[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
    LIMITED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES-LED FORCE IN HAITI 
                               RESOLUTION

  The Committee resumed its sitting.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Gunderson].
  (Mr. GUNDERSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman and Members, I think there are two 
obvious conclusions that ought to begin any discussions of a resolution 
here this afternoon, and the first is Haiti is not the enemy. We are 
not at war with Haiti, my colleagues; let us understand that; and, 
second, let us understand that the Congress ought to never control the 
conduct of foreign policy when military hostilities are involved. 
However, my colleagues, I say, when you take those two premises, you 
quickly, I think, come to some conclusions based on experience, and I 
would invite every one of my colleagues, especially my colleagues on 
the Democratic side of the aisle, to think back to how we handled the 
whole situation in Central America during the early 1980's. Now we did 
not have troops in a hostile situation there either, but what did we 
do? We authorized American commitments for a certain period of time, 
and then each time as we neared that date of expiraiton, we came back 
and considered where we were at and what we should do from this point 
forward.
  I have to tell my colleagues in all honesty that I am not excited 
about any of these three resolutions, and anybody who wonders whether 
Congress ought to conduct foreign policy ought to read all three of 
them, and they will come to the conclusion that we should not. But that 
does not give us an answer; does it? So then let us look at the 
resolutions and understand what they do.

  The Michel resolution says that we should not have occupied Haiti, we 
should immediately begin orderly withdrawal, and if we have not 
completely withdrawn by January 3, 1995, a resolution will 
automatically be introduced to consider withdrawal within 30 days.
  The Dellums-Murtha resolution is simply a sense of Congress 
supporting prompt and orderly withdrawal. So it is a sense of Congress 
that means nothing, and makes us feel good, covers us back home, and 
asks the President, if it is convenient for him, to report to us on a 
monthly basis.
  The third resolution, the Torricelli-Hamilton resolution, authorizes 
troops until March 1, 1995, and so we are now ex post facto authorizing 
troops, and we are putting a limit on the authorization. Sounds good. I 
was all excited and thought I was going to vote for the Hamilton-
Torricelli resolution, and then I read further, and it says, ``But if 
the President decides he wants to keep the troops longer, later, 
because of national interests, he can do that.''
  So it does not mean anything at all. It is not a limited 
authorization. It just says, ``Feel good. We are going to sanctify what 
the President has done, and we are going to give him the automatic 
carte blanche to do that.''
  So, Mr. Chairman, I say to my colleagues, if you have concerns about 
Haiti, and I think every one of us does, and if you are looking for a 
way in which Congress can have the constitutional authority we have to 
review our role, the earliest and best opportunity to do that is with 
the Michel resolution. I'm not here to tell you the Michel resolution 
is proper public policy, but I'm here to tell you it is the best of the 
three alternatives before us this evening, and so I encourage you to 
give it your support.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Florida [Mrs. Meek].
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I have listened very intently at 
the debate this afternoon. I rise to support the Torricelli-Dellums-
Murtha-Hastings amendment, and I want to say that people do not seem to 
understand, for some reason, that the President of the United States, 
President Clinton, is in no way obligated to seek their formal 
approval. He does not need their authority to go and invade Haiti.
  We are not at war with Haiti. If Congress wants war with Haiti, they 
have to declare war with Haiti. The President has not done that.
  So, Mr. Chairman, there is no real reason for us to stay here all 
afternoon debating whether or not we should be in Haiti. The fact is we 
are in there, and we are in there, and now that we are in there, Mr. 
Chairman, we must do something.
  I have been to Guantanamo. I have gone to the hospital ship Comfort. 
I have seen our military men with the sensitivity and the feeling to 
collar the young starving babies that come off the ships from Haiti. I 
have seen our military there. We must support them. We must undergird 
them. We cannot come here every day with a lot of pious platitudes and 
never say to our military people, we support the kind of action you're 
doing in Haiti. We know you're not at war. You are there trying to keep 
the peace if we will let you.

                              {time}  1800

  You are doing your very best, and we salute that. Our military 
personnel need a pat on the back. We must support the Dellums-Hastings-
Murtha amendment. We must defeat the Michel substitute. Who has a time 
clock and who knows how to assess how long it is going to take to do 
what needs to be done in Haiti? The President of this country is 
authorized to do that. Congress is not. So we must look at those 
things.
  I want to also say, why do we ask other people? Some of us really do 
not have the sense of humanity that we need to respond selectively, Mr. 
Chairman, and differently to suffering people, when the people involved 
are not people who look exactly like you. We are all akin to the 
holocaust victims; we are akin to the Arabs on the West Bank; we are 
akin to the Moslems in Bosnia and Serbia; to the Catholics and 
Protestants in Ireland; and to the victims of tribal atrocities in 
Rwanda.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not think everyone is fit to contribute to the 
policy making in this global village. This Congress has to get with it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Molinari].
  Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, today we finally debate an issue that should have been 
brought to congressional attention and to the attention of the American 
people before September 19, that is, before we sent one American 
soldier to Haiti.
  Nonetheless, we stand here tonight instead to debate three very 
different options for action. No. 1, the Dellums bill. It says that our 
troops should stay as long as the President deems possible. No. 2, the 
Torricelli resolution says that our troops are authorized through March 
1, 1995.
  Only the third resolution, the Michel-Gilman resolution, demands that 
the President withdraw our troops immediately. And for those of us who 
did not support the President's decision to send forces into Haiti 
without a stated mission or without an exit strategy, we will not 
praise that decision now.
  Only the Michel-Gilman resolution makes that clear. So I ask my 
colleagues, why are we waiting until March 1, 1995 to bring our forces 
home? Will someone tell us what will change? What are we waiting for? 
What are we hoping for? An economic resurgence? A stable 
infrastructure? A citizenry totally embracing democracy? And if that 
does not occur by March 1, then what?
  We wait a little longer.
  No. On October 15, Cedras says he will be deposed and Aristide will 
return. We can and we should do absolutely no more. Because every day 
we have our troops in Haiti waiting for some sign, they are in danger. 
And they are not really sure why either. In a recent expose by the New 
York Post, a journalist detailed the marines' uneasiness at their role, 
and told of their inability and frustration to tell the good guys from 
the bad. He wondered out loud, I am still trying to figure out my 
mission over here. Did I join the Marine Corps, or did I join the Peace 
Corps?
  Which brings us to another critical decision between the resolutions. 
Only the Michel-Gilman resolution demands that U.S. troops under all 
circumstances remain under U.S. control.
  Have we not learned our lessons from Somalia, where our forces were 
asked to become part of a U.N.-led peackeeping effort? Have we not 
learned from watching the daily disasters in Bosia that U.N. 
peacekeepers are placed in untenable situations? Only the Michel-Gilman 
resolution says loudly, not our troops.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Michel-Gilman resolution. The 
White House has yet to tell us why we are in Haiti; the sponsors of the 
other resolutions have yet to tell us what we are waiting for; and our 
troops have yet to know just what their role is and is to be.
  Mr. Chairman, let us bring them home, let us salute their courage, 
let us thank them for their sacrifice, let us praise them. But let us 
bring them home.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Rhode Island [Mr. Reed].
  Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Michel 
amendment and in support of the Dellums-Murtha amendment. No one in the 
Democratic Caucus has been more persistent in warning of the pitfalls 
involved in Haiti.
  But today we come to an issue which we must judge given the realities 
as they exist today. The first reality is that we do have a national 
security interest in operations within Haiti, and that interest is to 
prevent the uncontrolled immigration of people into the United States.
  I ask those people who strongly urge that we immediately withdraw, 
what will that do to our ability to control our borders and prevent the 
exodus of frustrated, bewildered, and perhaps terrorized Haitians? I 
would suggest if we leave precipitously, they will cling to our ships, 
hang on to the skids of our helicopters, they will leave there as fast 
as possible, and that national security interest we undercut by the 
Michel amendment.
  We also have a second security interest, a noble interest, supporting 
democracy. That was an interest recognized by everyone in this Chamber. 
It was recognized by the Republicans when they advanced the Goss 
proposal in May of this year, which called upon us to contribute to the 
long-term democratic stability of Haiti. That still is an interest.
  But the real reality we face today is the reality that we have 
American troops on the ground. One of the greatest privileges of my 
life was to command paratroopers in the 82d Airborne Division. When I 
saw those young men getting ready to go on those planes, my heart went 
out to them. I was relieved physically when those planes were turned 
around, and I know those young men probably said they wanted to go into 
a fight, but that is the bravado of youth.
  We averted a major military operation through the peaceful 
intervention of our forces into Haiti, but there are still American 
soldiers on the ground. The Michel proposal would undercut their 
ability to control tactically their environment, because when they ask 
local Haitians for help, for intelligence, for support, they would be 
responded to by, ``Why? You are leaving immediately, if not sooner.'' 
When they looked into a crowd, they would not sense that they had 
control, but rather that that crowd knew that next day there would be 
fewer and fewer and fewer Americans.
  In every military operations, Grenada, Panama, we have stood by our 
troops. We must stand by them today. Reject the Michel amendment, 
support the Dellums-Murtha amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Spence], the distinguished ranking Republican on 
the Committee on Armed Services.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the administration's 
Haitian policy.
  As we enter the third week of the United States military occupation 
of Haiti, it is becoming increasingly clear that United States combat 
troops are the wrong instrument to use in trying to invigorate whatever 
few elements of Democracy exist in Haiti.
  Yes; we will succeed in facilitating the return of President 
Aristide. And if that was the extent of our mission, we could bring all 
of our troops home starting next week.
  But the administration plan goes beyond merely returning Aristide to 
power--it will have U.S. troops serving as his protectors and palace 
guard for the remainder of his Presidential term.
  Mr. Chairman, this policy is deeply flawed.
  U.S. troops on the ground today are performing a difficult mission 
with the valor and competence that we have come to expect from our fine 
young men and women in uniform. But, they have been placed in the midst 
of a political mine field with no discernible military misison--just a 
political one.
  Establishing democracy in Haiti is a worthy objective, but in the 
final analysis, it can only be achieved by the Haitians themselves and 
not at the gun point of our occupation force.
  Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is my belief that the President made a 
grave mistake in sending United States forces to Haiti in the first 
place.
  But since he already crossed that line in spite of overwhelming 
congressional and public opposition, we must now focus on securing the 
immediate and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces 
from Haiti.
  Later in this debate we will consider three different resolutions 
addressing the question of how long United States forces should remain 
in Haiti and under what conditions.
  I believe the withdrawal should start immediately, but that debate 
lies ahead.
  At that time, I want to raise two issues of critical importance to 
the integrity and safety of our military forces--the difficulties of 
operating under U.N. command and the readiness implications of 
overcommitting our military forces around the world.
  Mr. Chairman, the administration would have us believe that our 
troops will be withdrawn in a matter of months at which time this 
entire mess will be handed over to the United Nations.
  In reality, when, and if the United States is able to hand off this 
operation to the United Nations, a transition we all ought to be 
skeptical of, the follow-on operation will essentially be a U.S. 
operation in all but name.
  This is the same sequence that we followed in Somalia--the United 
States goes in strong, stabilizes the situation, and then hands off to 
the United Nations. But just like in Somalia, the reality in Haiti will 
be that this handoff will simply be to ourselves. That is, the United 
States will be handing off to a so-called U.N. force that is 
principally comprised of American Forces. And, like in Somalia, it will 
be the United States component of this U.N. force that will be expected 
to continue doing the heavy lifting of providing security, logistics, 
intelligence, and, I suspect, nation building. Even though we assert 
that United States troops will not be nation building in Haiti, that is 
exactly the course we are already embarked upon.

  This means that the operation will change from a U.S. Force of 20,000 
troops with the capability to deal with most any security threat the 
Haitians could muster, to a dramatically reduced U.N. force of 6,000 
troops under U.N. command. Other than the American contingent of this 
U.N. force, the additional forces will be comprised of a patchwork of 
nations chosen more for political and diplomatic symbolism than for 
fighting or peacekeekping effectiveness.
  Mr. Chairman, we are repeating history only 1 year after that tragic 
weekend firefight in Mogadishu. We paid for our policy mistakes in 
Somalia with the blood of our troops.
  We should be smart enough not to allow United States Forces to be 
placed under a United Nations force commander, even if the U.N. agrees 
to make this officer an American.
  Such an arrangement may appear politically attractive, but as we 
found in Somalia, it creates dual chains of command that guarantee 
confusion, dissention and wastes precious time in making critical 
tactical decisions in the heat of battle.
  There is no reason why the United Nations and the international 
community cannot take the entire nation building operation from the 
United States in Haiti, As the largest financial contributor to the 
United Nations, United States taxpayers will still pick up the tab on 
at least 32 percent of the cost of rebuilding Haiti under any scenario. 
But we shouldn't ask our constituents to place thousands of their sons 
and daughters under the pale blue flag of the United Nations and run 
the risk of repeating the mistakes of Somalia once again.
  Mr. Chairman, the other point that deserves mention is that United 
States Forces have been deployed to Haiti at a time when our military 
forces are already stretched beyond the breaking point. They are not on 
the edge, but instead, our forces have started to fall of the cliff and 
readiness is beginning to suffer to an extent we collectively vowed, 
after the 1970's, never to repeat again.
  While the administration has indicated it intends to seek a 
supplemental appropriation to offset the costs of the Haiti operation, 
it is unclear when such a supplemental would be approved, and whether 
it will fully compensate the services for the billion of dollars that 
Haiti is bound to cost the Department of Defense.
  Beyond the fiscal costs, this administration's fondness for peace 
operations is straining a military force structure that has been 
significantly reduced due to the Clinton budget cuts.
  In simple terms--resources are down but commitments are up. Let me 
cite some specific examples of the problem. In the Marine Corps, due to 
funding shortages, 7 East Coast aircraft squadrons were grounded for 
the month of September.
  For instance, one Marine Corps aircraft squadron based in North 
Carolina usually flies 476 hours a month to maintain operational 
proficiency. Last month it flew zero hours.
  In the Navy, 162 aircraft from active flying units have been put in 
giant ziplock bags because we do not have the money to fly them.
  In the Army, entire divisions are starting to report reduced 
readiness ratings, indicating a reduced ability to go to war.
  The Air Force is facing similar problems as recently demonstrated to 
Secretary Perry during his trip through Germany.
  Mr. Chairman, I could go on in greater detail on this issue and I 
will at another time.
  But the point is that this was the grim readiness picture of our 
forces before the administration decided to send over 20,000 troops on 
another peacekeeping adventure in Haiti. Every day the situation 
worsens.
  Beyond the simple dollar costs, there are human, operational and 
training costs that cannot be recouped by supplemental appropriations. 
Before our eyes we are witnessing a steady decline in the operational 
readiness of our forces to carry out their primary mission of fighting 
and winning wars in defense of American national interests.
  Mr. Chairman, in a few days, we will leave Washington for our 
respective home States and leave the fate of United States operations 
in Haiti in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, Bill Clinton. That 
should give all Americans cause for concern. The debate today may or 
may not, influence where we are in Haiti when the 104th Congress 
convenes next year, but we must take this opportunity to voice our loud 
and determined opposition to the administration's plan to maintain 
United States Forces in Haiti, under U.N. command, through at least 
1996.
  Let us bring our men and women in uniform home now, their job in 
Haiti is done.

                              {time}  1810

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from Connecticut [Mrs. Kennelly].
  (Mrs. KENNELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, not long ago, this Chamber debated its 
authority in foreign policy and the United States role in Haiti. Prior 
to the agreement by President Carter and General Powell, many Members 
on both sides of the aisle called for congressional approval of 
intervention if the President deployed troops for the purposes of 
military engagement. Fortunately, the agreement reached avoided the 
need for an invasion. And no one described it better than General 
Powell. We avoided seeing young Haitians killing young Americans and 
young Americans killing young Haitians. In times of crises, many often 
argue that congressional debate can lead to procrastination, delay, and 
diffusion of American purpose. Many question the Constitution and where 
authority lies to call for military action. While past experience has 
dictated this authority lies with the President, it is the 
responsibility of Congress to debate, to air reservations and concerns, 
and to express approval or disapproval. It is our responsibility as an 
institution and it is our responsibility to the American people.

  Now we all support our troops and their mission, and while we all 
hope for stability and peace in Haiti, this mission must continue to be 
clearly defined. The current situation is still extremely tense and the 
role of United States troops is still questioned by both the American 
public and the Haitian people.
  The demands on our troops appear to be growing since their successful 
landing. If our troops are to be effective, specific objectives must be 
set for our operation in Haiti while the United States maintains its 
presence. Our policy must be clear and consistent. The role of our 
Forces spelled out, stabilization brought about, and an orderly 
transfer of authority must be among our goals. We must do this as 
swiftly and effectively as possible and in the meantime we commend our 
troops for a flawless landing and for giving hope to the Haitians who 
have been unbelievably mistreated--we heard about the brutality these 
people suffered but now we have seen it. This horrible mistreatment 
must be stopped and our military returned to our own shores knowing 
they have ended a human nightmare.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kansas [Mr. Roberts].
  (Mr. ROBERTS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  My colleagues, two reference points:
  First, this past Monday, retired Army Lt. Col. Larry E. Joyce 
observed the 1-year anniversary of the loss of his son, James Casey 
Joyce, who was killed in Somalia. Colonel Joyce reflected upon the loss 
of his son and the 44 members of the Armed Forces who died in Somalia 
and expressed and reminded the Nation of the terrible price we pay when 
brave men and women in uniform are sent to enforce what he called ``an 
invalid foreign policy.'' That policy decision ended in a military 
debacle that cost 18 Rangers their lives and resulted in a policy of 
negotiation and eventual withdrawal. So today, while General Aidid is 
still in control, it is warlord repression as usual. And the question 
must be asked for what did our Rangers die?
  Reference point No. 2: As we debate these resolutions, we should all 
be reminded of the advice of former Senator Richard Russell, the 
Georgia Democrat who was chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee during the Vietnam war.
  He said,

       I shall never knowingly support a policy of sending even a 
     single American serviceman to risk his life unless the entire 
     population and wealth of our country, all that we have and 
     all that we are, is to bear a commensurate responsibility in 
     giving him the fullest support and protection of which we are 
     capable.

  The fatal error is not in setting dates for withdrawal or trying to 
cut our losses when things go wrong but incurring them at all in places 
that do not involve our fundamental interests.
  The basic error that has been and is being made by this 
administration is the misuse of the American military. Too many times 
our Armed Forces, our men and women in uniform are being asked to be 
policemen or social workers distributing welfare and assistance to 
victims of failed political and social orders all throughout the world.
  I do not mean to argue we cannot do that. But the point is, using our 
military for those means is misusing the military. And it is more 
fundamental than that.
  Part of the Ranger creed is that they take care of their own. The 
motto of our U.S. Marine Corps is Semper Fidelis, always faithful. We 
Marines are told that if we are pinned down, we are part of the 
greatest fighting force in the history of the world. And if any Marine 
gets into trouble, we will send in the squad, the platoon, the company, 
the regiment, the division and, if necessary, the whole damn Marine 
Corps. And we have never been stopped yet.
  Some would say that these days of commitment are gone, that we face 
new challenges. Things have changed. I think the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums], referred to that.
  The rules of military engagement and the value of each American life 
have not changed. We do not commit American men and women to possible 
combat situations where the military mission is not clear and where 
there is no specific mission.
  Our former Marine Commandant, Al Grey, was fond of saying every 
Marine was a warrior in defense of his country. Not today. No, not 
today.
  Today our military have become peacekeepers, traffic cops and social 
workers in an effort to restore democracy where none has existed. And 
until the first member of the American military dies in yet another 
nonmilitary mission, let us not let that happen. Before that happens, 
let us bring them home.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton].

                              {time}  1820

  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Dellums amendment 
to leave Haiti as soon as responsibly possible. It is the only position 
consistent with our role in the world today.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate has been about something that has never 
happened. There is no war or invasion, such as in the Persian Gulf, 
where the President came and asked our permission, or Grenada and 
Panama, where he did not. Our troops went in after an agreement that 
averted war and invasion had taken place. They are embarked on a 
peacekeeping mission which has no resemblance to war or invasion.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been amused to watch Members in role reversal 
tonight Members who have urged, pressed, and insisted upon military 
action in the past are now playing the roles of doves and 
isolationists, using the very language that they have criticized in 
others.
  It appears that their views turn not on the mission, but on who is 
Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, they feed the notion that the problem 
with this mission is that the country that is benefiting is Haiti. Many 
of those most critical of this benign peacekeeping mission would sign 
on today to a full-scale invasion of Cuba. For them oppression is not 
oppression unless the oppressors are communists, even if there is no 
difference in the atrocities that are committed.
  There is really only one question before the body, Mr. Chairman. That 
is, whether there is a sufficient national interest for our troops to 
remain until the earliest date they can responsibly pull out. Is it in 
our national interest to uphold our agreements? Is it in our national 
interests to control our borders? Let us ask the people of Florida 
about that one. Is it in our national interest to promote democracy and 
stop terrorism a few hundred miles off our shores?

