[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
    LIMITED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES-LED FORCE IN HAITI 
                               RESOLUTION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Studds). Pursuant to House Resolution 
570 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration 
of the joint resolution, H.J. Res. 416.
  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 416) providing limited authorization 
for the participation of United States Armed Forces in the 
multinational force in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of 
United States Armed Forces from Haiti, with Mr. McDermott, Chairman pro 
tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole House rose 
earlier today, the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by 
the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] had been disposed of.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in part 2 of 
House Report 103-840.


   amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. torricelli

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     Torricelli: Strike all after the resolving clause and insert 
     the following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Limited 
     Authorization for the United States-led Force in Haiti 
     Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) On September 18, 1994, the special delegation to Haiti 
     succeeded in convincing the de facto authorities in Haiti to 
     sign the Port-au-Prince Agreement under which such 
     authorities agreed to leave power.
       (2) On September 18, 1994, after the Port-au-Prince 
     Agreement was reached, the President ordered the deployment 
     of United States Armed Forces in and around Haiti.
       (3) On September 21, 1994, the President submitted a 
     report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1541 et seq.), on the introduction of United States Armed 
     Forces into Haiti.
       (4) The Congress fully supports the men and women of the 
     United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission 
     in Haiti with professional excellence and dedicated 
     patriotism.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--The Congress declares the 
     following:
       (1) The United States-led force in Haiti should use all 
     necessary means to protect United States citizens, to 
     stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that orderly 
     progress may be made in transferring the functions of 
     government in that country to the democratically-elected 
     government of Haiti, and to facilitate the provision of 
     humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti.
       (2) Transfer of operations in Haiti from the United States-
     led force in Haiti to the United Nations-led force in Haiti 
     should be facilitated and expedited to the fullest extent 
     possible.
       (3) United States Armed Forces should be withdrawn from 
     Haiti as soon as possible.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Authorization.--Subject to subsection (b), United 
     States Armed Forces are authorized to participate in the 
     United States-led force in Haiti only--
       (1) to protect United States citizens;
       (2) to stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that 
     orderly progress may be made in transferring the functions of 
     government in that country to the democratically-elected 
     government of Haiti; and
       (3) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance 
     to the people of Haiti.
       (b) Limitations.--
       (1) termination of authorization.--The authorization 
     provided by subsection (a) shall expire on March 1, 1995, 
     unless the President determines and certifies to Congress in 
     the report required by section 4(b)(3) that the continued 
     participation of US armed forces in the US-led force is 
     essential to protect US citizens or vital US national 
     security interests.
       (2) Prohibition on foreign command.--United States Armed 
     Forces described in subsection (a) shall remain under the 
     command and control of officers of the United States Armed 
     Forces at all times.

     SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       (a) In General.--The President shall submit to the Congress 
     reports on--
       (1) the participation of United States Armed Forces in the 
     United States-led force in Haiti and the United Nations-led 
     force in Haiti, including--
       (A) the number of members of the United States Armed Forces 
     that are participating in such United States-led force and 
     such United Nations-led force;
       (B) the functions of such Armed Forces; and
       (C) the costs of deployment of such Armed Forces; and
       (2) the efforts to withdraw United States Armed Forces from 
     Haiti, including--
       (A) for the purpose of achieving a transition from the 
     United States-led force in Haiti to the United Nations-led 
     force in Haiti, the status of efforts to implement the Port-
     au-Prince Agreement and to otherwise carry out the terms of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions 917 (May 6, 1994) 
     and 940 (July 31, 1994);
       (B) the status of plans to accomplish such transition to 
     the United Nations-led force in Haiti; and
       (C) the status of plans to withdraw United States Armed 
     Forces from Haiti.
       (b) Reporting Dates.--A report under this section shall be 
     submitted--
       (1) not later than November 30, 1994, covering the period 
     since September 18, 1994;
       (2) not later than December 31, 1994, covering the period 
     since the report described in paragraph (1); and
       (3) not later than February 1, 1995, covering the period 
     since the report described in paragraph (2).
       (c) War Powers Resolution Reporting Requirements.--The 
     requirements of this section do not supersede the 
     requirements of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et 
     seq.).

     SEC. 5. REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the speaker of the 
     House of Representatives and the majority leader of the 
     Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the minority 
     leader of the House of Representatives and the minority 
     leader of the Senate, respectively, should monitor closely 
     events in Haiti in considering whether to exercise any 
     authority that may be granted to reassemble the Congress 
     after the adjournment of the Congress sine die, if the public 
     interest shall warrant it.

     SEC. 6. JOINT RESOLUTION PROHIBITING CONTINUED USE OF UNITED 
                   STATES ARMED FORCES IN HAITI.

       (a) In General.--If a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (b) is enacted, the President shall remove United 
     States Armed Forces from Haiti in accordance with such joint 
     resolution.
       (b) Description of Joint Resolution.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a), a joint resolution described in this 
     subsection is a joint resolution the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``Pursuant to 
     section 6 of the Limited Authorization for the United States-
     led Force in Haiti Resolution, the Congress hereby directs 
     the President to remove United States Armed Forces from Haiti 
     not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this joint resolution, except for a limited number of members 
     of the United States Armed Forces sufficient to protect 
     United States diplomatic facilities and personnel.''.
       (c) Priority Procedures.--
       (1) Introduction of joint resolution.--Paragraph (2) shall 
     only apply to a joint resolution described in subsection (b) 
     and introduced on or after the date on which the President 
     submits, or is required to submit, the report required by 
     section 4(b)(3).
       (2) Consideration of joint resolution.--Only one joint 
     resolution described in subsection (b) and introduced in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) shall be considered in 
     accordance with the procedures described in section 7 of the 
     War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546), except that, for 
     purposes of such consideration, the term ``calendar days'' in 
     such section shall be deemed to mean ``legislative days''.

     SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this joint resolution, the following 
     definitions apply:
       (1) Legislative days.--The term ``legislative days'' means 
     days in which the House of Representatives is in session.
       (2) Port-au-prince agreement.--The term ``Port-au-Prince 
     Agreement'' means the agreement reached between the United 
     States special delegation and the de facto authorities in 
     Haiti on September 18, 1994.
       (3) United nations-led force in haiti.--The term ``United 
     Nations-led force in Haiti'' means the United Nations Mission 
     in Haiti (commonly referred to as ``UNMIH'') authorized by 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions 867 (September 
     23, 1993), 905 (March 23, 1994), 933 (June 30, 1994), and 940 
     (July 31, 1994).
       (4) United states-led force in haiti.--The term ``United 
     States-led force in Haiti'' means the multinational force 
     (commonly referred to as ``MNF'') authorized by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994).

     SEC. 8. AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE WAR.

