[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
VISIT TO THE SENATE BY NELSON MANDELLA, PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask the Senate stand in recess, with the
permission of the Senator from Georgia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to yield.
I believe the request is that the Senate stand in recess for 5
minutes to greet Nelson Mandella, the President of South Africa.
Thereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the Senate recessed until 2:59 p.m.;
whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding
Officer (Mr. Campbell).
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, as we all know, this is a very special day where we
have heard the wonderful comments, inspiring comments, of the President
of South Africa, and I think it gives us a great deal of hope, not only
in South Africa but everywhere in the world where people are divided by
race or religion or by culture or by economic class, as we see in the
situation in Haiti.
Mr. President, the days and months ahead will require much in the way
of alleviating the suffering of the Haitian people from the other
departments and agencies of the United States Government, including
especially AID, our allies from the United Nations, and especially from
President Aristide and his supporters. I will be watching their
performance very closely and will not hesitate to speak out if I think
their actions are inappropriate and are endangering the safety of
American military forces.
Mr. President, I want to note that although, as I have already
pointed out, this resolution does not state a fixed or even a target
date for the withdrawal of our forces at this time, the Senate through
the power of the purse and the House through the power of the purse
retain the power to do so in the future if such proves necessary.
Finally, although as I have noted on the Senate floor several times,
I did not support an invasion of Haiti, I am pleased that the Haitian
people now will have an opportunity to build democracy in their own
country. I said very specifically ``build'' not ``restore'' or
``reestablish'' democracy because there has never really been a
functioning democracy in Haiti. The United States has taken the lead
now in giving the Haitian people that opportunity. It will require hard
work and determination by the citizens of Haiti if they are to succeed.
It cannot be done for them. It cannot be done by military force. It
cannot be done by U.S. or international occupation. It must be done by
the Haitian people themselves. It will not happen overnight, but it
will require a long, step-by-step process, as the fundamental
institutions of a democracy are being built. These institutions include
a freely elected and functioning parliament--and those parliamentary
elections taking place pursuant to this Haitian Constitution this year
are enormously important--a police force separate from the army that is
trained and disciplined and under civilian control; a small
professional army under civilian control; and an independent judicial
system. Success will also require the cooperation and assistance of
many other nations acting in concert with the United Nations and the
legitimate government of Haiti.
Finally, I want to mention my strong belief that a broad amnesty law
must be enacted by the Haitian Parliament if the reconciliation that
President Aristide supports is to take place. In that connection, I
want to note that there have been some incorrect media reporting about
the terms of the Carter-Jonassaint agreement, the Port-au-Prince
agreement, with respect to amnesty and retirement of General Cedras,
General Biamby, and Police Chief Francois.
First, it should be noted that the Governors Island Agreement that
was signed by President Aristide and General Cedras in June 1993 called
for, quoting from that agreement, ``an amnesty granted by the President
of the Republic within the framework of article 147 of the National
Constitution and implementation of the other instruments which may be
adopted by the Parliament on this question.''
President Aristide only has the authority under the Haitian
Constitution to grant political amnesty. I noted a headline yesterday
morning that said President Aristide refuses to grant broad amnesty.
President Aristide has only limited power as to what he can grant--
namely political amnesty. He does have enormous influence over the
Parliament, however, and I think it is important for him to take this
lead in terms of what the Parliament may do. But a general amnesty or a
broader amnesty is within the discretion of the Haitian Parliament.
The Governors Island Agreement also provided that General Cedras
``has decided to avail himself of his right to early retirement.'' The
Carter-Jonassaint agreement called for Cedras, Biamby, and Francois to
retire ``when a general amnesty will be voted into law by the Haitian
Parliament, or October 15, 1994, whichever is earlier.'' There was no
guarantee of amnesty in the agreement negotiated by President Carter,
by General Powell, and by myself. Anyone reading that agreement can
determine that there was no guarantee of amnesty.
I have seen several media reports talking about a guarantee of
amnesty. That simply is incorrect. There was no guarantee. The question
of amnesty is up to the Haitian Parliament. But I do believe it is
essential that amnesty be granted if democracy is going to be restored
and if the pattern of retribution and violence that has been too long
in the Haitian culture is to be stopped.
Thus, both the Governors Island Agreement and the Carter-Jonassaint
agreement call for the same thing; that is, for General Cedras to
retire and for the Haitian Parliament to exercise its discretion in
deciding whether to grant a broader amnesty for him. Additionally, it
is interesting to note, despite a lot of media comment--particularly
editorial comment that did not seemingly understand the Governors
Island Agreement--that neither the Governors Island Agreement nor the
Carter-Jonassaint agreement required Cedras and company to leave Haiti.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to serve notice that if there is no
amnesty, if the cycle of retribution and violence that has plagued
Haiti for decades is not broken, and if the step-by-step process of
building democratic institutions does not begin, I for one will not
support the extended presence in Haiti of the men and women of the
Armed Forces of the United States. I believe that our role there should
be limited, in any event. We are talking about a matter of months, not
years. But if we see a pattern of retribution, if we see no amnesty
granted by the Parliament, if we do not see leadership by President
Aristide in regard to breaking this pattern of retribution, then I
think that the U.S. Senate and U.S. Congress will take a different view
in the months to come relating to this resolution.
There will be other resolutions, I am sure, next year depending on
the situation on the ground in Haiti. The people of Haiti have an
opportunity, what we call a window of opportunity, to begin to build
democracy. A resumption of the historic pattern of retribution and
violence would not only result in my view in an early withdrawal of
United States forces from Haiti, but it would also doom democracy in
Haiti.
I am hopeful that President Aristide and the leaders of the Haitian
Parliament, as well as the citizens of Haiti, will avail themselves of
this window of opportunity for beginning a democracy that can bring
peace and prosperity to that country that has too long suffered under
dictatorship and under a pattern of violence and retribution that must
be broken.
Mr. President, I thank my friend from Connecticut. I now yield the
floor.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Kentucky.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] is
recognized.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, first I want to thank the distinguished
Senator from New Hampshire for his leadership on the Haiti issue going
back to the debates that we heard here in this body on amendments to
the foreign operations bill earlier this summer. I think his efforts
have been truly outstanding.
Mr. President, I want to talk about a little different aspect of this
issue. The Senate and the American people are bearing the cost of the
occupation of Haiti in terms of the danger to our military personnel,
and the cost in dollars of the occupation of a country with 20,000 of
our troops.
Mr. President, there is a hidden cost as well and it is this: It
seems perfectly clear that in return for Russian acquiescence to our
invasion of Haiti--or, shall I say, occupation of Haiti--by virtue of
their support for the U.N. resolution, the administration has said in
effect to the Russians, maybe even said it openly, you do what you will
in the New Independent States. In other words, the hidden cost of the
occupation of Haiti is that we are in effect saying to the Russians you
go ahead and do what you will in Ukraine or Georgia or Armenia, as
Azerbaijan, or anywhere else in the former Soviet Union and we will
utter not a peep.
This policy, Mr. President, is extraordinarily distressing to many
Americans, Americans of Eastern European descent who are quite
concerned about the reemergence of the Russian empire in what the
Russian Foreign Minister calls the near abroad.
This is sort of a ``Russian Monroe Doctrine,'' Mr. President, in
which the Russians essentially lay down the policy that it is their
prerogative to intervene at any time, with or without concurrence, in
the internal affairs of any of those countries that used to make up the
Soviet Union. And many of us suspect that their view may well be that
that Russian preeminence also applies to what used to be the Warsaw
Pact.
So suffice it to say, Mr. President, the policy of this
administration with regard to Russia, which it hails as one of its
great foreign policy achievements is, in fact, just the opposite. Our
policy in that part of the world is: Whatever Russia wants, Russia
gets, whether it is funneling all of our foreign assistance through the
Russians, or whether it is attempting to defeat earmarks, as we
experienced in the foreign operations conference last summer.
We, in the Senate bill, earmarked assistance for Ukraine, earmarked
assistance for Georgia, earmarked assistance for Armenia, and had an
amendment offered with regard to Russian troop withdrawals from the
Baltics. We went to conference with the House, and the administration
in concert with the House conferees, stripped out all of those
earmarks, and a message was perfectly clear. It was this: We do not
want to offend the Russians. We do not want to offend the Russians.
So what we are saying in effect, Mr. President, is that whatever the
Russians want in that whole area of the world, which clearly is in our
national interest--we fought a war in Europe 50 years ago, and the
European political ideology dominated that part of the world. It is the
reason that we had the cold war.
We may argue about whether or not we have any national interest in
Haiti. Most of us think we do not--national interest nor national
security interests--but nobody would argue that we do not have national
interests in Central Europe. That was what the cold war was all about.
Yet, here, we are essentially acquiescing to the re-emergence of the
Russian empire by just rolling over and saying to the Russians:
Whatever you want to do in that part of the world, fine. So the
administration, in effect, asked the Russians for permission to go into
Haiti, and the quid pro quo for that was: You do what you will in your
part of the world, and we will utter not a peep.
Mr. President, I think that is a major, if you will, hidden cost of
the occupation of Haiti--a hidden cost of the occupation of Haiti. Why
in the world we would want to go into Haiti and referee this internal
dispute is beyond me, Mr. President. I do not know anybody in the
Senate, certainly not on this side of the aisle, and I suspect most on
that side, who can state convincingly an argument that Haiti is in our
national interests, and certainly not our national security interests.
What is particularly disturbing about the Russian aspect of this is
the blatant nature of the administration's quid pro quo. For example,
the administration's ``Russia-first'' policy, to which I referred, was
underscored last month by our U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright. She
concluded a swing across Europe just last month with a September speech
in Moscow in which she said: ``Russia is an empire where the mother
country and the colonies''--the colonies--``are contiguous.'' ``Is an
empire,'' she said, not ``was'' an empire. A slip of tense? Well,
maybe. But the speech went on to assert an equivalent status between
the United States and Russia conceding ``Russia's mandate and
activities in the near abroad were appropriate.''
This is the American Ambassador to the United Nations in Moscow
saying openly and publicly: You do what you will in what used to be the
Soviet Union. It is no concern of ours.
Fortunately, Mr. President, a Danish journalist in the audience
reminded Ambassador Albright that history and human psychology made
Russia's emerging role more unsettling than the activities of a Nation
like ours with a 200-year tradition of political pluralism and freedom.
Some might ask why this Russia-first approach should matter. After
all, important progress has been made in internal and economic reform
in Russia, and we are happy about that. None of us needs reminding that
the last summit was held in the wake of a near overthrow of the Yeltsin
government, a violent attack on parliament, and a defeat of key
economic reforms. There is no doubt that Russia has changed for the
better.
But, Mr. President, there is an important difference between
supporting Russian internal reforms and supporting Russian external
ambitions. And that, Mr. President, is clearly one of the hidden costs
of the Haiti invasion. We have said, in effect, to the Russians: Do not
object to what we do in Haiti, and you have a free hand, as far as we
are concerned, in all of the areas that used to make up the Soviet
Union.
Mr. President, there are a number of insertions I would like to make
in the Record.
I ask unanimous consent some attachments be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1994]
Will U.S. Pay `Hidden Cost' for Haiti?
(By Mitch McConnell)
In a recent interview, Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev
was asked to respond to critics in the Clinton administration
who questioned Russian regional ambitions. ``The president
should fire them immediately,'' he replied.
Fortunately, for Kozyrev, Boris Yeltsin and Russia, their
critics within the administration are few, and even those
have limited access to senior policy makers. But is that in
American interests? By seeking immediate improvement in our
relationship with Russia, are we sacrificing longstanding and
long-term interests in regional European stability? Are we
risking our economic and national security interests for the
perception of cooperation?
There has been widespread speculation in Washington policy
circles, supported by commentary from Moscow, that Russia
agreed not to veto the United Nations resolution on our use
of force in Haiti in exchange for broader latitude for their
activities in the new independent states of the former Soviet
Union. This latter prospect chills the political souls of
emerging democracies from Estonia to Ukraine. As well it
should.
Strong evidence confirms their collective cause for alarm.
Our ambassador to the United Nations concluded a swing across
Europe with a September speech in Moscow. ``Russia is an
empire where the mother country and the colonies are
contiguous,'' Madeleine Albright noted. A slip of tense?
Perhaps. But the speech went on to establish an equivalence
between the U.S. and Russia, conceding Russia's ``mandate . .
. and activities in the near abroad (were) appropriate.'' A
Danish journalist reminded Ambassador Albright that history
and human psychology made Russia's emerging role more
unsettling than the activities of our nation with its 200-
year tradition of political pluralism and freedom.
So far, largely with American consent, Russia is exercising
its options in the neighborhood. Its foreign intelligence
service issued a report arguing the merits of political and
economic reintegration of the former Soviet republics under
Russian leadership. Western opposition to the idea was
characterized as ``dangerous'' by the agency's chief. The
argument endorsed Russian-led reunification; it left no room
for the voluntary, independent decisions of sovereign nations
to seek a common course.
Reintegration has been echoed by senior Russian defense
officials who have urged the creation of a unified security
zone. With Russian troops in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan,
many of the new republics publicly wonder whether these calls
aren't commands.
Just as the recent intelligence report offered an
interesting preview of Russia's summit agenda, last year a
similar report was released in advance of the annual NATO
conference. That report opposed any expansion of NATO unless
and until Russia was accorded special status. Even the vague
terms of the Partnership for Peace were challenged unless
Russia was offered premier standing.
Moscow's view prevailed then as now. Due to strident
Russian opposition, bilateral exercises between the U.S. and
Poland were canceled just before Clinton arrived in Warsaw;
no nation could be permitted joint exercise in advance of
those scheduled with Russia.
A year ago, the administration held up Partnership for
Peace as a road map to NATO. Now, it is clear that Russia has
been accorded sweeping rights of first refusal. That is a
devastating blow to an alliance that has guaranteed European
security for 45 years.
Why should any of this matter? After all, important
progress has been made in advancing political reform and
building the private sector in Russia. No one needs reminding
that the previous summit was held in the wake of a near
overthrow of the Yeltsin government exacerbated by the
parliament's defeat of key economic proposals. No doubt, on
many fronts, Russia has changed for the better.
But there is a significant difference between American
support for Russia's internal process of change versus their
extra-territorial pursuit of national interests. To date, the
U.S. has committed nearly $3 billion in direct support for
Russian political and economic reform because it serves our
mutual interests in expanding global trade and markets and
advancing democracy.
In contrast, U.S. consent to the involuntary reintegration
of the new independent states, recognition of a Russian
sphere of influence over the so-called near abroad or
allowing Russia a veto over defense policy in Europe directly
undermines American national security interests in regional
peace and security.
We have not yet reached a point where U.S. and Russian
goals, let alone principles are one and the same. While there
certainly are overlapping interests, there are also starkly
divergent, if not competitive, global agendas.
Advancing common interests and protecting American
interests are not mutually exclusive. We can pursue a
verifiable arms control agenda with Russia, as we limit their
unilateral peacekeeping operations in the region. We can
encourage the expansion of Russian free markets, as we oppose
their continued sales of lethal technology to Iran. We can
support their active participation in United Nations
decisions, and still object to their recent effort to open a
commercial dialogue with Iraq in violation of the spirit, if
not the letter, of international sanctions.
We should remember Yeltsin will not live forever, and in
fact, is due to leave office by 1996. A Russia in Vladimir
Zhirinovsky's chokehold is a different nation to be reckoned
with. While the Clinton administration may hold a benign view
of Yeltsin's aggressive international pursuit of Russian
interests, democracy does not foretell nor guarantee his
successor.
The summit offered Clinton and Yeltsin, the U.S. and
Russia, an opportunity to continue to define and pursue
common ground. We can and should offer Russia support to
establish itself as a successful international economic and
political power. But that success must not come at the
expense of the political sovereignty, security or economic
independence of any other nation.
Our license to act in Haiti is not worth the freedom which
has swept Europe. Our invasion should not cost us European
stability and security.
____
[From the Washington Post, July 24, 1994]
Yalta II
(By Lally Weymouth)
Recently, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations,
Yuli Vorontsov, asked the world body to bless the Russian
deployment of peace-keepers to the Abkhazia region of
Georgia. Informally. Vorontsov has said that without some
sort of U.N. endorsement of Russian peace-keeping in Georgia,
Moscow would veto a resolution authorizing the dispatch of
troops to Haiti.
Verontsov got his wish. This week, as a consequence, the
Clinton administration entered into a cynical deal with
Russia that at least one U.N. diplomat compares with the
controversial 1945 ``spheres of influence'' Yalta pact. In
exchange for a Russian promise not to veto a U.N. resolution
on Haiti, Washington gave Moscow the green light to conduct
its own ``peace-keeping'' operation in Georgia.
What this really means is that the United States has given
Russia the right to reoccupy the Caucasus and other former
Soviet republics in return for Russian acquiescence in U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Haiti.
In supporting, albeit tacitly, Russian ``peace-keeping'' in
Georgia, the United States appears to have redefined the U.N.
peace-keeping mandate. For example, under the U.N. Charter,
no more than one-third of a peace-keeping force can come from
any one country. But the ``peace-keepers'' in Georgia are
almost exclusively Russian.
How did Georgia become a pawn in an international power
game? Back in January 1991, civil war broke out between South
Ossetia--an autonomous region in Georgia--and ethnic
Georgians. The South Ossetians had previously declared their
intent to secede from Georgia.
Four months later, Georgia's then leader, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, proclaimed that Georgia was seceding from the
Soviet Union. This act sparked civil strife in Abkhazia, an
autonomous republic of Georgia. In the fighting that ensued,
Abkhazia initially gained the upper hand--thanks in part to
help from Moscow.
Just one year later, Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power in
a coup orchestrated by local warlords. Shortly thereafter, in
March 1992, former Soviet foreign minister Eduard
Shevardnadze became the leader of Georgia. Shevardnadze,
however, found himself in a difficult position. During the
summer of '93, Gorbachev's former emissary to the West--a man
who'd helped end the Cold War--discovered that the Abkhazian
secessionists were beating back the Georgian army, thanks to
Russian help. Moreover, many Northern Caucasians had come to
the aid of the Abkhazian secessionists. To complicate
matters, Gamsakhurdia, the former president, suddenly mounted
a powerful challenge to Shevardnadze. Gamsakhurdia's forces
actually began to march toward Tbilisi. Suddenly, victory
for the deposed leader looked certain.
At this key moment, an isolated Shevardnadze reversed
policy and turned to his former Russian tormentors--the anti-
Gorbachev element led by Boris Yeltsin--for assistance. At
Moscow's urging, Georgia agreed to join the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), while Shevardnadze signed a
collective security agreement that allowed Russia to
establish bases in Georgia. Moscow responded in July and
August '93 by dispatching 900 marines to Georgia: They
enabled Shevardnadze to defeat Gamsakhurdia quickly. This
deployment marked the first official Russian involvement in a
conflict in the Caucasus.
Russia subsequently deployed so-called ``peace-keepers'' to
Georgia and Abkhazia--but not in the manner envisaged by
Shevardnadze. The ex-Soviet foreign minister had hoped to use
the Russian troops to occupy Abkhazia. Instead, the Russians
stationed their troops along the Ingur River--effectively
partitioning Georgia.
Trapped in Moscow's embrace, Shevardnadze came to
Washington last March seeking American support and funding
for a U.N. peace-keeping force. The former Gorbachev deputy
begged Washington not to leave him alone to face Moscow. But
he secured little or no help from the Clinton administration;
Congress was similarly unresponsive. Indeed, at a press
conference ostensibly held in his behalf, reporters focused
on Whitewater.
A few months ago, CIS demanded and got ``observer status''
in the U.N. General Assembly. Russia's aim was to equate the
CIS with other regional bodies, such as NATO. This week at
the United Nations, Russia tried but failed to secure
international recognition of this equivalency. A senior
Clinton administration official insists that the United
States deserves credit for refusing to equate the CIS with
other regional bodies like NATO or the Organization of
American States: The latter have a presumptive right to
conduct peace-keeping operations in their areas without
Security Council approval. But a foreign diplomat argues that
this week's U.N. resolution effectively means that ``CIS is
being welcomed de facto as a regional arrangement.''
In the past, Russia has insisted its interest in Georgia
and the rest of the ``near abroad'' turned on a desire to
protect Russians living in the republics. Now that claim no
longer withstands scrutiny. There aren't many Russians in
Abkhazia. Currently, Russia asserts that it desires to bring
peace to embattled regions. Close study of the situation in
Georgia doesn't support Moscow's claim. The Russians, after
all, supported the Abkhaz separatists against Shevardnadze--
the man who helped bring down the ``Evil Empire.''
Thanks to Clinton's eagerness to invade Haiti, Russia--with
U.S. support--has been granted U.N. backing to begin to
reconstitute its empire. Georgia will likely prove only the
first step toward a new Russian assertiveness. Moscow is also
seeking to amend the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
so it can move troops and armaments to its Caucasus region--
just across the border from Georgia.
According to well-informed experts, Russia will move next
on Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave, where the
government of Azerbaijan is already under pressure to permit
Russian peace-keepers and/or a ``separating'' force. Abkhazia
will probably be the model: Russia will in all likelihood
freeze Armenian gains in place and then sign an agreement
permitting it to establish bases.
Statement of U.S.-Russian Relations
The member organizations of the Central and East European
Coalition are alarmed at the direction Russian foreign policy
has taken and United States reaction to that policy. On
September 21, Russia's foreign intelligence agency released a
disturbing report which outlines the recreation of a Russian
empire. The headline for this story in The Wall Street
Journal was ``KGB Successor Wants Rebirth of Old Empire;''
The Washington Post entitled it ``Russia's Spy Chief Warns
West: Don't Oppose Soviet Reintegration.'' Regardless how the
story is titled, the fact is that this report confirms a
pattern of dangerous Russian activity.
In January 1992, The New York Times reported that then
Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi said he would ``seek
a redrawing of borders that would reflect a `glorious page'
in the nation's past.'' Russia has indeed pursued such a
course of action using political and economic intimidation as
well as military force.
In Tajikistan, the Russian military assisted Tajik,
communists in overthrowing the democratically elected
government. In Moldova, the Russian 14th Army, under the
leadership of General Lebed, has assaulted the territorial
integrity of Moldova with the creation of the illegal Trans-
Dniestr Republic. In Georgia, it was the Russian military
which armed the Abkhazian rebellion against the Georgian
Government.
Political threats and intimidation have been a chief weapon
in Russia's arsenal. The Russian Parliament enacted
legislation illegally annexing Sevastopil from Ukraine. Until
the United States Senate passed legislation threatening a cut
off of economic assistance, Russia refused to withdraw its
troops from the Baltic Nations on the schedule it originally
set. After publicly stating that he does not oppose Polish
membership in NATO, President Yeltsin sent letters to the
United States, Germany, Great Britain, and France warning
against allowing Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to join
NATO.
Russia's main weapon against its neighbors, however, has
been economic warfare, especially the wielding of its energy
sword. While Russia claims to have raised oil prices to world
market levels, it has, in fact, been selling oil at different
prices to different nations depending on the level of the
country's subservience to Moscow. Ukraine has been a
principle target of this effort.
In addition, Moscow has wielded the oil weapon in reverse.
In the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Russia has
refused to allow their oil to pass through Russian pipelines
until these nations granted Russia a percentage share in
their oil industries. Just last week, Russia publicly refused
to recognize an oil agreement between Azerbaijan and Western
oil companies.
Russia's interference in the internal affairs of its
neighbors has been justified as either peacekeeping or the
protection of ethnic Russians in these countries, the so-
called ``near abroad.'' In virtually all the areas of Russian
``peacekeeping'' however, Russia is responsible for either
starting or exacerbating the conflict. In the case of
protection of the ``near abroad'' it should be noted that we
are not talking about protecting Russian citizens; we are
talking about foreign nationals who happen to be of Russian
heritage. This principle, if accepted, is a dangerous
precedent. Fifty-five years ago, Nazi Germany justified its
aggression on this basis; today, Serbia is doing likewise.
One must also consider that there are about 25 million non-
Russians living in the Russian Federation. Is Russia prepared
to accept the right of Ukraine or Germany, for instance, to
intervene in Russian internal affairs to defend Russian
citizens of Ukrainian or German heritage? This is not idle
speculation. There are, in fact, as many ethnic Ukrainians in
Russia as there are ethnic Russians in Ukraine. This
principle can, indeed, be a slippery slope!
The information packet which we provided you expands on
these issues in greater detail. It contains disturbing quotes
from both Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev as well as a partial chronology of
what is internationally unacceptable Russian behavior toward
its neighbors.
For the Coalition, however, the more disturbing issue is
United States acceptance of this pattern of Russian behavior.
When Russia helped overthrow the democratically elected
government of Tajikistan, Washington was silent; when Russia
dismantled the nation of Moldova, Washington was silent;
when, one year ago, Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze pleaded for
U.S. condemnation of Russia's actions to destabilize Georgia,
Washington was silent; when the economies of Kazahkstan and
Turkmenistan were threatened by Moscow, Washington was
silent; when Ukraine's territorial integrity was threatened
by Russia, Washington was silent.
When President Yeltsin objected to the membership of
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in NATO, the Clinton
Administration acquiesced. America was embarrassed when, in
Naples, President Clinton said Russian troops would be out of
the Baltic Nations by August 31 and President Yeltsin
countered with a firm ``nyet.'' Yet, the Clinton
Administration strongly opposed the actions of the United
States Senate which adopted, by a vote of 89 to 8,
legislation suspending aid to Russia if the troops were not
withdrawn on the schedule originally set by Russia.
While continuing to express concern about ethnic Russians
outside of Russia, the Administration has yet to defend
ethnic non-Russians in Russia, whose rights are
routinely violated. If the United States accepts Russia's
right to protect ethnic Russians outside of Russia, as it
appears it has, then it must also accept Russia's right to
protect the three million ethnic Russians living in the
United States. In the not too distant future we may see
Russian troops in Brighton Beach!
Most disturbing of all, however, was U.S. Ambassador
Madeleine Albright's September 6th speech in Moscow.
Ambassador Albright equated Russia, an empire for six hundred
years, with the United States, a democracy for over two
hundred years and justified Russia's interference in its
neighbors' internal affairs under the guise of
``peacekeeping.'' In her justification, she stated that
Russia ``is an empire where the mother country and the
colonies are contiguous.'' It is troubling to the Coalition
that the Clinton Administration not only accepts but
justifies a behavior by the Russian empire that we would
oppose if pursued by any other nation.
In her speech, Ambassador Albright referenced Chairman
Shevardnadze's request, under duress, for Russian assistance
but failed to mention Shevardnadze's plea, just one year ago,
for U.S. condemnation of Russia's campaign to destroy
Georgia. While praising Russian actions in Georgia, she
ignored her own June 21 statement where she said: ``although
Russia desires stability, there have been troubling aspects
to its policy towards the new republics. Russian military
units in Georgia and Moldova have exacerbated local
conflicts.''
And, finally, she admitted that the United States worked to
insure a United Nations mandate for Russian ``peacekeeping''
in Georgia. Many have suggested that the Clinton
Administration had, in fact, traded Georgia for Haiti at the
U.N.
On September 6, The Washington Times reported the existence
of a State Department policy paper which states: ``It is
understood that a Russian sphere of influence is being
recognized with Europe extending to the eastern border of
Poland, leaving the Baltics somewhat up for grabs . . .'' At
the same time, in a State Department reorganization, the
nations of the former Soviet Union are being consolidated in
one bureau, thereby giving legitimacy to a Russian ``sphere
of influence.''
The Coalition is concerned about this pattern of United
States policies which cedes the nations of Central and
Eastern Europe to a Russian ``sphere of influence.'' Fifty
years ago this February, the United States made similar
concessions to Russia at Yalta. That was followed by a fifty-
year cold war. We feel that the policies being pursued by the
Clinton Administration are morally and politically wrong,
dangerous, and will result in a new cold war.
Foreign Policy Statements by President Yeltsin and Minister Kozyrev
1. ``Russia's economic and foreign policy priorities lie in
the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States . . .
Russia's ties with them are closer than traditional
neighborhood relations; rather, this is a blood relationship.
. . . We can't stay indifferent to the fate of our
countrymen. I do not mean special rights or privileges. But
the people of Russia will not understand if I don't say ow
[that] the independent states have to prove through their
actions that guaranteeing the human rights of national
minorities is indeed the cornerstone of their foreign policy.
And here neither selective approaches nor double standards
are permissible. . . . The main peacekeeping burden in the
territory of the former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian
Federation. . . . Attempts by others to use the tensions
between the commonwealth states for one's own advantage are
extremely short-sighted.'' Boris Yeltsin (address to the
United Nations), The Washington Post, September 27, 1994
2. ``Nobody and nothing can free Russia from the political
and moral responsibility for the fate of countries and
peoples which for centuries have moved forward together with
the Russian state.'' Boris Yeltsin (address to graduates of
the military academies), RFE/RL Daily Report, June 28, 1994
3. ``A strong and powerful Russian state, is also in the
interest of our closest neighbors. A strong Russia is the
most reliable and real guarantor of stability on the entire
territory of the former Soviet Union.
``It is our duty to make the year 1994 the year of close
attention to the problems of people of Russian extraction
living in neighboring states. . . . It is Russia's duty to
secure and to (implement) this practice in reality, not in
words. When it comes to the violations of the lawful rights
of people of Russia, this is not an exclusive internal affair
of some country, but also our national affair, an affair of
our state . . . Russia has the right to act firmly and
toughly when it is necessary to defend the national
interests.'' Boris Yeltsin, ``State of the Nation'' Address
before the full session of the Federal Assembly, February 24,
1994
4. ``The countries of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
States) and the Baltics--this is a region where the priority
vital interests of Russia are concentrated.
``We should not withdraw from those regions which have been
the sphere of Russian interests for centuries and we should
not fear these words (military presence).'' Andrei Kozyrev,
Reuter, January 18, 1994
5. ``Dear fellow-countrymen! You are inseparable from us
and we from you. We were and will be together. We are
defending and will defend your and our common interests,
using the law and our solidarity. In the new year of 1994 we
will do so with greater energy and decisiveness.
``We are so indissolubly bound by history, economics and
our joint fate that we simply cannot live separately. Our
peoples just would not allow it.'' Boris Yeltsin (New Year's
message to ethnic Russians living outside of Russia), Reuter,
December 31, 1993
6. ``Russia considers itself a great power and a successor
to the Soviet Union and all its might.'' Boris Yeltsin, Itar-
Tass, December 8, 1993
7. ``We are a great power by reason of our destiny and
normal good relations are in our interests . . . both in the
economic and military sense, we are a superpower. There is no
use getting angry over the perceptions of (Russia) by near
abroad. Anyhow, everything will get back to its old place.''
Andrei Kozyrev, Rossiskaja Gazetta, December 7, 1993
8. ``Russia has made the peacemaking, and the protection of
human rights, particularly that of national minorities, the
priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory
of the former USSR.
``Russia realizes that no international organization or
group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this
specific post-Soviet space . . . peacemaking cannot be
separated from the protection of human rights.'' Andrei
Kozyrev, Address before the United Nations Organization,
September 28, 1993
9. ``The world community is increasingly coming to
understand Russia's special responsibility in this difficult
task. I think the moment has come when responsible
international organizations, including the United Nations,
should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace
and stability in the region of the former union.'' Boris
Yeltsin, The New York Times, March 1, 1993.
10. ``Our principal task is to . . . give effect to the
concept of a successor state, enabling Russia as a whole
painlessly to take the place of the former USSR in the United
States and its specializing institutions, and in the whole
system of international relations . . . (and to) create a
distinctive zone around Russia of good neighborly relations
and cooperation . . .
``It should not be forgotten that the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) brings together peoples who have
been linked to Russia for centuries. It is also obvious that
the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of
vital interest to us . . .
``The situation of the Russian-speaking population in
states of the former USSR presents a considerable and complex
problem for the Russian Federation's foreign policy and
diplomacy. We are counting on support from the NATO member
nations to help ensure protection for the rights, life and
dignity of the Russian minorities . . .
``In relations with the nations of Eastern Europe, it is
vital for us to achieve a fundamentally new level of
political and economic links, making use of previously
acquired positive experiences in practical aspects of
collaboration. The future of Eastern Europe lies in its
transformation--not into some kind of buffer zone, but into a
bridge linking the East and West of the continent
. . .
``It is essential to achieve greater practical efficiency
in the use of force to put out `brush fires.' Russia has
undertaken peacemaking operations in a whole range of
regions--Moldova, Georgia, Tadjikistan--providing forces and
resources in accordance with agreements with the appropriate
countries. We recognize our responsibility for stability in
that part of the world . . .'' Andrei Kozyrev, NATO Review,
Vol. 41, #1, February 1993.
a pattern of dangerous russian policies
1992
In January, The New York Times reported that Russian Vice
President Aleksandr Rutskoi said he would ``seek a redrawing
of borders that would reflect a `glorious page' in the
nation's past.'' The New York Times, January 31, 1992.
On April 4, vice President Rutskoi travelled to Crimea and
told naval officers in Sevastopol that Crimea must once again
be part of Russia. RFE/RL Daily Report, April 6, 1992.
Russian waged a campaign to undermine the political and
economic independence of Ukraine. RFE/RL Daily Report, June
10, 1992 & June 11, 1992.
On May 21, 1992, in violation of numerous treaties, the
Russian Parliament enacted legislation declaring void the
1954 Treaty transferring Crimea to Ukraine. The Washington
Post, May 22, 1992.
Russian documents demonstrate the Russia views the Baltic
nations as their property and has no intention of withdrawing
troops. Financial Times, June 15, 1992.
As early as June 5, there were reports that Russia's 14th
Army was transferring arms and ammunition to the ``Dniester''
Russian insurgent forces in Moldova. RFE/RL Daily Report,
June 5, 1992.
In a June 5 story, The Financial Times quoted Sergei
Stankevich, as adviser to President Yeltsin, as saying: ``It
is important for Russia to defend the legal and other rights
of Russians outside of Russia,'' a remark reminiscent of
statements made by Milosovic and Hitler. Stankevich was
referring to ethnic Russians and not Russian citizens.
Financial Times, June 5, 1992.
On June 19, President Eduard Shevardnadze accused Russia of
military intervention in Georgia. The Washington Times, June
20, 1992.
On June 21, Russian forces attacked the Moldovan police who
were responding to Russian insurgent activity. Financial
Times, June 1992; The Washington Post, June 22, 1992.
Evgenii Ambartsumov, chairman of the Russian Supreme
Soviet's Committee on International Affairs, stated that he
agreed with Vice President Rutskoi's threats against Moldova
and Georgia. RFE/RL Daily Report, June 24, 1992.
Sergei Stankevich stated in an article that Russia should
be more aggressive toward its neighbors. RFE/RL Daily Report,
June 24, 1992.
President Shevardnadze of Georgia and President Mircea
Snegur of Moldova accused Russia of imperialism. RFE/RL Daily
Report, June 24, 1992.
Referring to Crimea, Vice President Rutskoi stated that he
does not recognize any agreements that gave Russian land to
other countries. The Washington Times, August 8, 1992.
On December 7, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies
questioned the status of Sevastopol as a Ukrainian city. RFE/
RL Daily Report, December 8, 1992.
1993
Russia will open a consular office in the Trans-Dniester
region which will grant Russian citizenship to local citizens
desiring it, said General Aleksander Lebed, commander of the
14th Russian Army in Moldova. RFE/RL Daily Report, January 7,
1993.
Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, head of the CIS, again
claimed all ex-Soviet nuclear weapons as belonging to Russia.
RFE/RL Daily, January 26, 1993.
Russia demanded world prices from Ukraine for oil and gas.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Shokin said Ukraine
could have subsidized energy if it made concessions over the
Black Sea fleet, allowed Russian military bases to be
established in Ukraine, and allowed Russia to export energy
supplies through Ukraine's pipelines. The Financial Times,
February 19, 1993.
President Boris Yeltsin declared Russia must be given the
freedom to act as a guarantor of peace in the former Soviet
bloc with special powers granted by the United Nations. The
Financial Times, March 1, 1993, Christian Science Monitor,
March 2, 1993.
Ukraine attacked President Yeltsin's remarks as seeking
international endorsement for dominance in the region. The
Washington Times, March 2, 1993.
Sergei Stankevich, political advisor to President Yeltsin,
warned Poland against developing foreign and military ties
with Ukraine. Other senior Russian officials told East
European officials not to build embassies in Kyiv, since they
will be downgraded to consular section in 18 months.'' The
Financial Times, March 17, 1994.
Eduard Shevradnadze asserted that Georgia was forced into
war within the Abkhazian region. ``Separatism has taken root
over several decades thanks to the special interests of a
third force.'' The continued presence of Russian troops is
preventing a peaceful settlement in Abkhazia. The Financial
Times, April 13, 1994.
Over one-third of the Black Sea fleet ships raised Russian
flags, further adding tension to the dispute between Russia
and Ukraine over ownership of the fleet. The New York Times,
The Washington Times, UPI, May 31, 1993.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin said Estonia's citizenship
law was a verison of apartheid and ethnic cleansing.
