[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY BOARD ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1994--MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair lay before the Senate a 
message from the House of Representatives on a bill (H.R. 2440) to 
amend the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to authorize 
appropriations for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, and for other 
purposes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message 
from the House of Representatives:

       Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the 
     Senate to the bill (H.R. 2440) entitled ``An Act to amend the 
     Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to authorize 
     appropriations for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, and for 
     other purposes.'', with the following amendment:
       In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Safety Board Act 
     Amendments of 1994''.

     SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Section 1118(a) of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
     for the purposes of this chapter $37,580,000 for fiscal year 
     1994, $44,000,000 for fiscal year 1995, and $45,100,000 for 
     fiscal year 1996. Such sums shall remain available until 
     expended.''.

     SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS 
                   TO THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC AIRCRAFT.

       (a) Definition of Public Aircraft.--Section 40102(a)(37) of 
     title 49, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     subparagraph (B) and inserting the following:
       ``(B) does not include a government-owned aircraft--
       ``(i) transporting property for commercial purposes; or
       ``(ii) transporting passengers other than--

       ``(I) transporting (for other than commercial purposes) 
     crewmembers or other persons aboard the aircraft whose 
     presence is required to perform, or is associated with the 
     performance of, a governmental function such as 
     firefighting, search and rescue, law enforcement, 
     aeronautical research, or biological or geological 
     resource management; or
       ``(II) transporting (for other than commercial purposes) 
     persons aboard the aircraft if the aircraft is operated by 
     the Armed Forces or an intelligence agency of the United 
     States.

     An aircraft described in the preceding sentence shall, 
     notwithstanding any limitation relating to use of the 
     aircraft for commercial purposes, be considered to be a 
     public aircraft for the purposes of this part without regard 
     to whether the aircraft is operated by a unit of government 
     on behalf of another unit of government, pursuant to a cost 
     reimbursement agreement between such units of government, if 
     the unit of government on whose behalf the operation is 
     conducted certifies to the Administrator of the Federal 
     Aviation Administration that the operation was necessary to 
     respond to a significant and imminent threat to life or 
     property (including natural resources) and that no service by 
     a private operator was reasonably available to meet the 
     threat.''.
       (b) Authority To Grant Exemptions.--
       (1) In general.--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation 
     Administration may grant an exemption to any unit of Federal, 
     State, or local government from any requirement of part A of 
     subtitle VII of title 49, United States Code, that would 
     otherwise be applicable to current or future aircraft of such 
     unit of government as a result of the amendment made by 
     subsection (a) of this section.
       (2) Requirements.--The Administrator may grant an exemption 
     under paragraph (1) only if--
       (A) the Administrator finds that granting the exemption is 
     necessary to prevent an undue economic burden on the unit of 
     government; and
       (B) the Administrator certifies that the aviation safety 
     program of the unit of government is effective and 
     appropriate to ensure safe operations of the type of aircraft 
     operated by the unit of government.
       (c) Investigative Authority of Board.--
       (1) Accidents involving public aircraft.--Section 
     1131(a)(1)(A) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: ``or 
     an aircraft accident involving a public aircraft as defined 
     by section 40102(a)(37) of this title other than an aircraft 
     operated by the Armed Forces or by an intelligence agency of 
     the United States''.
       (2) Duties and powers.--Section 1131 of title 49, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
       (B) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Accidents Involving Public Aircraft.--The Board, in 
     furtherance of its investigative duties with respect to 
     public aircraft accidents under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this 
     section, shall have the same duties and powers as are 
     specified for civil aircraft accidents under sections 
     1132(a), 1132(b), and 1134(b)(2) of this title.''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) 
     and (c) shall take effect on the 180th day following the date 
     of the enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 5. RELEASE OF RESERVATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN 
                   PROPERTY LOCATED IN RAPIDES PARISH, LOUISIANA.