       It is the sense of the Congress that, under circumstances 
     existing prior to concluding the Port-au-Prince Agreement, 
     the Constitution of the United States would have required the 
     President to obtain the approval of the Congress before 
     ordering United States Armed Forces to invade Haiti to remove 
     the de facto authorities in Haiti.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli], will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a 
Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
rise, of course, in support of the Torricelli substitute.
  Mr. Chairman, first let me extend a word of congratulations to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums], the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Hastings], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha], and the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. The House has clearly spoken, 
spoken with a very decisive majority on this issue, and all of us must 
respect the majority voice in this House.
  I opposed the Dellums substitute not because of what it said, but 
because of what it did not say. I do not think that this Congress lives 
up to its constitutional responsibilities when it passes a sense of 
Congress resolution after American combat forces have been introduced 
into a dangerous situation.
  What we have just done is to pass a sense of Congress that calls for 
reports, not very much more. We have not approved the policy. We have 
not disapproved the policy. We simply default. We dodge our 
responsibility. We do not take a position on the gravest question that 
a government can make, whether you commit American forces to combat.
  The amendment that we just adopted is a classical, classical 
congressional dodge. It sidesteps the question of authorization. We 
leave no fingerprints by passing that amendment. What we have done is 
protect our political flank. But what we have not done is exercise our 
constitutional responsibility.
  Now, I believe in the Torricelli amendment. And may I say that to my 
amazement, to my utter amazement, the administration has been working 
in support of the Dellums-Hastings-Murtha-Dicks provision. It has been 
working in support of a resolution which says, Mr. President, tell us 
what your policy is. That is what that resolution says. The President 
has been on television explaining it, they have had all of their 
Cabinet people up here telling us what the policy is. We passed a 
resolution a moment ago overwhelmingly saying, Mr. President, what is 
your policy, and the President of the United States supports it.
  Not only that, that resolution says withdraw as soon as possible, and 
many of you support that position, and we all understand that is a 
reasonable position. There are several reasonable positions here. But 
it is not the administration policy. But the administration supported 
it, and I just do not understand why they can support that amendment.
  The Torricelli-Hamilton amendment authorizes the United States 
presence in Haiti. It is the only amendment, it is the only substitute 
before us tonight, that does it. We should share responsibility when 
American forces go into a combat situation, and we should not dodge the 
question.
  If we are going to play a rough role, a good role, a difficult role, 
we have to be willing to step up to the plate, and we do that by voting 
for or against an authorization.
  Look, my friends, you cannot have it both ways. Members cannot 
complain about no authorization beforehand, and then duck 
responsibility for authorization after the fact. And that is what we 
have done.
  I believe we have a clear choice: Do the United States troops 
operating in Haiti today operate there solely on the President's 
authority, or do they operate there with the support and the 
authorization of the United States Congress?

                              {time}  2330

  I believe we should authorize. May I say to those of my colleagues 
who worry about a date of withdrawal, that this Torricelli substitute 
has no certain date of withdrawal. It provides the amount of time that 
the military sought. It provides useful pressure to make sure that the 
job gets done in the time frame that they want it. And it permits the 
President a waiver if circumstances require. So our troops are fully 
protected under the Torricelli substitute.
  Finally, let me just say that the Torricelli substitute is the only 
amendment that limits the scope, the purpose of our mission. Under the 
amendment just adopted, there is no limitation; there is no restraint; 
there is no restriction. The American forces can do anything they want 
to. They can get involved in nation building. There is no limitation, 
none.
  If our experience in Somalia means anything at all, it is that we 
have got to watch it when we put these military troops into position 
because we can have mission creep.
  And so the Congress has the obligation here to come in and say, these 
forces are not there for nation building. They are there not to run 
Haiti. They are not there to create democracy for Haiti. Those are the 
tasks for the Haitians themselves, not for us.
  We ought to put language of limitation in a resolution of 
authorization. And we do. We clearly define the role of the United 
States troops in Haiti to protect citizens, to stabilize the security 
situation in Haiti so that an orderly process can take place and a 
legitimate government be restored and to facilitate the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti.
  The Torricelli resolution, my friends, I understand that the 
Torricelli substitute calls on you to make a tough decision. I 
understand that. It is your responsibility to. It is my responsibility 
to stand up to our constitutional rights, to participate in the 
decision when you put combat troops into a dangerous situation and say, 
we support the policy. We support the troops and we participate in the 
decision, the gravest decision that the Government makes, when you put 
combat forces on the grounds.
  I urge support of the Torricelli amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just a few 
questions to the Black and Democrat Caucus. I would like to ask the 
gentlemen, where were you in Cuba? Where was the caucus in Grenada? 
Where was the caucus in Panama? Where was the caucus in Desert Storm?
  Where was the caucus in El Salvador? Where was the caucus in 
Nicaragua?
  I think it was wrong. I think it was wrong for Congress not to be 
advised and sought by the President. I think it was wrong to allow 
Aristide to go back, and I think it is wrong to allow Cedras to stay. I 
think it was wrong for the United States to invade Haiti.
  I think it was wrong to state that there was 25 multinations in this, 
when none of them participated in the initial invasion.
  I ask Members not to support this amendment.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  My colleagues, I know it is late and Members are impatient to end 
this debate.
  There is one and only one argument that I would like to offer to my 
colleagues in support of the resolution offered by the gentleman from 
New Jersey, [Mr. Torricelli]. That is that his proposal is the only one 
that fulfills, our fundamental responsibility, that there be a clear 
and proper assertion of the authority of the Congress of the United 
States over an undertaking such as the one that we are engaged in in 
Haiti.
  Of course, it would have been better to have been able to do this 
ahead of time, but we could not. And the action that we should take 
tonight, in adopting the gentleman's resolution is far preferable to 
silence or to reliance on the nonstatutory, nonbinding sense of 
Congress proposals that have been previously voted on.
  The alternative to real action by the Congress is, obviously, 
inaction or even worse, inaction posing as action.
  And in either of those cases, the net effect is our acquiescence in 
the proposition that one man, the President of the United States, can 
take the Nation into an enterprise like the one we are engaged in in 
Haiti, and we are fated to do nothing but act as interested observers.
  I find that to be an idea that is impossible to square with the 
principles of the limits on the executive and the shared legislative-
executive power that are so central to this republic.
  If we sit on our rights and responsibilities, if we default in them, 
we cannot later complain when those rights have been diminished by our 
own inaction.
  My colleagues, it is time for us to live up to the responsibilities 
that we took an oath to uphold. The gentleman's resolution is the only 
alternative before the House tonight that fulfills that obligation.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from New Mexico, [Mr. Schiff].
  (Mr. SCHIFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York, [Mr. Lazio].
  Mr. LAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I have been calling for a Congressional 
debate on sending our troops to Haiti since July. While I am pleased 
that this debate is finally taking place, I would have much preferred 
it to occur before our troops actually went to Haiti. We have a 
responsibility not just in Haiti, but to explore and begin to define, 
rationally, our Post Cold War Foreign Policy.
  But we now have close to 20,000 of our service men and women in 
Haiti, trying to resolve an internal struggle that has nothing to do 
with our national security. This misguided intervention in Haiti is 
symptomatic of the Clinton administration's ongoing struggle with 
foreign policy. It is hurting our credibility throughout the world, it 
is costing us hundreds of millions of dollars, and it is unnecessarily 
putting our troops in harm's way. Our Government will soon be making 
payroll for the Haitian police and security forces. We are now paying 
all costs for the observers.
  The Haitian occupation represents yet another example of the 
President's misuse of the military. Time and again he has subjected our 
Armed Forces to constraints and missions which are inconsistent with 
their purpose and training. While he continues to slash their funding, 
he chooses to send them all over the world--a policy effectively at 
cross purposes. As I have said before on this floor, the President 
cannot have it both ways.
  This intervention is Clinton adventurism at its worst. It lacks clear 
objectives, it ignores strategic realities, and it should be ended 
before we get in any further over our heads and before we lose any 
lives.

  The Dellums amendment, which was just passed, and the Torricelli 
amendment, which we are now debating, will bring us no closer to seeing 
the safe return of our troops. The Michel/Gilman substitute was the 
only clear option to providing for an end to this wayward intervention. 
But instead, we have chosen to put this debate off for a few months, in 
which time it is uncertain how many losses we will suffer.
  Support our troops in Haiti.
  Bring them home now!

