[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 145 (Friday, October 7, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 7, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                    NOMINATION OF BUSTER C. GLOSSON

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the nomination.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, as you know, I am discussing the reasons 
that I believe General Glosson should not be confirmed in his promotion 
recommended by the Department of Defense and by the President.
  As I have tried to make clear, the sequence of events is that there 
was a panel, which is traditionally done in our military services for 
promotion, set up to promote some members of the Air Force. That 
promotion process is not to be interfered with. The integrity of it 
must be maintained.
  The inspector general of the Air Force, backed up by the Department 
of Defense inspector general, said that General Glosson tampered with 
that process, and the evidence of it was given out by three generals 
who were on the board who knew that these communications by General 
Glosson were not only morally and ethically wrong, but they violated 
the regulations of the Air Force. They resigned. That was the basis for 
the inspector general investigation.
  Those facts were supported by the investigations of the inspector 
general, and then further, when questioned about it, the inspector 
general said that General Glosson lied under oath. Made aware of this, 
the Secretary of the Air Force, although she would say it was on 
General Glosson's initiative, withdrew from consideration for other 
higher up positions within the Air Force.
  Somehow it was surmised that a consolation prize for this process 
would be that General Glosson would retire at a three-star rank. So the 
nomination went through the Department of Defense, Secretary of 
Defense, the White House and came up here. It was up here for several 
months. Finally, the Armed Services Committee decided that it ought to 
go back to the Department of Defense for some review.
  There was a special panel set up to go back and look at everything to 
see if General Glosson lied and these generals that resigned that said 
that General Glosson was tampering in the process, whether all that was 
accurate.
  And so the panel reported back--and I discussed that--and that is 
why, because of the panel report, our own Armed Services Committee felt 
they could move ahead and bring General Glosson to the floor of the 
Senate for final confirmation at retirement rank of lieutenant general.
  And so we are dealing with whether or not General Glosson, 
interfering in this process, should be rewarded by a three-star rank 
and the stamp of approval that Senate confirmation gives to that.
  So I wish to speak a little about the inspector general's activity in 
this area versus what the panel had to say as it relates specifically 
to whether or not Glosson lied. As far as the panel is concerned, as 
far as the IG is concerned, there is no dispute that Glosson interfered 
in the process, and the three generals who resigned from the panel and 
said he did interfere, there is no dispute that they were telling the 
truth. The only dispute is did Glosson lie about it under oath.
  But even if he only interfered in the process, that is a very, very 
serious matter and subject to all sorts of action that can be taken 
against anybody so doing.
  But I want to just focus on this lying issue. Again, the joint IG 
investigation concurred in by the Air Force JAG and the Air Force 
general counsel found that General Glosson did lie under oath. The 
inspectors general conducted a criminal investigation into the 
allegations against General Glosson. It was conducted as a criminal 
investigation on the advice of the Air Force judge advocate after he 
was made aware of these allegations.
  This was not an administrative inquiry. Had it been, the IG could 
have compelled General Glosson's testimony. But General Glosson did not 
fully cooperate in the way that reflected an administrative inquiry. 
For instance, he required the presence of a personal attorney, and he 
disallowed a transcript of the interview by the IG personnel. According 
even to the committee report, General Glosson was evasive and 
misleading in his responses.
  The IG is duly authorized to conduct such investigations as was the 
case in this matter. It hires experienced investigators to conduct such 
investigations. These investigators make judgments based on weighing 
the facts against criminal standards. And when their judgments are 
signed off on by counsel, which it was in this case, it then makes a 
very powerful case.
  The review panel, on the other hand--I am talking about the panel 
that was set up after the Armed Services Committee sent this back to 
the Defense Department for reconsideration--this review panel, on the 
other hand, made a political judgment about whether General Glosson 
lied, and it did not have criminal investigative expertise.
  As a member of the Judiciary Committee, I have become familiar with 
the investigative process. In legal proceedings, facts are determined 
by skilled factfinders, the trial courts. In ensuing appeals, the 
appellate courts are to provide deference to the factfinding of the 
trial court. This deference is especially strong when the district 
court's factual findings were based on live testimony, where the 
district court was able to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses 
based on the testimony.
  The IG's heard all the witnesses, and their findings on credibility 
should not be dismissed lightly. Because the parties often disagree 
about the facts and because anyone can testify in a self-serving way, 
the processes of cross-examination and observing credibility are 
extremely important in resolving the factual inconsistencies in 
litigation generally. The three-member panel, again, set up just a few 
weeks ago after the Armed Services Committee sent it back to DOD, did 
hear live testimony. They also concluded that the three generals 
testifying against General Glosson were telling the truth.
  They did not say the same thing about General Glosson. However, the 
panel's live testimony was taken long after the IG's heard the 
testimony--nearly 1 year later, when witnesses' memories, except 
apparently General Glosson's, were fresher.
  In my view, therefore, and for reasons I mentioned earlier, the 
three-member panel's review does little to persuade me that the finding 
of lying by the IG's on the part of General Glosson was wrong. This is 
especially true since the panel's factfinders said that General 
Glosson's testimony to them was evasive and misleading. Mind you, this 
is not the IG's talking. It is the review panel talking.
  Couple this with the fact that the panel did not state that General 
Glosson told the truth. Let me repeat that: Couple that with the fact 
that the panel did not state that General Glosson told the truth and 
that is hardly, then, I think a ringing reversal of the findings of the 
IG's. So again, I say that that argument simply is not persuasive.
  Mr. President, there are three main arguments used over the last year 
by those who want to push through the Glosson nomination. Each one of 
these arguments is flawed. I wish to review the three. The first 
argument is as follows: Yes, General Glosson improperly tried to 
influence the promotion board. However, you have to look at this in 
light of his entire military career.
  General Glosson, indeed, had a distinguished military career.
  It is punishment enough, the argument goes, that General Glosson's 
career was prematurely cut short. I wish to address this argument. 
First of all, General Glosson had been promoted often to reflect his 
distinguished career. He rose all the way to major general without a 
single blemish on his record. That was his last promotion. Since that 
promotion, General Glosson engaged in activity in question, and so this 
confirmation relates only to what he did since his last promotion.
  The argument that he should get his promotion based on his entire 
career is simply not a persuasive one, particularly when you deal with 
something that is potentially a court martial offense, interfering with 
the promotions board processes and, for sure, lying under oath.
  The second argument that I think can be discredited is that if the 
U.S. Senate confirms General Glosson, here is what it is saying, here 
is the signal we are sending, not just to other flag officers but the 
entire military and to cadets and to plebes and those who are at the 
bottom of the ladder. We are saying to them, you can have a 
distinguished military career, and near the end of that career, you can 
do something improper and we will overlook it. If you have an 
unblemished career, you are allowed one big foulup and we will look the 
other way, because one major foulup will be looked at in the context of 
your entire career.
  That, Mr. President, is unacceptable because it is a political 
solution. It violates the very rigorous standards that we as an 
institution have fought hard to establish; namely, to make the 
promotion system like Tylenol--tamper proof.
  A second argument I heard was the conspiracy argument. The conspiracy 
was that it was not General Glosson who lied, it was the other three 
generals who were influenced. They ganged up on General Glosson and 
conspired against him. It was they who lied to stop his career dead in 
its tracks.
  Mr. President, none of the investigating bodies found one scintilla 
of evidence to support this conspiracy theory. To the contrary, at 
every turn, the three generals were found to be telling the truth--the 
Air Force IG, the DOD IG, the Air Force JAG, the Air Force general 
counsel, the Secretary of the Air Force, the three-member review panel, 
and the Armed Services Committee. Yet, this argument was used to get me 
to take a sympathetic view of General Glosson. Let me just say 
parenthetically the way to get me or anyone else to take a sympathetic 
view of General Glosson is to win the case on the merit of the findings 
in the joint IG report that these findings of the joint IG report are 
unfounded. So this argument of conspiracy is also a nonstart.
  (Mr. AKAKA assumed the chair.)
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, a third key argument was that the joint 
IG report was biased. That argument said that the Air Force IG LTG 
Eugene H. Fischer held a bias against General Glosson and that, 
therefore, the joint IG report was tainted. This argument was not only 
wafting behind closed doors around here but the Armed Services 
Committee considered the issue in its deliberations as well.
  In response to this argument, let me say first that the Air Force IG 
was merely a participant in the investigation invited by the DOD IG. It 
was the DOD IG that conducted the investigation and called all the 
shots.
  Second, the three-member panel reviewed this allegation and found 
absolutely no basis for such allegations. In fact, the panel's findings 
even directly shot down these allegations. It said ``We adduced no 
evidence establishing that Lieutenant General Fischer had serious 
personal conflicts with LTG Glosson.'' Again, this was one of those 
arguments wafting around the halls of this institution. Let me be very 
clear about it. There is no factual basis for these arguments.
  I might say, Mr. President, at this point, all of these different 
arguments that I just alluded to were used back in the spring and the 
early summer of why this should go through. In recent weeks, I think 
that the people have come to the conclusion that these arguments do not 
hold water, and I have not been hearing them on the personal appeals 
that have been made to me by my friends in this body who have asked me 
to just look another way and let this go through.
  Mr. President, the image and the integrity of the U.S. Navy has 
suffered greatly in recent years. Incidents like the Navy cheating 
scandal at the Naval Academy, also things like Tailhook, and other 
scandals have given the Navy much more than just a black eye. As a 
result of all of this, at the Naval Academy they talk about the new 
Navy--the new Navy now. What that means is that the Navy is trying to 
clean up its image. It is trying to instill in its lower ranks a new 
ethical standard. But if this new ethic is to take hold, what happens 
at the lower ranks must also take hold at the upper ranks. And the 
Senate is very much a part of that process.
  It seems to me we need to follow the Navy's lead. We, in the Senate, 
have been trying to clean up our own act. We are passing laws 
restricting gifts and lobbying. We will soon pass a law to subject 
Congress to the new laws that we pass for the rest of the country that 
we have exempted ourselves from, although I doubt now if we are going 
to get this done this year. But this will be done by February next 
year. The new Senate needs to instill a new ethic. By eliminating the 
appearance of double standards, we build up our credibility and our 
integrity as an institution. We are trying to become the new Senate 
just like the Navy is trying to become the new Navy.
  Mr. President, we would be taking a giant step backward if we let 
this nomination go forward having failed to resolve these very serious 
issues. There is no question that General Glosson tampered with the 
promotion board. And it is not disputed that he did not tell the truth 
about what he did. Meanwhile, all agree that the three generals who 
testified against General Glosson were truthful.
  Advocates of General Glosson say the following: That despite this 
blemish, you have to look at his overall career. But the problem with 
this argument is, as I have said, that if we do that, it is business as 
usual. That certainly then would not be the new Senate speaking. That 
argument says all right to do something untoward at the end of a 
brilliant career and you will get away with it. What they are really 
doing is asking the entire Senate to just look the other way.
  I do not know of one rule, I do not know of one guideline, one 
anything, Mr. President, that makes an exception for bad conduct if you 
have a brilliant career. That argument simply does not wash.
  Do my colleagues really want to make that argument to the public? 
They look at that argument and they would say, yes, it is business as 
usual, business as usual here in the Nation's Capital. And I, for one, 
am just one Senator, but for one Senator, I would agree with that. This 
is such a clear case.
  If we let this nominee go through, then who would ever stop? What 
would it take to put an end to business as usual? What would it take to 
put an end to placing political connections over integrity? What would 
it take for the U.S. Senate to rise up and finally say enough is 
enough?
  The integrity of the nomination process is too important to be 
compromised for the benefit of one officer regardless of his or her 
military achievements and his or her friends in Congress.
  Unless and until some new evidence is brought forward to alter the 
unanimous conclusions regarding General Glosson's conduct, the Senate 
must reject his nomination. To do otherwise elevates form over 
substance.
  We saw how the Navy cracked down on the Naval Academy at the time of 
cheating. In a large part, the Senate played a major role in that, and 
I think they did it under the leadership of Senator Byrd and others. I 
have already referred to the fine arguments that Senator Byrd made in 
those hearings. Are we going to discipline those at the bottom but not 
discipline those at the top? Are we going to discipline the plebes but 
not discipline the lieutenant generals who influence the process?
  I want to borrow an analogy. In the 6th century B.C., the Athenian 
lawmaker Solon spoke about the sometimes selective effectiveness of 
law. His observation is on all fours with today's experience. Solon 
said, ``Laws are like spider webs in that if anything small falls into 
them, they ensnare it. But large things break through and escape.''
  Mr. President, Solon in 6th century B.C. could easily have been 
describing our confirmation process rather than laws. But it applies to 
both.
  In other words, this is business as usual. This is what we have had 
all too often in this body, and all too often in this town. That is 
what is involved in the Glosson case. It is all right to punish the 
plebes and the cadets, but do not hold the generals to the same tough 
standards.
  We are the leaders in the confirmation process. Do you not know that 
every officer and every enlisted man and woman in the military is 
watching how we vote on this nomination? We are about to send a clarion 
signal to those military men and women watching. In the context of 
their culture, the outcome of this debate is as big a deal as the Gore/
Perot debate on NAFTA and what it was to most of us on that issue. It 
is pivotal, defining, and it will greatly affect the morale at all 
ranks in the military if we turn our heads on this issue.
  The question is: How will we in the U.S. Senate respond? I suggest to 
my colleagues, Mr. President, that the Senate is on the spot here, 
perhaps even more so than General Glosson. Will we set the example 
needed to reflect a new sentiment? Or will it be business as usual, and 
will we allow General Glosson to bust through the spider's web?
  In my view, this is a key vote on the credibility of our institution. 
This integrity issue, I think, is central to a lot of people in the 
bureaucracy. I was asked to meet with the Secretary of the Air Force on 
these nominations. But, you know, when they came to talk to me, they 
said they came to talk about the Colonel Bolton promotion and the 
General Barry promotion. They did not want to visit about General 
Glosson. They did not say they did not want to visit about it; they 
just said they came to speak about those other two.
  Why, in my suspicion, they do not want to talk about it is that this 
integrity issue is pretty doggone important and central to the whole 
issue, and people in the Air Force do not want to have to be dealing 
with that integrity issue because it is very difficult to support and 
justify.
  Let me read now from a letter from the DOD inspector general to 
Deputy Secretary Duetch responding to the panel report. Again, 
remember, there are these promotion panels which the three generals 
resigned from when Glosson tried to influence them. But the panel 
report that I am talking about refers to the three-member panel that 
was set out to go over the Glosson nomination a second time after our 
Armed Services Committee sent it back to the Defense Department. And so 
when that panel report came back, the Armed Services Committee felt 
that it gave them enough room to bring this to the Senate floor.
  The inspector general had an opportunity to respond to that, and so 
this letter is from the inspector general to Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Deutch. This letter addresses how the panel dealt with the 
issue of General Glosson's lying. It is entitled ``Memorandum for 
Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subject: Nomination, Lieutenant General 
Buster Glosson:

