[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                      NOMINATION OF H. LEE SAROKIN

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, in my statement on October 4 concerning the 
nomination of Judge H. Lee Sarokin, through inadvertence, part 2 of an 
analysis of Judge Sarokin's record by Thomas L. Jipping failed to be 
printed in the Record. I ask unanimous consent that the omitted portion 
be printed at this point in the Record and that the bound volume be 
corrected to reflect the continuous printing of part 1 and part 2.
  There being no objection, the analysis was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From Coalitions for America, Aug. 20, 1994]

 Flunking the Credibility Test, Part 2: Comparing the Testimony to the 
                                 Truth

                       (By Thomas L. Jipping)\1\

       President Clinton has nominated H. Lee Sarokin, currently a 
     U.S. District Judge in New Jersey, to the U.S. Court of 
     Appeals for the Third Circuit (NJ, PA, DE, VI). The Senate 
     Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on the nomination on 
     August 3, 1994. Senators fulfilling their constitutional role 
     of advice and consent look at a nominee's substantive record 
     and testimony at his hearing. Coalitions for America has 
     already provided extensive analysis of Judge Sarokin's 
     record;\2\ this memorandum examines his hearing testimony. 
     Judge Sarokin was, at best, disingenuous and, at worst, 
     dishonest about some of the very controversial parts of his 
     record. His testimony painted a picture of a judge who 
     consistently respects precedent and maintains his proper role 
     as a judge no matter what his personal views, a judge whose 
     decisions are rarely reversed on appeal, and a judge with 
     mainstream views on important issues. Comparing the testimony 
     to the truth shows that this picture is false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
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                        i. inventing new rights

                            A. The testimony

       In the so-called ``library case,'' arguably Judge Sarokin's 
     most infamous decision, he struck down a library's rules for 
     the behavior and hygiene of patrons. On the one hand, it is 
     just one of many activist decisions that was reversed on 
     appeal. On the other hand, however, it is a striking example 
     of how Judge Sarokin attempts to advance social and personal 
     causes in the guise of judicial decisionmaking. It is also a 
     clear example of how Judge Sarokin misled the Judiciary 
     Committee and, therefore the Senate, about the very 
     controversial nature of his record.
       In Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown,\3\ 
     Judge Sarokin effectively created a constitutional right not 
     to be discriminated against on the basis of behavior or 
     hygiene. He struck down regulations adopted by the Morristown 
     library board regarding behavior and hygiene standards for 
     library patrons. The board had adopted those regulations 
     after repeated, yet unsuccessful, attempts to handle a 
     continually disruptive and obnoxious patron. At his August 3 
     hearing, and in other settings, Judge Sarokin maintained that 
     ``[t]here were two issues that were presented to me,'' 
     namely, a First Amendment issue and a vagueness/overbreadth 
     issue. He claimed that ``the only issue with which the Third 
     Circuit disagreed was whether or not the regulations were 
     vague and over-broad. They did not disagree about the First 
     Amendment analysis.''