                              {time}  2340

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens].
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to congratulate President Clinton on 
his courageous action to liberate the people of Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to H. J. RES. 416 and all 
of the amendments to the Resolution. The Michel amendment is reckless 
and irresponsible and completely opposite to the positions taken by Mr. 
Michel and the Republican Members on the use of force in Lebanon, 
Grenada, Panama and Nicaragua. The Dellums, Murtha, Hastings and Dicks 
Amendment is worthy of support because it recognizes the danger of 
setting a date certain for the withdrawal of American troops. This 
Amendment is critically flawed, however, because it expresses the sense 
of Congress that the President should have gotten Congressional 
approval for the operation before sending troops.
  Such a ``Sense of Congress' chastises the President for his refusal 
to conduct government by public opinion poll. It refuses to recognize 
President Clinton's decision to liberate Haiti as a noble, unselfish, 
courageous act with no political rewards and great political risks. 
Such a ``Sense of Congress'' also refuses to make an important 
distinction between a declaration of war and a police action on behalf 
of a friendly government that was ousted by military criminals. Unlike 
Grenada or Nicaragua or Panama, President Clinton's action was clearly 
in support of a government chosen by and still revered by the masses of 
the Haitian people.
  As we move into the new world order it is important to uphold 
substance over form. Each day the moral value of President Clinton's 
action is reaffirmed by the unfolding events in Haiti. By ignoring the 
misguided and prejudice driven public opinion the President provided 
leadership for a venture that is working and that sets a positive model 
for United States and international community policy for the future. 
Congress should not pass resolutions which downgrade the nobility of 
President Clinton's wise action.
  When President Harry Truman recognized the State of Israel, he 
ignored public opinion, the advice of the majority of the members of 
his Cabinet and the sentiment prevailing in Congress at the time. 
President Truman stood alone and recognized the new State of Israel. 
Most of the democratic world followed President Truman's example and 
Israel was allowed to take its place in the constellation of nations. 
President Clinton's decision to liberate Haiti ranks with the decision 
by President Truman.
  When Abraham Lincoln decided to free the slaves by issuing the 
Emancipation Proclamation public opinion was arrayed against him. The 
Congress and all of the members of President Lincoln's Cabinet also 
were against freeing the slaves. President Lincoln stood alone and 
signed the Emancipation Proclamation. In his decision to liberate Haiti 
President Clinton placed himself on the same moral plain as Abraham 
Lincoln.
  President Clinton should be applauded and congratulated by the 
Congress for this leadership in the liberation of Haiti. History will 
condemn all Congressional resolutions which chastise President Clinton 
for this action on behalf of the weakest and most helpless among us.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Rangel].
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, if I had my way, the President of the 
United States would have come to the American people and to this 
Congress and would have explained the posture that he found himself in. 
I would have thought he would have made a powerful and persuasive case 
that placing our troops into Haiti was in our national security 
interests, because he had joined in with the OAS, the international 
community, in order to make it abundantly clear.
  Mr. Chairman, it was my hope that the President would have persuaded 
the American people and this Congress that we would support that 
action, because when the President speaks, I think we should listen. I 
think that he was right in this particular case.
  He did not do that, however. Now we find ourselves on the eve of the 
election trying to find out what we wish he would have done or, better 
than that, trying to send a statement as to what we believe will fly 
with the American people when we get back home.
  Clearly, Mr. Chairman, one alternative that we have is just to say 
``Hey, get the heck on out of there. We did not authorize you to go 
there and we wish that you and all our American troops would just go 
home.''
  The second thing is the Dellums amendment, where we say ``You are 
there. The President has spoken. Get the job done as soon as you can, 
and get back home.''
  The third thing, which means absolutely nothing like the other two, 
is that we say ``We did not authorize you to go there. You have a 
restriction on what you have to do when you get there, and you have a 
time restriction to do that in.''
  Give us a break. What we are talking about here is a political 
message. For God's sake, do not send a political message to the troops. 
What the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] is trying to say is 
whether you believe it is right or whether you believe it is wrong, you 
support the American troops, wherever you find them.
  It is not for you and it is not for me to be able to say when this 
job is going to be done. It is up to our commanders who are trained, 
that we support, to determine when the mission is accomplished, report 
to the Commander in Chief, and with our prayers, our will, and our 
support, they will be back home as soon as possible.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that, once 
again, everybody in this Chamber supports our troops. However, let me 
read what the Torricelli resolution will do.
  It provides retroactive congressional authorization for the military 
occupation of Haiti, retroactive. We are supporting what the President 
did. Seventy-five to eighty percent of the people of this country did 
not want our troops sent to Haiti. Seventy-five to eighty percent of 
the people in this body and the other body did not want our troops sent 
to Haiti, yet we are approving this action.
  Mr. Chairman, some of those young people are going to be killed or 
maimed. If Members vote for this resolution, they are agreeing with 
what the President did when the American people said no and we said no, 
and the blood of those young people will be on the hands of everybody 
that votes for this resolution, in my opinion.
  Mr. Chairman, in addition, this is open-ended. It does not expire on 
March 1. It can be converted into a permanent occupation by American 
forces. The President can do that unilaterally.
  In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, after March 1, 2,000 to 3,000 U.S. 
forces can be put under foreign command. I am saying, the American 
people do not want that, either.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are not going to have another vote on this 
if this passes until after next March 1, and it may be even after that. 
Mr. Chairman, this is not a good approach. We should not be sanctioning 
what President Clinton did, because the American people simply did not 
want it. We should not be giving approval for what they did not want.
  Make no mistake about it, every person who votes for this resolution, 
if a young person is killed down there, is going to be held 
responsible, just like President Clinton, who did this without our 
approval, and without the American people's approval.
  Do not vote for this resolution, Mr. Chairman. We should bring our 
troops home now. That is what the American people want.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the Torricelli-Hamilton resolution 
accomplishes these important objectives: It sets our exit from Haiti 
for March 1, 1995. It gives our armed forces the time necessary to 
complete their mission, avoiding the concerns military experts have 
expressed about undermining our troops and it makes a strong 
constitutional statement about Congress's role in such actions.
  Because of the hand that has been dealt us due to previous 
congressional inaction on this issue, Torricelli-Hamilton is the most 
responsible course of action. It expresses the will of the American 
people, and protects our Armed Forces.
  I opposed the previous amendments because I believe in the following 
proposition.
  If we pass a resolution that does not include a date for withdrawal, 
then we will have, in effect, abdicated Congress's constitutional power 
to declare war, and assumed the responsibilities of the consequences.
  This debate would be unnecessary if we would have the courage to 
assert our constitutional responsibility and statutory authority under 
the War Powers Act.
  To those who claim that establishing a date for withdrawal can put 
the lives of the valiant men and women of our armed forces at risk, I 
suggest that our failure to pursue our constitutional and statutory 
authority under the War Powers Act does the same. That is why I believe 
the Torricelli-Hamilton amendment is the best avenue available to us. 
Establishing March 1 as a date in which authorization ceases, preserves 
congressional authority and best protects our troops.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Torricelli-Hamilton resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, remember, when Members vote on the 
Torricelli amendment, it is a retroactive authorization of an ill-
advised incursion into Haiti to install a president who will surely 
embarrass the United States. It will bring us casualties. Setting a 
date certain, as it does, for withdrawing is potentially a very 
disastrous course. The withdrawal date becomes a timetable for each 
faction in Haiti to seek to exploit.
  Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman says it is the 
responsibility of the Congress to authorize the use of our armed forces 
in Haiti. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the President has acted without the 
support of the Congress, and without the support of the American 
people.
  However, this Congress has a higher duty, and that is to serve as a 
check on the President when he is wrong; to say, ``No, bring the troops 
home.'' Vote against the Torricelli amendment.
  Mr. Torricelli. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to 
the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
  (Mr. Oberstar asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, the public policy question facing this 
House, the American people, and the Clinton Administration is: What is 
America's interest in Haiti?
  The answer: Democracy. Restoring to office a President who was 
elected by over 68 percent of the voters in the first honest, fair, 
free election in the history of Haiti. Restoring a President ousted by 
a military coup--just as we did under President Bush, in Panama.
  Critics have warned that we must not, in this mission, engage in 
democracy-building in Haiti. We have already engaged in democracy-
building in 1987 during the Reagan Administration--when we rightly 
spent millions of dollars to help Haitians write a constitution and an 
election law; to train election judges and teach the people how to 
vote, in a country whose law school had been closed for 25 years and 
whose judicial system was virtually inoperative.