  Haiti is in our sphere of influence, whether we like it or not. There 
is no way to turn our heads on that without ceding our role as a world 
power.
  Those who define our national interest only in military terms have to 
tell me what we were doing in the Persian Gulf. There was no country 
there that, as such, was a threat to the United States of America.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate is irrelevant because the mission is 
already winding down. The Caribbean troops are in. Democracy is already 
at work. An amnesty already has been enacted. The date for the return 
of President Aristide has been announced as October 15. The Haitian 
people's response to our troops has been one of overwhelming gratitude.
  To leave precipitously or on a date certain invites the antidemocrats 
to bide their time. It gives the enemies a time frame to plan a violent 
counterrevolution to the nonviolent change now taking place. It has no 
relation to the work that needs to be accomplished, And it risks 
wasting all we have put into this mission by pulling out, leaving more, 
not less, chaos.
  Mr. Chairman. A great power does not cut and run from a mere 
peacekeeping mission.
  Before this mission began, the question was asked: What would success 
look like? Turn on your television tonight, look at the relationship 
between our troops and the Haitian people, and you will see.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 30 seconds to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, Desert Storm was not a threat to 
anybody? An invasion of another country, stole nuclear triggers out of 
San Diego, developed nuclear weapons, controlled and wanted to control 
the energy sources of two-thirds of the value in the world, and that 
was not a threat? I am glad the gentlewoman is not controlling our 
military.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  (Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, 
Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. Chairman, let me just say, first of all, that we do care about 
our troops in Haiti and that we want them brought home safely. Because 
we want our troops out quickly does not mean we are not concerned about 
their safety.
  I have a good friend, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] 
who is one of the sponsors of this resolution. I think he is a 
dedicated servant of the people. I value his friendship.
  However, I do believe this legislation is open-ended. It gives the 
President the ability to keep our troops there indefinitely. We do not 
think that is in order.
  We did not send our troops there. The Congress did not send our 
troops there. The American people did not want them there. The 
President did it by himself, and everybody in this Chamber knows it.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this was done largely for political reasons. 
Why do I say that? Let me read to you what Dante Caputo, the former 
special U.N. Envoy to Haiti, who resigned the day after the invasion, 
had to say.
  In a memo to the U.N. Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he 
said ``The President of the United States' main advisors are of the 
opinion that not only does this option constitute the lesser evil, but 
that it is politically desirable.'' They wanted the troops in there 
just before the election because they thought it would improve the 
President's numbers and his party's numbers and help them in the 
elections this fall.
  Mr. Caputo went on to say, ``The United States acted as a brake to a 
diplomatic solution, creating a situation where intervention became 
nearly inevitable.'' What he was saying was that there was a diplomatic 
solution that could have been reached, but the President and his 
administration deliberately put the brakes on diplomatic negotiations 
because he wanted the troops to go in there for political reasons.
  That is unforgivable, because young Americans' lives are at risk 
unnecessarily, because we could have solved this diplomatically.
  Mr. Chairman, when people start talking about the illegal aliens 
coming across the water and coming into the country, fleeing 
oppression, we have a much bigger problem with Mexico. We are getting 
over 1 million people a year coming in from there. If we are going to 
divert resources to protect our borders, that would be the first place.
  If we used the Coast Guard down in the Caribbean, we could solve the 
problem, so that is a red herring, saying that we cannot protect our 
borders. We can if we wanted to use the facilities available to us.
  Let us talk about Mr. Aristide. Mr. Aristide, according to a drug 
cartel informant, got a sack full of money from the drug cartel to 
bring drugs through Haiti. In addition to that, this man we want to put 
in, who is no lover of democracy, believes in putting tires around 
people's necks, filling them with gasoline, and burning them to death.
  We have his speeches. We have his speeches where he advocates that 
sort of thing. We are risking American lives to put this man in power? 
He is a person who was kicked out of his religious order because he 
incited riots in Haiti, and yet we are risking American lives to keep 
this man in power.
  Mr. Chairman, this was done for political purposes by the Clinton 
administration, in my view. It was done to put this man back in power 
who is no lover of human rights or democracy. We are endangering 
Americans' lives unnecessarily. It is not in our national interest to 
do so, and we should bring our troops home immediately, as quickly as 
possible, at the same time ensuring their safety as we get them out of 
there.
  If we had a grave national interest I would say keep them down there, 
but there is no national interest. It is only political posturing by 
this administration, and it has backfired on them, because the American 
people know what they are doing. They are going to show their 
disapproval of this administration, of what they have done, on November 
8.
  Many of my colleagues on that side of the aisle know what is going to 
happen and they see it in the cards. Mr. Clinton made a big, big 
mistake. Let us not cost young American lives because he had this 
political goal in mind. young Americans' lives should not be risked for 
a political goal.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Lewis], the distinguished deputy majority whip.
  Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to speak in favor of 
the Dellums-Hastings-Murtha amendment. Our mission in Haiti, the 
mission of our young men and women in uniform, is not a charge of war 
but a declaration of peace, an affirmation of our belief in human 
rights, democracy and self-determination. Let us not pull the rug out 
from under the feet of our troops.
  We are there, in Haiti, to restore democracy, to renew freedom, to 
revive hope for the people of that small and desperate country. We have 
been summoned by the spirit of history to do what we can, to do what we 
must, to do what is right.
  Whether you agree or disagree with our policy, now is the time to 
stand with our troops, to support them, to give them the freedom they 
need to accomplish their mission of peace. It is unthinkable, unheard 
of, to tie the hands or our men and women in uniform when they could be 
in harms way. Let us not, let us not for one moment, dictate 
disengagement from Washington when our troops are engaged in 
peacemaking so close to home.
  The young men and women of the United States Armed Forces are 
fighting for the destiny of democracy. They are responding not to the 
battlecry of war but to the gasping calls of a people yearning for 
peace, freedom, hope, and democracy.
  We are not there, we are not there in Haiti to conquer, but to 
liberate. Not to destroy, but to build. Not to divide, but to bring 
together. Not to enslave, but to set free. Not to make war, but to make 
peace.
  Let us make peace. Let us not dictate to our military, our very able 
people there on the ground, when we should leave. We all want to leave 
Haiti as soon as possible, but let us leave when the time is right, 
when the atmosphere is right, when our job in done, when there is a 
true, real, and just peace.
  Mr. Chairman, I said back in 1963, on the steps of the Lincoln 
Memorial during the original march on Washington in which Martin Luther 
King, Jr. made his famous ``I have a dream'' speech: ``One man, one 
vote, that is the African cry, that is our cry today.'' And so, Mr. 
Chairman, that is the cry of the people of Haiti today, more than 30 
years later. As President Nelson Mandela told us here in this Chamber 
today, the cry for freedom has been heard in South Africa, so must it 
be heard in Haiti, right here in our hemisphere.
  We should be proud of our troops. We should support them on their 
mission. We should support the Dellums-Hastings-Murtha amendment.

                              {time}  1830

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Mica].
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I would not believe it unless I heard it with 
my own ears just last night. I heard our Secretary of Defense, William 
Perry, get on television and he said, ``We've done great things in 
Haiti.'' He said, ``The parliament has met.''
  Well, Mr. Secretary, the parliament met, but it met behind barbed 
wire, it met under armed guard, and it met with the force of 20,000 
American troops. And it met to consider a reprieve for murderers.
  Then he said the mayor of Port-au-Prince has returned, as if it was 
some triumphant return. He did not tell you that they had not 
confiscated all the grenades, they had confiscated some of the guns but 
they had not confiscated the grenades, and one was lobbed into a crowd 
and people were killed. What is going to happen when our troops leave?
  Then I heard him say the head of the feared police fled, and we have 
established a peace there.
  When the parade of October 15 comes and Mr. Aristide is hoisted to 
shoulders of his countrymen and there is a great parade and 
celebration, something will be lacking in that country, and something 
that we have created will exist in that country. That is going to be 
bitterness and that is also going to be something that existed in that 
country before we went there, and that is social and civil problems 
that we will not resolve even sending 100,000 American troops and 
sending billions and billions of hard-earned American taxpayers dollars 
to that nation.
  Maybe, my colleagues, we should have sent 20,000 businesspeople 
instead of 20,000 troops. Maybe we could have done more for Haiti's 
poor. The problems of Haiti's poor are no different that America's 
poor. What they need are jobs and good education and opportunity. 
Actually by that formula, we could have done much more to raise the 
standard and the tide in this poor country than by the steps we have 
taken and the steps we are about to condone here.
  Unfortunately, the other side and the liberals just do not get it. 
They will spend more money, they will put lives at risk, and where will 
we be? We will be right where we are today. We will be right where we 
are with Somalia. We will have a disaster on our hands and the American 
taxpayers will be the recipient of the large bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], my 
good colleague, for his tremendous work on this issue. He is to be 
congratulated for offering to this House and to the American people the 
greatest service and commentary relating to this sad situation.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Roemer].
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, nearly a century ago, Daniel Webster said, ``God grants 
liberty only to those who live it and are ready to guard and defend 
it.''
  In 1990 with the election of President Aristide, the Haitians found 
democracy but they were unable to defend it. United States troops are 
now in the process of building democracy and teaching Haitians how to 
protect this fragile freedom. I firmly believe, Mr. Chairman, that 
Haitians must assume this protective role without United States 
personnel and as soon as possible.
  I have carefully read all 3 resolutions and I encourage my colleagues 
to do the same. I believe the words in the Murtha-Dellums resolution 
best reflect a rational and fair foreign policy to both Haitians and 
Americans.
  First, the Murtha-Dellums substitute calls for a prompt and orderly 
withdrawal of all U.S. troops as soon as possible. Our troops must come 
home sooner than March 1.
  Second, it recognizes that the President should have sought the 
approval of Congress prior to sending United States troops to Haiti. I 
have made it clear that I did not support an invasion of Haiti.
  Third, our mission should not be democracy-building. For over 180 
years, the Haitians have been unable to build democracy. We could not 
build it in 19 years of occupation earlier this century.
  In the end, the best United States policy will allow Haitians to be 
vigorous in the defense of their own hard-fought freedom. It is their 
voice, not the voice of a United States Congressman or a United States 
Marine, that must be heard if liberty is again to triumph and endure in 
Haiti.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Knollenberg].
  Mr. KNOLLENBERG. Mr. Chairman, the primary question which is to be 
investigated is when and how we are to withdraw from Haiti. The second 
question is what we shall do in the meantime.
  This statement clearly frames today's debate on the fate of thousands 
of American men and women in Haiti as we speak. However, I must admit 
that it is a borrowed statement. In fact, I borrowed this statement 
directly from the Forbes Commission report of 1930 studying our 
occupation of 1915 to 1934.
  If I may borrow another statement, this is deja vu all over again.
  Yes, we are back in Haiti, trying again to stabilize the nation and 
sow the seeds of democracy. And, yes, the difficulties that we face 
today in this respect are similar to the difficulties we faced back 
then. Simply put, Haiti has no tradition of liberty and democracy.
  I have with me a list I will submit for the Record, a record of the 
fate of every Haitian leader since that nation gained its independence 
in 1804.
  Of the 40 leaders, only a handful have left office peacefully, either 
through retirement or death due to illness or natural causes. The rest 
have not met such kind fates.
  Haitian leaders have been murdered in prison, blown up, poisoned, 
overthrown, and even dismembered. Countless others, including most 
recently, President Aristide, have fled to other countries.
  Haiti does not have the foundations of democracy. Democracy cannot be 
imposed at gunpoint by American troops. Rather, it requires a national 
consensus and political culture, institutions responsible and 
responsive to the people, and an independent judicial system. Merely 
casting votes does not constitute democracy.
  However, our troops are being asked yet again to protect a democracy 
that does not exist. Mission creep has already seen us embarking down 
the slippery slope toward nation-building that proved so tragic in 
Somalia just a year ago.
  Every Member in this Chamber surely supports our troops in Haiti. 
However, many such as myself do not support the policies that have 
placed them there, or that keep them there to carry out an undefined, 
open-ended mission.
  Again, as it was asked in 1930, we must ask today: ``When and how 
should we leave Haiti, and what should we do until then?''
  I ask my colleagues to reject the administration's policy and support 
the Michel amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include for the Record the list of Haitian leaders, 
as follows:

            Next, Please--Haiti's Rulers Since Independence

       Jean-Jacques Dessalines, 1804-06, shot.
       Henri Christophe, 1807-20, suicide.
       Alexandre Petion, 1807-18, died of illness.
       Jean-Pierre Soyer, 1818-43, fled to France.
       Charles Herard, 1843-44, fled.
       Philippe Guerrier, 1844-45, died of old age.
       Jean-Louis Pierrot, 1845-46, unknown.
       Jean-Baptiste Riche, 1846-47, unknown.
       Faustin Soulouque, 1847-59, fled to Jamaica.
       Fabre Geffrard, 1859-67, fled to Jamaica.
       Sylvain Saenave, 1867-69, executed.
       Nissage Saget, 1870-74, retired.
       Michel Dominigue, 1874-76, fled to Jamaica.
       Boisrond Canal, 1876-79, fled to Jamaica.
       E. Felicite Saloman, 1879-88, fled to France.
       F. Florvil Hyppolite, 1889-96, apoplexy.
       Tiresias Simon Sam, 1896-1902, fled.
       Nord Alexis, 1902-08, fled to Jamaica.
       Antoine Simon, 1908-11, fled to Jamaica.
       M. Cincinnatus Leconte, 1911-12, blown up.
       Tancrede Auguste, 1912-13, poisoned.
       Michel Oreste, 1913-14, fled to Jamaica.
       Oreste Zamor, 1914, murdered in jail.
       J. Davilmar Theodore, 1914-15, fled.
       J. Vilbrun Gullaume Sam, 1915, dismembered.
       American occupation, 1915-1934,
       Stanio Vincent, 1930-41, resigned.
       Elie Lescot, 1941-45, fled to Florida.
       Dumarsals Estime, 1946-50, overthrown.
       Paul Magloire, 1950-56, overthrown.
       J. Nemours Pierre-Louis, 1956-57, resigned.
       Franck Sylvain, 1957, overthrown.
       Daniel Fignole, 1957, overthrown.
       Francois Duvalier, 1957-71, died of illness.
       Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1971-86, fled to France.
       Henri Namphy, 1986-88, stepped down.
       Leslie Manigat, 1988, overthrown.
       Henri Namphy, 1988, overthrown.
       Prosper Avril, 1988-90, fled.
       Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, 1990, taken hostage.
       Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 1991, fled to America.
       Cedras Junta, 1991-94(?).
       American occupation, 1994-.
       Taken from: The Economist; September 24, 1994; p. 21.

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Foglietta].
  Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, amidst the gamesmanship that is being 
played to gain political advantage, I urge that we support the men and 
women in our armed forces who are seeking to achieve democracy just 700 
miles from our border. First and foremost, we support the principles 
behind this mission, a return to democracy in Haiti. It is vital to 
stop the brutality of the military regime that overturned the will of 
70 percent of the Haitian people. The rule of the military leaders was 
a reign of terror that included murder of church leaders and Aristide 
backers. Rape, torture and a climate of fear was a means of repression. 
It is within the interests of the United States of America to halt this 
pain in a nation so very close to us. Every day that Cedras, Francois, 
and Biamby ruled the streets of Haiti was another day of embarrassment 
to our Nation, which is the sole remaining world leader. It is 
important that we halt the tyranny which was leading to an unacceptable 
influx of immigrants, when immigration is one of the most compelling 
issues confronting us.
  We believe that we will end this mission as soon as possible, that 
the President will bring back our troops as soon as the job is done, as 
soon as we have finished the job, as soon as is possible.

                              {time}  1840

  It would be wrong to set an arbitrary deadline for withdrawing the 
troops in this mission, and it would set a dangerous precedent for 
future efforts. I can just see, or just hear or imagine the people like 
Cedras, the criminals that they lead hiding up in the hills and saying 
let us just wait until March 1. Then we will go back down, start to 
murder again, start to wound again, start to rape again and take over 
that country again. We cannot let that happen.
  Let us do what is right. These people are our neighbors. They are 
only just a few miles from our shores. They want democracy. They want 
our help. We have read the reports in the papers, ``We love you. Thank 
God you're here. Our prayers have been answered. You've given us 
liberty.''
  Let us continue to support those people in their quest for democracy. 
Let our troops stay there, get the job done, and then get back as soon 
as possible.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham].
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, the President had months to consult 
Congress. He had time to scrap two aircraft carriers and army 
helicopters. He went to Haiti, consulted the United Nations but not the 
United States. He went to Vietnam, to the U.S.S.R., but not the United 
States of America. He avoided Congress and denied men and women the 
protection under the Geneva Convention if there had been a battle, and 
there almost was.
  The President himself denied, along with the Secretary of Defense, 
armor. It cost the lives of 22, not 18, rangers and 77 wounded, and it 
took 5 hours under U.N. control to get them out.
  If Members want to be bipartisan, support Michel-Gilman or even 
support the Dellums-Murtha language. But let us take out the 
partisanship.
  The Hamilton-Torricelli is under a king-of-the-hill, and guess what, 
the last one on the king-of-the-hill praises the President. Let us not 
play Jane Fonda tactics and politics. Let us support our troops, but 
take the politics out of it and support the first Republican one, the 
second, which is a Democratic proposal, and I have no qualms with that. 
But it is a sacrilege to support and say the President did a good job 
in this.
  Day three the President said there was a multinational force that was 
going to invade. On day three there was not a single multinational 
troop in Haiti. When our troops took the risk, there was not a single 
one, and as of yesterday there were on 10. Mr. Chairman, how many are 
we going to have in this multinational force in peacekeeping? How much 
are we going to pay?
  Aristide or Dracula, Cedras or Saddam Hussein, both of them are bad, 
and the exploits of both have been brought up.
  But I would ask when they say there have been no casualties, talk to 
the troops that had the 6 months on cruise and then had to turn around 
and go to Haiti under exercises, and talk to the alleged suicide victim 
who did not have time to take care of his domestic problems so he 
allegedly committed suicide, or talk to the sailor or the soldier that 
had a bullet in his gut sitting in the hospital because he is in Haiti 
and say there are no casualties. That is wrong.
  I would ask Members to support either Michel-Gilman or Dellums-
Murtha. I will support both. But not the political Torricelli and 
Hamilton that praises the President.
  We want to support our troops, absolutely. I think Members on both 
sides of the aisle do. But do not play political football with this. 
Support the troops. It is wrong.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Sawyer].
  Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, I am one who had grave reservations about a 
military invasion on Haiti. But circumstances have changed in short 
time. I was pleased, therefore, by the success of the Carter-Powell-
Nunn mission. It is an opportunity. And I think it would be a mistake 
to squander the opportunity which diplomatic achievement has been given 
us.
  If there is any lesson to draw from the brutal war in former 
Yugoslavia, it is that stopping hostilities once they have started is 
far more difficult than preventing them from beginning in the first 
place. Our troops in Haiti are doing just that--maintaining a secure 
environment so that we prevent another Yugoslavia on our doorstep.
  Haiti's history tells us that transitions of power have proved to be 
difficult periods. This time around, though, the presence of our troops 
is preventing the kind of widespread violence which has proved nearly 
impossible to recover from in the past.
  We are giving democracy a chance in Haiti. That is key to encouraging 
reconciliation in that polarized society, and key to promoting our 
interest in democracy and stability in the Caribbean.
  I still have concerns about our role in Haiti, and I want our troops 
brought home as soon as possible and in a safe manner. However, I am 
certain that it would be a disservice to the men and women who are 
performing admirably in a difficult mission to pull out the rug from 
under their feet. That is precisely what the Michel substitute would 
do.
  Mr. Chairman, no matter what anyone thinks about our involvement in 
Haiti, we should understand that passage of the Michel substitute will 
only serve to embolden those who wish to harm our young men and women 
on the ground.
  Our military leaders have told us that any attempt to set a date 
certain for withdrawal could have drastic consequences for the success 
and safety of the mission in Haiti. Mr. Speaker, it is easy for us to 
make armchair decisions within the safety of these four walls, but we 
should think about the effect of such decisions on our soldiers in the 
field.
  On September 27, General Sheehan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told 
the Foreign Affairs Committee that U.S. forces currently enjoy a 
tactical advantage. He told us that tactical advantage would evaporate 
if we set a date certain for withdrawal.
  The success of military operations requires the retention of an 
element of surprise. You're opponent should be kept off balance and 
left to guess your next move. Setting a date certain would have the 
effect of handing our military plans over to potential adversaries on a 
silver platter.
  The three substitutes before us are similar in several respects:
  They require regular reports to the Congress on military operations.
  None specifically authorizes U.S. participation in the U.N. phase of 
the operation.
  Both Dellums and Michel require a report on Human Rights violations.
  Both Michel and Torricelli set out procedures for expedited joint 
resolutions on the withdrawal of forces.
  The big difference is that the Michel substitute compromises our 
military mission by announcing to the world a deadline--January 3, 
1995.
  Our military commanders are the best ones to decide how to protect 
the safety of the soldiers serving under them. They have told us that 
we will jeopardize their security if we set a deadline for withdrawal.
  Mr. Chairman, we should not subjugate our military operations to poor 
political decisions. Unfortunately, that is what the Michel substitute 
does. I urge my colleagues to defeat the Michel substitute and support 
the Dellums and Torricelli amendments.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Ewing].
  (Mr. EWING asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. EWING. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the committee 
resolution because it endorses the President's Haiti policy, and would 
allow our troops to remain there until March 1 at least of next year.
  I will support, though, the Michel substitute. But I would have 
preferred a stronger alternative which would order the immediate 
withdrawal of our troops from Haiti.
  United States policy in Haiti has been a disaster, and on a more 
bipartisan note, it has been a disaster through Republican and Democrat 
administrations. It started under George Bush and was strengthened and 
carried forward under Bill Clinton.