``Yielding to the pressure of nationalists [the Estonian
leadership] forgot about some geopolitical and demographic
realities. The Russian side has the ability to remind them of
it.'' The Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1993.
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev bluntly ruled out
the U.S.'s offer to mediate the Russian-Ukrainian dispute
over nuclear weapons with Ukraine. Grachev said the only
appropriate role for the U.S. is to put pressure on Ukraine
to force Ukraine to turn over her nuclear weapons to Russia.
The Star Ledger, June 7, 1993. Grachev also refused to accept
a plan which would place Ukraine's nuclear weapons under
international supervision. The Washington Post, June 7, 1993.
Russia's Foreign Ministry dismissed suggestions that the
U.S. would play a more active role mediating disputes in the
former Soviet Union and said that Russia considers itself the
key player for ``maintaining stability in the region.'' The
Washington Post, August 14, 1993.
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared in his
address before the U.N. General Assembly, that no other group
of nations ``can replace our peace-making efforts'' along the
borders of the former Soviet Union. The Washington Post,
September 29, 1993.
Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller warned the Clinton
Administration of Russian dominance in Central Asia,
suggesting Western aid to Russia should be linked to Russian
support for democracy inside and outside of Russia. A series
of advances by Russia across the southern belt of the former
Soviet Union alarm Turkish officials and businessmen in the
region. The Washington Times, September 25, 1993.
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev admitted Russian
peacekeeping was a method to retain Russia's sphere of
influence. ``There is a danger of losing a geopolitical
position that has been gained over centuries,'' he wrote in
Isvestia, October 8, 1993. The Christian Science Monitor,
October 22, 1993.
President Boris Yeltsin adopted a more aggressive military
doctrine sanctioning the use of Russian troops beyond Russian
borders. It rejects the longtime Soviet promise not to use
nuclear weapons first, promising only not to use them against
non-clear states. The Washington Post, November 4, 1993.
President Yeltsin warned NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner
against enlarging NATO saying that early attempts to
incorporate Eastern Europe would damage Russia's strategic
interest and damage reconciliation with the West. The
Washington Post, December 10, 1993.
Two days before Russian elections, Polish Foreign Minister
Andrzej Olechowski urged the West to allow Poland to join
NATO. The West is ``too optimistic about Russia,'' he said,
and ``is playing into Russia's hands by not seeing the
signals of imperial thinking.'' The New York Times, December
12, 1993.
Newly-elected Vladimir Zhirinovsky said ``he would not
allow Russia's borders to be shrunk further,'' but instead,
Russia should be recreated within its former borders. He also
insisted that the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia,
the Caucuses and the Baltics must be brought back into
Russia's orbit. RFE/RL Daily December 14, 1993.
Polich Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, pleading for
admittance into NATO, said ``We cannot disregard the results
produced by Zhirinovsky . . . his agenda includes restoration
of the former Soviet Empire, and given how many votes he got
we can no longer write his opinions off as a bad joke.'' The
Washington Times, December 16, 1993.
1994
Polish President Lech Walecsa warned that the world risks
the reemergence of the Soviet bloc and communist regimes if
Western powers do not admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic into NATO. Such a refusal of the West to issue a
clear directive and timetable for admittance would be ``a
major tragedy'' that could lead to another Yugoslavia in
Europe. The Washington Post, January 4, 1994.
President Yeltsin's press secretary, Vyacheslaw Kostikov,
declared President Yeltsin was alarmed by the prospect of
East European nations joining NATO. The Foreign Ministry said
Lithuania's application was ``odd'' and ``counterproductive''
and that the Baltics are a ``part of the near abroad'' ``a
sphere of Russia's vital interest.'' RFE/RL Daily, January 7,
1994.
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that complete
withdrawal of troops from the Baltics would be against
Russia's interest because it would create a security vacuum
and it would leave ethnic Russians undefended. ``We should
not withdraw * * *.
Russia began cutting off natural gas supplies to Ukraine
and Belarus, forcing metallurgical and chemical plants to
consider shutting down. A Ukrainian official said the effect
of the decision would be ``like a bomb exploding on
Ukraine.'' The Washington Post, March 4, 1994.
Russia is using its vast economic leverage to reassert
political power in Central Asia, acquiring percentages of
lucrative Western energy deals in the republics surrounding
the Caspian Sea. ``Russia is holding Kazakstan hostage,''
said an oil executive in Almaty. The Washington Post, March
18, 1994.
Russia has decided to join NATO's Partnership for Peace,
using rape as an analogy. A Russian Security Council official
said that only by joining can Russia help shape the program
``according to Russia's national interest.'' The Washington
Post, March 18, 1994.
Russia's demand for a special status in NATO before signing
the Partnership for Peace plan has angered its former Warsaw
pact allies who worry about a repeat of the post-World War II
division of Europe. The Washington Times, May 22, 1994.
Turkish leaders warned that because of Western neglect, the
choices for the region's countries were between renewed
Russian domination and an Islamic resurgence, which they say
is being supported by countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. The New York Times, June 19, 1994.
The Russian Parliament approved sending 3,000 peacekeeping
troops to Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia in a move
intended to assert Moscow's role in the former Soviet Union
territory. The Washington Post, June 22, 1994.
U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright said that there have
been troubling aspects to Russia's policy towards her
neighbors. ``Russian military units in Georgia and Moldova
have exacerbated local conflicts.'' The Washington Post, June
21, 1994.
Kazakhstan accused Russia of cutting off most of the
republic's oil exports, paralyzing its most lucrative
industry. The Financial Times, June 28, 1994.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky, reflecting
disappointment in the U.S.'s policy towards East European
membership in NATO, said that a dangerous power vacuum has
been created in Eastern and Central Europe, which may attract
``new imperialists'' from Russia. The Washington Times, July
6, 1994.
President Boris Yeltsin, during a meeting with President
Clinton, when asked whether he would comply with the August
31 target date for withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia
answered, ``Nyet.'' The New York Times, July 11, 1994.
President Yeltsin tied Russia's economic and political
transformation to Moscow's status in the world community and
its ability to conduct ``a vigorous foreign policy . . .
above all in the CIS.'' Recent Russian diplomatic
successes have turned Moscow into a ``nerve center of
world change.'' RFE/RL Daily, July 21, 1994.
A five-page Russian document establishes Russia's desire to
re-establish a sphere of influence in Europe by gutting NATO.
This proposal calls for making the CSCE the primary
international organization in Europe, rather than NATO. One
diplomat said, ``Russia's objective is to go for the complete
dissolution of NATO.'' The Washington Times, August 16, 1994.
Ranked as Russia's 13th most popular leader, General
Alexander Lebed of the Trans-Dniester's 14th Army enclave,
rejected the idea of Russian democracy during a recent
interview. ``our leader have said `for centuries our state
has been totalitarian but starting this minute we will be a
democratic state.' That is just not possible. After all we
are still the Soviet people.'' The Financial Times, September
6, 1994.
The largest deal between foreign oil companies and
Azerbaijan was signed--but Russia refused to recognize the $8
billion dollar deal, demanding that the pipeline route should
pass through its territories, giving it a stranglehold over
energy exports from Azerbaijan. The Financial Times,
September 21, 1994.
The head of Russia's foreign intelligence service, Yevgeny
Primakov warned the West that it must accept the re-
integration of most of the former Soviet Union or face the
return of the Cold War. He released a report ``Russia--CIS
Does the West Need to Change Its Position?'' which calls for
a reintegration of the former Soviet Union and says an
economic union is inevitable and a defense and political
union is desirable. The Wall Street Journal, The Financial
Times, September 22, 1994.
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev urged the United States to
expand bilateral economic relations with Russia in order to
stabilize the CIS. He said those U.S. advisors who oppose
Russia's role in CIS economic integration and conflict
resolution ``are giving very bad, incorrect, and
irresponsible advice.'' RFE/RL Daily, September 22, 1994.
Central and East European Coalition
Mr. Martins Zvaners, American Latvian Association, 400
Hurley Avenue, Rockville, MD 20850, TEL: 301-340-8174, FAX:
301-340-8732.
Mr. Craig Baab, Armenian Assembly of America, 122 C Street,
NW., Suite 350, Washington, DC 20001, TEL: 202-393-3434, FAX:
202-638-4904.
Mr. Russell Zavistovich, Belarusian Congress Committee of
America, 724 West Tantallon Drive, Fort Washington, MD 20744,
TEL: 301-292-2610, FAX: 301-292-8140.
Mr. Radi Slavoff, Bulgarian Institute for Research and
Analysis, 6219 Rockhurst Road, Bethesda, MD 20817-1755, TEL:
301-530-8114, FAX: 301-530-0770.
Mr. Armand Scala, Congress of Romanian Americans, 6641-A
Old Dominion Drive, Suite 204, Mclean, VA 22101, TEL: 703-
356-2280, FAX: 703-356-2281.
Mr. Otakar Horna, Czecho-Slovak Council of America, 5017
Del Ray Avenue, Bethesda, MD, TEL: 301-656-6987.
Mr. Maido Kari, Estonia World Council, Inc., 19102 Stedwick
Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20879, TEL: 301-869-3275, FAX: 301-
869-0519.
Mr. Frank Koszorus, Hungarian American Coalition, 818
Connecticut Avenue, NW., Suite 850, Washington, DC 20006,
TEL: 202-296-9505, FAX: 202-775-5175.
Mr. Avo Ora, Joint Baltic American National Committee, 400
Hurley Avenue, Rockville, MD 20850, TEL: 301-340-1954, FAX:
301-309-1406.
Ms. Asta Banionis, Lithuanian-American Community, Inc.,
2060 North 14th Street, Suite 108, Arlington, VA 22201, TEL:
703-524-0698, FAX: 703-524-0947.
Mr. Laszlo Pasztor, National Federation of American
Hungarians, 717 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002,
TEL: 202-546-3003, FAX: 202-547-0392.
Ms. Myra Lenard, Polish American Congress, 1625 K Street,
N.W., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20006, TEL: 202-296-6955,
FAX: 202-835-1565.
Mr. John Karch, Slovak World Congress, 2626 Pioneer Lane,
Falls Church, VA 22043, TEL: 703-573-0805, FAX: 703-573-0805.
Ms. Tamara Gallo, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America,
Inc., 214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Suite 225, Washington,
DC 20002, TEL: 202-547-0018, FAX: 202-543-5502.
Mr. Eugene Iwanciw, Ukrainian National Association, Inc.,
400 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 859, Washington, DC
20001, TEL: 202-347-8629, FAX: 202-347-8631.
Mr. Linas Kojelis, US-Baltic Foundation, 1211 Connecticut
Avenue, N.W., Suite 506, Washington, DC 20036, TEL: 202-986-
0380, FAX: 202-234-8130.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Connecticut [Mr.
Dodd] is recognized.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I will just take a couple of minutes, if I
can, here. First of all, with regard to the resolution before us, I
think the Senator from Georgia has properly characterized the
resolution. I am pleased that the resolution does not have any fixed
date here for the reason articulated, I think rather clearly, by
General Shelton and others; that such a target date or a fixed date
would be counterproductive and, in fact, could pose a threat to our own
forces by requiring some acceleration of activities as they try to
complete their mission there.
I would secondly point out that as I read this resolution, it looks
more like an OSHA regulation, in some ways, than a resolution on Haiti,
since there are more reporting requirements in here than one might
normally expect. Nonetheless, the burden will fall on those who have to
write the reports. I hope there is as much attention paid by those who
are insisting upon these reports when they are prepared, as when they
required them. It is usually just a taxpayer cost and ends up on the
shelf someplace. That has been my experience. If this is what is needed
in order to get some consensus around here, I accept it. While I am not
enthusiastic, as I said, about the resolution, I will nonetheless
support it.
Let me point out that we were pleased a few minutes ago to have the
visit of Nelson Mandela here in the Chamber of the U.S. Senate. It was
truly an honor for all of us that the President of the Republic of
South Africa would be joining us. I will not belabor the point. I have
made the point that not too many years ago, when we were debating the
issue of sanctions on South Africa in this Chamber--which I recall
vividly as one who participated in that debate--there was some rather
interesting rhetoric used to describe the person that we so warmly
welcomed in this Chamber, which is worth, I think, just referencing,
because some of the same language has been used to describe President
Aristide.
I refer interested colleagues to the congressional debate of October
1, 1986, if they are interested in reading some of the language used to
describe Mr. Mandela.
And I quote here.
We also have heard repeated comments by those who favor the
intrusion of the U.S. Government into the affairs of South
Africa that Nelson Mandela is a hero. The fact is that Mr.
Mandela pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder. That is why
he was jailed. The fact also is that Mrs. Mandela boasted
that they had enough automobile tires and bicycle tires to
create enough ``necklaces'' to impose their will upon those
in the majority who have the courage to stand up and say ``We
don't want sanctions.''
If I took away Mandela, you will find similar remarks have been made
about President Aristide. The debate goes on with numerous references
to Mr. Mandela's communism, his strong support for Lenin and Marx
ideals.
Those are hardly the remarks we heard earlier today from the
President of South Africa talking about democracy and the fight for it.
I merely point out the mere coincidence of events that on the day
that we welcome, and properly so, and welcome as warmly as we have,
Nelson Mandela for his courageous effort over the years, 27 of them
spent incarcerated in his country, that we are debating a resolution
regarding Haiti, another nation seeking its freedom and its democracy,
in this case not thousands of miles from our shores in South Africa but
a mere 200 or so from our shores where they have also faced repression
of a similar kind in their own nation. And that much of the same
language used to describe Nelson Mandela some 8 years ago is being used
today too frequently to describe President Aristide.
In my view, the time will come when President Aristide will be
received as warmly for his struggle and his fight for democracy in his
country as Nelson Mandela is, properly so, today in his nation.
Again, I would hope that we can adopt this resolution, that our
troops will get out of Haiti as soon as possible, that there will be a
restoration of civilian government, a new police force and a military
in that country that will respect civilian government. And that small
country will have a chance for freedom, just as South Africa had never
had a chance of true democracy and freedom for itself until President
De Klerk, who in my view deserves in many ways as much credit for the
achievements in South Africa--it is remarkable what he did as the
President of that nation--and accompanied now by President Mandela,
such as has been in Haiti for these last number of years where they
have also never known freedom and democracy but are on the brink of
having a chance at it.
The hard work will be ahead in trying to provide economic opportunity
for people--jobs, decent housing, and so forth--that makes democracy
thrive and succeed. But they ought to be given first a chance to speak
freely, elect their chosen leaders without fear of intimidation. In the
next week or so we will see unprecedented action of a duly elected
President, thrown out of his nation in a military coup, going back to
his nation to be received warmly by the overwhelming majority.
I might point out that in a recent visit, including a group which I
took to Haiti last year, even members of the business community who
forcibly told us they had not supported President Aristide, politically
urged his immediate return to the country so they will have a chance of
stability and the restoration of democracy.
Again, after this resolution, which I am confident will be adopted,
we will adjourn, and the military force will withdraw and the
multilateral forces will assume the lion's share of the responsibility.
And we will all look back on this, despite our disagreements of how the
military ended up in Haiti, supporting the overall outcome and the
results that I am hopeful will occur in Haiti in these coming weeks and
months.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the senior Senator
from New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr.
Smith] is recognized for 7 minutes.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for yielding.
Before the Senator from Connecticut leaves the floor, it would be
interesting after Mr. Aristide has assumed power to look ahead 10 years
and see how much democracy there is in Haiti
I think most of us would agree that the past track record does not
bode too well for the future of democracy in Haiti, which really brings
me to the point.
I do support this resolution, but in doing so I want to point out
that the administration policy, in my opinion, toward Haiti is an
unmitigated disaster. We do not have any national security interests in
Haiti. We have no economic interests in Haiti. We do not have a clear
military objective in Haiti. And rather than training to fight and win
wars, our Nation's premier rapid deployment forces are serving as
police officers in a foreign land with no clear rules of engagement.
Their mission is unclear to the American people, and that mission, if
there is one, seems to evolve and change on a daily basis. They are
risking their lives every day, every minute as we speak, and they
already have been risking their lives, for a cause that is suspect and
a policy that is undefined. That is simply wrong.
Perhaps most outrageous is the fact that the President never sought
the approval of the American people, through their elected officials,
for this reckless endeavor. It is ironic and, frankly, offensive to me,
speaking personally, that the President would tout the authorization of
the United Nations for his Haiti policy, yet not seek congressional
approval. In effect, the President is saying that his action is
justified because Boutros Ghali approved it, and at the same time he
did not seek the approval of the U.S. Congress, the elected
representatives of the American people. The last time I read the
Constitution it vested these authorities in the Congress, not the
United Nations.
There was no emergency in Haiti, no United States citizens in
imminent danger, and no requirement to act prior to congressional
approval. In fact, it is clear that the reason President Clinton did
not seek congressional endorsement was because he knew that this policy
would have been rejected by the Congress. That is hardly a legitimate
reason, Mr. President, to commit U.S. military forces, the best of
America, in harm's way.
Is that legitimate reason to do that? I think not. It was not a
reason to commit them, and it is not a reason to keep them there any
longer.
Mr. President, the resolution before the Senate is very clear. It is
a rejection of the Clinton policy, pure and simple. It states that the
President should have sought congressional approval prior to deploying
troops to Haiti and that they should be brought home as soon as
possible. It is responsible in the sense that it does not put a
specific date which could, in fact, risk the lives of American troops.
Importantly, it also requires the President, once and for all, to go on
the record in a report to Congress and outline what the national
security objectives are, what is it that he is pursuing in Haiti, what
is he trying to do. As Senator Nunn has so eloquently said, how can you
restore democracy where there has never been democracy. There has to be
democracy at some point in the past before you can restore it in the
future.
The truth is all we have heard so far from the administration is the
excuse that we had to occupy Haiti because the President had threatened
to invade so many times that we would lose face if we failed to deliver
on that threat. That is a pretty pathetic and unacceptable rationale
for risking American lives. I reject it categorically, and based on the
abundance of mail and telephone calls I have received from New
Hampshire and, frankly, from around the country, so do the American
people reject it.
No one ever said that conducting foreign policy would be simple or
easy. It is not. We do not need 535 Secretaries of State. But as a
Presidential candidate, the President sought to trivialize his
inexperience and disinterest in foreign affairs. Now we are living with
the consequences. They are disastrous. Our credibility throughout the
world is in question. Our troops are being stretched to the limit to
implement the agenda of the United Nations and some humanitarian
interest rather than the national security interests of our Nation.
The American military, I say to our colleagues, is a national
treasure. It is the thing that works the best in all of the U.S.
Government. Think of any other Government agency, any other Government
entity that works better than the military. It is not a law-enforcement
agency to be contracted out wherever or whenever the United Nations
sees fit. Mr. President, it is time to bring our troops home.
I want to close by commending those troops. They are the best. I have
been out there in the field with them on many occasions, not in Haiti
as my colleague was, but I have seen the job they do. I have witnessed
it firsthand. I have been a member of the military, and I express my
absolute commitment to do everything possible to secure their safe and
expeditious return. But while they are in harm's way we should provide
them with whatever they need.
I adamantly oppose the occupation of Haiti by American troops, and I
oppose the policy of sending them there and offering them up as
policemen without clear objectives. But they are there--they are there,
and they need our unequivocal support. We do not need another situation
as we had in Vietnam.
As Americans, we have an obligation to do every single thing we can
to give them the maximum support, encouragement and equipment they need
to defend themselves and to get home safely. That is what I want to
happen.
I would just say, Mr. President, if any American soldier were to lose
his or her life I would have to say, for what? For what?
Mr. President, let us bring the troops home and bring them home
quickly. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, will the Chair advise me how much time is
remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from New
Hampshire that he controls 54 minutes and the Senator from Connecticut
controls 50 minutes.
Mr. GREGG. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, under the unanimous-consent agreement, I
believe I have 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls 15 minutes
in his own right under the unanimous-consent agreement.
Mr. McCAIN. The Senator does not have to yield me any time. According
to the unanimous consent agreement, I have 15 minutes. I appreciate the
generosity of the Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. President, I state emphatically, I did not support the
President's proposal to intervene in Haiti. I do not support his policy
now.
If the Democratic leadership had given the Senate an opportunity to
vote on this matter before our troops landed in Haiti, I would have
voted against it. A majority of this body, in my view, would have voted
against it. The American people would have voted against it. I found it
extremely distressing that when the Senate found an opportunity to
offer an amendment on this issue before our troops were dispatched to
Haiti, we were prevented from voting.
Mr. President, I have ventilated that situation often enough that I
will not review how that transpired.
But the fact is that I believe the administration made a very, very
serious error in committing American troops to an enterprise in which
the American people did not give significant or at least majority
support.
Years ago, after the Vietnam war, Mr. President, Gen. Maxwell Taylor,
who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Kennedy,
and later as Ambassador to South Vietnam, said, in the review of that
tragic chapter in American history, that there are certain criteria
that need to be met before sending American troops overseas in a
military engagement. Among those were a clear strategy for prosecuting
that enterprise, a clear exit strategy, and most importantly the
support of the American people.
Because we found out during the Vietnam war that, over time, that no
matter how efficiently the performance of our men and women in the
military, no matter how overwhelming our military superiority may be,
without the support of the American people, as soon as casualties
mount, public support will dissipate. By the way, the time for the
information on the number of casualties becomes less and less as we get
instantaneous information. I can remember during the Vietnam war that
it was incredible to many Americans that we would receive information
from the battlefields of Vietnam as short a time as 24 hours after the
recording of those events took place. Now, as we know, we receive that
information instantaneously.
In fact, if it was not rather tragic, it would be a little amusing,
as we see as many cameramen as troops in some incidents that have
transpired during our occupation of Haiti.
But the fundamental premise remains, Mr. President, that you have to
have the support of the American people.
Now, there are various precedents that we can look at in citing the
need for this support. I suggest that Vietnam is one where that support
was not secured and the Persian Gulf engagement was one in which the
support of the American people was obtained.
In fact, at the time of the invasion of Kuwait, only 37 percent of
the American people supported sending United States troops to liberate
Kuwait. The President of the United States then went to the United
Nations, he went to the American people, and he went to the Congress,
the representatives of the American people, both here and in the other
body. He did, in my view, a superior, in fact, a superb job of
convincing the American people that our vital national security
interests were indeed at stake in the Persian Gulf.
In that previous poll that I mentioned, where only 37 percent of the
American people supported our engagement in the Persian Gulf, at the
end of the debate and vote here in the U.S. Senate--which some, I was
not one of them, but some called perhaps the Senate's finest hour in
recent years, where this issue was ventilated in spirited debate and,
frankly, extremely insightful discussion--then the American people did
support it, as did a majority of this body and a majority of the other
body. So that when later American lives were placed at risk, where
American casualties were sustained, we saw an outpouring of patriotism,
of support, of concern, and love that perhaps we had not seen since
World War II.
We certainly did not see this kind of support during the Vietnam war,
and there was very little of it manifested in the Korean war.
At the conclusion of the engagement in the Persian Gulf, we greeted
those men and women who served with such distinction with parades and
with an upsurge of patriotism that was heartening to all Americans.
Mr. President, I am sorry to predict to you today that none of that
will happen in Haiti, because the majority of the American people today
do not believe that our vital national security interests are
threatened in Haiti.
The American people do believe, as I do, that we have an interest in
Haiti. We have an interest in stopping human rights abuses in Haiti. We
have an interest in restoring President Aristide. We have an interest
in trying to uplift the grinding poverty that afflicts most of the
citizens of that unhappy and tragic land.
We also have an interest in stopping the killing in Rwanda. We have
an interest in stopping the killing in Liberia. We have an interest in
stopping the killing in Bosnia, which many predict will get worse as
this winter wears on.
Many of us have an interest in stopping the killing in Azerbaijan.
Many of us have an interest in stopping conflicts in some 47 places in
the world where armed conflicts are taking place today, as I speak.
However, the people of the United States have not made the profound
and difficult decision that our interests in Haiti are so compelling
that we risk our treasure and our most precious blood, that of
America's youth. I believe that since the occupation of Haiti, the
President of the United States and his administration have still not
made, or even attempted to make a case, to the American people that our
vital national security interests are involved and that the problems of
Haiti require our military involvement.
Mr. President, I do not pretend to be a military strategist or even
tactician. I once served, obviously, as is well known. But that does
not mean that I pretend to have the talents of so many enlightened and
educated people who spend their lives in this business. But I do pay
attention to their opinions and their views. And I have yet to meet a
person who is a military historian, who is a tactician or a strategist,
who can tell me how this situation can end beneficially either for the
people of Haiti or the people of the United States.
One of the reasons many of these experts are convinced that this
situation is one which is increasingly difficult to solve is because of
the fact that we were there once before. We were there once before. We
were supposed to be there for a few months and we stayed 19 years.
Admittedly, there were significantly different circumstances. But the
motivation to maintain order was fundamentally the same on the part of
President Woodrow Wilson as it is today on the part of President
William Clinton.
I believe this bipartisan solution should have made clear that we
should not have intervened in the first place, but this resolution does
make two very important points in a manner which will not undermine the
safety of our troops or their performance of the mission they have been
ordered to perform.
First, the President should have sought congressional approval before
employing United States Armed Forces to Haiti. Second, the resolution
offers support for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces as soon
as possible. In my view that does not mean as soon as order is restored
to Haiti. It does not mean as soon as democracy is flourishing in
Haiti. It does not mean as soon as we have established a viable nation
in Haiti. As soon as possible means as soon we can get out of Haiti
without losing any American lives.
There may be different interpretations of this resolution on the
other side of the aisle because I think clearly this resolution will be
approved overwhelmingly in the upcoming vote. But it is my view, and I
think the majority of the American people's view, and I want to make it
clear, that as soon as possible means as soon as possible, exactly what
those words say.
In addition, the provisions of this resolution require the President
to report to Congress on the policy objectives, mission, and rules of
engagement in Haiti. This information will help Congress to keep track
of the evolution of our mission, otherwise known as mission creep.
This resolution will not, however, prevent mission creep. Congress
may monitor the situation and encourage the President to limit the
mission of our troops in Haiti. But it is ultimately the Commander in
Chief's responsibility.
I am deeply concerned that the mission has already begun a Somalia-
like evolution. Our original mission in Haiti was based on cooperation
with the Haitian military and police--a very unsound basis, I will
admit, but it was the stated mission upon the arrival of American
troops. The Haitians were to police themselves. But the cooperation
that was to prevent mission creep has not materialized and United
States troops have assumed a greater and greater responsibility for
policing Haiti. Despite the obvious shift in the mission,
administration officials reassure us constantly that our troops are not
involved in police work. Yet we all see on CNN what they are doing. Day
by day their mission expands. American military personnel have been
tasked with preventing looting, stopping Haitian on Haitian violence,
protecting private property, and arresting attaches.
Perhaps my definition of policing is very different from that of the
administration, but I would call all of this police work, and I would
call it all very, very dangerous.
Our success in limiting Haitian on Haitian violence and United States
casualties are at best tactical successes. It will be months or years
before we can evaluate any progress toward accomplishing the loosely
stated mission of establishing order and democracy.
I also want to point out the practical problems we are already
hearing from our military people in Haiti. They are supposed to prevent
violence, but only too much violence. They are supposed to stand aside
if something happens, but if someone's life is in danger then they are
supposed to intervene. It is very, very difficult for an American
military person on the spot, viewing a disturbance, to know when that
fight or beating or whatever it is, crosses a line between harassment
and a life-threatening situation. What our people on the ground there
are telling us is they are faced with decisions that have to be made at
the moment on the scene. Clearly their mission and role there is very
ill-defined.
There is an aspect of this I want to discuss again that has the
American people confused and I believe is a very, very significant
contribution to the lack of support for this effort. One night not too
long ago the President of the United States comes on national
television and says to the American people: These are thugs, these are
murderers, they are rapists, these are human rights abusers; their time
has come. ``You must go.''
That is a clear-cut, unequivocal statement on the part of the
President of the United States that unless these people leave power,
and indeed leave the country as was later elaborated by administration
people on national talk shows the following Sunday, then we are going
to invade.
Much to the astonishment and amazement of many Americans, the next
day we did not invade. We sent a delegation--which is certainly
laudable. But the results of that delegation were that it came back to
tell the American people that these murdering, raping thugs are now
honorable military men who need to have honorable military
retirements--that these are men whose rights under international law
would be violated if they were forced to leave the country. And the
chief negotiator, former President Carter, said he was ashamed of the
President's policy.
Not only are the American people confused--I keep track of these
events and I am confused. Are these people murdering thugs or are they
honorable military people? I would like to know, which is which? Are
they going to be forced to leave Haiti or are they going to have an
honorable retirement? Frankly, one of the most respected persons I know
is saying: Well, you can say what you want. Once you get there and you
have taken over the country it does not matter. What happens the next
time we face a problem and we send people down to negotiate? Are they
going to look back and say: You told them in Haiti certain things would
happen, but once you got there they did not happen?
Who are these people? Who is President Aristide? I suggest his
autobiography ought to be read. It is full of Marxist ideology and
liberation theology. I have seen films where he extolls the virtues of
necklacing. Who is the enemy in Haiti and who is the friend? The
American people, I think, need to know that. Who are we supporting and
who are we opposing?
Mr. President, has my time nearly expired?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. McCAIN. I support the resolution and appreciate the indulgence of
the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
North Carolina, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms],
is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at this moment more than 21,000 U.S.
service men and women have been sent to occupy Haiti. They have no
business being there and we should get them out right away.
I am deeply concerned when at any time and for any reason United
States troops are placed in harm's way and I am especially concerned
because the United States has absolutely no vital interest at stake in
Haiti.
I heard a report which was on television, and followed up by a report
in the New York Times, about apprehensions about the venereal disease
AIDS. The astonishing percentage of people in Haiti who have AIDS is
enough to make the President and all the rest of us who had anything
whatsoever to do with sending those troops down there think again about
what we have done to our own people.
I am especially mindful that many thousands of these troops in Haiti
today come from 29 separate military units, and they reside in my home
State of North Carolina. Tonight, from Fort Bragg to Camp Lejeune, the
loved ones are waiting and wondering and praying for the husbands and
fathers and mothers and wives and sons and daughters to come home
safely.
Many Senators have spoken about the morale of our troops in Haiti,
commenting that they appear well prepared and that they are in good
spirits. And of course they do and they are. Notwithstanding the
vigorous efforts of liberals in the Congress of the United States to
destroy it, the American military remains the finest fighting force on
Earth. Our troops are, indeed, well trained and well equipped because
under the vision and leadership of Ronald Reagan the United States made
a commitment to rebuild our military, a military which had been allowed
to fall into a state of such deep disrepair the soldiers could not
fight and ships could not sail and airplanes could not fly. So it
should be no surprise that our troops are well prepared for their
mission in Haiti, thanks to Ronald Reagan.
But Senators need to be reminded that the central question is not the
morale of those splendid men and women whom we have sent to Haiti. The
question is, why are they there in the first place? I will repeat what
I have said on this floor since the issue was first debated in October
of last year, 12 months ago.
The United States has no national security interest in Haiti, and
removing the warlords who have run Haiti for the past 3 years is not
worth one American life, nor is installing into power on the shoulders
of 21,000 U.S. servicemen and women, a sworn enemy of America, Jean
Bertrand Aristide. It just does not make any sense.
I also find it intriguing that many of the Senators who are showering
praise today upon Gen. Hugh Shelton and the rest of our military
personnel in Haiti are, in many instances, the very same Senators who
have unfailingly voted to slash defense spending. If they had had their
way, our armed services today would be so hollow that we might find it
difficult to mobilize a force to occupy even a defenseless island like
Haiti. So it is ironic, when you stop to think about it, that liberals
who attempted during the past 12 years to weaken the readiness of our
armed services are so committed to our occupation of this tiny island.
By way of example, perhaps I should mention that when Communist
guerrillas threatened to destroy democracy in El Salvador where our
Nation's security was truly at risk, liberals prohibited more than 55
U.S. military advisers--55 people--to go inside that country. They
would not let them go. Today, many of these same liberals argue that we
must keep 21,000 servicemen and women indefinitely in a nation which is
of no security interest to the United States whatsoever.
In addition to the cost in U.S. personnel lives, which may be high,
the financial cost of restoring Mr. Aristide to office is an abuse of
American taxpayers' money. Last week, I submitted in the Congressional
Record a list of 17 separate categories of U.S. expenditures totaling
more than $891 million, and these costs continue to skyrocket. The
Pentagon now believes its mission alone will cost more than $1 billion,
and that does not include more than $300 million in foreign aid that
the President intends to give to Haiti over the next 12 months. Nor
does it include at least $70 million which U.S. taxpayers will be
expected to cough up as our contribution to the U.N. force involved in
Haiti. And with a national debt of $4,692,749,910,013.32, as of
yesterday afternoon, our Nation can ill-afford to take on new debt,
additional debt to install Mr. Aristide to power.
So the situation now in Haiti is an accident waiting to happen.
President Clinton has failed to provide our troops and the American
people with anything remotely appearing to be a definition of our
mission there. When our troops entered Haiti about 2 weeks ago, we were
told that the Haitian military alone would be responsible for disarming
the Haitian thugs. Now American troops serve as the policemen of Haiti,
intervening in fist fights among the looters and the raiders and they
are trying to disarm the thugs.
I am not going to dwell further on these points because I, and many
other Senators, have made them before, but allow me to say that the
President and his advisors have made a grave mistake by placing United
States troops in Haiti. We simply cannot afford the cost of this
occupation financially, but far more important, the President will
never be able to justify the cost of this occupation in terms of
American life and American dollars.
Mr. President, please get our troops out of Haiti now before they
begin coming home in body bags.
Finally, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a listing of all
North Carolina based military personnel be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
NORTH CAROLINA-BASED MILITARY PERSONNEL ORDERED TO INVADE HAITI
Marine Corps Forces:
1. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Caribbean
of approx. 1,800 Marines, Camp Lejeune.
Army Forces:
1. 1st Corps Support Command, Ft. Bragg.
2. 16th Military Police Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
3. 503rd Military Police Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
4. 2-159 Medium Lift Helicopter Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
5. 20th Engineer Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
6. 27th Engineer Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
7. 37th Engineer Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
8. 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
9. 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
10. 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
11. 2nd Material Movement Center, Ft. Bragg.
12. 330th Material Movement Center, Ft. Bragg.
13. 46th Corps Support Group, Ft. Bragg.
14. 264th Corps Support Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
15. 18th Finance Group, Ft. Bragg.
16. 18th Personnel Service Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
17. 44th Medical Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
18. 55th Medical Group, Ft. Bragg.
19. 28th Combat Support Hospital, Ft. Bragg.
20. 261st Area Support Medical Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
21. 32nd Medical Logistic Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
22. 56th Medical Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
U.S. Army Reserve:
1. 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion Support Element,
Greensboro.
Air Force Units:
1. 4th Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB.
2. 23rd Wing, Pope AFB.
Air Force Reserve:
1. 53 Aerial Port Sq., Fayetteville.
2. 916 ARG, KC-10A, Goldsboro.
National Guard Units:
1. 145 AG, C-130, Charlotte.
Mr. HELMS. If I have any time remaining, I yield it back and I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator suggests the absence of a quorum.
Does either Senator yield time at this point?
Mr. HELMS. I withdraw, unless----
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask
that the time be charged to both sides equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I want to thank my
colleague from New Hampshire and also my colleague from Connecticut for
putting forth this bipartisan resolution. I think it is very important
that those of us who believe that the mission to Haiti should never
have been embarked on speak out loudly and clearly so that the
President and the administration know that this mission must come to a
close at the earliest possible moment.
I originally opposed the invasion of Haiti because I was simply not
convinced that there is any threat to our national interest that is
significant enough to warrant the loss of even one American life.
Administration officials have suggested that we are prepared for
casualties in Haiti during this occupation. Mr. President, I am not. I
was not prepared to accept United States casualties resulting from an
invasion of Haiti, and I am certainly not prepared for casualties
resulting from the occupation of Haiti.
On September 24, in the first fire-fight of the American intervention
in Haiti, a United States Navy interpreter was wounded and 10 armed
Haitians, policemen or attaches, were killed by Marines outside a
police station in the north coast city of Cap-Haitien. We have had the
first United States casualty and the first Haitians killed as a result
of our intervention.
Since then, Haitian-on-Haitian violence has escalated rather than
abated. Looting has become widespread, and the tension between our
troops and parts of the populace have increased. One American soldier
has been shot in the abdomen. This is a very similar pattern, Mr.
President, to what took place in Somalia. At first, the Somalis
welcomed us. Then they took up arms against us, with disastrous
results.
On September 29, an explosion at a political rally killed five
Haitians and wounded many more. U.S. soldiers were in close proximity
to the explosion and luckily none were killed or injured.
On September 30, two U.S. photographers were injured by mob violence.
The President has yet to report to Congress and answer our serious
concerns and questions regarding this mission.
