[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
   VISIT TO THE SENATE BY NELSON MANDELLA, PRESIDENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask the Senate stand in recess, with the 
permission of the Senator from Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to yield.
  I believe the request is that the Senate stand in recess for 5 
minutes to greet Nelson Mandella, the President of South Africa.
  Thereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the Senate recessed until 2:59 p.m.; 
whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding 
Officer (Mr. Campbell).
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, as we all know, this is a very special day where we 
have heard the wonderful comments, inspiring comments, of the President 
of South Africa, and I think it gives us a great deal of hope, not only 
in South Africa but everywhere in the world where people are divided by 
race or religion or by culture or by economic class, as we see in the 
situation in Haiti.
  Mr. President, the days and months ahead will require much in the way 
of alleviating the suffering of the Haitian people from the other 
departments and agencies of the United States Government, including 
especially AID, our allies from the United Nations, and especially from 
President Aristide and his supporters. I will be watching their 
performance very closely and will not hesitate to speak out if I think 
their actions are inappropriate and are endangering the safety of 
American military forces.
  Mr. President, I want to note that although, as I have already 
pointed out, this resolution does not state a fixed or even a target 
date for the withdrawal of our forces at this time, the Senate through 
the power of the purse and the House through the power of the purse 
retain the power to do so in the future if such proves necessary.
  Finally, although as I have noted on the Senate floor several times, 
I did not support an invasion of Haiti, I am pleased that the Haitian 
people now will have an opportunity to build democracy in their own 
country. I said very specifically ``build'' not ``restore'' or 
``reestablish'' democracy because there has never really been a 
functioning democracy in Haiti. The United States has taken the lead 
now in giving the Haitian people that opportunity. It will require hard 
work and determination by the citizens of Haiti if they are to succeed. 
It cannot be done for them. It cannot be done by military force. It 
cannot be done by U.S. or international occupation. It must be done by 
the Haitian people themselves. It will not happen overnight, but it 
will require a long, step-by-step process, as the fundamental 
institutions of a democracy are being built. These institutions include 
a freely elected and functioning parliament--and those parliamentary 
elections taking place pursuant to this Haitian Constitution this year 
are enormously important--a police force separate from the army that is 
trained and disciplined and under civilian control; a small 
professional army under civilian control; and an independent judicial 
system. Success will also require the cooperation and assistance of 
many other nations acting in concert with the United Nations and the 
legitimate government of Haiti.
  Finally, I want to mention my strong belief that a broad amnesty law 
must be enacted by the Haitian Parliament if the reconciliation that 
President Aristide supports is to take place. In that connection, I 
want to note that there have been some incorrect media reporting about 
the terms of the Carter-Jonassaint agreement, the Port-au-Prince 
agreement, with respect to amnesty and retirement of General Cedras, 
General Biamby, and Police Chief Francois.
  First, it should be noted that the Governors Island Agreement that 
was signed by President Aristide and General Cedras in June 1993 called 
for, quoting from that agreement, ``an amnesty granted by the President 
of the Republic within the framework of article 147 of the National 
Constitution and implementation of the other instruments which may be 
adopted by the Parliament on this question.''
  President Aristide only has the authority under the Haitian 
Constitution to grant political amnesty. I noted a headline yesterday 
morning that said President Aristide refuses to grant broad amnesty. 
President Aristide has only limited power as to what he can grant--
namely political amnesty. He does have enormous influence over the 
Parliament, however, and I think it is important for him to take this 
lead in terms of what the Parliament may do. But a general amnesty or a 
broader amnesty is within the discretion of the Haitian Parliament.
  The Governors Island Agreement also provided that General Cedras 
``has decided to avail himself of his right to early retirement.'' The 
Carter-Jonassaint agreement called for Cedras, Biamby, and Francois to 
retire ``when a general amnesty will be voted into law by the Haitian 
Parliament, or October 15, 1994, whichever is earlier.'' There was no 
guarantee of amnesty in the agreement negotiated by President Carter, 
by General Powell, and by myself. Anyone reading that agreement can 
determine that there was no guarantee of amnesty.
  I have seen several media reports talking about a guarantee of 
amnesty. That simply is incorrect. There was no guarantee. The question 
of amnesty is up to the Haitian Parliament. But I do believe it is 
essential that amnesty be granted if democracy is going to be restored 
and if the pattern of retribution and violence that has been too long 
in the Haitian culture is to be stopped.