                              {time}  1850

  The economic sanctions have done nothing to get dictators out of 
Haiti or out of Cuba but have caused a flood of refugees trying to 
reach the United States. We need to rethink our economic sanction 
policy, because it does nothing to remove dictators.
  There are a number of countries around the world where dictators are 
in control, and we do not use economic sanctions against them. In fact, 
just the opposite, we deal with them on a friendly basis.
  In this, and yet in other cases, the policy of sanctions has failed. 
In fact, there is no justification for sanctions or for putting 
Americans at risk in Haiti.
  When our troops went in, the President failed to clearly explain what 
the policy was and what the mission was, or possibly the President 
failed to explain and give us his true agenda. He chose possibly not to 
inform us that we might be engaged in nation-building.
  I would just say in closing that what was the lesson that we learned 
in Vietnam if we are into Haiti with the same type of policy?
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], the distinguished chairman of the Democratic 
caucus.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Hoyer].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized 
for 6\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to urge support for the 
Dellums-Murtha-Hastings substitute which expresses a sense of the 
Congress supporting an orderly and organized withdrawal of American 
troops without imposing an arbitrary deadline. Passage of either 
competing resolution, calling for either immediate withdrawal or the 
imposition of a March 1 deadline could harm the peacekeeping mission in 
the troubled Haitian nation. An arbitrary deadline would undermine our 
strategy, reduce our flexibility, and endanger our troops. An arbitrary 
deadline could lead to widespread chaos in Haiti and a mass exodus of 
refugees to the shores of the United States.
  If we are to achieve our goals, we must stand united in our support 
for our brave troops and the fine job they are doing as a neighboring 
country--one besieged by human rights violations until their arrival--
returns to democratic rule. Their presence has helped to alleviate 
additional widespread bloodshed. Moreover, Haitians who were once 
fearful of wrongful arrest and torture for their democratic advocacy 
have taken to the streets to praise and advocate democratic principles 
and beliefs.
  The goal of preserving democracy in the Western Hemisphere is a 
legitimate and important keystone of our foreign policy.
  Mr. Chairman, in 1991, in an address to the OAS, President Bush's 
then Secretary of State, James Baker, said, and I quote, ``The test we 
face is clear, to defend democracy, to stand united as a community of 
democracies, to make clear that the assault on Haiti's constitutional 
government has no legitimacy and will not succeed.'' Secretary Baker 
went on to say, ``Let the coup plotters in Haiti and any one who dream 
of championing them know this: This hemisphere is united to defend 
democracy.''
  My friends, we sent almost a half-million troops across the Atlantic 
Ocean and through the Mediterranean Sea to Saudi Arabia without a vote, 
and the reason we had no vote in that fall of 1990 was because 
President Bush asked Speaker Foley, ``Do not bring this to a vote, 
because it will undermine our strategic interests and it will diminish 
my ability to project America's position as it relates to our strategic 
and tactical interests,'' and we had no vote, notwithstanding the fact 
there were some on this floor in my party, yes, perhaps even for 
partisan reasons, asking for such a vote.
  Secretary Baker said that we could not let stand the overthrow of 
democracy. How many of my friends and colleagues with whom I have voted 
a number of times on security issues have stood as it related to 
Grenada, Panama, Nicaragua, Libya, Lebanon, and, yes Iraq, to say that 
we needed to stand together as a country, stand together as a Nation as 
we projected the interest of democracy across the waters?
  Haiti is close by. Secretary Baker enunciated the policy of the Bush 
administration, and to his credit, President Clinton reiterated that 
America would not allow in this hemisphere a democracy to be 
overthrown.
  Let us then come together, not as Republicans, not as Democrats, but 
as Americans committed to democracy, knowing full well that the last 
superpower on Earth, indeed, the last best hope on Earth of making sure 
that the international community is safe and secure from democracy, 
still has the will and still has the unity to project that power.
  But it is not just a strategic interest. It is not just political. It 
is tactical as well; for, yes, our young men and our young women, the 
best of our country, are on the ground in the service of their country, 
in the service of democracy, in the service of freedom, and their 
commander in chief on the ground. Lt. Gen. Henry Shelton, says, ``I am 
not in favor of setting a date per se at this point.''
  I am one of the biggest fans of the minority leader in this House. He 
is a man who fought for this country in the Second World War. He is a 
hero. But I suggest that he is egregiously in error in suggesting a 
time certain withdrawal.
  There is no more dangerous policy than telling the enemy on this date 
at this hour we will withdraw. There is hardly a military commander who 
will not echo the words of General Shelton. He went on to say, ``I 
think that when we do that,'' that is, set a time certain, ``we 
automatically tip our hand to the adversary in terms of when we are 
going to leave.''
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HOYER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Michel-Gilman measure does not have any 
date certain, I just wanted to clarify that with you.
  Mr. HOYER. I apologize if I misstated the thrust of the amendment 
which I understand suggests immediate withdrawal. Am I correct?
  Mr. GILMAN. It is the sense of Congress that we are asking for an 
immediate orderly withdrawal.
  Mr. HOYER. I understand, and I understand the difference, and to the 
extent I misstated, I appreciate it.
  Mr. Chairman, I understand that the alternative measures would impose 
arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal that would undermine our mission 
objectives. The Michel-Gilman substitute would order an immediate 
withdrawal and the Torricelli-Hamilton substitute would impose a March 
1 deadline for withdrawal.
  Ladies and gentlemen, I urge your support for the Dellums-Murtha-
Hastings substitute. It is the best strategy to reach our mission 
goals, and it is in the best interest of those men and women who are 
standing on the frontlines in defense of democracy in the name of 
America.
  Let us stand with them this night.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Buyer].
  Mr. BUYER. You know, I do note that the gentleman from Maryland that 
just had spoken in his reference to the war in the Persian Gulf, while 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. McHale] and myself were in the 
Persian Gulf war, I note for the record that he voted no on the use of 
force while I was in the desert.
  Mr. President, you have embarked on a liberal crusade to return a 
defrocked Marxist anti-American priest to power in Haiti. I disagree 
with the President's utopian foreign policy based on the idea democracy 
can be enforced around the world at the point of a gun.
  Military intervention will not solve the social, economic, and 
political problems of Haiti.
  The President wants us to restore democracy in Haiti, but we cannot 
restore by force that which never was.
  I fully support the brave men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces in 
Haiti who are serving in almost impossible circumstances attempting to 
accomplish a vague, ill-defined, and ever changing mission. My military 
service taught me that if it does not look right, does not smell right, 
or feel right, something probably is not right.

                              {time}  1900

  One of our troops in Haiti must have felt the same way when he said, 
``It feels like Somalia all over again.''
  Despite Administration claims, our forces are already experiencing 
mission creep that will expand our commitment into 1996 while we 
conduct nation building operations under the United Nations command.
  You see occupying Haiti was a bad idea 6 months ago, it was a bad 
idea on September 19, and it is a bad idea to occupy that country 
today. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote yes on the Michel-Gilman 
substitute and no on the Torricelli-Dellums-Hastings amendment.
  I say to my colleagues do not take so much out on the President. 
Equal blame is shared by the Democratic leadership that blocked us from 
having hearings on this issue before there ever was a military 
occupation in Haiti.
  We should not be having these hearings while we have troops on the 
ground, but we have been placed in that difficult circumstance, and I 
believe our troops understand.
  God bless them.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Tennessee [Mr. Clement].
  Mr. CLEMENT. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, as a veteran I served 2 years in the U.S. Army and 
still in the National Guard as a weekend warrior. I was one of those 
that did not support any type of military invasion of Haiti, but I am 
very pleased that we were able to go into Haiti without any loss of 
life.
  I congratulate our President, and I congratulate our Armed Forces for 
being able to accomplish that objective. I know I have had a lot of 
people ask me at home, ``Well, what authority does the President have 
to send troops into a crisis area?'' He has those authorities through 
the War Powers Act.
  But we also know in Haiti that thugs and criminals took over this 
country.
  Are they not doing the same thing in the United States of America? 
Neighborhood by neighborhood? And are we going to just sit idly by and 
watch it and do nothing to stop it?
  If we are going to preserve our democracy, we are going to have to 
fight for it, and every generation is going to have to fight for it. 
Surely we have a great country, but if you look at the great 
democracies of the past, the average longevity of the great democracies 
of the past is 200 years. The United States of America has already 
celebrated its 200th birthday about 30-plus years ago. But it is up to 
all of us to be interested in what happens next.
  I know a lot of Republicans are still upset with themselves when 
Beirut/Lebanon took place and President Reagan and the decisions that 
were made in Beirut, where we lost 241 U.S. Marines, they were lost in 
a car bombing of the barracks. And because of that all of us, whether 
we be Democratic or Republican or the like, want to ask questions about 
what is our mission? Is our objective clear? But I think all of us know 
that we are on the ground now, and just as I said a while ago, we have 
not had any loss of life, thank God.
  Let us set a specific date for the withdrawal of our troops, but less 
us also support our troops and preserve democracy in this hemisphere.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, there is literally so much to cover and so 
little time. The pity is that some of it could affect the votes coming 
up here. But we will just have to do the best we can. There is one game 
in town tomorrow, an Armed Services Committee hearing on Haiti, and I 
would recommend that all Members avail themselves of the privilege to 
sit in any committee room in this House, even a closed one, by merely 
getting the permission of the chairman, in this case Mr. Dellums.
  I know that Mr. Torricelli works as hard as anybody on these foreign 
affairs issues, and he will be there tomorrow. Elliott Abrams is 
coming. It is going to be a pretty good list of people. But it is going 
to be a little bit after the fact. But we must try to get educated 
tomorrow at this Haiti hearing. We have good panels on both sides.
  That is No. 1. No. 2, I just checked the wire service stories, and 
this is hot, hot, hot, 6:42, AP, open. Cedras is saying the United 
States is pressuring him and his lieutenants to get the hell out of the 
country before the October 15th date and take Felipe Biamby with him.
  Now there is a wife involved here, every bit as tough as Miss 
Hillary, and her name is Yanic, Yanic Cedras. She is saying, ``Stay our 
ground and die in our country.''
  Cedras and Yanic have a home in Spain. Maybe we can get them to go to 
Spain, where he can be like Juan Peron and Evita working crossword 
puzzles, taking breakfast in bed, and watching blood flow in the 
streets of Haiti from both sides.
  The big question is how many young Americans are going to shed blood 
for this--and as a practicing stumbling Catholic, weigh my words and 
try to gainsay what I am about to say--self-excommunicated priest who 
was kicked out of the Salesians of Don Bosco for inciting mobs to 
violence and murder, which did happen, and who is now rolling in money?
  We have made, through our State Department, available to Aristide all 
of the frozen Haitian funds. He is probably the only ex-priest who is a 
multi-multimillionaire with $40 million at hand.
  But here is something brand new. This is an unclassified communique 
from the State Department, intercepted by one of our Senators. We are 
now taking $2.58 million of our tax dollars, Mr. Chairman, from AID 
that we use to feed starving people and sire it to Anotide's transition 
team. Will we give it to Cherubin, who was down in Guantanamo looking 
for female company at night when he was supposedly recruiting from 
those boat people down there, policemens?

  Here is an article from the Nation, that says we paid Emmanuel 
Constant, head of FRAPH. FRAPH, for those of you who hate acronyms, is 
the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement of Progress in Haiti. We 
paid him intelligence dollars. He called us and said, ``I am going to 
have a few guys on the docks demonstrating against the U.S.S. Harlan 
County''--that would be a year ago in a few days--and he said, ``It is 
OK though, come on in.'' The left hand did not know what the right hand 
was doing. We never sent word to the U.S.S. Harlan County. As a result, 
America was embarrassed. This whole thing reminds me of Peter Sellers 
in ``The Mouse that Roared.'' I want to put in an article, an article 
by one of the best military writers in America, Harry G. Summers, Jr.
  (The article referred to is as follows.)

                    U.S. Troops Need a Clear Mission

                       (By Harry G. Summers Jr.)

       If you liked Mogadishu, you'll love Port-au-Prince.
       Just as Smith Hempstone, then the U.S. ambassador to Kenya, 
     warned all too correctly in 1992 that Mogadishu was likely to 
     be a repeat of the 1983 Beirut disaster where 241 U.S. 
     servicemen were killed in the bombing of the Marine barracks 
     there so Port-au-Prince is all too likely to turn into 
     another Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. servicemen were killed in 
     failed 1993 attempt to capture Somali warlord Gen. Muhammad 
     Farrah Aidid and the U.S. mission collapsed in disarray.
       Tuesday in Port-au-Prince, U.S. troops could be seen on TV 
     standing idle by, uncertain of their goals and limits, while 
     Haitian police beat to death a demonstrator welcoming their 
     arrival.
       Outrageous. The least any government can do for its 
     soldiers is make their mission clear and give them the tools 
     to achieve it.
       One of the chief tools for doing that is through the 
     military's ``rules of engagement.'' Those rules specify the 
     level of force that can be employed.
       Unlike Beirut, where Marines were standing guard with 
     unloaded weapons, in Mogadishu they were fully prepared to 
     use whatever force was necessary to safeguard themselves and 
     the relief effort.
       They did not have to wait to be fired on before they could 
     take action. Authority was given to use deadly force, not 
     only to respond to an attack but also to pre-empt any likely 
     attack. And they had the right to use whatever force was 
     necessary in proportion to the threat to defend against 
     civilian mob action and riots as well.
       The Somali thugs then controlling the streets got the 
     message. If you value your life, don't fool with the 
     Americans or you will suffer the consequences. Sufficient 
     order was established that the relief supplies could began 
     moving to the countryside, and by all accounts the initial 
     mission was a success.
       But by then the Clinton administration had come into 
     office, and it had more grandiose plans.
       Instead of just protecting distribution of relief supplies, 
     the U.S. military would stay in Somalia for ``nation 
     building,'' and to that end (as it had done in Lebanon a 
     decade earlier) take sides in the ongoing struggle for power 
     there.
       When 18 U.S. servicemen were killed in a futile attempt to 
     arrest Somali strongman Aidid, the U.S. effort ended, as in 
     Beirut, in ignominious retreat.
       While the original rules of engagement for the planned 
     invasion of Haiti have not been released, it is safe to 
     assume they were similar to the initial rules for Somalia.
       As in Somalia, the presumption was that there was no 
     legitimate government in Port-au-Prince and that the 
     dictatorship of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras would have either 
     collapsed in the face of the invasion or would have been 
     overwhelmed by physical force.
       U.S. forces would have been given the authority to use all 
     necessary force to restore and maintain order until President 
     Jean-Bertrand Aristide could reassume power and a legitimate 
     government with a new military and police force could take 
     responsibility for maintaining law and order.
       But, initially at least, such rules of engagement went down 
     the drain when a negotiated settlement was reached for the 
     peaceful transition of power. The invasion turned into a 
     landing party, with the mission of U.S. military forces 
     ambiguous at best.
       ``We are not in the business of doing the day-to-day law 
     and order (or) resolving or quelling any demonstrations,'' 
     said Gen. John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, ``unless these demonstrations or this level 
     of violence becomes so great that it threatens the overall 
     stability and security of our multilateral force, and then we 
     will intervene.''
       But the uproar back home that ensued when American troops 
     stood helplessly by while Haitian policemen clubbed at least 
     one demonstrator to his death soon forced a change in the 
     rules.
       ``The use of unnecessary force is a matter of concern to 
     us,'' said Lt. Gen. Henry Hugh Shelton, the U.S. commander on 
     the scene, adding that if the Haitian forces fail to take the 
     appropriate measures, `` we will take the next step.'' The 
     Pentagon lawyers later reportedly stated that the rules of 
     engagement permit use of deadly force to protect Haitian 
     civilians.
       For the U.S. military, it is the worst of all possible 
     worlds. As dangerous as overthrowing Cedras and maintaining 
     law and order would have been, at least the tasks would have 
     been clear. But now the military is deployed countrywide with 
     the mission changing hourly in response to domestic pressure.
       In retrospect, it would have been far better if the troops 
     had remained aboard ship as a potent reminder to Cedras to 
     honor his promise to step down. While a withdrawal back to 
     the ships now would send precisely the wrong message, to have 
     the troops remain dispersed across the country serves no 
     useful military or political purpose. Instead, it sets them 
     up as targets for all those who would disrupt a peaceful 
     settlement.
       But instead of getting them out of harm's way, White House 
     Chief of Staff Leon Panetta has said, ``We're going to 
     increase patrols.'' He unwittingly is setting the stage for a 
     Mogadishu-like disaster where American casualties would force 
     a premature U.S. withdrawal. Instead of increasing their 
     vulnerability, now is the time to withdraw our forces from 
     the streets and gather than in defensible enclaves, ready if 
     need be to underwrite with force the transition of power from 
     Cedras next month to Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Swift). The time of the gentleman has 
expired.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCurdy asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, again we find our Nation's finest young 
men and women in uniform performing brilliantly in difficult 
circumstances and in a dangerous situation in Haiti. They are bright, 
they are highly trained, and thank God they can think on their feet. 
Everyone in this Chamber supports them.
  But, Mr. Chairman, there are no clear national interests for the 
United States to be in Haiti. Moralism is not the basis for an 
effective foreign policy. Innovation is not a foreign policy.
  Mr. Chairman, I opposed the involvement, the intervention in Haiti, 
from the beginning. I opposed the sanctions. And I even supported an 
alternative by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] to try to help 
support democratic movement from within the country.
  However, the problems in Haiti are social, they are economic, and 
they are political and have been for over 200 years. This intervention 
is not going to solve those problems. The U.S. military is not in the 
business of nation-building. The mission is not defined. We have to ask 
now much is it going to cost? Where do we get the money? And are we 
going to continue to cut operations and maintenance budgets in order to 
pay for this indefinite engagement?
  It drains our readiness, and already we start to see the mission 
creep. Those here today say, ``Well, don't tie our hands now that we 
are there in.'' We should have come to this body in the first place, 
the same way we did in the gulf, which I supported the use of force in 
the Gulf. But we should have had that debate months ago.

                              {time}  1910

  The mission originally was to provide a stable and secure 
environment. Now it is to provide law and order and build democracy.
  There is a different kind of mission creep I worry about, the one I 
saw in a cartoon about a Haitian sign maker. The first sign said, ``God 
bless America.'' The second sign said, ``Welcome, Marines.'' And the 
third sign said, ``Yankee, go home.''
  Democracy cannot be built on the back of one man. It needs 
institutions, and it is going to take years.
  Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, bring our troops home.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Hunter].
  Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman], my friend, for yielding this time to me.
  My colleagues, last year, October 3, 1993, we learned a lesson when 
18 Rangers were killed, and they were pinned down in Mogadishu in 
Somalia, and we were forced to rely, because we did not have armor and 
we were not able to retrieve them with an American quick reaction force 
from the 10th Mountain Division, we were forced to rely on a Malaysian 
and Pakistani component of the U.N. forces, and we learned a lesson, 
and that was that reliance on a multinational force for quick combat 
relief is a very complex and a very difficult thing and, sometimes, a 
very time consuming thing, and it can cost lives. We learned that 
lesson, I think.
  Many Members stood up on this floor and vowed that they would always 
vote to keep American troops away from U.N. leadership, and I say to my 
colleagues now, ``Whether or not you learn a lesson, a military 
operation is always subject to a test when the next military operation 
occurs, and at that point we discover whether or not we learned the 
lesson.''
  Did we learn the lesson about the problems with U.N.-led U.S. forces? 
The answer, I think if we pass the Michel resolution, the Michel-Gilman 
resolution, is yes because the Michel-Gilman resolution has a clear 
prohibition at all phases of this operation against American troops 
being led by U.N. commanders. The Torricelli resolution has a partial 
ban; that is, it bans U.N. leadership of the present American military 
operation in Haiti, and I would ask all my colleagues to turn to page 9 
to see that ban manifested. But it says nothing about UNMIH; that is, 
the U.N. forces, the occupation force, that follows the American 
military mission.