       I have reviewed the report on issues relating to the 
     nomination of Lieutenant General Buster Glosson for 
     retirement in grade, which was forwarded to this office by 
     deputy general counsel on September 15, 1994. I believe the 
     fact finders correctly concluded that Lieutenant General 
     Fisher was not biased in any way with respect to his 
     participation in the inquiry conducted by this office 
     regarding the allegations against Lieutenant General Glosson.
       Further, the fact finders and the investigators who 
     conducted the inspector general inquiry reached the same 
     conclusion, based on the same rationale, that the 
     conversations between Lt. General Glosson and the three 
     complainants conformed more closely to the recollections of 
     the complainants and that Lt. General Glosson's 
     communications were highly improper.

  The inspector general says:

       I disagree, however, with the fact finders' criticism of 
     the manner in which the inspector general inquiry was 
     conducted. The report asserts that the lead investigator 
     concluded early in the investigation that Lt. General Glosson 
     was lying and then attempted to gather evidence to prove that 
     conclusion. However, the report cites not a single instance 
     in which the investigators failed to pursue a material fact 
     or were deficient in their evaluation or presentation of the 
     evidence. In fact, the fact finders did not uncover any 
     significant new information in the course of their own 
     inquiry.
       The report also characterizes the approach to the 
     investigation as too prosecutorial and aggressive. That 
     characterization is based on anecdotal examples that do not 
     withstand scrutiny. For instance, the report contends that 
     the interview of General McPeak was combative and contains a 
     small excerpt from the transcript of the interview.

  Then the inspector says:

       I have reviewed the entire transcript and believe the 
     investigators acted properly throughout the entire interview. 
     The investigators did not badger the Air Force Chief of 
     Staff. Rather, they brought him back to the issues when he 
     sought to avoid tough questions by providing nonresponsive 
     answers. Similarly, the report characterizes an interview by 
     Major General      

  The name is redacted.

       A ``grilling'' because of questions the investigator asked 
     about the details surrounding the telephone conversation 
     which Major General      

  So and so.

       Overheard, including whether he recalled if Lt. General 
     Glosson was wearing a long-sleeved or short-sleeved shirt 
     that day, because the Air Force switches uniforms in the 
     fall. The question was intended to help fix the date on which 
     the conversation occurred. As such, it was completely proper 
     and probative.
       I find it especially perplexing that the fact finders would 
     criticize the investigators for a too-aggressive and 
     prosecutorial approach in view of their acknowledgement that 
     Lt. General Glosson was evasive and misleading in his initial 
     interview with the investigator. Were it not for the 
     investigators' determination to pursue the matter in despite 
     of the dissimulation, we would have failed in our duty to 
     uncover the truth.
       Finally, I feel compelled to disagree with the conclusion 
     in the report that Lieutenant General Glosson did not lie 
     during the investigation and that his testimony resulted 
     merely from inaccurate recollection.
       I find it inconceivable that any senior Air Force officer 
     could have gone through the crisis of the past several years 
     relating to promotion boards, including one instance where an 
     Air Force general officer was retired at a lower grade, 
     without being cognizant both at the time and later 
     recollections of any conversations he had with three board 
     members relating to a fellow officer's potential promotion.
       It should also be noted that the entire report, including 
     that important conclusion, was reviewed by the Air Force 
     deputy general counsel and the Air Force judge advocate 
     general. Those legal officials' initial concurrence was that 
     the findings of the report were supported by the evidence of 
     the record.
       The factfinders make no reference whatever to the legal 
     review. I believe the legal review is further testimony to 
     the fairness of the report and its conclusions, and I 
     continue to stand on it. I request that you forward this 
     memorandum to the chairman and ranking member of the Senate 
     Committee on Armed Services.