  I felt privileged to play a role in that process for the Reagan 
administration in the summer of 1987, when the offices of the Electoral 
Commission were burned and homes of the Commission members machine-
gunned. I had just come from the reenactment of our own Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia and urged my Haitian friends to persevere: 
creer la nouvelle Haiti--to build the new Haiti--the American people 
support you, I said.
  The election of 1987 was ambushed by the forces of Duvalierism, with 
the complicity of the army. But the Bush administration picked up the 
challenge and set about democracy-building, by supporting the election 
process of 1990.
  Again, I was honored to play a role for that administration in 
democracy-building through meetings with Haitian military leaders and 
interviews on Haitian TV and radio. Haiti had barely begun to draw the 
deep, complicated breath of democracy in 1991 when, again, the army 
intervened and forced President Aristide out of office.
  Now, another U.S. President, a democrat, is trying to give democracy 
life in Haiti. I asked people as they left the voting places in Haiti: 
Pouki sa ou te vote? Na vote liberte a--why did you vote? We voted for 
freedom, they said--freedom from the Ton-Tons Macoutes, freedom from 
oppression.
  The United States military intervention in Haiti is creating the 
essential conditions for freedom in that land--peace, the absence of 
oppression and fear imposed by the Haitian Army. The Haitian people 
will build their own parliamentary democracy--with our help in 
establishing peace.
  What we have begun under these Presidents, we must not now abandon. 
To do so would be `lave mains, essiye pa te.' `to wash your hands, and 
dry them off in the dirt'.
  Don't abandon this fledgling opportunity for democracy for the most 
destitute of our neighbors. Don't tie the hands of our President with 
an artificial date for withdrawal. Our intervention forces can, and I 
am confident will, be withdrawn in stages as we achieve each of the 
goals President Clinton has set for our intervention: The restoration 
of the Aristide Presidency; the holding of parliamentary elections this 
December; the emplacement of a trained police force, the introduction 
of an international peacekeeping force, and the initiation of an 
economic recovery programs.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Berman]
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, with great reluctance, I am going to oppose 
this amendment for one reason only. That is that the March 1 date is 
being viewed not as a time within which Congress would revisit the 
issue of whether the purposes made sense and the operation should be 
continued to be authorized, but rather, as a date certain for 
withdrawal. There are compelling military arguments against a date 
certain for withdrawal.
  Having said that, and I was an advocate of having this alternative as 
a defense against what I thought would be the more disastrous action of 
Congress, adopting a resolution like the Michel resolution, I have to 
say, Mr. Chairman, that the words of the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Skaggs], the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, should be 
listened to very carefully by the body.
  The one resolution we will probably speak on in this case is a sense-
of-Congress resolution. The question this body must face is whether or 
not to repeal the War Powers Act, because it has no meaning whatsoever. 
It is not taken seriously. Every President has viewed it as 
unconstitutional. It passed only because the veto of President Nixon 
was overridden at its weakest political time.
  We are not even coming up to the plate to make a decision on 
authorization. We cannot have a debate after an operation that started 
about whether to deauthorize, for we pull the plug on our troops and on 
our whole country's purpose in that particular operation.

                              {time}  2350

  I think it follows almost as an inevitable consequence, and I say it 
with deep despair because it was sponsored and pushed by our dear 
friend, our former colleague, Dante Fascell, that this is dead letter 
law and it should probably be repealed by this body because this body 
is not willing to take the responsibilities that only it thinks it has 
seriously.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Bateman].
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  (Mr. BATEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BATEMAN. Mr. Chairman, sometime 30 minutes or so ago, the very 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs scolded me 
and most of you for having voted for the Dellums-Murtha and others 
amendment. I think we have scolding in order for ourselves but not for 
the grounds that the distinguished gentleman scolded us. We have spent 
all of these hours in debate essentially praising our troops and saying 
how much we respect them and care for them, which is not even an item 
under controversy or dispute. If some enterprising journalist counts 
tomorrow the number of times that Members of this House in the course 
of this debate have risen and said, ``The President should have come to 
the Congress for authorization before he sent those troops there,'' he 
would find that the number is probably going to be the overwhelming 
majority of everyone who has addressed this question in this debate. 
Yet what are we now doing? Ignore the fact that he did not have 
authority. He did not seek authority. And he would not have gotten 
authority if he had sought it.
  Now after the fact, how dare someone scold me and say I am now 
obligated to give him that authority ex post facto. He does not deserve 
the authority because the policy is a flawed, failed policy. It should 
not have been implemented. I will not be a party to saying it should 
have been, or that I would in any way be cast in the role of having 
authorized it.
  We should bring these troops home. They had no business going there. 
They ought to come back at the earliest practical moment consistent 
with their safety.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman yielded this 
gentleman 4 minutes in order to allow a couple of Members on our side 
an opportunity to speak in opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Murtha].
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a couple of points very clear. 
Everybody in the field is against this. We asked General Sheldon 
personally about a date certain. He was against a date certain. General 
Shalikashvili sent a letter over, said it would hamper the troops and 
endanger the troops to have a date certain.
  We have a resolution passed by the other body, 91 to 8, which says, 
``Get out as soon as possible,'' and praises the actions of the troops. 
This is an identical resolution to it, the resolution we have passed 
already. I ask the Members to defeat soundly the resolution which 
micromanages from Washington, DC, what they are going in the field. It 
would be a disaster for us to pass a resolution like this trying to 
manage what goes on down in Haiti.
  So I would ask the Members to vote against this resolution and vote 
for the final passage which was the same as the other body passed.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I too wish the President 
had asked for authorization, but it ill behooves those who have spent 
12 years fighting to free the President from any constraint in the 
dispatch of American troops to now complain when we do not have any way 
to do it. Let us all work together now and try to do that in the 
future. As for now, I reject the argument that we will somehow have 
left our duty undone. We have had several proposals put forward. The 
very large vote for the proposal put forward by the gentleman from 
California does state a clear policy. Members have said, well, they 
would like the Hamilton-Torricelli resolution except for the fact that 
it has a date certain for withdrawal. Well, a plane could float if it 
were lighter, but it is not. It does have the date certain for 
withdrawal that would undermine the notion that there is some unity. It 
would undermine the performance of the mission, and does not make a 
great deal of sense. I am willing now to start and work with people on 
the other side for means of controlling the President. By the way, we 
have one now, and that is an amendment to an appropriations bill. So if 
you put through the line item veto, you will never have any method of 
restraining a President. Let us go after that in the future. But for 
now, let us not destroy the unified position we have managed to put 
forward here by the gentleman from California and I hope the amendment 
is defeated.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cox].
  Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my vehement opposition to the 
Torricelli-Hamilton substitute. This is an Orwellian bill being offered 
under an Orwellian rule. At times like this, this Chamber represents a 
hall of mirrors more than the people's House. To the public we may seem 
to be voting on sharply differing alternatives, different competing 
legislation, but thanks to this fraudulent king-of-the-hill procedure, 
Members can now vote on every side of this issue and that is not all. 
The Torricelli amendment seems to be authorizing United States forces 
in Haiti only for a limited time. But thanks to last-minute changes in 
the Torricelli amendment, we are in fact debating exactly the reverse, 
an open-ended virtually unlimited authorization for a United States 
military occupation of Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, the American people need to know first of all that this 
amendment would authorize the use of forces in Haiti to ``stabilize the 
security situation in Haiti.'' This is a Herculean task indeed. For 200 
years of Haitian history there has not been a secure and stable 
situation. In the 5 years before Aristide came to power, Haiti had five 
governments, five governments in 5 years. Aristide himself was in power 
for only 7 months. The only supposed stability that Haiti has enjoyed 
during its history was during the brutish 30-year dictatorial regime of 
Papa Doc and then Baby Doc Duvalier.
  Surely President Clinton knows this since his Secretary of Commerce 
Ron Brown served as Baby Doc's registered foreign agent and lobbyist 
here in Washington. The shadow of that Somalia debacle of last year now 
lies over this House tonight.
  Where is the evidence that this episode will end differently than 
Somalia where warlord Aideed is back on top right where we found him 
when we go there? Where is the evidence that the Clinton administration 
has developed a greater capacity to manage our military affairs? Why 
should we be willing tonight to make an open-ended wager with the lives 
of our troops and the prestige of the United States on the off chance 
that this time, unlike Somalia, unlike China, unlike Bosnia, unlike 
Korea, that this time President Clinton might get it right?
  But we are told the Torricelli resolution has a fail-safe to make 
sure that this kind of fiasco cannot occur again. It is the sham March 
1995 deadline. Suffice it to say first of all that 6 months was ample 
time for President Clinton, for his turn at the wheel in Somalia, to 
have his policy go disastrously awry. But much more importantly, the 
March 1 trigger mechanism in this resolution is a sham.
  The Haiti occupation would expire on March 1 unless, and this is the 
world's largest loophole, unless the President determines and certifies 
that the continued participation of United States Armed Forces is 
essential to protect United States national security interests.