  It was under the United Nations occupation force in Somalia on 
October 3, 1993, that we found out that we had great problems. Our 
problems initiated when we had to get American speaking drivers of the 
Malaysian and Pakistani armor while our Rangers were pinned down in 
Mogadishu. Our problems persisted, and precious hours went by as we 
tried to arrange coordination with the Pakistanis and with the 
Malaysians, and finally, as we fought our way through the city with 
those Pakistani and Malaysian tanks, they stopped. They stopped two 
blocks away because the firefighting became very severe, and the 
Pakistanis said, ``We aren't going any further,'' and so the Americans 
that ultimately rescued what was left of our Ranger forces had to go 
the last two blocks with no armor.
  The message that came through to every American family that had a 
young man in uniform was this:
  Having an American commander who is accountable, who has the welfare 
of his troops furthermost in his mind and as his primary mission, is 
the person we want to have commanding those troops.
  Only the Michel resolution has a total ban on U.N. command of 
American troops. Every family that has a young person in uniform in 
this country has a stake in the Michel resolution.
  I say to my colleagues, ``Let's pass it.''
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Maryland [Mr. Wynn].
  (Mr. WYNN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, this evening I rise in support of the 
Dellums-Murtha-Hastings amendment. Throughout all the debate that we 
have heard, and will hear, there is one truth, and that is our military 
leaders know best, and while it is fine to say we support our young men 
that are on the ground, the real way we could support them is to do 
what the military strategists believe makes sense, and that is not to 
set a date certain, not to telegraph our intentions to our enemies, but 
rather to allow for an orderly process wherein they can execute or 
withdraw after their mission is complete.
  I think an appeal to common sense is in order at this point, that we 
not tell our enemy what we are going to do, that we not allow them to 
provoke us, and that we not allow them to defeat our efforts which, so 
far, have been highly successful.
  Some say we do not have a national interest at stake. I disagree. We 
have an immigration crisis impacting our country's shores. We have a 
prospect of regional instability throughout our own hemisphere. We have 
a human rights crisis in our backyard in which murder, rape, and 
beatings have become the order of the day, and we have the 
responsibility to nurture democracy.
  I would note that I am offended by those who repeatedly say, ``Well, 
Haiti has never had democracy.'' Well, neither has Russia, but it does 
not seem to me we have given up on them. In fact our policy of 
decisiveness has been successful. Thanks to our President, former 
President Carter, Senator Nunn, and Colin Powell we landed, not 
invaded. Francois has left. We have an agreement in place for the 
removal of Cedras. We are, in fact, enforcing an agreement on which Mr. 
Cedras previously reneged. We have an amnesty program in place, and we 
have a commitment of a U.N. peacekeeping force.
  Today, my colleagues, we are paying the price of world leadership. 
Lip service is insufficient. Today in Haiti we are trying to discourage 
a precedent in the Western Hemisphere, and that precedent would be 
thuggery over democracy. We should not allow thuggery over democracy. 
The military will always have the guns, so it is insufficient to say 
the Haitian people should provide for their own democracy. The Haitian 
people have spoken. They want democracy. Seventy percent voted for 
President Aristide.
  We have an opportunity, and, as I have indicated, we have met with 
considerable success to support and nurture that democracy. I hope we 
will not pull the rug out from under our young men before they complete 
that task.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith], the ranking Republican on the 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, the laudable goal of helping 
Haiti reclaim its fledgling democracy, stop human rights abuses, end 
hunger, mitigate disease, promote justice, encourage economic reform 
and create jobs is not in dispute.
  All of us want the best for Haiti and an end to the hatred and 
violence.
  All of us want the dictatorship ousted.
  All of us want true reconciliation to commence for a people who have 
suffered excruciating pain.
  It is Mr. Clinton's new ways and means to that goal, however, that 
most Americans find unacceptable and troubling.
  After a series of gaffes and major policy reversals on Haiti and 
elsewhere around the world, including Somalia and China--which only 
served to confound and confuse the brutal dictatorship concerning U.S. 
resolve--remember the U.S.S. Harlan County--the President has now put 
thousands of U.S. soldiers at risk of death or maiming in Haiti to 
effectuate Mr. Aristide's return.
  Yes, President Aristide was elected with a popular mandate of 
approximately 70 percent. And, notwithstanding serious concerns about 
his past embrace of violence, there was a consensus that a peaceful 
negotiation was justified out of respect for the ballots cast by the 
Haitians themselves.
  I suppose one could rationalize the diplomacy designed to cause his 
return with the hope that even if his past was pockmarked with 
violence, the international presence and spotlight of world scrutiny 
might chill acts of revenge or score-settling and new acts of violence.
  But now that President Clinton has ordered U.S. soldiers to risk 
dying for Mr. Aristide, now that the United States is in the process of 
forcibly restoring him to power with bullets, bayonets and crowd 
control gear, there can no longer be any delay in a comprehensive probe 
of Mr. Aristide's past record. His behavior in office, which will 
likely resume on or before October 15, has now become our direct 
responsibility for which we are morally responsible. Past is often 
prologue. As the Spanish-born philosopher George Santayana so aptly put 
it in his novel The Life of Reason (1905), ``Those who cannot remember 
the past are condemned to repeat it.''
  Diplomatic niceties and ``useful fictions'' should not be employed to 
cover up exactly what Aristide has done in the past.
  The question remains, has President Aristide ever incited mob 
violence?
  Exactly what was Mr. Aristide talking about on September 27, 1991 
when he told a rally: ``If you catch one, do not fail to give him what 
he deserves. What a nice tool! What a nice instrument! What a nice 
device! It is a pretty one. It is elegant, attractive, splendorous, 
graceful, and dazzling. It smells good. Wherever you go, you feel like 
smelling it. It is provided for by the Constitution, which bans 
macoutes from the political scene * * *.''
  Is there anyone who seriously doubts that President Aristide was 
talking about necklacing, that barbaric practice of assassination where 
the victim is bound, his arms tied or hacked off and a gasoline-filled 
tire put around his neck and ignited? In Haiti, necklacing is called 
``Pere Lebrun'' [Father Lebrun], the name of a popular Haitian tire 
dealer.
  I have seen the videotape of this rally where some of Mr. Aristide's 
supporters were brandishing tires and machetes.
  What exactly prompted the Salesians in 1988 to throw Father Aristide 
out of their order for ``incitement to hatred and violence and a 
glorification of class struggle?'' His exclusion from his religious 
order raises serious questions.
  In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 
1993, Mr. Clinton's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Alex 
Watson said, ``There was ample evidence that President Aristide incited 
intimidation or violent behavior among his followers.''
  Secretary Watson's testimony is that there is ``ample evidence'' of 
inciting violence. Journalist Mark Danner, writing in the New York 
Review of Books in October 1993, of his visit with Aristide in March 
1986, describes the days following the downfall of the Duvalier 
dictatorship:

       It was during the early days of the dechoukaj--the 
     ``uprooting'' that followed the fall of the dictator Jean 
     Duvalier in 1986--that I first visited the Church of St. Jean 
     Bosco--Angry crowds of poor Haitians surrounding an unlucky 
     Tonton Macoute--and hacking him apart with machetes. Other 
     Macoutes were stoned, or covered with gasoline and burned 
     alive. Their remains were left lying in the sun to be further 
     abused, or in some cases they were paraded through the 
     streets like war trophies: a bloody severed head speared on 
     the end of a pole; a shrunken, charred torso lashed to a 
     wooden strut like a roasted pig.
       I stood and marveled at the justice of the people, Father 
     Aristide told me--startling me with the passion in his 
     voice--How could he, a priest, call such acts ``justice''? 
     How could he countenance mobs burning men alive in the 
     streets? ``One must know when to look at the acts of the 
     people and judge them as a psychologist, not as a priest,'' 
     he replied. ``Our consciences should be clear--these 
     Mascoutes were Satan,'' he said intensely, leaning forward 
     until his face was only a few inches from mine, We saw Satan 
     Incarnate in certain of these Mascoutes. It was the people 
     who decided to act; and in this they were doing God's work.

  Two major Aristide opposition figures were killed in the days 
immediately prior to the coup: Roger Lafontant--who led the pre-
inauguration coup attempt--was murdered under Lavalas orders in his 
jail cell on September 27; democratic politician Sylvio Claude, was 
necklaced by pro-Aristide mobs in Les Cayes the following day.
  What was Mr. Aristide espousing when he wrote in his ``In the Parish 
of the Poor: Writings from Haiti,'' published in 1990:

       Look at their machetes. The blades are rusted, the handles 
     dirty. The peasants let the knives hang at their sides except 
     when they are working in the field. But don't be fooled. A 
     machete is useful in almost any situation. Those rusty blades 
     are long and sharp. They remind me of Bolivar's sword. That 
     is, taking their future into their own hands.

  Mr. Speaker, the events leading to the coup against Aristide were 
accompanied by an escalation of violence by Aristide supporters. In 
August, then Prime Minister Preval was implicated in financial 
corruption. When the parliament called him for questioning in order to 
dismiss him, mobs surrounded the building, and some were holding tires 
etched with the names of Parliamentarians; on September 3, Aristide 
himself appeared in the Chamber with a vase of flowers, which Haitians 
interpreted as floral decorations for the graves of his opponents.
  On August 4, Mr. Aristide addressed a youth rally not long after a 
life sentence given to Roger Lafontant, who had unsuccessfully 
attempted a coup. Mr. Aristide suggests that the Constitution did not 
provide for death by necklacing but it does not bar the practice:
  Mr. Aristide said:

       Was there pere lebrun inside the courthouse? [audience 
     yells no] Was there pere lebrun in front of the courthouse? 
     [audience yells yes] Did the people use pere lebrun? 
     [audience yells no] Did the people forget it? [audience yells 
     no] Did they have the right to forget it? [audience yells no] 
     Do not say that I said it. [laughter]. In front of the 
     courthouse, for 24 hours, pere lebrun became [word 
     indistinct]. The Justice Ministry inside the courthouse had 
     the law in its hands, the people had their cushion outside. 
     The people had their little matches in their hands. They had 
     gas nearby. Did they use it? [audience yells no] That means 
     that the people respect [audience yells the constitution] 
     does the constitution tell the people to forget little pere 
     lebrun? [audience yells no]
       The people are the law, meaning what they do is 
     constitutional. The law respects the Constitution.
       When the people heard: life in prison, the people forgot 
     their little gas and little pere lebrun. Was pere lebrun used 
     on that day? [audience yells no] if it had not gone well, 
     would the people have used pere lebrun? [audience yells yes] 
     Therefore, when through education one learns how to write 
     pere lebrun and learns how to think pere lebrun, one does not 
     use it when it is unnecessary. One learns how not to use it; 
     where not to use it. [end recording].

  Mr. Chairman, the way some Aristide advocates derisively dismiss 
allegations and testimony concerning his support of violence only 
diminishes their credibility--it does not answer the charges which need 
to be honestly and painstakingly addressed.
  Mr. Michel/Gilman amendment demands an honest assessment of the human 
rights abuses committed by either faction from December 15, 1990-
December 15, 1994. This is a good start, although the probe must go 
deeper. There should be no coverup of the truth. I remind my colleagues 
that the Torricelli legislation does not require this.
  The Michel/Gilman amendment gives the House the opportunity to 
express opposition to the deployment itself and that the President 
should immediately commence the safe and orderly withdrawal of United 
States Armed Forces from Haiti and should conclude that withdrawal as 
soon as possible in a manner consistent with the safety of those 
forces.
  Of course this debate--and vote--should have been conducted prior to 
the invasion and occupation of Haiti but all efforts to do so were 
stymied by the administration and the House Democratic leadership.
  Another pertinent question remains as to whether politics and the 
November elections had anything whatsoever to do with the U.S. invasion 
of Haiti and the timing of that operation.
  Mr. Chairman, last week at a Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, I 
asked Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott this question, and 
exactly what U.N. Envoy to Haiti Dante Caputo meant in a confidential 
memo that represented the U.S. position on Haiti ``as a test case for 
which the U.S. has to have found a solution before November?''
  Mr. Caputo, a former Argentinian foreign minister, also wrote in a 
memo to U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali on May 23, that:

       The Americans see in this type of action a chance to show, 
     after the strong media criticism of the Administration, the 
     President's decision making capability and firmness of 
     leadership in international political matters,'' and pointed 
     out that a U.S. armed deployment was ``politically 
     desirable'' and that ``the current opposition of public 
     opinion to an armed invasion will change radically once it 
     has taken place.''

  The credibility of these statements are of particular value when one 
recalls that it was Mr. Caputo who brokered the Governor's Island 
Agreement between General Cedras and President Aristide. In protest of 
the U.S. invasion, Mr. Caputo resigned as U.N. envoy to Haiti hours 
after the invasion--a loss of a competent statesman who heavily cared 
about the future of Haiti.
  Mr. Talbott, for his part last week, denied before our Committee ever 
referring to November in his conversations with Mr. Caputo or that 
domestic politics had anything to do with the decision to invade Haiti.
  The American people and this Congress have a right to know if the 
November elections had anything whatsoever to do with President 
Clinton's decision to invade.

  For now, the jury is out and Americans have a right to know the 
answer.
  Mr. Chairman, the Michel/Gilman amendment also requires that the 
administration provide Congress with details and information 
concerning:
  The costs of military operations in and U.S. assistance to Haiti.
  Planning for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti.
  Reconvening of Congress after adjournment if events in Haiti so 
warrant.
  Provisions for House and Senate votes under expedited procedures no 
later than January 21, 1995, on a resolution requiring the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces from Haiti within 30 days after the date of enactment.
  Finally, the establishment of a congressional commission to make 
recommendations on U.S. policy toward Haiti.
  In June, Mr. Chairman, I introduced a resolution which would have 
established a congressional commission to seek appropriate policy 
options in Haiti during the occupation of Haiti by the U.S.-led force 
in Haiti. The resolution, H. Con. Res. 264, has bipartisan support, 
including the Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee. 
The Commission provided for in Section 8 of the Michel/Gilman Amendment 
would consist of House and Senate leaders responsible for 
decisionmaking on the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Armed 
Services, Appropriations, and Intelligence.
  I believe the Congress needs the benefit of an assessment of the 
humanitarian, political, and security conditions in Haiti. A report 
would be rendered in 45 days. And, the report would assess the status 
of U.S. force levels and mission, the humanitarian needs of the Haitian 
people, and designs for withdrawal of U.S. forces and transferring 
responsibilities to the U.N. Mission in Haiti [UNMIH]. Further, it 
would outline appropriate post-intervention policy options for the 
multinational force, Friends of Haiti--U.S., Canada, Venezuela, and 
France--private sector development, electoral development and training 
for institutional development.
  In addition to travel to Haiti, meeting with President Aristide newly 
restored to his office, Members of the Parliament, private, non-
governmental organizations, and religious leaders, the Commission would 
garner advice from recognized experts on Haiti and Haitian culture, 
human rights, health and social welfare, political institution 
building, and security training.
  Mr. Chairman, I remind my colleagues that in 1983, then-Speaker 
O'Neill sent a congressional delegation to Grenada following the U.S. 
invasion in Grenada to assess the situation. The official House 
delegation was headed by then-Majority Whip Tom Foley and Minority 
Leader Bob Michel.
  In 1991, I was part of the Speaker's congressional commission which 
went to northern Iraq following the Gulf War to assess the special 
needs of the Kurds who fled into the mountains and into Turkey. The 
assessment was helpful in garnering congressional support for the 
humanitarian mission there. Of course this commission would take a 
comprehensive look at the situation and suggest solutions.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, I fully support the Michel/Gilman amendment 
which, I believe, reflects the concerns of the American people. I urge 
strong support of the amendment.

                              {time}  1930

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, but 
would like to commend the distinguished member of the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs on the Committee on Foreign Affairs for his 
long-term concern with relation to the Haitian issue.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Swift). The time of the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Gilman] has expired.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to thank the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Smith] for his interest and commitment 
on the question of Haiti, not simply this week but for some period of 
time, and for his eloquent address.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Hughes].
  (Mr. HUGHES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from 
New Jersey for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, we are not here tonight to debate whether or not the 
United States should invade Haiti. With over 20,000 American troops 
already on the ground in Haiti, that question is moot.
  Rather, we are here to consider our options for completing our 
mission and getting our troops home as quickly and safely as possible.
  I would hope that everyone in this Chamber feels as strongly as I do 
that as long as American troops are on the ground in Haiti, we must do 
everything we possibly can to support them. Similarly, we should all 
agree on the need to complete our mission and get our troops out of 
Haiti in the quickest and safest manner possible.
  Unfortunately, I do not think I have heard as much partisan rhetoric 
and circuitous reasoning as we are hearing tonight. I am seriously 
troubled by the deliberate attempts of some in and out of Congress to 
undercut President Clinton's efforts to deal with this situation. He is 
our President. Yet, many in this Chamber do not want him to succeed.
  Many of these critics were not heard when we invaded Grenada and 
Panama during the Reagan and Bush administrations. For example, we keep 
hearing over and over again in this debate that it is not in our 
national interest to keep the peace and restore democracy in Haiti.
  The fact is, it was the Bush administration which initiated America's 
policy to restore democracy in Haiti, following the military coup which 
ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1991. It was 
the Bush administration that told the Organization of American States 
that this coup was wrong, and that it was in the national interest of 
the United States to work to restore President Aristide to power.
  It has always been my policy to give the President the benefit of the 
doubt in conducting foreign affairs, whether that President was a 
Republican or Democrat. The President is our Commander-in-Chief. We 
cannot all be Secretaries of State.
  It is time to tone down the rhetoric, close ranks behind President 
Clinton and give his policy a chance to work, just as we did in the 
Persian Gulf, Panama and Grenada.
  This constant second-guessing of the President does little more then 
encourage General Cedras and his cohorts to thumb their noses at us, 
and gives little comfort to the thousands of American men and women who 
are putting their lives on the line this very moment in Haiti, and to 
their families here at home.
  As South African President Nelson Mandela so eloquently reminded us 
just today, we are all part of the world community. The United States 
is the only superpower in the world.
  Just as we helped to light the flame of freedom in South Africa, we 
have a responsibility to assist other nations whose people dream of 
freedom and democracy as well.
  It is particularly important to pay attention to our own hemisphere, 
where instability among our neighbors affects us in a myriad of ways. 
For example, we cannot expect to get our own immigration policies under 
control until we are able to deal with the instability in Haiti, and 
the serious economic and political problems it is causing in this 
hemisphere.
  Indeed, one reason why we have such problems in Central and South 
America is that we have neglected for too long the nagging instability 
in Haiti and elsewhere in our hemisphere.
  If we can not provide leadership in our own hemisphere, how can we be 
respected by the world community? It is a matter of our own 
credibility.
  We sought and received the backing of the United Nations to deal with 
the Haitian issue, and yet some here would have us walk away from that 
commitment. That's not leadership. It is an admission of vacillation 
and defeat.
  Yet that is just what we will do if the Michel-Gingrich amendment 
calling for an immediate withdrawal from Haiti passes.
  In my judgment, the Michel-Gingrich resolution is politically 
foolish, if not dangerously counter productive.
  It would be a terrible mistake to tie the hands of our President and 
our current military leaders, as well as those of future Presidents and 
military leaders, by setting a date certain for the withdrawal of our 
troops from Haiti.
  In the short term, such a decision would make it far more difficult 
for the United States to achieve its objectives in Haiti. Indeed, it 
simply encourages General Cedras and his cohorts to stall and disrupt 
as long as possible--and perhaps resort to violence against out 
troops--knowing that our hands will be tied once the deadline passes.
  Unfortunately, that is just what the Michel resolution would do. 
Although the Torricelli amendment gives the President a little more 
leeway, it too would have the same effect.
  By setting a date certain for the withdrawal of United States troops, 
both resolutions run the risk of shortcircuiting a policy that is 
working fairly well so far, and which has the best chance of restoring 
democracy to Haiti.
  In so doing, they would escalate the dangers which our troops face in 
attempting to disarm those who are responsible for the violence and 
instability in Haiti, and make it far more difficult to restore 
authority to the democratically elected government of President 
Aristide.
  By comparison, the Dellums-Murtha substitute takes a more responsible 
and rational approach to the situation in Haiti. It supports a prompt 
and orderly withdrawal of United States forces from Haiti as soon as 
possible, without setting a data certain for such withdrawal.
  It also requires the President to submit a detailed description of 
United States policy in Haiti and monthly reports on the status of the 
military operation, so the American people will know exactly what our 
goals are and the progress we are making in achieving them.
  While I oppose making an indefinite commitment to rebuild Haiti, the 
fact is, we do have to assist this hemisphere in bringing stability to 
that troubled country.
  In the final analysis, the Dellums-Murtha amendment offers the best 
chance for accomplishing our goals in Haiti, reinforcing our standing 
in the world community, and getting our troops home quickly and safely. 
I urge my colleagues to support Dellums-Murtha and to oppose the Michel 
and Torricelli resolutions.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Menendez].
  (Mr. MENENDEZ asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, let us tell the American people the 
truth.
  We must tell them the truth because this debate involves placing the 
men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States in harm's way. 
Let us make clear what this debate is about and what it is not about.
  First, this debate is not about setting a date certain for our troops 
to withdraw from Haiti. It fact, not one of the three resolutions that 
we will vote on today will commit the President to getting our troops 
out of Haiti.
  The Gilman substitute does not--I repeat, does not--ensure that our 
troops will be out of Haiti by a date certain.
  The Gilman amendment states the following, about a withdrawal from 
Haiti: Come January 3, 1995, if there are still American troops in 
Haiti, then a resolution will be introduced and voted in Congress no 
later than January 21, 1995 which requires that we withdraw from Haiti 
within 30 days of passage--if it passes.
  In other words, the Gilman resolution simply states that we will vote 
on withdrawal by a date certain--not that we will withdraw by a date 
certain. This is an important distinction for the American people to 
understand. It is utterly irresponsible to claim that we are voting for 
a date certain. It is simply not in the language. And I would hope that 
my friends on the other side of the aisle would tell the truth about 
that. They are not committing us to getting any troops out by a date 
certain.
  Second, the Dellums-Murtha-Hastings-Dicks substitute states that we 
should withdraw as soon as possible, but does not set a deadline for 
withdrawal, either.
  But I ask my colleagues, Who is the enemy in Haiti? Who are we 
fighting against? I thought our enemy was General Cedras, Colonel 
Francois and company. The people that brutalized their fellow Haitians 
and plundered their country. But these people are permitted to leave 
with honor, without prosecution, without punishment for their heinous 
acts, the very same acts which President Clinton claimed were 
sufficient enough to meet the test of national interests. What does 
that say for our defense of human rights, one of our alleged pillars of 
foreign policy.
  I think its worthy to note in this debate that the fear of a refugee 
influx is has now risen to the level of being a national security 
threat. History will mark this precedent as we look at Haiti's 
neighbor, Cuba and other countries in the days to come.
  Finally, the Torricelli-Hamilton resolution does not offer us a date 
certain for withdrawal, either. But it does accomplish one important 
objective: it sets our exit for March 1, 1995. It also gives our armed 
forces the time necessary to complete their mission, avoiding the 
concerns that our military experts have expressed, while making a 
strong constitutional statement about the role of Congress in such 
actions.
  Working with the hand that has been dealt us, and due to previous 
congressional inaction, I have chosen to support this option as the 
most responsible course of action. It expresses the will of the 
American people but at the same time protects the valiant men and women 
of our Armed Forces.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Edwards].
  Mr. EDWARDS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the issue today is not what our 
personal positions are on Haiti. The issue is not whether we support a 
military invasion of Haiti. The issue today is not Bill Clinton, and it 
should not be partisan politics.
  The issue today is whether this Congress will inadvertently 
jeopardize the lives of young American citizens in Haiti by setting an 
inflexible date certain for their withdrawal.
  Could anyone imagine General Eisenhower telling the Germans at 
Normandy that allied troops would withdraw if their mission was not 
successful by a certain date? Certainly not.
  Could anyone imagine General Patton telling Rommel that he would 
retreat his tanks if his mission was not accomplished by a certain 
date? Certainly not. Could anyone imagine President Bush telling Saddam 
Hussein or General Noriega that United States troops would be withdrawn 
from Kuwait or Panama if his mission was not accomplished by a certain 
date? Certainly not.