                              B. The truth

       This is simply not true and it is difficult to understand 
     how Judge Sarokin could so blatantly misrepresent his own 
     decision and the basis for the Third Circuit's reversal. In 
     fact, the Third Circuit disagreed with every substantive part 
     of Judge Sarokin's First Amendment analysis as well as every 
     other issue. The record is very clear about what Judge 
     Sarokin decided and what the Third Circuit reversed:
       Judge Sarokin held that a library is a ``traditional'' or 
     ``quintessential'' public forum for the expression of 
     ideas\4\ akin to ``streets and parks''.\5\ The Third Circuit 
     reversed that decision.\6\
       Judge Sarokin held that a library is a full-fledged 
     ``designated public forum.''\7\ The Third Circuit 
     disagreed.\8\
       Judge Sarokin held the library's rules were ``not 
     reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.''\9\ The 
     Third Circuit reversed that decision.\10\
       Judge Sarokin held that the library's rules were 
     unconstitutionally overbroad.\11\ The Third Circuit reversed 
     that decision.\12\
       Judge Sarokin held that the library's rules were 
     unconstitutionally vague.\13\ The Third Circuit reversed that 
     decision.\14\
       Judge Sarokin held that the library's rules violated the 
     due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\15\ The Third 
     Circuit reversed that decision.\16\
       Judge Sarokin held that the library's rules violated the 
     equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\17\ The 
     Third Circuit reversed that decision.\18\
       Judge Sarokin held that the library's rules violated the 
     New Jersey Constitution.\19\ The Third Circuit reversed that 
     decision.\20\
       Anyone reading these decisions, each a mater of public 
     record, will see that at least these eight issues were 
     addressed in the Kreimer case. The appeals court reversed 
     Judge Sarokin on every one of them. Given the clarity of the 
     record, his statement to the Judiciary Committee that there 
     were only ``two issues'' involved and that the appeals 
     court disagreed on only one could only have been an 
     attempt to cover up the strikingly activist and very 
     controversial nature of his record. This lack of candor is 
     cause for serious concern about this nominee and his 
     fitness to serve on the second highest court in the land.
       The Third Circuit not only reversed Judge Sarokin on all of 
     these issues, it also disagreed with several of his 
     interpretations of important precedents. For example, citing 
     a Supreme Court decision, Judge Sarokin insisted that the 
     Court has ``consistently held that government must limit 
     time, place, and manner restrictions of a public forum to 
     prohibitions of activity which actually and materially 
     interferes with the peaceful and orderly management of the 
     public space.''\21\ As the appeals court pointed out, this is 
     not at all what the Court has held.\22\ The case Judge 
     Sarokin cited involved prohibition of particular symbolic 
     political speech on the basis of its content; this lies at 
     the heart of the First Amendment and this type of regulation 
     would be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. In 
     addition, that case involved the unique setting of public 
     schools. There is neither a factual nor legal parallel in the 
     Kreimer case.
       Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) asked Judge Sarokin if he 
     believed his ruling on vagueness was faithful to Supreme 
     Court precedent. The nominee insisted that the Supreme 
     Court's decision in Brown v. Louisiana,\23\ which he had 
     cited in his opinion in Kreimer, explicitly held protected by 
     the First Amendment activity (sitting in silent protest) 
     which the library's regulation in Kreimer would have 
     prohibited. As he told the Committee, ``that is why I thought 
     it was unconstitutional.'' Yet, as Justice Brennan's 
     concurring opinion in Brown clearly emphasizes, only a three-
     Justice plurality took the position that silent protest was 
     protected under the First Amendment.
       Perhaps H. Lee Sarokin, with 25 years of litigation 
     experience and another 15 years as a U.S. District Judge, 
     simply misread an important Supreme Court decision (he told 
     the Committee that Brown was ``the most significant case on 
     this issue''). If this is the case, he should long ago have 
     been willing to admit this and correct his mistake. Yet later 
     in his hearing, after Senator Thurmond had pointed out his 
     misreading of Brown, Judge Sarokin repeated his error, again 
     insisting that the opinion of a Supreme Court plurality was 
     actually the holding of a Supreme Court majority and, 
     therefore, dictated his decision in Kreimer.
       Perhaps Judge Sarokin simply utilized whatever he could to 
     buttress his preferred result. As this memorandum points out 
     below, the Third Circuit in other cases has rebuked Judge 
     Sarokin for deciding cases on the basis of his own 
     ``intuition,''\24\ his ``own views''\25\ and for refusing 
     to follow binding precedent with which he disagreed.\26\ 
     In a 1984 case, Judge Sarokin even cited the very Third 
     Circuit precedent that he ignored to reach his preferred 
     result.\27\ Perhaps in Kreimer he knew what he was doing 
     after all.