       (a) Release.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     and except as provided in subsections (b) and (d), the United 
     States releases without consideration all reservations, 
     restrictions, conditions, and limitations on the use, 
     encumbrance, or conveyance of certain real property (together 
     with any improvements thereon and easements appurtenant 
     thereto) consisting of approximately 1,991.53 acres of land 
     and located in Rapides Parish, Louisiana, the location of 
     Esler Field, as identified in the deed of conveyance from the 
     United States to the Parish of Rapides, Louisiana, dated 
     January 23, 1958, to the extent such reservations, 
     restrictions, conditions, and limitations are enforceable by 
     the United States.
       (b) Exceptions.--The United States reserves the right of 
     reentry upon or use of the property described in subsection 
     (a) for national defense purposes in time of war or other 
     national emergency without charge. The release provided by 
     subsection (a) does not apply to any conditions or assurances 
     associated with (1) the continued nonexclusive use without 
     charge of the airport and use of space at the airport, 
     without charge, by the Louisiana National Guard, (2) the 
     nonexclusive use of the airport by transient military 
     aircraft without charge, or (3) the nonexclusive use of the 
     airport by transient military aircraft without charge during 
     periods of maneuvers.
       (c) Limitation on Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to affect the disposition or 
     ownership of oil, gas, or other mineral resources either in 
     or under the surface of the real property described in 
     subsection (a).
       (d) Federal Aviation Administration.--
       (1) Nonapplicability of release to grant agreements.--The 
     release described in subsection (a) does not apply to any 
     conditions and assurances associated with existing airport 
     grant agreements between the Rapides Parish Airport 
     Authority/Esler Field and the Federal Aviation 
     Administration.
       (2) Agreement.--Notwithstanding any other provisions of 
     law, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
     shall enter into an agreement with the Airport Authority of 
     Rapides Parish, Louisiana, to provide for the terms and 
     conditions under which the real property described in 
     subsection (a) may be used, leased, sold, or otherwise 
     disposed. The agreement shall be concluded not later than 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (e) Effective Date.--This section shall take effect on the 
     180th day following the date of the enactment of this Act.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, today, the Senate will consider the 
authorization of the programs of the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB). The bill will provide a 3 year authorization for the NTSB 
and enable the agency to continue its work protecting the travelling 
public. With the recent aviation crashes, the NTSB once again has 
demonstrated its professionalism and dedication to protecting the 
travelling public.
  Last Friday, this body confirmed a new chairman of the NTSB, Jim 
Hall. I know that Jim is looking forward to his stewardship and I wish 
him and the NTSB well. H.R. 2440 will send him and the NTSB a message--
go out and continue your investigations, make those tough 
recommendations, and help us ensure a safer transportation system.
  As many of my colleagues know, the NTSB is comprised of 5 members, 
who are responsible for investigating accidents and making 
recommendations on how to improve the transportation system. The NTSB's 
work is recognized around the world, and when a tragic accident occurs, 
the entire nation instantly becomes aware of the work of the NTSB. By 
the end of this year, the NTSB will need at least two new members. I 
would hope that the nominees are available for consideration by the 
Senate when the 104th Congress convenes.
  I want to mention one final point with respect to H.R. 2440, 
concerning public aircraft. Much time has been spent reviewing how best 
to address the question of what constitutes a public aircraft. The 
provision in H.R. 2440 will exclude aircraft used for passenger 
transportation from the definition of public aircraft. Airplanes used 
for executive transport, such as transporting a governor to meetings, 
would not be considered a ``public aircraft''. On the other hand, using 
aircraft for firefighting and law enforcement would continue to be 
considered ``public aircraft.''
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, with the passage of H.R. 2440, the 
Senate will reauthorize the programs of the National Transportation 
Safety Board [NTSB].
  The Senate version of the bill, S. 1588, was reported by the Commerce 
Committee on November 17, 1993. The Senate considered S. 1588 on May 
12, 1994. The House revised the bill with a number of non-controversial 
and technical changes.
  We all have witnessed the work of the NTSB sifting through the 
wreckage of transportation accidents. Each of us has been affected by 
the NTSB, whether it is because of a train wreck in South Carolina, an 
aircraft accident in North Carolina, or some other tragic event.
  Discussions with the NTSB and recommendations by the NTSB have led to 
safety improvements throughout the country and the world. I appreciate 
the hard work and dedication of the members and staff of the NTSB. What 
many of my colleagues may not know is that at the end of this year, the 
NTSB will lose the valuable services of John Lauber. He has served two 
terms and has been an NTSB member since 1985. I thank him for his many 
years of service on the Board.
  I have some concerns about the future of the NTSB. At the end of this 
year, it is possible that the Board may have only two members. At a 
minimum, three members are needed for a quorum, and absent a quorum, no 
recommendations can be made. The investigations into the two aviation 
accidents in Pittsburgh and Charlotte, for example, may be completed in 
the next 6 to 9 months, and we must ensure that the NTSB is able to 
complete these and other pending investigations. I know the 
Administration is seeking to fill these positions so that the vital 
work of the NTSB will continue.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I am pleased to lend my support to 
legislation to reauthorize the National Transportation Safety Board. 
His agency provides invaluable expertise in their role as independent 
investigators in transportation accidents. Tragically, we have had to 
call on their skills too often this year but the public should be 
reassured by the dedication and the professionalism of the men and 
women of this important Federal agency.
  In addition to providing the authorization for NTSB, I am pleased 
that language was included in this bill to address the issue of 
commercial purposes as it relates to public helicopters responding to 
emergency situations.
  As we all know, the summer wildfires of 1994 had a drastic impact 
throughout the State of Washington. Local governments were frustrated 
that although fires were burning, all available resources could not be 
utilized. Emergency or not, it is presently prohibited for public 
agencies to reimburse one another for the use of helicopters.
  The language in this bill will now give authority to local 
governments to respond immediately to emergency situations without 
having to cut through the bureaucratic redtape. In certain cases where 
an imminent threat is looming and private operators are not readily 
available, public agencies will be allowed to use each other's 
helicopters.
  This language helps ensure that when an emergency breaks out, all 
aircraft--public and private--will be available to respond without 
delay.
  I have worked with other members of the Washington delegation, 
representatives from Federal, State, and local public agencies, and the 
private sector on this issue and feel comfortable that the end result 
is balanced and fair. I feel this language adequately addresses the 
problems that public agencies have faced while at the same time 
protecting the interests of the private sector.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, the Senate is about to take final action 
on H.R. 2440, a measure to reauthorize the National Transportation 
Safety Board [NTSB] for 1994 through 1996. This bill contains a 
provision I authored. It is designed to advance the safety of public 
use aircraft. This bill is very important to promoting transportation 
safety. I urge its prompt approval.
  Mr. President, this reauthorization bill has gone through several 
changes during this legislative session. It was originally approved by 
the House of Representatives last November. The Senate's alternative 
version, which included my public aircraft safety provision, was passed 
by the Senate in May 1994. Earlier this week, the House agreed to the 
Senate-passed version, with some additional provisions. Today, the 
Senate is ready to pass the measure and send it to the President. The 
final bill is a well-crafted product.
  I would like to explain briefly my provision in this legislative 
measure. Its purpose is to advance the safety of travel on public 
aircraft; that is, aircraft used exclusively in the service of federal, 
state, and local governments. Under current law, public use aircraft 
are not subject to Federal Aviation Act [FAA] safety regulations to the 
extent imposed on civil aircraft.
  My provision would amend the definition of public use aircraft to 
mandate that FAA safety regulations, directives and orders issued for 
civil aircraft be made applicable to all government-owned, nonmilitary 
aircraft engaged in passenger transport.
  Further, the Administrator would be allowed to waive FAA requirements 
for public aircraft provided an equivalent level of safety has been 
established by the governmental entity responsible for the aircraft. I 
am pleased the House incorporated some additional language with my 
exemption provision, providing specific criteria which the 
Administrator must consider in order to grant such an exemption. That 
should help the Administrator ensure that any exemption from this 
provision would not compromise safety.
  Finally, my provision would grant the NTSB authority to investigate 
accidents involving all public, nonmilitary aircraft. This last point 
is very important because it will allow for an accurate data base to be 
established. In turn, it should enable us to assess more conclusively 
public aircraft safety standards and procedures.
  Mr. President, I am pleased to report that Jim Hall, who became a 
member of the NTSB last year and was confirmed by the Senate last week 
to serve as NTSB Chairman, also recognizes the importance of expanding 
the NTSB's authority to investigate public use aircraft accidents. Upon 
enactment of this provision, Chairman Hall will face the challenge of 
ensuring that the NTSB carries out this new mandate and, in the long 
term, advances public use aircraft safety. I will do my part in working 
to ensure adequate congressional oversight in this area.
  Mr. President, some additional background on my provision may be 
helpful. I first became aware of the regulatory exemptions for 
government-owned aircraft soon after last year's tragic plane crash 
that claimed the lives of Governor George Mickelson and seven other 
South Dakotans. While the exemption for public use aircraft from FAA 
safety regulations and directives had no bearing on the cause of that 
particular crash, such exemptions could greatly jeopardize the safety 
of passengers on public use aircraft. Therefore, I introduced 
legislation to remedy this potential problem.