                              {time}  1940

  I would suggest, then, Mr. Chairman, that it would be just as wrong 
and just as dangerous for this Congress to set a date certain for the 
withdrawal of United States troops from Haiti. That is exactly what we 
are hearing from our American military leaders, including General 
Shalikashvili.
  I hope one of the painful but important lessons of Vietnam is that 
whether we personally oppose or support U.S. military action in another 
country, it is a deadly mistake to tie the hands of our troops once 
they are deployed. Let us not make that mistake again here today. Let 
us support our troops.
  We all want to bring our troops home as soon a possible, but until 
our young American citizens are home safely, let us not put our 
personal and partisan differences into a position of jeopardizing their 
lives. Let us support our troops. Let us let the military do its job 
without political second-guessing in Washington.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge opposition to the Michel amendment and support 
for the Dellums amendment.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me, and I want to express my appreciation to him for his leadership 
in this area. It has really been very distinctive, important, and 
constructive. I am pleased to join with him in the Torricelli-Hamilton 
amendment. I would like to direct my remarks to that amendment, if I 
may, at this point.
  Mr. Chairman, I think it is the best of the three choices that are 
before us. I would like to spell that out, Mr. Chairman. First, just to 
explain it, it authorizes United States military operations in Haiti 
until March 1, but then it has a Presidential waiver, and if the 
requirements are met, then the time can be expanded.
  Second, it sets out limited purposes of the U.S. military operation. 
I will come back to that in a moment. Third, for those who oppose the 
United States presence in Haiti beyond March 1, it guarantees a vote on 
a resolution directing the President to withdraw the troops.
  Mr. Chairman, the advantage of the Torricelli amendment is that it is 
the only one of the three that authorizes the presence of United States 
combat troops in Haiti. Three weeks ago, just before the President sent 
troops into Haiti, Members of this institution were talking all the 
time about the President should not commit troops without an 
authorization. Everybody agreed with that. Now, many Members of this 
institution are unwilling to authorize the presence of those troops, 
even after the fact.
  The Torricelli-Hamilton amendment authorizes the United States 
presence in Haiti. It is the only amendment before us that speaks to 
the question of authorization. Members must step up to the plate and 
exercise their Constitution responsibilities. Congress should share 
responsibility any time U.S. troops are deployed abroad for possible 
combat purposes.
  The Murtha-Hastings resolution does not do that. It does not 
authorize the presence of troops in Haiti, nor does the Michel 
amendment. If Congress is to play a role in difficult decisions on the 
use of force, Members should be willing to step up to the plate, and we 
do that by voting on the question of authorization, not by adoption a 
sense-of-the-Congress resolution.
  The sense-of-the-Congress resolution, for example, in the Dellums-
Murtha-Hastings-Dicks amendment said the President should have sought 
and welcomed congressional approval before deploying troops, but it 
does not say anything about the Congress stepping up to its 
responsibility and authorizing after the fact.
  You cannot have it both ways. Members cannot complain about no 
authorization beforehand, and then duck responsibility for 
authorization afterwards. The House tonight faces a very clear choice: 
Do United States troops in Haiti continue to operate solely on the 
President's authority, or do they also have the support and 
authorization of the United States Congress? I believe we should 
authorize.
  Let me make on other point about the Torricelli amendment. It is the 
only amendment before us that limits the scope of responsibility of the 
military forces. The Dellums-Murtha-Hastings-Dicks amendment is 
completely open-ended. You can get into the whole business of nation 
building under that amendment. There is no limitation on the scope of 
what military forces must do.
  In the Torricelli substitute, we are very specific about the limited 
purposes of our involvement: to protect United States citizens; to 
stabilize the security situation in Haiti, so that you can have orderly 
progress in transferring to a legitimate government; and to facilitate 
the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people in Haiti.

  What we do not do in the substitute amendment by the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli], we do not authorize nation building. Under 
the Murtha-Hastings-Dicks-Dellums substitute there is not any mention 
of this, and it is completely open-ended.
  Under the Torricelli substitute, we do not authorize United States 
troops to run Haiti. We do not authorize them to rebuild Haiti. We do 
not authorize them to create democracy in Haiti. Those are the tasks 
for the Haitians themselves, with help, of course, from the 
international community.
  Mr. Chairman, the reason for the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute offered by the gentlemen from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] is 
that it puts the Congress on record in support of United States combat 
troops in Haiti, and it authorizes their presence. It outlines a clear 
mission, limited in time, limited in scope.
  It gives United States troops a reasonable chance to accomplish their 
mission. It protects the constitutional prerogatives of this body, and 
it does not simply cede those responsibilities away, or duck the 
question. It ensures that Congress will come back in the 104th Congress 
and have the opportunity to pass judgment on the continued wisdom of 
this operation at a later date.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe, therefore, the reason that the Torricelli 
substitute is superior is because it steps up to the plate and permits 
us to exercise our congressional responsibilities under the 
Constitution, and it limits the amount of time that the troops can be 
there, and it limits the scope of the mission.
  May I say, Mr. Chairman, finally, that there are many, of course, who 
argue tonight for an early withdrawal, but I think that is a mistake. 
To pull our troops out on an early deadline simply risks the mission in 
Haiti.
  We have many views in this Congress about whether or not we should 
intervene, but that question is behind us now. The troops are there, 
and we should see that those troops succeed, and American foreign 
policy succeeds in Haiti.
  Mr. Delay. Mr. Chairman, United States policy toward Haiti has been 
full of errors from the start. First, we based our policy for the 
restoration of democracy on returning to power Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 
a man who--although elected democratically--clearly does not govern 
democratically.
  Aristide and his followers routinely incited mob violence and class 
warfare. He has publicly condoned the practice of necklacing 
opponents--igniting a gasoline-soaked tire around the head of an enemy 
and burning the victim alive. He also is believed to have personally 
ordered the execution of one of his top political enemies prior to 
being overthrown in September 1991. Aristide, moreover, routinely acted 
without the consent of the Haitian parliament and ignored the country's 
constitution.
  Yet now President Clinton has committed thousands of United States 
troops to Haiti in the hope that General Cedras will stick to his part 
of the agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter and leave power so that 
Aristide can take his seat again as president until the end of his 
term.
  At this time, many unanswered questions remain:
  What if Aristide decides not to step down at the end of his 
presidential term, as he has agreed to do? Until now, Aristide has held 
firm to his belief that the period of his exile does not count as part 
of his 5-year term in office. Will the United States blockade Haiti and 
impose economic sanctions if Aristide remains in office past 1996, in 
violation of the 1987 Haitian Constitution?
  What if Cedras or other members of the junta refuse to leave Haiti 
once they step down from power? Already Cedras has indicated that he 
has no desire to leave, and nothing in the agreement prevents him from 
staying. Imagine the kind of unrest that could ensue if he stays and 
decides to run for parliament this year or president next year. Will we 
be playing referee between the two political factions?
  What if Aristide turns on us again? the Clinton administration has 
been able to keep Aristide fairly quiet while he has been living in 
Washington. Once he's back in Haiti, however, he could revert to the 
anti-Americanism that has been prevalent throughout his political 
career. In a 1990 radio interview regarding United States support for 
the upcoming Haitian elections, for example, Aristide claimed that 
``they (the Americans) want to hold our guts always in their hands. 
Thus, we will become economically, politically, and cultural dependent. 
For our part, we reject this * * *''
  Perhaps the biggest question is what will we do if democracy fails to 
take root with Aristide's return? This is a country that, 
unfortunately, has never known democracy. Is the Clinton administration 
planning to keep United States troops in Haiti indefinitely?
  Clinton has yet to define as exit strategy to identify clearly the 
conditions that must be met in order to get our troops back home. At 
this point I fear that we could see a repeat of the failed nation-
building attempt that took place in Somalia last year with the 
unnecessary loss of some 40 American lives.
  The Hamilton resolution is a sham: it retroactively authorizes the 
United States occupation of Haiti, giving the President political cover 
if anything goes wrong; there are no provisions prohibiting 
appropriations for operations after the March withdrawal date so the 
President is under no obligation to honor it; furthermore, while the 
resolution seems to say that American troops will only serve under U.S. 
command, it does not specify whether this will hold true after the 
transition to a U.N.-led force takes place.
  The situation in Haiti poses no threat to international peace and 
security, and there was never any meaningful consultation with Congress 
on the issue of sending United States troops to occupy the island. 
Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that the American people do not 
support this operation.
  I would like to express my strong support for the Michel resolution, 
which states in no uncertain terms that U.S. troops should come home 
now. Instead of placing American young men and women in needless 
danger, we should be establishing ties with existing democratic 
institutions in Haiti for the promotion of free and fair elections, and 
the economic embargo of Haiti should be fully lifted to revive the 
economy.
  Mr. KOPETSKI. This issue is a very difficult one for me to resolve. 
And my dissatisfaction with the options presented is evidenced by the 
seemingly contradictory nature of my votes.
  Let me state first, that I have no issue in deciding how to vote on 
Mr. Michel's substitute. I reject it and voted against it. I believe 
the United States does have a national security interest in Haiti and 
it is necessary to place troops there. I believe it would be wrong to 
withdraw our troops immediately from Haiti.
  I supported the Dellums substitute because it reflects many of my 
beliefs: it commends the performance of our men and women in uniform 
who once again were asked to place their lives on the line on foreign 
soil; and it supports the prompt and orderly withdrawal of our troops 
as soon as possible. I find these important promises and worthy of my 
vote.
  What the Dellums amendment does not do is legally authorize the 
placement of troops on foreign soil. The substitute expresses only the 
sense of the Congress and is not legally binding. This is the flaw in 
the choice. I believe the Congress has the constitutional 
responsibility to authorize legally the placement of troops on foreign 
soil when placed in harms way as is the case in Haiti.