     II. Opposition to PreTrial Detention and Mandatory Sentencing

                            A. The testimony

       On March 20, 1987, Judge Sarokin addressed the Mid-Atlantic 
     Conference of Law Reviews. This speech was published as an 
     article in the West Virginia Law Review.\28\ He stated that 
     law journals should analyze various proposals for changes in 
     the civil and criminal law. He also made very plain his own 
     opinion about some of those proposals. He stated:
       ``Look at what is happening in the criminal area. We have 
     pretrial detention of the accused in direct contradiction of 
     the presumption of innocence. . . . Mandatory and uniform 
     sentencing is in the wings depriving judges of the right to 
     grant mercy.\29\

                              B. The truth

       There is no question about Judge Sarokin's opinion of 
     pretrial detention, mandatory sentencing, and uniform 
     sentencing--he opposes each of them. These are very 
     controversial views. Perhaps understanding this, he responded 
     at his hearing to a question by Senator Thurmond by insisting 
     that ``I merely outlined for them a number of issues that I 
     thought Law Reviews should take up. I certainly did not 
     suggest to them how they should come out.'' This statement is 
     simply not true, and one need only read the article to see 
     this on its face. He made very clear what his opinion on 
     these matters were. Again, it is very difficult to square 
     Judge Sarokin's statements to the Judiciary Committee with 
     the clear public record.


                     III. Deference to Lower Courts

       Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), Judiciary Committee Chairman, 
     asked Judge Sarokin some questions about his judicial 
     philosophy to determine whether the nominee has a sufficient 
     understanding of his proper role as a judge. At various 
     times, this role requires a judge to be deferential to lower 
     courts as well as respectful to higher courts. Senator Biden 
     asked Judge Sarokin about both areas.

                            A. The testimony

       In certain instances, appellate judges must be deferential 
     to decisions by lower courts. Because trial judges are 
     finders of facts in the first instance, appellate judges must 
     defer to those factual findings unless they are ``clearly 
     erroneous.'' This means appellate judges cannot simply 
     substitute their own judgment whenever they wish. Senator 
     Biden asked Judge Sarokin whether, if appointed to the 
     appeals court, he could ``accept factual findings by the 
     lower court.'' Not surprisingly, Judge Sarokin assured the 
     Committee he would ``certainly'' do this successfully.

                              B. The truth

       Senators need not wait until Judge Sarokin sits on the 
     appeals court, however, to know the truth about this 
     important issue. Even in his capacity as a trial judge, Judge 
     Sarokin has been required to apply the same deferential 
     standard and has already demonstrated that he cannot do so 
     successfully. The Federal Magistrate Act states that ``a 
     magistrate's order is not to be reconsidered unless it is 
     `clearly erroneous or contrary to law.'''\30\ The U.S. 
     Supreme Court,\31\ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\32\ 
     and the General Rules of Judge Sarokin's own court\33\ 
     require the same standard. Judge Sarokin, therefore, is 
     presently required to apply to magistrates' decisions the 
     very same standard that, as an appellate judge, he would 
     have to apply to district judges' decisions.
       He has repeatedly refused to apply this deferential 
     standard and has instead applied a ``plenary'' standard that 
     allowed him to substitute his own judgment. In one high-
     profile case, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed Judge 
     Sarokin for applying the wrong standard and wrote: ``The 
     `clearly erroneous' standard obviously would have been less 
     onerous for the defendants than was the district court's 
     plenary review standard.''\34\ Judge Sarokin ignored the law 
     precisely so he could be as onerous as possible on the 
     parties he disfavored.
       Several years later, in the very same case, Judge Sarokin 
     again had to review a magistrate's recommendation. The court 
     of appeals said it was ``undisputed''\35\ as well as ``clear 
     and unambiguous''\36\ that the correct standard was 
     deference; Judge Sarokin could only consider the evidence 
     that was before the magistrate and could only overturn a 
     decision that was ``clearly erroneous and contrary to law.'' 
     Instead, he ignored the law, ordered the parties to submit 
     evidence from a different case that the magistrate had not 
     even seen, and substituted his own judgment. This was a 
     sufficiently serious judicial ``usurpation of power''\37\ to 
     warrant the ``extraordinary'' and ``exceptional'' remedy of a 
     writ of mandamus reversing this decision. In addition, as 
     described below, the Third Circuit actually removed Judge 
     Sarokin as the presiding judge in this case because he could 
     not maintain an appearance of impartiality.
       Judge Sarokin may well say that he will, as an appellate 
     judge, have no problem applying the deferential ``clearly 
     erroneous'' standard to lower court findings. His record, 
     however, shows that he has disregarded this very standard as 
     a district judge when reviewing magistrate recommendations.


                     iv. respect for higher courts

                            A. Supreme Court

                            1. The testimony

       As part of his discussion about judicial philosophy, 
     Senator Biden also asked Judge Sarokin if, as a court of 
     appeals judge, he would follow binding precedent. Judge 
     Sarokin responded that he would be ``clearly bound by any 
     Supreme Court precedent'' and that he would ``have no trouble 
     with that'' whether or not he agreed with the particular 
     precedent.