I am becoming increasingly troubled by the apparent mission creep
which characterized our involvement in Somalia and is becoming apparent
in Haiti as well. Originally, administration officials briefed the
Senate that United States forces would be routed around Haitian-on-
Haitian acts of violence. Now the violence is finding our troops much
as it did in Somalia. In addition, the policy regarding our troops'
intervention in acts of violence between Haitians has been changed. The
new policy puts our troops between the two opposing sides. The only
outcome of this can be more American casualties.
Mr. President, I believe it is important to reiterate this point. The
President chose not to seek congressional approval prior to sending
combat troops into Haiti when there was absolutely no national security
interest and no reason to do that. There was no U.S. citizen being
threatened.
Then the President's representatives briefed the Congress that we
would not involve our troops in violence between Haitians. Now the
President has said, again without seeking congressional approval, that
this policy is altered and our troops are directly in harm's way. Let
us not forget that President Bush ordered United States troops into
Somalia for the purely humanitarian purpose of ending a politically
imposed famine. It was the Clinton administration that changed the
mission to one of nation building.
We are all familiar with the tragic outcome of that intervention. We
lost precious American lives. It appears that our military is once
again being plagued by mission creep as part of a misguided cause of
nation building. I think that nation building is a term that reflects
the arrogance of many in this country who think that Haiti or Somalia
can have democracy imposed upon them at the point of a bayonet.
I am sure my office is not unique in the Senate. I have received
hundreds of thoughtful letters, phone calls, and telegrams since
President Clinton addressed the Nation. The one theme which
predominates is that the President has simply failed to present a clear
and convincing case that there is, indeed, a vital national security
interest in Haiti.
Advocates of an interventionist foreign policy have always advanced
lofty goals, but in the final analysis these goals must be achievable
and they must be worth the price we pay.
Even if democracy in Haiti were achievable at the point of a bayonet,
is it worth the life of one American soldier or marine? This is an
internal decision that must be made by the Haitian people. Is it worth
the estimated 500 million to 850 million taxpayer dollars that will be
added to our deficit for this intervention?
One of the many thoughtful letters that came into my office was from
a retired colonel, Richard Platt, of Universal City, TX. He wrote:
I have served my country as a soldier for 35 years,
including two tours of duty in Vietnam. I had hoped that we
as a nation had learned from our mistakes. Apparently I was
wrong. It appears that we have again committed brave young
Americans in a disastrous mission in support of inept
political policies. The United States has absolutely no vital
national interests in Haiti, and it is not worth a single
American life. It is time to speak up--loudly.
That is what he wrote to me. Mr. President, I am taking Mr. Platt's
advice, and I am speaking. I am going to speak loudly, as I have in the
past, because I think that is the best way to send the message to the
President.
This mission must be defined. It must be defined clearly and
narrowly. And the American people must understand it. Most of all, Mr.
President, I hope by speaking out, we will shorten this mission to the
very briefest possible time that our troops would be in harm's way. I
am going to speak to try to make that happen.
Thank you, Mr. President.
I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.
I yield the floor.
Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Wisconsin.
Mr. FEINGOLD. With the consent of the floor leader, Senator Dodd, I
yield myself 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized
for 10 minutes.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
As we debate the Mitchell-Dole resolution regarding the United States
policy toward Haiti, I would like to discuss an issue that goes beyond
the specific military operation and calls attention to the disturbing
institutional process by which we arrived at this point.
Today, there are over 19,500 United States troops in Haiti. This is a
U.S.-led mission with phenomenal contributions from other nations and
is scheduled for transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force for phase 2,
which is to be responsible for maintaining public order,
professionalization of the police force, and assisting in the
legislative election.
Mr. President, simply speaking, the United Nations authorized this
mission, but the U.S. Congress never did.
We have debated and voted on the issue of United States troops in
Haiti on several occasions in the past year. We have also voted on a
series of haphazard and ad hoc resolutions relating to the United
States troops in several other conflicts such as Haiti, Bosnia, and the
Golan Heights.
Mr. President, it has been a sloppy and ineffective approach to war
powers.
I believe that Congress should have had a central role in authorizing
the Haiti mission because it is a large military operation where our
troops may face imminent hostility. For that reason, I introduced a
resolution 2 weeks ago, shortly after our troops went into Haiti,
calling for an up or down vote on the deployment of United States
forces in Haiti on or before October 15, 1994, when the mission in
Haiti can obviously become more perilous. I strongly believe that
Congress has a responsibility to vote up or down on this particular
mission.
I compliment the House Foreign Affairs Committee for taking up a
resolution which did take a position on this issue. They voted to
authorize the mission until March 1, 1995. Now, Mr. President, I am not
at all sure I agree with the authorization or the withdrawal date
chosen, but at least that committee faced the issue head on.
There, Chairman Lee Hamilton noted:
The presence of more than 15,000 U.S. troops in Haiti is a
significant foreign policy action. It is important for
Congress to vote to authorize the deployment of U.S. troops
overseas whenever they are placed in situations where there
is the potential for combat.
Obviously, Mr. President, the Haiti situation is such a situation.
Despite what has turned out to be a political battle, war powers
should not be a partisan issue. The underlying issue is not simply
whether Members of this Congress support or oppose President Clinton's
decision on Haiti. It is what power we would have if a different
President in the future would decide to deploy 50,000 troops, for
example, to Costa Rica for inappropriate or obscure reasons. That is
why I am focusing on this issue. With the precedent we are setting in
Haiti, such abuse by a less well-meaning President could well occur.
Our Founding Fathers did not leave these kinds of decisions to one
person. The Constitution mandates a balance of powers, in most cases,
of the use of Armed Forces. In this case, though, only the Chief
Executive ordered the deployment of 19,000 Americans into combat. He
also unilaterally decided that he did not have to seek congressional
authorization to do it.
Mr. President, I was particularly troubled by the legal rationale the
administration offered for the President's deployment of forces to
Haiti. In a letter from Walter Dellinger in the Office of Legal Counsel
at the Department of Justice to Senators Dole, Cohen, Thurmond, and
Simpson, the administration cited some legal justification for this
unilateral action, including an argument that the deployment was in
accordance with a sense-of-the-Congress resolution attached to the
Department of Defense appropriations bill in October 1993.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel,
Washington, DC, September 27, 1994.
Hon. Robert Dole,
Hon. Alan K. Simpson,
Hon. Strom Thurmond,
Hon. William S. Cohen,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senators, I write in response to your letter of
September 15, 1994, in which you requested a copy or summary
of any legal opinion that may have been rendered, orally or
in writing, by this Office concerning the lawfulness of the
President's planned deployment of United States military
forces into Haiti. After giving substantial thought to these
abiding issues of Presidential and congressional authority,
we concluded that the President possessed the legal authority
to order that deployment.
In this case, a combination of three factors provided legal
justification for the planned deployment. First, the planned
deployment accorded with the sense of Congress, as expressed
in section 8147 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1418, 1474 (1993).
That resolution expressed Congress's sense that the President
would not require express prior statutory authorization for
deploying troops into Haiti provided that he first made
certain findings and reported them to Congress. The President
did make the required findings and reported them. We
concluded that the resolution ``evince[d] legislative intent
to accord the President broad discretion'' and ```invite[d]'
measures on independent presidential responsibility.'' Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Second, the planned
deployment satisfied the requirements of the War Powers
Resolution. Finally, after examining the circumstances,
nature, scope and duration of the anticipated deployment, we
determined that it was not a ``war'' in the constitutional
sense. Specifically, the planned deployment was to take place
with the full consent of the legitimate government, and did
not involve the risk of major or prolonged hostilities or
serious casualties to either the United States or Haiti. For
those reasons, which are set out in detail below, we
concluded that the President had legal and constitutional
authority to order United States troops to be deployed into
Haiti.
i.
First, the Haitian deployment accorded with the sense of
Congress, as expressed in section 8147 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139.\1\
That provision was sponsored by, among others, Senators Dole,
Simpson and Thurmond. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,021-22 (daily
ed. Oct. 20, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 8147(b), 107 Stat. 1474, of the Act states the
sense of Congress that ``funds appropriated by this Act
should not be obligated or expended for United States
military operations in Haiti'' unless certain conditions
(including, in the alternative, prior Congressional
authorization) were met. Section 8147(c), 107 Stat. 1475,
however, added that
[i]t is the sense of Congress that the limitation in
subsection (b) should not apply if the President reports in
advance to Congress that the intended deployment of United
States Armed Forces into Haiti--
(1) is justified by United States national security
interests;
(2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been
taken to ensure the safety and security of United States
Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States
Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of
their rules of engagement;
(3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
(A) the proposed mission and objectives are most
appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than
civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
(B) that the United States Armed Forces proposed for
deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the
objectives of the proposed mission;
(4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the
deployment are established;
(5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for
ending the deployment has been identified; and
(6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of
the deployment are estimated.
In short, it was the sense of Congress that the President
need not seek prior authorization for the deployment in Haiti
provided that he made certain specific findings and reported
them to Congress in advance of the deployment. The President
made the appropriate findings and detailed them to Congress
in conformity with the terms of the resolution. See Letter to
the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives
from the President (Sept. 18, 1994). Accordingly, this is
not, for constitutional purposes, a situation in which the
President has ``take[n] measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress,'' Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Rather, it is either a case in which the
President has acted ``pursuant to an . . . implied
authorization of Congress,'' so that ``his authority is at
its maximum,'' id. at 635, or at least a case in which he may
``rely upon his own independent powers'' in a matter where
Congress has ``enable[d], if not invite[d], measures on
independent presidential responsibility.'' Id. at 637.
ii.
Furthermore, the structure of the War Powers Resolution
(WPR) recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral
Presidential authority to deploy armed forces ``into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' 50
U.S.C. Sec. 1543(a)(1). The WPR requires that, in the absence
of a declaration of war, the President must report to
Congress within 48 hours of introducing armed forces into
such circumstances and must terminate the use of United
States armed forces within 60 days (or 90 days, if military
necessity requires additional time to effect a withdrawal)
unless Congress permits otherwise. Id. Sec. 1544(b). This
structure makes sense only if the President may introduce
troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without
prior authorization by the Congress: the WPR regulates such
action by the President and seeks to set limits to it.\2\
To be sure, the WPR declares that it should not be
``construed as granting any authority to the President with
respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' 50
U.S.C. Sec. 1547(d)(2). But just as clearly, the WPR assumes
that the President already has such authority, and indeed the
WPR states that it is not ``intended to alter the
constitutional authority of the . . . President.'' Id.
Sec. 1547(d)(1). Furthermore, although the WPR announces
that, in the absence of specific authorization from Congress,
the President may introduce armed forces into hostilities
only in ``a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces,'' id. Sec. 1541(c), even the defenders of the WPR
concede that this declaration--found in the ``Purpose and
Policy'' section of the WPR--either is incomplete or is not
meant to be binding. See e.g., Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the
Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers
Resolution, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79, 81 (1984).\3\
The WPR was enacted against a background that was ``replete
with instances of presidential uses of military force abroad
in the absence of prior congressional approval.''
Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without
Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980). While
Congress obviously sought to structure and regulate such
unilateral deployments,\4\ its overriding interest was to
prevent the United States from being engaged, without express
congressional authorization, in major, prolonged conflicts
such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea, rather than to
prohibit the President from using or threatening to use
troops to achieve important diplomatic objectives where the
risk of sustained military conflict was negligible.
Further, in establishing the funding a military force that
is capable of being projected anywhere around the globe,
Congress has given the President, as Commander in Chief,
considerable discretion in deciding how that force is to be
deployed.\5\ See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789
(1950); cf. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 515-16
(1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring) (President
``may direct any revenue cutter to cruise in any waters in
order to perform any duty of the service''). By declining, in
the WPR or other statutory law, to prohibit the President
from using his conjoint statutory and constitutional powers
to deploy troops into situations like that in Haiti, Congress
has left the President both the authority and the means to
take such initiatives.
In this case, the President reported to Congress,
consistent with the WPR, that United States military forces,
together with units supplied by foreign allies, began
operations in Haitian territory, including its territorial
waters and airspace. The President stated in his report that
he undertook those measures ``to further the national
security interests of the United States; to stop the brutal
atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to
secure our borders; to preserve stability and promote
democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of
the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to
us, including the Governors Island Agreement and the
agreement concluded on September 18 in Haiti.'' Letter to the
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from
the President, at 2 (Sept. 21, 1994). We believed that the
deployment was fully consistent with the WPR, and with the
authority Congress reserved to itself under that statute to
consider whether affirmative legislative authorization for
the continuance of the deployment should be provided.
iii.
Finally, in our judgment, the Declaration of War Clause,
U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 11 (``[t]he Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o declare War''), did not of its own
force require specific prior congressional authorization for
the deployment of troops at issue here. That deployment was
characterized by circumstances that sufficed to show that the
operation was not a ``war'' within the meaning of the
Declaration of War Clause.\6\ The deployment was to have
taken place, and did in fact take place, with the full
consent of the legitimate government of the country
involved.\7\ Taking that and other circumstances into
account, the President, together with his military and
intelligence advisors, determined that the nature, scope and
duration of the deployment were not consistent with the
conclusion that the event was a ``war.''
In reaching that conclusion, we were guided by the initial
premise, articulated by Justice Robert Jackson, that the
President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, ``is
exclusively responsible'' for the ``conduct of diplomatic and
foreign affairs,'' and accordingly that he may, absent
specific legislative restriction, deploy United States armed
forces ``abroad or to any particular region.'' Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789. Presidents have often utilized
this authority, in the absence of specific legislative
authorization, to deploy United States military personnel
into foreign countries at the invitation of the legitimate
governments of those countries. For example, during President
Taft's Administration, the recognized government of Nicaragua
called upon the United States to intervene because of civil
disturbance. According to President Taft, ``[t]his led to the
landing of marines and quite a campaign. . . . This was not
an act of war, because it was done with the consent of the
lawful authorities of the territory where it took place.''
William Howard Taft, The Presidency 88-89(1916).\8\
In 1940, after the fall of Denmark to Germany, President
Franklin Roosevelt ordered United States troops to occupy
Greenland, a Danish possession in the North Atlantic of vital
strategic interest to the United States. This was done
pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the
Danish Minister in Washington, and was welcomed by the local
officials on Greenland.\9\ Congress was not consulted or even
directly informed. See James Grafton Rogers, World Policing
and the Constitution 69-70 (1945). Later, in 1941, the
President ordered United States troops to occupy Iceland, an
independent nation, pursuant to an agreement between himself
and the Prime Minister of Iceland. The President relied upon
his authority as Commander in Chief, and notified Congress
only after the event. Id. at 70-71. More recently, in 1989,
at the request of President Corazon Aquino, President Bush
authorized military assistance to the Philippine government
to suppress a coup attempt. Pub. Papers of George Bush 1615
(1989).
Such a pattern of Executive conduct, made under claim of
right, extended over many decades and engaged in by
Presidents of both parties, ``evidences the existence of
broad constitutional power.'' Presidential Power to Use the
Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op.
O.L.C. at 187.
We are not suggesting, however, that the United States
cannot be said to engage in ``war'' whenever it deploys
troops into a country at the invitation of that country's
legitimate government. Rather, we believe that ``war'' does
not exist where United States troops are deployed at the
invitation of a fully legitimate government in circumstances
in which the nature, scope, and duration of the deployment
are such that the use of force involved does not rise to
the level of ``war.''
In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for
the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary, the
President was entitled to take into account the anticipated
nature, scope and duration of the planned deployment, and in
particular the limited antecedent risk that United States
forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer
or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the
deployment.\10\ Indeed, it was the President's hope, since
vindicated by the event, that the Haitian military leadership
would agree to step down before exchanges of fire occurred.
Moreover, while it would not be appropriate here to discuss
operational details, other aspects of the planned deployment,
including the fact that it would not involve extreme use of
force, as for example preparatory bombardment, were also
relevant to the judgment that it was not a ``war.''
On the basis of the reasoning detailed above, we concluded
that the President had the constitutional authority to deploy
troops into Haiti even prior to the September 18 agreement.
Sincerely,
Walter Dellinger.
footnotes
\1\In speaking of the deployment, we should be understood to
include, not only the actual deployment begun on September
19, but the military operation that was planned, and in part
initiated, before an agreement with the Haitian military
leadership was negotiated on September 18 by former President
Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell (the
``September 18 agreement''). As the President noted in his
televised address of September 18, that agreement ``was
signed after Haiti received evidence that paratroopers from
our 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, had begun to load up to begin the invasion which I
had ordered to start this evening.'' Text of Clinton's
Address, The Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1994, at A17.
\2\It should be emphasized that this Administration has not
yet had to face the difficult constitutional issues raised by
the provision of the WPR, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1544(b), that
requires withdrawal of forces after 60 days involvement in
hostilities, absent congressional authorization.
\3\The WPR omits, for example, any mention of the President's
power to rescue Americans; yet even the Comptroller General,
as agent of Congress, has acknowledged both that ``the weight
of authority'' supports the position that ``the President
does possess some unilateral constitutional power to use
force to rescue Americans,'' and that Sec. 1541(c) ``does not
in a strict sense operate to restrict such authority.'' 55
Comp. Gen. 1081, 1083, 1085 (1976). See also Peter Raven-
Hansen and William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the
Commander in Chief, 80 Va. L. Rev. 833, 879 (1994) (``[a]
custom of executive deployment of armed force for rescue and
protection of Americans abroad has developed at least since
1790''); id. at 917-18 (``since 1868 the so-called Hostage
Act has authorized and required the President to `use such
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think
necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate [the] release'
of American citizens `unjustly deprived of [their] liberty by
or under the authority of any foreign government.' . . .
[T]he Hostage Act lends further support to custom and may
constitute congressional authorization for at least this
limited defensive war power.'').
\4\Even though the President has the inherent power to deploy
troops abroad, including into situations of hostilities,
Congress may, within constitutional limits, regulate the
exercise of that power. See, e.g., Santiago v. Nogueras, 214
U.S. 260,266 (1909) (President had power to institute
military government in occupied territories until further
action by Congress); The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch)
421, 427-28 (1814).
\5\We recognize, of course, that the WPR provides that
authority to introduce the armed forces into hostilities or
situations where hostilities are clearly indicated may not be
inferred from an appropriation act, unless that statute
``states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this chapter.'' 50 U.C.S.
Sec. 1547(a).
\6\See Note, Congress, The President, And The Power To Commit
Forces To Combat, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1771, 1790 (1968)
(describing other limited interventions and suggesting
conclusion that ```war' in the sense of article I, section 8,
requiring congressional sanction, does not include
interventions to maintain order in weak countries where a
severe contest at arms with another nation is likely to
result''). Here, of course, there is still less reason to
consider the deployment a ``war,'' since it was undertaken at
the request of the recognized, democratically-elected
government, and not merely to ``maintain order.''
\7\Moreover, the deployment accorded with United Nations
Security Council Resolution No. 940 (1994). There can thus be
no question but that the deployment is lawful as a matter of
international law.
\8\President Grover Cleveland had also opined that a
``military demonstration'' on the soil of a foreign country
was not an ``act of war'' if it was ``made either with the
consent of the [foreign] government . . . or for the bona
fide purpose of protecting the imperiled lives and property
of citizens of the United States.'' 9 Messages and Papers of
the Presidents 1789-1897 466 (James Richardson ed., 1898).
\9\The Danish King and ministers were in German hands at the
time.
\10\Although the President found that the deployment would
not be without risk, he and his senior advisers had also
determined that the United States would introduce a force of
sufficient size to deter armed resistance by the Haitian
military and thus to hold both United States and Haitian
casualties to a minimum. The fact that the United States
planned to deploy up to 20,000 troops is not in itself
dispositive on the question whether the operation was a
``war'' in the constitutional sense, since the very size of
the force was designed to reduce or eliminate the likelihood
of armed resistance.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
Now, while Mr. Dellinger cites an escape clause for the President to
act in dire circumstances, he seemingly ignores the fact that the
principal purpose of the resolution passed by this body was to ensure
that ``funds should not be obligated or expended for United States
military operation in Haiti'' unless authorized in advance by Congress
or under certain limited emergency situations where there was not time
to seek and receive congressional authorization.
I have to say that I am dismayed at the line of reasoning propounded
by the administration. A sense-of-Congress resolution which was clearly
designed to limit the use of appropriated funds for a military
operation in Haiti without prior congressional approval was
intentionally interpreted to authorize an unauthorized expedition.
The language cited by Mr. Dellinger in his September 27 justification
refers to an exception to the general limitation in the resolution
which allowed such deployment if the President reported in advance to
the Congress on a number of conditions.
What, in fact, happened is that the President ordered the invasion on
Sunday, September 18, and sometime close to midnight--well after the
decision had been made and implemented--he transmitted to Congress a
report advising Congress of the objectives and charter of the
deployment. To argue that a report submitted after an invasion order
had been issued was compliance with the advance report requirement
makes a mockery of congressional intent.
Mr. President, Mr. Dellinger's letter makes two other arguments for
the legal justification for the deployment without congressional
authorization which I would like to touch on briefly.
First, he refers to the War Powers Resolution and states that its
structure makes sense only if the President has authority introduce
troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior
authorization by Congress. He argues that the War Powers Resolution
simply regulates such action by the President and seeks to set limits
to it. The letter goes on in my view to minimize the War Powers
Resolution by suggesting that while Congress obviously sought to
structure and regulate unilateral deployments, ``its overriding
interest was to prevent the United States from being engaged, without
expressed congressional authorization, in major prolonged conflicts
such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea.'' I found it astounding that the
administration does not recognize the link between the evolution of
both Korea and Vietnam from limited actions to major wars.
The final argument that article I, section 8 of the Constitution does
not require specific prior congressional authorization for the
deployment of troops at issue here must also be challenged. I believe
that when the United States deploys almost 20,000 troops, combat-ready,
in the circumstances at hand, it is a word-game to assert that
congressional authorization under article I is not at issue.
Given that the invasion of Haiti contained no pretense of an element
of surprise, there was no reason to circumvent the original intent of
the resolution: That the President should seek congressional
authorization prior to an invasion such as the one conducted in Haiti.
I voted for the resolution invoked by Mr. Dellinger, but since the
administration has demonstrated that it does not recognize a
fundamental role for Congress in the use of force, I will be far more
reluctant in the future to vote for any other resolutions on specific
missions which provide or will be construed to provide a mechanism for
the administration to circumvent the need for congressional approval of
military deployments.
Mr. President, we should not let this action go unchallenged. A
provision in the Mitchell-Dole resolution we are considering today,
which states that ``It is the sense of the Congress that the President
should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. Armed
Forces to Haiti,'' acknowledges the problem.
However, the resolution does not go ahead and authorize the
deployment. The resolution also avoids the opportunity to authorize
phase II, the UNMIH mission. Another provision explicitly states that
``Nothing in this resolution should be construed or interpreted to
constitute congressional approval or disapproval of the participation
of the U.S. Armed Forces in the United Nations Mission in Haiti.''
Obviously, Mr. President, if we are going to authorize United States
participation in the UNMIH mission, now is the time to do it.
However, with the circumstances before us today--when United States
Forces are already deployed--it appears that the Senate is going to
sidestep a direct up or down vote on the United States mission in
Haiti. This is precisely the reason we are in dire need of an overhaul
of the War Powers Resolution, which has proven unworkable.
To conclude, Mr. President, I am hopeful that next Congress, when we
have finally grown tired of the seat-of-the-pants amendments on the use
of force, our committees will delve into this issue and we will be able
to develop a process where, in concert with the administration, the use
of force is a shared decision, as envisioned under the Constitution,
between the executive and legislative branches, not just the decision
of one person, the Commander in Chief.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). Who yields time?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the President pro
tempore, Senator Byrd.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does Mr. Brown wish?
Mr. BROWN. Ten minutes.
Order of Procedure
Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that I may yield the floor, without
losing my right to the floor, to Mr. Brown for not to exceed 10
minutes, and then to Mr. Dorgan for not to exceed 10 minutes, that I
then be recognized, and that the intervening time not be charged to the
time under my control.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Colorado is recognized for up to 10 minutes on time
chargeable to the Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, let me thank the distinguished Senator from
West Virginia. I appreciate his courtesy, and I want to also commend
the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for his thoughtful comments.
He has been consistent on this subject. He is one who has spoken out
both on the floor and in the Foreign Relations Committee on which we
both serve. I commend him for not only a consistent but a thoughtful
approach.
Mr. President, as one Republican who supports the War Powers Act, I
share his concern about the procedures that have been followed in the
deployment of United States combat forces into Haiti. Specifically, Mr.
President, I think it is unfortunate, even tragic that the President
refused to seek the approval of the U.S. Congress before this
deployment was made--this in spite of the fact that this Senate made it
quite clear that they expected to be consulted and involved in the
decision to commit U.S. forces to combat.
Moreover, Mr. President, let me be specific. It is my belief that the
timing of the sending of those forces was partly associated with an
effort to avoid votes which were scheduled that following week in both
Houses of Congress. In other words, part of the rationale for deploying
forces without prior congressional approval was an attempt by the
executive branch to circumvent the President's responsibility to
consult Congress. Making the circumvention even more deplorable was the
fact that the Congress had clearly expressed its wish to be involved in
any decision to commit U.S. forces.
Some will say the War Powers Act allows the Commander in Chief to
deploy forces in a variety of situations, and that is quite true. But
one should not think about these War Powers provisions without noting
what made the Haitian adventure different. It did not involve an
emergency or an unexpected circumstance. As a matter of fact, this
invasion has been talked about by the President for many, many months.
Clearly, one cannot justify the deployment of forces on the basis that
it involved emergency action. It did not. The deployment cannot be
justified on the basis that there was an urgent need for secrecy or
that the secrecy of the operation would be jeopardized by going to
Congress. Clearly, it would not. No secret was made of the plan to
invade.
The simple fact is that the deployment of forces was completed in
such a manner as to avoid congressional involvement. Mr. President, I
think it was a mistake. I think it was a mistake because the
Constitution is quite clear in giving Congress the power to declare
war. The War Powers Act is quite clear in setting forth
responsibilities. Furthermore, the Congress has been quite clear in its
resolve and its interest that the President seek prior authorization
from Congress before we deploy our forces in the field of combat in
Haiti.
Mr. President, I am concerned about the decision to deploy United
States forces to Haiti for two additional reasons. One, we did not have
a clear mission, and deployment in Haiti was not vital to our national
security interests. If we have learned one thing from our experience in
Vietnam, in Lebanon, in Somalia, it is that it is a mistake to deploy
United States combat forces around the world without a commitment to
win, without clear objectives, without a clear purpose. How many
tragedies do we have to endure before we learn that about U.S. overseas
deployments?
The second issue is one that should concern all Americans. That is,
the administration's implied message that the authorization by the
United Nations Security Council was adequate for the deployment of U.S.
forces, and the implication that the approval of the U.S. Congress was
not needed.
Mr. President, this is a dangerous precedent. The forces that serve
the United States are not only paid for by the U.S. taxpayers, but fall
under the purview of the U.S. Constitution and the system of government
we have established. We do not have American forces subject to United
Nations authorization. They are subject to American authorization. To
use the United Nations to circumvent the Congress of the United States
is a mistake--a mistake for this President, and for other Presidents
who might do so.
There are two parts of this resolution that are very important and
are part of the reason why I will support the final text. Section 1,
subparagraph (b) says this:
The President should have sought and welcomed congressional
approval before deploying U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti.
I believe that is absolutely correct. Is it a tough criticism of the
President? Yes, I think it is. Hopefully, however, it is a policy the
President will learn to adopt.
There is a separate section, section 5, that is helpful:
Report on U.S. agreements. Not later than November 15,
1994, the Secretary of State shall provide a comprehensive
report to Congress on all the agreements of the United States
entered into with other nations, including any assistance
pledged or provided in connection with the United States
efforts in Haiti. Such reports shall include information on
any agreements or commitments relating to the United Nations
Security Council actions concerning Haiti since 1992.
Mr. President, we have not had full disclosure from the
administration as to what commitments and agreements were made in
ancillary discussions to secure the support and participation of other
nations. The American people are entitled to know what commitments were
made or what verbal understandings were reached, and this resolution
makes it clear that all of this information is called for. As one of
the chief authors of this section, it is particularly important that
the Congress receive effective reporting on all verbal or written
agreements entered into by the executive branch to secure other nations
support.
Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that this
resolution comes to the floor without the ability to amend it. A strong
effort was made in this body to avoid amendment in the original
resolution after U.S. forces were deployed to Haiti. The implication
was that if we insisted on amendments, no resolution would have been
brought forth. That was the case when we first considered a Haiti
resolution, and it is the case this time.
It is a mistake to prevent amendment and to coverup the deep feelings
of many Members on this issue. Members of this body, I think, should
have a chance to offer amendments. I had hoped to offer one that added
to the sense of the Congress: The United States does not have vital
national security interests which justify the military occupation of
Haiti.
Mr. President, the fact is the Deputy Secretary of State, in a
writing in 1992 in Time Magazine, said the following:
Once a country utterly loses its ability to govern itself,
it also loses its claim to sovereignty and should become a
ward of the United Nations.
Mr. President, I do not agree with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott. I do not think we ought to have countries all over the world
who become the ward of the United Nations. The United States, the
United Nations' largest financier, should not have to pay the bill for
all of those countries. Secretary Talbott suggests in those articles
that making Somalia and similar anticountries, as he describes them,
U.N. protectorates or trust territories is a good idea.
It would be a disaster. The American population should not have to
pay the bills for all those other countries that ``loses [their]
ability to govern'' themselves. Should we help? Certainly, under
circumstances where we can.
Second, Mr. President, asking the approval of Congress before we send
our men and women into harm's way is not just an issue that deals with
the powers of Congress or the powers of the President. Perhaps we think
about it in those terms. Nonetheless, I am convinced that it deals with
the very heart and fiber of the commitment we have to the American
fighting men and women who put on the uniform in this country.
We should not put our people in harm's way. We should not put them in
combat without making sure we are committed to the objective they are
risking their lives for. To put them in harm's way as has been done in
Haiti, and in Somalia, shows a callous disregard for the commitment and
the devotion of the fighting men and women of this country.
We owe them a clear commitment. We owe them a clear objective. We owe
them our resolve and support. One of the tragedies of Vietnam is that
the men and women who served in the uniform of this country in Vietnam
served with a great deal more commitment than our Congress did. Our
Congress never laid out a clear commitment to win in that combat. The
Presidents of both parties who directed our country during that time
period never made a final commitment to the objectives they were
willing to risk the lives of American soldiers for.
I think it is wrong for politicians to send young men and women to
war without clear objectives, without the clear support of the Congress
and without any indication that the country is committed to them and to
their mission. Avoiding a vote in Congress is a way of avoiding putting
Congress on the line. We should never do it again.
Let us pray that the commitment and the courage displayed by our men
and women in Haiti, and in service around the world, is matched in the
future by our political leaders, who seem so willing to risk their
lives.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] is recognized for up to 10 minutes.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is this time to be
charged to Senator Dodd.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is to be charged to the majority
leader or his designee.
Mr. GREGG. Thank you.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I do not think this is so much a debate as
it is a discussion, because I do not think there is great disagreement
on the floor of the Senate on this issue.
I felt that we should not have committed armed forces to an invasion
of Haiti. I wrote the President to tell him this in early August. I
still feel that way. I feel now that we ought to find a way to withdraw
our forces from Haiti as quickly as possible.
I do not think there is much disagreement on this point. This
resolution really moves in that direction and, frankly, I think most
Members would agree with me when I say that our troops should come home
soon.
However, I came to the floor to talk not so much about the use of
military strength, or about vital security and national interests, but
about life in Haiti. I am not an expert on Haiti, but I have been
there.
I want to tell you that before we began this debate today, and after
this debate will end this evening, and 5 months ago, and 5 months from
now, the dominant condition affecting the lives of the people who live
in Haiti is gripping, wrenching poverty. This debate will not change
that. American troops will not change that.
I went to an area in Haiti with my late friend, Congressman Mickey
Leland, on a hunger trip. We viewed a project that the U.S. Agency for
International Development was sponsoring. Briefly, it was a project
dealing with hogs. It came about because Haitians had had to kill all
the hogs in Haiti because of disease. All the hogs in Haiti had been
eradicated.
So the Agency for International Development was reintroducing hogs in
Haiti, and they had a hog project. And they would bring together little
groups of about 15 to 20 families, who collectively would receive a sow
and own it. Their responsibility was to feed it, and then they would
take it walking over the island to where they could get this sow bred,
and they would continue to feed the sow, and the sow would have
piglets.
The promise was that if you and other people like you, a number of
families, get together, and you take this sow that we will give you, if
you get the sow bred and feed it, you will have a dozen other pigs, and
you will increase the stock of wealth for food, for sustenance, for the
future. USAID showed us this project, and they were very proud of it.
They showed us a Haitian who had this pig. After we saw this pig, a
woman took me aside, and she said to me, ``You know, they want us to
feed this pig because they tell us that if we do that we will get more
piglets. We will all be better. But I cannot feed my children.'' With
tears in her eyes, she said: ``I do not have food for my children. But
to be better off in the future, I should feed this pig now.''
This was a wonderful project, but it demonstrated the gripping
problem of Haiti. You will find people, with tears in their eyes, who
cannot get food to eat, who cannot get medical treatment for their
children. Congressman Leland and I went to some of the few neonatal
clinics in Haiti. We held in our arms children who were dying.
Now, I represent a part of the country that produces more food than
we need. Yet if I get on a plane today, I can fly to Haiti as quickly
as I can fly to Bismarck, ND, in my State. When we talk about Haiti, we
are talking about a neighbor.
I hope the debate here today is not whether we care about a neighbor,
whether we care about Haiti. The debate is about the use of military
force and vital security interests. I understand all of that.
As I said before, I think the introduction of troops in Haiti is not
going to change a bit the dominant feature of Haitian life, which is
that people are desperately poor. They will be desperately poor unless
we decide that that condition of human poverty in our neighborhood can
be remedied. We can do a much, much better job, all of us, through the
multilateral agencies, the World Bank, and the IMF, and the Agriculture
Department, and other means, to try to improve the human condition in
Haiti. The Haitian people are neighbors of ours.
People say let us deal with things here at home first. Yes, I agree
with all of that. But we cannot stand here and say it does not matter
to us that in our hemisphere close to our borders live people in some
of the most gripping, wrenching poverty anywhere in the world.
We can change that. The interesting thing in Haiti, as my friend from
Connecticut will know, is when you fly into Haiti, you see an island
that looks from the air to be about half brown and half green. The
green part of the island is the Dominican Republic and the brown part
is Haiti. In Haiti, they cut down much of the vegetation for fuel.
You wonder to yourself: if you were in charge of Haiti, how on Earth
could you get out of this? How can you deal with these problems on your
own? These problems require America's attention. Our military force,
no, not in my judgment, but our attention, yes.
We need to understand that when our forces leave, there will still be
ways to help people in our neighborhood who very much need our help.
Does anyone here understand what kind of courage it must take for a
group of people, including children, to get in a small boat, which may
not be seaworthy, and put out to sea and try to sail to America? I know
many people consider the Haitian boat people a nuisance. They do pose a
problem for our country, but they are in many, many cases very brave
people risking their lives to try to better their condition.
The best way to improve the lives of Haitians is for us to find ways
to help Haiti, not with military force, but in other ways.
I would say to my colleagues that all of this relates to hunger.
Hunger in the world creates instability.
My friend, the late Harry Chapin, the wonderful singer, used to say
if you could solve the hunger problems of the world you would correct
most of the problems that now require military action.
Hunger creates instability. It is in our own enlightened self-
interest to tackle this problem.
When I began, I noted that it is a paradox that we are the bread
basket of the world, and we produce all of this wonderful food, yet we
have in our neighborhood people dying, people in Haiti with children
who do not have enough to eat. In Cite Soleil, near the Port-au-Prince
airport, a slum of 250,000 people, children were playing in garbage
dumps, in open sewers. Haiti has some of the worst poverty you see
anywhere around the globe.
We talk about national security interests and the use of force. There
is not much debate about that because most of us feel we ought to
withdraw the troops very quickly. Those who say that we have a national
security interest in Haiti have a pretty thin case. But it is not a
thin case to suggest that we, all of us, have a responsibility to look
out for our neighborhood, to help people who desperately need it, and
to decide there are some things we can do through the aid agencies that
exist.
I would make one other observation. We have enacted an embargo around
Haiti, an embargo that now has been lifted. Embargoes, by and large,
strangle the poorest people in the countries where embargoes have been
imposed. And that is certainly true in Haiti.
But let me tell my colleagues what just happened this morning. A
missionary friend of mine, who is now in Haiti, called to tell me there
are a million and a half pounds of desperately needed food and medicine
in a ship sitting at the pier in Port-au-Prince. The missionaries
cannot get it off loaded for various reasons. So I spent some time on
the phone trying to figure out how to get that million and a half
pounds of food and medicine off the ship that is now at the pier.
This is the sort of thing that we must speed up if we are to help the
human condition in Haiti.
I am not a foreign policy expert. The foreign policy experts here
will discuss a lot of higher sounding things. But in the final
analysis, the question for the people of Haiti is what will their life
be like tomorrow or the next day? What will life be like, for
themselves and those they love?
