
       While these reports are not classified, the Department of 
     Defense has consistently maintained that no chemical agents 
     were located in areas occupied by U.S. forces--including in 
     testimony before committees of both the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.
       The Department of the Army originally told Committee staff 
     that prior to releasing Captain Johnson's report they must 
     obtain clearance from the Department of Defense, and that an 
     intelligence review must be conducted.\59\ That would seem to 
     contradict the claim that there is no classified information 
     on this subject. They claimed that prior to releasing the 
     British report, they must get the permission of the 
     British.\60\ However, when British report was received, it 
     was dated July 14, 1994, indicating that it had been prepared 
     in response to the Committee request, in coordination with 
     the Department of Defense.\61\
       The Committee was not provided with an official British 
     report dating from the time of the incident by the Department 
     of Defense as requested. A copy of that report was obtained 
     by the Committee outside of Department of Defense channels. 
     This official report, dated August 7, 1991, confirms that 
     mustard agent was detected, and that the substance was oily, 
     like mustard agent.\62\ Nitric acid is not oily.
       The U.S. report, prepared by Captain Johnson, confirms that 
     not only was mustard agent detected in the container using a 
     mass spectrometer, but also in microdoses on the ground.\63\ 
     This would eliminate the explanation that the container held 
     fuming nitric acid--rocket fuel oxidizer--so concentrated 
     that if reacted with materials in the mass spectrometer 
     causing false readings when the material was examined. The 
     mass spectrometers in both FOX vehicles were also 
     successfully calibrated before and after this detection 
     event.
       There is also the issue of how the Department of Defense 
     has handled this and other investigations into reported 
     chemical agent detection events. Committee staff continues to 
     receive reports from individuals, many of whom are no longer 
     in the military--civilians who have been contacted by high 
     ranking military officers assigned to work with the Defense 
     Science Board Task Force investigating this issue. We have 
     received complaints from veterans that rather than trying to 
     seek other witnesses or corroborate their reports, these 
     officers have called to convince them that they were 
     mistaken. That their findings were not credible--that their 
     statements made to Congress would be refuted.\64\ Most 
     recently, an individual associated with this detection of 
     chemical agents was contacted by one of these officers. This 
     officer specifically told the individual that these findings 
     would be refuted by the Department of Defense--even before 
     the Department received the report from the British that was 
     eventually forwarded to the Committee.
       In this case there were 21 field tests conducted on this 
     substance which were positive for mustard agent; both U.S. 
     and British Chemical Agent Monitor readings confirmed 8 bars 
     for mustard gas, a maximum reading indicating the presence of 
     highly concentrated agent; 8 of 8 mobile mass spectrometer 
     tests, using two separate FOX vehicles and liquid agent in a 
     controlled setting identified identical substances--mustard 
     agent, and phosgene oxime; it was the same color as mustard 
     agent; it was oily like mustard agent; a mobile mass 
     spectrometer reading indicated that microdoses of mustard 
     agent were present in the soil; a British soldier suffered a 
     chemical injury consistent with what would be expected when 
     exposed to these agents, particularly to phosgene oxime; and 
     the Department of Defense explanation was described by the 
     National Institute for Standards and Technology variously as 
     ``highly unlikely,'' ``no likelihood,'' and ``not possible.''


             c. chemical injury and chemical storage bunker

  Iraqi Bunker Complex--Southeastern Iraq (between Kuwaiti border and 
                          Basra) March 1, 1991