                              2. The truth

       The truth is that, in some cases, Judge Sarokin has been 
     more than willing to distort Supreme Court precedent to fit 
     his jurisprudential needs and, in other cases, quick to 
     disregard entirely Supreme Court precedent that does not 
     allow him to achieve his preferred results.
        For example, in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town 
     of Morristown,\38\ discussed above, Judge Sarokin held that 
     library rules governing patron behavior and hygiene were 
     unconstitutional. He cited the Supreme Court's decision in 
     Brown v. Louisiana\39\ and insisted that the Court there had 
     held that a silent protest in a library was 
     ``constitutionally protected.''\40\ Yet, as Justice William 
     Brennan's concurring opinion in Brown emphasized, only a 
     plurality of the Court believed that the silent protest was 
     protected.
       In Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp.,\41\ three chemists brought 
     an age discrimination suit against their former employer. 
     Judge Sarokin awarded them attorney's fees plus a 20% 
     multiplier. The U.S. Court of Appeals ordered him to 
     reconsider in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.\42\ 
     He appointed a magistrate who recommended that no multiplier 
     be awarded, but he granted a 50% multiplier instead. The 
     appeals court reversed Judge Sarokin and, noting that he had 
     ``offered no explanation why the specific figure of 50 
     percent was chosen''\43\ and earlier had actually 
     ``rejected plaintiffs' request for a 50 percent 
     increase,''\44\ severely criticized Judge Sarokin for 
     imposing his personal views and ignoring relevant 
     precedent. among the Third Circuit's criticisms were the 
     following:
       [T]he district court, without concealing its disapproval of 
     both the Supreme Court's decision and ours, proceeded in 
     accordance with its own views.\45\
       We conclude that in at least four respects essential to its 
     decision, the district court applied the incorrect legal 
     standard.\46\
       It appears that the court proceeded to follow its own view 
     of the relevant market in ascertaining the availability of 
     adequate legal representation.\47\
       In making its determination on the risk associated with 
     this individual case, the court failed to follow the clear 
     direction of [the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court]. . . . 
     The district court made no secret of its disagreement with 
     the instruction it received on this issue.\48\
       [I]n another departure from the task set for it, the 
     district court established a contingency multiplier for this 
     individual case rather than setting a standard which would be 
     applicable to future litigation within the same market.\49\
       Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although the 
     district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to 
     meet their burden of proof by not quantifying the contingency 
     premium, the court nonetheless relieved the plaintiffs of 
     their burden of proof.\50\
       The court finally rebuked Judge Sarokin by concluding that 
     ``the error with the district court's judgment was the 50 
     percent multiplier it arrived at was supported only by the 
     court's own intuition. This is precisely what the Supreme 
     Court and this court held is impermissible. Neither the 
     district court nor this court is free to superimpose its own 
     view of what the law should be in the face of the Supreme 
     Court contrary precedent.''\51\ This is an unusually harsh 
     series of rebukes, justified because Judge Sarokin had 
     rendered an unusually activist series of decisions, openly 
     expressing his personal distaste for binding precedent and 
     openly ignoring that precedent.
       Similarly, in LeBrun v. Thornburgh,\52\ Judge Sarokin made 
     clear his personal views of the issues and law involved and 
     followed those personal views rather than the law. In this 
     cases, Judge Sarokin held that certain immigration law 
     provisions violated the equal protection clause of the 
     Fourteenth Amendment. These provisions (which are no longer 
     operative) required that in order for children born out of 
     wedlock to American fathers and foreign mothers to be U.S. 
     citizens, the father must acknowledge the child before age 21 
     and the child must live in the United States for a certain 
     number of years before age 28. Judge Sarokin made clear his 
     personal objection to the statutory provisions, calling them 
     ``inhumane and unfair'' as well as ``sexist.''\53\ He even 
     took exception to using the term ``illegitimate'' to describe 
     children born out of wedlock, calling it ``discriminatory'' 
     and ``archaic.''\54\ The basis for his decision seemed to be 
     his personal observation that the policy in the statue ``is 
     wrong.''\55\
       In addition to clearly stating his personal moral 
     objections to this requirement, Judge Sarokin wrote that his 
     holding ``may be analogized to the `disparate impact' 
     doctrine under Title VII.''\56\ The Supreme Court has 
     explicitly held, however, that the equal protection clause 
     requires showing intentional discrimination; the disparate 
     impact theory does not apply. Judge Sarokin was simply wrong 
     as a matter of law to hold otherwise. Yet, in response to a 
     question by Senator Charles Grassley, however, he insisted 
     that there was ``ample case law to support that conclusion.''