  Thus, both the Governors Island Agreement and the Carter-Jonassaint 
agreement call for the same thing; that is, for General Cedras to 
retire and for the Haitian Parliament to exercise its discretion in 
deciding whether to grant a broader amnesty for him. Additionally, it 
is interesting to note, despite a lot of media comment--particularly 
editorial comment that did not seemingly understand the Governors 
Island Agreement--that neither the Governors Island Agreement nor the 
Carter-Jonassaint agreement required Cedras and company to leave Haiti.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to serve notice that if there is no 
amnesty, if the cycle of retribution and violence that has plagued 
Haiti for decades is not broken, and if the step-by-step process of 
building democratic institutions does not begin, I for one will not 
support the extended presence in Haiti of the men and women of the 
Armed Forces of the United States. I believe that our role there should 
be limited, in any event. We are talking about a matter of months, not 
years. But if we see a pattern of retribution, if we see no amnesty 
granted by the Parliament, if we do not see leadership by President 
Aristide in regard to breaking this pattern of retribution, then I 
think that the U.S. Senate and U.S. Congress will take a different view 
in the months to come relating to this resolution.
  There will be other resolutions, I am sure, next year depending on 
the situation on the ground in Haiti. The people of Haiti have an 
opportunity, what we call a window of opportunity, to begin to build 
democracy. A resumption of the historic pattern of retribution and 
violence would not only result in my view in an early withdrawal of 
United States forces from Haiti, but it would also doom democracy in 
Haiti.
  I am hopeful that President Aristide and the leaders of the Haitian 
Parliament, as well as the citizens of Haiti, will avail themselves of 
this window of opportunity for beginning a democracy that can bring 
peace and prosperity to that country that has too long suffered under 
dictatorship and under a pattern of violence and retribution that must 
be broken.
  Mr. President, I thank my friend from Connecticut. I now yield the 
floor.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell] is 
recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, first I want to thank the distinguished 
Senator from New Hampshire for his leadership on the Haiti issue going 
back to the debates that we heard here in this body on amendments to 
the foreign operations bill earlier this summer. I think his efforts 
have been truly outstanding.
  Mr. President, I want to talk about a little different aspect of this 
issue. The Senate and the American people are bearing the cost of the 
occupation of Haiti in terms of the danger to our military personnel, 
and the cost in dollars of the occupation of a country with 20,000 of 
our troops.
  Mr. President, there is a hidden cost as well and it is this: It 
seems perfectly clear that in return for Russian acquiescence to our 
invasion of Haiti--or, shall I say, occupation of Haiti--by virtue of 
their support for the U.N. resolution, the administration has said in 
effect to the Russians, maybe even said it openly, you do what you will 
in the New Independent States. In other words, the hidden cost of the 
occupation of Haiti is that we are in effect saying to the Russians you 
go ahead and do what you will in Ukraine or Georgia or Armenia, as 
Azerbaijan, or anywhere else in the former Soviet Union and we will 
utter not a peep.
  This policy, Mr. President, is extraordinarily distressing to many 
Americans, Americans of Eastern European descent who are quite 
concerned about the reemergence of the Russian empire in what the 
Russian Foreign Minister calls the near abroad.
  This is sort of a ``Russian Monroe Doctrine,'' Mr. President, in 
which the Russians essentially lay down the policy that it is their 
prerogative to intervene at any time, with or without concurrence, in 
the internal affairs of any of those countries that used to make up the 
Soviet Union. And many of us suspect that their view may well be that 
that Russian preeminence also applies to what used to be the Warsaw 
Pact.
  So suffice it to say, Mr. President, the policy of this 
administration with regard to Russia, which it hails as one of its 
great foreign policy achievements is, in fact, just the opposite. Our 
policy in that part of the world is: Whatever Russia wants, Russia 
gets, whether it is funneling all of our foreign assistance through the 
Russians, or whether it is attempting to defeat earmarks, as we 
experienced in the foreign operations conference last summer.
  We, in the Senate bill, earmarked assistance for Ukraine, earmarked 
assistance for Georgia, earmarked assistance for Armenia, and had an 
amendment offered with regard to Russian troop withdrawals from the 
Baltics. We went to conference with the House, and the administration 
in concert with the House conferees, stripped out all of those 
earmarks, and a message was perfectly clear. It was this: We do not 
want to offend the Russians. We do not want to offend the Russians.
  So what we are saying in effect, Mr. President, is that whatever the 
Russians want in that whole area of the world, which clearly is in our 
national interest--we fought a war in Europe 50 years ago, and the 
European political ideology dominated that part of the world. It is the 
reason that we had the cold war.
  We may argue about whether or not we have any national interest in 
Haiti. Most of us think we do not--national interest nor national 
security interests--but nobody would argue that we do not have national 
interests in Central Europe. That was what the cold war was all about. 
