[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 146 (Saturday, October 8, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 8, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ACT

                                 ______


                         HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR

                              of minnesota

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, October 7, 1994

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing the Federal 
Aviation Administration Act of 1994. This legislation is a major part 
of the continuing program of the Subcommittee on Aviation to reform the 
Federal Aviation Administration. Our goal is to enhance FAA's ability 
to act decisively and objectively to ensure the safety and efficiency 
of our national aviation system.
  During the past year the subcommittee has taken important steps to 
reform FAA. In Public Law 103-305, we established a 5 year term of 
office for the FAA Administrator. This will help ensure that 
administrators stay in office long enough to learn the areas in which 
reforms are needed and, equally important, to be sure that needed 
reforms are carried out. In S. 1587, we adopted major government-wide 
procurement reform, including a pilot project for FAA. These reforms 
will greatly enhance FAA's ability to procure the equipment needed to 
modernize the air traffic control system. In addition, during the past 
2 years we have been working with FAA to develop the administrative 
reforms needed to improve the agency's ability to manage high 
technology contracts.
  The Independent FAA Act, which I am introducing today, will enhance 
FAA's ability to act promptly in carrying out all of its 
responsibilities. The Act will establish FAA as an independent agency 
in the executive branch. By eliminating unnecessary and time-consuming 
DOT oversight and review, we can improve FAA's ability to act promptly 
to regulate safety, to meet the needs of its customers, and to fully 
use the funds available in the Airport and Airway Trust Fund to develop 
the aviation infrastructure. FAA's responsibilities are basically 
technical, and should be carried out professionally and objectively. 
FAA should not be part of a Department whose policies vary with the 
overall political philosophy of the executive branch. The current DOT 
appears to agree with this assessment, since, as I will discuss, they 
are proposing to make the FAA's air traffic control system, the FAA's 
largest activity, largely independent of any executive branch 
supervision.
  The approach of my bill is similar to that followed in the recently 
enacted law to remove the Social Security Administration from the 
Department of Health and Human Services and make it an independent 
administration. In signing this bill into law on August 15, President 
Clinton noted that his Administration has ``embark(ed) upon a 
revolution within the Federal Government * * * to provide service to 
the public that matches or exceeds the best service available in the 
private sector. Establishing an independent Social Security 
Administration will enhance its ability to meet this goal and provide 
`world class service' to all Americans.''
  My introduced bill also removes from the budget process the Airport 
and Airway Trust Fund administered by FAA. This change will improve the 
chances that the $5 billion a year contributed by aviation users to the 
trust fund will be spent on a current account basis for the intended 
purposes of developing the Nation's airports and purchasing capital 
equipment for the air traffic control system, not reserved in a growing 
surplus that helps to cover up deficit.
  This legislation is not the end of FAA reform. A further task 
remains: to make necessary changes in the general laws governing FAA's 
operations; to improve FAA's ability to modernize the air traffic 
control system; to obtain the best qualified personnel to staff FAA's 
widespread facilities; and to carry out FAA's other responsibilities. 
During the period before the convening of the 104th Congress, we will 
be consulting with a wide range of interested parties and experts to 
determine what further legislation is needed. Early in the 104th 
Congress, I expect to introduce a broader version of today's bill, to 
include the necessary changes in the laws affecting FAA's operations.
  I am pleased to note that the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee of 
jurisdiction will be introducing similar legislation in the Senate. 
Senator Ford has been a longtime supporter of an independent FAA. We 
will be coordinating our efforts to develop a comprehensive reform 
package for the 104th Congress, as we did during the mid-1980s in 
sponsoring legislation to reestablish the FAA as an independent agency.
  I believe that the approach of the introduced bill is much more 
responsive to FAA's problems than the Administration's proposal to 
divide FAA into two entities: a government corporation to run the air 
traffic control system; and a rump FAA to regulate the corporation and 
carry out the agency's other responsibilities. The Administration's 
proposal is too narrow because it attempts to reform only the air 
traffic control system and does not improve FAA's ability to carry out 
its other responsibilities, including the regulation of safety and 
assisting with the development of the Nation's airport system. In 
addition, the Administration's proposal has the potential for creating 
new problems which would impair the safety and efficiency of the ATC 
system.
  The Administration's proposal does not make needed reforms to improve 
FAA's ability to develop needed safety and security regulations in a 
timely manner. While DOT oversight and review slow down virtually all 
FAA activities, the problem is particularly pronounced in the area of 
regulation. FAA's regulatory process is inordinately slow. These 
problems have persisted regardless of which party controls the 
executive branch. This suggests that the problems are not political, 
but institutional.
  To cite some examples, in the mid-1980s, there was a strong need for 
FAA regulatory initiatives to improve the survivability of airline 
passengers in the event of a crash and fire. Rules were needed to 
require emergency escape path markings, seat cushions that would not 
readily catch fire, protective breathing equipment for use by flight 
attendants in emergencies, and improved cabin interior materials for 
new aircraft. When FAA tried to move on these important safety 
improvements, its rules had to run a hostile gauntlet of second-
guessers at DOT and OMB, which resulted in their implementation being 
delayed for many months.
  Another example of DOT negatively affecting the regulatory process 
can be found in late 1980s rulemaking establishing a requirement that 
commuter aircraft be required to carry ground proximity warning 
devices. These devices alert pilots when the aircraft was not 
configured to land safely as it approached the ground. DOT's objections 
resulted in a stretching out of the compliance period far beyond what 
was reasonable. Accidents occurred during the compliance period that 
could have been prevented by requiring timely installation of this 
safety device.
  Delays in rulemaking have continued into the current administration. 
In 1990, Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act which 
directed FAA to promulgate regulations requiring individuals with 
unescorted access to aircraft and secured areas of airports to undergo 
employment investigations, including criminal history records checks in 
appropriate cases. Almost 4 years have elapsed, yet final regulations 
have still not been issued.
  On the issue of drug testing for airline employees, it has been clear 
for several years that there is a need to reduce the rate of random 
drug testing. In July 1992, the House passed legislation calling on FAA 
to begin a rulemaking to accomplish this reduction. FAA did not issue a 
notice of proposed rulemaking until February 1994. Thus far no final 
rule has been passed. A further example of inordinate delay has been 
rulemaking to establish flight and duty time limits for flight 
attendants. The issue was thoroughly discussed during the Reagan and 
Bush Administrations, which were philosophically opposed to the concept 
of such regulations. Early in the Clinton Administration, the Committee 
was assured that the Secretary of Transportation and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget supported regulations limiting 
flight attendant working hours. Despite this high level commitment, it 
took a year and a half to adopt final rules.