  The Hamilton substitute fulfills our Constitutional responsibility 
and legally authorizes the placement of troops. I believe I have a 
constitutional duty by the oath of office taken to vote to authorize 
the troops if I deem it necessary to have troops in Haiti. I do and I 
did.
  The flaw in the Hamilton substitute which give me great concern is 
the deadline imposed on the President to withdraw the troops. I don't 
support this deadline. I believe it is bad policy, if not dangerous 
policy, for our troops on the ground and for strategic purposes.
  I believe that, as in Somalia and in the current engagement, the 
imposition of post authorization of troops by Congress as well as 
imposition of Congressional deadlines for withdrawal exposes a 
significant, impractical flaw in the War Powers Act. The Act needs 
fixing if not repeal for it places Congress in the untenable position 
of choosing between Constitutional duty and deference to the Commander 
in Chief to take first actions to protect the lives of our troops. But 
This is a review and action for a future Congress.
  In light of the above I did vote for Mr. Hamilton's substitute 
opposing the deadline but granting the legal authority which the 
President must have in order to have American troops in Haiti.
  Though my votes are in past contradictory I was not given the choice 
I wanted; a legal authorization for the president to commit troops in 
Haiti for as long as necessary to protect our national security 
interests. I've done the best I could to honor my oath of office and to 
support good policy for America.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, each of the resolutions before us tonight 
has its serious imperfections.
  I voted against the Michel resolution because I believe that it would 
have led to chaos in Haiti and threatened our troops.
  The Dellums resolution would set no target date for withdrawing 
American troops from Haiti.
  The Toricelli resolution sets a target date, but its retroactive 
authorization is unwise and easily misunderstood.
  I opposed the use of force in Haiti. Now that our troops are there, I 
believe that we must support them. I also believe that there must be a 
clear mission and a target date set for their safe withdrawal.
  Since none of the resolutions before us tonight adequately address my 
concerns, I must reluctantly vote no on all of them.
  Ms. LOWEY. Mr. Chairman, I have said for months that I did not want 
to see United States Troops in Haiti. Like most Americans, I did not--
and do not--want to see young Americans placed in harms way. And I 
decided tonight that my responsibility in casting votes on alternative 
plans for bringing our troops home was to those several thousand 
American troops who are in Haiti now.
  If I could bring them home tonight, I would do it without question. 
And I continue to say that our priority now should be to turn this 
mission over to United Nations Forces and bring our troops safely home 
without delay. The key word is, without a doubt, ``safely.''
  It would be irresponsible for the Congress to add to the danger 
facing American troops already stationed overseas by casting a 
politically motivated vote. Military experts--one after another--have 
said that setting in stone a date for withdrawal of our troops puts 
them in greater danger. In the words of Gen. John Shalikashvili, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ``The bottom line is that the 
dynamic created by a mandated withdrawal date could make the situation 
more dangerous to our troops.'' And that makes good common sense--I 
don't know of any victorious military operation in history that has 
been conducted after sharing key strategic information with the 
adversary.
  My vote tonight--for the Murtha-Dellums resolution--should leave no 
doubt in anyone's mind about my determination to bring our troops home. 
I do not--and never have--supported this military action in Haiti. This 
resolution says--and means--that our troops should be withdrawn as soon 
as possible.
  Finally, I want to say a word about the discrepancies between the 
rhetoric of tonight's debate and the reality of the alternatives before 
us. Yes, the Michel resolution calls for the immediate withdrawal of 
our troops--but read on--the resolution then delays until January 21, 
1995, a vote on a resolution to require withdrawal--and that 
resolution, if adopted, would allow 30 days--until February 20, 1995--
for the withdrawal to be complete. The committee's resolution requires 
withdrawal by March 1. The difference--8 days--falls far short of what 
the rhetoric would have us believe.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today during this important debate 
on the resolutions regarding U.S. military involvement in Haiti.
  As many of my colleagues know, I opposed the invasion of Haiti, and 
cosponsored legislation to require the President to seek the approval 
of Congress prior to any military intervention in Haiti. However, the 
President committed U.S. Troops prior to congressional consideration, 
and now we have 20,000 troops in that country.
  Today, we debate how best to move forward given the fact that our men 
and women in uniform are in Haiti, facing daily danger but as yet, 
thankfully, without loss of life. There are three resolutions on the 
floor today: one sponsored by Rep. Michel, urging an immediate 
withdrawal of troops; one by Rep. Murtha, expressing the withdrawal of 
U.S. Troops as soon as possible; and one by Rep. Toricelli, authorizing 
the placement of troops in Haiti and urging their withdrawal by March 
1, 1995.
  While I opposed an invasion of Haiti, I do not believe with 20,000 
troops in that country we should pull them out today. Such a resolution 
sends a mixed signal to the military leaders in Haiti, undercuts the 
soldiers and sailors who are working for a quick and peaceful 
resolution to the return of exiled President Aristide, and potentially 
even puts them in harm's way. Therefore, I intend to vote against the 
Michel resolution.
  The Toricelli resolution authorizes this mission retroactively, and 
urges a withdrawal by March 1 of U.S. troops stationed in Haiti. As an 
opponent of military intervention of Haiti, I do not believe that we 
should authorize this mission. For that reason, I will oppose the 
Toricelli resolution.
  I intend to vote for the Murtha resolution, which calls for 
withdrawal of U.S. troops as soon as possible from Haiti. It is similar 
to the bipartisan resolution sponsored by Senators Bob Dole and George 
Mitchell now under consideration in the Senate.
  The President has indicated the return of President Aristide by 
October 15, 1994, just a few days away. Once he has returned to Haiti, 
we should bring our troops home as the situation becomes more secure, 
and allow the United Nations security forces to take over. Our troops 
will have fulfilled their mission to restore President Aristide to 
power, and our military role will be complete. I believe the Murtha 
resolution allows the President to accomplish these goals and I support 
efforts to bring our troops home as soon as possible.
  Mr. FRANKS of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my 
support for the Michel substitute to H.J. Res. 416. The Michel 
substitute is the best course of action in Haiti. From the beginning, I 
have opposed United States military involvement in Haiti. We need to do 
everything we can to get our troops home and out of harms way. I 
believe that the Michel alternative establishes a clear plan to bring 
our soldiers home. The Michel substitute is also the only alternative 
that prohibits U.S. forces from serving under foreign command.
  Along with the fear of losing American lives, there are several 
reasons that stand out in my mind why we shouldn't be in Haiti. For 
example, who is going to assume the cost of this mission? I know the 
United Nation approved this occupation, but I don't see our allies 
opening up their checkbooks for support. I will tell you who is going 
to pay, the American taxpayer. The Department of Defense has already 
stated it does not have enough money to cover the $250 million initial 
cost of this operation. Estimates of the cost of the occupation are now 
being made as high as $3 billion. So once again the American taxpayer 
is going to get stuck with the bill for an occupation that the majority 
of Americans oppose. Something is wrong with the picture.
  Another concern is the fact that President Clinton blatantly ignored 
the will of the American people and the Congress. Instead he turned to 
the United Nations, rather than the elected officials of his own 
country giving the people the impression that Mr. Clinton places the 
approval of the United Nation ahead of the American people. It is also 
sad that only after American troops have been in Haiti for 2 weeks that 
we now are addressing this issue properly on the floor of the House of 
Representatives. It is unfortunate that the Democratic leadership 
prohibited the Congress from voting on this important matter prior to 
the United States occupation of Haiti
  President Clinton should study the rules of engagement outlined by 
former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Secretary Weinberger 
argued that there are four principles that should be adhered to before 
committing U.S. troops on foreign soil: The operation should have the 
support of the American people and the Congress, the mission should be 
specifically defined, the operation should be in the strategic interest 
of the United States, and finally there should be a clear exit plan for 
our troops. Unfortunately, the Haiti occupation does not satisfy any of 
these four criteria.
  You may recall that this is not the first nation-building exercise 
for American troops in Haiti. From 1915 to 1934 U.S. forces occupied 
this caribbean nation to no avail. In fact, Haiti has never had a 
sustainable democracy.
  Mr. Chairman the Michel substitute to H.J. Res. 415 is the only 
alternative that provides a clear plan to get United States troops out 
of Haiti. The Dellums and Torricelli plans fail to define a specific 
course of action. The Michel plan holds the President accountable to 
the Congress on this important matter. I believe that we are ducking 
our own responsibility as elected Members of the House of 
Representatives if we adopt the Torricelli or Dellums alternatives.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the substitute offered 
by Representative Dellums, Representative Murtha, and a number of my 
colleagues.
  This resolution, unlike the others we are considering today, does not 
tie the fate of our soldiers to an arbitrary date. Setting either 
January 3, 1995 or March 1, 1995 as the date certain for the withdrawal 
of our forces will undercut the ability of our President to conduct 
foreign policy. In addition, a date certain for withdrawal will impair 
his responsibility as Commander in Chief to direct our armed forces.
  The deadline also flies in the face of military strategy, by 
disregarding the need for secrecy. Affording those who do not share our 
interests in restoring democracy in Haiti the opportunity to plan 
around our exit date could expose our forces to serious dangers. 
Furthermore, our strategic objectives, and their potential undoing, 
would be tied to our departure date. I cannot think of a military 
leader in our history that has tied his fate to this type of policy, 
which has serious consequences for this and future military operations.
  I was opposed to the invasion of Haiti and I continue to have grave 
misgivings about our current occupation. Nevertheless, the President 
has deployed our forces to that country to restore order and to help 
ensure a smooth transfer of power from Haiti's current military regime 
to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Congress must call upon the 
President to accomplish this mission quickly and then return home.
  Our military forces are the most highly trained and professional 
soldiers in the world, and they deserve our support. We are asking them 
to perform a dangerous and ever-widening mission, under difficult 
circumstances, with unclear rules of engagement. Their responsibilities 
include protecting Haiti's citizens and political leaders from attack, 
and seizing weapons from paramilitary groups. Previous experience shows 
that nation-building and peacekeeping missions in hostile environments 
can place American soldiers in the difficult position of fending off 
attacks from local factions.
  At this juncture, we need a precise mission laying out our objective 
and how we will accomplish it. This policy must also include clearly 
defined rules of engagement, and an exit strategy; not an exit date. 
Finally, we must commit the resources needed to give our soldiers the 
ability to defend themselves and to ensure their safe return.
  For these reasons, I believe it is incumbent on this body to call 
upon the Administration to produce the most rational and even-handed 
policy possible. We must focus our energies on approving a measure to 
help guarantee that the fundamental requirements I have mentioned are 
met and that our forces are withdrawn from Haiti as soon as possible, 
with minimal risk.
  Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, throughout my tenure in 
Congress I have always strongly opposed offensive U.S. military action 
against foreign nations except as an absolute last resort. I am a firm 
believer in the importance of diplomatic resolve.
  However, I also strongly believe that once American troops are 
committed overseas and engaged in a mission as important as the 
restoration of democracy in the Republic of Haiti, we, as Members of 
Congress and as citizens of this great country, must stand firmly 
behind our men and women and support their efforts 100 percent. We must 
give our courageous and competent soldiers the moral and economic 
support necessary to the successful completion of their duties.
  Throughout the last days of the 103d Congress, there has been a great 
deal of election year politics and grandstanding by those individuals 
whose sole purpose has recently been to damage the President of the 
United States. We cannot allow such tactics to sabotage our troops in 
Haiti.
  This morning South African President Nelson Mandela addressed a joint 
session in this chamber and praised the United States for its diligent 
efforts to help break the stranglehold of apartheid in his nation and 
bring freedom and democracy to the South African people. Does not the 
United States have the same responsibilities in Haiti?
  Mr. Chairman, I congratulate President Clinton for working diligently 
to restore democracy in the Republic of Haiti in the face of great 
opposition. He has shown great strength and courage as this Nation 
Commander in Chief in attempting to resolve longstanding unrest in that 
nation in the swiftest and most nonviolent that is possible.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Dellums substitute and allow the 
American troops to complete their mission and bring peace to Haiti and 
urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. KIM. Mr. Chairman, we are at long last debating the American 
occupation of Haiti. I believe we need to examine how much this 
occupation is going to cost. The early estimates peg our cost at $250 
million through the end of this year.
  Our Nation's Armed Forces have been slashed by 25 percent since the 
Gulf War and are unable to meet their training budgets. How are we 
going to pay for the occupation without further degrading our military 
readiness?
  What are we spending our money on?
  We are spending thousands of dollars to buy obsolete weapons. We are 
spending tens of thousands of dollars to train and pay Haitian police 
to sit in Guantanamo refugee camps. We have spent millions for 
humanitarian food relief and stood by and watched the distribution 
centers be ransacked.
  What is our mission? Is it restoring Jean-Bertrande Aristide to power 
or is it to promote democracy? Aristide is no different from the 
military thugs we are overthrowing. Aristide advocates murder and 
brutality as valid tools of government. How is siding with Aristide any 
different from choosing sides in the chaos of Somalia? When Aristide 
returns, who knows what will happen? Haiti may degenerate into civil 
conflict. Are we going to take sides in a civil war? Are we going to 
invade Haiti again to replace Aristide?
  What is going on? How long are we going to be Haiti? Without answers 
to those questions Congress has a responsibility to end this ill-fated 
adventure. Our servicemen and women should never be thrown into a 
dangerous environment without a clear mission. And given our budgetary 
problems we should end this ill-advised waste of precious taxpayer 
dollars.
  I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for the Michel substitute.
  Mr. LIGHTFOOT. I rise in opposition to the resolution. I will not 
vote to give President Clinton a backdoor authorization for his 
unilateral decision to deploy troops to Haiti. Nor do I believe we 
should let House Democrats have any opportunity to hide from their 
complicity in this matter.
  Like all Americans I support our Troops when they are in harm's way 
and I pray for their safety and success. But if this operation devolves 
into the same nation building fiasco we witnessed in Somalia, the 
responsibility should rest squarely where it belongs, with President 
Clinton and the House Democrats who sanctioned this adventure last 
June.
  On June 25, 1994, I offered an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, 
State appropriation to cut the $25 million budgeted for the United 
States contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations in Haiti. That 
amendment was opposed by House Democrats because they decided it would 
unnecessarily tie the President hands.
  How ironic that we now find ourselves here today discussing a 
Democrat resolution which is opposed by our field commanders because it 
would tie the President's hands in Haiti. It's clear to me the 
Democrats have stuck their collective fingers into the air and suddenly 
discovered the American people don't want our troops in Haiti.
  Well it's too late. House Democrats had several legislative 
opportunities to stop this madness and like Bill Clinton, you avoided 
your responsibility.
  The President should be held accountable because he has presented the 
American people a fait accompli. Yes, today Congress can try and order 
our troops home in a safe and orderly manner. But if we are not 
prepared to take that decisive step, I don't think we should ignore the 
recommendation of our force commanders and establish arbitrary dates 
for the withdrawal of our troops.
  I believe the President has evaded his constitutional duty by 
avoiding Congress in this matter. Haiti is no threat to our national 
security. The buildup toward our intervention in Haiti was conducted 
quite publicly.
  Who did the President consult before launching this mission? He 
consulted with United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, 
the members of the United Nations Security Council, the leaders of 
Caribbean and Latin American nations.
  It appears Bill Clinton had time to consult with everyone but the 
American people. I guess we should be grateful that Bill Clinton found 
10 minutes to address the American people with a half hearted attempt 
to justify invading Haiti on the eve of his intervention.
  But Mr. Speaker, there is a bigger issue here than just our ownership 
of a small, useless Caribbean nation. President Clinton's action in 
Haiti exemplifies his administration's foreign policy.
  Presidential decision directive 25, the Clinton administration's 
peacekeeping doctrine, was designed for situations just like Haiti. 
PDD-25's criteria for establishing and participating in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations are so vague as to justify any dubious 
multilateral action the President's advisors, decide upon. If you can 
justify Haiti with PDD-25, then you can justify anything.
  Under the Clinton peacekeeping doctrine, our military is no longer to 
defend the United States, it's no longer to be used for power 
projection, it's to be a global police force.
  Well Mr. Speaker, Americans don't like watching American troops in 
Haiti entering homes and making arrests without warrants--in the name 
of democracy. Americans don't like watching American troops shut down 
television stations because we don't like what is being broadcast--in 
the name of democracy. And Americans don't like the idea of using 
American troops using American bayonets, to replacing one set of 
dictators with a person who has no demonstrated commitment to 
democracy, the rule of law or human rights.
  I urge this House to support nothing less than legislation which 
brings home our troops--now.
  Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, while I have not supported 
an American invasion or occupation of Haiti, I want, at the outset, to 
make it very clear that I am supportive of the courageous men and women 
in uniform who are currently performing their military tasks with skill 
and professionalism in Haiti. I also commend Gen. Colin Powell, Senator 
Nunn and former President Carter for their efforts to negotiate an 
agreement which eliminated the possibility of a forced military entry 
into Haiti and the loss of life that might have entailed.
  I am also supportive of President Clinton's effort to intercept 
Haitian refugees at sea and transport them to Guantanamo and other 
locations outside the United States, rather than allowing the large 
scale entry of Haitian refugees into Florida. Ultimately, the only 
long-term solution to the Haitian refugee crisis is to encourage the 
restoration of greater prosperity and individual security in Haiti--
that goal serves the needs of both the United States and of the Haitian 
people. Permitting a large-scale Haitian exodus to the United States 
creates problems in our country and does not correct the underlying 
cause of the exodus--poverty and human rights violations in Haiti.
  It is my view that no substantial military invasion or occupation of 
a foreign nation should occur without the express authorization of the 
representatives of the American people--Congress. I have held that view 
during the Reagan and Bush administrations and now express the same 
position during the Clinton administration. I appreciate that 
Presidents Reagan and Bush as well as President Clinton deny the need 
for congressional authority prior to this type of military action, and 
this difference of opinion is why I sought judicial clarification of 
the issue prior to Desert Storm. The Court declined to rule on meaning 
of the constitutional warmaking clause prior to Desert Storm because 
President Bush did ultimately seek a congressional vote. No such vote 
was taken prior to invasions of Lebanon, Panama, or Grenada and 
President Clinton is currently following the precedent set by previous 
Presidents.
  I believe that the United States should execute an orderly withdrawal 
from Haiti in a manner consistent with preserving the safety of our 
troops. I have not talked to one parent in South Dakota who believes 
that the national interest of the United States justifies jeopardizing 
the lives of their sons or daughters in Haiti. Our Nation should 
facilitate the deployment of an international peacekeeping force as 
quickly as possible.
  The United States can and must play some role in reducing the turmoil 
in Haiti, but I do not believe that our country can continue to play 
the role of policeman for the world, or even for our hemisphere. In 
situations such as this where the threat to the United States is 
marginal, the better strategy is to rely on international peacekeeping 
efforts--in which the United States will often play some significant 
role--in conjunction with trade and diplomatic efforts.
  Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Dellums-Murtha 
substitute to House Joint Resolution 416. As a former naval officer, 
who served during the Cuban missile crisis, I have firsthand experience 
of military operations in the Caribbean. Therefore, I take seriously 
the responsibility of placing the men and women of the U.S. Armed 
Forces in harm's way.
  Had President Kennedy been schackled with a date certain for the 
termination of the Cuban quarantine, the Soviet Union would have 
successfully put nuclear missiles in Cuba.
  Our senior military leaders like Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, 
General Shalikashvili; JCS Director of Operations, General Sheehan; and 
former JCS Chairman Colin Powell have told us that we place our troops 
at risk by imposing a date certain. It seems irrational to me that we 
would then impose a date certain, which is little more than a political 
solution to this military operation. U.S. troops should not be pawns in 
the debate between the legislative and executive branches of 
Government.
  The plan we have before us in the Dellums substitute requires the 
administration to define the mission, identify the costs, estimate the 
duration of United States presence in Haiti with monthly reports to 
Congress. This substitute supports our troops without giving 
congressional approval to their deployment and without jeopardizing 
them with a date certain. I see this as the best means to successfully 
completing the mission in Haiti.
  I know that is this partisan environment some who have never served 
their country in the military will criticize those of us who refuse to 
jeopardize our troops for political gain. While I disagreed with the 
decision to introduced troops into Haiti without congressional 
approval, now that they are there we must give them our full and 
unequivocal support. I urge adoption of the Dellums-Murtha substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to 
the rule, the bill is considered for amendment under the 5-minute rule. 
The amendments printed in part 1 of House Report 103-840 are considered 
as adopted.
  The text of House Joint Resolution 416, as amended, is as follows:

                             H.J. Res. 416

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Limited 
     Authorization for the United States-led Force in Haiti 
     Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) On September 18, 1994, the special delegation to Haiti 
     succeeded in convincing the de facto authorities in Haiti to 
     sign the Port-au-Prince Agreement under which such 
     authorities agreed to leave power.
       (2) On September 18, 1994, after the Port-au-Prince 
     Agreement was reached, the President ordered the deployment 
     of United States Armed Forces in and around Haiti.
       (3) On September 21, 1994, the President submitted a 
     report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1541 et seq.), on the introduction of United States Armed 
     Forces into Haiti.
       (4) The Congress fully supports the men and women of the 
     United States Armed Forces who are carrying out their mission 
     in Haiti with professional excellence and dedicated 
     patriotism.
       (b) Statement of Policy.--The Congress declares the 
     following:
       (1) The United States-led force in Haiti should use all 
     necessary means to protect United States citizens, to 
     stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that orderly 
     progress may be made in transferring the functions of 
     government in that country to the democratically-elected 
     government of Haiti, and to facilitate the provision of 
     humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti.
       (2) Transfer of operations in Haiti from the United States-
     led force in Haiti to the United Nations-led force in Haiti 
     should be facilitated and expedited to the fullest extent 
     possible.
       (3) United States Armed Forces should be withdrawn from 
     Haiti as soon as possible.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) Authorization.--Subject to subsection (b), United 
     States Armed Forces are authorized to participate in the 
     United States-led force in Haiti only--
       (1) to protect United States citizens;
       (2) to stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that 
     orderly progress may be made in transferring the functions of 
     government in that country to the democratically-elected 
     government of Haiti; and
       (3) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance 
     to the people of Haiti.
       (b) Limitations.--
       (1) Termination of authorization.--The authorization 
     provided by subsection (a) shall expire on March 1, 1995, 
     unless the President determines and certifies to Congress in 
     the report required by section 4(b)(3) that the continued 
     participation of U.S. armed forces in the U.S.-led force is 
     essential to protect U.S. citizens or vital U.S. national 
     security interests.
       (2) Prohibition on Foreign Command.--United States Armed 
     Forces described in subsection (a) shall remain under the 
     command and control of officers of the United States Armed 
     Forces at all times.

     SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       (a) In General.--The President shall submit to the Congress 
     reports on --
       (1) the participation of United States Armed Forces in the 
     United States-led force in Haiti and the United Nations-led 
     force in Haiti, including--
       (A) the number of members of the United States Armed Forces 
     that are participating in such United States-led force and 
     such United Nations-led force;
       (B) the functions of such Armed Forces; and
       (C) the costs of deployment of such Armed Forces; and
       (2) the efforts to withdraw United States Armed Forces from 
     Haiti, including--
       (A) for the purpose of achieving a transition from the 
     United States-led force in Haiti to the United Nations-led 
     force in Haiti, the status of efforts to implement the Port-
     au-Prince Agreement and to otherwise carry out the terms of 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions 917 (May 6, 1994) 
     and 940 (July 31, 1994);
       (B) the status of plans to accomplish such transition to 
     the United Nations-led force in Haiti; and
       (C) the status of plans to withdraw United States Armed 
     Forces from Haiti.
       (b) Reporting Dates.--A report under this section shall be 
     submitted--
       (1) not later than November 30, 1994, covering the period 
     since September 18, 1994;
       (2) not later than December 31, 1994; covering the period 
     since the report described in paragraph (1); and
       (3) not later than February 1, 1995, covering the period 
     since the report described in paragraph (2).
       (c) War Powers Resolution Reporting Requirements.--The 
     requirements of this section do not supersede the 
     requirements of the Was Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et. 
     seq.).

     SEC. 5. REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the speaker of the 
     House of Representatives and the majority leader of the 
     Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the minority 
     leader of the House of Representatives and the minority 
     leader of the Senate, respectively, should monitor closely 
     events in Haiti in considering whether to exercise any 
     authority that may be granted to reassemble the Congress 
     after the adjournment of the Congress sine die, if the public 
     interest shall warrant it.

     SEC. 6. JOINT RESOLUTION PROHIBITING CONTINUED USE OF UNITED 
                   STATES ARMED FORCES IN HAITI.

       (A) In General.--If a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (b) is enacted, the President shall remove United 
     States Armed Forces from Haiti in accordance with such joint 
     resolution.
       (b) Description of Joint Resolution.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a), a joint resolution described in this 
     subsection is a joint resolution the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``Pursuant to 
     section 6 of the Limited Authorization for the United States-
     led Force in Haiti Resolution, the Congress hereby directs 
     the President to remove United States Armed Forces from Haiti 
     not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this joint resolution, except for a limited number of members 
     of the United States Armed Forces sufficient to protect 
     United States diplomatic facilities and personnel.''.
       (c) Priority Procedures.--
       (1) Introduction of joint resolution.--Paragraph (2) shall 
     only apply to a joint resolution described in subsection (b) 
     and introduced on or after the date on which the President 
     submits, or is required to submit, the report required by 
     section 4(b)(3).
       (2) Consideration of joint resolution--Only one joint 
     resolution described in subsection (b) and introduced in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) shall be considered in 
     accordance with the procedures described in section 7 of the 
     War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546), except that, for 
     purposes of such consideration, the term ``calendar days'' in 
     such section shall be deemed to mean ``legislative days''.

     SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this joint resolution, the following 
     definitions apply:
       (1) Legislative days.--The term ``legislative days'' means 
     days in which the House of Representatives is in session.
       (2) Port-au-prince agreement.--The term ``Port-au-Prince 
     Agreement'' means the agreement reached between the United 
     States special delegation and the de facto authorities in 
     Haiti on September 18, 1994.
       (3) United nations-led force in haiti.--The term ``United 
     Nations-led force in Haiti'' means the United Nations Mission 
     in Haiti (commonly referred to as ``UNMIH'') authorized by 
     United Nations Security Council Resolutions 867 (September 
     23, 1993), 905 (March 23, 1994), 933 (June 30, 1994), and 940 
     (July 31, 1994).
       (4) United states-led force in haiti.--The term ``United 
     States-led force in Haiti'' means the multinational force 
     (commonly referred to as ``MNF'') authorized by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994).

     SEC.  . AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS TO DECLARE WAR.

       It is the sense of the Congress that, under circumstances 
     existing prior to concluding the Port-au-Prince Agreement, 
     the Constitution of the United States would have required the 
     President to obtain the approval of the Congress before 
     ordering United States Armed Forces to invade Haiti to remove 
     the de facto authorities in Haiti.

  The CHAIRMAN. No further amendment to this bill is in order except 
those printed in part 2 of the report.
  Those amendments may be offered only in the order printed in the 
report, only by a Member designated in the report, are considered as 
read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report, equally 
divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent of the 
amendment, and shall not be subject to amendment, except as specified 
in the report. If more than one of the amendments printed in part 2 of 
the report is adopted, only the last to be adopted shall be considered 
as finally adopted and reported to the House.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 2 of 
House Report 103-840.


     amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in 
the nature of a substitute.
  The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as 
follows:

       Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
     Gilman: Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Withdrawal from 
     Haiti Resolution''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) On September 19, 1994, President Clinton introduced 
     United States Armed Forces into Haiti for purposes of 
     effecting a transition of power from the military regime of 
     General Raoul Cedras to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
       (2) Under President Clinton's plan, approximately 20,000 
     United States Armed Forces personnel have been deployed to 
     Haiti and most are to remain there until, in the judgment of 
     the United Nations Security Council, they have established a 
     secure and stable environment and a follow-on United Nations 
     peacekeeping force known as the United Nations Mission in 
     Haiti (UNMIH) is capable of assuming their functions.
       (3) In accordance with United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 940 (1994), the UNMIH peacekeeping force is to 
     consist of 6,000 personnel and is to remain in Haiti until 
     February 1996.
       (4) President Clinton intends for United States Armed 
     Forces personnel to comprise a substantial portion of the 
     UNMIH peacekeeping force that will remain in Haiti until 
     February 1996.
       (5) President Clinton never requested or obtained the 
     authorization of the United States Congress for his plan to 
     deploy United States Armed Forces to Haiti.
       (6) The incremental cost to the United States of President 
     Clinton's planned military occupation of Haiti is estimated 
     to total not less than $500 million and could be 
     significantly higher. In addition, it is anticipated that the 
     United States will provide hundreds of millions of dollars in 
     economic and humanitarian assistance to Haiti during the 
     military occupation.
       (7) The deployment of United States Armed Forces to Haiti 
     is adversely affecting military readiness by placing an 
     enormous stain on a reduced military force structure and by 
     consuming considerable resources from an underfunded defense 
     budget.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (a) the President should not have ordered United States 
     Armed Forces to occupy Haiti;
       (b) the President should immediately commence the safe and 
     orderly withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Haiti 
     and should conclude that withdrawal as soon as possible in a 
     manner consistent with the safety of those Forces;
       (c) the President should pursue all appropriate diplomatic 
     steps to ensure that the UNMIH peacekeeping force is promptly 
     put in place and is fully comprised of military personnel 
     from other countries.

     SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN COMMAND.

       United States Armed Forces in Haiti shall remain under the 
     command and control (including operational control) of 
     officers of the United States Armed Forces at all times.

     SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HAITI.