  Signed Derek J. Vander Schaaf, Deputy Inspector General.
  Mr. President, from day one, I have argued that the Senate should not 
confirm General Glosson's nomination until the dark cloud hanging over 
his name is somehow lifted.
  Well, Mr. President, that dark, ominous cloud still hangs over the 
Glosson name. A reinvestigation did not succeed in washing away the 
evidence. An independent panel of three judges took a fresh look at all 
the evidence, but it was unable to break free of the facts and to lift 
the cloud.
  The evidence against General Glosson is compelling. It is impossible 
to reconcile General Glosson's story with the testimony of three senior 
Air Force officers. That is the problem we have to wrestle with today. 
That is the issue. The Glosson nomination has been a very difficult and 
contentious issue for the Armed Services Committee. The committee has 
been agonizing over it for months. It is kind of like a festering thorn 
in the committee's side.
  The complaints that were lodged against General Glosson go right to 
the heart of the integrity of the military promotion boards.
  This nomination poses a real dilemma for the committee since General 
Glosson was accused of breaking the rules that the committee has worked 
so hard over the past 5 years to put in place.
  All the committee's hard work had one goal in mind, and that goal was 
to insulate the promotion board from improper influences and 
communications. The whole idea is to strengthen the officer corps by 
promoting the most qualified, based on skill, on performance and on 
integrity, and, let me say, not on political pull.
  Those are the rules that General Glosson broke. The inspector general 
of the Department of Defense and the inspector general of the Air Force 
accused General Glosson of tampering with a promotion board and then 
lying about what he did when questioned by investigators. The 
accusations by the inspectors general are laid out in a joint report 
dated November 8, 1993.
  The inspectors general's accusations rest primarily on the testimony 
of three senior Air Force officers. The three officers who filed 
complaints against General Glosson are as follows: Lt. Gen. John W. 
Nowak, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Logistics; Lt. Michael Ryan, 
Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Maj. Gen. 
Richard Myers, Director of Fighter Weapons Programs for the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. These are the ranks and the 
positions they held at the time of the investigation.
  These three senior Air Force officers were members of the 1993 major 
general selection board. These three general officers, Nowak, Ryan and 
Myers, formally complained that General Glosson had communicated with 
each of them separately regarding the integrity of a fellow officer 
whose name was under consideration by the board.
  I will refer to the person whose integrity Glosson questioned as 
General X to protect his privacy.
  Communications with a promotion board regarding a particular officer 
are ``expressly forbidden.'' They are ``prohibited'' by paragraph 11-d 
of Air Force regulation 36-9. A failure to obey this regulation could 
be a court-martial offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
Officers who are assigned to serve on these boards must take a solemn 
oath to ``act without prejudice or partiality,'' and they have a duty 
to request relief if they think the board's proceedings have been 
compromised ``by improper influence of superior military authority.''
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield for a brief question?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes. If I do not lose my right to the floor, I will 
yield.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to have our colleagues be able 
to hear both sides of this debate. I know the Senator has spoken now 
for I do not know how long and it is within his rights as long as he 
chooses to. But I think the other side of the issue should be heard so 
people can make a decision with both sides having been heard.
  I would like to inquire of the Senator at what stage would he be 
willing to have others speak on this subject?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. If the Senator can give me some information, I could 
answer that question. If the Senator can find out how many hours we are 
going to be in session tomorrow, because we will be voting on cloture 
sometime on the second day, and if we are just going to be in session a 
few hours tomorrow so I cannot discuss this, then I want to make sure 
we discuss it before we go home tonight.
  And then I know--see, the reason I am concerned about this, I say to 
my friend from Georgia, is because we are involved in four debates all 
at one time. We are involved in the Glosson debate, the Barry debate, 
the Bolton debate, and then the California National Park debate, and we 
had 3 or 4 hours on the national park debate.
  If we get into the national park debate tomorrow and they spend all 
the time on that, then cloture is going to come, and I will not have 
the opportunity to present the case that I want to present to the 
Senate. If we are going to have a long period of time for debate 
tomorrow, I would be glad to yield without losing my right to the floor 
to the Senator for what time he might want right now.
  Mr. NUNN. I have no way of telling the Senator that. I will certainly 
inquire of the leadership what their intentions are.
  I think most people would be able to speak if we vote on all these 
matters sometime tonight or in the morning. But if the Senator from 
Iowa is saying we really are going to be here until Sunday to debate 
these, I think the Senator would have plenty of time to debate, because 
if I know the Senate, and I think I do, there is nobody going to be 
here to speak after 11 o'clock anyway. I think we will have ample time 
to debate. I imagine if this is going to be stretched out to Sunday, 
there will be a number of hours that all of us would.
  I defer to the Senator. I inquire of him how long does he think it 
will take him to present this case. Let us say in any circumstance does 
he anticipate he will take another 2 or 3 hours, 30 or 40 minutes, or 
another 5 or 6 hours?
  I am trying to get a general idea on this. We have a number of 
speakers on the Armed Services Committee. Two of the nominations 
passed, as the Senator knows, by unanimous consent, all Republicans and 
Democrats. The Glosson nomination, I believe, was a 14-to-7 vote. So we 
will have other people who want to talk on the nomination on really 
both sides.
  So I guess my question really is: If the Senator has all the time he 
needs to present his case on all of these, would he give us some 
general range of that so we can inform other Senators who may want to 
speak on this?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. First of all, I would like to be cooperative and 
intersperse what I have to say with what the Senator has to say and 
others have to say on the other side, if that does not close me out of 
saying what I want to say in the whole process.
  So the Senator asked a very legitimate part of the process. I would 
even benefit from hearing what the Senator has to say about it before I 
am done. I just want to make sure that we have an opportunity to do 
this. But do not forget that the issue before the Senate that is going 
to determine whether or not we vote tomorrow is not necessarily on 
these nominations, because the first vote on cloture is going to be on 
the national park bill.
  Mr. NUNN. I understand.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. So I do not want and I am not going to have that yoke 
around my neck. I am not responsible for extending debate until someone 
on the national park debate says they are going to vote sooner than the 
usual ripened time.
  Mr. NUNN. I understand the Senator's point. I will also inquire into 
that and perhaps come back in an hour or so and at that stage determine 
when the remarks can be made.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. If the Senator wants to come back before the hour is 
up, I am happy to cooperate with him and let him speak.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I will be glad to yield for a question if it is not for 
a long period of time and if I do not lose my right to the floor.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. It is for a question.
  Mr. President, my question is part question and part plea.
  I ask the Senator to please let Senators know whether or not we 
should cancel some very important things. My whole family is together 
for the first time in over a year and a half. The Senator has it within 
his power to cancel my weekend. That lies within the Senator's power.
  I would tell him that if it is really important to do so, I 
understand he can exercise his prerogative. I ask him not to do that 
lightly. It is very important to me. And there are many other personal 
stories like this.
  If the Senator wants to keep us here through the whole time, please 
tell us so. I plead with the Senator. Do not play cat and mouse and 
say, ``Well, it depends on what you say and how the debate goes.'' I 
think the Senator knows what he is going to do.
  I would personally appreciate it if I could call my wife and my 
children and their wives who are accompanied by their grandchildren and 
say, ``I will not be coming tonight. Please proceed with the weekend 
without me.''
  You know, as the Nation goes, that is not an important issue. As my 
personal life goes, that is an important issue. And it is important 
enough so that the Senator from Iowa who is a friend can give me a 
straight answer. And I ask for one now.
  Mr. GRASSLEY Mr. President, for reasons before said, I cannot answer 
the Senator's question, because the issues that I am debating will not 
be voted upon until there is a determination of when we are going to 
vote on the California national park bill.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, Mr. President, we do not get to that until we 
finish this. If the Senator could give us an idea on what his 
intentions are.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Is the Senator from Louisiana telling me that the 
debate on the national park bill is all done?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. No. But you cannot get to that. I mean, I had good 
hopes that we would move to that vote as soon as we finish this.
  Look, if the Senator wants to keep us here until Sunday, you know, I 
can accept that as an answer. But what I find difficult to accept is 
the vagueness of it all. Like, ``Well, you know, it depends on them.'' 
And they say,'' No, it depends on you.'' You know, the old rope-a-dope.
  The United States Senate, when I came 22 years ago, never operated 
like this. Senators were sensitive to the personal lives of other 
Senators. They were aware of what they were doing and they talked 
straight with one another. I think that is what we ought to do now. I 
mean, tell us. You have it within your power.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am telling the Senator and any other 
Senator that is interested in the question that the Senator from 
Louisiana asked as forthright and as honest as I can.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. That I should cancel the weekend?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I cannot answer for you or anybody else on that point. 
I can only tell you that I am going to present my case. I was prepared 
to debate one of these nominations last fall, I was prepared to debate 
the other in February, and I was prepared to debate another one as 
early as last April.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Would the Senator mind telling me how long he is 
prepared to debate tonight and tomorrow?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I would say 2 or 3 hours.
  Now, when you are asking me, am I prepared to debate and stop at that 
point, then you get back still to the other question. It does not 
matter whether Chuck Grassley stops right now or not, if the debate on 
the national park bill is not done, you are not going to go home, 
anyway. And I have nothing to do with that debate.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. I fully understand.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I would resume my discussion.
  A failure to obey the regulation that I was talking about could be a 
court-martial offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
  Officers, who are assigned to serve on these boards, must take a 
solemn oath to act ``without prejudice or partiality.''
  And they have a duty to request relief if they think the board's 
proceedings have been compromised by improper influence of superior 
military authority.
  After considerable anguish, the three generals stepped forward, 
asking to be excused.
  Each then related the substance of their individual conversations 
with General Glosson to Air Force Secretary Widnall, and she 
subsequently excused them from the board.
  Their complaints then triggered a criminal investigation.
  The complaints were directed at General Glosson but they potentially 
involved the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Merrill A. McPeak. 
That set off alarm bells.
  Because of the serious nature of the complaints, a joint 
investigation was launched by the Inspectors General of the Department 
of Defense and the Air Force.
  The Department of Defense Inspector General was in charge of the 
investigation. The Defense Department Inspector General made all the 
key decisions regarding the scope and direction of the investigation.
  The Air Force Inspector General at the time, Lieut. Eugence H. 
Fischer, came along for the ride. He was invited to participate in the 
investigation--mainly as an afterthought--and at the urging of senior 
Air Force officials, including Secretary Widnall.
  The DOD Inspector General overruled the Air Force IG when 
disagreements arose.
  All the parties involved were questioned under oath.
  Mr. President, I would like to review the principal evidence in the 
case--the testimony of the three senior Air Force generals--the 
complainants.
  This is the key to the Glosson nomination.
  It is important to note at this point that the testimony was gathered 
two to three weeks after the alleged communications occurred. So it's 
fresh material. The investigators were on a fresh trail.
  I will take General Ryan's testimony first.
  I will briefly hit the main points covered by General Ryan's 
testimony.
  General Ryan testified that about one month after he was officially 
notified that he was designated as a member of the 1993 major general 
selection board in early October 1993, General Glosson called him on 
the telephone.
  This is how General Ryan described the telephone conversation. I 
quote:

       I got a call from LTG Glosson, who related to me the 
     following: That General X had lied to the Chief of Staff and 
     that the Chief of Staff didn't want him promoted. I asked 
     Gen. Glosson, I said, let me see if I got this right. I was 
     kind of taken aback. General X lied to the Chief of Staff, 
     and the Chief of Staff does not want General X promoted. And 
     he says, that's it. And I said, I understand the message. And 
     that was the end of the conversation. It was a very short 
     conversation.

  The investigators then asked General Ryan a very crucial question.
  Do you think General Glosson knew you were a member of the promotion 
board when he called?
  I quote: ``In your mind, were you convinced that he knew your were a 
board member?'' General Ryan's answer: ``Oh, yeah, I'm sure.'' The IG 
followed up: ``No doubt about that?'' General Ryan: ``No doubt * * * In 
fact, there was no question in the tenor and tone * * *''
  After the conversation with General Glosson, General Ryan testified 
that he felt ``disturbed.'' He said and I quote: ``After a point, it 
started festering in me again * * * It really started bugging me * * * 
I don't think I can get through it. I can't sign that piece of paper at 
the end of the board and swear you know of no attempt to influence the 
outcome of the board.''
  Mr. President, those are the important points raised in General 
Ryan's testimony.
  Now, I would like to turn to General Nowak.
  General Nowak's testimony is almost identical to General Ryan's 
testimony.
  Now, I would like to briefly summarize the key points raised in 
General Nowak's testimony.
  On or about October 6, 1993, after he had been appointed to the 
board, General Ryan telephoned General Glosson to discuss a program of 
mutual interest.
  After the business at hand was concluded, General Glosson then made 
these remarks to General Nowak. I quote:

       I want to tell you something, but you cannot check with the 
     Chief to verify this or anything about it. I need you to know 
     that General X lied to the Chief. The Chief caught him and 
     knows he lied, and he should not be promoted. If, in the 
     course of your activities over the next few days, his name 
     and record should pop up on your radar screen, you need to 
     make sure that you do what's necessary.

  General Nowak said ``that was the total extent of the conversation. 
We hung up.''
  General Nowark, like Ryan, was ``somewhat taken aback'' by what 
General Glosson had said to him.
  ``My honest assessment,'' at that point ``was I was not influenced by 
General Glosson,'' but ``I thought it was a poor thing to do.''
  General Nowak, like Ryan, was convinced that General Glosson knew he 
was a member of the board.
  ``It was clear to me,'' General Nowak said, ``that he wanted to 
affect my evaluation of General X.''
  To General Nowak, Glosson's intent was crystal clear.
  General Myers' testimony tracks exactly with the testimony given by 
Generals Ryan and Nowak.
  Now. Mr. President, I would like to briefly summarize the high points 
in General Myers' testimony.
  On or about October 6, 1993, General Myers was notified that he would 
serve on the 1993 major general board.
  The next morning General Myers received a call from General Glosson, 
who asked him to come to his office for a visit. General Myers agreed.
  This is how General Myers remembers the substance of his conversation 
with General Glosson.
  General Glosson asked me: ``Have you been notified you're on a board? 
And I said, yes sir, I talked with General Boles yesterday and he told 
me I was on a board. And he said Well * * * that seemed to concern him 
a little bit. And then he said, Well, I'm going to tell you this, 
anyway. Then General Glosson said General X has lied to the Chief, and 
words to the effect that the Chief doesn't want him to get promoted.''
  In reply, General Myers asked: ``So what do you want me to do about 
this?''
  General Glosson replied: ``Well, there may not be much you can do * * 
* Maybe you ought to just rate the record fairly low and hope it comes 
up in discussion, comes up in the gray area, and then you, you know, 
take it from there.''
  General Myers testified that he told General Glosson: ``You put me in 
a heck of a position here.'' Glosson agreed, saying ``yes, I know.''
  And that was it. The conversation lasted no more than 5 minutes.
  Like Generals Nowak and Ryan, Myers too was upset by what had 
transpired.
  For Myers, one of the most disturbing aspects of the conversation was 
General Glosson's close personal relationship with the Chief of Staff, 
General McPeak. Glosson was considered a ``confidant'' and member of 
the Chief's ``inner circle.''
  This thought might have passed through Myers' mind: could this be a 
``black channel'' communication from the Chief designed to torpedo a 
candidate?
  Myers thought it was ``really a strange conversation and probably not 
proper.'' He concluded that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force would 
not attempt to influence a promotion board. The whole idea ``was 
repugnant to me * * * The more I thought about it, it became 
ludicrous.''
  General Glosson's testimony presents a somewhat different picture of 
what happened.
  To briefly summarize, here are the important points raised during the 
interview with General Glosson.
  General Glosson admitted he had conversations with Generals Ryan, 
Nowak, and Myers.
  General Glosson admits he questioned the integrity of General X 
during those conversations.
  General Glosson admits telling them: ``that General X had lied to him 
on more than one occasion'' in the past.
  General Glosson even admits saying General X ``can't be truthful with 
the Chief and the Chief didn't trust him,'' complaining General X would 
be promoted anyway.
  While the two versions of what happened bear many similarities, there 
are crucial differences.
  First, General Glosson denied telling Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers 
that Chief of Staff did not want General X promoted.
  Second, General Glosson denied knowing that Generals Ryan, Nowak, and 
Myers were members of the promotion board.
  General McPeak's testimony did not help General Glosson, not by a 
long shot.
  Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to summarize the key 
points raised by General McPeak's testimony.
  General McPeak denied telling General Glosson that General X had lied 
to him.
  And General McPeak also denied telling General Glosson, or anyone 
else, that General X should not be promoted.
  But the most damaging part of General McPeak's testimony was the part 
about General Glosson's knowledge and awareness of promotion board 
membership.
  General McPeak's testimony clearly indicates that General Glosson had 
access to this kind of information on a routine basis.
  General McPeak testified that he would not be surprised or bothered 
if General Glosson had obtained board members' names from the 
``Personnel Office.''
  McPeak said: ``lots of people know who's on the board. All the 4 
stars do. And as I said, I've always put Glosson in a special 
category...I can think of no issues that I haven't been willing to 
discuss fully with Buster Glosson.''
  Mr. President, as I said a moment ago, the principal evidence in the 
case is the testimony of those involved.
  What does the testimony tell us?
  Does the testimony answer four critical questions?
  First, did General Glosson tell Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers that 
General X was unfit for promotion to higher rank?
  Second, did General Glosson tell them that General X had lied to the 
Chief of Staff and the Chief did not want him promoted?
  Third, did General Glosson know that Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers 
were members of a promotion board when he spoke to them?
  Fourth, did General Glosson attempt to influence the outcome of the 
promotion board?
  We should not confirm General Glosson unless the answers to these 
four questions are a clear, unambiguous ``no.''
  Now, let us revisit the testimony, the principal evidence in the 
case.
  Does it support resounding ``no'' answers on those four questions.
  Not quite.
  What does the evidence show?
  It tells us that General Glosson contacted three board members and 
made very unfavorable remarks about the integrity of a fellow officer 
whose name was before the board for promotion.
  Now, why would General Glosson do such a thing?
  You do not have to be a rocket scientist to figure it out.
  General McPeak's testimony suggests that there is a high probability 
that Glosson knew at least one or all three generals was on the board. 
Glosson was trying to block General X's promotion.
  The testimony of Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers is almost identical 
about what General Glosson supposedly said.
  General Glosson, by comparison, gives a somewhat different version of 
what was said.
  Mr. President, it comes down to this: His word against their word.
  There is no room for miscommunication or misunderstanding. There is 
no way to resolve the conflicting testimony.
  What we have here are irreconcilable accounts of what happened. There 
is just one inescapable conclusion: Somebody is lying.
  The stories given by Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers are almost 
identical. The consistency in their individual accounts lends 
credibility to their testimony. But the consistency may not be 
absolute.
  Generals Myers and Ryan discussed their separate communications with 
General Glosson before the board met and before being questioned by 
investigators. That is significant.
  Did they huddle to get their stories straight? Was this an act of 
conspirators?
  The conspiracy theory does not stand up to much scrutiny.
  Neither General Ryan nor General Myers spoke with General Nowak, yet 
his story is identical to theirs.
  Moreover, Generals Ryan and Myers voluntarily disclosed their 
discussions about the Glosson communications.
  Conspirators do not freely acknowledge their discussions.
  In sum, there is not one shred of evidence to suggest that three 
generals conspired to fabricate the allegations against General 
Glosson.
  What benefit could they possibly derive from doing that?
  Quite to the contrary, Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers came forward 
at great personal risk and with no certainty about what the final 
outcome would be. Theirs was an act of moral courage. Their action 
could have blown up in their faces and ended their careers. It was very 
risky business.
  So what is the bottom line?
  The inspectors general concluded that Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers 
are telling the truth. Everything points in that direction.
  The accounts given by Generals Ryan and Myers were corroborated by 
the testimony of General Nowak, who testified that Glosson made 
identical statements to him.
  And if the three generals are telling the truth, then that leads to 
one inescapable and difficult conclusion: General Glosson is not being 
truthful.
  Mr. President, I would now like to take a moment to read the IG's 
important findings regarding General Glosson's conduct.
  I will quote directly from the inspectors' general report. These are 
the inspectors' general findings on General Glosson's conduct. I quote 
from page 18 of the report.

