[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
    MOVING BEYOND THE STATUS QUO: THE NEED FOR A BOLD NUCLEAR POLICY

                                 ______


                        HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, October 7, 1994

  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, the world has changed dramatically and I had 
hoped for a bold change in policy governing our nuclear forces. We have 
instead courageously committed ourselves to stay the course, polish our 
missiles, and wrap up a few loose ends.
  For the benefit of my colleagues I would like to include in the 
Record an analysis of this policy change prepared by the Union of 
Concerned Scientists. The opportunity to win the peace is at hand and 
we should be actively negotiating further nuclear reductions.

                  Clinton's Status Quo Nuclear Policy

                          (by Jennifer Weeks)

       With the release of the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] and 
     the conclusion of the September 27-28 Washington summit, the 
     Clinton Administration confirmed that its nuclear weapons 
     policy is basically treading water. Although Russian 
     President Boris Yeltsin has proposed additional nuclear cuts, 
     the U.S. seems determined to ignore this opportunity.
       Announcing that the administration would undertake the NPR 
     in October 1993, then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin promised a 
     ``fundamental'' reexamination of nuclear weapons policy, 
     doctrine, force structure, and arms control issues. However, 
     a year later, the final product called only for a few 
     cosmetic changes to the nuclear forces inherited from the 
     Bush Administration--retiring four nuclear submarines and 26 
     B-52 bombers--while retaining the 3,500 warheads allowed 
     under the START II treaty. The NPR rejected adopting a policy 
     of no first use of nuclear weapons.
       Clinton Administration officials justified the decision not 
     to seek nuclear reductions below START II levels as a 
     precaution against a possible political reversal in Russia, 
     which is drawing down its arsenal more slowly than the U.S. 
     due to political and economic constraints. In Defense 
     Secretary William Perry's words, ``the small but real danger 
     that reform in Russia might fail and a new government arise 
     hostile to the United States, still armed with 25,000 nuclear 
     weapons requires us to maintain a nuclear hedge.''
       Days after the NPR was unveiled, Russian President Boris 
     Yeltsin presented a fundamentally different perspective in an 
     address to the U.N. General Assembly. Speaking hours after 
     President Clinton, Yeltsin indicated that Russia is prepared 
     to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy. 
     Yeltsin proposed negotiating a treaty among the five nuclear 
     weapons states that would provide, among other things, for 
     ``further elimination of nuclear munitions and reduction of 
     strategic carriers.'' He also called for strengthening 
     security assurance to non-nuclear weapons states, in order to 
     build support for extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty [NPT  in 1995.
       However, the joint statement issued by Clinton and Yeltsin 
     at the conclusion of their Washington summit expressed only a 
     remote possibility of timely progress on further cuts:
       ``The Presidents instructed their experts to intensify 
     their dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to 
     develop concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and 
     practices on both sides to the changed international security 
     situation and to the current spirit of U.S.-Russian 
     partnership, including the possibility, after ratification of 
     START II, of further reductions of, and limitations on, 
     remaining nuclear forces.''
       Not only did the U.S. pass up a potential opportunity to 
     achieve further Russian nuclear reductions; in addition, this 
     highly qualified pledge is unlikely to satisfy growing 
     international pressure for the nuclear powers to fulfill 
     their obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty [NPT] to move toward nuclear 
     disarmament. In mid-September, at a preparatory meeting for 
     the April 1995 conference that will consider whether to 
     extend the NPT, the non-aligned states announced that their 
     support for the NPT will depend on ``substantive progress'' 
     in a number of areas--including statements from the U.S. and 
     Russia on how they will reduce their nuclear arsenals below 
     START II levels.
       Clinton and Yeltsin did agree to two significant actions at 
     their September meeting. First, the U.S. and Russia will 
     speed implementation of START II by deactivating weapons that 
     are to be reduced under that treaty as soon as it is 
     ratified, rather than over a period of years as specified in 
     the treaty. This accelerated schedule could make it possible 
     to implement START II more quickly, paving the way for 
     additional reductions.
       Second, at a meeting scheduled for December of this year, 
     Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
     will exchange data on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear 
     warheads and fissile materials and on their safety and 
     security. However, this step falls short of what is needed. 
     The U.S. and Russia will ultimately have to exchange complete 
     information on their nuclear inventories--including the sizes 
     and locations of stockpiles and storage sites, and 
     descriptions of various weapon facilities--to make this data 
     useful for defense and arms control planning, and to prevent 
     either side from setting aside a secret cache of nuclear 
     weapons or materials.
       To make nuclear reductions permanent and irreversible, 
     Clinton and Yeltsin will have to take a number of further 
     steps, including:
       Reciprocal monitoring: Joint monitoring of sites in each 
     country where weapons are dismantled and where components and 
     weapon-usable fissile materials are stored would increase 
     security at Russian nuclear sites and build confidence that 
     both sides are reducing their arsenals on schedule.
       No weapon ``recycling'': In his U.N. speech, Yeltsin called 
     for an agreement among the five nuclear powers to bar using 
     fissile materials from dismantled warheads in new weapons. If 
     the U.S. and Russia agreed to dismantle all of the warheads 
     they will remove from service under START I and II and to put 
     the fissile materials under international safeguards, they 
     would not be able to keep large reserve stockpiles of nuclear 
     warheads (as both countries are currently expected to do).
       Deeper cuts: The most effective way to reduce future 
     nuclear threats is to lock in substantial nuclear reductions 
     now. If the Clinton Administration is worried about a 
     resurgent Russia--as the Nuclear Posture Review 
     recommendations indicate--then it should do everything 
     possible in the short term to bring Russia's nuclear weapons 
     under control.
       Hardliners in both the U.S. and the Russian governments 
     oppose the types of steps outlined above, and likely were a 
     major factor in the cautious tone of the September summit. 
     Ironically, it is Yeltsin who seems most willing to oppose 
     those voices against change; in his U.N. speech he stated. 
     ``We would like that there be no nuclear or other kinds of 
     weapons of mass destruction in the world.'' In contrast, 
     Clinton approved the NPR without comment just days before 
     Yeltsin came to town, effectively removing deep cuts from the 
     agenda. However, the Clinton Administration is strangely 
     reluctant to take proactive steps to secure the Russian 
     nuclear weapons and materials that it says are obstacles to 
     further cuts.
       Reform in the former Soviet republics will doubtless be a 
     long, difficult process, and there is no guarantee that 
     Yeltsin will be able to maintain stability in Russia. That is 
     precisely why President Clinton should pursue every 
     opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat from Russia today. 
     Rather than continuing to fight a mini-Cold War, Clinton and 
     Yeltsin should and can build a new security relationship--one 
     that relies far less on nuclear weapons.

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