       This case involves the experiences of former Sergeant David 
     Allen Fisher, who also discovered what appears to have been a 
     cache of chemical weapons where the Department of Defense 
     says none were deployed.
       While searching an Iraqi ammunition bunker in Iraq in an 
     area south of Basra, Mr. Fisher brushed up against some 
     wooden crated marked with skulls and crossbones. Within 8 
     hours his arm had reddened and began to sting. Several hours 
     later, he noticed painful blisters on this upper arm.\65\
       In his report of the incident, in a Question and Answer 
     Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public 
     Affairs Office, and in a subsequent journal article, Colonel 
     Michael Dunn, who would later become the commander of the 
     U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Chemical Defense 
     confirmed that Fisher's injuries were the result of exposure 
     to chemical agents.\66\
       In this case, as in the other cases like it, it seems 
     impossible to obtain an explanation from the Department of 
     Defense that is consistent with the events as reported by the 
     soldiers present. In August, a pentagon spokesperson stated 
     that whatever chemicals were encountered in the bunker must 
     have been left over from earlier fighting between Iraq and 
     Iran.\67\
       However, in September 1994, that same spokesperson said 
     that he was not aware that any chemical weapons crates were 
     discovered by Mr. Fisher, despite Colonel Dunn's report and 
     despite the fact that Mr. Fisher received a Purple Heart for 
     his injuries.\68\ Others who were present that date including 
     the FOX vehicle operators, one of whom received a bronze 
     star, and Colonel Dunn corroborate these events. Further, 
     according to Mr. Fisher, this was an active bunker complex 
     with artillery pieces present and their mission there was to 
     go from bunker to bunker searching for Iraqi soldiers.\69\ 
     Old chemical weapons, left over from a previous war, would be 
     stored in a separate storage facility; if they were present 
     at an active artillery position, they were deployed with the 
     intention of using them.


              d. chemical detection and chemical injuries

  Breaching Operations--Second Marine Divi- sion--Southwestern Kuwait 
                           February 24, 1991

       The following is an excerpt take directly from ``U.S. 
     Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2D Marine 
     Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm,'' an official 
     report published in 1993 by the History and Museums Division, 
     Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC.
       ``The use of chemical munitions by the Iraqis had been 
     expected, but happily had not yet occurred. At approximately 
     0656, the ``Fox'' chemical reconnaissance vehicle at Red 1 
     detected a ``trace'' of mustard gas, originally thought to be 
     from a chemical mine. The alarm was quickly spread throughout 
     the division. Since everyone had been to don his protective 
     outer garments and boots the previous evening, it was only 
     necessary to hurriedly pull on a gas-mask and protective 
     gloves to attain MOPP level 4. A second ``Fox'' vehicle was 
     sent to the area, and confirmed the presence of an agent that 
     had probably been there a long time. Unknown in its origin, 
     it was still sufficiently strong to cause blistering on the 
     exposed arms of two AAV crewmen. Work continued on the 
     clearance of the lanes, and MOPP level was reduced to 2 after 
     about a half-hour.''\70\
       Several issues are raised by this report. First, chemical 
     mustard agent was detected by the FOX vehicles with the unit. 
     Second, two marines were reportedly injured as a result of 
     exposure to these agents, Third, it is highly unlikely that 
     the chemical agents could have been there ``a long time.'' 
     These detections were made in southwestern Kuwait, an area 
     not occupied by Iraq until after the invasion of Kuwait on 
     August 2, 1990. Investigation by the Committee into this 
     incident continues.


            e. chemical and biological analysis of equipment

       The Committee has submitted samples for analysis to several 
     renowned laboratories, including the Lawrence Livermore 
     National Laboratory's Forensic Science Center.\71\
       In biological analyses, based on preliminary testing using 
     advanced DNA analyses and screening techniques, unique DNA 
     sequences were detected. Q-fever and Brucella were indicated 
     on the inside of a gas mask carrying case, the top of a gas 
     mask filter, and under the rubber seal of a mask submitted to 
     the Committee for analysis by U.S. Persian Gulf War veterans 
     who brought them back from the Middle East.\72\
       When additional primer pairs were compared, the findings 
     were negative. These tests were repeated with identical 
     findings--that is, the same identical unique DNA primer pairs 
     were indicated.\73\
       While false positive DNA testing can occur with only a 
     single primer pair analysis, these results can also be 
     indicative of the presence of only a single strand--perhaps 
     due to the presence of another genetically-altered biological 
     warfare-related microorganism.\74\
       We do know that the U.S. licensed the export of genetic 
     materials capable of being used to create thee types of 
     genetically-altered biological warfare agents to the Iraqi 
     Atomic Energy Commission--an Iraqi governmental agency that 
     conducted biological warfare-related research--prior to the 
     war.\75\ One method of creating these genetically altered 
     micro-organisms is by exposing them to radiation. The U.S. 
     also licensed the export of several species of brucella to 
     Iraqi governmental agencies.\76\ Both Q-fever and Brucellois 
     are also endemic to the region.\77\
       This study is far from conclusive but points to the need 
     for further research in this area. According to the Lawrence 
     Livermore National Laboratory, biological studies need 
     further attention. Cultures need to be investigated more 
     closely. Experiments to amplify the whole genome and to allow 
     for the manipulation of increased concentrations of DNA by 
     advanced testing would likely be more precise in identifying 
     threat organisms--organisms that may be causing Gulf War 
     Syndrome.
       In addition many chemical compounds were present in the 
     samples. The scientists at Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory Forensic Science Center believe that additional 
     analysis of more samples may isolate and identify unusual 
     hazardous chemical compounds, chemicals that in combination 
     may be hazardous, chemical warfare agent compound's 
     or biological pathogens on the surface of collected 
     items--and that much more study is warranted.\78\
       While these results are preliminary they are also very 
     important. They show that we have the tools to get to the 
     bottom of this problem if we simply choose to use them.