Yet, here, we are essentially acquiescing to the re-emergence of the 
Russian empire by just rolling over and saying to the Russians: 
Whatever you want to do in that part of the world, fine. So the 
administration, in effect, asked the Russians for permission to go into 
Haiti, and the quid pro quo for that was: You do what you will in your 
part of the world, and we will utter not a peep.
  Mr. President, I think that is a major, if you will, hidden cost of 
the occupation of Haiti--a hidden cost of the occupation of Haiti. Why 
in the world we would want to go into Haiti and referee this internal 
dispute is beyond me, Mr. President. I do not know anybody in the 
Senate, certainly not on this side of the aisle, and I suspect most on 
that side, who can state convincingly an argument that Haiti is in our 
national interests, and certainly not our national security interests.
  What is particularly disturbing about the Russian aspect of this is 
the blatant nature of the administration's quid pro quo. For example, 
the administration's ``Russia-first'' policy, to which I referred, was 
underscored last month by our U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright. She 
concluded a swing across Europe just last month with a September speech 
in Moscow in which she said: ``Russia is an empire where the mother 
country and the colonies''--the colonies--``are contiguous.'' ``Is an 
empire,'' she said, not ``was'' an empire. A slip of tense? Well, 
maybe. But the speech went on to assert an equivalent status between 
the United States and Russia conceding ``Russia's mandate and 
activities in the near abroad were appropriate.''
  This is the American Ambassador to the United Nations in Moscow 
saying openly and publicly: You do what you will in what used to be the 
Soviet Union. It is no concern of ours.
  Fortunately, Mr. President, a Danish journalist in the audience 
reminded Ambassador Albright that history and human psychology made 
Russia's emerging role more unsettling than the activities of a Nation 
like ours with a 200-year tradition of political pluralism and freedom.
  Some might ask why this Russia-first approach should matter. After 
all, important progress has been made in internal and economic reform 
in Russia, and we are happy about that. None of us needs reminding that 
the last summit was held in the wake of a near overthrow of the Yeltsin 
government, a violent attack on parliament, and a defeat of key 
economic reforms. There is no doubt that Russia has changed for the 
better.
  But, Mr. President, there is an important difference between 
supporting Russian internal reforms and supporting Russian external 
ambitions. And that, Mr. President, is clearly one of the hidden costs 
of the Haiti invasion. We have said, in effect, to the Russians: Do not 
object to what we do in Haiti, and you have a free hand, as far as we 
are concerned, in all of the areas that used to make up the Soviet 
Union.
  Mr. President, there are a number of insertions I would like to make 
in the Record.
  I ask unanimous consent some attachments be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1994]

                 Will U.S. Pay `Hidden Cost' for Haiti?

                          (By Mitch McConnell)

       In a recent interview, Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev 
     was asked to respond to critics in the Clinton administration 
     who questioned Russian regional ambitions. ``The president 
     should fire them immediately,'' he replied.
       Fortunately, for Kozyrev, Boris Yeltsin and Russia, their 
     critics within the administration are few, and even those 
     have limited access to senior policy makers. But is that in 
     American interests? By seeking immediate improvement in our 
     relationship with Russia, are we sacrificing longstanding and 
     long-term interests in regional European stability? Are we 
     risking our economic and national security interests for the 
     perception of cooperation?
       There has been widespread speculation in Washington policy 
     circles, supported by commentary from Moscow, that Russia 
     agreed not to veto the United Nations resolution on our use 
     of force in Haiti in exchange for broader latitude for their 
     activities in the new independent states of the former Soviet 
     Union. This latter prospect chills the political souls of 
     emerging democracies from Estonia to Ukraine. As well it 
     should.
       Strong evidence confirms their collective cause for alarm. 
     Our ambassador to the United Nations concluded a swing across 
     Europe with a September speech in Moscow. ``Russia is an 
     empire where the mother country and the colonies are 
     contiguous,'' Madeleine Albright noted. A slip of tense? 
     Perhaps. But the speech went on to establish an equivalence 
     between the U.S. and Russia, conceding Russia's ``mandate . . 
     . and activities in the near abroad (were) appropriate.'' A 
     Danish journalist reminded Ambassador Albright that history 
     and human psychology made Russia's emerging role more 
     unsettling than the activities of our nation with its 200-
     year tradition of political pluralism and freedom.