  My original legislation would have mandated that all FAA regulations 
issued for civil aircraft relating to airworthiness, and other safety 
related orders, be made applicable to all public, nonmilitary aircraft. 
I agreed to alter my original provision only after the FAA and several 
other Federal agencies raised operational concerns that merited 
consideration. While the resulting compromise is not as far reaching as 
I think it should be, it is an important step forward in advancing 
public use aircraft safety.
  Mr. President, I also want to point out that the topic of public use 
aircraft is gaining increased public awareness. In fact, several news 
articles regarding this issue were printed recently. I ask unanimous 
consent that articles by David Eisnstadt from the October 2 and 3, 
1994, issues of the Times Union be printed in the Record immediately 
following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PRESSLER. I want to commend the journalist, David Eisenstadt, and 
the Hearst Newspapers, for recognizing the importance of this aviation 
issue. These articles provide a great deal of insightful information 
that merits the attention of all levels of government, from State and 
local governments to Congress and the administration. I urge my 
colleagues to read them and become more aware of the potential problems 
that could result without necessary regulatory action. Let's not wait 
for more aviation accidents and lost lives to spur necessary policy 
considerations. Again, I urge my colleagues to read the articles.
  As ranking member of the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, I believe 
Congress is obligated to do its utmost to advance air travel safety 
wherever a problem exists. This measure narrows greatly the areas in 
which public use aircraft are exempted from FAA compliance. I urge my 
colleagues to support the bill.

                               Exhibit 1

                   Unregulated pilots take their toll

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Washington.--As soon as they learned that a U.S. Energy 
     Department airplane had slammed into a school warehouse near 
     Billings, Mont., killing all eight people aboard, air traffic 
     controllers across Montana suspected that they knew who was 
     piloting the jet.
       At 39, pilot Curt Schwarz had earned a reputation for 
     flying dangerously. Pilots and mechanics gossiped that 
     Schwarz gambled with takeoffs and landings and often sneered 
     at basic airplane safety.
       ``He was always in a rush, trying to cut corners.'' said 
     Bob Chopko, a colleague of Schwarz at the Energy Department.
       For his last flight, the government pilot had falsified his 
     medical certificate, one of the basic credentials of flying, 
     and was relying on a co-pilot, 32-year-old Dan Arnold, who 
     was not licensed to fly the sophisticated Cessna 550, 
     according to documents on the 1992 crash.
       Robert Machol, the FAA's former chief scientist who helped 
     investigate the Billings crash, said of Schwarz, ``This 
     pilot, it was very clear, was reckless and stupid.''
       Schwarz was also not covered by many of the FAA's 
     regulations for private and commercial pilots.
       Two former National Transportation Safety Board officials--
     Ira Furman and Herb Bates--think its crazy for government 
     airplanes to escape regulation.
       ``It's worth remembering that a government plane is just as 
     capable of killing as any other plane,'' says Furman.
       Bates expresses his agreement, ``What you have is a large 
     group of flying people who are truly not monitored. It costs 
     so many people their lives,'' he says.
       A Hearst analysis of the available information on 
     government aircraft accidents since 1983--272--reveals a 
     history marked by crashes involving reckless government 
     pilots, poorly trained government pilots and others who were 
     loosely supervised and monitored by managers who were not 
     pilots and lacked other aviation experience.
       The General Accounting Office, the investigatory arm of 
     Congress, found a similar pattern in its 1986 examination of 
     Alaska's state flying operation. The GAO, relying on special 
     data provided them by the FAA, found that government aircraft 
     in Alaska crashed more often than general aviation planes and 
     helicopters.
       ``Our review disclosed no persuasive reason why 
     (government) aircraft should not be expected to meet at least 
     the minimum maintenance and crew standards expected of civil 
     aircraft,'' the GAO reported to Congress.
       In the Schwarz case, the pilot's failure to follow routine 
     aviation maintenance and safety practices was blatant.
       For example, he failed to undergo periodic ``checkrides'' 
     with independent observers to assess his flying ability. He 
     didn't verify that operating procedures on the airplane were 
     safe. He didn't prepare a flight manifest listing his 
     passengers and crew. And he didn't update his flight plan 
     when he took off for his last leg that day.
       ``The pilot conducted unorthodox and nonstandard operating 
     techniques and procedures,'' according to the Energy 
     Department's crash study.
       It's impossible to know whether Schwarz would have crashed 
     his government plane if he and the aircraft had been subject 
     to government safety rules.
       However, Pamela Charles, a helicopter pilot, an FAA-
     certified mechanic and aviation executive, speculated that 
     the chances were very good that Schwarz would not have been 
     flying that day had he been subject to federal oversight. Her 
     reasoning: FAA spot checks probably would have discovered the 
     altered health certificate.
       ``If the FAA had known, he (Schwarz) would have been cited 
     and may have had his certificate suspended,'' she said. ``By 
     virtue of having a review process, these things get caught.''
       Other cases raise similar questions about the scant 
     oversight and few binding rules imposed on government 
     aviation.
       In 1982, the city manager of Portsmouth, Va., was flying to 
     Baltimore to inspect the development of that city's harbor. 
     The police pilot flying the Beech D-95A airplane was licensed 
     but had not logged any time in airplanes in six months. 
     Instead, he'd been flying helicopters.
       The pilot overloaded the plane and, in rain and fog, 
     crashed into an apartment building in Columbia, Md., about 20 
     miles from Baltimore. Five people died, including one person 
     in the apartment building.
       Had he been subject to federal aviation rules, the pilot 
     would have broken regulations that require those carrying 
     passengers to have flown recently. It also violates federal 
     flying rules to exceed an airplane's carrying capacity.
       ``Even though this crash involved a pilot who was not fresh 
     on airplane flying, he did nothing illegal because he was a 
     public pilot,'' says former NTSB Chairman James Burnett.
       In 1983, an Alaska Fish and Wildlife officer who would have 
     been banned from flying at night by federal flying rules 
     because he couldn't see well in the dark, took off after 
     dusk. He crashed and died.
       This pilot also would have broken the rule that forbids 
     using an aircraft after sunset that's unequipped to fly at 
     night.
                                  ____