                       f. committee staff remarks

       What seems to be emerging is a troubling pattern of events 
     involving individuals who have received medals--Bronze Stars, 
     Meritorious Service Medals, Army Commendation Medals, and 
     Purple Hearts--in the course of coming into contact with 
     unconventional weapons that the Department of Defense 
     continues to insist were not even present in theater. 
     Chemical and biological weapons were either present, or they 
     were not present. If weapons such as these were present, they 
     were deployed doctrinally, as a matter of Iraqi Army 
     practice, not in isolated instances. These events raise 
     serious concerns about the veracity of the Department of 
     Defense's claims as well as their motives. These reports call 
     into question each and every Department of Defense refutation 
     of previously reported detections and each and every 
     triggered chemical agent detection alarm.
       We know that there were chemicals found near An Nasiriyah, 
     in an area that was secured by elements of the 18th Airborne 
     Corps. The U.N. confirms that they were there, and a Defense 
     Department official testifying before the Senate Banking 
     Committee confirmed that troops were close to this facility--
     contradicting previous testimony in the same hearing by 
     another senior Defense Department official.
       Careful scrutiny leads us to conclude that they were found 
     in a container in southeastern Kuwait in an area tested by 
     Kuwaiti, British, and American soldiers from the 11th Armored 
     Cavalry Regiment.
       We know from the reports on Sergeant Fisher that they were 
     found in an Iraqi bunker complex south of Basra in an area 
     that was secured by elements of the 3rd Armored Division.
       Two U.S. Marines were injured by chemical agents in 
     breaching operations during the ``ground war.''
       We now know that many of the soldiers that were present 
     during each of these events are ill--others were given medals 
     for their actions. Many of the veterans of the Gulf War and 
     their families are now suffering permanently debilitating 
     illnesses--some have died. Currently it is estimated that 
     there are 29,000 servicemen and women on the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs Persian Gulf Registry and 7,000 on the 
     Department of Defense Registry. The Department of Defense 
     Registry is growing at a rate of about 500 individuals per 
     week.
       Just over one year ago, on September 9, 1993, when the 
     first staff report was prepared for the Chairman, we were 
     forced to estimate the numbers of sick veterans. Since that 
     time we have learned that 5,400 Persian Gulf War veterans had 
     registered with the Department of Veterans Affairs up to that 
     point. The Department of Defense Registry numbered only a few 
     hundred. In just over a year's time the number of veterans 
     who have registered in these registries has grown by nearly 
     700%. We have also learned that many of the signs and 
     symptoms of illnesses initially experienced by the veterans 
     of the Persian Gulf War are now being experienced by their 
     spouses and families. This data confirms that these illnesses 
     are becoming a major threat to the health and well-being of a 
     significant and rapidly growing number of individuals and 
     warrants a serious and immediate effort by the government to 
     determine the precise causes of the illnesses.