The answer to that question will largely be determined by whether the
Haitian people have enough to eat, and whether the hospitals and
clinics in Haiti are able to treat those who are sick.
We, and others in the world in our situation, can and should help the
Haitian people out of this terrible, terrible predicament in which they
find themselves.
Let me thank the Senator from West Virginia for the patience and
courtesy he has extended to me.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Under the most recently adopted unanimous-consent agreement, the
President pro tempore is recognized, and under the previous order the
President pro tempore controls up to 1 hour.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Chair.
I understand that Mr. Gorton wishes to speak for 5 minutes and Mr.
DeConcini wishes to speak for 7 minutes.
I ask unanimous consent that my rights to the floor may be protected
while I yield a total of 12 minutes, not against my time, but I yield
12 minutes of our time so that those two Senators may be recognized and
they will get time from my own side appropriately and then I may then
be recognized again.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Gregg.
Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Washington.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the resolution before us is a fairly good
response to a terrible solution. The majority leadership prohibited
this body from taking effective action before the occupation of Haiti,
almost certainly because that kind of occupation would have been
repudiated by the vast majority of the Members here. Today, however, we
are faced with a profoundly different set of challenges. We are faced
with an occupation in being.
Domestic discord under circumstances like this will almost inevitably
damage the morale of our armed services in Haiti, perhaps eventually
our effectiveness, and may itself result in American casualties. It
should, therefore, be avoided.
I have expressed my strong objections to our mission in Haiti on a
number of occasions, but those objections in no way reflect upon my
admiration for the troops we have there today. They have done a
remarkable job, and they certainly have my full support and I believe
that of all of the Members of this body.
Since the President plans to keep them there until at least March,
however, I believe it most appropriate that we now turn our attention
to returning those troops safely and as promptly as possible.
The first part of any such effort is implicit in the resolution
before us now. While many Senators, including this one, want to see the
troops brought home as soon as possible, our senior military commanders
warn that a mandated, date certain withdrawal might well jeopardize
soldier, sailor and marine lives. I defer, therefore, and am willing to
let the military determine the manner and the date on which the troops
can best be removed.
I also consider it important that we help the administration clarify
its goals. The objective that it has offered--the creation of an
environment in which democracy can be restored--is at least a moving
target. It is highly questionable that there has ever been a democracy
in Haiti which could be restored.
First, our military had originally considered the de facto military
forces in place to be their greatest obstacle, but it is now the pro-
Aristide forces hungry for quick justice that occupied attention. In a
similar vein, our military has been forced to relinquish its plan to
work with the Haitian military and has intensified the search for guns
by buy-back or confiscation. Each of these policy shifts could possibly
endanger American lives, and may still do so. If we can clarify our
overall goals, therefore, and what is required of our armed services
precisely, we can minimize the danger to our troops.
Finally, even when we do clarify these goals, it may very well be
left to this body to decide whether we can ever reach the apparent
goals that this administration has laid out for our military.
Some 75 percent of Haiti's population is unemployed and a third
relies on aid for food and health care. After 200 years of despotic
government, featuring coups, assassinations, and corruption, there is
little civil society to rebuild in Haiti. Congress may need to
intervene, as it did with Somalia, to prevent our soldiers from
pursuing a mission that can only be achieved at unacceptable cost, if,
indeed, it can be achieved at all. Bayonets are not generally a good
foundation for a new democracy.
Since these three issues cannot be effectively addressed as most of
the Senate would have hoped--through a debate over a Presidential
request for congressional authorization--we are left to do what we can
now that the occupation is in place. On the whole, I consider the
resolution we have before us helpful: It will demonstrate this body's
support for the troops, express our disappointment with the
administration for not seeking congressional authorization, and demand
that the administration clarify its goals in Haiti. I certainly will
vote in its favor. But, as this occupation continues into its third
week, I stress to this administration that we have placed our troops in
danger in order to pursue a probably unattainable goal, one not in the
vital interests of the United States, and that if our troops linger too
long in Haiti it will be difficult to sustain bipartisan support for
their presence there. Clear goals and a prompt removal are very, very
much in order.
I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for yielding.
Mr. DeCONCINI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Arizona, Senator DeConcini, is recognized for up to 7 minutes, with
time chargeable to the majority leader or his designee.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I believe I have time under the
unanimous consent agreement for up to 15 minutes. I suggest the time be
charged against that time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 7 minutes that the Senator has requested
will be chargeable to the Senator. And the Senator is recognized under
the order in his own right.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Chair and I thank the distinguished
President pro tempore for this time.
Mr. President, I have listened to some of the debate here. I am
pleased to see that there is going to be, I believe, unanimous support
for the resolution before us concerning Haiti.
What disturbs me, Mr. President, is the tremendous amount of rhetoric
and I think politicking that has gone on here directed towards
President Clinton and his policy in Haiti.
Mr. President, I do not need to remind anybody that President Clinton
is our Commander in Chief and deserves the support of this body and the
support of the American people.
We cannot both stand up and praise our troops and then run down the
President of the United States for his policy in Haiti. That only
serves to undermine our troops. Our men and women serving in Haiti
deserve our strongest praise and support. That they have performed
their mission with tremendous professionalism is reflected in the great
warmth with which they have been received by the Haitian people.
The mission in Haiti, by any assessment, has been highly successful.
It is clear that the criticism is purely and simply a political attack
against this President. Despite all evidence of the success of the
mission, opponents continue to exploit the issue for the November
elections.
I support this resolution. It is very reasonable and does not set a
time certain, but expresses the concern of all of us, No. 1, that
Congress should be involved; No. 2, that we should get out as soon as
we can; and, No. 3, as I read it, that the policy of the Clinton
administration is succeeding. It is an important issue that merits the
reasonable discussion that we are having today. But, Mr. President, I
believe we jeopardize our mission and our approximately 20,000 troops
that are in Haiti if we let this continue to be a politicized.
I understand what the Democratic leadership had to agree to in order
to ensure that no date certain for the withdrawal of our troops was
included in this resolution. However, I must point out that the
Republicans would never have tolerated this type of micromanaging
resolution with a Republican in the White House. And I have been here
long enough to experience exactly what I just said.
The distinguished Republican leader, Senator Dole, when he was
speaking of the failed coup attempt against Noriega, said:
A good part of what went wrong did not happen last weekend.
It started happening many years ago when Congress first
decided to start telling the President how he ought to manage
a crisis.
Yet, many of our colleagues continue to tell this President how he
ought to manage this situation, as if they were President. Well, some
of them will run for President. Let them then make those decisions.
It is President Clinton's leadership which allowed our troops to go
into Haiti, not as an invasion force but peacefully. It is President
Clinton who has begun to achieve what was sought by the Bush
administration--the restoration of a legitimately elected President of
Haiti and the building of democratic institutions in that country.
It was President Bush who said, in September of 1991, after the coup
in Haiti:
This constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United
States.
After 3 years of negotiations and other peaceful attempts to get
General Cedras and the other leaders of the coup to step aside,
President Clinton made a decision that it was time to bring an end to
the terror and impoverishment that the military in Haiti were
perpetrating against the Haitian people.
He was prepared to send in troops to restore democracy, a policy
articulated by President Bush and then Secretary Baker.
The coup by Cedras and Co. snuffed out overnight the democracy that
the Haitian people were beginning to build for the first time, in their
history. Efforts to peacefully restore the democratically elected
Government of Haiti were met with lies, broken promises, and arrogant
disregard by Cedras and his groups.
During the debate in this Chamber before our troops went into Haiti,
many Republicans claimed that the President was motivated by a desire
to bolster his numbers in the polls. That, of course, did not happen.
So the continued harping on this policy is surely, in part, motivated
by a desire to affect the November election this year.
The 180-degree turn made by those Republicans attempting to tie the
hands of a Democratic President, after they argued that two previous
Republican occupants of the White House should remain unfettered, is
astounding.
Where were these Republicans during the Panama, Grenada, and Persian
Gulf operations? If Senator Dole's comments during those debates are
any indication, they were arguing that the Democrats should not
interfere in the President's foreign policy.
During that debate, the distinguished minority leader said:
I think my own view is the President of the United States
has to make the final decision.
Continuing with the quotation:
. . . the primary thing is not pleasing all Members of
Congress, it's protecting American lives in that area and
restoring democracy. You can't please every Member of
Congress, whatever you do, though I think in this case it
should be almost unanimous.
While I think it is appropriate to debate the issue of congressional
participation on such issues, it should not be made a political issue,
once a decision has been made, as a decision has been made here.
After the debate and the vote in the Persian Gulf, every Senator
voted--I believe every Senator, except maybe one--to support the
President completely, as we did during the Grenada and Panama
invasions. And that is the proper role of this body and that is what we
ought to do now.
Mr. President, the President's policy in Haiti deserves praise, not
politically motivated criticism. The military thugs who forced the
democratically elected government from power are no longer terrorizing
Haitian citizens, and great progress has been made toward restoring
civil order, building the foundations for democracy, and monitoring and
training the Haitian police.
While I want our troops to come home as soon as possible, a fixed
date for their return, in my view, would be unsound. It is the generals
who need to be consulted and the President who has to make the final
decision.
I thank, again, the distinguished President pro tempore for
permitting the 7 minutes that he so graciously did, as he always does,
in giving time to Senators and putting their preferences before his
own.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Under the
previous order, the President pro tempore is recognized for up to 1
hour.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I cannot
support the joint resolution offered by the majority leader and the
minority leader.
Mr. President, some 20,000 American troops are now deployed in Haiti.
This formidable force is intended to maintain order during the
transition of power and return of the democratically elected Government
of Haiti. According to current plans, lesser numbers of United States
troops, perhaps 2,000 to 3,000, will remain in Haiti after the
peacekeeping mission shifts to a U.N.-run operation. And the United
Nations mission will remain in Haiti until the next democratically
elected President of Haiti is inaugurated in February 1996. So, the
President and the administration have committed the United States to a
substantial and long-term operation. This commitment is not risk-free,
either, as the events of Saturday, September 25, proved, when one
American soldier was wounded and 10 Haitians were killed, or on Sunday,
October 3, when a United States soldier was wounded in a deliberate
attack.
Creating a stable environment in Haiti that allows for the return of
the migrants now housed at Guantanamo, Cuba, and which allows Haitians
to live in peace in Haiti, is a result that they, and we, should hope
for. But, inevitably, there are costs involved. The military costs of
intervening in Haiti are estimated at about $120 million for the
remainder of fiscal year 1994 and about $300 million in fiscal year
1995, according to the Department of Defense. U.S. reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 1995 will total some $200
million, according to preliminary figures provided by the Office of
Management and Budget. Some estimates of the combined cost of United
States actions in Haiti from different think tanks have ranged as high
as $1.5 billion through 1996--that is billion spelled with a ``b''--
including costs already incurred for sanctions enforcement and
migration-related costs.
These are substantial sums, and are yet another reason why the
Congress should be actively involved in these decisions. Thus, this
commitment in Haiti raises important questions, not only about our
actions toward that nation, but also about the way this body and the
executive branch make decisions on matters of war, peace, intervention,
foreign policy, and coalition-building.
In my view, regarding the matter of Haiti, prior to the military
action ordered by the President on Sunday, September 18, there were far
too many mixed signals, far too much overblown rhetoric, and far too
many threats to take military action without the full force of
congressional and public support behind them. And then in the end, with
an invasion that was launched on a Sunday and pulled back, the Congress
was faced with a fait accompli, an invasion ordered to begin at
midnight on a Sunday night, when Congress was not in session, before
expected congressional action early in the following week. While last
minute negotiations fortunately altered the invasion and transformed
it into an agreed-to, and relatively trouble-free, occupation, the fact
remains that U.S. troops were committed to an action in a sovereign
nation without the authorization of Congress.
But for those last minute negotiations there would have been an
invasion.
I now read from a letter written by Abraham Lincoln on February 15,
1848, addressed to a friend, William H. Herendon. The letter is to be
found in the collected works of Abraham Lincoln.
* * * Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and
you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems
it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war
at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his
power in this respect, after having given him so much as you
propose. If today he should choose to say he thinks it
necessary to invade Canada to prevent the British from
invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, ``I
see no probability of the British invading us''; but he will
say to you. ``Be silent: I see it, if you don't.''
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to
Congress was dictated, as I understand it--this is what Lincoln is
saying to his friend--by the following reasons: Kings had always been
involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally,
if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our
convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly
oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one
man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.
The invasion of Haiti was launched when Congress was not in session,
near the close of the fiscal year, near the close of the session of
Congress.
My problem with this pending resolution is not that I disagree with
its provisions. In fact, I agree with them. I certainly agree that the
President should have sought and welcomed congressional approval before
deploying United States Armed Forces into Haiti. I believe, of course,
that it is unlikely that such authorization would have been given by
the Congress.
And what would that tell you? That would say that the American people
were not behind such an invasion. This is the ``people's branch'' and
the administration well knew that the people's branch would not give it
authorization, would not authorize an invasion because the people's
branch accurately represented the opposition of the people to such an
invasion.
The President, having chosen to deploy forces without such
authorization, is in the difficult position of having not secured
congressional support for the commitment he has undertaken for the
Nation. I believe this is politically unwise for any President, because
if unexpected calamities occur, such as happened in Somalia last year
and in Beirut a decade ago, then the commitment of forces can become
politically untenable overnight, forcing an embarrassing withdrawal.
I also agree that our forces should be withdrawn from Haiti in a
``prompt and orderly'' manner. In fact, I voted for an earlier
resolution offered by the two leaders on this matter, with identical
language, on September 21, 1994. Further, I believe the resolution
before us contains very useful reporting requirements as regards costs,
the planned follow-on U.N. operation, security, duration, and other
matters. But resolutions such as this one, and the one on September 21,
are not binding, and they do not substitute for the constitutional role
that the Congress has with regard to matters of war.
In fact, there is much in the pending resolution that I agree with.
My concern is that it does not go far enough. The resolution does not
include the setting of specific parameters on the duration and scope of
this operation, which was done in the cases of both Somalia and Rwanda,
and done in both instances at my urging and on my amendments. I believe
that we should stand and take the responsibility to fund this
operation, if we support it, and for a specific timeframe. Afterward
the operation would transition to the United Nations, or end entirely,
or be extended if the President requested such an extension and
appropriate funding, and Congress approved the request and the funds. I
believe that is the way to discharge our responsibilities and our
constitutional role, and it would serve as a mechanism for the
President to develop what support he can for his policy.
The President sought the United Nations' support, but not the
Congress' support, not the elected representatives of the American
people. Go to the United Nations, yes; get their OK, get their
approval, get their blessing. But do not ask the Congress for its
approval or for the funds. That was the course that was followed.
Madison wanted the power of the Commander in Chief to be kept
separate from the power to take a nation to war. In ``The Writings of
James Madison,'' volume VI, page 148, Madison states as follows:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of
things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be
commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the
latter functions by a great principle in free government,
analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse,
or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.
Jefferson praised the transfer of war power, as we find in ``The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson,'' volume V, page 123:
We have already given an example, one effectual check to
the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose
from the executive to the legislative body, from those who
are to spend to those who are to pay.
Section 2 of article II of the U.S. Constitution--Mr. President, we
ought to read that document once in a while. Alexander the Great, who
was a friend of Aristotle and a student of Aristotle, admired most, of
all literature, the ``Iliad,'' written by Homer. Alexander asked
Aristotle to correct a copy of the ``Iliad'' for him. Plutarch tells us
that Alexander the Great slept always with his dagger and a copy of
Aristotle's corrected version under his pillow--under Alexander's
pillow.
Mr. President, I do not sleep with a copy of the Constitution under
my pillow, nor do I sleep with a copy of the ``Iliad'' under my pillow,
but I always keep a copy of the Constitution near, if not in my
pocket--and it is not always there--but nearby, along with the Bible
and a copy of ``Plutarch's Lives.'' I try to retire to that
Constitution, as I do to the Bible, and other books, from time to time,
and each time I find something in them I did not find before.
Section 2 of article II of the U.S. Constitution I am well acquainted
with. It is not something I discovered yesterday or the day before.
Here is what it says:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States, when called into the actual service of the United
States * * *
But the actual calling of the militia into service is done by the
Congress, not by the President. As we note in paragraph 15 of section 8
of article 1, the Congress shall have the power ``to provide for
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions; * * *.''
We are accustomed to the now familiar pattern of most recent chief
executives; namely, that of invoking the title ``Commander in Chief''
and descriptions of him as being the sole organ of foreign relations or
chief of administration, to suggest a conclusion of constitutional
invulnerability. No statutory or court decision of authority is ever
volunteered in support of the conclusion. At its heart, this issue is a
separation of powers issue.
Then, at the heels of any introduction of forces, comes the cry not
to legislate any timeframe or other criteria governing the scope or
duration of the operation, or invasion, on the claim that we have to
``support our troops on the ground.'' ``Don't jerk the rug out from
under our troops; we have to support them.'' So the administration gets
them in on a Sunday and then they are in. We heard that for nearly a
decade in Vietnam, some of my colleagues will recall. It is as if the
introduction of forces somehow somehow, somehow, suspends the operation
of our constitutional distribution of powers.
The Constitution divides governmental powers into three areas;
legislative, executive, and judicial. And distributes these powers
among three co-equal branches: Congress, the President, and the Courts;
and it provides a system of checks and balances to keep the powers
separate and the branches equal. Underlying this scheme of government
in the area of immediate concern is the desire to establish
interdependence between Congress and the Executive in hopes of
fostering cooperation and consensus in the supersensitive areas of
national security and foreign affairs. As Commander in Chief, and the
chief spokesman in the field of foreign relations, the President has
independent powers, not simply those conferred on him by statutes. But,
at the same time, by virtue of its power over the purse and its powers
to raise and support armies, and its powers to provide and maintain a
navy, and its power to regulate both, Congress has broad constitutional
powers implicating both national security and foreign affairs.
The separation of powers principle is not intended to benefit me, or
this branch in particular, or any other Members who temporarily hold
this high office. It is meant to protect individual liberty--the
individual liberty of the people who come here and visit in the
galleries, who walk the streets and toil in the mines, and who sweat in
the fields of this country.
The purpose of the separation of powers and checks and balances is to
protect the individual liberty of every man, woman, and child in this
great country. That is why the Framers separated those powers. That is
why the Framers wrote into that great document the checks and balances,
the main balance wheel of which is the power over the purse.
The separation of powers principle is intended to prevent one branch
of government from enhancing its position at the expense of another
branch and, thus, disturb the delicate balance of powers that the
Framers assumed as the best safeguard against autocracy. The President
certainly has command of the army and navy and the militia, and he may
respond to an attack upon the United States or deal with a sudden and
unexpected emergency without any previous authorization by the
Congress. He has that inherent power to act in a sudden, unexpected
emergency to protect this country against an invasion. There is also
authority for the proposition that he has inherent power to act to
safeguard American lives and property abroad. It should be noted,
however, that Congress is under no legal obligation, Congress is under
no constitutional obligation, to fund any foreign or military policy
advocated by this President, the last President, or any President of
the United States, and the President is totally dependent upon Congress
for authority or money, and usually both, to implement any policy.
Congress is under no legal obligation or constitutional obligation to
supply either or both. While Congress cannot deprive the President of
command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him with an
army, or a navy, or a militia, to command.
The Constitution in article I, section 1, states, ``all legislative
powers''--not just a few, not just some, not many, not most but all,
all legislative powers--``herein granted''--here--``shall be vested''--
not may be vested, shall be vested--``in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.''
Now, I know around here in many instances it depends on whose kettle
is calling the pot black, and we will rise in indignation if it is the
President of the other party doing something but few will rise in
indignation and support this Constitution when it is a President of
one's own party. It is a great tendency to point the finger, stand on
the sideline and be the first to criticize if something goes wrong. Why
not read the Constitution. We take an oath to support and to defend it,
to live by that Constitution. The Constitution is always there. It does
not sleep. It does not rest. It does not take recess. And it is for me,
it is for our President, whether he is a Republican or Democrat, and it
is for this Congress now, yesterday, and forever to abide by.
The Constitution in section 9, article I, paragraph 7 states, ``No
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by law.'' This provision is a restriction upon the
disbursing authority of the executive branch, and it means that no
money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated
by an act of Congress. Accordingly, the absolute control of the moneys
of the United States is in Congress--that is what this Constitution
says--and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power
only to the American people--not to any political party, but to the
American people; not to any President, not to any general but to the
American people; not to any newspaper but to the American people.
The power to make appropriations includes the authority not only to
designate the purposes of the appropriations, but also the terms and
conditions under which the executive department of the Government may
expend appropriations. The terms and conditions under which
appropriations are made are solely in the hands of Congress, with the
President allowed one thing--the right to veto a bill in its entirety--
and it is the plain duty of the executive branch of the Government to
comply with those terms and conditions set forth by the Congress. The
power of the purse provides the most effective basis for ensuring
compliance by the executive branch.
Now we have before us another nonbinding measure in the form of a
joint resolution offered by the majority leader and the minority
leader. This language in this resolution neither defines the mission of
the United States operation in Haiti nor places any limits on how long
it may last, nor how may troops might be committed, nor how much money
might be spent.
The administration has stated that United States forces should help
stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that orderly progress can
be made in transferring the functions of government to the
democratically elected Government of Haiti. This joint resolution does
not help to keep the mission limited to this reasonable goal. It simply
requires the President to prepare and submit to the Congress within 7
days a statement on the administrative policy on Haiti, the military
mission, and on the general rules of engagement. Any changes to the
policy, the military mission, or to the rules of engagement are to be
reported to the Congress within 48 hours. And so, if the Congress were
to disapprove of the policy, or to any changes in the policy, mission,
or rules of engagement, additional extraordinary effort would be
necessary to register disapproval or to legislatively limit the
administration after the fact.
The administration's stated goal is a reasonable one, given the
situation in Haiti, but I believe that unless it is linked to a
definite termination point, and a funding cutoff, this mission could
keep United States troops in Haiti for a very long time, as they were
earlier so engaged for 19 years in this century, trying to stabilize
the situation. There is nothing in this joint resolution to stop the
administration from leaving U.S. troops there indefinitely. I do not
believe that the President intends to mire the United States in an
indefinite nation-building exercise--in fact, I am sure he does not--
nor am I saying that the democratically elected Haitian Government
cannot smoothly take over the functions of government and maintain
order. Indeed, I pray that they can, but we cannot predict what
problems might arise. Karl von Clauswitz astutely observed in 1832
that, ``War is the province of uncertainty; three-fourths of the things
on which action in war is based lie hidden in the fog of a greater or
lesser degree of certainty.'' If the mission that has been outlined by
the President cannot be accomplished within a reasonable amount of
time, then I think the Congress, the administration, and the American
people ought seriously to consider the long-term prospects for success
in this operation.
Linking a defined mission to a definite end, enforced by a funding
cutoff, can be a positive tool. As we have learned from previous United
States military missions abroad, most recently in Somalia and Rwanda,
it prevents mission creep, the gradual expansion of a mission from one
of limited and well defined tasks to one that gradually expands to all-
inclusive and long-term nation-building. Having committed the prestige
of the United States to this mission in Haiti, it becomes all too easy
to keep gradually expanding our mission there in an attempt to
guarantee the long-term success of the operation. I believe that it
would be useful for the administration, and for the Congress, to
exercise the tool of restraint in regard to the Haiti operation.
We must take care to prevent the United States military mission in
Haiti from expanding into nation-building. Defining, and thereby
limiting, the mission and duration of the operation effectively
prevents mission creep. Our mission is not democracy-building. We heard
all this talk in the beginning about restoring democracy. We are not
restoring democracy. One cannot restore that which does not already
exist.
Our mission is not democracy building.
I hope the people of Haiti can build a strong, sound democracy. The
early success of the operation in Haiti bodes well for this difficult
effort. But it is not a job for the U.S. military, and not the job of
the Department of Defense.
This joint resolution before us also requires monthly reports on the
progress being made toward a transition to the U.N. mission in Haiti. I
agree with this goal of a speedy transition to the United Nations. But
without the possibility of a firm date for the U.S. mission to end,
what incentive is there for the United Nations to take over? The
mission in Haiti now is paid for exclusively by the nations
participating in the operation, which means that the United States is
paying nearly all of the costs. When the United Nations assumes its
role in Haiti, if it ever does, the United Nations must not only find
the troops for the mission, but it must find the funds. The United
States pays just over 30 percent of the prospective U.N. operation in
Haiti. So what incentive is there for the United Nations to move
quickly to take over in Haiti? If they can stall long enough, the
United States could remain in Haiti, almost alone, until the
inauguration of the next President of Haiti, in February 1996. That is
the target day for the end of the U.N. mission in Haiti. Anything less
than a fixed date for a United States withdrawal risks keeping far
larger numbers of United States troops in Haiti than would otherwise be
the case.
The lack of any definitive date for an end to the United States
operation in Haiti puts our troops there at greater, not lesser, risk.
I know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary
of Defense, among others, have argued that setting a fixed date for the
end of the U.S. mission ``puts our troops on the ground at risk.''
Well, a fixed date for withdrawal did not have that effect in Somalia,
and it did not have that effect in Rwanda. I do not believe it will in
this case, either. In fact, the lack of a foreseeable end to what
virtually amounts to a United States occupation of Haiti may actually
put our troops at greater risk. Elements in Haiti that want to see us
pull out in a panic know that all they have to do is to stage a bloody
and vicious attack on our troops, as happened in Somalia. That would
change the mood on this floor pretty dramatically, and there would be
lots of support for an amendment to withdraw immediately. Although
there seems to be little support for such a measure now, I believe that
it would be much better to act reasonably and calmly to establish
limits now, rather than to wait for panic later.
In addition to ``putting our troops on the ground at risk,''
opponents of a date certain for a U.S. withdrawal argue that setting a
date hurts the morale of the troops.
Of all of the laughable excuses that I have seen trotted out by the
administration in support of the action that has been taken, it is this
one. Setting a date might hurt the morale of the troops. That is
nonsense.
I have difficulty understanding how active duty troops sitting in the
hot sun in Haiti, far from their families, or reservists called away
from their families and from their jobs, could fault their elected
representatives for demonstrating concern about keeping their mission
limited in scope and concern about bringing them home as quickly as
possible. I do not think they want to be in Haiti forever, any more
than I think the people of Haiti want United States forces in Haiti
forever. I think the families of American troops in Haiti also want to
know that the Congress is keeping a watchful guard on their loved ones,
as well as on their tax dollars.
Mr. President, we have heard a lot of concern expressed here for the
threats to military readiness, and how all these peacekeeping missions
are eating into the military's operations and maintenance accounts, and
into military training accounts and the like. On many occasions,
Senators from both sides of the aisle have come to the floor to warn
against anything that would threaten our readiness or let the military
slip back into a ``hollow force.'' In the fiscal year that just ended,
the need to divert funds from training, operations, and maintenance
accounts to cover the incremental costs of unbudgeted peacekeeping,
humanitarian, and other crisis operations left many military units too
short of funding to continue training, keep up flying hours, or to
maintain their equipment. Secretary of Defense Perry was forced to
invoke the venerable Feed and Forage Act. That act, dating back to
1820, allows the Department of Defense to incur funding deficiencies to
continue basic support for the military.
The Senate Appropriations Committee has tried to assist the
Department of Defense in dealing with these funding shortfalls by
including supplemental funding in the foreign operations and defense
appropriations bills to replace funds expended for the incremental
costs of operations in Rwanda, Cuba, and Korea. Yet, here we are, in
this resolution, accepting an open-ended military operation over which
the Congress exerts no control, where the Congress accepts a commitment
of troops for an indefinite period--and that is why I will not vote for
this resolution--and where the administration--given so much
flexibility in terms of mission and duration--is merely directed to
report on its plan for ``financing the costs of the operation and the
impact on readiness without supplemental funding.'' Let me repeat that:
``without supplemental funding.'' In an era of sharply declining
budgets, it seems highly unlikely that this administration--or any
administration--can pay for the incremental costs of a substantial
military operation without either supplemental funding or more cuts in
training, operations and maintenance, or R&D and procurement programs.
This is true for other Government agencies and departments as well.
Without supplemental funding for new initiatives in Haiti, for
reconstruction and development aid that will keep Haiti on the path
toward long-term stability and dissuade ``economic refugees'' from
again seeking United States shores, other priority programs will
suffer. Without supplemental funding for the Department of State, the
Department of Justice, or the Agency for International Development,
important counterproliferation and counternarcotics programs, and aid
to Russia and the former Soviet States, might all suffer.
If we are serious in this body about our constitutional prerogatives
and our responsibilities, we have got to exert our authority and
fulfill those responsibilities. We cannot hide behind what are
virtually toothless, hortatory resolutions and claim that we have,
thereby, lived up to our constitutional duties. A failure to do so
merely opens the door for the ``mission creep'' we all claim that we so
worry about, particularly in missions of this type which are
nontraditional and which call upon our fighting men to perform tasks to
which they are unaccustomed.
Destroy their morale? Impair their morale? Well, I will laugh all the
way home. I would not want one of my grandsons or granddaughters in
Haiti this afternoon. I do not think it would destroy or hurt their
morale to have a cutoff date, or a cutoff of funds. Let me say
parenthetically that I would not support cutoff dates, or a cutoff of
funds if our military forces were engaged in any military conflict that
involved the security interests of this country--never. I would not be
a party to drawing the line and cutting off funds where the security
interests of this country were engaged. But the security interests of
this Nation are not involved in Haiti. Haiti is not a threat to the
security of this country. There is no sudden unanticipated emergency
requiring the use of troops, without the approval of Congress.
I have no doubt that President Clinton fully intends to try to remove
our troops in a timely fashion, but there is always the tendency to
want to stay just a little longer in missions such as this, as we
stayed too long in Somalia.
Once our troops are in a country, then you can be sure that this
administration, or any administration--I have been here through several
administrations and they are all alike in that respect--will find some
reason, some excuse to go further, or some excuse as to why Congress
should not act. Well, do not jerk the rug out from under our President,
they say. Do not jerk the rug out from under our troops. Do not do
anything to hurt the morale of our troops. Do not do anything to put
them at great risk.
I believe a time certain for withdrawal would be a constructive act
by this body, and one which would reassure the mothers and fathers of
our service men and women about the length of time we will ask their
children to remain in harm's way.
We in the Senate often like to have it both ways on matters
pertaining to war and foreign policy. Not too many days ago dozens of
Senators took to this floor to excoriate the administration on the
proposal to commit troops to Haiti. The rhetoric was hot--oh, sweet
rhetoric--hot, heavy, and angry, and the warnings of doom reverberated
throughout the rafters of this Chamber. Now, only weeks later, because
no lives have yet been lost in combat, the heat of the moment has
become the warm glow of complacency about this matter. How magically
the passion cools here. How quickly things change.
But constitutional responsibilities do not change, and our duty to
act in the people's best interests never alters. And the words of
Members in this Senate must confuse and confound when we excoriate on
one day and shrug shoulders on the next.
That, in my view, is what this resolution amounts to, in terms of any
real assertion of the constitutional role of the Congress--a shrug of
the shoulders.
I would find little comfort in reports and mission definitions if one
of my fine grandsons or granddaughters were in Haiti today. This
resolution--this piece of paper would bring me little comfort--little
comfort. No wonder the American people are disgusted with the men and
women who run away from their constitutional duties. Reports are
useful, but they are no guarantee of a speedy return home for our young
men and women like an end date certain, backed up by a cutoff of funds,
enforced by a vote in this body.
The President can always come back, state his case, make a good
justification for our extending the date, ask for more funds, and if a
good case has been made, Congress can vote to provide the moneys,
undoubtedly.
I believe that the setting of such a date is our solemn
responsibility. I believe that the setting of such a date is a
constructive act which would help focus and tighten the scope of the
mission.
I believe that the setting of such a date will help the United
Nations to get its act together and prepare to move into Haiti as
quickly as possible.
My amendment on Rwanda helped the military to focus and to complete
that mission ahead of schedule and with considerable savings in cost. I
believe that my amendment on Somalia ended a situation wherein the
original stated mission had not only crept beyond its boundaries but
galloped totally out of control. Both of those measures contained
certain end dates with a cutoff of funds on those dates.
To me our duty is clear. While I opposed a United States invasion of
Haiti, and so stated well in advance, I do not propose to hamstring our
troops in the field or the rest of the Department of Defense by
supporting language that could clearly undermine our readiness, and
that is what this language in this resolution can do--undermine our
readiness, because we continue to draw down funds that are needed by
our military forces to keep our military forces ready. Nor do I want to
support language that might cause other important foreign policy or
Justice Department initiatives to be robbed to pay for programs in
Haiti. I remain consistent in my belief that the Congress has a greater
role to play in this matter than the feeble one--the feeble one
outlined in this resolution.
Madam President, I yield whatever time remains to the two sides, and
I ask unanimous consent that it be divided equally among the two sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The 7 minutes will be equally divided.
The Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. GREGG. May I ask how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 22 minutes remaining.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from
South Carolina.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I wish to thank the able Senator for
his kindness.
Madam President, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this
resolution.
Many Members of the Senate worked hard, in a bipartisan manner, to
develop the resolution we are considering today. The resolution
contains all the elements I believe to be necessary.
The resolution commends the men and women of the Armed Forces who are
performing a difficult mission in an outstanding manner. Our young men
and women are once again demonstrating to the world that they can
accomplish the most complex missions and do them very well. Every day
we, and the world, see disciplined military personnel who understand
their jobs and perform those jobs under adverse circumstances. I am
proud of these young Americans. I know the American people are proud of
them too. I hope our friends and enemies around the world are also
watching. Both should be confident of America's capabilities.
Madam President, these magnificent young people of our military
forces deserve to know why they are there and what they are to
accomplish. The American people deserve this as well. That is why we
have asked the President to clearly define the national security
objectives and the military mission of our forces in Haiti. These
markers must be established for all to know. I am concerned that we are
already witnessing mission creep. We were told that only 15,500 U.S.
Forces would be necessary in Haiti. Today there are about 25,000 and
some Marines have been redeployed. We were told that U.S. Forces would
not become Haiti's police force. Yet we see American soldiers arresting
Haitians, patrolling streets and performing crowd control duties. We
were told U.S. Forces would not be an occupying force. We see our
military taking over radio stations and running electric power plants.
This sounds like an occupation to me.
Our troops also deserve to know they have the full backing of the
American people whenever they are committed to a difficult and
dangerous mission. This backing is most clearly manifest by a
congressional resolution prior to committing U.S. Forces to a
nonemergency situation. Such a resolution demonstrates the support and
resolve of the American people and helps to sustain the national
commitment if the situation becomes more difficult than anticipated.
The administration passed up the opportunity for such a resolution.
Today, we express the sense of the Congress that the President should
have sought congressional approval.
Madam President, we have not established a specific date for the
withdrawal of our forces. We do, however, express the sense of the
Congress that all U.S. Forces should be withdrawn from Haiti in a
prompt and orderly manner as soon as possible. This is an important
point. Our military commanders need the flexibility and latitude to
conduct their operations. Military commanders should be working toward
accomplishing their mission, not against an arbitrary time table. At
the same time, I think the resolution is very clear that we do not
intend to have U.S. Forces in Haiti for a protracted time. If there is
not significant progress toward withdrawal by the time Congress returns
in January, I am sure we would consider more stringent measures.
As I have said before here on the floor of the Senate, I urge the
President to work with the Organization of American States to develop a
plan for the humanitarian, economic, and political recovery in Haiti.
This resolution recognizes the lifting of the economic embargo and the
President's efforts to persuade the United Nations to lift their
sanctions. These are positive steps. I hope to see more positive
initiatives on the political and economic fronts from the United States
unilaterally and from our regional partners.
The resolution also requires detailed monthly reports as long as our
forces are in Haiti. The most important of these reports are the costs
and sources being used to fund the operation. The longer we are
involved in Haiti, the more scarce resources needed for military
readiness are consumed. Even if there is a supplemental appropriation
later next year, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units will have
missed critical training opportunities and readiness will have begun to
erode. Money alone cannot bring back the lost training or degraded
readiness.
In conclusion, Madam President, Joint Resolution 229 is a good
resolution which preserves the flexibility of the military commanders
and expresses, in a clear, concise manner, the sense of the Congress on
the withdrawal of U.S. Forces; the necessary departure of the de facto
government; and the orderly transition to the legitimate government of
Haiti. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. DODD. Madam President, we have no Senators over here at this
moment. We expect several to arrive momentarily.
In the meantime, if my colleague from New Hampshire does not object,
I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the
time be charged against both sides equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. EXON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EXON. Madam President, I ask the manager of the bill on this side
of the aisle to yield me 5 minutes.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I am happy to yield to my colleague from
Nebraska 5 minutes, or some additional time if he so needs it.
Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from the great State of Connecticut, and
I thank the Chair.
Madam President, I am going to be very brief on this because I think
probably most of the issues from almost every perspective have been
addressed already on this matter.
I wish to associate myself with the remarks just made by my great
friend and colleague from South Carolina. I think Senator Thurmond
summed up the whole situation very, very well.