                              {time}  2400

  Where have we heard that before? It sounds familiar. It reminds me in 
fact of the identical language in the resolution contained in the 1994 
defense appropriation. That resolution which Congress already passed 
barred the use of any appropriated funds for U.S. military operations 
in Haiti unless prior to the use of force the President reported that 
the intended deployment is ``justified by U.S. national security 
interests.'' In fact, there were even more conditions.
  Every Member of this body knows tonight that when the President 
ordered our troops into Haiti 3 weeks ago those conditions were not 
met. In fact, a majority of this body that voted just moments ago for 
the Dellums resolution certified legally that even tonight these 
conditions have not been met.
  It simply cannot be more clear. If the Torricelli amendment passes, 
the Congress of the United States will delegate to President Clinton 
the power indefinitely extend our congressional authorization. This we 
must not do.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  (Mr. DORNAN asked and given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a unanimous-consent 
request that the sentence following: ``I support our troops'', appears 
before everybody's remarks all night long on this debate, retroactively 
and to come. Does anybody object to that?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. McDermott). The Chair cannot entertain 
that request.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, it was a good idea. We all support the 
troops.
  Now I want to collect my thoughts. Hold the clock a second because I 
am going to quote two senior Democrats.
  In the Pennsylvania corner, but not a Pennsylvanian, one of the top 
eight people in tenure and seniority said the following sentence, 
cleared up for airline traffic. He said to another senior Democrat, in 
my presence: ``If those blankety-blank-blanks down at the White House 
get a handful of Americans killed, our Democratic Party is going to 
take the biggest bath at the polls it has in this century.'' That is 
one.
  Second, I know the Black Caucus is as diversified in its thoughts on 
this as any other caucus in this House. But one of the members who 
knows more because of a key leadership assignment than anybody else in 
that Black Caucus said the following, and mark these words: ``Aristide 
can get elected any day in the week, all year long, but he is totally 
unable to govern.''
  I would love to give you his name, but I do not have his permission. 
And that is truly a wise statement.
  What are we going to do if he is deposed again? The lawyer of Castro 
who went in there on an Air Force plane, I have just learned, his wife 
that ran against Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, whose name is Magna, 5 months ago 
embraced Castro, kissed him before the cameras, and it has been in the 
papers all over in Florida, and he said, ``You are my teacher, oh great 
one. I have learned from you what you have done for the people.''
  I say this: Haiti is an issue in doubt.
  Cuba libre.
  Cuba libre.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Kim].
  (Mr. KIM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KIM. Mr. Chairman, we are at long last debating the American 
occupation of Haiti. I believe we need to examine how much this 
occupation is going to cost. The early estimates peg our cost at $250 
million through the end of this year.
  Our Nation's Armed Forces have been slashed by 25 percent since the 
gulf war and are struggling to meet their training budgets. How are we 
going to pay for the occupation without further degrading our military 
readiness?
  What are we spending our money on?
  We are spending thousands of dollars to buy obsolete weapons back 
from Haitians. We are spending thousands of dollars to train and pay 
Haitian police to sit in Guantanamo refugee camps. We have spent 
millions for humanitarian food relief and stood by and watched the 
distribution centers be ransacked.
  What is our mission? Is it restoring Aristide to power or is it to 
promote democracy? Aristide is no different from the military thugs we 
are overthrowing. Aristide advocates murder and brutality as valid 
tools of government. How is siding with Aristide any different from 
choosing sides in the chaos of Somalia? When Aristide returns, who 
knows what will happen? Haiti may degenerate into civil conflict. Are 
we going to take sides in a civil war? Are we going to invade Haiti 
again to replace Aristide?
  What is going on? How long are we going to be Haiti? Without answers 
to those questions, Congress has a responsibility to end this ill-fated 
adventure. Our servicemen and women should never be thrown into a 
dangerous environment without a clear mission. And given our budgetary 
problems we should end this ill-advised waste of precious taxpayer 
dollars.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this ill-
written resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I oppose the amendment. I am not an 
attorney. All you have to do is check my court record.
  But we are passing sense-of-Congresses here and we are telling the 
President how we feel tonight.
  I support now the prevailing amendment that passed, Dellums. But what 
we are doing tonight is telling the President how we feel. We were not 
elected to tell the President how we feel; we were elected to govern. 
Let me say we were not elected to send signals. We do not work for 
Western Union.
  But the reason I am opposed to this amendment is I think it is a 
dangerous amendment. The President has gone off and committed troops 
and did not check with us. Now we authorize it after the fact and we 
set a precedent of saying go ahead, Presidents, you have already done 
this all of these years and we do not like it, but now we are going to 
approve it after you have done it.
  I am recommending that Chairman Dellums and Chairman Murtha, two of 
the better chairmen in this House, and Chairman McDade and Chairman 
Spence on that side get together, amend the War Powers Act, because 
there are different types of military needs. When Saddam went into 
Kuwait he came to the Congress, President Bush, God bless him. But it 
was clear, was it not?
  But Haiti needed a surprise, and there should be a provision in an 
amended War Powers Act where he could confer with the key leaders of 
this House and get a proviso approval, whatever President it is. But we 
should not affirm the President's usurping the power to declare war, 
and do not let it be confused in the nebulous, well-meaning, well-
intentioned amendment.
  Vote this down, even though it is a sense-of-the Congress. Let the 
Dellums language stand, and I say to the chairman he is the exact 
perfect man with Murtha, McDade, and Spence to clarify the difference 
between an emergency and in fact the surprise needs to protect our 
hemisphere.
  I am not an attorney, but you know I have the same rights as an 
attorney on the House floor, and I like it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 6 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis], our final speaker.