       So far, largely with American consent, Russia is exercising 
     its options in the neighborhood. Its foreign intelligence 
     service issued a report arguing the merits of political and 
     economic reintegration of the former Soviet republics under 
     Russian leadership. Western opposition to the idea was 
     characterized as ``dangerous'' by the agency's chief. The 
     argument endorsed Russian-led reunification; it left no room 
     for the voluntary, independent decisions of sovereign nations 
     to seek a common course.
       Reintegration has been echoed by senior Russian defense 
     officials who have urged the creation of a unified security 
     zone. With Russian troops in Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, 
     many of the new republics publicly wonder whether these calls 
     aren't commands.
       Just as the recent intelligence report offered an 
     interesting preview of Russia's summit agenda, last year a 
     similar report was released in advance of the annual NATO 
     conference. That report opposed any expansion of NATO unless 
     and until Russia was accorded special status. Even the vague 
     terms of the Partnership for Peace were challenged unless 
     Russia was offered premier standing.
       Moscow's view prevailed then as now. Due to strident 
     Russian opposition, bilateral exercises between the U.S. and 
     Poland were canceled just before Clinton arrived in Warsaw; 
     no nation could be permitted joint exercise in advance of 
     those scheduled with Russia.
       A year ago, the administration held up Partnership for 
     Peace as a road map to NATO. Now, it is clear that Russia has 
     been accorded sweeping rights of first refusal. That is a 
     devastating blow to an alliance that has guaranteed European 
     security for 45 years.
       Why should any of this matter? After all, important 
     progress has been made in advancing political reform and 
     building the private sector in Russia. No one needs reminding 
     that the previous summit was held in the wake of a near 
     overthrow of the Yeltsin government exacerbated by the 
     parliament's defeat of key economic proposals. No doubt, on 
     many fronts, Russia has changed for the better.
       But there is a significant difference between American 
     support for Russia's internal process of change versus their 
     extra-territorial pursuit of national interests. To date, the 
     U.S. has committed nearly $3 billion in direct support for 
     Russian political and economic reform because it serves our 
     mutual interests in expanding global trade and markets and 
     advancing democracy.
       In contrast, U.S. consent to the involuntary reintegration 
     of the new independent states, recognition of a Russian 
     sphere of influence over the so-called near abroad or 
     allowing Russia a veto over defense policy in Europe directly 
     undermines American national security interests in regional 
     peace and security.
       We have not yet reached a point where U.S. and Russian 
     goals, let alone principles are one and the same. While there 
     certainly are overlapping interests, there are also starkly 
     divergent, if not competitive, global agendas.
       Advancing common interests and protecting American 
     interests are not mutually exclusive. We can pursue a 
     verifiable arms control agenda with Russia, as we limit their 
     unilateral peacekeeping operations in the region. We can 
     encourage the expansion of Russian free markets, as we oppose 
     their continued sales of lethal technology to Iran. We can 
     support their active participation in United Nations 
     decisions, and still object to their recent effort to open a 
     commercial dialogue with Iraq in violation of the spirit, if 
     not the letter, of international sanctions.
       We should remember Yeltsin will not live forever, and in 
     fact, is due to leave office by 1996. A Russia in Vladimir 
     Zhirinovsky's chokehold is a different nation to be reckoned 
     with. While the Clinton administration may hold a benign view 
     of Yeltsin's aggressive international pursuit of Russian 
     interests, democracy does not foretell nor guarantee his 
     successor.
       The summit offered Clinton and Yeltsin, the U.S. and 
     Russia, an opportunity to continue to define and pursue 
     common ground. We can and should offer Russia support to 
     establish itself as a successful international economic and 
     political power. But that success must not come at the 
     expense of the political sovereignty, security or economic 
     independence of any other nation.
       Our license to act in Haiti is not worth the freedom which 
     has swept Europe. Our invasion should not cost us European 
     stability and security.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, July 24, 1994]

                                Yalta II

                          (By Lally Weymouth)

       Recently, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, 
     Yuli Vorontsov, asked the world body to bless the Russian 
     deployment of peace-keepers to the Abkhazia region of 
     Georgia. Informally. Vorontsov has said that without some 
     sort of U.N. endorsement of Russian peace-keeping in Georgia, 
     Moscow would veto a resolution authorizing the dispatch of 
     troops to Haiti.
       Verontsov got his wish. This week, as a consequence, the 
     Clinton administration entered into a cynical deal with 
     Russia that at least one U.N. diplomat compares with the 
     controversial 1945 ``spheres of influence'' Yalta pact. In 
     exchange for a Russian promise not to veto a U.N. resolution 
     on Haiti, Washington gave Moscow the green light to conduct 
     its own ``peace-keeping'' operation in Georgia.