I would also say that I think there has been a very good debate on
this matter. Many important things have been brought out. Certainly,
the very well put remarks by the President pro tempore, the senior
Senator from West Virginia, should be listened to and understood by
all.
I was very much impressed by the remarks made by Senator DeConcini,
the Senator from Arizona. I thought some excellent points were made
earlier in the debate, and I have been able to listen to most of it, by
the junior Senator from North Dakota.
I think that there has been some good input on the matter that
confronts us.
From the very beginning of this controversy, though, Madam President,
I would simply like to say that this Senator from the State of Nebraska
did not feel that troops should have been sent to Haiti in the first
instance, but that is by the boards. The Commander in Chief made that
decision. The Commander in Chief's decision may turn out to be right.
But we have an obligation to express our views on this matter.
I am particularly impressed by the fact that with all of the other
controversy and rancor that we have had in this body in the last few
days, and especially the last few weeks of this session, the majority
leader and the minority leader, with the assistance of many other
Senators, have come to what I think is the right and proper action in
the nonamendable joint resolution that is before us.
From the very beginning of some of the actions that have been
suggested on this matter, I was shocked and amazed of what I thought
was an inappropriate, ill-timed, ill-conceived resolution that came out
of the House of Representatives on this. And I hope that a little more
cautious look by the Members of the House of Representatives will see
the wisdom of the very laborious, the very detailed, joint resolution
that has been presented by the majority and the minority leaders.
Among anything else, it indicates to me that we can get together on
some things that are most important. I do not know of anything more
important than backing the troops that are there now, who are doing a
truly outstanding job. And I believe that this Senate previously, and
the people of the United States as a whole, while they do not always
agree with the actions that are taken, are fully committed to the great
men and women who are carrying on that action in Haiti today.
Let us pray, let us hope that they will be successful; that things
can be worked out. And if that happens without bloodshed, then I think
we can look back on this as, once again, the U.S. Senate doing its
proper action by bringing this matter up for debate.
The whole war powers situation confronts us time and time again. We
have never solved that to the satisfaction of this Senator. However, I
think it would be very unwise for us to do anything more than what we
are doing with this resolution.
By and large, I think that the leadership that we have seen from many
of our senior Members of this body, especially including the senior
Senator from South Carolina, who I think summed up my situation as
about as well could be summed up in the remarks that he made a few
minutes ago on the floor of the Senate. I congratulate Senator Thurmond
once again. It has been a pleasure to work with him over the years.
Here was a case where I think he was right on point.
I simply hope that we would overwhelmingly pass this bipartisan joint
measure that has been hammered out by the majority leader and the
minority leader and get on with other pressing business that we have to
face.
Once again, I thank the hard work of all that made it possible to
come to this bipartisan compromise. I hope it will receive resounding
support when we vote on it in about an hour in the Senate.
I thank my friend from Connecticut for yielding me this 5 minutes.
I yield back any remaining time.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
McCain be added as an original cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with
the time being charged against both sides.
Mr. EXON. Will the Senator withhold?
Mr. GREGG. Yes.
Mr. EXON. I would like to be allowed to continue for 1 more minute,
on the time of the of the Senator from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EXON. At the close of my statement, I had intended to give some
additional remarks, but I was afraid I was running out of time.
Therefore, I asked for an additional 1 minute.
Madam President, there has been no harder worker than Senator Chris
Dodd from Connecticut on this whole matter. He has gone down to Haiti.
Before he went down there and since he came back, his advice, his
counsel, his carrying the ball on this measure has been very impressive
to this Senator from Nebraska.
Among those that I wish to single out for special commendation and
for a job well done, it is my friend and colleague from Connecticut,
Senator Dodd.
I yield back any remaining time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from
Nebraska that he cannot technically put in a quorum call.
The Chair would ask the Senator from Connecticut if he wishes to do
so.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask
that the time be divided equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, how much time remains on this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 19 minutes left.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I want to begin by agreeing with several
things said by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Senator
Byrd. I guess it was inevitable in writing a sense-of-the-Senate
resolution related to Haiti that if we were going to get most Members
of this body to agree with it, if we were going to have bipartisanship,
it was ultimately going to be what the distinguished Senator from West
Virginia called it, and that is a toothless resolution.
I am in agreement with the Senator from West Virginia. I never
supported sending American troops into Haiti. I want to get them out as
quickly as possible, and I would like to set a time limit on their stay
in Haiti. I would like to say to the President that as of a certain
date, we want our troops out of Haiti.
There are those who argue that to set a time limit is to endanger
American lives and, based on that argument, though it is an argument I
do not agree with, I have withheld my support for an effort that would
set a deadline for withdrawing American troops. But in reality exactly
the opposite is true. I agree with the Senator from West Virginia. I
believe that terrorist elements in Haiti on both sides of this conflict
clearly understand that engaging in terrorist acts against Americans
will affect our policy.
I have watched what is going on in Haiti, and I have visited with
Members of the Senate who have gone to Haiti and who have brought us
back reports. I have concluded the same thing that the American people
concluded before we ever went into Haiti; that we have put American
troops into an unwinable situation.
I am also deeply concerned that we are slowing down training
functions all over America, as we siphon off money to pay for this
police action in Haiti. I am concerned about it for two reasons. No. 1,
I want to maintain our readiness and our training. But, second, it
tells you something about the level of defense cuts that the Clinton
administration has imposed on the Nation, when routine training
missions must be sliced to pay for an operation consisting of but
20,000 troops sent into Haiti.
I can remember during the Carter administration when our planes did
not fly, and our ships did not sail because we did not have the money.
I am concerned that not only do we have President Carter setting
foreign policy in Haiti, but more ominously, are also adopting
President Carter's defense policy.
I am concerned that what we are witnessing, and what many Members of
this body have participated in, is the destruction of the greatest
defense that the world has ever known. I urge my colleagues who have
voted to cut defense in order to fund social programs to look at the
training missions we are canceling in order to pay for a 20,000-person
police action in Haiti. If that does not tell you something about where
we are in defense, if that does not send up a red flag or set off an
alarm, then I do not think Members of the Senate are awake.
In terms of Haiti, I believe each of us, in carrying out our
constitutional responsibilities, have to ask one--and really only one--
relevant question when we are talking about whether or not America
ought to intervene militarily. There are many ways you can express it.
You can talk about America's dominant interest. You can talk about
whether or not the President has a plan to get out at least as detailed
as the plan he is using to get in. You can ask the question of whether
or not things are going to be permanently different once you leave
compared to when you got into this action. I think the answer to each
and every one of those questions is no.
But there is a more fundamental question, and for those of us who
have children, as I do, it is probably an easier question to
understand. I have a son 21 and a son 19. I think the relevant
question, in sending 20,000 American troops into Haiti to basically be
police officers, is: Would I be willing to send one of my own sons?
It seems to me, when we know with virtual certainty that if we stay
in Haiti long enough, floundering around without a workable policy, in
the midst of what clearly is going to become a crossfire, Americans are
going to be killed. And the question is, if our sons or daughters were
there, would we be satisfied with the mission? Would we be satisfied
with what we are trying to achieve? Would it be worth the risk? Would
it be worth the potential sacrifice?
I think the answer to these questions was ``no'' long before the
President sent in our troops. I think it is ``no'' today. I am
reluctantly going to join my colleagues in voting for this sense-of-
the-Senate resolution. But the bottom line is, it does not change
policy and I want this policy changed.
I do not want to try to play President when somebody else was elected
President. There is no doubt about the fact that President Clinton, as
Commander in Chief, has the authority to send American troops into
Haiti. That is not the question. The question is, is it a wise policy?
Is it a workable policy? Can we change things in Haiti?
I think the answer in each case is no.
I want to get American troops out of Haiti as quickly as we can get
them out. I would like to set a time limit on American involvement in
Haiti. But because members of our military have urged us not to do it,
because so many in the administration believe it is a mistake, I am
going to withhold. The Congress is going to adjourn tomorrow. The
President will then, obviously, not have Congress around to second-
guess his decisions. But when we come back in January with a new
Congress, and I hope a dramatically different Congress, if we are still
in the same situation in Haiti, I want to go on record as saying at
that point I am going to support an effort to set a time limit on this
involvement. I urge the President to get American troops out of Haiti.
I have watched the television pictures of what is happening in Haiti.
I was stunned, as I am sure other Americans were, at the recent
newspaper photo where a Haitian protester with a knife in his hand
grabbed a dove away from a person who was marching for peace, and bit
the bird's head off. Are we going to sell that person on democracy
using American military power?
I am not sure if there are good guys in this struggle. I do not
believe what we are going to achieve in Haiti is worth the loss of a
single American life. I want American troops out of Haiti. I did not
support sending them there. The President cannot get them out too soon
to suit me. But if we come back in January and American troops are
still in Haiti, the President can be prepared for the United States
Senate to vote on setting a time limit to pull our troops out.
If our troops are still in Haiti in January, the President can expect
a vote at some point to cut off funds for this operation. The President
had a right to start the involvement; we have a right and an
obligation, in my opinion, to terminate it. If the President does not
make the decision to bring our troops home, at some point we are going
to make that decision for him.
Madam President, I reserve for our ranking member the remainder of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from New
Hampshire has 7 minutes 20 seconds remaining.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask
that the time run against both sides equally.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Mikulski). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that 5 minutes of
the time under the unanimous-consent agreement which was yielded to
Senator Warner be yielded to Senator Faircloth.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from North Carolina may proceed.
Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Madam President, before coming to the Senate, I spent
45 years of my life in the private sector meeting a payroll as a
businessman and farmer. The private sector is a world that rewards
common sense and hard work. But I learned very quickly, coming into
Washington, ideas which make absolutely no sense to the working people
of America seem perfectly reasonable to career bureaucrats in
Washington who have become further and further removed from the
realities of the understanding of everyday American working people.
Madam President, I can think of no better example of an utter lack of
common sense than Bill Clinton's decision to send our troops to Haiti.
The people of America know that it does not make common sense to say
that you want to restore democracy by occupying an island nation with a
history of being ruled by voodoo priests, witchdoctors, and blood-
thirsty dictators.
The American people know that it does not make common sense to put
the lives of young American men and women at risk in order to install a
Haitian President who encourages his followers to put burning tires
around the necks of his political opponents.
The American people know that it does not make common sense to think
that this occupation will permanently change anything about Haitian
society. They know that we have occupied Haiti before, and the last
time we were there it took us 19 years before we could withdraw our
troops. They know that despite that earlier occupation, Haiti is a
squalid, wretched place that only the Haitian people themselves can
ever hope to fix.
The common sense possessed by the American people seems to elude
their Commander in Chief, Bill Clinton.
To him, and to his fellow Rhodes scholar elitists at the State
Department, the world is a geopolitical chess game, and American
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are pawns in the game. Bill
Clinton believes that it makes common sense to try to control the fate
of everything from America's health care system to the future of
backward island nations with a history of voodoo worship makes perfect
sense.
It does not matter to Bill Clinton that the American people do not
want this occupation. It does not matter to Bill Clinton that Congress
was blocked from having a vote as he led us to the brink of war. He
actually believes that he should be able to impose his will on the
lives of individuals whenever he pleases, and Congress and the American
public have no choice but to follow blindly along, like lemmings into
the sea. That is wrong!
Mr. President, an administration with a Commerce Secretary, Ron
Brown, who was a lobbyist for the bloody Duvalier dictatorship in
Haiti, has no moral authority to now pontificate about human rights in
Haiti.
An administration that will not repudiate Marion Barry, the crack
cocaine-smoking candidate for Mayor of the Capital of the United States
of America, has no moral authority to preach about drug dealing in
Haiti.
And an administration with a Surgeon General, Joycelyn Elders, who
has insulted and demeaned the Catholic Church, has no moral authority
to now piously invoke the term ``Father Aristide'' to try to legitimize
the mentally unbalanced man they want to install in power.
As a young man I visited Haiti on several occasions. I saw first hand
the violence and death that has plagued that island nation for hundreds
of years. On one occasion I saw two people brutally gunned down in the
street by the ton-ton macoutes--the savage band of killers and thugs
that are the traditional enforcers for the dictators, witchdoctors, and
voodoo priests that have long controlled this tiny island nation.
The United States has absolutely no reason to be in Haiti. We have no
vital interests in Haiti. Our National security is not at stake. We
have no guarantee that an invasion will curtail immigration to the
United States, or solve Haiti's political problems.
All we have gotten so far for the millions of American tax dollars
spent, and the thousands of American lives put at risk, is the sight of
United States that are forced to stand by and watch Haitians being
beaten in the streets.
All we have gotten so far is the specter of the mentally unbalanced
Mr. Aristide complaining about the American President who has tried to
put him in office in Haiti, and of Jimmy Carter telling Mr. Cedras on
Haitian soil that he was ashamed of America's foreign policy.
We now learn that the American taxpayers are going to be actually
paying the Haitian military that Bill Clinton was going to wage war
against only days ago. Is there any wonder that the world has lost
confidence in an American foreign policy that changes every day?
I can tell you, Madam President, that Haiti is not worth one drop of
American sweat, much less American blood. I will support American
troops as long as they are in Haiti, but I will not support the
decision to send them there in the first place.
The tragedy of Haiti will not end until the Haitians, themselves, end
it. Until that happens, no amount of American intervention will make a
bit of difference in the long run. Let us hope that the tragedy of
Haiti does not become an American tragedy as well.
I yield my time.
I thank the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia now controls 13
minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first, I ask unanimous consent that
among those listed as cosponsors on this resolution, the name of the
Senator from Virginia follow that of the distinguished ranking member
of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond. Senator Thurmond
worked very hard on this resolution together with his staff under the
direction of General Reynard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Now, Madam President, I first wish to commend the
leadership of the Senate reaching a consensus on this very important
resolution. I was privileged to work with them in that effort. I also
wish to commend the codel leader, Senator Dodd, of Connecticut, joined
by Senator Pell, Senator Levin, myself, Senator Coverdell, and the
current manager of our time, Senator Gregg, in our work down there. It
was a pleasure to be with these gentlemen.
Now, Madam President, I am going to be fairly reserved in my remarks
even though I have some very strong feelings on this issue. I do so
because I wish to put myself at this very moment into the combat boots
of several thousand United States soldiers patrolling the dangerous
streets and villages and towns of Haiti. We must regard the remarks we
make here as such that they can be heard and perhaps even
misinterpreted by some in Haiti. So let us use a measure of caution,
that we not in any way through this debate raise the level of risk to a
single United States soldier or, indeed, others trying to bring about
some resolve of this crisis in Haiti.
As I mentioned, I traveled to Haiti with our codel, which enabled me
to gain some valuable perspectives about this problem.
At the outset, I want to say what pride I take as an American in
those wearing the uniform of our Nation, carrying out the orders of the
Commander in Chief, whether it be on land, on sea, or in the air.
Every American can take pride in the manner in which they are
carrying out a mission, a mission which has really no textbook or
manual precedent. Throughout our 200-year military history, many books
have been written on how to conduct various military operations. I
studied them myself. But the manual--the textbook for this mission--is
still being written. Fortunately, we have excellent troops, well
trained, well disciplined, good morale. Whatever we do here has to be
supportive of that. And they are under the leadership of very able
senior officers. We should take pride in what they are trying to do.
General Shelton, commander of the U.S. forces, multinational forces in
Haiti; Vice Admiral Johnson, commander of the naval forces in the joint
task force; and, Major General Meade, commander of the 10th Mountain
Division.
Mr. President, I support this resolution. I appreciate having had the
opportunity to work on it. The resolution most significantly does not
contain a date certain for withdrawal of our troops. I do not say that
as criticism to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia and
others. I respect their views. But my opinion on this was gained from
talking with our military commanders, not just General Shelton, but
right down to the lieutenants and the sergeants and the troops
themselves, that the members of the codel had the opportunity to visit
with on a one-on-one basis. We do not want to say anything here, nor do
we want to put anything in the resolution which would raise that risk.
And there are certain dynamics generated by a date certain which could
raise that risk. So I am pleased that this resolution does not have a
date certain. And if it did, I could not support it.
Also a date certain could have complicated General Shelton's plans to
carry out this mission as best he can in what he views as the time
available to him. We all want our troops to come home safely as soon as
possible. Many of us, including the Senator from Virginia, stood on
this very floor and said in a respectful way to the Commander in Chief,
the President, do not send U.S. troops to Haiti. But that has been done
through the exercise of the President's powers under the Constitution.
So we start from that point of how best to address that situation. Our
first priority is the safety of our men and women. And then the mission
must be carried forward in such a manner that will enhance, I repeat
enhance, not discredit the foreign policy of this country.
This mission is not clearly defined. It changes from day to day. We
are fortunate that we have had only two casualties insofar as I know as
of this moment. But the President has the authority under the
Constitution and he has put the troops there.
I say that the second consideration is our foreign policy. If for any
reason the world perceives--and particularly those other nations who
are now committed to joining us in this operation--if the world
perceives that we carried this policy out in a manner other than
showing leadership and resolve, then what will the North Koreans say
when we go and lay down a set of conditions to resolve that problem, a
problem I regard a hundredfold more serious than Haiti?
All along I have joined with those that questioned whether we have
any vital security interest in Haiti. But that debate is for a later
day from where we are now.
So those are the two reasons that guide me in supporting this
resolution. First, to keep our troops safe; and, second, I want our
Nation to be viewed by the world as a credible working partner in
resolving those problems where hopefully henceforth we have a vital
national security interest.
While we were there in Haiti, we met with General Cedras. I am sure
Senator Dodd has outlined in detail the groups with whom we met. We
were assured by the general that he would leave office--I stress
office, not the country--by October 15. And all of us are hopeful that
the return of President Aristide will be conducted in a spirit of
reconciliation to the extent it can be achieved. Reconciliation--that
is the atmosphere in which we can bring our troops back with the least
amount of risk and harm.
The parliament has been working throughout the day. I do not know
what they may or may not have resolved. In my own judgment, they will
probably have a resolution which will not be clearly specific, which
will not perhaps meet the objectives and goals that many of us would
like to see. Perhaps it is going to be left vague and ambiguous on
purpose so they can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps, so that a
spirit of reconciliation can be achieved to avoid further loss of life
and injury, not only to the troops of the United States but the troops
and police of other nations, and, of course, to the people of Haiti.
I would like to address another issue. This word ``disarmament''
should never have been used in the context of the province of Haiti.
You go to the dictionary, go to the history books. Disarmament relates
to the conferences primarily after World War I when the Nation's sat
down and tried to figure out how to disarm themselves--the Naval
Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Conference, and to get rid
of mechanized weapons. You are never going to disarm Haiti totally.
There are weapons under almost every bed, hand grenades squirreled away
here and there. And to think that our troops should ever be given the
mission to go into a house for search and seizure is absolutely wrong.
We learned that lesson in Somalia. Our troops are doing the best they
can to remove the weapons where they have good intelligence to know
there are caches and repositories of some magnitude. That they can do,
although the risk is great. Never underestimate the risk to our troops
down there.
Our delegation traveled through the streets. On one street corner
they would wave. On the next corner they would shake their fists. And
if you did a U-turn, when you passed by the corner where they waved
their hand, they would raise the fist and those that raised their fist
would wave. It changes that quickly. It is a situation where anything
can erupt at any time.
So let us be very careful in the use of the word ``disarmament'' and
not convey the impression to the people of Haiti or to the people of
that hemisphere or to the people in this country that our troops are
going to be able to withdraw these weapons and make this a tranquil
land. It is not achievable. But--our troops, to the extent they can--
will provide an orderly means perhaps through the weapons buy-back
program, or otherwise, to get the weapons out of the hands of people.
Every weapon seized, every weapon bought back in some manner diminishes
the risk to our people.
Then, Madam President, we have to turn to the question of the cost
estimate. It is incalculable at this time. The Senate Armed Services
Committee received estimates of perhaps more than $1 billion. We do not
know. But that is a cost we have to watch and watch carefully. It is a
cost that should be borne by other nations of the world, because we
have problems here at home. We have pockets of poverty and despair here
in the United States which parallel, in many respects, what we saw in
Haiti last Saturday. These dollars are needed here at home as badly as
they are needed abroad.
Mr. President, I remain concerned about a number of issues which are
as yet unsettled. The Haitian Parliament has not yet agreed on the type
of amnesty to be granted or the form it will take. This is key to an
orderly transition in Haiti.
What will be the extent of the United States role in the United
Nations mission in Haiti [UNMIH] and how long with the United States
forces be involved? I recall well that it was after the United Nations
took over the operation in Somalia that much of the risks to our troops
began there: The mission creep, the hunt for Aideed and finally the
battle of October 3-4 1993, where 18 United States soldiers were killed
and 83 were wounded. While we were supplying humanitarian relief with
one hand, the other was entrapped into combat operations.
The latest cost estimates indicate that our efforts in Haiti will
cost upward of $1 billion. I am not optimistic that the long-term
outcome of our endeavor to instill democracy in Haiti, where it never
has existed, will prove worthy of the cost in dollars as well as the
efforts and sacrifices of our men and women in uniform and their
families. Many of our troops in Haiti were in Somalia last year. We are
asking a lot of these brave soldiers. I hope and pray for the rapid and
safe return of all those we have committed to the operation in Haiti.
Mr. President, in closing, I am compelled to make one final
observation. I fear that we have focussed a disproportionate level of
our attention on Haiti, where we have no clear national security
interests. Now that we have committed our Armed Forces, however, we
must focus our attention there in the interests of the safety of the
men and women we have committed to that effort.
Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has just expired.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, that is a very dramatic announcement. I
accept that, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida, Mr. Graham, is
recognized.
Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield. If I am correct, the
Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes, or something like that, remaining
in his time and he is prepared to yield that back, unless the
leadership would like to have that time.
I will yield my time to the Senator from Iowa, from the 7 minutes
reserved for the Senator from Arizona. I ask unanimous consent that
that occur.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I support this resolution. Although it
is not the resolution which I would have written, it represents a fair
consensus on an issue of great national importance.
Principally, I support this resolution because of what it does not
say. What it does not say is a specific time for withdrawal of our
troops from Haiti. The safety of our troops depends upon the restraint
of not establishing in advance a specific date for their withdrawal. If
our enemies knew that we had a date certain for withdrawal, they would
take advantage of that deadline and endanger the security of our men
and women in uniform.
The safety of our troops must be our principal priority. We should be
proud as a Nation of what our troops are accomplishing in Haiti. They
are doing their jobs in a professional and efficient way.
Frankly, I am disturbed and surprised by the comments of some of my
colleagues this afternoon, who seem to be disappointed by the success
that our troops have had in Haiti. Obviously, this is a mission which
is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Gratefully, we are
appreciative for the treatment of our troops to date, and that we have
been able to accomplish this difficult, complex and, as the Senator
from Virginia stated, almost unprecedented mission, with minimal
casualties. But we understand that no one should underestimate the
jeopardy of the circumstances in which our troops are placed in Haiti.
Madam President, many of us today, and millions around the world,
heard the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela. He
stated that we--and particularly the United States of America, with its
special responsibility--are embarked on a principled and courageous
endeavor to support democracy in the world. Haiti is another example of
that principled and courageous endeavor to support democracy.
Our United States national interests are clearly at stake in the
circumstances of Haiti. Some of those interests include the signal that
we are sending to the hemisphere and to the world that we are ready to
stand by our commitments in support of democratic principles. I fear
that had we vacillated in Haiti, it would have become the first of a
series of attacks upon democratic regimes, particularly the new and
fragile regimes of the Western Hemisphere.
Madam President, as in South Africa, we are standing by the
principles that are older than our Nation itself, in support of human
rights around the world. One of the fundamental principles of Thomas
Jefferson, in writing the Declaration of Independence, was that he was
not writing a statement for only those colonialists who lived on the
Atlantic shore of North America; rather, he was writing a document of
universal principles. We stood by those universal principles of human
rights in South Africa. We are doing so again in Haiti and, when we do
so, we are standing for the very best in our Nation's tradition.
Because Haiti is part of the neighborhood of the Western Hemisphere, we
are standing by our own self interests in protecting democracy and
human rights in Haiti. As we have tragically learned, when conditions
deteriorate in our neighborhood, we are not immune to the adverse
consequences, whether they be in the form of persons fleeing from
persecution and abject poverty, seeking to reach this country, to the
sale and sovereignty of the country, to the drug traffickers, to the
endangerment of the United States citizens in that country. All of
those, and more, become at risk when democracy and human rights are
challenged in the Western Hemisphere.
So, Madam President, I am disappointed that some of my colleagues
continue to criticize the President while our troops are on the ground
in a vulnerable circumstance, while they are taking all the risk. I
want to be recorded in full support of the courageous decision by the
President. I want to be recorded in full support of our courageous,
highly professional, and patriotic men and women who are carrying out
this mission. It is at times like this that we should come together as
Americans, beyond partisan bickering, and fashion our support for our
troops who are committed to this mission and to some of the most
fundamental principles, the protection of democracy, and a commitment
to universal human rights.
I am proud of what America is doing in Haiti. And tonight I look
forward to our continued contribution toward building in that nation
institutions that will make it a peaceful, human rights-respecting
country with a sense of future and prosperity for its people.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I am about to yield 5 minutes to our
colleague from South Dakota. I am confident he will express strong
support for the present situation in Haiti.
Before I do so, let me just commend my colleague from Florida for an
excellent set of remarks. He is very knowledgeable about the situation
in Haiti, and his comparison to the situation in Haiti and what
transpired in South Africa--coincidently, this resolution occurring on
the very day that Nelson Mandela addressed a joint meeting of
Congress--I think is appropriate.
I also commend our colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, who
accompanied Senator Gregg and me on our trip last week to Haiti. While
I disagree with a couple of points, I think he properly and carefully
identified the appropriate military questions and issues as well as the
foreign policy issues, and I commend him for his remarks.
I am glad to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from South
Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 2 minutes
remaining.
Mr. GREGG. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from South
Dakota also, and I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his courtesy
in yielding to the Senator from South Dakota 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, I thank the accommodation for 7
minutes. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his kindness.
Madam President, I have been very, very concerned about an issue
recently reported in the New York Times. President Clinton said on June
8 that one of the reasons for possibly invading Haiti was because of
that country's involvement in the drug trade. I ask unanimous consent
to insert this article in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Says Haiti's Military Runs Cocaine
(By Howard W. French)
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, June 7.--Haiti's military leaders
have been working with Colombian traffickers for the past
four years to help move hundreds of pounds of cocaine each
month from South and Central America to the United States,
American diplomats and other officials say.
In their first detailed account of the role of the Haitian
armed forces in international narcotics traffic, American
officials said that much of Haiti's military leadership,
including its commander, Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, either has
been actively involved with Colombian drug dealers or has
turned a blind eye to their trafficking in cocaine, accepting
payments for their cooperation.
For months, United States officials have discounted reports
of drug trafficking by senior Haitian officers, and some see
the sudden turnabout as an attempt to lay the groundwork for
a possible invasion to restore the exiled Haitian President,
the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
The American officials are now saying that the Haitian
officers are earning hundreds of thousands of dollars each
month for allowing their country to be used as a
transshipment center by the main Colombian drug rings in Cali
and Medellin.
haitian military informers
The officials who discussed the role of Haitian Army
leaders said that their information had been developed in
recent months in large part thanks to cooperation from
members of the Haitian military itself.
``These sources have been very specific about the dates,
the sources and the quantities of narcotics involved, and we
have this first hand now,'' said one American official, who
spoke on the condition of anonymity. Asked if the evidence
against Haiti's military was sufficiently strong to take
legal action against them, the official said, ``We are pretty
close.''
The disclosure of the investigation comes three weeks after
President Clinton cited Haiti's involvement in the narcotics
trade as one of the national security concerns that had
convinced him that international military action might be
required in Haiti.
In recent days, as speculation has grown about a possible
United States-led military action to oust the country's
military leaders, members of the Haitian high command have
begun consultations here with lawyers who represented Manuel
Antonio Noriega, the former Panamanian leader who is serving
a 40-year sentence in a Federal penitentiary.
General Noriega, who was accused by the United States of
involvement in international narcotics trafficking and money
laundering, was captured in an American military intervention
in 1989 and brought to the United States for trial.
Generals 'r' Us
Two of General Noriega's lawyers, Frank Rubino and John
May, acknowledged today that they had recently been in Haiti
for talks with the military. Refusing to discuss further any
details of their involvement here, Mr. May, who was contacted
by telephone in Miami, said, ``Generals are our business.''
Congressmen Skeptical
Haitian military officials have denied any involvement in
the narcotics traffic. Following a recent cocaine seizure,
Col. Antoine Atouriste, the officer in charge of Haiti's
antidrug force, said that reports about the drug running role
of the Haitian military were part of an international
campaign to destroy it.
Father Aristide has long asserted that his country's army
had been kept in power by narcotics profits.
Members of Congress who are opposed to the use of American
force to reinstate Father Aristide say that they are
skeptical of the case being put together against Haiti's
military leaders and say they suspect political motives lie
behind the charges.
``There is less true concern over the narcotics problem
that there is to lay a foundation for some kind of military
action in Haiti,'' said Robert Torricelli, Democrat of New
Jersey, who heads the House Foreign Relations subcommittee on
Western hemisphere affairs. ``There is a problem with
narcotics in Haiti, but it is no larger than any number of
other places.''
Officials who discussed details of the Haitian military's
role in cocaine trafficking said that until the recent
embargo was placed on the country, cocaine was regularly air-
dropped into Haiti or delivered by ships from Panama and
Colombia.
The role of the Haitian military, the officials said, was
to provide protected landing strips and ports, assuring that
the unloading of the cocaine was undisturbed.
``Then it is taken to other locations by waiting vehicles,
distributed to other points around the country and held until
it can be shipped onwards in loads of 50 to 100 kilograms,''
an official said.
Because of the international embargo against Haiti,
officials said they believed the country had an unusually
large stockpile of cocaine on hand, which it was unable to
export.
Mr. PRESSLER. This allegation about Haiti was repeated by the
President and other administration officials several times. Then
suddenly they stopped saying it and there was no further discussion of
it.
I would like to know what they found out or why they have dropped
that subject. Maybe they found out that Haiti did not have any
involvement in the drug trade. Or maybe they found out that the door
led to some embarrassing places.
Madam President, I am concerned that the reason the administration
suddenly stopped citing Haitian drug trafficking as a justification for
invading Haiti was because of reports that, while President of Haiti
several years ago, Jean-Bertrand Aristide may have taken bribes from
Colombian drug dealers to permit drug smuggling routes to operate
through Haiti. These serious allegations have not been thoroughly
investigated by the U.S. Government. At a time when United States
troops are putting their lives on the line in Haiti preparing to
restore Aristide to power, these allegations must be thoroughly
examined.
Madam President, today I have written to President Clinton expressing
my concerns. Yesterday, in the Judiciary Committee I asked Lee Brown,
the drug czar about this matter. He said he did not know anything about
it, that it would not be his office's concern.
Someone in the White House must know because they were citing the
drug trade in Haiti as a reason to invade that country earlier this
year. They were investigating Haitian drug trafficking, then suddenly
they became silent. Is it possible that one of the doors--one of the
paths of corruption led someplace that they did not wish?
Again, I have written to the President today expressing my concerns.
I have previously written to Janet Reno and others about it as well.
Included with the letter is a list of questions which I think deserves
to be fully disclosed.
I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my letter to the President be
printed in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, October 6, 1994.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I am deeply disturbed by recent
allegations that, while President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide accepted payments from foreign drug traffickers. It
is my understanding that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
acting on orders from the White House or the Justice
Department, recently investigated drug trafficking in Haiti.
During the course of the investigation, the DEA ostensibly
uncovered information linking Mr. Aristide to Colombian drug
money. If true, these charges pose serious questions about
American involvement in the effort to return Mr. Aristide to
power.
I have previously written to Attorney General Janet Reno
asking her to provide any information concerning the
allegation that the Justice Department denied a request from
DEA field agents to interview Mr. Aristide. I have also asked
Senators Biden and Hatch, as Chairman and Ranking Member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, to hold hearings on this
matter.
Let me say that I was not the first to raise the issues I
am discussing today. These allegations first appeared in the
press and they need to be addressed publicly by the
Administration. Cloaking any of this information under a
heavy blanket of top secret security clearances is not
acceptable. The American public has the right to know. They
are paying for the Haiti operation. Their sons and daughters
are serving there. Enclosed is a list of questions which I
think deserve to be answered. I would greatly appreciate a
prompt response from your Administration.
Sincerely,
Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator.
____
Enclosure.
Senator Larry Pressler--Questions to President Clinton Regarding the
DEA investigation into Drug Trafficking in Haiti
(1) Was an investigation of drug trafficking in Haiti
conducted by the DEA, FBI, CIA, State, or Justice
Departments?
If so, who ordered the investigation and when? Who in the
Justice Department or the White House was involved? Was it
the result of a classified memo drafted in early April by
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard directing
federal agencies to investigate rumors of Haitian drug
trafficking?
(2) Is the investigation ongoing or has it been concluded?
If it has been concluded, why was this done?
(3) What was the original purpose of the investigation? Has
the purpose changed over time? If so, why?
(4) Whom did the investigation target? Who in the Haitian
government or military have been or are now the subject of
this investigation?
(5) What have been the results of the investigation, to
date?
Was any evidence uncovered that suggested that Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, or those closely associated with him,
accepted payments from foreign drug traffickers?
If so, who in the Administration was informed of the
results of the investigation to date? When was each person
informed? Was anyone in the White House or the Justice
Department informed, and if so, who and when?
(6) During the course of the investigation, was there a
request from DEA field agents conducting the investigation to
interview personally, or otherwise question in any form,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide regarding these accusations? If the
request was made, explain fully the circumstances surrounding
the request.
Who made the request? To whom was it made? When was the
request made?
In what form was the request made? If in written or
electronic form, please provide a copy of the request and any
notes or memorandum concerning it which the DEA has in its
possession.
(7) Who within the Administration, both inside and outside
the DEA, was aware of the request to question Aristide?
(8) Was the request to question Aristide ultimately denied?
If so, who denied it. When was the denial made? Why was the
denial made? Was the denial based on political factors?
Prior to the final decision not to question President
Aristide, was the request submitted to an ``oversight
committee'' composed of members from the DEA, the Justice
Department and/or others? If so, who were the members of the
``oversight committee''? On what dates did they meet to
discuss the request? What was the committee's determination?
Prior to the final decision not to question President
Aristide, was any Administration official in the Justice
Department, the White House, or any other government agency
consulted or contacted regarding the request? If so, who was
consulted? On what dates did the consultations occur?
At any time during the consideration of the request to
question President Aristide, did any Administration official
suggest reasons for denying the request based, in whole or in
part, on political considerations. If so, which
Administration officials made the suggestion? When was the
suggestion made?
(9) In the course of the investigation, did DEA field
agents, or other law enforcement officials interview a Mr.
Molina, a former lieutenant of the Medellin drug cartel
regarding an allegation that Aristide, while in power,
accepted drug money from the cartel?
What did Molina tell DEA field agents? Did he allege that
Jean--Bertrand Aristide accepted money from the Medellin drug
cartel?
Was Molina ever given a polygraph or other lie detector
test? If so, who administered the test? What were the
results? Who in the Administration was informed of the
results?
Did the DEA agents, under the direction of the Justice
Department, offer a deal to Molina in return for his
cooperation?
If so, who in the Administration authorized the deal? What
were the precise details of the deal offered to him? Were
drug charges against Molina, pending in the U.S., dropped as
a result?
Was Molina ever brought to the United States for
questioning? If so, is Molina still in U.S. custody? If not,
where is he and why was he released? Was Molina allowed to
leave the U.S. as a condition of the deal offered to him?
(10) Did the DEA, or other U.S. law enforcement agency,
ever interviewed any other individual who substantiated the
allegation that Aristide, or those close to him accepted,
payments from foreign drug traffickers?
If so, who was interviewed? What was said? When did the
interview or interviews occur?
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, let me say I am not the first to raise
the issues I am discussing today. These allegations first appeared in
the press, and they need to be addressed publicly by the
administration. Cloaking any of this information under a heavy blanket
of top secret security clearance is not acceptable. The American public
has a right to know. They are paying for the military operation in
Haiti. Their sons and daughters are at risk there.
Let me briefly outline my concerns. On May 21 of this year, the
Washington Post reported that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark
Richards drafted a classified memo directing Federal agencies,
including the DEA, CIA, FBI, State and Justice Departments to
investigate narcotics trafficking in Haiti.
I ask consent to insert this article in the Record at this point.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, May 21, 1994]
U.S. Investigates Allegations of Haitian Drug Trafficking
(By Pierre Thomas)
The Justice Department is investigating allegations that
top Haitian military officers have been heavily involved in
cocaine trafficking since the mid-1980s, administration
sources said yesterday.
Federal law enforcement officials have received tips that
the officers protected or allowed cocaine shipments to enter
and leave the country freely, federal sources said. The
sources described the inquiry as being at a preliminary,
``fishing expedition'' stage.
``There have been rumors for years, and now given the
current heightened concern, this has emerged as a priority,''
said one high-ranking administrator who asked not to be
named.