                              {time}  0010

  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, in many ways, this is a 
frustrating debate. In many ways, this is a positive debate. Most of 
all, this is certainly an important debate.
  It is frustrating because almost no one in this body believed that 
sending American troops to Haiti was a good idea. Many of us expressed 
our reservations to the President and the Secretary of Defense in 
person. It is frustrating because most of us believe in the concept of 
the Commander in Chief. The Commander in Chief made a decision that now 
has placed almost 20,000 American men and women in Haiti.
  The job our troops are doing is truly incredible. Using almost every 
form of modern technology and interforce cooperation, they are rapidly 
stabilizing a country that is almost uncontrollable. Our troops arrived 
without a shot being fired--that largely because of a very important 
contribution made by a most unusual commission headed by former 
President Carter.
  President Carter, Senator Nunn and General Colin Powell deserve our 
gratitude.
  We are there and because of that fact, I have grave reservations 
about all three resolutions--for each impact in a direct way the 
command authority of our Commander in Chief.
  The Michel-Gilman resolution makes the most sense of the three 
resolutions--but I still have reservations. Our troops are in a place 
of great danger. Their presence in Haiti has undermined the strength of 
Cedras, Francois, and Biambi. I believe they will all leave which at 
least paves the way for the duly elected President--Aristide--to 
return. Let's us not kid ourselves about President Aristide. Father 
Aristide both verbally and in writing has expressed his hatred for the 
United States. He does not like Americans. Indeed, it is not clear that 
he will be any better for the people of Haiti or their condition than 
the military dictators. Nonetheless, he is the duly elected President.
  Any resolution that encourages those military autocrats could cause 
one or more of them to try to re-exert their power. That could cause an 
eruption that would put our troops in grave danger.
  The Dellums-Murtha resolution appeals to me in many ways. It does 
not, however, prohibit foreign control of U.S. troops. This worries me 
greatly. What is noteworthy is that the Senate has just passed an 
identical resolution by a vote of 91 to 8.
  The Torricelli-Hamilton resolution makes no sense at all. It endorses 
the President's ill-conceived policy retroactively. It provides for 
permanent authorization of the President's action and it allows our 
troops to be placed under foreign command. This is a policy which does 
not encourage expeditious removal of our troops and potentially places 
them in the position of being Haiti's police force for not months, but 
years.
  In many ways, Haiti symbolizes the most important challenges our 
country faces as we enter the 21st century. Haiti is a third world 
country within our hemisphere, home to almost 7 million people--most of 
whom go to bed hungry every night. Through U.S. aid, we feed about 1 
million every day; our allies feed another one-half million.
  The crowds are cheering our troops because they bring hope for change 
and freedom, but in another sense, they are very sad crowds, for the 
people are almost all very thin from hunger. Their big brown eyes stare 
out in hopelessness, for their condition is not new. It has continued 
for all of our lifetime.
  As a young person at UCLA, I remember one of the texts on 
international affairs entitled ``Wanted--An Asian Policy.'' If the book 
were written today, it would be entitled Wanted--A Foreign Policy.
  Since I have been a member of this House, we have largely been 
without a comprehensive foreign policy. Oh, there have been high points 
under President Jimmy Carter and under Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George Bush. While this is not one of them, President Clinton has had 
high points as well.
  But in this new post cold war world, we need a long range foreign 
policy--A policy that reflects our economic and strategic interest in 
the world. A policy that advocates and supports freedom, democracy and 
economic growth with individual opportunity. A policy that recognizes 
that a strong America is important to freedom in the world but also 
understands that we cannot be the policeman for the world.
  Mr. Chairman, we must do all that is necessary to facilitate 
Aristide's return to Haiti by October 15. We should be shifting to 
phase II--providing stabilized conditions for U.N. Forces. We should 
encourage Cedras and Biambi to follow Francois out of the country. And 
finally, we should remove our troops from Haiti as quickly and as 
safely as common sense will allow.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Mr. Chairman, for 10 hours I have been on this floor helping to 
preside over this debate, distributing time and listening to my 
colleagues. For just a few moments I would like your time and your 
attention to explain why the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], and I have asked you to endure 
another few speeches and another resolution.
  The story begins with the first words that each of you ever spoke in 
this institution: ``I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.''
  My colleagues, more than any vote, any issue, anything you ever do in 
your public careers, when you leave this Chamber late at night in the 
years to come, you will measure your own success or failure by whether 
or not you were true to those few words. Central to that commitment, 
central to whether or not you kept your pledge, is whether you have 
truly defended the prerogatives of this Congress and this institution.
  My Republican friends, a decade ago you were wrong in defending the 
invasions of Lebanon, Panama, and Grenada with a vote in this Congress. 
I said so. I believed it then, I believe so now.
  My Democratic colleagues, we compound the problem. Many of you are my 
friends. Some of you I respect a great deal. Your speeches in those 
years were true.
  The truth is no different now. The prerogatives of this institution 
require, when the sons and daughters of your constituents are put in 
harms' way, that this Congress take a vote and take a stand.
  The political affiliation of a President is of no consequence, no 
bearing, and no relevance in making a judgment on this issue.
  And so, my colleagues, I rise, indeed, not to discuss Haitian 
democracy at all. To anyone who has listened, I have been as doubtful 
about our occupation in Haiti as any Member. But I have another 
concern. The most powerful weapon that the United States has to advance 
democracy is not our military.

                              {time}  0020

  It is no weapon, it is no soldier, it is no force. When 62 aircraft, 
a score of naval ships and 20,000 soldiers and untold millions are sent 
to Haiti on the order of a single man without the consent of any other 
institution of this Government, then no democratic ideal is being 
advanced. And make no mistake about it, what you do and how you define 
our democracy is heard in the Kremlin as they consider the caucuses, is 
understood in France when they look at Africa, other Latin American 
nations when they look to their neighbor. Our lesson to the world is 
not might, no matter how powerful we may be; it is the rule of law; it 
is the prerogative of this institution and our elected Representatives 
to embody the ideals of our Constitution.
  I know to some it seems of no consequence any more. In 200 years we 
have been involved in 246 invasions, occupations, military skirmishes. 
Some of them are the great pride of our time, World War II to Korea to 
a host of other engagements. Some are a national embarrassment because 
the elected Representatives in their time stood silent as we stand now.
  My colleagues, it was said best in 1848 by a young Republican 
Representative from the seventh District of Illinois. New to this body, 
he rose and he said,

       Allow a President to invade a neighboring nation whenever 
     he may deem it necessary, and you allow him to make war. The 
     Constitutional Convention resolved to frame the Constitution 
     so that no one man should hold this power.

  My colleagues, that young Congressman was Abraham Lincoln. He was new 
to this institution, but he understood a central truth of this 
Government: That we govern together. When he spoke, it was an illegal 
and immoral invasion and occupation of Mexico that generated his words.
  A century later it could have been Vietnam. The crisis is now Haiti. 
But it is more than Haiti. As has been said on this floor time and time 
again, Haiti is more than a crisis, it is a model. In this postwar 
world what do there and how we conduct ourselves and the rules 
established on this floor will be revisited time and time again.
  If I understand the principles of our President, we will fight in 
nations around the globe to ensure that democratically elected regimes 
retain their power, that illegal immigration is stemmed, that human 
rights are respected.
  I believe in all those objectives, but I submit to you, my 
colleagues, if you are not more vigilant in the defense of the lives of 
our children, the credibility of this Government and the use of our 
forces, we are going to be a very busy United States of America.
  My colleagues, finally, the Congress' role in defining these new 
arrangements of power, you and I know, comes at a moment of some 
weakness in this institution.
  From the media to many of our constituents, they have looked upon the 
problems of this institution as simply the problems of the Members. But 
if tonight in your own consciences you are not taking a stand to 
authorize or deauthorize, establish a process to approve or disapprove 
in the 104th Congress because of the vulnerability of a Member or the 
problems of an institution, then we no longer have individual problems, 
we have a problem of the ability of this institution to govern.
  My colleagues, I have been proud of every moment I have spent in this 
institution. With all the respect that each and every one of you 
deserves, I must humbly conclude this has not been our finest moment.