                        B. U.S. Court of Appeals

                            1. The testimony

       Later in the hearing, Senator Thurmond asked Judge Sarokin 
     if, as a district judge, he is presently bound by the U.S. 
     Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Not surprisingly, 
     Judge Sarokin agreed that he is. Yet just as he has openly 
     defied Supreme Court precedent and decided cases based on his 
     own views and own intuition, Judge Sarokin has ignored 
     binding precedent from the Third Circuit. It is no wonder 
     that he is the most reversed federal judge in New Jersey.

                              2. The Truth

       In one of the more egregious examples, Judge Sarokin not 
     only refused to follow binding Third Circuit precedent, he 
     even cited the very precedent he was ignoring. In U.S. v. 
     Rodriguez,\57\ a criminal suspect read and signed a waiver of 
     his Miranda rights. He signed the waiver with a false name. 
     Judge Sarokin held that, because of this, the waiver was not 
     voluntary. In doing so, he included the following citation:
       ``But see United States v. Chapman, 448 F.2d 1381, 1386 n.7 
     (3d Cir. 1971)'' (contention that signature was not one's own 
     is not relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the 
     confession).
       Judges or authors use ``but see'' to introduce the citation 
     of legal authority that may contradict but does not affect 
     their conclusion. That is, Judge Sarokin thought to reference 
     this directly contrary Third Circuit precedent, and even to 
     describe its contrary holding, but did so in such a way as to 
     indicate his belief that it was of interest but no 
     consequence for his decision. In response to a question by 
     Senator Thurmond at his hearing, however, Judge Sarokin 
     insisted that this decision was ``definitely'' in accord with 
     Third Circuit precedent.
       In response to a question by Senator Hank Brown (R-CO), 
     Judge Sarokin stated that the Third Circuit had decided in 
     Chapman that using a false name was not ``dispositive'' on 
     the question of voluntariness. Yet in Rodriguez, Judge 
     Sarokin himself described the Third Circuit's decision in 
     Chapman as holding that using a false name is not even 
     ``relevant'' to that question.
       Later in the hearing, Senator Brown read a question 
     submitted by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) about the same issue. 
     Judge Sarokin stated that ``I can't imagine that the Third 
     Circuit's ruling would be that use of an alias was never 
     relevant in this type of a proceeding.'' Yet this is exactly 
     the way Judge Sarokin himself described the Third Circuit's 
     holding in Chapman. Judge Sarokin insisted that ``it would be 
     inconceivable to me that I found the Third Circuit decision 
     that said you can't use this as a factor and in the same 
     sentence I said I am going to.'' Yet in Rodriguez, Judge 
     Sarokin cited the Third Circuit's decision in Chapman, 
     described that holding as saying that using a false name is 
     ``not relevant'' to the issue of voluntariness, then held 
     that the suspect in the case before him had not made a 
     voluntary waiver because he had signed the waiver with a 
     false name. The contradiction should be plain for all to see.