                      A Crash Waiting in the Wings

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Washington.--Aircraft pilots and mechanics don't mince 
     words describing the airplane used to transport Gov. Mario M. 
     Cuomo and other top state officials.
       They call it the ``death plane.''
       The aircraft--a 13-passenger Grumman G-1 built in 1966--was 
     tagged with the name in 1988 when the pilot made a forced 
     landing at an airport near Williamsport, Pa., after radio 
     equipment began burning, filling the cabin with smoke. Cuomo, 
     returning to Albany from the Democratic National Convention 
     in Atlanta, was not hurt.
       The plane made another emergency landing in 1990 with Lt. 
     Gov. Stan Lundine aboard. When an instrument panel light 
     began flashing to warn of an engine fire, the pilot quickly 
     found a runaway near Utica for an emergency landing. It 
     turned out to be a false alarm.
       These emergency findings illustrate the consequences of a 
     bizarre anomaly in the elaborate American system of aviation 
     safety: Aircraft and pilots for local, state and federal 
     governments are exempt from almost all--54 of 63--key federal 
     aviation safety regulations that apply to commercial and 
     private aviation.
       Cuomo and Lundine aren't the only state executives with 
     white-knuckle tales about flying on state-owned aircraft.
       In Graefenburg, Ky., in 1992, Gov. Brereton C. Jones and 
     four others were injured when their state helicopters crashed 
     in a ravine. The Sikorsky S-76A went down after an engine 
     compartment door flew open, overheating the engine and 
     causing the aircraft to stall.
       Scouring the debris, National Transportation Safety Board, 
     or NTSB, investigators discovered that two clamps on the 
     left-side engine door had been left unsnapped. The 
     investigators concluded that the governor's helicopter 
     crashed partly because the state flight crew did not 
     properly inspect the aircraft before takeoff.
       In 1993, South Dakota Gov. George Mickelson and several 
     other state officials were killed when their state airplane, 
     a Mitsubishi MU-2, crashed into a grain silo during an 
     emergency landing near Dubuque, Iowa. The plane crashed after 
     a blade broke off a cracked propeller hub.
       Crash investigators later discovered that the Federal 
     Aviation Administration had been warned by the manufacturer 
     and its own scientists about flaws in the MU-2's propeller 
     system. The FAA did not react to those warnings, however, 
     because it was unsure how frequently the problem occurred.
       There's no way to determine if these episodes would have 
     been avoided had the aviation operations of New York State, 
     Kentucky and South Dakota been subject to federal safety 
     rules.
       However, these cases spotlight government aviation's unique 
     status in the skies, creating a separate class of 
     approximately 4,000 aircraft flying for local, state and 
     federal governments across the country.
       An examination by The Hearst Newspapers has found:
       Government aircraft have higher crash rates than airplanes 
     in commercial and general--or private--aviation. (See 
     accompanying chart.)
       Since 1983, at least 181 people have died in 272 crashes of 
     government aircraft. Experts say the number of crashes is 
     underreported and that many of them could have been avoided 
     if the planes and pilots had been subjected to the same 
     oversight that apply to private and commercial aviation.
       In 1992, the year with the most recent data, more people 
     died in government air crashes (51) than in commercial air 
     travel (33), although there were about twice as many 
     airliners and commuter jets flying many times the miles and 
     passengers of government aviation.
       Even the FAA, which enforces safety regulations on the 
     aviation industry, is exempt. It has 53 aircraft and about 
     2,000 pilots.
       The United States treats government aviation far more 
     casually than countries such as Canada and the United 
     Kingdom.
       Government agencies fiercely oppose moves to bring them 
     under safety rules that apply to commercial and general 
     aviation.
       The Hearst inquiry shows that government aviation has 
     bucked the trend in aviation safety over the past decade: 
     While commercial and private aircraft are crashing less, 
     government aircraft are crashing more and killing more people 
     than 10 years ago.
       ``The safest way to fly in government airplanes is not to 
     fly in them,'' says Ira Furman, a former NTSB official who 
     now is an independent aircraft accident investigator and 
     aviation consultant based in Long Island.
       The Hearst examination did not include military aircraft 
     because the Defense Department has a comprehensive set of 
     aviation safety regulations and accident investigation 
     programs tailored to the difficulty, hazard and special 
     requirements of flying military missions.
       Sparse data conceal the safety problems of government 
     aircraft.
       For example, until 1989, local, state and federal 
     authorities were not required to report crashes of government 
     aircraft to federal aviation safety officials. Furthermore, 
     there is no requirement that federal safety officials 
     investigate crashes of government airplanes.
       For example, federal aviation safety authorities will have 
     no role in the investigation of the Aug. 27 crash in Peru of 
     a federal Drug Enforcement Administration plane that killed 
     five DEA agents. The DEA will handle its own investigation.
       By contrast, federal law requires the NTSB to investigate 
     any crash of a commercial aircraft or a private plane 
     involving a death. (The International Civil Aviation 
     Organization investigates crashes of flights that cross 
     international boundaries.)
       Former NTSB Chairman James Burnett believes that the actual 
     number of crashes of government-owned airplanes is vastly 
     understated. He estimates such crashes at ``several hundred a 
     year''--far higher than the 272 since 1983 tabulated by the 
     NTSB at the request of The Hearst Newspapers.
       At any time, Burnett says, the 4,000 largely unregulated 
     government aircraft are an aviation disaster waiting to 
     happen.
       ``One of these days, we will see a big accident as a result 
     of (government aircraft),'' Burnett warns.
       Pamela Charles, a commercial helicopter pilot, FAA-
     certified mechanic and National Guard pilot, also suspects 
     that the crash rate of government aircraft is far higher than 
     official records show.
       ``There are lots of crashes that aren't reported, which 
     means we don't know what's really happening out there,'' she 
     says. ``It's really quite scary--we're setting ourselves up 
     for more and more accidents.''
       Unlike government aviation, commercial and private flying 
     operations are subject to federal regulations covering three 
     main categories: pilots and crews, operational safety, and 
     maintenance and certification. Violators face penalties 
     ranging from license revocation to fines reaching into six 
     figures.
       Arthur Wolk, a Philadelphia-based lawyer and pilot who 
     specializes in aviation law calls the exemption for 
     government-owned aircraft a blatant double standard.
       ``Our governments, flying the same airplanes with our 
     money, act above the law; create a hazard and set a bad 
     example,'' says Wolk.
       Giffen Marr, a Bell Helicopter-Textron Inc. executive and 
     former military test pilot, said the lack of regulations for 
     government aircraft has created high-altitude anarchy.
       ``I just can't believe that we--as a large civilized 
     nation--allow a portion of the aviation system to go 
     uncontrolled,'' he said.
       ``You'd think governors and others who fly would be allowed 
     the same protection as everybody else--but most people don't 
     realize there are no requirements for these aircraft nor how 
     much jeopardy they are in.''
       Richard Xifo, an aviation consultant based in Centreville, 
     Va who has worked for the FAA, points out one of the weird 
     consequences of the immunity granted government, aircraft and 
     pilots.
       ``The situation is so ludicrous that you don't even need a 
     pilot's license to fly a government airplane,'' he said.
       As FAA lawyer Gregory Walden wrote in a 1990 internal memo 
     obtained through the Freedom of Information Act:
       ``A person without a pilot's certificate legally may 
     operate a public aircraft, and without an airworthiness 
     certificate, as far as the FAA is concerned.''
       A pilot's certificate informally is called a pilot's 
     license. That and a medical certificate are the two essential 
     credentials of flying in the United States.
       Small commercial operations and aviation safety experts see 
     the government's exemption from its own regulations as a free 
     ride given government-owned aircraft.
       The idea of voluntary compliance smacks of a ``do as I say, 
     not as I do'' attitude from the federal government, they say.
       Michael Pangia, a pilot and former top trial lawyer for the 
     FAA now in private aviation law practice in Washington, said: 
     ``The federal government is passing regulations all the time 
     to get me to inspect my plane and other things. If it's that 
     important for me, it should be important for all.''
       The experience of other aviation experts backs up Pangia.
       Of the 272 government aircraft accidents over the last 
     decade that were reported to federal officials, as compiled 
     by the NTSB at the Hearst Newspapers' request, 57 might have 
     been avoided if the planes and pilots had been subjected to 
     federal aviation regulations, according to Xifo, Charles and 
     others who reviewed the NTSB crash data at the request of The 
     Hearst Newspapers.
       Sloppiness runs like a plot through the records of the 57 
     crashes.
       In some cases, the pilots, mechanics and their supervisors 
     were not qualified for the work they were assigned to do; in 
     other cases, the pilots had histories of careless flying.
       In some instances, the government aircraft crashed after 
     key parts had been installed improperly, going unnoticed due 
     to insufficient inspection. In many cases, pilots were 
     unlicensed and flew in aircraft unequipped for the task.
       Defenders of the current double standard argue that 
     governmental bodies would need more tax money to spend on 
     their aviation operations if all public aviation were subject 
     to FAA regulations.
       Others point out that some governmental units get high 
     marks for keeping their airplanes in top shape and making 
     sure their pilots get top training.
       For example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is 
     among those often cited for its professional flying 
     operations. The Los Angeles sheriff's aviation operation--and 
     other government units singled out for praise--exceed federal 
     government safety requirements in crucial areas like aircraft 
     inspection and maintenance.
       Los Angeles County has a legion of aviation safety 
     officials, for example, and New York state toughened its 
     safety and flying standards after the incidents involving 
     Cuomo and Lundine.
       ``After the Williamsport incident, we reassessed our whole 
     aviation system. We looked at what needed to be improved,'' 
     said Ben Marvin, a spokesman for the state Department of 
     Environmental Conservation, which oversees New York's 
     aviation operation. The result: The state is requiring its 
     planes to meet the same kind of FAA safety rules that would 
     apply to commuter airlines, he said.
       ``In all fairness, some of these operations are quite 
     professional,'' said William Dvorak, a vice president of 
     quality assurance for California Helicopters Inc., based in 
     Ventura, Calif. ``But anything can happen with a lot of 
     others, and that's the worry.''