  Numerous other examples could be cited.
  In the Aviation Subcommittee's investigation of why FAA rulemaking 
takes so long, it has become clear that the excessive time required for 
FAA to negotiate with the large number of offices in the office of the 
Secretary of Transportation which are involved in the rulemaking 
process is a significant problem. I see no reason why an agency of 
50,000 employees, headed by an executive level II administrator should 
not make final decisions on rulemaking within its jurisdiction without 
having to steer them through the paper-shufflers and second-guessers at 
the departmental level.
  Another important area which is not dealt with by the 
Administration's reform proposals is the need to fully use funds 
contributed to the proceeds of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, 
particularly for airport development. The Airport and Airway Trust Fund 
was established to furnish a mechanism for the users of the aviation 
system to contribute revenues which will be used in a dedicated revenue 
stream to develop our Nation's airports and the air traffic control 
system. In addition, the users pay a portion of the expense of 
operating the air traffic control system. The Trust Fund is not part of 
the deficit problem, since user contributions are more than adequate to 
cover the systems' needs. In fact, the problem over the years has been 
the budget and appropriations process, which has not permitted spending 
of all the revenues contributed by the users.
  In the late 1980s, the surplus of unspent money in the Trust Fund 
grew to more than $7 billion. In 1990, an understanding was reached 
between the Administration and all the congressional committees 
involved to embark upon a program to use this surplus to develop the 
aviation system, as originally intended. The surplus was drawn down to 
$4 billion at the end of fiscal 1993. Since then, the House and Senate 
have passed reauthorization bills which, if fully funded, would permit 
the surplus to remain at roughly this level. However, appropriation 
legislation has withheld authority from FAA to spend almost $1 billion 
of authorized funds for airport development.
  My bill will help ensure that the Trust Fund is able to spend its 
receipts. First, by removing the Trust Fund from the budget process, we 
will remove the need for the Appropriations Committees to cut funding 
for aviation programs to meet general budget targets for 
transportation. Second, by making FAA an independent agency, we will 
prevent spending from the Aviation Trust Fund, which does not 
contribute to the deficit, from being reduced, as a trade off to permit 
funding of other programs covered by the overall budget of the 
Department of Transportation.
  In addition to not dealing with problems of delay and full spending 
for airport development, the Administration's proposal to establish a 
government corporation for the air traffic control system [ATC] does 
not deal with some of the main problems faced by the ATC system. 
Moreover, the corporation proposal holds the potential for seriously 
disrupting the ATC system.
  Before we consider the Administration's proposal, we need to step 
back and evaluate the overall performance of the ATC system. The system 
has problems, and much of my work in the Congress has been devoted to 
identifying these problems and pushing the agency to solve them. But we 
must not allow these problems to obscure the ATC system's strengths.
  FAA now runs the world's best air traffic control system, which moves 
more than 450,000,000 passengers a year, with a high degree of safety 
and efficiency. The system is improving. Since 1982, air traffic delays 
have declined by 15 percent, while aircraft departures have increased 
by 39 percent.
  In addition, the system has been extremely efficient. Between 1971 
and 1992, FAA's cost for each instrument operation increased by 90 
percent. This was far less than the increase of 241 percent in the 
consumer price index over the same period of time.
  With an excellent system in place, we should be extremely reluctant 
to make radical changes which have the potential of disrupting the 
system. Unless there is a strong case to the contrary, the policy 
preference should be for focused reforms which deal with specific 
problems, while leaving in place the organizational structure which is 
working well.