The Haitian military has come under increasing scrutiny
since its overthrow of democratically elected President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. The military has
repeatedly ignored international calls for the restoration of
Aristide to power.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard drafted a
classified memo in early April requesting that federal
agencies, including the FBI, the State Department, Drug
Enforcement Administration and CIA, comb their files for
information about Haiti drug trafficking, sources said.
The investigation is centering on Max Paul, Haiti's
director of ports, and more than a dozen military officials
including: Lt. Col. Michel Francois, the head of police in
Port-au-Prince, the capital city; Brig. Gen. Jean-Claude
Duperval; and Col. Antoine Atouriste. Francois previously has
strongly denied any involvement in drug trafficking.
But several administration sources stressed there is little
concrete evidence so far tying these Haitian officials to any
specific wrongdoing.
``We are a long way from confirming any of this,'' said one
official. ``We are a long way from indicting these people and
having enough evidence to present to a court. We think that
some of these people are dirty. So far we just don't have
it.''
Other administration sources also pointed out that drug
trafficking in Haiti is small compared to the volumes of
drugs moved through other transshipment points in the region.
A recent State Department report on international drug
trafficking said: ``Haiti continues to be used by Colombian
trafficking organizations as a base of operations and
transshipment point for the movement of South American
cocaine to the United States. The government of Haiti has had
little success in attacking the problem and clearly has an
inadequate interdiction and enforcement capability.''
While noting that Haitian officials are ``susceptible'' to
corruption--presumably because of the country's impoverished
condition--the State Department report said the ``United
States government does not have evidence directly linking
senior [Haitian] officials to drug trafficking.'' The report
also said that ``compared to trafficking indicators in other
areas such as the Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of
detected air and maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is
low.''
Mr. PRESSLER. During the course of this investigation, it is my
understanding the DEA uncovered allegations that Jean-Bertrand Aristide
accepted payments from Colombian drug traffickers while President of
Haiti. The allegations were made by an informant interviewed by the
Drug Enforcement Agency and deemed credible by the Miami DEA office.
I further understand that the Miami office of the DEA requested an
interview with Aristide to substantiate the charges. This request was
denied by officials in Washington on the advice of an interdepartmental
oversight committee composed of officials from the DEA, Justice
Department, and other Federal agencies.
The decision to not question Aristide disturbs me deeply. In effect,
the decision prevents DEA investigators in the field from doing their
job.
I want to know why this decision was made by the Justice Department
and the DEA. Was the decision based on political factors? Is the
administration attempting to suppress an investigation which could
prove embarrassing to Mr. Aristide?
Why has the administration stopped citing Haitian drug traffic as a
reason to invade Haiti? They did earlier this year.
A New York Times article dated May 20, 1994 quoted President Clinton
as citing drug trafficking as one of the reasons why the United States
might have to invade Haiti.
I ask unanimous consent to print this article in the Record at this
point.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, May 20, 1994]
President Lists Reasons To Use Force in Haiti
(By Douglas Jehl)
Washington.--President Clinton today offered the clearest
explanation yet of why his Administration is considering the
use of military force in Haiti while resisting it elsewhere
in the world.
``It's in our backyard,'' the President said at a White
House news conference as he ticked off the first in a list of
six reasons why he is weighing military action to oust
Haiti's leaders if economic sanctions do not force them to
step down.
He said Haiti's proximity to the United States and the
danger that more of its citizens could seek refuge in
southern Florida meant that his Administration had an
obligation to force an end to the military dictatorship
there.
Mr. Clinton's comments, in response to a question at a
joint appearance with India's Prime Minister, also
represented a response to Republican critics who say it would
be wrong to risk American lives to restore the exiled
President, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
With a tighter United Nations embargo on Haiti to take
effect at midnight on Saturday, aides to Mr. Clinton
emphasized that no American military action there was
imminent. After facing criticism on past occasions in which
the Administration has appeared to back away from tough talk
on Bosnia, the aides said no decision on whether to use
military force in Haiti will be made until the sanctions have
been given time to work.
But with opinion polls showing mounting public
dissatisfaction with his conduct of foreign policy, the aides
say that Mr. Clinton has grown concerned that he has failed
to cast the challenges he faces in proper context and that,
in particular, he has not adequately explained why his
Administration is suddenly devoting so much attention to
Haiti after 32 months of military tyranny there.
A senior White House official who said Mr. Clinton had
planned his answer described it as part of an effort to build
public support for military action in Haiti that would allow
him to act even if other countries remain opposed to such a
mission.
Among the six reasons Mr. Clinton mentioned today as adding
up to a ``significant'' American interest in restoring
democracy to Haiti were its proximity and the fact that Haiti
had been used as a staging area for drug shipments bound for
the United States. In addition, he said Haiti was now the
only country in the Western Hemisphere where military leaders
have seized power from an elected leader, making it and Cuba
the hemishere's only remaining non-democracies.
massive outflow feared
He also mentioned the several thousand Americans who live
in Haiti and the one million Haitian-Americans who live in
the United States as reasons Americans should be intent on
restoring democracy there.
But Mr. Clinton saved his strongest warning for what he
described as ``the continuous possibility'' that Haitians
left poor and desperate under military rule would join in a
``massive outflow'' and seek refuge in the United States.
Mr. Clinton spoke after a meeting with Prime Minister P. V.
Narasimha Rao of India on a day in which he devoted unusual
attention to security issues. He had back-to-back meetings
with his top foreign policy advisers and with American
military commanders from around the globe.
His meeting with Mr. Rao was the first between an American
President and an Indian Prime Minister in seven years, a lag
emblematic of the uneasiness between the two countries after
successive Administrations have spoken disapprovingly of
India's human rights record and its development of nuclear
weapons.
Outside the White House today, hundreds marched in
opposition to India's policies in Kashmir and other northern
regions, and Mr. Clinton acknowledged that the United States
and India still had differences over human rights and the
spread of nuclear weapons.
But the President praised India for having overcome
internal strife and remaining the world's second largest
democracy, and he said of the disagreements that ``in the
content of our common interests and our common values, we
believe they can be managed in a constructive way.''
The yearlong American standoff with North Korea over
nuclear weapons still has the potential to become the
Administration's biggest foreign policy crisis. But Mr.
Clinton and his aides have made clear in recent weeks that
they are looking with more impatience at the intransigence of
Haiti's military leaders, who seized power in September 1991
from Father Aristide, the democratically elected President,
and have refused since last fall to honor an agreement in
which they pledged to step down.
The strict United Nations sanctions that are to be imposed
on Saturday represent a new effort by the United States and
other powers to force Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras and his fellow
commanders from power. But the President has been forthright
in saying he would consider using military force to oust them
if the sanctions fall, and Administration officials say the
misery the embargo may inflict means that the White House
could reach that point of decision as soon as this time next
month.
time for them to go
Mr. Clinton said recently of the military commanders that
``it's time for them to go,'' and aides have described him in
recent weeks as increasingly determined to see democracy
restored.
The President's new special adviser on Haiti, William Gray,
held a well-publicized meeting here today with Father
Aristide in a sign of the White House's commitment to
stepping up its efforts on his behalf.
Asked today why he appeared to be putting Haiti in a
different category from Bosnia and Rwanda, where he has ruled
out putting United States forces in ground combat roles, Mr.
Clinton said he was not prepared ``to discuss hypothetical
uses of force.'' But he went on to make clear that he
believed that the American interests in Haiti set that
country apart from more distant trouble spots.
His remarks seemed intended in part as an answer to critics
like Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the Republican leader, who
this week said an American invasion of Haiti ``would be the
wrong act at the wrong time for the wrong reason.'' Senator
Dole and other Republicans have called on Mr. Clinton to seek
a compromise with Haiti's military leaders that would restore
democracy without providing for Father Aristide's return, but
that is a step the White House has been unwilling to take.
Mr. PRESSLER. In fact, during this past spring, other members of the
administration were using drug trafficking as an excuse to intervene in
Haiti. Then suddenly, we heard no more from the administration about
drug trafficking in Haiti. It was as if the stage went dark. Was this
because of information uncovered by the DEA investigation? Did
information come to light implicating Jean-Bertrand Aristide?
Allegations to this effect were made by a Colombian national, a Mr.
Molina, reputedly a major lieutenant of Pablo Escobar, the former head
of the Medellin, Colombia, drug cartel. Mr. Molina allegedly named
Haitian generals among those who accepted cash payments from the
Colombian drug cartel. More importantly, Mr. Molina also allegedly
named Mr. Aristide. I understand that when Mr. Molina provided this
information, he was given a lie detector test by the DEA. He passed.
In return for his cooperation, I understand Mr. Molina was offered a
deal by the Justice Department. Apparently, Mr. Molina was facing at
least one indictment in the United States for operating a ``continuing
criminal enterprise.'' If convicted, he would have faced life in
prison. Instead, the charges against Mr. Molina were dropped and he was
allowed to return to Colombia.
I have also received information alleging that a second informant has
substantiated the allegations against Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This case
is still pending.
Such cases are frequently murky. Nevertheless, allegations having
been made, the U.S. Government has the responsibility to pursue them.
Mr. Molina has been described as being ``reliable'' in other DEA cases.
Would it not be better to put to rest allegations against Mr. Aristide
by allowing him to be interviewed by the DEA? Instead, the Government
has decided not to allow Mr. Aristide to be questioned.
As each day passes, more information comes to light. The allegations
against Mr. Aristide have been the subject of two ABC news stories, as
well as articles which have appeared in the Wall Street Journal and the
Washington Times.
I ask unanimous consent to print these articles in the Record at this
point.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Transcript of ABC news report on ``Good Morning America,'' September
18, 1994
ABC News has learned that Federal law enforcement officials
have been investigating a report that Haitian President Jean
Bertrand Aristide may have been involved in Payoffs to
Haitian officials by Colombian drug traffickers. The
allegations came from a Colombian drug dealer cooperating
with the Drug Enforcement Agency. ABC'S Jim Angle has more:
As the U.S. pushed to return Aristide to power,
administration officials were wrestling with a potential
public relations disaster. The DEA had uncovered allegations
that Aristide, while in office, took payoffs from a cocaine
cartel. Law enforcement sources told ABC News that when
Agents asked to question Aristide, Washington squelched the
idea.
That was denied by Defense Secretary William Perry on
``This Week with David Brinkley:
``There have been uncorroborated Allegations made by an
informant about President Aristide. Those were investigated
by the Justice Department. Nobody was told that they couldn't
do it.''
The informant a former member of Pablo Escobar's cartel,
told the DEA that payoffs were going not only to Haiti's top
three military leaders--President Raoul Cedras, Army Chief of
Staff Phillipe Biamby, and chief of Police, Michel Francois .
. . but also to President Aristide himself. Justice
Department sources say there is no other information to back
up the claims and Aristide supporters were outraged:
``There is no truth to any allegations that President
Aristide has been involved in drug trafficking or drug
payoffs or anything of the kind. This is absolute garbage.''
Justice Department officials say the investigation has not
been closed but now that Haiti's military leaders have agreed
to depart, allegations about the past are likely to be far
less important than questions about Haiti's future.
____
Transcript of ABC News Report on ``World News Tonight,'' September 19,
1994
With the United States on the verge of invading Haiti to
return President Aristide to power, there was one last-minute
embarrassment--the DEA had recent information that Aristide,
while in office, took payoffs from the Pablo Escobar cocaine
cartel.
And law enforcement sources told ABC that when agents asked
to question Aristide, Washington killed the idea. That was
denied by Defense Secretary William Perry on ``This Week with
David Brinkley'':
``There have been uncorroborated allegations made by an
informant about President Aristide. Those were investigated
by the Justice Department. Nobody was told that they couldn't
do it.''
The informant was one of Pablo Escobar's lieutenants who is
now cooperating with the DEA * * *. He said that payoffs were
going to Haiti's top three military leaders--President Raoul
Cedras, Army Chief of Staff Phillipe Biamby, and Chief of
Police, Michael Francois.
But the Colombian informant also said his Haitian
connection, Franz Biamby, a cousin of the Army Chief of
Staff, saw Aristide take a suitcase filled with several
hundred thousand dollars in payoffs.
Franz Biamby, now in jail in Miami, admitted to authorities
that he smuggled cocaine. And he implicated other Haitian
officials--but not the top three military leaders * * *. or
President Aristide.
The administration was hoping to do to Haiti's military
leaders * * * what the United States did to Panamanian leader
Manuel Noriega--arrest them and put them in jail.
The administration had cast a wide net in an effort to
build a drug case against the military leaders * * * The last
thing it wanted to hear were new allegations against
Aristide.
Defense Secretary Perry said today the matter is closed:
``The Justice Department made a very detailed investigation
of this. They concluded that the evidence did not support
this allegation by one informant.''
But other sources tell ABC News the investigation is still
open.
Justice Department officials met last Thursday, even as the
United States was preparing Haitians for an invasion, to
decide how to handle this political hot potato.
This evidence was flimsy * * * but officials couldn't stop
the investigation without appearing to interfere * * * just
as the United States was preparing to put lives on the line
to return Aristide to power.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1994]
U.S. Faces Dilemma on Restoring Haiti's Leader, As Americans Wonder if
Aristide Is Good or Evil
(By Robert S. Greenberger)
Washington.--When President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns
to Haiti, the question here is will he go back as the good
guy or the villain?
The Clinton administration policy is anchored on restoring
President Aristide as Haiti's elected leader by Oct. 15. But
four days into the U.S.'s peaceful occupation of the
Caribbean nation, support for that goal is in danger of
eroding.
President Aristide finally delivered a belated ``thank
you'' to the U.S. yesterday for its efforts to restore him to
power. But his three-day delay in doing so has only fueled
concerns in the U.S. that the administration is saddled with
an unreliable and temperamental partner.
aristide is criticized
Democrats in the past few days have begun attacking the
Haitian leader as an ingrate. ``The proper response from Mr.
Aristide is not to second guess or nitpick. The proper
response is two words: `thank you,''' Rep. David Obey of
Wisconsin, one of the few members of his party who had
advocated an invasion of Haiti, said earlier this week.
Meantime, critics from the right are pressing a campaign to
demonize the Haitian priest, circulating stories about his
involvement in violence and unfounded rumors about drug
payoffs and even murder. On the night President Clinton gave
his nationally televised speech on Haiti, the American
Conservative Union aired a TV ad showing a 1991 Aristide
speech--in Creole--that appeared to encourage ``necklacing,''
or putting a tire around a political opponent's neck and
setting the tire on fire.
Efforts to tar Mr. Aristide in the public mind could prove
critical to the long-term success of the U.S. mission in
Haiti. Americans only support such military endeavors when
they have a clear sense of battling evil. Former President
Carter fogged that distinction by extolling the ``bad
guy,''--Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras--as a patriot and a man of
honor just a few days after President Clinton had labeled the
same general a thug and a murderer. An effective attack on
President Aristide, the supposed ``good guy'' in this
international melodrama, could push public patience over the
edge.
``It's my impression that the events of the last few days
have really changed the way Aristide and Cedras are viewed as
hero and villain,'' says Christopher Caldwell, assistant
managing editor of the American Spectator and author of a
scathing attack on President Aristide in that conservative
magazine's July issue. In response, President Aristide's
defenders, and paid publicists, are pressing to polish his
image among Americans and counter the attacks.
exaggeration or truth?
Many of the charges surfacing against Mr. Aristide from Mr.
Caldwell and others on the right clearly are the product of
innuendo and exaggeration. Reed Irvine, who heads Accuracy in
Media, a conservative watchdog group, passes on a ``tip''
that President Aristide ordered the killing of a Haitian
priest earlier this summer, to put the spotlight back on
Haiti instead of the Cuba crisis. Mr. Irvine concedes he
heard the story from someone he doesn't know, who claims to
have Pentagon connections. Nevertheless, a small Washington
newspaper ran the story.
But the 41-year-old President Aristide also has given his
opponents plenty of material to work with. He is a radical
Roman Catholic priest who has fought with his church and
often spewed anti-American statements. His stubbornness and
independence continue to drive U.S. officials to distraction.
Although his human-rights record during his short tenure as
Haiti's elected president was vastly superior to what came
before and after, he clearly encouraged, or in some cases
didn't act to prevent, mob violence. In one instance, he
stalled an investigation of the murders of five jailed
youths.
targeting legislators
Much of the anti-Aristide efforts are directed toward
Congress, a fertile field for anti-interventionist sentiment.
When House leaders were negotiating the language of a
resolution praising the negotiated agreement in Haiti,
Republicans insisted that the document wouldn't praise
President Aristide. Democrats agreed. On the Senate floor,
GOP Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas, citing descriptions of
President Aristide as a ``anti-American Marxist demagogue,''
declared, ``I don't see a good guy in Haiti.''
President Aristide isn't unarmed in this battle of
perceptions. A bevy of highly paid aides has been peppering
the airwaves, noting that President Aristide was
democratically elected with nearly 70% of the vote and was
beginning to bring real reform to Haiti's impoverished
masses when he was ousted by the military in September
1991.
The public-relations firm of McKinney & McDowell received
$191,000 during a seven-month period that ended in April,
according to the most recent filing with the U.S. Justice
Department. And the Miami law firm of Kurzban Kurzban &
Weinger, P.A., acting on behalf of President Aristide,
dispersed $594,500, to several law firms and individuals.
Among the most prominent spokespeople is former Democratic
Rep. Michael Barnes, whose law firm receives a monthly
retainer of $27,500. The money comes from Haitian government
bank accounts in the U.S. that were frozen following the
military coup and that now are controlled by President
Aristide.
favorable human-rights record
Beyond the public relations, President Aristide had a
generally favorable human-rights record during his seven
months in office, says Kenneth Roth, executive director of
Human Rights Watch, a private group. Nevertheless, he adds,
President Aristide has one ``large blight on his record.'' In
July 1991, five youths were arrested by police and later
murdered; President Aristide blocked an investigation of a
leading suspect, the police chief, who was a strong Aristide
supporter.
The State Department's human-rights report for 1991
concluded that, ``although there were few institutional
advances made to improve respect for human rights during the
Aristide government, there were fewer instances of abuse by
soldiers, which resulted in a greater sense of personal
security.''
President Aristide's history with his church is also
somewhat mixed. According to a spokesman for the National
Council of Catholic Bishops, he was expelled from his order,
the Salesians of Don Bosco, in November 1988 because he no
longer was living up to the principles and the restrictions
of the order, which primarily is focused on the needs of the
poor. Prior to the expulsion, which later was approved by
Rome, he was given several warnings by his superiors for
preaching violence. The Salesians, however, say President
Aristide chose to leave because of the order's restriction
against mixing religion and politics.
allegations of drug ties
Another recent attack on President Aristide involves
allegations of ties to the drug trade. In a letter to
Attorney General Janet Reno, written the day after the U.S.
reached agreement with Gen. Cedras in Haiti, Sen. Larry
Pressler, a South Dakota Republican, citing an ABC News
report, called for an investigation of charges that President
Aristide received money from drug dealers.
Carl Stern, a Justice Department spokesman, says the
charges, which weren't new, had been investigated and ``there
was no basis found for going further.''
But such charges are kept alive by a network of
conservatives that includes talk-radio shows. Armstrong
Williams, host of ``The Right Side,'' says he receives
hundreds of calls from listeners who characterize President
Aristide as a criminal and unfit for U.S. support. Mr.
Williams, in turn, passes on tidbits that buttress that
perception. ``Aristide,'' he says, ``is my favorite subject
these days.''
____
[From the Washington Times, Oct. 4, 1994]
Pressler Urges Panel to Probe Claim That Aristide Took Bribe, Asks Why
DEA Interview of Ousted Leader Was Barred
(By Jerry Seper)
Sen. Larry Pressler wants the Senate Judiciary Committee to
investigate accusations that deposed Haitian President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide and his top aides took payoffs from
Colombian drug dealers to keep Haitian smuggling routes to
the United States open.
In a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen.
Joseph R. Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat, and Sen. Orrin G.
Hatch of Utah, the ranking Republican on the panel, the South
Dakota Republican described the accusations as ``extremely
serious.''
``Such allegations, if true, are extremely troubling given
the administration's strong support for President Aristide
and his return to power,'' Mr. Pressler said.
In a separate letter to Attorney General Janet Reno, Mr.
Pressler sought information on the Justice Department's role
in an ongoing Aristide investigation and asked if the
department had refused to allow U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration agents in Miami to question the ousted
president.
``I also wish to know whether the Justice Department
refused DEA permission to interview President Aristide, the
department's reasons for denying such a request and the name
of the department official responsible for that decision,''
said Mr. Pressler, himself a Judiciary Committee member.
The Aristide accusations surfaced this year when a former
member of the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia told the DEA
Mr. Aristide and several aides took bribes from cartel
leaders to guarantee cocaine smuggling routes through Haiti
to the United States.
The former Medellin lieutenant and top aide to Pablo
Escobar, the cartel's late boss, told DEA agents in Miami
that the payoff was given to Mr. Aristide in the months
before his ouster in September 1991 by a military coup.
The informant, now a government witness, described the
suspected Aristide payoff and payment of bribes to key aides
during interviews earlier this year, first reported last
month by ABC News.
An investigation is under way, although a request by DEA
agents in Miami to question Mr. Aristide in the probe was
rejected last month by a Justice Department oversight
committee. The Undercover Review Committee challenged the
informant's credibility but did not stop the investigation.
Justice Department sources said the informant could not
provide specific corroboration and showed ``some deception''
in a polygraph test administered by the DEA. Some department
officials said the polygraph findings were ``mixed'' but not
disqualifying.
Although the decision not to question Mr. Aristide came at
a time the Clinton administration was considering using
military force to return him to power, Miss Reno has denied
that politics played any role.
Mr. Aristide has denied the accusations. A spokesman
described statements by the informant as ``nonsense.''
The informant, the sources said, told the DEA that the
Aristide payoff was delivered by Franz Biamby, the Medellin
cartel's Haitian connection. Mr. Biamby, a suspected drug
smuggler, is a cousin of Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby, chief of
staff to Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's military leader.
The sources said Mr. Biamby told the informant he
personally delivered a money-filled suitcase to Mr. Aristide.
The information came during an investigation of Mr. Biamby's
suspected ties to Haitian drug smugglers, along with that of
other former and current Haitian civilian and military
leaders, they said.
``It's hard to believe the Clinton administration would
seek an investigation of Haiti's military leadership and
their roles in drug smuggling and not know the DEA would also
come up with the Aristide connection,'' said one source close
to the investigation.
In his letter to Miss Reno, Mr. Pressler said he understood
the DEA discovered Mr. Aristide's suspected ties to the
Medellin cartel after the White House had directed the agency
to ``investigate allegations of profiteering from drug
trafficking'' by military officials in Haiti, including Gen.
Cedras.
``During the course of this investigation, the DEA
ostensibly uncovered information linking not only Haitian
military officials to drug money, but also President
Aristide,'' he said.
In May, the Justice Department confirmed it was
investigating drug trafficking by the Haitian military,
naming 14 top military officers, Haiti's port director and
the Haitian National Intelligence Service as investigative
targets.
____
[From the Washington Times, Oct. 3, 1994]
Escobar Aide Tells DEA of Aristide Bribe
(By Jerry Seper)
A former member of a Colombian drug cartel, now a
government informant, has told the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration that ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide personally took a bribe from cartel leaders to
guarantee that cocaine smuggling routes through Haiti to the
United States would remain open.
The unidentified informant, according to Justice Department
sources, told DEA agents in Miami that the cash--several
thousands of dollars stuffed in a suitcase--was given to Mr.
Aristide in 1991 by members of the Medellin drug cartel,
headed at the time by Pablo Escobar.
The informant is deemed ``credible'' by Justice Department
officials in other pending cases, the sources said.
A former Medellin cartel lieutenant and top Escobar aide,
the informant described the suspected Aristide payoff and the
payment of bribes to other Haitian officials, including key
Aristide aides, during several interviews this year with DEA
officials.
An investigation into the accusations is continuing,
although a request by DEA agents in Miami to question Mr.
Aristide in the probe was rejected last month by a Justice
Department oversight committee. The Undercover Review
Committee challenged the informant's credibility but did not
stop the probe.
The sources said the informant could not provide specific
corroboration and showed ``some deception'' in a polygraph
test administered by the DEA. Some Justice Department
officials said the polygraph findings were ``mixed'' but not
disqualifying.
The informant told agents in Miami that the Aristide payoff
was delivered by Franz Biamby, the Medellin cartel's Haitian
connection, the sources said. Mr. Biamby, a suspected drug
smuggler, is a cousin of Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby. Gen.
Biamby is chief of staff to Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's
military leader.
According to the sources, the informant said Mr. Biamby
told him he had personally delivered the money-filled
suitcase to Mr. Aristide. The information, they said, came
during an investigation of Mr. Biamby's suspected role in
drug smuggling in Haiti, along with that of other former and
current Haitian civilian and military leaders.
The sources said the informant often served as a ``bagman''
for Escobar, the notorious Medellin boss who was killed in a
shootout with Colombian police last year.
At one time, Escobar headed a drug trafficking operation
out of Medellin, Colombia, and had a net worth of more than
$2.5 billion. He was blamed for the deaths of hundreds of
people--including presidential candidates, judges and
police--in a series of assassinations and car bombings.
Justice Department officials have denied that politics
played any role in the decision to turn down the interview
request, although it came at a time when the Clinton
administration was considering using military force to return
Mr. Aristide to power.
Attorney General Janet Reno said last week the decision to
reject the Aristide interview was made by the department's
undercover review committee. She said committee members,
including criminal division lawyers who are assigned to the
panel, were ``participating in a DEA structure, and I've
tried to do it the way it's always done to make sure that
there is no political interference.''
DEA spokesman Bill Ruzzimenti has declined comment, saying
that, as a matter of policy, the agency will neither confirm
nor deny that anyone is the subject of an active
investigation.
Mr. Aristide has denied accusations that he was involved in
drug payoffs. A spokesman described statements by the
informant as ``nonsense.''
White House spokesman David Levy did not return calls to
his office last week seeking answers on what and when
administration officials knew about the Aristide
investigation.
The DEA informant accused Mr. Aristide and his aides of
using Haitian military officers and others to protect
incoming drug flights and outgoing shipments, the Justice
Department sources said.
Haiti has long been a suspected transshipment point for
cocaine headed to the United States from South America.
Haitian officials and military leaders, according to law
enforcement authorities, have long been involved in an
international smuggling network that uses freighters, small
boats, commercial airliners and smaller aircraft to smuggle
drugs to the United States. Its remote landing strips are
easily accessible to small planes flying too low to be
detected by radar.
The DEA has estimated that a ton of cocaine is smuggled
through Haiti to the United States each month. A 1992 State
Department report described Haiti as a ``transshipment point
of illegal narcotics, especially cocaine, into the United
States.''
Mr. Aristide is a Roman Catholic priest who was expelled in
1988 from the Salesian order, one of the church's largest,
for using religion to incite hatred and violence. He was
elected president in December 1990 and overthrown nine months
later in a military coup. He is expected to return to Haiti
after coup leaders step down Oct. 15.
As president, he repeatedly used implicit threats of mob
violence to intimidate his opponents in the business class,
the National Assembly and the military.
In September 1991, shortly before his ouster, he invoked
``God's justice'' in urging his followers to ``necklace''
opponents--hang discarded, gasoline-filled tires around their
necks and set them ablaze. He did not mention burning tires
explicitly but referred to the smell of something burning.
Mr. Aristide is still a priest in the eyes of the church
because he never officially received a dispensation from his
vows. Church law bars priests from holding elected office,
except in unusual circumstances.
____
[From the Washington Times, Sept. 30, 1994]
DEA Probes Report of Aristide Drug Link--Colombian Smugglers Said to
Use Haiti
(By Jerry Seper)
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents are
investigating accusations that deposed Haitian President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide took bribes from Colombian drug
dealers to ensure that longstanding Haitian smuggling routes
into the United States remained open.
The DEA probe, according to Justice Department sources, has
focused on the ousted president and several top aides. They
are suspected of accepting payoffs during the Aristide
presidency to guarantee Haiti's use as a transshipment point
for millions of dollars in cocaine bound for the United
States.
Mr. Aristide and his aides, some of whom stayed in Haiti
after the Aristide government was overthrown in September
1991, were accused by a DEA informant of using Haitian
military officers and others to protect incoming drug flights
and outgoing shipments, the sources said.
The probe is continuing despite a department decision last
month rejecting a DEA request to question Mr. Aristide in the
case. The sources said the department's Undercover Review
Committee, which oversees high-profile cases, rejected the
request after challenging the informant's credibility.
The interview request was rejected as the Clinton
administration was considering using military force to return
Mr. Aristide to power, although Attorney General Janet Reno
yesterday denied that politics played a role in the decision.
A militant Roman Catholic priest, Mr. Aristide was elected
president in December 1990 and overthrown nine months later
in a military coup. He is expected to return to Haiti after
coup leaders step down Oct. 15.
The Aristide investigation began after information on the
suspected payoffs was given to DEA agents by the informant,
who has been described as reliable in other cases. The
sources said the unidentified informant was unable to provide
specific corroboration and showed ``some deception'' in a
polygraph test administered by the agency.
``We get allegations, we pursue them in every way we can
without any political interference,'' Miss Reno said during
her weekly press briefing yesterday. ``DEA has a structure
for making informed decisions . . . to ensure there is no
political interference, and I insisted that it be done that
way.''
Initially, she said the DEA made the decision not to
question Mr. Aristide: ``DEA made a decision; it was not made
by the department.'' Later, however, she acknowledged the
decision had been made by a committee within her department.
DEA spokesman Bill Ruzzimenti declined comment yesterday,
saying that, as a matter of policy, the agency will neither
confirm nor deny that anyone is the subject of an active
investigation.
White House spokesman David Levy did not return a call to
his office yesterday seeking answers on what and when
administration officials knew about the Aristide
investigation.
Haiti has long been a suspected transshipment point for
cocaine headed to the United States from South America.
Haitian officials and military leaders, according to law
enforcement authorities, have been involved in smuggling
since the 1980s.
The DEA investigation, according to Justice Department
officials, has focused on a suspected Haitian-Colombian
smuggling network established by Haitian Col. Jean-Claude
Paul, who died in 1988 under suspicious circumstances.
Col. Paul, who at one time provided protection for Mr.
Aristide during the priest's rise to political prominence in
Haiti, was suspected by U.S. drug agents of making $40
million by facilitating cocaine shipments for the Medellin
cartel between December 1986 and his death in November 1988.
Indicted in March 1988 by a federal grand jury in Miami on
charges of aiding drug traffickers, Col. Paul died nine
months later of poisoning at his home in Port-au-Prince. He
had been accused of conspiring to import 200 pounds of
cocaine into the United States. Also indicated were his
brother, Antonio Paul, and his ex-wife, Marie Merielle
Delnois.
As commander of the powerful Dessalines Barracks in Port-
au-Prince, he was accused of using one of his personal
airstrips in Haiti to ferry Colombian cocaine into the United
States. The indictment came after a DEA informant, Osvaldo
Quintana, outlined the suspected smuggling operations to a
grand jury.
The 49-year-old colonel became one of the most powerful
army officers in Haiti after the fall of the Duvalier family
dictatorship in February 1986. He remained a key figure after
being forced into retirement and managed to avoid being sent
to the United States for trial.
Col. Paul died Nov. 6, 1988, after eating a bowl of soup
containing a ``toxic substance,'' which was not identified. A
maid and gardener were arrested but not charged.
Fritz Pierre-Louis, a former Haitian army lieutenant who
later defected, told a Senate subcommittee in 1988 that he
personally turned over confiscated cocaine to Col. Paul only
to have it disappear. Mr. Pierre-Louis said 70 percent of the
colonel's Dessalines Barracks forces was involved in the drug
trafficking.
Haiti is a key part of an international smuggling network
that has long used freighters, small boats, commercial
airliners and smaller airplanes to smuggle drugs to the
United States. Its remote landing strips are easily
accessible to small planes flying below radar level.
The DEA has estimated that a ton of cocaine is smuggled
through Haiti to the United States each month, although
shipments have been slowed by the recent U.S. embargo. A 1992
State Department report described Haiti as a ``transshipment
point of illegal narcotics, especially cocaine into the
United States.''
Mr. Aristide has denied any involvement in drug trafficking
and has publicly condemned suspected trafficking within the
Haitian military leadership that overthrew him. During his
exile in Washington, he said the military leaders who deposed
him were responsible for $500 million in smuggling annually.
Seizures of cocaine in Haiti, however, dropped from 3,812
pounds in 1990, the year before Mr. Aristide assumed power,
to 415 pounds in 1991, after he took over as president.
In May, the Justice Department said it was investigating
drug trafficking within the Haitian military. It said
prosecutors had evidence that military officers were
continuing to protect incoming and outgoing cocaine
shipments.
A six-page memo named 14 top military officers. Haiti's
port director and the Haitian National Intelligence Service
as targets of the Justice Department probe. The memo said
authorities had established ``that the Haitian military have
been closely involved in the facilitation of drug trafficking
since at least the early 1980's.''
The memo, which said indictments were not expected in the
immediate future, said drugs confiscated from smugglers often
were sold to other traffickers for delivery in the United
States. It also said Haitian officers were closely involved
with Colombian smugglers, although it did not identify the
dealers.
According to the memo, the key target was Lt. Col. Michel
Francois, chief of police in Port-au-Prince. Col. Francois,
not the nation's military chief, Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, was
identified as the most powerful figure in the regime that
overthrew Mr. Aristide.
The memo does not mention Gen. Cedras as an investigative
target. A confidential Senate report last year said the
general's role in smuggling was not clear:
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, this decision not to interview Mr.
Aristide is even more disturbing since American military forces are
currently occupying Haiti and, according to a recent New York Times
article, we are spending $5 million on covert activities to restore
Aristide to power.
I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the New York Times
article at this point.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Sept. 27, 1994]
C.I.A. Reportedly Taking a Role in Haiti
(By Elaine Sciolino)
Washington, Sept. 27.--In a move that some lawmakers
believe could subvert the democratic process in Haiti,
President Clinton has approved a secret contingency plan that
authorities unspecified political activities to neutralize
the opponents of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, senior
Administration officials said today.
In addition, the $5 million plan authorizes the Central
Intelligence Agency to spend $1 million on propaganda
activities to help ease Father Aristide's return and to use
covert means to protect American forces there from hostile
military groups, the officials added.
To avoid charges that the United States is interfering, the
C.I.A. does not have the authority to undertake political
activities on its own, the officials added. But the vague
nature of the term ``political actions'' has alarmed some
lawmakers who fear that money could be used to corrupt
politics in Haiti.
Administration officials briefed key lawmakers last
Wednesday about Mr. Clinton's order, known as a finding, as
required by law. Since then, the C.I.A. has begun to use some
of the $1 million earmarked for propaganda for covert radio
broadcasts and to penetrate military groups that might seek
to harm American troops.
The officials briefing Congress told lawmakers that one of
the goals was to ``create a political climate'' that would
help put into effect the agreement that former President
Jimmy Carter reached with Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's
military leader, on Sept. 18.
Under that agreement, General Cedras and other military
leaders must relinquish power after the parliament approves a
general amnesty, or by Oct. 15, whichever comes earlier. The
Clinton Administration supports an amnesty so that it does
not have to forcibly remove the Haitian leaders if they
refuse to leave.
A number of lawmakers said they were convinced that under
the covert operation, pro-military legislators elected under
disputed circumstances could be paid off to step aside, and
that the C.I.A. had the authority to pay expenses, provide
security or give other incentives to parliamentarians who do
not want to vote for amnesty.
``I cannot discuss intelligence matters, but it would not
be uncommon for the United States to get involved in some
manner in promoting free and fair elections,'' said Senator
Dennis DeConcini, Democrat of Arizona. ``To me this could be
done in many ways. I would think an open overt way would be
the best. The institutions are there.''
Senior Administration officials familiar with the
Presidential finding insisted that it did not authorize the
C.I.A. to bribe officials or try to influence the vote on
amnesty.
``We have specifically excluded paying people off or
getting involved in the political process in an intrusive
way,'' said one senior Administration official. ``We took
those activities out. We have done absolutely zero in this
domain, and I seriously doubt whether we will pursue this at
all.''
But a number of Administration officials conceded that
there could be circumstances in which the United States might
want to take action to stop the military from paralyzing
Haitian politics, as it did last year in blocking the
Governors Island accord, under which the military was to step
down.
``Our concern is that the bad guys are going to bribe
people, intimidate people, keep people away from the
parliament,'' said one senior United States official. ``On a
limited basis, we may have to do things to counter that.''
For example, if the United States uncovered a coup plot
against Father Aristide, Washington could take measures to
thwart it, officials said. And although, on paper at least,
payments to deputies are not allowed, officials said they
could be offered protection, transportation to and from
parliament and other help.
Some lawmakers familiar with the plan also expressed
concern about spending $1 million on C.I.A.-generated
propaganda when Washington is already supporting an overt
program, including two radio stations that broadcast messages
from Father Aristide and the distribution of millions of pro-
Aristide leaflets.
Administration officials countered that the covert
propaganda program gives the Administration maximum
flexibility and provides funds for activities like
newspapers.
