[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                RECYCLABLE COLLECTION PROGRAMS UNCHANGED

                                 ______


                         HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, October 7, 1994

  Mr. MINETA. Mr. Speaker, just a few weeks ago the Congress passed and 
the President signed into law the Federal Aviation Administration 
Authorization Act of 1994. Title VI of that Act dealt with preemption 
of State economic regulation of motor carrier transportation. In 
general, Title VI would preempt state economic regulation of most forms 
of intrastate trucking.
  A question has been raised recently about whether Title VI has the 
effect of preempting State economic regulation of the curbside 
collection of recyclables. It clearly does not.
  The relevant language in the Act is in Sec. 601(c) of the Act, which 
states in relevant part: ``* * * a State, political subdivision of a 
State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or 
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and 
effect of law relating to a price, route, or service of any motor 
carrier * * * with respect to the transportation of property.''
  The key issue becomes whether the curbside collection of recyclables 
is within the meaning of the term ``transportation of property.'' That 
term is a term long used in the Interstate Commerce Act and has had its 
exact legal meaning refined over the years through a series of 
precedents. Sec. 601(c) is an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 
and we are in Title VI using the term ``transportation of property'' 
consistent with its meaning in the Interstate Commerce Act and the 
related precedents.
  The meaning of the term as refined by precedent is broad enough to 
cover, for example, recyclables being transported as part of a 
commercial transaction to a major remanufacturing concern, but not so 
broad as to cover garbage collection and closely analoguous curbside 
collection of recyclables. This distinction is fully spelled out in the 
written opinion I recently received from the General Counsel of the 
ICC, which I insert in the Record with this statement.
  There should be no uncertainty or question in anyone's mind about 
this: curbside collection of recyclables is not within the definition 
of transportation of property as the term is used in the ICC Act or in 
Title VI of the Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1994. Curbside 
collection of recyclables is therefore not preempted by Title VI.
  I would like to thank in particular my colleague from the State of 
Washington, Maria Cantwell, who has taken the leadership role in 
ensuring that this issue be clarified and in assuring that curbside 
recyclable collection programs will continue unchanged by this 
legislation.
                                   Interstate Commerce Commission,


                                Office of the General Counsel,

                               Washington, DC, September 30, 1994.
     Hon. Norman Mineta,
     U.S. House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Mineta: You have requested my opinion as 
     to whether Title VI of the Federal Aviation Authorization Act 
     of 1994 preempting State regulation of intrastate truck 
     transportation can be interpreted as foreclosing a State or 
     municipality from regulating curbside collection of 
     recyclables in connection with the provision of curbside 
     trash collection service. In my view it cannot.
       The ICC has never regulated curbside collection of garbage. 
     In fact, the Commission has issued decisions finding that 
     garbage and refuse are not considered property under the 
     Interstate Commerce Act because they have no value. See Joray 
     Trucking Corp. Common Carrier Application, 99 M.C.C. 109, 110 
     (1965). There is no basis, in my opinion, for treating 
     recyclables that are handled as a part of trash pickup or 
     other curbside collection differently for regulatory 
     purposes. In other words, recyclables segregated from trash 
     for curbside collection should not be deemed to be property 
     under I.C.C. precedent and as such would not come within the 
     purview of Title VI of the FAA Act.
       A distinction must be drawn between recyclables 
     transportation that is a part of the curbside collection 
     process and over the road shipments of recyclables in 
     commercial quantities such as a movement of metal scrap from 
     or to a foundry. As I have previously advised in response to 
     a joint letter from Congressmen DeFazio, Rahall and Cantwell 
     to Chairman McDonald, recyclables that have value for use in 
     a manufacturing process have been treated as property under 
     Commission case law. Transportation of Waste Products for 
     Reuse, 114 M.C.C. 92, 104-105 (1971).
           Sincerely,
                                                    Henri F. Rush,
     General Counsel.

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