            Canada, Britain Subject Aircraft to Strict Rules

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Washington.--When it comes to safety regulation of 
     government-owned aircraft, U.S. skies are in anarchy compared 
     to countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada.
       Both Britain and Canada enforce standards at least as high 
     for government fliers and aircraft as for private and 
     commercial operations. By comparison, government planes in 
     the United States are exempt from 54 of 63 key federal safety 
     regulations overseeing private and commercial aviation.
       Canadian aviation officials chuckle when discussing the 
     U.S. practice.
       ``It's a little bit of a joke up here, what you do down 
     there in the States,'' says William Peppler, general manager 
     of the Ottawa-based Canadian Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
     Association. ``All people are entitled to the same safety 
     standards, aren't they?''
       It's a different story in Canada.
       There, government-owned airplanes must meet the same 
     safety, maintenance and flying rules that apply to commercial 
     and private pilots and aircraft, according to Peppler.
       ``We try to make government aircraft conform to a high 
     standard,'' says Peppler. ``Believing that everyone is 
     important, we maintain the same safety standards for all 
     airplanes.''
       The British standards for government aircraft are even more 
     rigorous.
       In contrast to U.S. practices, the more difficult or 
     dangerous a flying operation, the stiffer the rules a British 
     pilot is required to follow.
       For example, U.S. police aviators are exempt from most 
     federal aviation laws. In Britain, by contrast, police flying 
     operations are subject to the same rules as commercial ones.
       ``It's a different picture here,'' says Ron Campbell of the 
     United Kingdom Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. ``The 
     more rigorous the role, the more rigorous the oversight and 
     inspection.''
       In the United States, Canada and Britain, government 
     regulations require a private pilot to have an annual 
     aircraft inspection as well as an airworthiness certificate 
     for the aircraft.
       But if a British aircraft and pilot are engaged in 
     government flying work, government aviation inspectors check 
     the airplane more frequently--every 50 hours of flying.
       The Canadian government aircraft would face inspection 
     every 100 hours of flight.
       The American government flier doesn't have to do either.
                                  ____


                  Government Aviation: Just the Facts

       Government aircraft have higher crash rates than airplanes 
     in commercial and general (private) aviation.
       Since 1983, at least 181 people have died in 272 crashes of 
     government aircraft. Experts say the number of crashes is 
     underreported and that many of them could have been avoided 
     if the planes and pilots had been subjected to the same rules 
     that apply to private and commercial aviation.
       During the year with the most recent data--1992--more 
     people died in government aircrashes (51) than in commercial 
     air travel (33) although there were about twice as many 
     airliners and commuter jets flying many times the miles and 
     passengers of government aviation.
       More than 200 pilots and aviation technicians have reported 
     incidents of risky and dangerous flying and poor safety 
     practices by government aircraft and aviators since 1986 to 
     an airplane safety hot line run by the National Aeronautics 
     and Space Administration.
       Even the FAA--which enforces safety regulations on the 
     aviation industry--exempts its 53 aircraft and 2,000 pilots 
     from many of the very rules it requires others to obey.
       The United States treats government aviation far more 
     casually than countries like Canada and the United Kingdom.
       Government agencies fiercely oppose moves to bring them 
     under safety rules that apply to commercial and general 
     aviation.
                                  ____


                         Agency Probe Under Way

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       The Federal Aviation Administration--the regulatory agency 
     responsible for enforcing airplane safety--can get 
     closemouthed when questions are raised about government 
     flying operations.
       When The Hearst Newspapers last February began checking the 
     safety records of unregulated government aircraft, the FAA 
     wasn't eager to shed light on the question.
       ``There's really nothing I can give you about (government) 
     aircraft because we don't have anything to do with them,'' 
     said Frasier Jones, and FAA spokesman.
       As interviews with National Transportation Safety Board 
     officials and other federal officials progressed in May and 
     June, the FAA rejected four requests to speak with its top 
     official, David R. Hinson, about why the FAA opposes efforts 
     to end the exemption from federal regulation the government 
     aircraft have.
       In late June, the FAA changed its tune.
       While declining to allow Hinson to be interviewed, the FAA 
     permitted a reporter to talk with Anthony Broderick, its 
     chief of aviation regulations.
       Broderick let drop the news that the FAA had just launched 
     its own investigation of government aircraft safety and would 
     release its findings in ``about six months.''
       ``One of the things we just started, literally within days, 
     is a project to try and assess the magnitude of that issue 
     and get a better feel for what's going on out there (in 
     government aircraft).''