The secret order renders invalid an earlier $12 million
secret plan to offer Haiti's three top military leaders a
comfortable life in exile and to conduct covert activities
that might undermine them.
Administration spokesmen officially refused to confirm or
deny the existence of the secret programs. ``Consistent with
this Administration's steadfast practice, we do not comment
one way or another on alleged intelligence activities,'' said
Michael McCurry, the State Department spokesman.
As part of the plan, Mr. Clinton authorized the C.I.A. to
introduce agents inside Haiti to detect plots to assassinate
American soldiers or take them hostage.
In a formal review after the mission in Somalia, where 18
American troops were killed last October while trying to
capture a clan leader, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board concluded `that there was not sufficient
support by the C.I.A., and that authority for covert
operations should be in place whenever American forces were
deployed in a potentially hostile environment, senior
officials said.
Mr. PRESSLER. Apparently, we are spending millions of dollars in
overt and covert aid to get rid of opponents of Mr. Aristide in order
to return Mr. Aristide to power. Some of his opponents are alleged to
have been involved in drug smuggling activities, and now there are
allegations about Mr. Aristide as well.
It is unsettling to me that we are investing such large sums of money
and putting U.S. servicemen in possible jeopardy on behalf of Mr.
Aristide, yet the U.S. Government decides not to interview him about
the allegations of an informant who is considered reliable.
I had hoped to appear before the Committee on Government Operations
in the other body tomorrow to ask questions of the DEA Administrator,
Tom Constantine. Regrettably, the chairman of that committee has
refused my request to ask questions at the hearing.
Therefore, I have submitted my questions to the President. I want to
know the results of the investigation into Haitian drug trafficking.
What information has been uncovered? Who in the White House was
notified of this information and when? Did the White House or the
Justice Department make the decision not to question Mr. Aristide? Was
the decision based on political factors?
Did the DEA interview Mr. Molina? Did the Justice Department cut a
deal with him? If so, what were the details of the deal? Did he pass a
lie detector test? Where is Mr. Molina now?
Madam President, what I want is simple. I want the administration to
give a clear strong, unreserved statement that they know of no evidence
that Jean-Bertrand Aristide, or anyone closely associated with him,
accepted money from foreign drug traffickers.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Presiding Officer wishes to advise the
Senator from South Dakota his time has expired.
The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I want quickly, if I can, before yielding
to the colleague from Iowa, to say with all due respect to my friend
and colleague from South Dakota, that this is nothing new. Every day
there was some new allegation raised about President Aristide.
Let me just inform my colleagues that we have received very credible
evidence that the so-called source that our colleague from South Dakota
refers to is totally unreliable, has been unreliable in dozens of cases
before; that the major source of paid information that was received by
our Government regarding Mr. Aristide came, in fact, from the very
people who we are now trying to disarm in that country; that, in fact,
a careful reading of the information from our Embassy in Haiti between
January or February 1991 and the end of September 1991, when President
Aristide was ousted in the coup, points to a clear, strong cooperation
between the Aristide government and our Drug Enforcement Agency, and
officials; that, in fact, the problem has resided in the very people we
are trying to get rid of.
Colonel Francois, the head of police, the only job he had as a police
officer, just moved into a $250,000 home in the Dominican Republic. He
did not buy the place with a policeman's salary.
The problem is with the element we are trying to get rid of. I
believe had there been further and serious allegations involving
President Aristide and drugs, you would have heard of them a long time
ago, given the effort to try and assassinate the character of this
individual.
So I want the record to be clear for my colleagues.
Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. DODD. I will not yield.
There is absolutely no truth whatsoever to these 11th hour
allegations regarding President Aristide and anyone who spends 5
minutes looking at it will draw the same conclusion.
Madam President, I am glad to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Iowa.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
The Senator from Connecticut has 2 minutes. The Senator from Iowa has
7 minutes.
Mr. DODD. I yield 9 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa.
Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator for yielding.
Again, Madam President, there has been more disinformation and
character assassination and rumor mongering about President Aristide
than anybody I have ever seen.
This latest allegation of President Aristide and drug running has
been leveled before. I am surprised by my friend and colleague from
South Dakota, who is a good individual and an intelligent individual,
to keep this kind of rumor mongering going. In fact, the article in the
Washington Times dated October 3, to which my colleague refers, says
that the information really came from Francois Biamby, who is the
cousin of, guess who, Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby. General Biamby is one
of the heads of the military junta along with General Cedras. He is the
one saying he delivered the money-filled suitcase to Mr. Aristide
Mr. PRESSLER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. HARKIN. The Senator had his time. I will finish my statement.
I remember a year ago up in the secret office in room 407 when the
CIA came in to give a briefing. I think the Senator from South Dakota
may have been in on that briefing. At that time it was alleged that Mr.
Aristide had taken drugs.
Well, guess where we got that information? After President Aristide
was overthrown in the coup, Cedras and the military turned over to our
people what they said were drugs that they had taken from President
Aristide's residence. Based on that, the CIA gives us this information
that he takes drugs.
Then we heard that President Aristide had been treated in a mental
hospital in Canada. Well, it took me probably 45 days to 2 months to
track that down. I finally did. This allegation has been totally,
totally shown to be false. We had a person with an affidavit from
President Aristide saying he could get any and all information from any
hospital in Canada regarding any treatments he ever received. Armed
with that, this individual went up to Canada to the hospitals and, of
course, they said they had absolutely no record of ever treating him.
Just to show you the amount of disinformation the CIA can
disseminate, when they first told us the year President Aristide had
been in a mental hospital in Canada, it turned out that President
Aristide was not even in Canada. He was studying biblical history in
Israel. So you have to take this all into account.
I will tell you, there has been a campaign against President Aristide
the likes of which I have never seen.
Mr. PRESSLER. Will my friend yield?
Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, there has been a lot of talk today about
President Clinton. I want to say, Madam President, that President
Clinton has done the right thing, the honorable thing, the good thing,
and he has done it correctly.
President Clinton went the extra mile after he came into office to
carry forward the policies of President Bush regarding Haiti. He went
the extra mile to seek a peaceful solution. We had the Governors Island
Accord. General Cedras signed it. Then there was the Harlan County
incident. Rather than send our unarmed troops in there in harm's way,
President Clinton sent them back and tried to seek a peaceful solution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Iowa withhold?
It is difficult to hear the Senator from Iowa because of other
conversations in the Chamber. The Presiding Officer would ask that
other conversations cease.
Mr. HARKIN. President Clinton continued the negotiations. Then we put
on the embargo. And then when it was clear that the Haitian generals
would not leave, did President Clinton go off Lone Ranger-like to take
care of Haiti? No. He went to the United Nations. He went to get other
countries to support us. And, in fact, we have more nations supporting
what we are doing in Haiti than we did in the Gulf war. So President
Clinton went the extra mile.
And then, finally, he said, ``Enough is enough, they have to go.''
And then, at the last minute, he sent a negotiating team down to Haiti
for one last chance. And the negotiating team succeeded.
You know, Madam President, memories are short around here. I remember
when Ronald Reagan went into Grenada. He did not go to the U.N. He did
not go to seek any help. He went down there Lone Ranger-like; a country
of 100,000 people. We lost 19 troops when we invaded Grenada. No one
talks about that.
When we went after Noriega in Panama, we lost 24 U.S. soldiers. No
one talks about that. I happened to have supported that. The day after
Grenada, I got on the floor and supported it. I supported President
Bush when he went to Panama.
And yet, while we are here in Haiti, while we are disarming the
military and paramilitary Forces, while we are bringing Aristide back,
we have not lost one American soldier and hope to God we do not lose
any. Yet, for all of that, people get on the floor today and castigate
President Clinton as though he did something wrong.
I want you to know I am proud of this President and I am proud of
what he has done. We have finally taken steps to root out one of the
worst dictatorships, terrorist organizations in this hemisphere and to
stick up for the people of Haiti.
You do not have to take my word for it. Read the newspapers. Every
day wherever our troops are in Haiti, the people come out and treat
them as liberators, embrace them, turn over their guns to them.
As long as our troops are on the side of the Haitian people, they
will not be harmed. The only harm that could possibly come to our
troops would be from FRAPH and other paramilitary entities that are
down there.
Finally, Madam President, I also want to praise President Aristide.
His entire life has been one of fighting for the poor, those without
power, those who suffered under the dictator Duvalier, the Tonton
Macoutes and the repressive military. Here is a man who was elected in
a free election with 67 percent of the vote. Under Aristide, human
rights abuses dwindled precipitously in the 8 months he was in office.
There was not one case of necklacing during his entire tenure in
office. Oh, we always hear about that, but the fact remains, there was
not one case of necklacing when President Aristide was in office. That
happened before he assumed office.
Under his brief tenure, President Aristide stopped the drug
trafficking, he halted abuses by the military, he paid off their
foreign debts, he took away Government enterprises and turned them over
to the private sector.
It was the military and the elite that said, ``No, he had to go,''
and 8 months later he was overthrown in a coup. Since that time, a
disinformation campaign the likes of which we have never seen has been
continuing, trying to discredit him and tear him down.
The closest I can come to what has happened to President Aristide is
Nelson Mandela. Today, President Mandela addressed a joint meeting of
Congress. We all stood and applauded, wildly enthusiastic. But just a
few years ago he was branded by some people here as a Communist
terrorist, someone who, if let out and got power would unleash
bloodletting throughout South Africa to seek vengeance. Madam
President, it did not happen then.
President Aristide has vowed reconciliation without vengeance and
that is what he will do.
Mr. DODD. Will my colleague from Iowa yield?
Mr. HARKIN. I am delighted to yield.
Mr. DODD. I just got off the phone with someone in the Deputy
Attorney General's office, who called because he was disturbed over
some of the comments made on the floor regarding the Justice
Department's alleged interference with the Drug Enforcement Agency's
handling the allegations regarding President Aristide's involvement
with narcotics. He told me that at the briefings with Senator Hatch of
Utah and Senator Biden of Delaware, the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, they are satisfied that the Drug Enforcement Agency made the
decision on their own based on the fact there was no merit whatsoever
to the allegations not to interview President Aristide. The Justice
Department was not involved. Two of our colleagues, senior members of
the Judiciary Committee, have been briefed on this point.
Mr. PRESSLER. Will my friend yield?
Mr. DODD. And, in fact, as to the allegations raised by our
colleagues, for three times attempts have been made to communicate the
same information and the calls have not been returned.
Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. HARKIN. How much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and 30 seconds.
Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. HARKIN. I do not have the time to yield.
Madam President, there is story that will come out in The Nation
magazine tomorrow that paints a terrible picture of FRAPH, the right
wing terrorist organization in Haiti, and the fact that it has close
ties to our Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Madam President, if these charges are indeed true, it raises very
serious questions as to what our CIA is doing in Haiti right now. I
raised this issue here on the floor a week ago. Well, certain elements
of the CIA who have been spreading disinformation about President
Aristide are now back in Haiti again.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this article from The
Nation magazine be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries: Our Man in FRAPH
(By Allan Nairn)
Emmanuel Constant, the leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad,
is a protege of US intelligence. Interviews with Constant and
with U.S. officials who have worked directly with him confirm
that Constant recently worked for the C.I.A. and that U.S.
intelligence helped him launch the organization that became
the FRAPH. Documentary evidence obtained from other sources
and confirmed in part by Constant also indicates that a group
of attaches--some of them implicated in some of Haiti's most
notorious crimes--have been paid for several years by a U.S.
government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on
the movements of the Haitian poor.
In my October 3 Nation article [``The Eagle Is Landing''] I
quoted a U.S. intelligence official praising Constant as a
``young, pro-Western intellectual . . . no further right than
a young Republican'' and saying that U.S. intelligence had
``encouraged'' Constant to form the group that emerged as
FRAPH. Reached at his home on the night of September 26,
Constant confirmed the U.S. official's account. He said that
his first U.S. handler was Col. Patrick Collins, the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency attache, who he described as ``a
very good friend of mine'' (Constant spoke of dealing later
with another official he called ``[the US's] best liaison,''
but he refused to give a name). Constant said that colonel
Collins had first approached him while Constant was teaching
a training course at the headquarters of the CIA-run SIN
(National Intelligence Service) and was also (at the Bureau
of Information and Coordination [BIC] in the General
Headquarters of the Haitian coupe regime) building a computer
data base for Haiti's notorious rural Section Chiefs.
Giving an account that dovetailed closely with that of the
US official, Constant said that Collins began pushing him to
organize a front ``that could balance the Aristide movement''
and do ``intelligence'' work against it. He said their
discussions had begun soon after Aristide fell in September
1991, They resulted in Constant forming what later evolved
into FRAPH, a group that was known initially as the Haitian
Resistance League.
Constant at first refused to go beyond his usual public
statements on the FRAPH, but opened up after I told him that
I understood that he knew Col. Collins. Our initial interview
took place on the first day of the bold anti-FRAPH protests
on the streets of Port au Prince. Constant said that he
wanted to offer his men as ``guides'' for the occupation
force, saying that ``I've participated in the stabilization
of this country for the past three years, and the US knows it
very well, no matter what agency you talk to.''
Two days after that, as a crowd marched past FRAPH
headquarters, FRAPH gunmen opened fire killing one of the
demonstrators. Five days later, in the wake of embarrassing
coverage about both continued mayhem by the FRAPH and a US
raid on a supposed pro-Aristide terrorist camp (that was
actually--as it turned out--a world-famous dancing school).
US occupation forces raided FRAPH's downtown Port Au Prince
headquarters, carting away two dozen street-level gunmen (and
women) as live cameras and cheering crowds looked on. Some US
reporters proclaimed that this was the death of the terror
system, and CNN's Richard Blystone, announcing that there was
more crackdown to come, said that Constant was now ``at
large'' (a claim also made by the next morning's New York
Times).
Five minutes after Blystone's CNN broadcast, I reached
Constant by telephone at his Port-au-Prince home. He said
that the arrests had only been of low-level FRAPH people, and
that he still intended to put his men at US disposal. He said
that there were no US troops outside his house and worried
that it might be set upon by mobs. Then he said that he had,
just then, to leave for a meeting (on the street, he said)
with a US Embassy staffer who was hitherto unknown to him but
who he thought might be from the CIA.
He said that he would call back after the meeting, but he
didn't, and I couldn't reach him again. But the next day
Constant appeared in public guarded--for the first time--by
US Marines, and stated his fealty to the occupation and his
support for the return of Aristide.
Much of the US press played this as a stunning about-face,
but, in fact, Constant had been saying those things in public
and to me all week. He had told me that the Carter/Powell/
Nunn-Cedras pact, was ``the last chance for Haiti,'' and had
expressed no worry about the return of Aristide, saying that
the new Parliament, to be chosen in December, would be
constituted in a way that would hem him in.
Col. Collins is now back in Haiti (his last tour ended in
1992). The Clinton administration has brought him back for
the occupation, and he has refused to comment on the
record. But a well-informed intelligence official
(speaking before the FRAPH furor broke) confirmed that
Collins had worked with Constant and had, as Constant
says, guided him and urged him on. Collins has, in recent
weeks, spoken quite highly of Constant and has said that
Constant's mission from the United States was to counter
the ``extreme'' of Aristide. Collins has also said that,
when he first approached him, Constant ``was not in
position to do anything . . . [but] things evolved and
eventually he did come up, [and] what had been sort of an
idea and technically open for business--all of a sudden,
boom, it takes on national significance.''
When the relationship started, Constant was working for the
CIA, teaching a course at the Agency-run SIN on ``The
Theology of Liberation'' and ``Animation and Mobilization.''
The SIN, at that time, was engaged in terrorist attacks on
Aristide supporters, as were Constant's pupils, army S--2
field intelligence officers. The targets included, among
others, popular church cathecists. Constant says that the
message of the SIN course was that though communism is dead,
``the extreme left,'' through ti legliz, the grass-roots
Haitian ``little church,'' was attempting ``to convince the
people that in the name of God everything is possible'' and
that, therefore, it was right for the people to kill soldiers
and the rich. Constant says he taught that ``Aristide is not
the only one: there are tens of Aristides.''
Collins has recently acknowledged that FRAPH has indeed
carried out many killings, but he has said that they have not
been as numerous as the press and human rights groups claim.
He has said that one approach is that ``the only way you're
going to solve this is . . . [that] it'll all end in some big
bloodbath and there'll be somebody who emerges from it who
will establish a society of sorts and a judicial system and
he's going to say: O.K., you own the land, you don't--that's
it, whether it's fair or not.''
Though most U.S. officials would never speak that way, it's
universally acknowledged that FRAPH is an arm of the brutal
Haitian security system, which the US has built and
supervised and whose leaders it has trained, and often paid.
When I asked Constant, for example, about the anti-Aristide
coup, he said that as it was happening Col. Collins and
Donald Terry (the C.I.A. Station Chief who also ran the SIN)
``were inside the [General] Headquarters.'' But he insisted
that this was ``normal;'' the CIA and DIA were always there.
A foreign diplomat who knows the system well says that it
is from those very headquarters that Haiti's army, with the
police and the FRAPH have run a web of clandestine torture
houses (one of them in a private home at #43 Fontamara), some
of which are said to still be working as this article is
written on the occupation's 17th day. According to the
diplomat--who quoted internal documents as he spoke--the
walkie-talkies of house personnel are routinely monitored by
the U.S. Embassy, which, he said, also listened in on those
of the U.N. Civilian Mission. Some interrogators wear shirts
marked ``Camp de Aplicacion'' (an army base). The
diplomat also detailed a structure of seven chief attaches
who have run killings and brought victims to the torture
houses.
Four of those senior attaches (as well as other, lower-
ranking ones), according to documents and interviews, appear
to have worked out of the Centers for Development and Health
(C.D.S.), a large multiservice clinic funded mainly by the
U.S. Agency for International Development. One of them, Gros
Sergo (who was killed in September, 1993), listed C.D.S. on
his resume, writing that he worked in the archives and was a
``Trainer of Associates'' there. Another, Fritz Joseph--who,
Constant says, is the key FRAPH recruiter Cite Soleil and
who, according to official records, has been a chief attache
since the coup--is acknowledged by the C.D.S. director to
have worked at C.D.S. for many years. The two others, Marc
Arthur and Gros Fanfan (implicated by the UN in the murder of
Antoine Izmery), have been named in sworn statements as
having regularly received cash payments from C.D.S. Constant
confirms that FRAPH leaders and attaches are working inside
C.D.S. (and says specifically that Marc Arthur has worked
there) and says he speaks often on the phone with the
clinic's director, Dr. Reginald Boulos. Boulos denies that he
speaks to Constant, says that Sergo's resume is wrong, says
he does not knowingly employ attaches, and says that he did
not know until recently that Fritz Joseph was a FRAPH leader
but that he fired him when critics pointed out that he was.
Boulos said that C.D.S. files track ``every family in Cite
Soleil'' but insisted that, as far as he knows, attaches
don't have access to the archives. Boulos said he hadn't seen
Sergo in years, and when told of an entry from Sergo's
calendar that appeared to contradict that, he said it was
mistaken. He also downplayed the fact that Sergo had listed
him as a personal reference, along with coup leader General
Raoul Cedras (Another AID-funded unit Haiti, Planning
Associates, has also said, in AID meetings in Washington,
that it employs FRAPH personnel).
Sergo's papers indicate that he reported to Police Chief
Michel Francois (he has a pass, written on the back of
Francois' card, authorizing him and Marc Arthur ``to see the
Chief of Police at all hours of the day and night''), that he
and his squad organized anti-Aristide demonstrations, that,
just before C.D.S., he was in the Interior Ministry's
``intelligence police,'' and that he had appointments to meet
with the CIA's SIN chief, Col. Sylvain Diderot, and with
members of the Mevs. one of Haiti's ruling families.
Though some Haitian officials claim that Francois was on
the CIA payroll, this is denied by Lawrence Pezzullo, the
former US Special Envoy in Haiti, but Pezzullo did reveal
that the CIA paid Francois' brother, Evans, now a Haitian
diplomat in the Domincian Republic (Pezzullo joked, as to the
Colonel himself, ``you couldn't pay him enough to buy him.'')
FRAPH emerged as a national force in the latter months of
1993 when it staged a series of murders, public beatings, and
arson raids on poor neighborhoods. In one attack, Mrs. Alert
Belance had her right hand severed by FRAPH machetes.
President Clinton, when it was convenient, later used
photos of these macabre assaults to (accurately) brand
Haiti's rulers as ``armed thugs [who] have conducted a reign
of terror.'' But, in the moment when that terror was actually
at its height, Clinton used the FRAPH killings to harshly
pressure Aristide to ``broaden'' his already-broad cabinet in
a ``power-sharing'' deal. Pezzullo, in part echoing Collins'
original vision for Constant (though he denies any knowledge
of the arrangement), says that FRAPH was ``a political offset
to Lavalas'' and that as the ``bodies were starting to
appear'' ``We said [to Aristide]: the only people seen
operating politically now are the FRAPHistas,'' and that they
had to ``fill that gap with another force with the private
sector, otherwise these FRAPH people will be the only game in
town.''
It is often pointed out that FRAPH embarrassed the US by
chasing off the Harlan County, but in that case, US officials
could not agree about whether the ship should even be there.
Constant says he got no US guidance, but he openly announced
his dockside rally the day before and he apparently did not
get any US warning to call it off.
On the fundamentals, though, US officials have been united
in pressing Aristide from the right. Constant said, in our
first interview (well before his Marine press conference),
that he might now be ``too high profile'' for the US. But
even if he is, US intelligence is a system. And--as Constant
once taught about Aristide--there are others in the wings.
Mr. HARKIN. I also ask unanimous consent that a paper, entitled
``Background on FRAPH,'' also be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the International Liaison Office for President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide]
Background on FRAPH
FRAPH (Haitian Front for Advancement and Progress) is a
right-wing, extremist, paramilitary organization comprised
largely of current and former members of the security forces
and their civilian collaborators. Members of FRAPH have
carried out numerous illegal ``arrests,'' beatings, torture,
intimidation and murders of supporters democracy, often
taking the victims to the local military barracks for
incarceration. In most parts of the country, local FRAPH
organizations work in very close collaboration with the
military, and at times are better armed than the military.
Military officials often claim that ``FRAPH is we, we are
FRAPH.''
The acronym FRAPH sounds like the French and Creole words
for ``hit'' and the group's symbol is a fist. The
organization first came to international attention in October
of 1993, when it organized to oppose the planned return of
President Aristide under the Governors Island Accord. Since
then FRAPH has worked to consolidate itself as a political
front organization for the military coup regime. It recruits
members through intimidation, seeking to convince Haitians
that democracy will never return and that the only way to
survive is to join FRAPH. FRAPH revives Duvalier's Tonton
Macoute organization to fit the current political needs of
coup leaders.
fraph's leadership:
FRAPH is ``loyal primarily to the nation's shadowy police
commander, Lt. Col. Michel Francois.'' (Douglas Farah,
Washington Post, 1/26/94).
Emannual Constant, FRAPH leader, is the son of a former
army commander under Francois Duvalier. (Bella Stumbo, Vanity
Fair, 2/94)
FRAPH's secretary general Jodel Chamblain is a former
Tonton Macoute. (Pamela Constable, Boston Globe, 1/22/94;
Stumbo, 2/94). He reportedly participated in the massacre of
voters in the election of November 29, 1987, as well as in
Roger Lafontant's failed coup d'etat of January 1991.
Lynn Garrison, an advisor to Lt. Gen. Cedras and the
Haitian military, a Canadian who also reportedly holds a U.S.
passport and owns a Haitian art gallery in Los Angeles,
claims he helped to found FRAPH. (Stumbo, 2/94).
fraph's origins
FRAPH was consolidated when it organized a small group of
thugs and turned back the U.S.S. Harlan County, arriving with
an international mission as specified under the Governors
Island Accord. To quote Emannual Constant: ``I still can't
believe we succeeded * * * We were all so scared. My people
kept wanting to run away. But I took the gamble and urged
them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! We were
astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born . . .
now we know (Aristide) is never going to return.''
(Stumbo, 2/94).
FRAPH's FUNDING AND ARMS
Michel Francois controls black market in gasoline and
funnels resources into FRAPH. (Farah, 1/26/94).
FRAPH ``receives funding from Francois and a few
ultraconservative members of Haiti's elite.'' (Farah, 1/26/
94).
The military supplies FRAPH with weapons (an obvious point,
given that there is no other source of weapons in Haiti).
(Farah, 1/26/94).
Many members of FRAPH (section chiefs, paramilitary
attaches, and former Tonton Macoutes), now reportedly carry
i.d. cards signed by army officers. (Haiti Info. Feb. 6,
1994).
FRAPH's ACTIVITIES AND TACTICS
The U.N. International Civilian Mission to Haiti has
identified FRAPH as being involved in extensive human rights
violations. For example, in reference to repression of a
youth group the Mission states: ``Other members of the
organization were reported to have been illegally arrested by
members of the Duvalierist political organization Front pour
I ` advancement et le progress haitien (FRAPH) on the day of
their general strike, 7 October, and taken to . . . the site
of a mass grave during the Duvalier era where bodies have
regularly been discovered since the coup d'etat. One person .
. . was questioned about the activities of supporters of
President Aristide and shown photographs of several people .
. . whom his interrogators said they were going to kill; he
also saw some 20 bodies at the site.'' (Supplementary Report
of the International Civilian Mission, Nov. 18, 1993).
FRAPH is responsible for burning down an estimated 250
homes in Cite Soleil, a large slum in Port-au-Prince, on
December 27, 1993. Haitian human rights groups estimate 70
people murdered. According to the Boston Globe, ``Driving
residents out with clubs, they torched shacks with gasoline
and grenades.'' (Constable, 1/22).
FRAPH members prevented the fire department from putting
out the fire. After the fire, FRAPH members have been alleged
to be present at offices where aid was being distributed to
victims. (Report by the National Justice and Peace
Commission, January 1994.)
FRAPH members gather intelligence for the military. (Farah,
1/26/94).
FRAPH organizes violent public demonstrations against
democracy. (Stumbo. 2/94; Farah, 1/26/94).
FRAPH members make explicit death threats against President
Aristide and his followers. For example: FRAPH leader
Berniche Elysee of Jeremie stated ``If Aristide comes back .
. . I personally will kill him;'' FRAPH member Joel Avril of
Jeremie stated ``If (Aristide) comes here, he is dead.''
Also, FRAPH member Frenel Jean stated, ``It is better that
1,000 Aristide supporters die than one Macoute.'' (Farah, 1/
26/94).
FRAPH uses U.S. flags at demonstrations and often chants
pro-U.S. slogans. Constant has a large U.S. flag in his
house. (Farah, 1/26/94).
FRAPH's POLITICAL STRATEGY
FRAPH is expanding and consolidating its membership through
the use of terror. ``FRAPH has been opening dozens of offices
around the country and signing up members with fear, free
food and promises to end Haiti's crisis.'' (Susan Benesch,
Miami Harald, 3/7/94) As one resident of Cite Soleil stated;
``If you don't become a member of FRAPH, you had better leave
or you'll be dead,'' (Haiti Info, Feb. 6, 1994)
FRAPH's political strategy appears to be: (1) prevent the
return of President Aristide; (2) establish a reign of terror
and wipe out democratic organizations in civil society; (3)
consolidate itself as an organization; (4) attempt to take on
the appearance of a legitimate political party in order to
institutionalize its hold on power and gain international
acceptance, probably through elections.
FRAPH is now beginning to attempt to portray itself as
legitimate, civilian organization not directed by the
military in ``a bid to clean up its thuggish image.''
(Benesch 3/7/94). Emmanuel Constant ``said the days of
holding rallies surrounded by men with automatic weapons had
passed, but that in the beginning `people needed to feel a
little fear.''' (Farah, 1/26/94).
Constant also said that ``FRAPH's first goal was to do
`whatever is necessary' to keep Aristide out'' and that ``now
the organization of the population is the second objective.''
(Benesch, 3/7/94).
To appear less violent ``Constant said he recently obeyed
Francois' request that FRAPH keep its weapons hidden.''
(Benesch, 3/1/94).
FRAPH is pushing for elections. Emmanuel Constant ``would
like to run for president and thinks he can win.'' (Farah. 1/
26/94).
Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, what we are considering here is a
resolution supporting our President and supporting our troops in Haiti.
This troubled land needs some time. It needs our help. It needs our
military there to make sure that violence is not wreaked upon the
people of Haiti by the paramilitary groups. If we can not stick up for
democracies in our own hemisphere, God help us. If we cannot stand on
the side of the Haitian people who have welcomed us as liberators, to
help them throw out the yoke of repression and to help them build a
functioning democracy, then we have no right to claim leadership in the
world or in this hemisphere.
Madam President, this resolution deserves the support of everyone
here. We hope and pray that our troops will continue to do the same
kind of work that they are doing in disarming and dismantling these
groups. We hope and pray that the paramilitary groups in Haiti will not
resort to the violence to which they have become accustomed in the
past.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. HARKIN. This resolution deserves overwhelming support and
approval by the Senate.
haiti
Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, events in Haiti continue to unfold
amidst great uncertainty and danger for U.S. troops there. Although the
United States-led United Nations effort offers hope to the people of
Haiti that peace and democracy can come to their troubled homeland, the
success of our current effort is by no means assured. I know I state
the obvious, and voice the feelings of many in this chamber, when I say
we must take great care not to be drawn into a protracted and largely
unilateral effort to achieve noble but ill-defined goals of stability
and democracy in Haiti.
I welcomed the agreement reached by President Carter and his
delegation with the military authorities in Haiti and commend President
Carter, General Powell and Senator Nunn. Clearly, United States Forces
faced a much less threatening situation in Haiti upon arrival than they
would if they had to fight their way ashore. While the agreement is not
perfect, it may prove to be a basis for an orderly transition from
authoritarian rule back to democracy.
The political stability and economic progress of our hemisphere are,
in my view, solidly in our national interest. Our own domestic
prosperity depends on having democratic societies with which to trade
and which do not threaten our shores with massive waves of immigrants.
Three years ago, Haitian President Aristide was overthrown by a
military junta. No matter what one thinks of Aristide personally, he
was overwhelming elected president and still has the support of the
majority of the Haitian people. Following the coup, the military
government brutally suppressed Aristide supporters while human rights
abuses on the island skyrocketed.
I supported the intensive diplomatic efforts by the United States and
the international community to convince the unlawful military-led
government in Haiti to step aside and allow a peaceful return to
democracy. Unfortunately the Haitian military leaders refused to
implement the Governor's Island Accords they signed last summer and
have stonewalled all diplomatic efforts since then.
The United Nations has threatened and sanctioned the use of force to
remove the illegal government from Haiti. And having made that threat,
we--the United States and the international community--had to be
willing to carry it out.
The on-going violence in Haiti is deeply troubling to me, and one of
our objectives must be to see that it does not continue. Clearly the
task of gaining concrete operational control over the Haitian police
force is well underway. This process must be completed and these
functions must be turned over to a U.N. force as soon as possible.
We need look no further than the immediate region to see an example
of how this approach to ending a civil war can be successful. El
Salvador, while different from Haiti, in many significant ways,
provides a guide for successful demilitarization and separation of
military and police forces. We can also look to Honduras, traditionally
the second poorest country in the hemisphere after Haiti, for
encouragement that a poor country, when it has a commitment to
democracy, can make great progress in asserting civilian control over
the military. The economy of Honduras is slowly, steadily gathering
strength and attracting investment as the stability of democracy
creates a more healthy economic environment. With some assistance, this
too, could happen in Haiti.
As we look to the swift completion of the United States military
mission in Haiti and a replacement of U.S. soldiers with U.N. forces, I
propose that we pause for a moment to look beyond Haiti, to think for a
moment about what our national priorities and goals really are. Many of
my colleagues do not see reinstatement of democracy in Haiti as in our
vital national interest. I have argued that if we take the long-range
view, it certainly is. This disagreement points up the need for better
formulation and then clearer articulation of our vision of our place in
the world. In the absence of a clear understanding of our role, it is
impossible to sort out which trouble spots should get our attention and
where we should expend our limited resources. I urge the President and
the Congress to take up the challenge that this debate--as well as
discussions of the tragedy in Bosnia--has so poignantly illuminated and
begin the very difficult work of formulating a new expression of our
national goals and priorities for the coming years.
Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to explain
why I am compelled to vote against the leadership's resolution on
Haiti.
There is much in this resolution I agree with. For example, it states
that, ``the men and women of the United States Armed Forces in Haiti
who are performing with professional excellence and dedicated
patriotism are to be commended.'' I could not agree more.
It also says, ``the President should have sought and welcomed
Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed Forces to
Haiti.'' Again, I fully agree.
This resolution also asserts that, ``the departure from power of the
de facto authorities in Haiti, and Haitian efforts to achieve national
reconciliation, democracy, and the rule of law are in the best
interests of the Haitian people.'' Who could argue with that?
However, the heart of this resolution is the statement that,
``Congress supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United
States Armed Forces from Haiti as soon as possible.''
Mr. President, this is not good enough. Our troops must come home by
a specific date, not at some indefinite future time. As our experience
in Somalia demonstrated, we need to set a legal deadline for United
States withdrawal if this is to be anything more than a warm and fuzzy
statement of good intentions. Without a legal deadline, U.S.
decisionmaking will not develop and implement a plan for withdrawal. A
sense of Congress that the troops should come home ``as soon as
possible'' is not enough.
This is not a question of rushing the United States out of Haiti,
leaving it to descend back into chaos. It is a question of setting the
clock ticking so that the administration will have to formulate and
implement a plan to turn over the job of policing Haiti to police.
In Somalia, our military went in with one mission, then saw it
transformed into something very different. The result was tragedy. In
Haiti, we are seeing the same phenomenon. Our troops were initially
trained as invaders, then told they were partners with the Haitian
authorities, and now have been transformed into police. Every day in
Haiti brings an unforeseen circumstance which leads to a change in the
mission.
Let me just list a few examples:
September 18: The Carter-Cedras agreement states, ``the Haitian
military and police forces will work in close cooperation with the U.S.
Military Mission.''
September 20: After U.S. soldiers watched Haitian police beat a pro-
Artistide demonstrator to death, General Shalikashvili said, ``We are
not in the business of doing day-to-day law and order.''
September 21: An unnamed ``senior administration official'' is quoted
by the Washington Post describing a new approach: ``Where a military
personnel observes grave abuses by the Haitian police or military that
threatens the life of a victim * * * he may be authorized to intervene
by the senior United States commander on the ground.''
September 22: U.S. troops seize the Haitian army's heavy weapons.
September 24-26: After a firefight in Cap Haitien and the resulting
chaos, U.S. troops seize police stations, assume police
responsibilities in the north of the country. General Shalikashvili
announces that U.S. troops will intervene ``if mob violence begins to
threaten the overall stability of the country.''
September 27: U.S. forces assume responsibility for security at the
Parliament building.
September 30: Administration officials announce that the troop
ceiling will be raised from 15,000 to 19,600.
October 1: U.S. forces move to disarm paramilitary groups. An unnamed
senior official says the decision whether or not to intervene is
tactical; that is, to be taken on a case-by-case basis.
October 2-3: U.S. forces seize paramilitary leaders.
October 5: The Washington Post quotes a United States official in
Port-au-Prince as saying, ``clearly, the United States has been drawn
into doing more traditional police work than originally intended. There
was a real assumption the Haitians would carry out their functions.
Were we naive? I guess to some degree.''
I opposed the use of American troops in Haiti absent a compelling
rationale. Without a clear definition of the goals, means, contingency
plans, and exit strategy, the administration should not deploy American
troops. From the continuing mission creep we are witnessing in Haiti,
it is clear that the administration does not have a clear goal, means,
contingency plans, or exit strategy.
Mr. President, combat troops should not be turned into police. The
two roles are totally different. One uses overwhelming force to crush a
uniformed enemy; the other uses minimal force to control a civilian
population. One requires fury, the other restraint.
History is filled with examples of the difficulty of using combat
troops to try to impose civil order. We need look no farther than
Israel's experience with the Palestinian intifada. The early days of
the uprising in 1987 and 1988 were marked by high Palestinian
casualties, in large part because Israel's magnificent combat troops
were unsuited to the task of civilian riot control. Only after Israel
deployed border police and other units trained in police functions did
the casualty numbers drop.
Mr. President, I will vote against this resolution because I support
our troops. I support them too much to go on record favoring their
continued use as policemen in Haiti.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I intend to vote for this resolution.
But that vote is not a vote for, or an endorsement of, our policy in
Haiti.
I should begin by observing that I agree with the resolution's claim
that the President should have come to Congress for authorization prior
to committing American troops to an invasion or long-term mission in
Haiti. Frankly, Mr. President, I would not have authorized such action.
I am not persuaded that vital national security interests were at stake
in Haiti. Nor am I persuaded that the military can succeed, in the long
run, in restoring and preserving democracy in Haiti for the long term.
Admirable as our motives for wanting to see democracy restored are,
in my mind they do not justify the use of military force. Military
force is not just an extension of diplomacy; it is the ultimate
response to a direct and significant threat to our national security
interests. Much as I despise what the dictators did in Haiti, I do not
believe that their actions were a direct and significant threat to
America's national security.