  The existing air traffic control system does not operate as an 
autonomous function within FAA. Rather, operation of the system 
requires the cooperative coordinated efforts of a number of divisions 
in FAA, including the divisions responsible for: air traffic control 
services, facilities and equipment, safety certification and 
regulation, airport development, research and development, and legal 
services. This interdependence was recognized by the experts who 
testified before the Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline 
Industry, most of whom agreed that the ATC system cannot be separated 
from other FAA functions because they are interdependent, (Aviation 
Daily, June 23, 1993).
  The proposed breakup of FAA into an air traffic control system, and a 
rump agency with the rest of FAA's responsibilities, would disrupt 
organizational relationships and responsibilities which have been 
worked out over decades. Given human nature, a breakup of FAA would 
inevitably produce a period of jockeying for position and power which, 
at a minimum, would seriously distract employees. The end result of 
this struggle cannot be fully anticipated. However neat the 
organizational lines in the original plan, there undoubtedly will be 
unexpected problems affecting safety and efficiency.
  This is not the first time corporatizing ATC has been proposed. An 
earlier proposal for a separate ATC corporation concluded after an in-
depth study:

       Of all the options being considered, this one (a separate 
     ATC corporation) raises the most serious possibilities for 
     substantial disrupting a complex program which, despite major 
     obstacles, has proven to be safe and reliable.\1\

     \1\``Organizational Options for the Federal Aviation 
     Administration,'' study by Herbert N. Jasper for the 
     Transportation Research Board (1991).

  Because of the disruptive effects of breaking up the agency, the 
study recommended against a major reorganization of FAA, if there were 
feasible alternatives.

       Reorganization * * * is never accomplished without some 
     difficulty and the investment of resources, as well as the 
     risk of unintended consequences. Therefore, one should be 
     certain that the problems to be addressed can not be 
     adequately treated within the existing structure before 
     turning to legislation to effect a reorganization as the 
     remedy.

  I fully agree that we should not run the risk of disrupting our 
outstanding ATC system, unless there are serious problems which cannot 
be resolved by reforms which will keep the agency intact. The bill I am 
introducing today will permit reform without disruption.
  The main concern I have about converting the ATC system to a 
corporation is the effect on aviation safety.
  The corporation plan contemplates that system users, principally the 
airlines, will be saddled with a fee system to pay for the corporation. 
This means that the air traffic control system will be an expense for 
airlines, affecting their profit and loss. At the same time airlines 
will play a role in setting corporation policies and deciding how much 
the corporation will spend.
  Do we really want to have a relationship between airline 
profitability, and ATC spending and other decisions affecting safety? 
Would prescription drug users feel comfortable with an FDA financed by 
the pharmaceutical manufacturers? Would shareholders feel good about a 
Securities and Exchange Commission financed by brokerage firms? To be 
blunt about it, when airline profit margins start to influence air 
traffic control practices, the safety margin may be eroded, and that 
would not serve the public interest.