       We make the following findings based upon a preponderance 
     of the evidence:
       A. Lt. Gen. Glosson improperly communicated with the 
     complainants and did so with the intent to influence their 
     consideration of General X for promotion during the Calendar 
     Year 1993 Major General Selection Board.
       B. Lt. Gen. Glosson lied under oath during our interview in 
     describing the nature and circumstances of his communications 
     to the complainants.
       C. Lt. General Glosson lied in his comments to the 
     complainants regarding General X.
       D. Gen. McPeak played no role in Lt. Gen. Glosson's 
     misconduct.

  There is an important issue that needs clarification.
  The inspectors general are saying that there are two sets of lies.
  First, the substance or guts of General Glosson's communications with 
the three complainants was the first set of lies. Those lies were told 
in early October 1993.
  Second, General Glosson lied when interrogated by investigators. That 
is the second set of lies. Those lies were told in late October 1993.
  Mr. President, that is strong medicine, I know, but that is the 
conclusion.
  It is the first time the inspectors general have ever accused a high 
official of lying under oath.
  And I know the inspectors general only reached this conclusion after 
long and careful deliberation. They stuck to the facts, and the facts 
led them to those conclusions. It is as simple as that.
  Now, the inspectors general did not present those conclusions without 
first clearing them through the Department's legal counsel. That was 
done.
  The department's lawyers put their stamp of approval on the report.
  The joint inspectors general report was reviewed and approved by the 
General Counsel, Sheila Cheston and Judge Advocate General of the Air 
Force, Major General Sklute.
  I repeat, this is what the lawyers said:

       We have reviewed this report and concluded that its 
     findings are supported by the evidence of record.

  Their signatures appear on the letter transmitting the report to the 
Secretary of the Air Force.
  Those signatures are dated November 8, 1993.
  The DOD General Counsel was neutral.
  After reviewing the inspector general's report, Secretary of the Air 
Force Sheila Widnall issued a formal letter of admonishment to General 
Glosson for communicating with three designated members of the 1993 
major general promotion board. She continued: ``this communication 
called into question the integrity of a promotion candidate.''
  That is the Secretary of the Air Force making those accusations 
against the general.
  Mr. President, from the start, I felt the inspectors general had 
presented a solid case against General Glosson.
  I had no reason to disbelieve the evidence. It was a credible report.
  But the Armed Services Committee took a different view.
  The Armed Services Committee has been struggling with the Glosson 
nomination for months. Until now, it had been unable to reconcile all 
the conflicting evidence.
  The Glosson nomination has been like festering thorn in the 
Committee's side.
  So, in frustration, in August the Committee turned to the Defense 
Department for help.
  The Committee asked the Department to form an objective panel to take 
a fresh look at all the evidence.
  That was done, and I will not dwell on that process, since it will be 
covered in detail, I am sure, by the chairman of the committee Senator 
Nunn.
  The independent panel's report is dated September 13, 1994.
  For the most part, the panel's report is an excellent piece of work.
  The panel examined the same evidence as the inspectors general did 
and came to the same conclusions for the very same reasons. Only the 
very bottom line is different. That is it.
  The panel was less decisive on the question of lying under oath. But, 
of course, that is a difficult question for anyone to wrestle with--
especially when a high-ranking official is involved.
  But whether you go to the IG's report, ratified all the way up the 
line, or whether you see the panel's report, except or that one issue, 
everything else is the same.
  The panel concluded that General Glosson did not tell a deliberate 
lie. His recollection was inaccurate. He was, quite simply, mistaken.
  In my mind, these are semantic differences.
  General Glosson does not now remember things as they really happened.
  Mr. President, the panel report does not clear General Glosson's 
name.
  It does not cast reasonable doubt over the IG's finding that Glosson 
lied.
  The panel report merely suggests that things may not--and I say may 
not--be quite as bad as we thought they were, but they are still pretty 
bad.
  Maybe he did lie. Maybe he did not lie. We will never know for sure.
  But there is no doubt about it, he tampered with the promotion board, 
because here are the panels findings.
  Here are the panel's main findings.
  First, the panel concluded that preponderance of the evidence 
suggests that the testimony given by Generals Ryan, Nowak, and Myers 
was truthful and accurate.
  Second, the panel concluded that General Glosson improperly attempted 
to influence General X's promotion.
  Third, the panel concluded that General Glosson's testimony was 
inaccurate--but not because he was lying but because his memory was 
foggy.
  And forth, the panel concluded that the conflicts in evidential 
material were irreconcilable.
  The differences were simply too vast to be reconciled.
  The panel report does not get General Glosson out of hot water.
  It is difficult to believe that General Glosson's mind could fog up 
so quickly.
  He was first questioned by the inspectors general just 3 weeks after 
the alleged conversations took place. How did he suffer memory loss in 
such a short span of time.
  While the panel report concludes that General Glosson did not lie, it 
does not say that Glosson was truthful, either.
  It does not say that General Glosson told the truth. That is an open 
question--at least for the panel.
  For the inspector general, General Glosson lied under oath when 
questioned by investigators.
  The IG is sticking to his guns. He is not backing off. He stands 
behind his report: General Glosson lied under oath.
  In a memorandum to the Under Secretary of Defense on September 21, 
1994, the Deputy DOD Inspector General Vander Schaaf states:

       I feel compelled to disagree with the conclusion in the 
     report that LtGen Glosson did not lie during the 
     investigation and that his testimony resulted merely from 
     inaccurate recollection.