                               Footnotes

     \1\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs from Secretary of Defense 
     William J. Perry, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Jesse Brown, 
     and Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, 
     dated May 4, 1994. (Appendix A-1)
     \2\Testimony of Dr. Edwin Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for 
     Personnel and Readiness before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a hearing convened 
     on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on 
     the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, on May 25, 
     1994. (Appendix A-2)
     \3\Department of Defense testimony before the U.S. Senate 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs during a 
     hearing convened on U.S. Export Policies to Iraq and Their 
     Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian 
     Gulf War, on May 25, 1994. (Appendix A-3)
     \4\Memorandum for Persian Gulf War Veterans, Persian Gulf War 
     Health Issues, from John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the 
     Joint Chiefs of Staff and William J. Perry, Secretary of 
     Defense, dated 25 May 1994. (Appendix A-4)
     \5\``Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
     Persian Gulf War Health Effects,'' Office of the 
     Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 
     (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1994); and 
     Department of Defense Press Release, June 23, 1994.
     \6\Recommendation for Award of Army Commendation Medal, 
     Sergeant James Warren Tucker, Decontamination Platoon Squad 
     Leader, 54th Chemical Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 
     dated July 1993. (Appendix B-1)
     \7\Recommendation for and Award of Meritorious Service Medal, 
     Captain Michael F. Johnson, Troop Commander, 54th Chemical 
     Troop, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, dated January 1993. 
     (Appendix B-2)
     \8\Ibid.
     \9\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--Appendix B-3). Initial Report: Suspected 
     Chemical Container, prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer 
     Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United 
     Kingdom), dated 7 August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN 
     CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
     \10\Ibid.
     \11\From Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, 
     prepared by Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st 
     EOD Squadron Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 
     August 1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix 
     B-5, B-6).
     \12\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by 
     Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron 
     Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August 
     1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--Appendix B-4).
     \13\Ibid.
     \14\Ibid.
     \15\Appendix B-7.
     \16\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by 
     Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron 
     Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August 
     1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
     \17\Ibid.
     \18\Ibid.
     \19\Ibid.
     \20\Susan Budavari, ed., ``The Merck Index: An Encyclopedia 
     of Chemicals, Drugs, and Biologicals, Eleventh Edition`` 
     (Rahway, N.J.: Merck and Co., Inc., 1989), pp. 995-996. 
     (Appendix B-8) James A.F. Comptom, Military Chemical and 
     Biological Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties 
     (Caldwell, N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. 
     (Appendix B-9)
     \21\Jane's NBC Protection Equipment, 1990-91, (London, U.K.: 
     Jane's Information Group, 1991). Appendix B-10).
     \22\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by 
     Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron 
     Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August 
     1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
     \23\Ibid.
     \24\Ibid.
     \25\Ibid.
     \26\Ibid.
     \27\Ibid.
     \28\Memorandum for the Commander, 11th ACR, Tasking Number 
     91-047, dated 7 August 1991 from Joseph W. Miller, Lieutenant 
     Colonel, GS, ACofs, G-3. (Appendix B-11)
     \29\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \30\Ibid.
     \31\Ibid.
     \32\Ibid.
     \33\Ibid.
     \33\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological 
     Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell, 
     N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-
     9)
     \34\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents-
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \35\Ibid.
     \36\Ibid.
     \36\Ibid.
     \37\Ibid.
     \38\Staff interviews with Captain Johnson and Sergeant 
     Tucker.
     \39\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents  
     Information Paper; To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \40\Ibid.
     \41\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents  
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \42\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M. 
     Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of 
     the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated 
     July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-12).
     \43\Committee inquiry to the National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology, dated August 1, 1994. (Appendix B-13).
     \44\Letter to Committee staff from Dr. Stephen E. Stein, 
     Ph.D., Director, National Institute for Standards and 
     Technology, Director, Mass Spectrometry Data Center, Chemical 
     Science and Technology Laboratory, dated September 6, 1994. 