       Not later than November 1, 1994, and monthly thereafter 
     until the cessation of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 
     President shall submit a report to Congress on the situation 
     in Haiti, including:
       (a) a listing of the units of the United States Armed 
     Forces and of the police and military units of other nations 
     participating in operations in and around Haiti;
       (b) the estimated duration of Operation Uphold Democracy 
     and progress toward the withdrawal of all United States Armed 
     Forces from Haiti consistent with the goal of section 3(b) of 
     this resolution;
       (c) armed incidents or the use of force in or around Haiti 
     involving United States Armed Forces or Coast Guard personnel 
     in the time period covered by the report;
       (d) the estimated cumulative incremental cost of all U.S. 
     activities subsequent to September 30, 1993 in and around 
     Haiti, including but not limited to:
       (1) the cost of all deployments of United States Armed 
     Forces and Coast Guard personnel, training, exercises, 
     mobilization, and preparation activities, including the 
     preparation of police and military units of the other nations 
     of the multinational force involved in enforcement of 
     sanctions, limits on migration, establishment and maintenance 
     of migrant facilities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and 
     all other activities relating to operations in and around 
     Haiti; and
       (2) the costs of all other activities relating to United 
     States policy toward Haiti, including humanitarian 
     assistance, reconstruction, aid and other financial 
     assistance, and all other costs to the United States 
     Government;
       (e) a detailed accounting of the source of funds obligated 
     or expended to meet the costs described in subparagraph (d), 
     including:
       (1) in the case of funds expended from the Department of 
     Defense budget, a breakdown by military service or defense 
     agency, line item and program, and
       (2) in the case of funds expended from the budgets of 
     department and agencies other than the Department of Defense, 
     a breakdown by department or agency and program;
       (f) the Administration plan for financing the costs of the 
     operations and the impact on readiness without supplemental 
     funding;
       (g) a description of the situation in Haiti, including:
       (1) the security situation;
       (2) the progress made in transferring the functions of 
     government to the democratically elected government of Haiti; 
     and
       (3) progress toward holding free and fair parliamentary 
     elections.
       (h) a description of issues relating to the United Nations 
     Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), including
       (1) the preparedness of the United Nations Mission in Haiti 
     (UNMIH) to deploy to Haiti to assume its functions;
       (2) troop commitments by other nations to UNMIH;
       (3) the anticipated cost to the United States of 
     participation in UNMIH, including payments to the United 
     Nations and financial, material and other assistance to 
     UNMIH;
       (4) proposed or actual participation of United States Armed 
     Forces in UNMIH;
       (5) proposed command arrangements for UNMIH, including any 
     proposed or actual placement of United States Armed Forces 
     under foreign command; and
       (6) the anticipated duration of UNMIH.

     SEC. 6. REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

       Not later than January 1, 1995, the Secretary of State 
     shall report to Congress on the participation or involvement 
     of any member of the de jure or de facto Haitian government 
     in violations of internationally-recognized human rights from 
     December 15, 1990 to December 15, 1994.

     SEC. 7. REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS.

       It is the sense of the Congress that the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the 
     Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority 
     Leader of the House of Representatives and the Minority 
     Leader of the Senate, respectively, should monitor closely 
     events in Haiti in considering whether to exercise any 
     authority that may be granted to reassemble the Congress 
     after the adjournment of the Congress sine die.

     SEC. 8. ESTABLISHMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON HAITI.

       (a) Establishment and Duties.--there is established a 
     congressional commission to assess the humanitarian, 
     political, and diplomatic conditions in Haiti and to present 
     to the Congress a report offering appropriate policy options 
     available to the United States with respect to Haiti. The 
     Commission shall call upon recognized experts on Haiti and 
     Haitian culture, as well as experts on health and social 
     welfare, political institution building, and diplomatic 
     processes and negotiations.
       (b) Composition of Commission.--The Commission shall 
     consist of the following Members of Congress (or their 
     designees);
       (1) The Speaker of the House of Representatives;
       (2) The minority leader of the House of Representatives;
       (3) The chairman and ranking Member of the following 
     committees of the House of Representatives:
       (A) The Committee on Appropriations;
       (B) The Committee on foreign Affairs;
       (C) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
       (D) The Committee on Armed Services;
       (4) The majority leader of the Senate;
       (5) The minority leader of the Senate;
       (6) The chairman and ranking Member of the following 
     committees of the Senate:
       (A) The Committee on Appropriations;
       (B) The Committee on Foreign Relations;
       (C) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence;
       (D) The Committee on Armed Services; and
       (7) The chairman and vice-chairman of the Congressional 
     Hunger Caucus.
       (c) Report of Commission.--Not later than 45 days after 
     enactment of this joint resolution, the Commission shall 
     submit to the Congress a report on the Commission's analysis 
     and assessment of appropriate policy options available to the 
     United States with respect to Haiti.

     SEC. 9. JOINT RESOLUTION PROHIBITING CONTINUED USE OF UNITED 
                   STATES ARMED FORCES IN HAITI.

       (a) In General.--If a joint resolution described in 
     subsection (b) is enacted, the President shall remove United 
     States Armed Forces from Haiti in accordance with such joint 
     resolution.
       (b) Description of Joint Resolution.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a), a joint resolution described in this 
     subsection is a joint resolution the matter after the 
     resolving clause of which is as follows: ``Pursuant to 
     section 9 of the Withdrawal from Haiti Resolution, the 
     Congress hereby directs the President to remove United States 
     Armed Forces from Haiti not later than 30 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this joint resolution, except for a 
     limited number of members of the United States Armed Forces 
     sufficient to protect United States diplomatic facilities and 
     personnel.''.
       (c) Priority Procedures.--
       (1) Introduction of joint resolution.--Paragraph (2) shall 
     apply only to a joint resolution described in subsection (b) 
     and introduced on January 3, 1995, or if the Congress is not 
     in session on that date, the first day of session thereafter, 
     if all United States Armed Forces have not been withdrawn 
     from Haiti by that date.
       (2) Consideration of joint resolution.--Any joint 
     resolution described in subsection (b) and introduced in 
     accordance with paragraph (1) shall be referred to the 
     Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
     or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the 
     case may be, and one such resolution shall be reported out by 
     such committee together with its recommendations by January 
     18, 1995, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the 
     yeas and nays. Any joint resolution reported or required to 
     be reported pursuant to the preceding sentence shall become 
     the pending business of the House in question (in the case of 
     the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided 
     between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted 
     on no later than January 21, 1995, or if the House in 
     question is not in session on that date, the first day of 
     session of such House thereafter, unless such House shall 
     otherwise determine by the yeas and nays. The procedures 
     described in subsections 7(c) and 7(d) of the War Powers 
     Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546) shall apply to further 
     congressional consideration of any joint resolution approved 
     by either House pursuant to the preceding sentence.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Michel-Gilman substitute now before us 
reflects the will of the American people and deserves the support of 
their representatives in this House.
  Most important, unlike the Torricelli resolution, the Michel-Gilman 
substitute does not authorize any occupation of Haiti. Rather, it 
expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should not have 
deployed our troops there in the first place.
  Our resolution provides that the President should immediately 
commence the safe and orderly withdrawal of United States forces from 
Haiti and should conclude that withdrawal as soon as possible in a 
manner consistent with the safety of those forces.
  The Michel-Gilman substitute expresses the sense of Congress that the 
President should take diplomatic steps to organize a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation in Haiti composed of military personnel from 
other countries.
  In the event that the President has failed to respect the will of 
Congress by withdrawing our forces, this substitute also provides for 
House and Senate votes no later than January 21, 1995, on a resolution 
requiring the withdrawal of U.S. forces within 30 days.
  Our substitute also prohibits foreign command or operational control 
of United States forces in Haiti at all times.
  In addition, the Michel-Gilman substitute also requires separate 
Presidential reports on the costs of all of our expenditures, on the 
troubling questions on human rights, and on plans for withdrawing U.S. 
forces.
  Mr. Chairman, President Clinton acted on his own without any 
congressional authorization in deciding to occupy Haiti. Each of us are 
now called upon to decide for ourselves whether that was a wise 
decision.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe we can far better respond to the will of the 
American people by supporting the Michel-Gilman substitute.
  I believe it is time for the U.N. peacekeeping to take over, and it 
is time to bring our troops home. Accordingly, I urge a ``yes'' vote 
for Michel-Gilman.

                              {time}  1950

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Michel-Gilman 
resolution. I must say that I had an opportunity last weekend with the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha], the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Young], the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Skeen], the gentleman 
from California [Mr. Dixon] and other Members to go to Haiti. I want to 
report to my colleagues that what we saw there was an outstanding 
example of the United States being able to take troops, move them on 
the ground. Logistically it was another one of the great examples of 
our mobility and our ability to react in a crisis. I believe that there 
is no significant military threat to our forces in Haiti. Yes, there 
will be sporadic acts of violence, and we need to strengthen the police 
force in Haiti. We need to restructure it, clean it out of those people 
who are not sympathetic to Mr. Aristide and not willing to work for 
peace in Haiti. But to say that we should pull out and that there is no 
justification for being there is simply wrong and a mistake.
  First of all, the United States in my judgment has a national 
interest in being in Haiti. We have got a terrible problem with 
immigration towards our country. We have the disastrous acts against 
people in that country, rape and murder, over the last several years by 
the Cedras government. The United States had every right to act and to 
help restore Mr. Aristide and I think he will be restored.
  The best thing I saw down in that country was that the people of 
Haiti support the United States being there. They were very friendly to 
our soldiers. They want us to be there. They recognize that this gives 
them a chance for democracy, this gives them a chance to have a 
government that has been elected, a democratically elected government. 
To say that we should pull out immediately, that there was no reason 
for us to go there, I think is wrong. I am somewhat amazed and 
embarrassed that our colleagues on the other side of the aisle are 
suggesting that we did not do the right thing, that the President did 
not do the right thing. I think he did the right thing.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished ranking member of the Committee 
on Rules.
  (Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Michel/Gilman 
substitute.
  At the conclusion of my remarks earlier today, I said that 
wholeheartedly, the immediate, safe, and orderly withdrawal of United 
States forces from Haiti ``Is the only policy option I can support in 
the absence of any compelling plan to incorporate Haiti into the sphere 
of America's vital interests.''
  I would like to elaborate on that statement by saying that not a 
single American soldier, sailor, marine, or airman should be committed 
for deployment in any operation in any country in which the United 
States does not have a clear, compelling, and absolutely vital interest 
at stake--period.
  And until the President, as Commander in Chief, makes that case with 
respect to Haiti, I will remain convinced that we have no business 
being there.
  Mr. Chairman, neither our citizens, the press, nor--I am convinced--
many Members of Congress have any clear idea of the extent to which our 
military capability has been diminished since the end of the Persian 
Gulf war.
  I am referring especially to the two pillars on which any national 
defense capability must be build: modernization and readiness.
  I want to make a few comments about modernization first as a means of 
providing some context, and then I want to focus on the issue of 
readiness, because that is the issue which is affected most directly by 
ill-advised operations such as the one in Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, President Clinton came into office promising to double 
the defense cuts that former President Bush outlined for the period 
through fiscal year 1999.
  Within several months of taking office, President Clinton took his 
own defense cut projections and doubled them!
  Only then, once the fix was in, did the President decide that a study 
should be made of what kind of defense capability is actually necessary 
to meet the minimum security needs of the country.
  The upshot of the whole thing is simply this: Our Government is now 
underfunding the minimum security needs of the country to the tune of 
more than $100 billion over the next 4 years.
  And even that figure is suspect because the current Defense budget 
contains so many non-Defense items.
  In the last 4 years alone, annual non-Defense spending, which is 
nevertheless listed in the Defense budget, has nearly quadrupled--from 
$3.5 billion to more than $13 billion.
  Mr. Chairman, our military is only 5 or 6 years away from a 
modernization crisis of gigantic proportions.
  Procurement, in real dollars, is down by 67 percent since 1985. 
Research and development, in real dollars, is down by more than 20 
percent in the same period.
  I cite these figures, Mr. Chairman, because General Shalikashvili has 
said that ``Modernization is the key to future readiness.''
  General Shalikashvili has also said this: ``Our structure is getting 
smaller and smaller with each year, but our commitments remain global 
in scope, and the range of activities we engage in are expanding.''
  Mr. Chairman, it is precisely that dilemma that is leading to the 
return of a hollow military.
  Between 1989 and 1993, the number of U.S. service personnel engaged 
in operational deployments overseas rose from 26,000 to 154,000.
  At least 26,000 more can be added to that figure now that the Haiti 
operation is in full swing--and we can expect to see an additional 
4,000 or more personnel committed to the Haiti operation within the 
next few days.
  What this means, Mr. Chairman, is that we now have more people 
committed to the Haiti operation alone than we had in our total 
operational deployments worldwide in 1989.
  What is the practical effect of all this?
  Here is one answer: The current issue of U.S. News & World Report has 
an article entitled ``Running on Empty at the Pentagon.''
  Listen to these first few paragraphs from that article:

       Two marine pilots recently flew their FA-18 fighters across 
     the country to train at Top Gun, the Navy's elite flight 
     school in California.
       But after they arrived, their commanders back at Cherry 
     Point, North Carolina informed the pilots that the unit 
     couldn't afford to pay for the five-week course. The pilots 
     flew home.
       It is the catch-22 of post-cold-war military life: From 
     Haiti to Bosnia, crises are testing the skills of United 
     States forces as never before.
       In an era of shrinking Pentagon budgets, however, such 
     operations are also draining military coffers, curtailing 
     vital training exercises, and idling units across the United 
     States.
       Training cutbacks late in the Federal fiscal year are not 
     unusual; but this September's freeze was the worst many 
     senior officers have seen since the late 1970's, the height 
     of the so-called post-Vietnam hollow Army.
       The situation got so bad last week that Secretary of 
     Defense William Parry invoked a little-used law, the feed and 
     forage act, permitting the military to spend for 1 week money 
     it doesn't already have.

  Mr. Chairman, one of the distinguished members of the Appropriations 
Committee, Bill Young of Florida, told the House last week that 65 
percent of enlisted personnel in our military are living on food 
stamps.
  The cumulative effect of all these operational deployments from 
Haiti, to Bosnia, to Macedonia, to Somalia, to Northern Iraq, to Rwanda 
is having a dramatic impact.
  Only last year, to quote general Shalikashvili again--even before the 
Haiti situation blew up--he said: ``The current pace of operations of 
U.S. forces throughout the world threatens our ability to maintain a 
high degree of readiness to meet all contingencies.''
  Mr. Chairman, the Bosnian relief operation has gone on longer than 
the Berlin airlift.
  The Air Force has flown more than twice as many sorties over Iraq 
since the Persian Gulf war ended than we flew during the war itself.
  A Marine amphibious-ready group which was deployed off Somalia for 6 
months was redeployed to Haiti after the marines had only 12 days of 
shore time.
  I cite these examples as being indicative of what is happening to our 
military.
  Mr. Chairman, all of these many operations around the world are 
chipping away at the capability of our military to meet a direct 
threat--a real threat--to our country.
  Mr. Chairman, the purpose of some of our deployments around the world 
have more merit than do others.
  But, Mr. Chairman, there is nothing about the Haiti situation which 
justifies the deployment of a single American--on-shore, off-shore, or 
anywhere else.
  And until the President provides us with that justification, there is 
only one course of action.
  We should commence immediately to effect the immediate safe 
withdrawal of our troops from Haiti.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Obey], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
Appropriations.
  Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I take a look at the Republican amendment and 
my only reaction is one of infinite sadness. What it says to me is that 
with troops in the field, with our friends and enemies alike in Haiti 
waiting to gauge our determination, this resolution would have the 
Congress tell everybody in Haiti that the United States is wrong, that 
we are going to cut out and we are going to start the process now. I 
just cannot imagine anyone believing that is a responsible act.
  In that negative context, this resolution also raises the specter of 
reassembling the Congress to pull the plug on our operation in Haiti. 
In my view, that is a simple, open invitation for terrorists to lob 
bombs into American positions, and I cannot imagine that anyone thinks 
it is a responsible thing to do. I want to see us out of Haiti, too, 
but to appear to set the stage for immediate withdrawal in my view will 
encourage the very elements in Haiti who should be left with no doubt 
about the steadiness of our nerve at this point. In my view, and I am 
sad to say it, this amendment does not read to me like a policy 
document. It reads to me more like a political statement for domestic 
consumption. It simply appears to launch a head-on political attack on 
the Commander in Chief, and I very much regret that.
  To those who say that we have no national interest in Haiti, let me 
simply point this out: In the 60's, 37,000 Haitian refugees came into 
this country; in the 1970's, 58,000; in the 1980's, 123,000; in one 
year alone in the 1990's, some 45,000; and there are 80,000 to 100,000 
Haitian refugees knocking on the door ready to come in now because 
their economy has been destroyed in their own country and they want to 
go someplace else and have a better life.
  I think the United States has the right to take action to control our 
own borders and to eliminate conditions which are causing deleterious 
effects within our own country. I think we have a perfect right to do 
that.
  I also think we have a national interest in sending a message to any 
country who signs an agreement with Uncle Sam that we expect them to 
stick by that agreement. Haiti did sign an agreement with the United 
States at Governor's Island. Korea may very well be signing agreements 
with the United States. I think we have a right to expect all parties 
to live up to those agreements, and we ought to be sending a message to 
any party in the world intending to sign an agreement with the United 
States that if they sign an agreement, they had doggone well better 
keep it.
  I would respectfully suggest that the Michel amendment be dismissed 
for what it is. It is not in my view a constructive approach to the 
situation at hand. I think we need to support the troops in the field. 
I would urge the defeat of the Michel amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, like all of our colleagues in this body, I 
am a strong supporter of our troops. As an 8-year member of the 
Committee on Armed Services, I have had the honor of visiting our 
troops in all their deployments around the world and work hard on the 
committee to support them.
  What I resent about what has happened in regard to our Haitian policy 
and the insertion of American troops in Haiti is the deliberate 
deception of this administration and the use of our troops for what has 
been called by U.N. officials, and our own State Department officials 
in one case, political ends. Why would I say that, Mr. Chairman?

                              {time}  2000

  Let us look at the words of the President. When the President went on 
national television he said to the American people it is in our 
national security interests to go into Haiti. He said one of the 
primary reasons was the tremendous amounts of boat people coming, and 
we just heard the previous speaker state that.
  Mr. Speaker, let me quote this President from November 12, 1992, when 
he said,

       I think that sending refugees back to Haiti was an error, 
     and so I will tell you I will modify that program and that 
     process. I can tell you I'm going to change that policy.

  Now here is a President who has told the American people that we are 
going into Haiti because of the illegal immigrants, yet he is the one 
who criticized George Bush's policy and said he was going to reverse 
the policy of stopping them from coming to our country and inviting 
them in. What did he think they would do, go the other way? Of course 
they came to America. Yet he used that deceptively with the American 
people as a reason for us to go into Haiti. If that were in fact the 
policy of this country we should invade Mexico because there are more 
illegal immigrants coming from Mexico than there are from Haiti.
  He said that we are there to restore democracy. Then why was not the 
President insisting we go into Cuba?
  He said that we were there to restore human rights, dignity. What 
about the other 20 nations that I inserted into the Congressional 
Record back in August who have been similarly listed by human rights 
organizations as the same human rights record as in fact Haiti has?
  The President also deceived the American people when he said this 
would be a multinational effort with our allies. Mr. Chairman, where 
are our allies? We had Secretary Deutch before our Committee on Armed 
Services last Wednesday and we asked him how many American troops were 
in the country at that time, and he said we have 19,000 troops. We now 
have 21,000. And I asked him very specifically on the record how many 
non-American forces are in Haiti on this day, 10 days after the troops 
went in. He said 24. And those 24, when I asked him where they were, 
are in the headquarters building. They are not out there with our 
forces.
  We say our allies are invaluable. Let me read what Reuters put out 
October 5, 1994. Diplomatic sources told Reuters that flight delays 
attempting to go into Haiti were caused partly by India's refusal to 
allow U.S. aircraft to fly over its territory carrying troops from a 
third country, and by Japan's refusal to let the United States aircraft 
make a refueling stop. Where is Great Britain? Where is France? Where 
are all of the European countries? Who do we have there? Bangladesh. 
Why do we have Bangladesh? Do not forget to tell the American people 
that we are paying the bill. We are not going to be having the 
Bangladesh people or country pay for the expenses, we are paying the 
bill. We have hired a mercenary force of Third World nations to send in 
a safety patrol, and we are paying all of the costs of that. At a time 
when we are telling the American people we do not have money, we are 
going to be spending up to $1.5 billion for this operation, paying for 
troops from Bangladesh and other Third World nations. Where is the 
multinational force?
  Then we say we have a specific mission. I think one of our soldiers 
put it best in U.S.A. Today on October 3 when he was asked, ``What am I 
doing here,'' this is his quote from Army Specialist Marc Pierre of New 
York City: ``Ask anybody what we're doing here and they'll say, `I 
don't know.' This is a joke.''
  This is not the Secretary of State, this is not the Secretary of 
Defense. This is one of those Army people in Haiti right now. The 
mission is totally clouded.
  I ask my colleagues to vote for the Michel amendment. It is the only 
alternative here that sends a signal to this President on his misguided 
foreign policy.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arkansas [Mr. Thornton].
  (Mr. THORNTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. THORNTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Gilman 
substitute.
  Mr. Chairman, I have been in harm's way for this country and I know 
what it means to be concerned about whether the people of this country 
are behind you when you are in harm's way. I think that it is very 
important to recognize, as the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Edwards] did, 
that our priority at this moment is not to debate the policy 
considerations that got us into Haiti, but debate how we can best 
support our troops in order to return them safely from Haiti. We all 
want them out in an orderly way as soon as practicable.
  I know this--if you are in a battle with an enemy you do not tip your 
hand. This issue is not a new experience for me. Nearly 4 years ago I 
stood here in the well at a time when we had deployed 500,000 American 
troops halfway around the world without congressional approval and 
people were urging that we withdraw from President Bush the authority 
to use force. I took this floor, and supported President Bush in his 
intervention in the Persian Gulf. And I went home and explained it this 
way:
  Folks, I said, I was thinking about this real hard and my wife and I 
were upstairs in our bedroom at home, and I thought to myself--now what 
if I heard a noise downstairs, and so I go over and grab my shotgun. 
And I go downstairs, and sure enough, I find a burglar raking the 
silverware off the table and putting it in a sack. And I look at him 
and I say, ``That's my silverware, and this is my house, and you're out 
of here.'' And he keeps raking and says, ``No, no, this is my sack, and 
I'm going to keep this silver.'' I say, ``You don't understand. This is 
my shotgun and you are leaving.''
  And then my wife says `'Ray, your gun's not loaded.''
  Mr. Chairman, let us not tell our adversaries in Haiti that America's 
gun is not loaded. Our service men and women are at risk there. Let's 
support them--not yank the rug from under them. Vote against the 
Michel-Gilman substitute.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Upton].
  Mr. UPTON. Mr. Chairman. I rise tonight in support of the Michel 
substitute.
  I would like to ask my colleagues a question. Do you believe that any 
of our troops, who are tonight risking their young lives in Haiti to 
fulfill a policy that is ill-conceived and poorly thought out by 
political wonks in Washington, are happy with this partisan and 
political debate?
  I think not.
  It's important to recognize that the lead sponsor of the resolution 
before us is the distinguished minority leader, Bob Michel. As he 
completes his last days as the minority leader, Bob Michel certainly 
did not need to take such a high profile role in this contentious 
debate. But it demonstrates to us all the importance that he places on 
getting our troops home safe and sound and the fact that we should view 
this debate tonight on the substance and the merits.
  I will be voting ``yes'' on the Michel substitute because the best 
course of action in Haiti is to start an immediate withdrawal of our 
brave soldiers who have served their country with distinction and 
honor.
  From day 1, I have opposed sending troops into Haiti and, in fact, 
voted against such action last May. To me, the key questions of why we 
would go in to Haiti and what we would do once we were there were never 
answered by the President. I was appalled that the President sought the 
approval of the United Nations, other countries, and organizations yet 
neglected to consult with the United States Congress prior to United 
States troops going into Haiti.
  Now, nearly 3 weeks after our troops landed in Haiti, the Congress 
finally gets its chance to vote on authorizing the use of troops in 
Haiti. It is nice that the Congress finally gets an opportunity to vote 
on such a vital matter, weeks and weeks and weeks after the United 
Nations had their say. However, nothing has happened to change my mind 
that our troops should not be there in the first place and that is why 
I will vote ``no'' on the Torricelli resolution.
  Normally when we reach the closing days of a session of Congress, we 
find ourselves occupied in budget battles. But tonight, as we prepare 
to close the books on the 103d Congress, we will be voting on an issue 
which involves the security and well-being of our Armed Forces and a 
matter which the American people have been watching very closely.
  It's an important test tonight for the Congress to assert its will 
and see that our troops are not stuck for years serving as some type of 
riot police in a country that does not involve our national security 
interests, let alone the cost in the hundreds of millions of tax 
dollars.
  It should be an easy vote tonight for everyone here in support of the 
Michel substitute.
  It is as simple as that.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
North Carolina [Mr. Hefner].
  (Mr. HEFNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HEFNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to approach this from a little 
bit of a different perspective. I do not have a prepared speech and had 
not planned to speak on this. But as someone who takes not a back seat 
to anybody in this House in supporting our armed forces, and I serve on 
the Appropriation Defense Subcommittee and am chairman of the Military 
Construction Subcommittee, and our focus has been on quality of life 
for our troops and their families since I have been the chairman for 
some 10 years now, but it seems to me we are leaving out one equation 
in this debate. The fact is our troops are now in Haiti, and we can 
yell and scream about the policy, and do this if we want to all night, 
but the fact remains our troops are in Haiti. Had I had a vote I would 
have not voted to send troops to Haiti, but they are there.