  Mr. President, the inspectors general believe that Glosson told two 
distinct and separate sets of lies:
  No. 1, the guts of his communications with the three complainants in 
early October;
  No. 2, his statements to investigators in late October;
  My reading of the DOD panel report suggests the panel only addressed 
the second set of lies.
  The panel dodged the question of set No. 1.
  Mr. Vander Schaaf, the Inspector General, said it was inconceivable, 
that a senior officer like Glosson could not remember what he had said 
to the three complainants.
  For a skilled fighter pilot and the mastermind of the air campaign 
against Iraq, it is hard to understand how he could so easily forget 
what he said to three members of the promotion about a fellow officer's 
suitability for advancement.
  The three complainants did not suffer from memory loss. They did not 
have any trouble remembering what was said.
  Mr. President, I just read Mr. Vander Schaaf's memo in its entirety.
  The Deputy IG says that General Glosson is lying, and he said that 
barely 1 week ago.
  While the panel concludes that Glosson suffered from inaccurate 
recollection, the panel is unambiguous about the truthfulness of the 
complainants. These are the three generals that resigned from the 
promotion board.
  The panel concludes that the testimony given by Generals Ryan, Nowak, 
and Myers was truthful. It seems to me that that is the single most 
important finding and that in and of itself is devastating for Glosson. 
If the three generals are telling the truth, and the differences are 
irreconcilable, then a reasonable mind might conclude that General 
Glosson is lying.
  Mr. President, it is important to revisit exactly the testimony given 
by the complainants. The three generals testified that General Glosson 
contacted each of them separately after they were appointed to the 
board and told them that general X had lied to the chief, meaning the 
chief of staff, and that the chief did not want general X promoted. The 
panel says all of that is true. That is what Glosson said.
  Glosson denies saying those things, and the panel concludes that 
General Glosson improperly attempted to block the promotion of general 
X.
  These two conclusions, when coupled together, tell me that General 
Glosson engaged in improper communications with members of a promotion 
board. Such communications are expressly forbidden and prohibited by 
paragraph 11 of the Air Force Regulations 36-9. A violation of those 
regulations could be a court-martial offense under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.
  I asked the American Law Division at the Library of Congress to 
examine this question: would an attempt to influence the major-general 
selection board conceivably be subject to criminal prosecution? In 
response to my request, an excellent memo was prepared by Mr. Bob 
Burdette, legislative attorney within the division. I think he did a 
good job. The short answer to my question is, yes, a prosecution under 
articles 92, 133 and 134 could conceivably be undertaken.
  I ask unanimous consent to print that memo in the Record.
  There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                    Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
     Subject: Whether An Attempt To Influence a Major-General 
         Selection Board Could Conceivably Be Subject To Criminal 
         Prosecution
     To: Hon. Charles E. Grassley
     (Attention of Charlie Murphy).
     From: American Law Division
       This memorandum responds to your request for an assessment 
     of whether a possible attempt to influence the deliberations 
     of a major-general selection board could conceivably be 
     subject to criminal prosecution. You have indicated that the 
     individual concerned spoke to persons who had been appointed 
     as members of a major-general selection board, made negative 
     comments concerning a particular individual who was under 
     consideration by that board for promotion to the grade of 
     major general, and represented his remarks as reflecting the 
     views of the Chief of Staff of the uniformed service 
     concerned. You have also indicated that the Inspector General 
     of the uniformed service concerned and the Inspector General 
     of the Department of Defense conducted a joint investigation 
     of the matter and concluded, in relevant part, that the 
     individual concerned had in fact ``improperly communicated'' 
     with the members of the selection board ``with the intent to 
     influence their consideration'' and had lied under oath to 
     the investigators concerning the matter. Several distinct 
     charges described in the Manual for Courts Martial (1984) 
     could be implicated by such a set of circumstances. They are 
     discussed separately below.

      Violation of or Failure To Obey a Regulation (Art. 92, UCMJ)

       The stated purpose of a relevant regulation of the 
     uniformed service concerned\1\ is to set out ``objectives, 
     policies, and procedures for promoting officers to and 
     evaluating officers in the grades of brigadier and major 
     general.'' Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
     denominates ``failure to obey any lawful . . . regulation'' 
     to be a punishable offense. Paragraph 16b(1) of the Manual 
     for Courts Martial describes the elements of the offense, in 
     relevant part, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\AF Regulation 36-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Violation of or failure to obey a lawful . . . regulation.
       (a) That there was in effect a certain lawful . . . 
     regulation;
       (b) That the accused had a duty to obey it; and
       (c) That the accused violated or failed to obey the . . . 
     regulation.
       As part of the Manual's explanation of what constitutes a 
     punishable violation, two items seem especially noteworthy 
     for present purposes. Paragraph 16c(1)(d), relating to 
     ``knowledge,'' points out that: ``Knowledge of a . . . 
     regulation need not be alleged or proved, as knowledge is not 
     an element of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not 
     constitute a defense.'' Paragraph 16c(1)(e), relating to 
     ``enforceability,'' states that:
       Not all provisions in . . . regulations can be enforced 
     under Article 92(1). Regulations which only supply general 
     guidelines or advice for conducting military functions may 
     not be enforceable under Article 92(1).
       In this regard, it might be observed that, far from 
     supplying only ``general guidelines,'' the regulation at 
     issue in the instant context is one which, inter alia, sets 
     out two relevant rules with considerable specificity. Part 11 
     of the regulation is captioned ``communications with 
     selection boards.'' The very first (which is to say, the most 
     prominent) sentence of paragraph a. thereof states, as 
     follows:
       All communications intended to express the views of . . . 
     the Chief of Staff of the Air Force . . . must be in writing, 
     furnished to each member, and made a part of the board 
     record.
       Use of the command ``must'' and the detailed duties 
     specified, taken together, imply a mandatory obligation 
     rather than a merely directive general guideline. The second 
     sentence of this same paragraph then explicitly declares 
     that:
       Communications regarding particular officers are expressly 
     forbidden, unless unusual circumstances exist that would 
     preclude an officer's performance from being documented in 
     the official record (i.e., sensitive classified mission, 
     etc.).
       A declaration that certain conduct is ``expressly 
     forbidden'' clearly seems to be a mandatory prohibition 
     rather than a mere general guideline.
       In light of the foregoing, if the facts are as alleged, a 
     prosecution under Article 92 could conceivably be undertaken.


            conduct unbecoming a gentleman (art. 133, ucmj)

       Paragraph 59c(2) of the Manual for Courts Martial describes 
     the nature of the offense of conduct unbecoming a gentleman, 
     in relevant part, as follows:
       Conduct violative of this article is action or behavior in 
     an official capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the 
     person as an officer, seriously compromises the officer's 
     character as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an 
     unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or 
     disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the 
     person's standing as an officer.
       Paragraph 59c(3) then offers, inter alia, examples of 
     offenses, as follows:
       Instances of violation of this article include knowingly 
     making a false official statement; . . . [and] using 
     insulting or defamatory language to another officer in that 
     officer's presence or about that officer to other military 
     persons . . . .
       If the facts are as alleged, a prosecution under Article 
     133 could conceivably be undertaken.


                    false swearing (art. 134, ucmj)

       Paragraph 79b of the Manual for Courts Martial sets out the 
     elements of the offense of false swearing, in violation of 
     the so-called General Article (Art. 134), as follows:
       (1) That the accused took an oath or equivalent;
       (2) That the oath or equivalent was administered to the 
     accused in a manner in which such oath or equivalent was 
     required or authorized by law;
       (3) That the oath or equivalent was administered by a 
     person having authority to do so;
       (4) That upon this oath or equivalent the accused made or 
     subscribed a certain statement;
       (5) That the statement was false;
       (6) That the accused did not then believe the statement to 
     be true; and
       (7) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the 
     accused was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in 
     the armed forces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon 
     the armed forces.
       By way of explaining the nature of the offense, paragraph 
     79c(1) states, in relevant part, that:
       False swearing is the making under a lawful oath or 
     equivalent of any false statement, oral or written, not 
     believing the statement to be true.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       Unlike a false official statement under Article 107 . . . 
     there is no requirement that the statement be made with an 
     intent to deceive or that the statement be official.
       If the facts are as alleged, a prosecution under Article 
     134 for false swearing could conceivably be undertaken.


                              conclusions

       The foregoing discussion has identified three distinct 
     criminal charges which could conceivably be brought against 
     an individual who attempted to influence the deliberations of 
     a major-general selection board in the manner you have 
     described.
                                               Robert B. Burdette,
                                             Legislative Attorney.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. In sum, Mr. President, a dark cloud still hangs over 
General Glosson's name. General Glosson may have had a distinguished 
career. I respect that. He may have been masterful in the way he 
planned and directed air campaigns. That is very much to his credit. 
But that was 3 years ago when Glosson was a brigadier general.
  A distinguished military record cannot become a license for 
misconduct. A good commander must be able to run the battle 
successfully, and General Glosson has demonstrated his capacity to do 
that. But as Senator Byrd has pointed out in another context, but I 
think applicable to this, a good commander must have two qualities. He 
or she must be able to defeat the enemy. That is a requirement. But a 
good commander must also have ``clean hands.'' In other words, a 
military commander must be of unquestioned integrity. In Senator Byrd's 
mind a commander must have clean hands or the commander does not pass.
  Mr. President, General Glosson does not have clean hands.
  If a military commander's integrity has been called into question, 
then those who must follow him or her into battle may not follow when 
the going really gets tough. Integrity is the cornerstone, it is the 
very foundation of leadership.
  Mr. President, General Glosson did in fact monkey with the promotion 
board, and he may or may not have lied about it. He is suspected of 
lying about it. That sets a terrible example if you are trying to clean 
up the military promotion process. If we reject the nomination, that 
will send a stern warning to military officers that if you tamper with 
the promotion board, you will get nailed.
  In other words, I think it means that we have to have zero tolerance. 
We must demand accountability, both from within the ranks and at the 
top. That is the signal that the Senate should send. Senate 
confirmation of General Glosson would send the wrong signal. If we 
confirm General Glosson, we would be saying, so long as you have a 
great military career, it is OK to engage in misconduct. Anything goes. 
Do not worry. The Senate will confirm you. So I urge all my colleagues 
to vote against General Glosson's nomination.
  Early in the debate I spoke about the Armed Services Committee's 
persistent, continuing effort to clean up the military promotion 
system. Over the past 5 years or more, the committee has worked very 
hard to bring some integrity to the process. General Glosson's alleged 
conduct is a step backward. Glosson's behavior threatens the integrity 
of the military promotion boards. His communication with three members 
of the 1993 major-general selection board pose a direct threat to the 
integrity of the board. That threat was very real. It threatened to 
compromise the impartiality of that board. Because of Glosson's 
behavior, three sitting board members felt honor bound to resign and 
did. General Glosson's communication also poses a threat to future 
promotion boards, unless, that is, General Glosson is disciplined in 
appropriate ways; others will follow General Glosson's example. And if 
they see the Senate ignoring what General Glosson did, they will say 
that it is a stamp of approval on this sort of undue influence on a 
promotion process. General Glosson's alleged conduct goes right to the 
heart of the problem. How do you protect the integrity of the military 
promotion process?
  He is accused of violating the rules that the committee has worked so 
hard over the last 5 years to put in place. The goal of the committee's 
work in this area is clear--to insulate promotion boards from improper 
communication and improper influence. The whole idea is to make sure 
that the best, the very most qualified officers are selected for 
promotion and rise to the top.
  Mr. President, there is a direct link between integrity of the 
promotion process and the integrity of the whole officer corps. This 
point was brought home by testimony of former Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan. I wish to quote from General 
Sullivan's testimony before the Armed Services Committee. His thoughts 
on this important subject are presented on page 213 of the committee 
report on the fiscal year 1992 defense authorization bill, and that is 
report 102-113. General Sullivan said this, and I quote:

       There is a direct link between the integrity of the 
     selection board process and the integrity of our officer 
     corps. The link lies in the confidence our officer corps has 
     in the objectivity and the professional ethic of the board. 
     Our selection must be fair and must be impartial and based 
     upon demonstrated potential instead of subjective criteria, 
     and they must be seen as such by our officer corps.

  General Sullivan's thoughts should tell us something about the 
Glosson nomination. It carries an important lesson. If General 
Glosson's improper communications with the 1993 major-general promotion 
board are tolerated by the Department of Defense and the Senate, then 
we could be undermining the integrity of the promotion process as well 
as the integrity of the officer corps.
  I wish to take a moment to review some of the committee's most 
important work in this field. I think that will help put the Glosson 
nomination in better perspective.
  Back in November 1991, the committee issued a report entitled, ``The 
Conduct of Proceedings for the Selection of Officers for Promotion in 
the U.S. Air Force.'' That is Senate report No. 102-54. The guts of 
that report was subsequently reprinted in another committee document on 
the same topic, report No. 102-4892 dated September 1992.
  This report contains the results of numerous investigations. The 
findings presented in the committee report in turn became the basis for 
legislative remedies proposed in the fiscal year 1992 defense 
authorization. These documents, reports issued by the Armed Services 
Committee, contain very important information. They tell us what is 
wrong with the military promotion process.
  One of the most serious deficiencies identified by the committee is 
this: Improper communications between senior officials and promotion 
boards over specific candidates. That is the key problem identified by 
the committee. Improper communication.
  Does that not sound familiar? That very same problem was created when 
General Glosson contacted 3 members of the 13-member board about 
general X. It is the same old problem that the Armed Services Committee 
studied and felt that something must be done about it back there in 
1987. In 1987, the committee uncovered serious irregularities with the 
1987 Marine Corps major general promotion list. I want to quote from 
page 213 of that committee report numbered 102-113:

       One of the key problems arising out of the 1987 inquiry 
     involved verbal inquiry communication about specific 
     candidates by senior officials to the president of the 
     selection board.

  That sounds very much like the Glosson case again, only Glosson did 
not contact the president of the board--at least we do not know of 
that. But he did contact at least three other members of the board. So 
when the committee found out about improper communication with the 1987 
Marine Corps major generals board, the committee took the issue 
straight to the top. They took it straight to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense. At that time, that was Secretary Cap Weinberger. In his usual 
way, Weinberger assured the committee that the problem was under 
control.
  On June 13, 1987, the promise of Weinberger's directive was given 
ordering the military departments to issue regulations to ``ensure the 
integrity of the promotion process by regulating the flow of 
information to the selection board.''
  The committee thought the departments would finally develop and 
implement a new set of rules designed to insulate promotion boards from 
improper influence and communications from senior officials.
  The committee thought that those rules were in operation. But I think 
the committee soon found out otherwise. After reviewing a number of the 
nominations in 1991 and 1992, the committee quickly realized that the 
military departments had failed to comply with the Weinberger 
directive. The committee discovered that the Air Force was the worst 
offender. The Air Force was just flat out ignoring the Weinberger 
order. The committee was correctly angered by the Air Force's defiance.
  I would like to quote from page 214 of that same report:

       The failure of the military departments to implement a DOD 
     directive on a timely basis is inexcusable.

  This is the Armed Services Committee of the Senate speaking.

       When it involves a directive that the Secretary has issued 
     to address problems of abuse in the promotion selection 
     process, the failure is intolerable. The failure to implement 
     applicable laws and regulations undermines the integrity of 
     the selection board process.

  Mr. President, I do not care if anybody in this body listens to me, 
but I would like to be able not to hear a buzz behind me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. We will have order in 
the Chamber so the Senator can be heard.
  The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Again, I am not asking so I can be heard. I am only 
asking so I am not disturbed.
  The committee was furious. I think this statement states that. The 
hammer fell on a man named Thomas J. Hickey. He was Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel from 1981 to 1991. In that post, he held rank of 
lieutenant general. Hickey got axed. He was held accountable. General 
Hickey was blamed for failing to comply with Secretary Weinberger's 
directive. And he was blamed for the ``existence and continuation of 
irregular and improper Air Force officer promotion policies and 
procedures.''
  General Hickey was nominated for retirement in grade of lieutenant 
general just like the Glosson situation. But do you know what the 
committee refused to do? The committee refused to act on the Hickey 
nomination for retirement as lieutenant general unlike Glosson. So 
General Hickey did not retire in grade. He was forced to retire a lower 
grade as major general. The committee came down hard on General Hickey. 
Why? Because the committee was ticked off. They had been told that 
things were going to change. Secretary Weinberger sends out a memo. But 
4 years later, the same old business--business as usual.
  The committee was ticked off because General Hickey failed to comply 
with these directives and for allowing improper promotion policies and 
procedures to continue undiminished.
  Mr. President, Mr. Bob Goldich of the National Defense Division of 
CRS has prepared an excellent background memo on the Hickey case.
  I ask unanimous consent to place that CRS memo on General Hickey in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                    Washington, DC, June 27, 1994.
     To: Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Attention: Charlie Murphy.
     From: Robert L. Goldich, Specialist in National Defense, 
       Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.
     Subject: Retirement of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hickey, U.S. Air 
       Force, in the grade of major general.
       This memorandum is provided in response to your request of 
     June 24, 1994, regarding the retirement of Major General 
     Thomas J. Hickey, U.S. Air Force, in the grade of major 
     general. Prior to his retirement, General Hickey had been 
     serving as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Air 
     Force in the grade of lieutenant general. General Hickey was 
     nominated by the President for retirement in the grade of 
     lieutenant general on September 11, 1990. However, on 
     November 27, 1991, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
     announced that it would not act on the nomination.\1\ By 
     statute [10 USC 601(b)(4], this required General Hickey to be 
     automatically retired in his permanent grade of major general 
     within 90 days of relinquishing his post as Deputy Chief of 
     Staff for Personnel of the Air Force on October 7, 1991.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Press reports state that the Senate did not act on General 
     Hickey's nomination for retirement in the grade of lieutenant 
     general because of his responsibility, as Deputy Chief of 
     Staff for Personnel of the Air Force during 1986-1991, for 
     the existence and continuation of irregular and improper Air 
     Force officer promotion policies and procedures.\3\
       In a committee print published in late 1991 and a report 
     published in late 1992, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
     ``identified the following systemic deficiencies in the Air 
     Force officer selection process:
       (1) Failure to issue implementing regulations required by 
     applicable statutes and Department of Defense directives to 
     ensure the fair operation of the selection board process.
       (2) Use of a preselection process that improperly excluded 
     ninety percent or more of the eligible officers from 
     consideration by statutory selection boards.
       (3) Improper communication to selection boards of 
     ``priority list'' [of officers under consideration for 
     promotion to the next higher grade] prepared by senior 
     officers.
       (4) Improper communication between the Air Force leadership 
     and selection board members.''\4\
       Press reports appeared to suggest that of these four types 
     of irregularities, that which generated the most concern was 
     number (2), the preselection process.
       The Committee was particularly concerned that these 
     procedures had continued after a 1987 Committee investigation 
     into Department of Defense (DOD) officer promotion 
     procedures. This latter investigation was prompted by 
     irregularities in the 1987 consideration of Marine Corps 
     brigadier generals for promotion to the grade of major 
     general. The specific issue that led to the 1987 
     investigation involved item (4), above--improper 
     communications between senior uniformed leadership of a 
     service and selection board members. However, the corrective 
     action taken by the Secretary of Defense in both 1987 and 
     1989 involved the issuance of revised DOD directives which 
     had broader aims of insuring ``the integrity of the promotion 
     process by regulating the flow of information to a selection 
     board,'' not only improper communications by senior 
     officers.\5\
       There is no indication in the press reports that General 
     Hickey was directly implicated in actively instigating any of 
     these irregularities. However, although the two Senate Armed 
     Services Committee documents do not mention General Hickey by 
     name, they do discuss at length the participation of the Air 
     Force Deputy Chief of staff for Personnel (a position 
     occupied by General Hickey during the time in question) in 
     the continuation of improper procedures after the 1987 
     incident--and the corrective actions which should have 
     prevented their recurrence. The Senate Armed Services 
     Committee apparently believed that, because General Hickey 
     had been the Air Force's senior uniformed personnel manager 
     when the 1987 incidents and investigations occurred, and 
     presided over the continuation of these irregularities into 
     the early 1990s, he should be held responsible.
       If we can be of further assistance, please call me at 
     extension 77633.
     \1\Joe West, ``Hickey Forced to Retire with 2 Stars, Not 3,'' 
     Air Force Times, Dec. 9, 1991: 3.
     \2\At the time of General Hickey's retirement, the statute 
     provided for a 90-day maximum in which a general or flag 
     officer appointed under its provisions could retain his or 
     her three- or four-star grade while ``awaiting retirement,'' 
     Subsequent legislation, effective April 1, 1992, reduced the 
     maximum to 60 days. Section 502(b), P.L. 102-190, December 5, 
     1991, 105 Stat. 1354, the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1992.
     \3\Joe West, ``Hickey Forced to Retire with 2 Stars, Not 3,'' 
     Air Force Times, Dec. 9, 1991: 3.
     \4\U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Report 
     on the Conduct of Proceedings for the Selection of Officers 
     for Promotion in the U.S. Air Force. October 8, 1992. 
     Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992 (102nd Congress, 2nd 
     session. Senate, Report no. 102-482): 2 (hereafter cited as 
     SASC Report). Also cited in U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee 
     on Armed Services. The Conduct of Proceedings for the 
     Selection of Officers for Promotion in the U.S. Air Force. 
     November 26, 1991. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1991 
     (102nd Congress, 1st session. Senate. Committee Print No. 
     102-54): iii (hereafter cited as SASC Print).
     \5\SASC Report: 3-4; SASC Print: 4-5.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. The committee was angry about certain improper 
promotion policies and procedures that blossomed under General Hickey. 
What did the committee find most troublesome? Guess what? It is still 
the same old story--improper communication between the Air Force 
leadership and the selection board members; same old business.
  The committee was also disturbed about the existence of the 
preselection processes. These are the things the committee disliked 
about the Hickey operation. The committee also was disturbed about the 
continuation of these abusive practices that it recommended putting 
strict remedies into law.
  The committee recommended establishing a statutory requirement for 
regulations to govern the flow of information to selection boards. The 
purpose of this legislation the committee said was to ``ensure the 
independence of the selection boards and to eliminate improper 
communication with and improper pressure on promotion selection 
boards.''
  This legislation was proposed in the fiscal year 1992 defense 
authorization bill. It consisted of eight separate statutory 
requirements. These are summarized on pages 214 through 216 of the 
report No. 102-113.
  I want to revisit one provision of particular importance. The key 
provision is summarized in paragraph 6. Provision number 6 was tough. 
It was harsh. It was designed to curb improper influence on board 
members. Attempting to influence a board's proceedings was going to be 
a criminal offense, if the committee got its way.
  This is the what Armed Services Committee was recommending in July 
1991. That was just 3 years ago. That is what the committee wanted. 
They wanted criminal sanctions for monkeying with the promotion board 
process.
  I would like to reread what the committee said on making improper 
influence a criminal offense on page 215.