             Private, Commercial Skies Full of Regulations

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Washington.--The good news is that the U.S. government has 
     63 key safety regulations to make sure private and commercial 
     pilots are well trained and the aircraft they fly are safe.
       The bad news is that 54 of the rules don't apply if the 
     pilots or the aircraft work for the federal or any local or 
     state government in the country.
       Although some government aviation units set high safety 
     standards for their pilots and planes, the only federal 
     aviation rules that apply to government aircraft pertain to 
     regulating aircraft in flight, such as the requirement that 
     planes keep a safe distance from each other.
       The reactions by a commercial operation and a government 
     operation to a new safety rule illustrate the differences.
       Bell Helicopters issued a warning in 1992 to owners and 
     pilots of their 205 series helicopter--a civilian version of 
     the military Huey UH-1. After several crashes and accidents, 
     Bell told the 205 owners of to replace the main yoke, a 
     critical part that holds the main rotor blades onto the 
     helicopter.
       Under federal aviation rules, a private or commercial owner 
     of a Bell 205 series helicopter had to obey Bell's warning 
     and replace the old steel yoke with a stainless steel model 
     by Dec. 1, 1993, or face FAA penalties.
       ``I'd have hell to pay if I didn't replace mine,'' says Rod 
     Qvuaam, owner of Helijet Inc., a Eugene, Ore., commercial 
     helicopter operation. ``I'd have my certificate pulled. It 
     would put me out of business.''
       However, a government operation using the same helicopter--
     in many of the same tasks--could ignore the warning.
       For example, the Washington state Department of Natural 
     Resources and the California Department of Forestry chose not 
     to replace the main yokes on any of their Bell 205s, 
     according to the agencies.
       This isn't the only time government flying operations have 
     ignored a safety requirement imposed on commercial and 
     general aviation.
       For example, Washington state has skipped these safety 
     practices that federal regulations require of commercial 
     aviation:
       The state does not subject its pilots to drug or alcohol 
     tests.
       None of Washington's five aircraft has been certified as 
     airworthy by the FAA.
       None of the state's aircraft has fire-control equipment, 
     such as extinguishers on board, or first-aid kits.
       In other areas, Washington state has elected to follow 
     federal aviation standards.
       Its mechanics are FAA-certified, its pilots are FAA-
     certified, and some maintenance practices are more rigorous 
     than the FAA requires.
       Still, George Kerr, operations chief for the Washington 
     Department of Natural Resources, concedes that the state's 
     work is not always up to federal standards.
       ``To be quite honest, they don't have the expertise for 
     what they're doing,'' Kerr says in reference to the state's 
     aircraft mechanics.
       It's a different universe for private and commercial 
     aviation.
       To oversee those who fly for hire or fun and to protect the 
     public, the FAA requires private and commercial flying 
     operations to obey three sets of key safety regulations. 
     These cover pilots and crews, maintenance and safety, and 
     flying itself.
       Private or commercial pilots, mechanics and aviation 
     supervisors who violate these federal rules face FAA 
     penalties that range from fines to license revocation. By 
     contrast, under federal aviation rules, a government pilot is 
     not subject to any outside authority.
                                  ____


                  Caution: FAA Rules Do Not Apply Here

       Federal regulations that apply to private or commercial 
     pilots and aircraft but not to government aircraft and their 
     pilots include:
       Mandatory drug tests.
       A pilot's license.
       A pilot's medical certificate, which is intended to 
     minimize the risk of a pilot being crippled by a health 
     problem in flight.
       Flight training requirements.
       Flight test requirements.
       An instrument certification to fly in certain weather 
     conditions.
       Required hours of flying experience to ensure a pilot can 
     safely handle the mission.
       FAA annual aircraft inspections.
       FAA spot checks, termed ``surveillance inspections.''
       Inspections are required to be completed by an FAA-
     certified mechanic.
       An FAA-approved maintenance program.
       An FAA-approved maintenance manual.
       An after-maintenance inspection by the FAA or its 
     representatives to ensure the plane is safe to fly.
       An accurate maintenance log.
       Commercial operators and those carrying people and cargo 
     are required to have an aircraft inspection every 100 flying 
     hours.
       Certain failures, like a false warning light in flight, are 
     required to be documented.
       An aircraft airworthiness certificate, issued by the FAA 
     that testifies a plane or helicopter can fly as billed and is 
     without mechanical defect.
       Fire-control equipment on board.
       Operating aircraft within allowable weight limits.
       A requirement on commercial operations that transport 
     people or cargo specifies that the FAA assess the carrier's 
     operations management structure and qualifications.
       Commercial aircraft must have cockpit voice recorders and 
     flight data recorders.
       Load manifests are required of commercial operations that 
     carry cargo.
                                  ____