        V. Ignoring Precedent in Obscenity and Pornography Cases

                            A. The testimony

       In E-Bru, Inc. v. Graves,\58\ Judge Sarokin granted an 
     injunction blocking the town of Paterson, New Jersey, from 
     applying its zoning ordinance to an adult bookstore. In his 
     opinion, Judge Sarokin wrote: ``We must remember that we are 
     dealing only with words and pictures, the harmful effects of 
     which, if any, has never been clearly established.''\59\ At 
     his August 3 hearing, Judge Sarokin responded to questions by 
     Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) about this case and insisted 
     such statements were his way of emphasizing ``that there were 
     First Amendment implications here that necessitated the 
     action that I took. It was an effort on my part to try to 
     explain and justify the legal ruling that I had made.''

                              B. The truth

       Judge Sarokin did not even attempt to explain why evidence 
     of harm from pornography was at all relevant to his 
     discussion of the legal issues. He provided no basis for his 
     conclusory statement that such harm ``has never been clearly 
     established.'' And he never distinguished, or even cited, the 
     Supreme Court's rejection of the argument that scientific 
     data conclusively demonstrating adverse effects is necessary 
     for communities to regulate pornography and obscenity.\60\ 
     How can it be, then, that his assertion that harm from 
     ``words and pictures'' has not been established was necessary 
     to ``explain and justify'' his legal ruling? It cannot be. As 
     in so many other cases, the only explanation is Judge 
     Sarokin basing his decisions on his personal views and, 
     further, injecting his personal views directly into his 
     written opinions.


                        VI. JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT

       Judge Sarokin presided over a high-profile lawsuit against 
     several tobacco companies. The plaintiffs sought thousands of 
     documents and the defendants argued that some of them were 
     protected by the attorney-client privilege. Judge Sarokin 
     appointed a special master who concluded that the attorney-
     client privilege did apply to some of the documents. He also 
     appointed a magistrate who concluded that the crime-fraud 
     exception to the privilege did not apply. Judge Sarokin not 
     only reversed the magistrate's decision but actually included 
     portions of the documents in his published opinions. The 
     Third Circuit reversed him and, based on actions like these 
     and outrageously biased statements against one of the parties 
     before Judge Sarokin, actually issued a writ of mandamus 
     removing him as the presiding judge in the case.

                      A. Judge Sarokin's testimony

       At his August 3 hearing, responding to Senator Brown, Judge 
     Sarokin admitted that disclosing these documents ``probably 
     was an error'' and said that ``probably I should have avoided 
     it.'' Yet he still attempted to justify this extraordinary 
     breach of judicial duty by saying that ``there was not some 
     wholesale disclosure.'' This is another example of how Judge 
     Sarokin's personal biases or views drive his jurisprudence. 
     Those biases lead him to make decisions which, like this one, 
     are often reversed on appeal. Those biases also prompt him to 
     make statements or take actions which are completely 
     unnecessary to decide the legal issues before him, but 
     instead serve to pursue his own personal agenda.

                              B. The truth

       The Supreme Court has said that ``any tribunal permitted by 
     law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased 
     but also must avoid even the appearance of bias.''\61\ The 
     Third Circuit removed Judge Sarokin as the presiding judge in 
     this case after concluding that ``it is impossible for us to 
     vindicate the requirement of appearance of impartiality in 
     view of the statements made in the district court's 
     prologue to its opinion.''\62\ Those statements were 
     included in a diatribe against all big business, claiming 
     they place ``money over morality'' and ``put the buying 
     public at risk solely for the purpose of making 
     profits.''\63\ He called the very companies who were 
     parties before him in that case ``the king of concealment 
     and disinformation.''\64\ While the Third Circuit had 
     refused a request earlier in the litigation to remove 
     Judge Sarokin because of his obvious bias,\65\ this time 
     the court had had enough. Even the liberal New York Times 
     agreed with removing Judge Sarokin, concluding that he had 
     ``flunked an important test of credibility.''\66\