       Improper influence on the board would be prohibited. In 
     violation of regulations implementing this section would 
     constitute a criminal violation of the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice. If a senior leadership of a service 
     disagrees with the selections recommended by the board, the 
     leadership's recourse is not to discuss the matter with the 
     members of the board. The leadership was to use the statutory 
     procedure for recommending that the President not approve the 
     list in whole or in part.
  And those are the words directly from the committee report. As I 
understand it, this provision never became law, but it speaks very 
clearly to the committee's attitude on improper influence of promotion 
boards. The committee's position was clear: Zero tolerance for board 
tampering. Such conduct was not to be tolerated. So why is the 
committee now willing to tolerate such behavior on General Glosson's 
part?
  I hope the committee or the chairman sometime can answer two 
questions: Was it the committee's intention in July 1991 to make 
improper influence of the promotion board a criminal offense under the 
Criminal Code of Military Justice, and exactly what was intended in 
that suggestion? And then I ask: Did General Glosson attempt to 
improperly influence the 1993 major general promotion board?
  After the Hickey affair, the committee thought the new rules were 
finally in operation. The new rules are embodied in Air Force 
regulation 36-9. The new rules may indeed be working, but they are not 
followed by everyone, because General Glosson came along and took it 
upon himself to break the rules. General Glosson contacted three 
members of the promotion board, questioning the integrity of a fellow 
officer who was before that board. General Glosson told them General 
``X'' could not be trusted, that he had lied to the chief of staff, and 
the chief of staff did not want him promoted. That was improper 
communication, just as it is now, when Secretary Weinberger issued 
those regulations. It is an improper communication, if there is such a 
thing.
  Communications of this nature about a particular officer are 
expressly prohibited by paragraph 11 of these Air Force regs. General 
Glosson violated paragraph 11 of the Air Force regs. If judged by the 
standard proposed by the committee in 1991, it seems to me that General 
Glosson might have engaged in criminal activity. If judged by paragraph 
11, he could first face a court-martial.
  There may be an inconsistency between the committee's action on the 
Hickey nomination and the proposed action on the Glosson nomination. 
General Hickey was hammered for failing to implement policies and 
procedures designed to insulate promotion boards from improper 
communications from senior officials. General Glosson, by comparison, 
violated the very same rules that General Hickey failed to implement. 
Yet, the committee is allowing him to skate.
  I do not know which is worse, failing to implement rules or violating 
those same rules. You will have to answer that for yourself.
  There seems to be an inconsistency, however, in the way that the 
committee handled these two nominations. It could be a double standard. 
Does General Glosson have more friends in Congress than General Hickey 
did? We have essentially the same problem, but we have different 
people. I do not understand the difference. The committee needs to 
explain why the Hickey and Glosson nominations have been handled in 
such different ways. I want to understand why the two were handled in 
these different ways.
  As I said in the beginning, the Armed Services Committee worked very 
hard over the past 5 years to clean up the military promotion system. 
If the committee's efforts are to be effective, it needs to hold the 
Department's feet to the fire. But we will never really clean up the 
military promotion process if we let guys like Glosson off the hook.
  The Armed Services Committee's persistent and continuing efforts to 
bring integrity to the promotion system are working. Progress has been 
achieved.
  Mr. EXON. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes.
  Mr. EXON. I will ask a question of my friend. But, first, I 
compliment my colleague from Iowa, with whom I have worked on many 
cases. I compliment him for his very comprehensive and thorough study 
he has done in this matter. As the senior Member of the Armed Services 
Committee who generally supports what that committee has done, I am 
particularly impressed with the recitation of the case you have made 
against General Glosson. We have devoted a lot of attention to him in 
the Armed Services Committee, as you can imagine.
  I appreciate some of the good things you have said about the work of 
the committee in this regard. I was one of those Senators who voted 
against sending the Glosson matter to the floor favorably. Although 
earlier I intended to support him, the more I looked into it, 
notwithstanding his outstanding service in the past, I happened to come 
down basically on the side of the points that have been made by the 
Senator from Iowa on this whole matter.
  So when this comes to a vote, I will be supporting the Senator from 
Iowa on the Glosson matter, not on the other. My question is simply 
this, and it is twofold: Number one, we have some wrap-up matters that 
this Senator is interested in, as is probably the Senator from Iowa, 
that need to be addressed very promptly so that we can get those 
matters over to the House of Representatives for their action before 
they adjourn.
  I would also, at an appropriate time, ask the Senator from Iowa about 
how long he intends to continue in this discussion, for the benefit of 
all. But I ask the Senator, possibly, if he can work out something to 
not lose his right to the floor, to give the managers a chance to move 
some matters that have to be moved, that have been unanimously approved 
by both sides of the aisle, and get those to the House. Timeliness is a 
key factor here.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I will interrupt here. I think the point the Senator 
raises is a good one. I have already had discussions with our 
Republican whip, as it is his desire to take up some of these important 
measures. He has assured me that if I yield the floor momentarily, I 
will not lose my right to the floor, and that he would go through the 
business as he has to, and I will get the floor back.
  (Mr. CONRAD assumed the chair.)
  Mr. BREAUX. If the Senator will yield for a question, we plan to ask 
unanimous consent that the Senate be allowed to proceed as in morning 
business to do exactly that, without affecting the right of the Senator 
to retain the floor as soon as this business is concluded.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Then, Mr. President, for that purpose, I will yield.

                          ____________________