  Mr. Hamilton and I have offered a resolution that makes no judgment 
on the invasion.
  Some of our opposition is clear.
  We simply accept the reality and ask you to authorize it, given the 
reality of the presence of our forces, and insure that you or your 
successors in the 104th Congress would cast a vote and let every man 
and woman whose life is on the line tonight in Haiti know that they are 
there because the democratic process asked them to be there; no one 
man, no one individual.
  I believe it was the right judgment. I accept the sentiments of the 
House. I will ask for no vote. But I will leave you tonight with a 
simple story of a great man who served in this House and left this 
world not so long ago.
  Mr. Chairman, a decade ago when I was new to this institution, not 
far from where Barney Frank sits tonight, late one night I talked to 
Tip O'Neill and I said to him, ``Mr. Speaker, in all your years in 
institution, is there any vote that you regret, any one you ever think 
about or you would take back?''
  And he said to me,

       Bob, every day, one vote every day. The President told me 
     he needed my help in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. I 
     believed in my party, I believed in my President, and I cast 
     a vote. I didn't think of that vote for a long time until one 
     morning when 241 U.S. Marines lost their lives in Lebanon. 
     And I thought of it during every debate on every resolution 
     for every foreign involvement since. You see, I listened, 
     too. They said a deadline would be wrong; trust commanders; 
     don't define the mission; allow it to evolve; allow the 
     President to have flexibility. Oh, they had flexibility, and 
     we did not define a mission, but we set a limit right after 
     241 brave young Americans came home in boxes.

  My colleagues, the House has made its judgment. I would have 
preferred that the courage of 20,000 young Americans in Haiti be met by 
the courage of 435 Members of this House to take a stand for or 
against, to establish a process to either end this engagement or allow 
it to proceed in the new year.
  Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Skaggs, Mr. Menendez, those who have joined me 
tonight, have taken our stand. We have not prevailed. We will be back 
in the 104th, I hope.
  But I tell you this, this issue, this issue remains with each and 
every one of us not only for as long as we are in this House but for as 
long as we care about the people's business and the integrity of the 
Constitution of the United States.
  Thank you for indulging me.
  Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, I don't want to belabor the question of the 
President's constitutional authority to occupy Haiti. The more urgent 
question, now that he has done it, is what to do now. But I want to 
briefly address the way in which the President respected our democracy, 
our Constitution, in setting in motion an invasion of Haiti. The 
Torricelli-Hamilton Amendment states explicitly that the Constitution 
would have required the President to obtain Congress' approval before 
ordering our armed forces to remove the de facto authorities in Haiti. 
Mr. Speaker, after careful consideration of the significant 
constitutional issues at stake, I have concluded that this statement is 
correct.
  First and foremost, I want to make emphatically clear that neither I 
nor my Republican colleagues who hold this view are enemies of a strong 
Presidency. From the days when I served as legal counsel to President 
Reagan to the present, I have firmly opposed the so-called War Powers 
Resolution as an unconstitutional and unwise fetter on the President's 
constitutional powers, and I have consistently upheld sweeping 
presidential authority to use the military forces of the United States 
in a whole host of contexts: in defense of American territory, lives, 
and property against actual or threatened attacks--like such military 
operations as Desert One, Grenada, Libya, or Panama; to enforce the 
laws of the United States, as was also the case in Panama; in 
circumstances where speed or secrecy are essential, as was the case in 
all of the above military actions; or for peacekeeping operations, as 
Lebanon and Somalia at least initially were. Some of these past 
operations ended successfully, and others ended in failure; but each 
fell within the scope of well-established exceptions to the requirement 
for prior congressional authorization--exceptions that date back to the 
framing of our Constitution over two centuries ago. I emphatically 
support these historic precedents, and I will support the President's 
right to take such actions unilaterally in the future--any President of 
any party, whether or not I agree that the action in question is 
justified.
  I offered a resolution describing the then-proposed invasion of Haiti 
as a usurpation of Congress' constitutional rights, because in Haiti 
President Clinton claimed to act under none of these established 
precedents. He claimed new authority, for unilateral presidential power 
that is historically unprecedented. The Constitution has not 
historically been construed to allow the President to send U.S. armed 
forces to invade another country, with every expectation of resistance 
by opposing armed forces, where neither secrecy nor American lives are 
at issue. That is the Desert Storm scenario; and, Mr. Speaker, as we 
all recall, Congress demanded at the time, and President Bush 
ultimately sought and received, our authorization for Operation Desert 
Storm. I advised President Bush at the time that a vote was essential, 
and so did many of my Republican colleagues; and so, Mr. Speaker, did 
every one of my Democratic colleagues, stridently and at length, 
without a single exception that I'm aware of. President Clinton and the 
Democratic leadership of Congress denied us a vote in Haiti, and have 
thereby created a broad, inchoate new category of Presidential power.