                               conclusion

       Judge H. Lee Sarokin has a very activist and very 
     controversial record, a record he tried to cover up or run 
     away from at his hearing before the Judiciary Committee.
       He claimed, in response to a question by Senator William 
     Cohen, that his record on appeal is ``maybe a little bit 
     better'' than ``anyone else on the [district] court.'' Yet 
     the New Jersey Law Journal concluded that ``Sarokin may be 
     the most reversed federal judge in New Jersey when it comes 
     to major cases.''\67\
       These are just some of the obvious and serious 
     discrepancies between Judge Sarokin's testimony at his 
     hearing and the record he has developed during his years as a 
     federal judge. It is perhaps understandable that he would 
     want to downplay his very liberal, very activist, and very 
     controversial record. But just as he had to be removed from 
     an important case because he could no longer even maintain an 
     appearance of impartiality, he should be prevented from 
     assuming a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals because he 
     cannot maintain the appearance of candor or restraint.


                               footnotes

     \1\Legal Affairs Analyst, Coalitions for America.
     \2\See ``Flunking the Credibility Test: Judicial Temperament 
     and Judicial Philosophy,'' report dated July 20, 1994; two 
     Nomination Memoranda dated August 18, 1994; Nomination 
     Memoranda dated August 4 and July 25, 1994.
     \3\765 F.Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1991)
     \4\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 187.
     \5\Id. at 186, quoting Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local 
     Educators' Assn, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
     \6\Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256.
     \7\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 187.
     \8\Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 187.
     \9\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 189.
     \10\Kreimer, 958 F.2d. at 1262-64.
     \11\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 190.
     \12\Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1265.
     \13\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 193.
     \14\Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1267-68.
     \15\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 195.
     \16\Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1269.
     \17\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 196.
     \18\Kreimer, 958 F.2d. at 1269 n.36.
     \19\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 197.
     \20\Kreimer, 958 F.2d. at 1270.
     \21\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 188, citing Tinker v. Des Moines 
     Indepenent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
     \22\Kreimer, 958 F.2d 1242, 1263 n.25.
     \23\383 U.S. 131 (1966).
     \24\See, e.g., Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 888 F.2d 975,983 
     (3d Cir. 1989).
     \25\Id. at 977.
     \26\Id. at 982.
     \27\See United States v. Rodriguez, Crim. No. 84-18 (D.N.J. 
     1984).
     \28\Sarokin, ``Beware the Solutions!,'' 90 West Virginia Law 
     Review 1003 (1988).
     \29\Id. at 1005.
     \30\Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108,1113 (3d 
     Cir. 1986), citing 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A).
     \31\See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,673 (1980).
     \32\See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a).
     \33\See General Rule 40D(4) of the U.S. District Court for 
     the District of New Jersey.
     \34\Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1120.
     \35\Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81,92 (3d Cir. 
     1992).
     \36\Id. at 91.
     \37\See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,95 (1967).
     \38\765 F.Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d 
     Cir. 1992).
     \39\383 U.S. 131 (1966).
     \40\Kreimer, 765 F.Supp. at 191.
     \41\702 F.Supp. 493 (D.N.J. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 975 (3d 
     Cir. 1989).
     \42\That decision was Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley 
     Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
     \43\Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 888 F.2d 975,979 (3d Cir. 
     1989).
     \44\Id. at 980.
     \45\Id. at 977.
     \46\Id. at 981.
     \47\Id. at 982.
     \48\Id.
     \49\Id.
     \50\Id. at 983.
     \51\Id. at 977.
     \52\777 F.Supp. 1204 (D.N.J. 1991).
     \53\Id. at 1206.
     \54\Id. at 1213.
     \55\Id. at 1212.
     \56\Id. at 1213 n.6.
     \57\Crim. No. 84-18 (D.N.J. 1984).
     \58\566 F.Supp. 1476 (D.N.J. 1983).
     \59\Id. at 1478.
     \60\See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58,60 
     (1973).
     \61\Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 
     393 U.S. 145 (1968).
     \62\Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81,98 (3d Cir. 
     1992).
     \63\Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681,683 (D.N.J. 
     1992).
     \64\Id.
     \65\See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335 (3d 
     Cir. 1987).
     \66\Editorial, New York Times, September 10, 1992, at A22.
     \67\Schroth, ``Sarokin Off Tobacco Case After Circuit's Rare 
     Move,'' New Jersey Law Journal, September 14, 1992.

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