  One of the main justifications which has been advanced in support of 
a corporation is that this form of organization would produce a system 
which is more responsive to airline concerns and will reduce airline 
costs. This raises some disturbing scenarios. What if the airlines want 
to cut their operating expenses by reducing separation-in-trail 
requirements--the distance between planes--to allow more planes in the 
air? What if the airlines are having financial difficulties and want to 
reduce their air traffic control costs by cutting back on the number of 
controllers and increasing each controller's area of responsibility?
  In the existing system, decisions on safety issues are made in the 
overall best public interest by the Federal Aviation Administration and 
the Congress, with input from system users. If we go to a corporation, 
how will the public be assured that ATC operations will be managed to 
protect the interest of airline passengers and ensure safety?
  The answer to these questions that has been advanced thus far by the 
Administration is that there will be no safety problems because the 
operations of the air traffic control system would be regulated by the 
remaining FAA. In other words, a new level of bureaucracy would be 
created by establishing within FAA a new safety unit to regulate the 
air traffic control system.
  Establishing this new regulatory system will require resolution of 
many difficult issues. Ultimately, the safety of the system will turn 
on whether the right solutions can be found. For example, which aspects 
of the corporation's operation will be considered safety issues to be 
regulated by FAA, and which issues will be considered operational 
issues to be left to the corporation? Will the hours a controller works 
or the size of the sector he or she manages be considered a safety 
issue to be regulated by the FAA? Or will it be an operations issue to 
be left to the corporation? What role will the airlines play on the 
corporation's board of directors or in making other decisions which 
could affect safety? How will FAA enforce its safety regulations 
against the corporation?
  The basic question which needs to be asked is whether we should risk 
the uncertainties of creating a new system to promote ATC safety when 
we have in place an outstanding system.
  The entire assumption that a government corporation would be more 
efficient than a government agency is based on an inappropriate use of 
private sector models. Normally, private businesses are considered to 
be more efficient than government agencies because private companies 
operate in a free market where competitive pressures force them to be 
efficient. By contrast the proposed ATC corporation would be a 
monopoly. It would not be subject to any competitive pressures to force 
it to be efficient.
  A prime example illustrating that a conversion from a government 
department to a government corporation with a monopoly does not enhance 
efficiency, is the United States Postal Service. In 1972, the Postal 
Service was converted from a government agency to a government 
corporation, with a monopoly over letter mail. There were high hopes 
that the corporation would modernize and improve its service. Recent 
events have made it crystal clear that the change in the form of the 
postal service organization was no guarantee of increased efficiency.
  With respect to changes in the laws governing FAA, the 
Administration's proposal for ATC focuses on changing the legal 
requirements governing procurement and personnel. These are important 
areas worthy of consideration. As we go forward with our discussions on 
further legislation, we will certainly consider changes in these areas. 
But I think we need to expand our horizons.

  The last 2 years experience with the Advanced Automation System 
contract indicate the need for FAA to make substantial improvements in 
its ability to manage large contracts. FAA needs to shift its focus. 
Because of the revolution in computer technology, FAA needs to find 
ways to shift its role from that of a developer of technology, to that 
of a customer of off-the-shelf technology developed by others. FAA also 
needs to show more discipline in contract management, by freezing 
contractual requirements, by obtaining accurate information, and taking 
necessary action to ensure that projects stay on budget and within 
schedule. We will be seeking expert guidance on how FAA can best be 
encouraged to make management changes. Is it exclusively a matter of 
internal FAA management, or are there organizational and legal changes 
which would help enhance FAA's performance?
  Similar issues are presented in procurement. I should note that I 
expect procurement to be less significant in the future than it has 
been in the past since much of FAA's modernization program is now under 
contract and the problem has shifted from procurement to contract 
management.
  In the procurement area we need to consider ways to improve FAA's 
ability to make good procurements under whatever system is in place. 
FAA's recent actions in the Global Positioning Satellite [GPS] 
procurement show that the existing system affords many opportunities 
for the agency to streamline the process. In addition, the recently 
enacted government-wide procurement reform legislation will furnish 
important additional opportunities for streamlining.
  For GPS, FAA proposes to complete the major procurement of 
differential stations in 3 years and 5 months. This compares to the 
average procurement time for major projects of eight and half years.
  FAA has proposed to procure GPS technology expeditiously by 
streamlining internal procedures and by assigning professional 
personnel exclusively to the GPS procurement. Again, we need to look at 
how these improvements can be applied to other programs. Is this 
primarily a matter of good management? Can legislation play a part in 
improving procurement management and administration?
  Thinking even more broadly, it has been said that the organizational 
culture of FAA does not encourage employees to focus adequately on the 
needs of users of the agency's services. While FAA's focus should not 
be limited to what its customers want, customers' needs should 
certainly be an important element. We should explore whether there is a 
need for organizational or other legal changes to ensure that 
customers' needs are given their proper weight.
  In conclusion, the legislation introduced today is an important 
building block in the process of FAA reform. I look forward to working 
with my colleagues and the aviation community to continue the process 
and develop a comprehensive reform proposal for the 104th Congress.

                          ____________________