             Fatal FAA Crash Shows a Lack of Accountability

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Linden, Va.--After nine years as a pilot for the Federal 
     Aviation Administration, the flying skills of 55-year-old 
     government aviator Donald Robbins had achieved a kind of 
     notoriety within the agency.
       Three other FAA pilots had refused to fly with Robbins, who 
     liked to brood at the controls and play tricks in flight on 
     his crew members, FAA documents show. A favorite Robbins' 
     game was to ``communicate as little as possible'' with co-
     pilots, meaning he often wouldn't tell them where they were 
     going even after being asked several times, according to the 
     documents obtained by The Hearst Newspapers through the 
     Freedom of Information Act.
       During the time I flew with Robbins, there was never a crew 
     meeting. He did not like oral communication * * * and did not 
     want to see a checklist,'' according to one internal FAA memo 
     detailing complaints from fellow FAA pilots about Robbins. 
     ``If he was flying, he would not allow the (co-pilot) to read 
     (the checklist); it appeared to me that Robbins thought this 
     proved he was a better pilot.''
       Robert Pearce, an FAA safety worker, wrote in one 
     complaint, ``Mr. Robbins has had an attitude in the office 
     during the last month and a half. He has not talked to anyone 
     because of the poor performance appraisal he received.''
       The anxiety about Robbins among his FAA pilots peaked last 
     September, prompting the FAA to dispatch an ``internal audit 
     team'' to see what was going on with Robbins and his 
     supervisors in FAA offices in Atlantic City, N.J., and 
     Oklahoma City, according to an FAA official.
       The team's report, said to be critical of Robbins, was 
     never made public. The FAA kept Robbins in the cockpit.
       Almost exactly a month late, Oct. 26, 1993, Robbins and two 
     FAA colleagues were killed when their government plane 
     crashed into the Blue Ridge Mountains.
       After inspecting runway equipment at the Winchester 
     Regional Airport, Robbins was weaving in and out of fog about 
     1,800 feet above the Virginia countryside when the plane 
     slammed into High Knob mountain.
       At the crash site in the woods about a mile from here, the 
     plane's sheared tail poked above other pieces of bent, metal, 
     its sharply detailed blue-and-white U.S. Transportation 
     Department logo identifying its owner:
       After rummaging through the debris, National Transportation 
     Safety Board investigators accused the FAA of laxity toward 
     the safety of its own aviation program.
       ``The oversight the FAA routinely performs over commercial 
     carriers was not being conducted over its own operations,'' 
     safety board Chairman Carl Vogt said in a statement after the 
     crash.
       The Hearst Newspapers' inquiry learned that Robbins' 
     personnel file contained a major personal blemish that the 
     FAA had disregarded even though it would have caused troubles 
     had he been a commercial pilot: Robbins failed to tell the 
     FAA promptly about a conviction for drunken driving--a 
     violation of federal flying rules as well as the FAA's own 
     policies.
       When he later received a second drunken-driving conviction, 
     Robbins also delayed reporting it. At the time of his death, 
     Robbins' New Jersey driver's license had been revoked because 
     he had failed to comply with the alcohol rehabilitation 
     program required by state law.
       Federal law doesn't require a pilot convicted of drunken 
     driving to forfeit his flying license. However, federal 
     regulations require such convictions to be reported to the 
     FAA; a second such conviction prompts a special FAA 
     investigation into the circumstances and requires FAA-
     certified rehabilitation.
       The FAA did not launch an investigation into Robbins' case 
     or penalize him but did ask him to document his past history 
     of traffic violations. Said an AA official familiar with the 
     events: ``Despite all this stuff, we just did not do anything 
     with him at all.''
       The events surrounding Robbins and his 1993 crash are 
     especially surprising because concerns about the FAA's 
     ability to police itself were raised after a 1988 FAA plane 
     crash. That crash in western Pennsylvania killed three agency 
     employees, two of whom--the pilot and co-pilot--had traces 
     of alcohol in their blood.
       An FAA internal audit after the 1988 crash showed that the 
     agency violated federal aviation rules in 159 instances in 
     its own flying operations in 1988.
       After the crash, the FAA gave assurances that it would 
     start regulating itself by the same standards it sets for the 
     airlines.
       The goal is to foster and achieve the highest degree of 
     aviation safety in all facets of the flight inspection 
     mission,'' William Williams, the FAA's aviation standards 
     director, wrote in a 1992 internal memo almost a year before 
     Robbins died.
       ``In order to realize the highest level of aviation safety, 
     we have prescribed a program that adheres to standards set 
     forth for the aviation industry.''
       However, The Hearst Newspapers inquiry found that the FAA 
     still has not met this goal.
       As the Robbins crash suggests, the FAA makes weaker demands 
     on its aviation employees than it requires of the airline 
     industry in these areas;
       The FAA performs drug tests on only a random selection of 
     its pilots. By contrast, commercial airline pilots have to 
     undergo at least annual drug tests.
       The FAA often waives licensing requirements for some senior 
     FAA officials.
       Under federal law, the airline officials responsible for 
     flight operations and their assistants are required to have 
     an airline transport pilot's license. Some of the FAA's 
     equivalent personnel, however, have been excused from this 
     requirement even though the safety board chided the FAA after 
     Robbins crashed last year for having unqualified flight 
     supervisors.
       ``We do not waiver this under any circumstances for the 
     airline industry nor would an airline want to do it anyway 
     because it's not very smart--it raises substantial liability 
     questions,'' said an FAA official, who spoke in an interview 
     on condition of anonymity.
       The FAA's own rulebook for its pilots is vague compared 
     with the detailed manuals it mandates for airline pilots.
       The FAA has no approved training program for its aviators 
     to maintain proficiency. On the other hand, federal aviation 
     regulations clearly spell out that an airline without a 
     training program won't get off the ground. The FAA even 
     has 2,000 flight standards inspectors to ensure that 
     airline pilot-training programs are up to speed.
       In the Robbins' case, the FAA's only move to discipline him 
     took the form of a reprimand letter after he damaged the 
     engine of another FAA plane in an earlier incident.
       ``As far as many of us are concerned, someone should have 
     acted to ground Robbins, that we at the FAA really are to 
     blame for the crash,'' said one FAA official.
       Reflecting on Robbins' death in an interview in August, 
     Anthony Broderick, the FAA's chief of aviation regulation, 
     said the FAA is trying to shape up.
       ``We are saddened by the tragic loss of lives and are 
     determined to make sure it doesn't happen again,'' Broderick 
     said.
       On his last flight, Robbins ignored routine safety 
     procedures--such as not following a filed flight plan, a 
     violation of the FAA's internal code and federal safety 
     regulations.
       After Robbins crashed last year, FAA spokeswoman Marcia 
     Adams said the agency had improved its practices since the 
     1988 crash. The FAA had ``adopted most'' of the recommended 
     changes to its flight operation urged by the safety board to 
     bring its practices in line with the airline industry, she 
     said, including spot checks of its own operation, filing 
     flight plans, moving forward on alcohol testing for pilots 
     and publishing maintenance and training manuals for FAA 
     flights.
       However, a March 1994 crash of an FAA plane outside 
     Williamson, Ga., shows that some FAA pilots and supervisors 
     are having a hard time adapting to the rules.
       Just two months earlier, in a January letter to the safety 
     board, FAA Administrator David R. Hinson assured the NTSB 
     that all FAA pilots would submit flight plans showing the 
     expected route, destination, mileage and fuel.
       Noted safety board investigators after the Georgia crash, 
     which injured two: ``No flight plan was filed.''
       A veteran FAA flight inspector who declined to be named 
     said: ``I have been involved with the FAA for more than 20 
     years and there really is a double standard, one that lets us 
     ignore the standards we impose on the rest of the aviation 
     community.
       ``That's why some of us here say the FAA leads the industry 
     in deaths.''
       Ultimately, this FAA official said, events like the death 
     of Robbins and his two colleagues challenge the FAA's ability 
     to regulate the skies.
       ``If we can't control our own organization, how can any 
     citizen reasonably expect us to be able to keep them safe 
     when they fly?'' the official said.
                                  ____


     Opponents Ground Legislative Regulation of Government Flights

                         (By David Eisenstadt)