                              {time}  2010

  Because you have some remnants there that if they say they are going 
to get out in January, ``We will just go into the mountains and we will 
wait them out and then we will go back and take over,'' and everybody 
will be the loser.
  Now, it seems to me that we would listen to the people that are on 
the ground, the generals that are on the ground, and we have talked 
with them, and I do not want to bring the people into this debate, 
because that is not their function. They are not political. They could 
care less who is going to be elected to Congress and who is going to be 
Speaker in this House. But they are responsible for the lives of these 
young men, and they are saying to us, ``Do not rush to a decision. Do 
not tip our hands,'' and I have the utmost respect for these generals, 
both General Luck, who is no longer there, and General Steiner, who is 
there with the 82d, and now the general from North Carolina who is 
there. I have not talked to all of these men, but I have talked to 
people that are in positions there of command, and they say we do not 
want a time certain to leave.
  I would hope that we could get out next week, and I pray that there 
will not be one single American drop of blood shed in Haiti, but is 
seems to me that you are sending the wrong signal when you set a time 
certain for use to get out of Haiti.
  So I think I am absolutely, totally opposed for us setting a time 
certain. I want these men out, but I want us to do it in a responsible 
way. I think we are missing the point when we do not consult with the 
commanders that are on the ground in charge of these precious men and 
see what they think about these amendments.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss].
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, today, day 18 of the occupation of a friendly 
neighboring country, I reviewed the collective history of my statements 
on United States-Haiti policy during the 103d Congress. As many know, 
for months I have taken every opportunity to discuss United States 
policy or the lack thereof in Haiti. I followed the inconsistencies, 
the improvisations, the zigs and zags from one self-generated refugee 
crisis to another, to the diplomatic bungling, to the ouster of Special 
Advisor Lawrence Pezzulo, to the Reorganization of the White House 
Haiti Policy Spin Team, to the imposition of a punishing embargo that 
blocked humanitarian aid flights and caused deplorable suffering, 
sickness and starvation among innocent Haitians, to the 
unprecedented sight of United States ships firing on civilian Haitian 
vessels in coastal commerce, to the reversal of a House vote in 
opposition to military intervention and in support of the Goss safe 
haven alternative, to the elusive cost estimates for this misadventure 
which now run into the billions of dollars and to a dramatic, if 
disingenuous, series of oval office speeches by the President. Reading 
through the chronology of the fits and starts of this policy it is 
abundantly clear that the White House has never had a workable, well-
defined foreign policy goal in Haiti or a feasible plan to achieve 
responsible results.

  Part bad design and part bad policymaking, administration decisions 
put the United States on an inexorable initiative toward military 
intervention and then intentionally cut off the safety cord of 
negotiation that could have prevented it. When a candid memo by U.N. 
special envoy Dante Caputo was leaked earlier this year, our worst 
fears were realized. The memo forthrightly stated the administration 
was tired of the ups and downs of Haiti policy and considered invasion 
the politically desirable option. Unbelievably White House policymakers 
continued to ignore the moderate elements in Haiti and the 
constitutional realities of that country. They succumbed to the 
elaborate public relations events that featured Randall Robinson's fast 
and a few liberal Members of Congress demonstrating in front of the 
White House. They ignored the studied advice of Lawrence Pezzullo, then 
special advisor on Haiti, who tried to push the administration to deal 
with the Haitian parliament--the people Aristide must learn to share 
power with.
  Administration officials refused to give any serious consideration to 
the Goss safe haven alternative sent to the transition team for the 
first time in December 1992. And, despite frequent inquiries, they were 
never able to answer the question: How do you get from United States 
military intervention in Haiti to a democratic, Haitian-controlled 
Haiti? In my view, they still haven't answered that question. Today 
nearly 21,000 American troops are on the ground in Haiti getting sucked 
further into the chaos and brutality of a civil war that has been a 
part of Haitian life for centuries. All the while these fumbles were 
going on, the Congress and the American people were shut out of the 
policy debate. This House should not pass a backhanded authorization of 
this mission, as my colleagues Mr. Torricelli and Mr. Hamilton have 
advocated. Instead, we need to be talking about an immediate withdrawal 
of American troops, a handoff to a multinational force, and getting the 
humanitarian aid and investment flowing again.

  Sadly, the United States occupation of Haiti is now a fait accompli, 
fuzzy rules of engagement and all. But that doesn't require us to 
endorse a bad policy either tacitly or outright. Retroactive taxation 
is bad, retroactive foreign policy approval is worse. It was not a good 
policy option in the first place and it is not going to get any better. 
Bring American soldiers home now and get on with the task of giving 
Haiti back to the Haitians. Accountability must follow--it is Congress' 
responsibility to oversee this type of broad military action. 
Accountability will follow--and hard questions will be asked. Evasive 
answers will not work with the American people.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Gilman substitute.
  I want to be clear here. We have three choices, of course, before us. 
I spoke very strongly a few minutes ago with respect to the Dellums-
Hastings-Murtha substitute, and as my friend, the chairman of the House 
Committee on Armed Services told me a few minutes ago, I was perhaps 
too harsh in my statement with regard to their amendment.
  With respect to these three, I, of course, favor the substitute 
offered by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  The second choice would be the Dellums approach.
  But I think the one that is before us now, the Michel-Gilman 
substitute, is clearly the worst of the three by far. I just think it 
would lead to a rather chaotic U.S. foreign policy.
  What kind of a message do we send to the world if the President sends 
troops into Haiti on one day, and then the Congress votes 3 weeks later 
to pull them out?
  I oppose the Michel-Gilman substitute for several reasons. No. 1, it 
does sidestep the question of authorization. I have made that point 
previously. If the House wants to act on Haiti, then it should pass, in 
my view, an authorization spelling out the terms and the conditions of 
the United States presence.
  The Gilman-Michel amendment certainly does not do that.
  Second, the Gilman-Michel amendment could force a vote here by 
January 21 directing the President to remove the troops. That is 
unrealistic in terms of the way this institution operates. We could 
face a vote on Haiti as soon as we return in January. It is wrong from 
an institutional point of view. The Congress will not be fully 
organized or prepared to give careful consideration to this matter in 
the opening days of this session. So I think it has a serious defect in 
its timing.
  The third reason I would oppose the Michel-Gilman substitute is 
because I do think it does not really give us enough time. We should 
defeat this amendment, because it pulls the plug not only on the United 
States troops in Haiti but it pulls the plug on United States foreign 
policy before we have time to achieve our objectives.
  We want the mission of our troops to be successful, and no matter how 
we may have felt about intervention, whether we were for it or against 
it, it seems to me that all of us now have a common interest in seeing 
that this country succeeds in its mission.
  The President has sent our troops to Haiti to promote our interests, 
and we want those troops to be successful. It is important for Members 
to recognize that we are achieving our objectives in Haiti as of 
tonight. The parliament is meeting, the mayor of Port-au-Prince is 
back, refugees are returning, 4,000 firearms have been turned in, the 
reform of the police has started, international troops have begun to 
replace United States troops, the coup leader, Mr. Francois, has fled 
Haiti for the Dominican Republic, and President Aristide is getting 
ready to return.

                              {time}  2020

  As the President said today, the people of Haiti are moving from fear 
to freedom. So if we pass the Michel-Gilman substitute, I think we make 
it highly unlikely that we will achieve our goals in Haiti. If we pass 
that substitute, we will really undercut the ability of the President 
to conduct American foreign policy and we will send a signal to all the 
world that we cannot be relied on in this country to conduct a 
sustained foreign policy.
  We have already achieved a number of our key objectives in Haiti. We 
are seeing further results hourly, daily. And it does not serve our 
interests to have an immediate pullout.
  The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has sent troops to Haiti, they 
are performing superbly, and Congress should not undercut their efforts 
by calling for their immediate withdrawal before they have had a chance 
to achieve their mission.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the defeat of the Michel-Gilman substitute.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn].
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Chairman, we have been asked ``What kind of a message 
do we send to the world?'' How about ``What kind of a message do we 
send to the world about the Constitution of the United States?''
  I sat in on a Haiti briefing this morning where it was said by 
members of the administration, ``Well, a few months is what we need 
there.''
  Much has been said about the need to support our troops in Haiti. Of 
course we support our troops. But this Congress did not put them in 
Haiti.
  What we have in the Michel-Gilman amendment is a milestone along the 
rocky road, namely January 3. If the troops are still in Haiti at that 
time, we can consider, on the 21st of January, whether they should or 
should not be there.
  I really cannot believe what I heard earlier this evening, that the 
President can go into Haiti and--since it is not war--he does not need 
the Congress's approval. We were told that ``Congress ought to get with 
it.''
  If you felt we should not have troops in Haiti, vote for Michel-
Gilman. As to whether or not it is war remains to be seen. But if the 
troops stay in Haiti, it is a clear precedent for any President to act 
on his own whim and to send United States forces anywhere in the world 
even though there is no national interest, no American citizens are 
being harmed, and the troops are simply in the role of police officer 
for either the United Nations or some other international or regional 
organization of nations.
  Ladies and gentlemen, if you believe that it is time to assert the 
role of Congress, and to maintain the authority of the American 
Constitution, then vote for the Michel-Gilman amendment. It is the only 
sane policy before us tonight.
  I submit for the Record the following comparison chart of the three 
amendments prepared by the House-Senate Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Caucus:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Dellums-Murtha-Hastings-   Torricelli-Hamilton 
   Michel amendment          Dicks amendment             amendment      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Withdrawal date: Urges   Withdrawal date: Urges   Withdrawal date: Sets 
 immediate withdrawal.    withdrawal in ``prompt   March 1 as target    
 Requires Congress to     and orderly'' fashion,   withdrawal date, but 
 vote by Jan. 21 on       ``as soon as             allows the President 
 resolution to require    possible.'' Sets no      to extend it if he   
 removal within 30,       deadline.                certifies a need.    
 days, if troops not                                                    
 out by Jan. 3.                                                         
Authorization: Does not  Authorization: Does not  Authorization:        
 authorize the            authorize the            Authorizes the       
 deployment in Haiti.     deployment in Haiti.     deployment through   
                                                   March 1, and defines 
                                                   the mission.         
U.N. role: Prohibits     U.N. role: Specifies     U.N. role: Silent on  
 U.S. troops from         that Congress is         U.S. role in U.N.    
 serving under foreign    making no statement on   peacekeeping force;  
 command in Haiti,        the U.S. role in U.N.    but prohibits foreign
 either in first phase    peacekeeping force.      command in U.S.-led  
 or the U.N. force.                                phase.               
Ex post facto: States    Ex post facto: States    Ex post facto: States 
 that U.S. troops         that President should    that the Constitution
 should not have been     have sought              required             
 sent to Haiti.           Congressional            Congressional        
                          authorization before     approval of any      
                          deployment.              forced (pre-Carter)  
                                                   invasion of Haiti.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Fazio].
  Mr. FAZIO. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I think all of us are struggling with the term we heard 
Nelson Mandela use here on the House floor today, one that was made 
most popular by our last President, George Bush. That is, the term the 
``new world order.''
  We all understand that we are in a new world order, given the fact 
that the bipolar conflict has been resolved. The United States is now 
preeminent in the world. But we are still working to define what 
exactly we mean by that. I think our experience recently in Somalia and 
our experience in Haiti make us focus much more in detail about how we 
will conduct any activities which we agree to engage in, whether it is 
through legislative initiative or on decision of the executive, in 
Third World countries.
  Many of us knew that in Vietnam, we were micromanaging a war out of 
Washington. I think we have all learned that that does not work. It is 
even more obvious in the environment that we found ourselves in Somalia 
and that we are in today in Haiti; that it is absolutely essential that 
we leave control of the day-to-day decisions with our local operational 
commanders.
  And I think we have learned from General Shelton exactly what he 
believes we ought to do as we decide how we want to vote on these very 
troublesome questions which face us this evening.
  This morning Katie Kouric, of NBC News, asked General Shelton, ``How 
do you feel about the vote that will be held in the Congress,'' a vote 
which she described as one that would set a date certain for U.S. troop 
withdrawal, a date of March 1.
  General Shelton said,

       ``Well, I am not in favor of setting a date per se at this 
     point. I do think when we do that, we automatically tip our 
     hand to the adversary in terms of when we are going to leave. 
     Consequently, if we are to achieve the end state that we came 
     in with, achieve the goals that we have, we must move much 
     more quickly, which in some cases could mean we would 
     endanger our own troops by trying to move too fast.

  I simply would like to say for me as we contemplate this difficult 
vote, I must vote with Mr. Murtha. Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Dellums 
because their amendment is what General Shelton believes is the 
appropriate thing to do.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  (Mr. DORNAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DORNAN. You know, all of this quoting of generals who are on the 
front lines, under the gun, is getting very painful around here.
  Let us just go back to Somalia 1 year ago today. The first of the 
desecrated, torn-apart bodies of our dead Medal of Honor winners was 
dumped on the steps of the U.N. compound in Somalia. None of you were 
with Jack Murtha or me on our two separate trips over there. At every 
level of command we heard different things.
  Those heroic Rangers said, ``Let us get this thug who killed my 
friends. Let us get him and arrest him.''
  The commander who literally had a mortar land at his feet, it was a 
dud--``The odds of catching him is 1 in 100. I have been telling you 
that all along. Please give us a mission.''
  General Hoar, the central commander, said, ``This is classic mission 
creep.'' General Downing said, ``What are we supposed to do there? 
Where is our air cover with the spectre gunships?'' General Montgomery, 
whom I talked to, said, ``Why can't I get armor for a rescue mission?'' 
That cost the Secretary of Defense his job. Mort Halperin was luckier. 
He managed to weasel his way into a job at the NSC.
  Do you know who the architects of this policy are? The same folks who 
under Carter told us the Sandinistas were not Communists and that they 
were not exporting the revolution. Do you hear the names? The left-wing 
Robert Pastor. Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright. This is the same 
team who told us to vote to give $75 million to Communists. Do you 
know, anyone in this Chamber, who Ira Kurzban is? Anybody want to hold 
up their hand? He is a registered foreign agent, which is not bad. But 
he represents Castro and Aristide at the same time. What does that tell 
you? Vote for Michel, vote for Ben Gilman's amendment; it says safe 
withdrawal. Let us get out of there fast.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums], the distinguished chairman of the Committee 
on Armed Services.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman from new Jersey [Mr. torricelli] 
for his generosity.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the Michel substitute. It misstates 
our constitutional responsibilities, fails the test of U.S. interests 
and obligations, and have U.S. forces only fight wars rather than 
prevent them.
  My commitment to preserve the role of the Congress in sending U.S. 
troops into armed conflict is unimpeachable.
  When it seemed that our President would undertake an invasion of 
Haiti, I told the President that congressional authorization was 
required to commit our troops to an act of war.
  However, the President did not invade Haiti. The requirement that the 
Congress authorize war does not necessarily extend to what amounts to a 
peacekeeping operation.
  Should we be consulted? Yes.
  Can we terminate funds or order withdrawal? Yes, subject to the full 
legislative process.
  But are we required in advance to authorize Article VI-type peace 
operations? I am not certain this is clear.

  The Michel substitute declares that the operation and expenses will 
degrade readiness. Readiness for what? The plain fact is that the 
United States can confidently approach the near term knowing that 
including Korea, a situation which seems capable for resolution by 
diplomacy, it is very unlikely that any armed conflict could break out 
in the near to mid term for which we would not be ready.
  In addition, I believe humanitarian or peace operations are precisely 
the things we should be undertaking and are among the operations for 
which we must be making our forces ready.
  Such a course is both consistent with our national strategy and our 
normative values--and it will save lives and money in the long run.
  The United States must lead efforts to prevent and deter war and 
violence, rather than just prepare ourselves for full-up military 
confronta that we could have prevented.
  The Michel substitute forestalls all of this by forcing a precipitous 
U.S. withdrawal from the effort to restore democracy in Haiti that is 
important to our national interests, and by prohibiting by law any 
operational command by non-U.S. troops.
  We should reject the Michel substitute's position to force a hasty 
withdrawal. How can we expect other nations to participate in efforts 
to create regional stability, if we cut and run? We cannot.
  We must work with the international community and the U.N. to 
establish an appropriately balanced force capable of providing the 
social stability that will allow Haitians the opportunity to freely 
elect a new parliament, see their duly-elected government resume office 
and, as importantly, secure the successful transfer of government to a 
second freely elected President.
  I opposed setting a time limit for withdrawal in Somalia, because 
time limits are artificial and dangerous obstacles to achieving our 
objectives. There exists a reasoned and supportable concept for 
promptly concluding the multinational stage of this operation and for 
bringing to closure the subsequent United Nations operation upon the 
inauguration of a new Haitian President in less than a year and a half. 
That, my colleagues, is an exit strategy.
  With all due respect to my colleagues and with a shared concern for 
the well-being of U.S. forces, I do not understand the continuing 
preoccupation with the issue of foreign command and control, which 
finds expression again in the Michel substitute. Throughout U.S. 
history we have willingly placed our troops under non-U.S. operational 
command when it was in the best interest of unity of command and 
operational safety and effectiveness. We should not peremptorily 
deprive the President, acting in his role as Commander in Chief, from 
making such an arrangement if he believes it is prudent, or indeed 
essential, for the safety of our troops and the effectiveness of their 
mission.
  For all of these reasons and more, I urge my colleagues to reject the 
Michel substitute--as a bad reading of the Constitution, as 
inconsistent with important efforts to promote democracy, and as 
contrary to both short-term and long-term United States interests.

                              {time}  2030

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum 
is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Farr of California). Evidently a quorum 
is not present.
  Members will record their presence by electronic device.
  The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members 
recorded their presence:

                             [Roll No. 496]

                       ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--378

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Grandy
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Nadler
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Swett
     Synar
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waters
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Farr of California). Three hundred 
seventy-eight Members have answered to their names, a quorum is 
present.

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