One of the reasons I would not have authorized our action in Haiti is
the ambiguity that continues to surround our mission there. We have
seen American soldiers standing by while Haitians slaughtered each
other, and we have been appalled by that image. But when American
soldiers intervene to prevent such action, they inevitably become
involved in keeping civil order. This is not a military mission, it is
a civilian mission. And when our military performs civilian missions,
they also become bogged down in civilian political disputes. Hopefully
the multiple reporting requirements mandated by this resolution will
help us avoid a gradual expansion of our mission into the sort of ill-
fated nation building exercise which ended so tragically in Somalia.
Now, Mr. President, I have been pleasantly surprised by our success
in Haiti so far. Things seem to be moving in the right direction. That
is, in my mind, a sound reason to get out while the getting is good,
not a reason to stay there until things turn sour. I want our men and
women out of Haiti as soon as possible. This resolution does not
accomplish that goal but it at least brings us closer to it. And in
that spirit, I will support it.
One final point, Mr. President. I am disturbed by the possible
precedent that is being established by our decisions to intervene
militarily. In Haiti, despite a brief bow at the United Nations and
none to the United States Congress, and a sustained effort to create a
facade of multilateral support, the United States essentially decided
to go in because we were disturbed by what was happening there and by
the failure of diplomacy to achieve the results we wanted. Mr.
President, if we adopt that as a rationale for military action, how can
we prevent other countries from using it as well? If Russia objects to
the behavior or internal politics of the New Independent States
surrounding her and decides to intervene, how can we object? How will
we distinguish our justification for using force from theirs?
That is not to suggest, of course, that unilateral American military
action can never be appropriate. It is. But since it is a recourse of
the state, it ought to be a last recourse, one which is used sparingly
and only when the central interests of the United States hang in the
balance. That is not the case in Haiti. And even if, as we all hope,
things turn out well there, that ought not be the lesson we learn from
our involvement in Haiti.
resolution on u.s. involvement in haiti
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my full support for
the resolution that is now before us. This resolution is not
restrictive in nature or an attempt to undermine, in any way, the
efforts of our military forces who are carrying out their orders with
impeccable skill. Rather, this resolution is clearly a request for
essential information to be provided to the U.S. Congress on a matter
of supreme importance.
Members from both Houses of Congress, Republican and Democrat alike,
have been demanding a clearer explanation from the Clinton
administration for the commitment of United States troops to resolve
the Haitian situation.
Public opinion polls and media analysis throughout this ordeal have
reflected frustration with what appears to be the development of
American foreign policy and the commitment of U.S. armed forces without
defined parameters. The questions posed by this resolution are an
attempt by Congress to assist the Clinton administration in more
clearly setting forth its goals in Haiti.
It would be troubling indeed if the administration were unable to
respond to these questions publicly to Congress and to the American
people. If such explanations could not be provided, it would be a
disturbing indication that the administration is itself unclear about
the foreign policy it is pursuing in Haiti and about the correct use of
military power. I do not think, therefore, that the Clinton
administration should view this resolution as unreasonable or onerous.
Mr. President, along with the great majority of my fellow Utahns, I
was strongly opposed to employing United States troops to resolve the
political and social problems of Haiti. I do not believe that U.S.
troops should be used for nation-building. Our painful experiences with
mission creep and nation-building attempts in Somalia surely have not
been erased or forgotten in such a short time. We cannot correct
history, but we certainly can learn from it.
We find ourselves the biggest world power at a time of worldwide
uncertainty. But certain principles remain fast. The administration is
accountable to the American people and to their Representatives in
Congress. The administration must communicate its policies promptly and
is obligated to explain the rationale for its single-handed commitment
of U.S. forces and, as of yet, untold hundreds of millions of dollars.
What precisely is the plan in Haiti? Our troops have been there
nearly a month, and what do we know?
Vague generalities of a generic mission statement have been
published. Unknown amounts of taxpayer funds have been committed. What
is our explicit obligation to President Aristide? What is President
Clinton's criteria for calling the mission completed and bringing our
U.S. troops home?
You can't expect to run a successful business without a business
plan. The American people want to know exactly what President Clinton's
plan is for Haiti. Their money and their sons and daughters are the
collateral for this U.S. investment, and it is understandable that they
want to know both the risks and the returns.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
the clinton administration's policy on haiti--more questions and still
no answers
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, since September 19, 1994, ten
thousand U.S. ground forces have been engaged in peacekeeping in
Haiti--with another ten thousand or more members of the armed services
on board ships in waters off the Haitian coast.
We are all extremely proud of the way that our men and women in
uniform are conducting themselves in Operation Uphold Democracy. We
were also proud of their conduct most recently in Somalia and in
Rwanda.
There is nothing missing with respect to the dedication and loyalty
of the United States forces now in Haiti. What is missing is leadership
at the top.
This absence of leadership was evident in the Clinton
administration's failure to consult with Congress before going to
Haiti. As the Clinton administration failed to consult with Congress
before turning what was a successful humanitarian mission in Somalia
into a manhunt for Aideed and a disastrous nation-building project.
Failure to consult with Congress has deprived the American people of
a full discussion of what the United States' interest is in Haiti and
why we are there--if the Clinton administration knows.
If there is a present administration policy toward Haiti--both in the
short term and the long run--it certainly has not been articulated to
Congress or to the American people.
President Clinton's actions with respect to Haiti raise numerous
question but provides no answers.
However, you can be sure that the United States will be feeding over
one million Haitians a day. By next February or March the Clinton
administration will be submitting a supplemental appropriation request
for hundreds of millions of dollars just for food and other
humanitarian assistance.
As has been the budgetary strategy in the past, there probably will
be a huge supplemental appropriation to pay for the cost of our
military presence in Haiti. But will the American people be willing to
pay the bill next year?
What is happening now in the Pentagon is that money is being taken
from accounts intended for other purposes and used to pay for our
military presence in Haiti. This is an approach reminiscent of robbing
Peter to pay Paul.
A Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress set the cost at
$427 million over normal operating expenditures for the first 7 months
of the operation.
Another estimate--apparently based on Department of Defense internal
documents but not officially confirmed by DOD--estimated that it would
cost $1.5 billion to invade Haiti and to maintain United States forces
in Haiti through 1995.
However, these are only estimates. When have estimates of this nature
ever been correct? The final bill will probably be millions or billions
of dollars more than any estimate provided by the present
administration.
What the peacekeeping budget of the United Nations? About one third
of that budget is paid by the United States. How much is the United
Nations going to contribute to nation-building in Haiti?
And what is the international community doing to provide money and
personnel to support the return of democracy to Haiti? We are told that
21 nations are expected to provide troops as well as law enforcement
and technical personnel.
If what we are told actually happens, then some time in the near
future there will be a U.N. force in Haiti comprised of persons from
Bangladesh, Jordan, Poland, and Argentina as well as other countries.
Will these nations be willing to participate on a long/term basis in
Haiti in support of what are basically United States domestic
immigration interests?
What will the implications of our presence in Haiti be for other
leaders in other parts of the world?
For instance, Boris Yeltsin says that he is now forced to have a
sphere of Russian influence in the republics of the former Soviet Union
since we have declared one through the United Nations in the Caribbean.
The American people and their elected representatives in Congress
deserve answers to the many unanswered questions involved in the
forcible return of Aristide to power.
We need to know what assurances we have that the Aristide regime will
respect human rights and democratic values.
If the preservation of human rights is an issue of vital importance
to the Clinton administration, why are we placing out trust solely in
one man--Aristide? The past human rights record of the Aristide
government was dismal.
The last time the United States occupied Haiti, United States troops
were stationed in that country for almost two decades.
What plan does the administration have for bringing the U.S. troops
home?
And what plan does the administration have for maintaining democracy
and economic stability in Haiti over the long haul? And will the
American taxpayers be willing to pay the bill?
United States aid to Nicaragua and El Salvador has dramatically
decreased with the return of democracy to these countries.
Our total aid to Nicaragua in fiscal year 1990 was $262.2 million--
the year Violeta Chamorro was elected president of that country. Our
total aid to Nicaragua in fiscal year 1994 had dwindled to $56.7
million.
The same pattern is true for El Salvador. Total United States aid to
El Salvador in fiscal year 1990 was $326.4 million and the total United
States aid in fiscal year 1994--after the peace was restored--had
declined to $97.3 million.
It looks as though our total aid to Haiti will drastically increase
with the return of Aristide--the democratically elected president. This
is in contrast to our severely declining assistance for democratic
governments in Central America. This important paradox needs some
explanation.
Can the United States afford to undertake the rebuilding of one of
the poorest and most economically backward countries of the Western
Hemisphere?
The answer to that question is clear. We cannot afford to rebuild
Haiti at the expense of neglecting our many other obligations
throughout the world.
The establishment of a true democracy in Haiti cannot occur
immediately by force of arms. As is the case with other nations in the
region, the nurturing of democracy takes time and will require broad-
based support of the Haitian people.
It is Haitians that must rebuild Haiti. Not the United States.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Haiti
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I would like to talk briefly about my
concerns about our mission in Haiti.
My colleagues will recall that I opposed a full-scale invasion of
Haiti. I wrote President Clinton to express my concern that violent
intervention may not help solve the difficult problems that Haiti
faces. I told him that I did not support an invasion.
I did this because I do not believe that we have a national interest
at stake in Haiti, American citizens are not in danger. The Haitian
military threatens the Haitian people, but it does not threaten anyone
else. Haiti does not control any resources that we depend on, and we
don't have any bases there. So I did not see the rationale for an
invasion, and I do not see a rationale for our current involvement.
However, now that almost 20,000 of our troops are in Haiti, I am glad
that they have faced little violence or combat so far. But I want to
say for the record that I think our troops should return home as soon
as possible.
Let me just discuss briefly why I feel this way.
We have seen from bitter experience in Lebanon and Somalia that it is
a lot easier to send troops into a chaotic country than it is to limit
their mission while they are here. It goes without saying that the more
deeply we get involved, the more dangerous our mission becomes.
The media reports clearly show that a climate of violence exists in
Haiti. It is almost a climate of mob rule. If more looting and disorder
occur, our troops may be forced by circumstances to protect one side or
another. We have already had one casualty on this mission; taking sides
among Haiti's factions will cause more bloodshed.
It also looks as if we might get bogged down in chasing people and
weapons. I am very concerned that we are now trying to disarm Haiti's
thugs and attaches. We are conducting searches for arms. To those of us
who remember what led, a year ago, to the tragic deaths of 18 American
Rangers in Mogadishu, these reports are troubling. While our intentions
may be honorable, the consequences of our actions may be fatal.
Another lesson we learned in Somalia is that it is difficult to try
to rebuild a shattered nation. The task might be easier in Haiti; Haiti
has not suffered the civil war that Somalia did. Yet we are setting
ourselves the challenge of reforming Haiti's military and police force,
safeguarding Haiti's democratically elected leaders, and ensuring that
next year's elections in Haiti are free and fair. The problem with all
this is that when our mission involves reforming a nation's
institutions, or any other nation-building activities, we are on a
slippery slope to long-term involvement in that nation's affairs.
For all of these reasons, we should withdraw our troops and make way
for a multinational or United Nations force as soon as possible. I
might add that during that transition, the lines of communication and
command must be extremely clear, so that there is no confusion at the
operational level.
In closing, let me just say to my colleagues that our military will
have virtually no role in solving Haiti's worst problem--its crushing,
grinding poverty. I have toured these slums. I have seen how awful the
poverty in Port-au-Prince can be. This poverty, which is the root of
all of Haiti's troubles, cannot be addressed by an invasion. We can
alleviate the poverty in Haiti only through a long effort of providing
assistance through multinational development banks and private
voluntary organizations.
The World Bank and other development and lending institutions should
be providing the economic development experience, training and
equipment that Haiti needs. Our military does not have any of these
capabilities. The fact speaks volumes about who should be in Haiti, and
who should not.
Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and I yield the floor.
haiti
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I will support the pending resolution
but I do so with some reluctance. I would have preferred to vote for a
resolution that stated clearly that the United States of America has no
national security interest in Haiti. In fact, the only vital national
interest we have in Haiti today is the 20,000 American troops sent to
that poor country.
I find the pending resolution a bit confused. Let me be clear. The
resolution now before the Senate states, ``the President should have
sought and welcomed congressional approval before deploying United
States Armed Forces to Haiti.'' At the same time, the resolution
concludes with the statement, ``Nothing in this resolution should be
construed or interpreted to constitute congressional approval or
disapproval of the participation of United States Armed Forces in the
United Nations Mission in Haiti.''
It seems as though the U.S. Senate is willing to criticize the
President for not seeking prior approval but we are not willing to take
a stand, yes or no, regarding this deployment of U.S. Armed Forces. Mr.
President, this is shameful.
A number of my colleagues have already come the floor of the Senate
to make the point that it is not worth the life of one American soldier
to try to bring democracy to Haiti. I concur with this view because I
believe Haiti has no history of democracy and it is naive to think that
the temporary presence of American occupation forces and American
economic aid will change the violent culture of Haitian politics.
I am also very troubled by the situation the President of the United
States has put us in. To begin with, the invasion of Haiti that was
averted by the courage and diplomatic skill of former President Carter,
Senator Sam Nunn and General Powell was clearly timed to prevent the
Congress from voting to disapprove of this act. Then, after thousands
of United States troops have occupied Haiti, we are told we cannot vote
to limit this occupation because we will endanger the lives of the
American military personnel in Haiti. So the President prevented the
Congress from voting to stop this invasion and now he says we can't
vote to end this dangerous occupation. I completely reject this view.
As we saw in Somalia, the Congress can vote to force the withdrawal
of United States troops from a situation in which our men and women in
uniform are needlessly put at risk. In the case of Somalia, Senator
Byrd's amendment forced the administration to bring our troops home and
that act of Congress did not endanger our troops. I believe we can and
should do the same thing in Haiti.
I will support the pending resolution to affirm my support for the
brave American military personnel currently serving in Haiti. I will,
however, continue to work to bring our troops home as soon as possible.
In my view, that is what we should be voting on today.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
HAITI
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the sons and daughters of America find
themselves on foreign soil today in an effort to create the conditions
which might make possible the development of democracy in the troubled
land of Haiti. The people of Haiti deserve the opportunity to establish
a democratic government which will respect the rights of all Haitians
and give the much-oppressed people of Haiti a chance to live in peace.
But I continue to believe it is wrong to use the young men and women
in our armed forces to carry out this mission. In that sense and many
others, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the
distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd]. Are American
national interests at stake in Haiti? I do not believe they are. Should
we send our troops to each of the many countries in the world where
there is not democracy? Certainly not.
I commend the men and women of our military services who have
answered the call of their Commander in Chief as they always have in
the past. I want to do nothing today or in the days ahead which might
put our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen at any greater risk than
they already are in Haiti. I applaud the authors of this resolution for
making the very first element of it a commendation of our men and women
who are serving with distinction in and around Haiti today.
I also applaud the authors for noting that ``the President should
have sought and welcomed congressional approval before deploying United
States Armed Forces to Haiti.'' I have made this argument in the past
months and the Record will note that I made the same argument to
President Bush in 1990 and 1991 before the Persian Gulf War. When the
American people are about to engage in war, unless the circumstances
demand immediate action to protect American personnel or interests, the
President owes it to the American people, the Constitution and the
brave men and women he is prepared to commit to combat to come to the
Congress and seek approval. I regret that the President did not come to
us before he deployed our forces to Haiti. I hope that he will respond
to this resolution promptly and ensure that the reports required in the
resolution do, in fact, give us the full benefit of his thinking on the
missions our people are supposed to perform.
I am also concerned, as the authors of the resolution are, with the
costs of this operation. There will be real costs--at least one-half a
billion dollars--for the deployment, the operation, and other forms of
aid which we will provide in the days ahead. There are also real and
potential costs in the readiness of our forces and their ability to
respond to the next crisis which involves our national interests. We
cannot continue to reduce the size and capabilities of our forces while
simultaneously increasing their involvement in operations around the
world. Ultimately, something must give. Equipment will wear out and we
will not be able to replace it. Modernization--the essential means of
ensuring our forces are ready to fight and win in the next decade and
the next century--will continue to be underfunded. The men and women of
the Armed Forces will be run into the ground and they will begin to
ask, as many already have, is it really worth it for me to deprive my
family and risk my life with deployment after deployment and little
time at home in between? Ultimately, we will be unprepared when a
genuine threat to American security occurs.
Operation Uphold Democracy is underway. I thank God that our forces
did not have to confront hostile forces as they entered Haiti and that
casualties and losses have thus far been very low. But I worry about
their safety next week and next months and their ability to do all that
they have been, and perhaps will be, asked to do. I would like our
forces not to have been sent in the first place. But they are there now
and I will give them the support they need to come home quickly and
safely with their heads held high and their fellow countrymen
appreciative of their efforts.
Mr. President, I am going to vote for this resolution because it
supports our troops who are in Haiti today, reinforces the
constitutional authority of the Congress to declare war, and calls for
a prompt withdrawal of our forces as soon as possible.
We must recognize the dangers inherent in the course we are on in
Haiti and around the world today. All of us in this country must
address the question of our role as a world power and when we should
use our military forces. There are other ways to support democracy than
with American soldiers.
We can support democracy through economic sanctions as we did in
South Africa, or through political aid as we did via the National
Endowment for Democracy in Eastern Europe, or even through the
provision of military equipment and training as we did for the anti-
Communist freedom fighters in Afghanistan.
We need not and cannot send American troops to every country in the
world where democracy is under siege. That, I hope, is the lesson we
will learn from Haiti as we move quickly, according to this resolution,
to bring our troops home.
Mr. BAUCUS. I rise in opposition to this resolution
The President did not seek my approval for occupying Haiti. And he
will not get my approval now.
The American soldiers involved in this mission have performed
admirably. They have shown themselves, and our country, as skilled in
military tactics and noble in goals. They have carried this mission out
brilliantly. But every day carries the same risk President Reagan ran
in Lebanon, and the same risk Presidents Bush and Clinton ran in
Somalia. Haiti is full of armed, violent people. Snipers who shoot out
of warehouses. Murderers with grenades that they toss into crowds.
Thugs who may at any minute turn their weapons on a jeep full of 18-
and 20-year-old marines. It is unacceptable.
And I do not believe this mission has a chance to succeed in the long
run. Even if we suffer no disaster or casualty at any point in our
occupation of Haiti, the problem in Haiti is a political issue which
Haitians themselves must solve through a national reconciliation. That
will not happen as long as American troops are enforcing order and
government. The longer we stay, the longer any true solution to Haiti's
problems will be delayed.
Every day we remain in Haiti is a day in which we continue placing
our soldiers in a dangerous and explosive situation. And I think the
mission should come to an end not ``as soon as possible,'' as the
resolution says, but on a certain, specific and imminent date. the only
thing this resolution will accomplish is to force people at the State
Department to fill out paperwork reports to Congress. It is not good
enough.
Instead of voting on this, we should be setting a date certain to
withdraw from Haiti. And we should back that up by withdrawing funds
for the operation the day afterward.
I will vote ``no,'' and I thank you, Mr. President.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, the United States mission in Haiti
has two core objectives: First, to meet our commitment to restoring
democracy to Haiti, and second, to meet that commitment peacefully, if
possible. I support that policy and those commitments.
While it is still premature to assess the success of our actions in
Haiti, the results so far are at least somewhat encouraging. Let's take
a look at the facts.
United States troops have entered Haiti peacefully. Only one of our
soldiers has been wounded to date.
American soldiers have begun to take arms off the streets through
selective raids at locations arms have been stockpiled, and through a
buy back program.
American soldiers are making substantial headway toward ending the
indiscriminate violence and terror that ruled the streets in Haiti, and
had sown fear among pro-democracy activists. Freedom is being restored.
Democracy, however, is more than the absence of violence. Democracy
means that different voices have a forum to be heard. Democracy means
that people with different ideas and views about how to govern agree to
disagree. Democracy provides the rule of law and access to justice.
As Senator Nunn said to the Haitian generals, democracy is much more
than the return of one man, President Aristide.
Because American forces entered Haiti, parliamentarians who had fled
the country returned to their jobs.
Evans Paul, the mayor of Port-au-Prince, has been able to come out of
hiding, and has returned to city hall.
We all know that for the fledgling democracy in Haiti to succeed, the
streets must be safer, there must be greater stability, and the Haitian
economy must begin to function again.
The United States has lifted the trade embargo against Haiti, and is
allowing money transfers to resume, and the United Nations has followed
suit.
The Haitian people have begun to hope again. People dance and march
in the streets. Two weeks ago, ordinary Haitians through their only
chance was to leave their country, even if that meant taking the
terrible risk of going to sea in very small boats and rafts.
Now, that has begun to change. Two thousand Haitian refugees at
Guantanamo Bay have volunteered to return to their homeland.
But much work remains to be done. The peaceful entry of our military
forces into that country does not end our job.
The agreement negotiated by President Carter, General Powell, and
Senator Nunn, has a number of points that will require future
interpretation.
I share the view of General Powell, who said when he returned from
Haiti, That all of the details ``will be worked out in due course.''
With our troops on the ground, I am confident that the agreement will
be interpreted and implemented in a manner fully consistent with the
United States view of that agreement. That is what we have seen so far,
and there is good reason to believe that is what we will continue to
see.
I also agree with General Powell's statement that we should ``not
lose sight of the overall achievement''. While there will continue to
be difficult moments in Haiti, and while there are still substantial
risks that we must continue to be aware of, we should not forget that
the U.N. resolutions are being implemented. President Aristide will
soon return. And, as General Powell noted, we do have the opportunity
for a future of peace and democracy in Haiti and a better relationship
between our two countries.
General Powell's analysis is a good one. The agreement and the
peaceful entry of our forces into Haiti was a real achievement. It does
open real opportunities, and it does enhance the prospects for the
future success of our policies in Haiti.
Our military leadership has set out two phases for operation uphold
democracy. In the first phase, the Americans will establish order. Then
in phase two, the forces of 28 nations will join us to maintain order
and hold elections.
This first phase will only end when three conditions are met: No
organized resistance remains, President Aristide returns, and a police
force is present.
At that point, phase two will introduce a U.N. force with a much
smaller American contingent, but one that is under American command.
But it is important to do the job properly. General Shalikashvili has
said that setting a date certain for withdrawal will put our troops at
risk, because it would change the dynamics on the ground. I am pleased,
therefore, that the resolution before the Senate today does not set a
specific date for the withdrawal of our forces, although I share the
view expressed in the resolution that our forces should leave Haiti as
soon as possible.
I would very much like to avoid putting any U.S. forces at risk. No
one wants to see young American soldiers, sailors, or air force
personnel wounded or killed.
In this situation, however, backing up our diplomacy with our Armed
Forces was essential, not just to have any hope of achieving our
objective or restoring democratic government to Haiti, but also because
U.S. credibility was at stake. Failure to honor the commitments made by
both this administration and the Bush administration would have
repercussions for the United States around the world.
But the U.S. has kept its commitment, and in so doing, we have once
again renewed our commitment to the principles that make the United
States so unique on the world stage. In Haiti, we are demonstrating
that we mean what we say, and that we are prepared to act based on our
principles and our core values.
I want to commend the President for his leadership, for sending
President Carter, Senator Nunn and General Powell, for their successful
negotiations, which no doubt saved many lives of both Haitians and
Americans.
But mostly, I want to commend the men and women of the U.S. military
for the fine job they are doing in Haiti. We must allow them to
complete their mission.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, is leader time reserved?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right to use his leader
time.
Mr. DOLE. I yield 2 minutes of that time to the Senator from South
Dakota, Senator Pressler.
Mr. GREGG. Madam President, may we have order, please?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct; the Senate is not in
order.
The Republican leader has yielded 2 minutes of his time to the
Senator from South Dakota.
We ask the Senate be in order.
Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, the question I was trying to ask
earlier is to invite my friends on the other side of the aisle to join
with me in the letter to the President so we can lay this investigation
out in the open. The Senator from Connecticut said that the ranking
member of the Judiciary Committee was satisfied. I am told by staff, he
has not necessarily said that. There is a very serious question about
Mr. Aristide's involvement with drug traffickers that needs to be
answered. The DEA's office in Miami was investigating this issue.
Apparently, one of the roads, one of the paths they investigated led to
the allegation that President Aristide himself took a bribe from
Colombian drug traffickers.
I think we should have a definitive statement from the administration
on that. They keep telling me to ``take a classified briefing.''
Yesterday, administration officials gave a briefing to the chairman and
ranking member of the Judiciary Committee. According to the Senator
from Connecticut, the administration told him that the ranking member,
the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], was totally satisfied. I believe
that is a mischaracterization of his view. Perhaps he will come to the
floor and speak for himself.
But I still do not understand why my colleagues on the other side of
the aisle will not join me in my letter to the President, asking these
basic questions. They would not even yield to me several minutes ago.
The administration wants me to take a classified briefing because they
know that if I do, I will not be able to repeat what was said. The
American people need to know if Jean-Bertrand Aristide took a bribe
regarding drugs when he was in office. Earlier this year, the
administration cited Haitian drug trafficking as one of the reasons for
invading Haiti. Then all of a sudden they stopped talking about it. And
I want to know why. Why will not the administration discuss the DEA
investigation in public? Where did the investigation lead? What did
they find? Who was involved in it? If it was the Haitian generals, say
so. If it was President Aristide, say so. Instead, the administration
says, ``This is all classified; you can get a classified briefing.''
The American people want a public briefing.
My point is our troops are in Haiti. The American people need to know
if they are being asked to restore a drug trafficker. Did Jean-Bertrand
Aristide ever take a bribe for drugs when he was President or
thereafter, or in any relationship? Did DEA field agents in Miami want
to question Aristide and the White House prevented them? These are
important questions which deserve to be answered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bryan). The time allocated to the Senator
has expired.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my colleague
from South Dakota for raising what I consider to be a very important
question that should be answered, if not today, then tomorrow or very
soon, by someone who--if anyone has the information. If not, there
should be an investigation.
Let me say, first of all, this is a bipartisan resolution. It took a
lot of doing by Members on both sides of the aisle. It can be
interpreted by Members on either side of the aisle in a different way.
It is this Senator's opinion that we have no security interest in
Haiti, no national interest in Haiti, and we should not be in Haiti. We
made a mistake. And I do not think a careful reading of this resolution
will give the administration much comfort.
But I must say I did not support setting an arbitrary withdrawal
date, with which I think the President agreed we should not have a
date. Members on both sides agreed we should not have a date.
First of all, it might increase the risk to young men and women
there. But, second, it might imply, if some of us agreed on a date, say
March 1, that we were buying into this policy for the next several
months, and that is not the case. I am not buying into any of this
policy. It is a mistake. It is a bad policy. We should not be there and
we ought to come home. It is going to cost hundreds of millions of
dollars. We are risking American lives every day. I just suggest maybe
when Aristide goes back next week would be a good time for American
troops to get out.
He has been restored. That is what it has been all about. Let us
restore Aristide, and when he is restored, let us go home. Let us come
home. Let us not risk any additional American lives.
We have heard administration officials say the last few days the
mission in Haiti has not changed. I guess it is no surprise the
American people are confused about United States policy toward Haiti
when the administration denies the obvious. Everyone with access to a
television knows U.S. policy in Haiti changes as fast as you can change
the channel.
First, the policy was that police and army are allies in keeping
order. Then we arrest and gag Haitian police. We were told that United
States policy will be to stay neutral in Haitian violence. Then we were
told American soldiers will intervene in certain cases of Haitian
violence in certain circumstances. We were told United States Armed
Forces would not be Haiti's police force, and then we see Americans
patrolling streets, detaining Haitians, and stopping looters. This
week, American forces added disarming Haitians to their mission.
If this is not a mission change, I do not know what it is. It is not
just mission creep, it is mission leap. The only exit strategy in Haiti
is for United States troops to change helmets from American green to
United Nations blue, and that sounds more like a shell game than an
exit strategy.
I have serious doubts the United Nations peacekeepers will be able to
perform any better in Haiti than they have in Somalia or Bosnia. I
stand second to no one in supporting American Armed Forces. The young
men ordered to occupy Haiti have a difficult task. Some have called it
Mission Impossible, bringing stability and democracy to a country that
has little of either. American troops should not be used on missions
that cannot be achieved in places where America does not have a vital
interest.
It is ironic to hear some opponents of the United States policy in
Central America defend the occupation in Haiti. We never sent more than
55 Americans to El Salvador, for example. Now we have 20,000 Americans
in Haiti, and nobody says a word on the other side. I remember the
arguments day after day after day on this Senate floor. It seems to me
they used to say El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam. Fortunately, they
did not have their way, and El Salvador is peaceful and democratic
today.
But, unfortunately, the occupation of Haiti shows the lessons of
Somalia have not been learned. Like Somalia, our objectives are vague.
Our mission is constantly changing. Like Somalia, we have embarked on
nation building and we are relying on the United Nations to call the
shots down the road. It is hard to avoid the observation that ``Haiti
is Creole for Somalia.''
The President chose not to come to Congress before sending American
troops to occupy Haiti. In fact, if you read this week's Time magazine,
it was all designed. The President wanted to get the troops in there
before Congress came back on a Monday, because we might possibly vote
up or down. He chose to send troops without the support of the American
people. It is a high-risk course to jump into a military adventure
without the parachute of the public and congressional support.
But having said that, let me end where I started. This resolution has
been worked out on a bipartisan basis. It can, as this Senator said, be
interpreted by different Members on either side in different ways. But
I must say I think it is a pretty fair resolution. It does not answer
every argument somebody might have. It does not have in there that it
is not in our national interest. Some of us would like to have had that
inserted in the resolution.
But overall, it seems to me it is a statement that needs to be made
and should be made and should have the full support of our colleagues
in the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to use the
remainder of my leader time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I encourage all Senators to vote for
this resolution. It is, in large measure, repetitious of that which the
Senate has previously voted in favor of. I expect and hope that most
Senators will vote for the resolution, so I will not address myself to
that directly at this moment.
But I would like to express my disappointment, indeed my dismay, at
many of the remarks that have been made during this debate. There seems
to be almost a sense of sadness by some of our colleagues that things
have gone so well in Haiti.
There seems to be almost a sense of disappointment that things have
gone so well in Haiti. A few weeks ago, the illegal government had
unlimited prospects and the democratically elected government had no
prospects. As a result of President Clinton's decisive leadership and
swift action by the United States, that situation has been reversed.
The argument is made that the President should have sought the
approval of Congress. I believe he should have. I felt that way with
respect to Panama, and I felt that way with respect to Grenada. But
none of the three Presidents involved agreed with my view.
President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama without prior
congressional approval. More than 20 Americans were killed. There was
not a single bit of second-guessing and nitpicking about that from the
people who are here today doing the second-guessing and nitpicking
about President Clinton.
President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada without any prior
congressional approval. Several Americans were killed in that
operation. There was not a single bit of second-guessing and nitpicking
about that by the same people who are here second-guessing and
nitpicking about President Clinton.
If ever there has been a double standard at work here in the Senate,
it has been in the reaction of those events, and very few Democrats--
very few--if any, engaged in the kind of nitpicking and second-guessing
on Presidents Bush and Reagan in those two incidents that our
colleagues have engaged in here today.
Let us face it, this thing has worked. Not a single American has been
killed as a result of this action, and we are going to have a
democratically elected government restored. Is it so hard for our
colleagues to acknowledge that something has worked and say a decent
word about the President? Is it so difficult to refrain from this kind
of nitpicking and second-guessing and trying to find fault?
This has been an instructive debate, Mr. President, not about the
resolution, not about the Haiti operation, but about an attitude that
has become so ingrained it seems virtually impossible for some of our
colleagues to do anything except second-guess, nitpick, find fault, and
try to criticize the President, whatever the circumstance. I regret it.
I believe that all Americans, or at least most Americans, regret it.
I hope that this resolution will pass and this debate will conclude.
I yield the floor. I believe all time is up, and we are prepared to
vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the question is on
the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.
The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading
and was read the third time.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the
third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution, regarding
United States policy toward Haiti, pass?
The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] is
necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 91, nays 8, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 323 Leg.]
YEAS--91
Akaka
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boren
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durenberger
Exon
Faircloth
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Heflin
Helms
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
Mathews
McCain
McConnell
Metzenbaum
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Riegle
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Smith
Specter
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone
Wofford
NAYS--8
Baucus
Boxer
Bradley
Byrd
Feingold
Hatfield
Pressler
Wallop
NOT VOTING--1
Stevens
So the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 229) was passed, as follows:
S.J. Res. 229
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ARMED
FORCES OPERATIONS IN HAITI.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(a) The men and women of the United States Armed Forces in
Haiti who are performing with professional excellence and
dedicated patriotism are to be commended;
(b) the President should have sought and welcomed
Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed
Forces to Haiti;
(c) the departure from power of the de facto authorities in
Haiti, and Haitian efforts to achieve national
reconciliation, democracy and the rule of law are in the best
interests of the Haitian people;
(d) the President's lifting of the unilateral economic
sanctions on Haiti, and his efforts to bring about the
lifting of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations
are appropriate; and
(e) Congress supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal of
all United States Armed Forces from Haiti as soon as
possible.
SEC. 2. PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY
OBJECTIVES.
The President shall prepare and submit to the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives (hereafter, ``Congress'') not later than
seven days after enactment of this resolution a statement of
the national security objectives to be achieved by Operation
Uphold Democracy, and a detailed description of United States
policy, the military mission and the general rules of
engagement under which operations of United States Armed
Forces are conducted in and around Haiti, including the role
of United Armed Forces regarding Haitian on Haitian violence,
and efforts to disarm Haitian military or police forces, or
civilians. Changes or modifications to such objectives,
policy, military mission, or general rules of engagement
shall be submitted to Congress within forty-eight hours of
approval.
SEC. 3. REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HAITI.
Not later than November 1, 1994, and monthly thereafter
until the cessation of Operation Uphold Democracy, the
President shall submit a report to Congress on the situation
in Haiti, including--
(a) a listing of the units of the United States Armed
Forces and of the police and military units of other nations
participating in operations in and around Haiti;
(b) the estimated duration of Operation Uphold Democracy
and progress toward the withdrawal of all United States Armed
Forces from Haiti consistent with the goal of section 1(e) of
this resolution;
(c) armed incidents or the use of force in or around Haiti
involving United States Armed Forces or Coast Guard personnel
in the time period covered by the report;
(d) the estimated cumulative incremental cost of all United
States activities subsequent to September 30, 1993 in and
around Haiti, including but not limited to--
(1) the cost of all deployments of United States Armed
Forces and Coast Guard personnel, training, exercises,
mobilization, and preparation activities, including the
preparation of police and military units of the other nations
of the multinational force involved in enforcement of
sanctions, limits on migration, establishment and maintenance
of migrant facilities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and
all other activities relating to operations in and around
Haiti; and
(2) the costs of all other activities relating to United
States policy toward Haiti, including humanitarian
assistance, reconstruction, aid and other financial
assistance, and all other costs to the United States
Government;
(e) a detailed accounting of the source of funds obligated
or expended to meet the costs described in subparagraph (d),
including--
(1) in the case of funds expended from the Department of
Defense budget, a breakdown by military service or defense
agency, line item and program, and
(2) in the case of funds expended from the budgets of
departments and agencies other than the Department of
Defense, by department or agency and program;
(f) the Administration plan for financing the costs of the
operations and the impact on readiness without supplemental
funding;
(g) a description of the situation in Haiti, including--
(1) the security situation;
(2) the progress made in transferring the functions of
government to the democratically elected government of Haiti;
and
(3) progress toward holding free and fair parliamentary
elections;
(h) a description of issues relating to the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), including--
(1) the preparedness of the United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH) to deploy to Haiti to assume its functions;
(2) troop commitments by other nations to UNMIH;
(3) the anticipated cost to the United States of
participation in UNMIH, including payments to the United
Nations and financial, material and other assistance to
UNMIH;
(4) proposed or actual participation of United States Armed
Forces in UNMIH;
(5) proposed command arrangements for UNMIH, including
proposed or actual placement of United States Armed Forces
under foreign command; and
(6) the anticipated duration of UNMIH.
SEC. 4. REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.
Not later than January 1, 1995, the Secretary of State
shall report to Congress on the participation or involvement
of any member of the de jure or de facto Haitian government
in violations of internationally-recognized human rights from
December 15, 1990 to December 15, 1994.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS.
Not later than November 15, 1994, the Secretary of State
shall provide a comprehensive report to Congress on all
agreements the United States has entered into with other
nations, including any assistance pledged or provided, in
connection with United States efforts in Haiti. Such report
shall also include information on any agreements or
commitments relating to United Nations Security Council
actions concerning Haiti since 1992.
SEC. 6. TRANSITION TO UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI.
Nothing in this resolution should be construed or
interpreted to constitute Congressional approval or
disapproval of the participation of United States Armed
Forces in the United Nations Mission in Haiti.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which
the joint resolution was passed.
Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
____________________