       Washington.--Ask those daredevil pilots who fly 
     firefighting airplanes and helicopters for a living if they 
     and their aircraft should be subject to federal aviation 
     safety laws.
       But be prepared to hear the sound of grinding teeth and 
     listen to predictions of more red tape instead of more lives 
     saved.
       ``If you want to handcuff us, if you want to prevent us 
     from putting out the next fire at Barbra Streisand's mansion, 
     regulate!'' barks Rob Harrison, former safety director of the 
     U.S. Forest Service's Flying operation.
       Harrison is not a lonely voice.
       George Flanagan, No. 2 man for Washington State's flying 
     operations, has this to say about making his state's 
     airplanes meet federal safety rules:
       ``If you want to put us out of business, that's the way to 
     do it,'' says Flanagan.
       Harrison and Flanagan are representative of the near-
     universal opposition to broadening federal safety standards 
     to include government aviation among the nation's local, 
     state and federal firefighters and police officers. They say 
     more rules would make government flying operations more 
     expensive, handicap fliers and cost some people their homes 
     and perhaps their lives.
       ``Right now, we are already so burdened with nonsensical 
     paperwork,'' says Harrison.
       Opposition to greater safety regulation and oversight for 
     government aviation isn't limited to those who risk their 
     lives protecting the public. Paul Erway, a Federal Aviation 
     Administration helicopter specialist, argues that more rules 
     and laws would actually diminish safety in the sky because 
     such a move would divert safety efforts from non-government 
     aviation.
       Erway says the relatively small number of government 
     aircraft--4,000--doesn't merit the same scrutiny that is 
     given large commercial operations which carry thousands of 
     passengers a year. It would also force the FAA to scrimp in 
     other areas, he says.
       ``There's no payoff for us to bust their chops,'' says 
     Erway. ``In a situation of limited resources, you try to get 
     the most bang for the taxpayers' buck.''
       Still, these opponents face some spirited foes.
       At least one U.S. senator and a vociferous crown of 
     aviation safety advocates contend that fewer rules for 
     government aviation mean more government aircraft crashes and 
     unnecessary deaths.
       A Hearst Newspapers investigation into the lack of federal 
     aviation safety regulations for government pilots or 
     airplanes found that government aircraft have higher crash 
     rates than do private and commercial aviation.
       ``We need to ensure that all aircraft be subject to 
     stringent and rigorous safety standards regardless of who 
     owns them,'' says Sen. Larry Pressler, a South Dakota 
     Republican. ``Government needs to sit up and take notice so 
     that safety regulations are written and enforced--we owe that 
     to the air-traveling public.''
       Pressler has tried for two years to require government 
     aviation to obey the same safety rules that oversee 
     commercial and private aviation. But with Congress on the 
     verge of vacating Washington for the year, the senator's 
     effort this year is going the same way as last year's: 
     nowhere.
       After South Dakota Gov. George Mickelson died in the crash 
     of a state airplane in 1992, Pressler proposed legislation to 
     subject government aircraft and fliers to the same rules as 
     private and commercial aircraft and pilots.
       Pressler's bill finally passed the Senate in June. Pressure 
     from the FAA, other federal agencies and law enforcement 
     groups moved other lawmakers to weaken the measure, the 
     senator said.
       ``It's not my intention to obstruct law enforcement or 
     firefighting operations,'' the senator said. ``But all 
     aircraft, whether commercial, private or government, should 
     be required to maintain the highest level of safety.''
       this draft version, now awaiting approval in the House of 
     Representatives, still would significantly expand federal 
     oversight of government aircraft. Any government aircraft 
     transporting passengers would be forced to meet the same FAA 
     safety requirements as commercial or private aircraft.
       The bill also would require the National Transportation 
     Safety Board to investigate ever government aviation 
     accident. By comparison, the law requires the NTSB to 
     investigate the crash of every commercial aircraft that was 
     carrying people and every crash of a private aviation plane 
     when there was a fatality.
       But there is a gaping loophole, Pressler said--a result of 
     the fierce lobbying against the measure by the FAA and 
     others.
       As now before the House, the bill contains a waiver to 
     allow the FAA to excuse any government entity from the 
     beefed-up rules if it has a good aviation record.
       In addition, the diluted version of Pressler's bill 
     provides the same special exemptions for some government 
     agencies--such as firefighters--enjoyed under current law.
       Steve Burns, a Senator committee investigator, said in a 
     recent interview: ``The status quo is pretty much 
     indefensible in this area. People don't like the idea that 
     the government holds them to a different standard than it 
     holds itself.''
       Earlier efforts to bring government aviation under federal 
     regulation also have failed--often because the FAA leadership 
     has opposed the move, documents obtained by Hearst Newspapers 
     through the Freedom of Information Act show.
       In 1986, the General Accounting Office--the investigating 
     arm of Congress--looked into the safety record of government 
     aircraft in Alaska and concluded:
       ``Our review disclosed no persuasive reason why public 
     aircraft should not be expected to meet at least the minimum 
     FAA maintenance and crew standards expected of civil 
     aircraft.''
       In 1991, the U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee found 
     that ``government aircraft are held to a far lower standard 
     than the private sector when it comes to operation, safety 
     and maintenance specifications.''
       The committee reported that the federal government spent 
     about $1.75 billion in 1991 to operate its non-military 
     aircraft fleet, although the government lacked a ``management 
     system capable of preventing waste and abuse.''
       But after each attempt to close the loophole, top FAA 
     officials have helped block it, concerned that accompanying 
     costs could be too high, according to documents obtained 
     through the Freedom of Information Act.
       Rep. Norman Mineta, D-Calif., tried in 1987 to bring 
     government fliers under the same rules as other pilots. His 
     bill, Mineta said in an interview, was watered down in the 
     House Transportation and Public Works Committee. In the end, 
     Congress only required that government air crashes were to be 
     reported to the NTSB, starting in 1989.
       ``That bill was killed from pressure by the FAA, the Energy 
     Department and others,'' Mineta says. ``Their objections had 
     no substance because safety ought not to be compromised.''
       Another committee member, Rep. James Oberstar, D-Minn., 
     chairman of its aviation panel, says the House so far has not 
     addressed the matter because ``no one has raised any concerns 
     about public-use aircraft.''
       However, complaints about the use of so-called public use 
     or government aircraft have been filed from single pilots and 
     the Airline Pilots Association with the FAA and other 
     government agencies for at least two decades.
       T.J. Shepard, the owner of Gallup Flying Service in Gallup, 
     N.M., framed the issue in a 1990 letter to his congressman, 
     Rep. Joe Skeen, R-N.M.
       The letter, obtained through the Freedom of Information 
     Act, said: ``As a public official, next time you fly, will it 
     be by a qualified, currently checked pilot and aircraft?''

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move the Senate concur in the House 
amendment to the Senate amendment and reconsider and table that motion.
  The motion was agreed to.

                          ____________________