     (Appendix B-14).
     \45\Ibid.
     \46\Ibid.
     \47\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents 
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \48\Ibid.
     \49\Ibid.
     \50\Appendix B-15.
     \51\Letter to Chairman Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Committee on 
     Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, from Dr. Theodore M. 
     Prociv, Deputy for Chemical and Biological Matters, Office of 
     the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, dated 
     July 26, 1994. (Appendix B-10).
     \52\Committee staff interviews with Captain Michael F. 
     Johnson.
     \53\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents  
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \54\James A.F. Comptom, ``Military Chemical and Biological 
     Agents: Chemical and Toxicological Properties'' (Caldwell, 
     N.J.: The Telford Press, (September 1987), 9-17. (Appendix B-
     16)
     \55\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents  
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \56\Ibid.
     \57\Staff interviews.
     \58\Memorandum for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
     Defense for Chemical Biological Matters (OASD(CBM)), Suspect 
     Chemical Container found in Kuwait City, Kuwait City, Kuwait, 
     in August 1991, Don W. Killgore, Lieutenant Colonel, 
     Technical Inspections Branch, Office of the Inspector 
     General, Department of the Army, July 29, 1994.--FOR OFFICIAL 
     USE ONLY--(Appendix B-17)
     \59\Staff interviews with Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. 
     Department of the Army.
     \60\Ibid.
     \61\Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Vicki Merriman, Office 
     of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
     Chemical and Biological Matters from Dr. Graham S. Pearson, 
     Director General, Chemical and Biological Defence 
     Establishment, Ministry of Defence, Porton Down, Salisbury, 
     Wilts, U.K., Suspect Chemical Container: Kuwait City: August 
     1991. (Appendix B-18)
     \62\Initial Report: Suspected Chemical Container, prepared by 
     Major J.P. Watkinson, Officer Commanding, 21st EOD Squadron 
     Group, Royal Ordinance (United Kingdom), dated 7 August 
     1991--RESTRICTED: MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE--(Appendix B-4).
     \63\Memorandum for Director, CATD, Iraqi Chemical Agents--
     Information Paper: To Present First Hand Knowledge of Iraqi 
     Chemical Agents Identified in Kuwait, prepared by Michael F. 
     Johnson, Captain, CM NBC Branch, January 4, 1994.--FOR 
     OFFICIAL USE ONLY--(Appendix B-3).
     \64\Letter of complaint from Mr. Randall Vallee, September 
     23, 1994 (Appendix B-19) and staff interviews.
     \65\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation 
     Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael 
     A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1)
     \66\Information Paper: Chemical Agent Exposure--Operation 
     Desert Storm, prepared and authenticated by Colonel Michael 
     A. Dunn, March 5, 1991. (Appendix C-1), Question and Answer 
     Brief prepared for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Public 
     Affairs Office, March 1991 (Appendix C-2), Lieutenant Colonel 
     John V. Wade, Major Robert M. Gum, and Colonel Michael A. 
     Dunn, ``Medical Chemical Defense in Operation Desert Shield 
     and Desert Storm,'' Journal of the U.S. Army Medical 
     Department, (January-February 1992), pp. 34-36. (Appendix C-
     3)
     \67\Thomas D. Williams, ``Veteran's Story Counters Official 
     One on Gas War,'' The Hartford Courant (September 21, 1994) 
     A2. (Appendix C-4)
     \68\Ibid.
     \69\Staff interviews.
     \70\Lieutenant Dennis P. Mroczkowski, ``U.S. Marines in the 
     Persian Gulf, 1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert 
     Shield and Desert Storm,'' (Washington, D.C.: History and 
     Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), p. 
     41 (Appendix D-1), p. 45 (Appendix D-2).
     \71\Laboratory analysis request from Chairman Donald W. 
     Riegle, Jr., Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
     to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic 
     Science Center, dated April 15, 1994. (Appendix E-1)
     \72\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick 
     Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and 
     Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and 
     Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm: 
     Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,'' 
     Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence 
     Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2); 
     Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.
     \73\Ibid.
     \74\Ibid.
     \75\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland 
     (January 21, 1994).
     \76\American Type Culture Collection, Rockville, Maryland 
     (January 21, 1994).
     \77\Robert Berkow, M.D., Editor-in-Chief, The Merck Manual of 
     Diagnosis and Therapy, Sixteenth Edition (Rahway, N.J.: Merck 
     and Co., Inc., 1992). Q-fever (Appendix E-3) and Brucellosis 
     (Appendix E-4) summaries attached.
     \78\Brian Andresen, Ph.D., Jackie Stilwell, M.S., Patrick 
     Grant, Ph.D., Jeff Haas, M.S., Richard Whipple, B.A., and 
     Armando Arcaraz, M.S., ``Preliminary Results of Gas Masks and 
     Exposure-Monitoring Equipment Associated with Desert Storm: 
     Chemical and Biological Analyses of First Samples Sent,'' 
     Forensic Science Center, J Division/NAI Directorate, Lawrence 
     Livermore National Laboratory, June 1994 (Appendix E-2); 
     Staff interviews with laboratory personnel.

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