  Mr. Speaker, I have read the opinion provided to the Congress by the 
Justice Department, purporting to establish that President Clinton 
could have invaded Haiti even absent the September 18 Carter agreement. 
The Justice Department cites three bases for such unilateral action. 
First, it argues that the sense of the Congress resolution contained in 
the 1994 defense appropriation authorized President Clinton to invade 
Haiti--and I want to emphasize that the Justice Department said, 
explicitly, that President Clinton could constitutionally have invaded 
Haiti if he close to, rather than simply occupying it with the consent 
of the de facto government, as we did on September 19. This argument is 
utterly specious. As the Justice Department is well aware, a nonbinding 
sense of the Congress resolution can neither augment nor curtail the 
President's constitutional or statutory authority. Even if it could, 
the conditions specified in the resolution were not remotely met. The 
President gave no meaningful ``report in advance'' of the military 
action he ordered: he sent a letter to the Speaker as the operation 
began, at a time when the Congress was in recess. Moreover, the 
resolution required that prior to the use of force the President would, 
among other conditions, have ``established'' ``clear objectives for the 
deployment,'' ``identified'' ``an exit strategy for ending 
deployment,'' and ``ensure[d]'' ``the safety and security of United 
Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States Armed Forces 
will not become targets due to the nature of their rules of 
engagement.'' Mr. Speaker, will any member here present tell me that 
these conditions were met on the night of September 18, as President 
Clinton ordered the military mission to begin? Will any member assert 
that they have been met today?
  The second basis for the Administration's position is an ill-assorted 
claim either that the Administration complied with the so-called War 
Powers Resolution, or that the War Powers Resolution supports the 
President's claimed constitutional authority to invade Haiti, or both. 
Mr. Speaker, as I noted before, I, together with all previous 
Administrations since its enactment, have regarded the War Powers 
Resolution as an unconstitutional, ill-conceived nullity; but even if I 
regarded it as the Ark of the Covenant, I would not argue that Congress 
could by statute amend the Constitution--particularly where the 
``amendment'' in question is supported to augment the President's 
constitutional authority to act without Congress, and particularly 
where the statute in question expressly recites that it is ``not 
intended to alter the constitutional authority of the * * * 
President,'' or to be ``construed as granting any authority to the 
President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' As to the 
Administration's claims to have complied with the War Powers 
Resolution, even if they were true, they would not answer the broader 
question whether the Administration complied with the Constitution--a 
considerably more venerable and binding document.
  Finally, the Justice Department tells us that the declaration of war 
clause does not require prior congressional authorization for the use 
of force authorized and commenced by President Clinton on that Sunday 
night--the forcible invasion of Haiti. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because we had 
the permission of the legitimate government, Mr. Aristide, and because 
the nature, scope, and duration of the deployment were not consistent 
with its being a war. The Department then cites a long series of U.S. 
military occupations of other countries, neglecting the fact that the 
cited examples were either uncontested, or for the protection of U.S. 
lives or property, or--in the case of the Philippines in 1989--involved 
genuinely minor and genuinely temporary commitments of forces, and 
exigencies of timing that made even consultation with Congress 
impracticable. The Department ends with the tautology that ```war' does 
not exist * * * in circumstances in which the nature, scope, and 
duration of the deployment are such that the use of force involved does 
not rise to the level of `war.''' Now, Mr. Speaker, I don't wish to be 
unfair to the administration's reasoning; there will be cases in which 
there is a genuine difficulty in drawing the line between uses of force 
that are so small-scale, temporary, riskless, and exigent--like the 
Philippines in 1989--that they genuinely do not rise to the level of 
warfare in the constitutional sense, and those which do. But a 
contested invasion of Haiti, involving 20,000 U.S. troops, does not 
seem to me to be one of them. And I am genuinely uncomfortable with the 
argument that the declaration of war clause does not apply to small, 
``easy'' wars. The exceptions to the declaration of war clause all turn 
on circumstances that the Framers, and every President since then, 
understood made congressional action impractical or unnecessary--like 
secrecy or self-defense. Congress cannot debate a secret mission and 
have it remain secret; defense of U.S. military and civilian personnel 
cannot await legislative action in Washington. None of these 
circumstances were present in the case of Haiti. In 1991 the Bush 
Administration found time for a vote in the midst of much more 
extensive preparations to attack a far stronger enemy. The Clinton 
administration has orchestrated a military buildup that has allowed 
time for the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of 
American States to vote on an invasion; and President Clinton thought 
it worthwhile to secure their approval--but not the approval of the 
Congress of the United States. The Senate has had time to hold seven 
votes concerning Haiti--but neither the House nor the Senate were 
allowed to hold the one vote that matters, on whether to authorize an 
invasion or occupation. Only now, when we have already embarked on the 
mission, are we allowed to debate it after the fact.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a travesty. The Democratic leadership of both 
the House and Senate shouted themselves hoarse in 1991 demanding a vote 
on Desert Storm, an operation supported by a clear majority of the 
American people. Vice President Gore, then a U.S. Senator, said that, 
and I quote, ``[t]he plain sense of our Constitution, supported by the 
full weight of history and jurisprudence, is that the President was 
never meant to have the power to order this Nation into war; that power 
was vested in the Congress after the most careful deliberation by our 
Founders for reasons that are as valid now as they were then.'' Leon 
Panetta, now President Clinton's Chief of Staff, joined a lawsuit 
seeking to prevent Desert Storm. Majority Leader Gephardt threatened to 
cut off funding for our troops if President Bush began Desert Storm 
without congressional authorization. Majority Leader Mitchell said 
that, and I quote, ``[o]ur firm view is that the President has no legal 
authority, none whatsoever, to commit American troops to war in the 
Persian Gulf or anywhere else'' without congressional authorization. 
What a difference a few years makes. Speaker Foley said last month that 
he agreed with President Clinton that there is no constitutional 
requirement for an authorizing vote on possible military action in 
Haiti; and Majority Leader Mitchell agreed.
  Mr. Speaker, this constitutional requirement is not an 18th century 
formality. It is designed, among other things, as a safeguard for our 
troops, so that they will not be required to make bloody sacrifices for 
causes that ultimately do not command the support of the American 
people. Desert Storm, for which we voted, was unlikely from the outset 
to be such a cause. But if ever there were a need for a popular 
mandate, it is now. Yet President Clinton has failed--utterly failed--
to persuade the American people or the Congress that this occupation is 
necessary or prudent. American troops are being inserted into one of 
the most unstable, violence-racked nations in the world--another 
Somalia, though with a longer, somewhat more tortured history. Why 
should we suppose that the public or Congress will have more stomach 
for American casualties here than they did in Somalia, or Lebanon? The 
Framers knew that a congressional debate would be an essential part of 
building public support for military action, and that where Congress 
had been in on the take-off of a military action it would be far more 
likely that they would stay the course. President Clinton, the ex-
Vietnam protester, should understand that. But he was not willing, over 
the last many months, to invest the effort needed to even try to build 
public support for his policy. As a result his Haiti policy has a hair-
trigger: any incident, any loss of Haitian or American life, could 
result overnight in the abandonment of the mission. Mr. Speaker, that 
is not fair to our troops. It is unfair to ask them to risk their 
lives, to make enormous personal sacrifices, for a mission that could 
be aborted overnight--as the Somalia mission was. Our soldiers are 
willing to lay down their lives at their Commander-in-Chief's 
direction. The American people and the Congress will understand and 
accept large sacrifices when they have been given the case for them; 
our history, including our recent history, proves that they and we will 
err on the President's side in every case where he has taken the effort 
to build support and make the case for his policies. That is not much 
to ask from the President. He has had two years to do it. And two weeks 
ago he decided to start doing it. That is not worthy of our troops, and 
it is unworthy of the office of the Presidency.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. McDermott). All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand a recorded 
vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 27, 
noes 398, answer ``present'', not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 499]

                                AYES--27

     Ackerman
     Cantwell
     Clement
     Deutsch
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Gephardt
     Hamilton
     Kaptur
     Kleczka
     Kopetski
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     McDermott
     Menendez
     Minge
     Neal (MA)
     Pallone
     Penny
     Richardson
     Rostenkowski
     Sanders
     Sharp
     Skaggs
     Stupak
     Synar
     Torricelli
     Williams

                               NOES--398

     Abercrombie
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Grandy
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Myers
     Nadler
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stump
     Swett
     Swift
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Applegate
     Fish
     Gallo
     Huffington
     Inhofe
     Lewis (FL)
     Ravenel
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Slattery
     Smith (OR)
     Sundquist
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  0047

  Mr. COSTELLO and Mr. LaFALCE changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Mr. McDERMOTT changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, although on the floor for vote on rollcall 
498, I neglected to vote, I had spoken against the Dellums-Murtha 
amendment, so, obviously, I would have voted no.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. McDermott). Under the rule, the 
Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the 
chair, Mr. McDermott, Chairman pro tempore, of the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, 
having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.R. Res. 416) 
providing limited authorization for the participation of United States 
Armed Forces in the multinational force in Haiti and providing for the 
prompt withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Haiti, pursuant to 
House Resolution 570 he reported the joint resolution back to the House 
with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

                              {time}  0050

  The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of 
the joint resolution, as amended.
  The joint resolution, as amended, was ordered to be engrossed and 
read a third time, and was read the third time.
  The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the joint resolution, 
as amended.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were ayes 236, 
noes 182, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 500]

                               AYES--236

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Bacchus (FL)
     Barca
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lehman
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     McCloskey
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Walsh
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--182

     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Chapman
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Grandy
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manzullo
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Sanders
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skaggs
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Swett
     Talent
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torricelli
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Weldon
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                        ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1

     Owens
       
       

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Applegate
     Fish
     Ford (MI)
     Gallo
     Huffington
     Inhofe
     Lewis (FL)
     Pelosi
     Ravenel
     Shaw
     Slattery
     Smith (OR)
     Sundquist
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  0107

  The Clerk announced the following pairs:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Slattery for, with Mr. Smith of Oregon against.

  Mr. POMEROY changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  So the joint resolution was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table

                          ____________________