       What this really means is that the United States has given 
     Russia the right to reoccupy the Caucasus and other former 
     Soviet republics in return for Russian acquiescence in U.N. 
     Security Council resolutions on Haiti.
       In supporting, albeit tacitly, Russian ``peace-keeping'' in 
     Georgia, the United States appears to have redefined the U.N. 
     peace-keeping mandate. For example, under the U.N. Charter, 
     no more than one-third of a peace-keeping force can come from 
     any one country. But the ``peace-keepers'' in Georgia are 
     almost exclusively Russian.
       How did Georgia become a pawn in an international power 
     game? Back in January 1991, civil war broke out between South 
     Ossetia--an autonomous region in Georgia--and ethnic 
     Georgians. The South Ossetians had previously declared their 
     intent to secede from Georgia.
       Four months later, Georgia's then leader, Zviad 
     Gamsakhurdia, proclaimed that Georgia was seceding from the 
     Soviet Union. This act sparked civil strife in Abkhazia, an 
     autonomous republic of Georgia. In the fighting that ensued, 
     Abkhazia initially gained the upper hand--thanks in part to 
     help from Moscow.
       Just one year later, Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power in 
     a coup orchestrated by local warlords. Shortly thereafter, in 
     March 1992, former Soviet foreign minister Eduard 
     Shevardnadze became the leader of Georgia. Shevardnadze, 
     however, found himself in a difficult position. During the 
     summer of '93, Gorbachev's former emissary to the West--a man 
     who'd helped end the Cold War--discovered that the Abkhazian 
     secessionists were beating back the Georgian army, thanks to 
     Russian help. Moreover, many Northern Caucasians had come to 
     the aid of the Abkhazian secessionists. To complicate 
     matters, Gamsakhurdia, the former president, suddenly mounted 
     a powerful challenge to Shevardnadze. Gamsakhurdia's forces 
     actually began to march toward Tbilisi. Suddenly, victory 
     for the deposed leader looked certain.
       At this key moment, an isolated Shevardnadze reversed 
     policy and turned to his former Russian tormentors--the anti-
     Gorbachev element led by Boris Yeltsin--for assistance. At 
     Moscow's urging, Georgia agreed to join the Commonwealth of 
     Independent States (CIS), while Shevardnadze signed a 
     collective security agreement that allowed Russia to 
     establish bases in Georgia. Moscow responded in July and 
     August '93 by dispatching 900 marines to Georgia: They 
     enabled Shevardnadze to defeat Gamsakhurdia quickly. This 
     deployment marked the first official Russian involvement in a 
     conflict in the Caucasus.
       Russia subsequently deployed so-called ``peace-keepers'' to 
     Georgia and Abkhazia--but not in the manner envisaged by 
     Shevardnadze. The ex-Soviet foreign minister had hoped to use 
     the Russian troops to occupy Abkhazia. Instead, the Russians 
     stationed their troops along the Ingur River--effectively 
     partitioning Georgia.
       Trapped in Moscow's embrace, Shevardnadze came to 
     Washington last March seeking American support and funding 
     for a U.N. peace-keeping force. The former Gorbachev deputy 
     begged Washington not to leave him alone to face Moscow. But 
     he secured little or no help from the Clinton administration; 
     Congress was similarly unresponsive. Indeed, at a press 
     conference ostensibly held in his behalf, reporters focused 
     on Whitewater.
       A few months ago, CIS demanded and got ``observer status'' 
     in the U.N. General Assembly. Russia's aim was to equate the 
     CIS with other regional bodies, such as NATO. This week at 
     the United Nations, Russia tried but failed to secure 
     international recognition of this equivalency. A senior 
     Clinton administration official insists that the United 
     States deserves credit for refusing to equate the CIS with 
     other regional bodies like NATO or the Organization of 
     American States: The latter have a presumptive right to 
     conduct peace-keeping operations in their areas without 
     Security Council approval. But a foreign diplomat argues that 
     this week's U.N. resolution effectively means that ``CIS is 
     being welcomed de facto as a regional arrangement.''
       In the past, Russia has insisted its interest in Georgia 
     and the rest of the ``near abroad'' turned on a desire to 
     protect Russians living in the republics. Now that claim no 
     longer withstands scrutiny. There aren't many Russians in 
     Abkhazia. Currently, Russia asserts that it desires to bring 
     peace to embattled regions. Close study of the situation in 
     Georgia doesn't support Moscow's claim. The Russians, after 
     all, supported the Abkhaz separatists against Shevardnadze--
     the man who helped bring down the ``Evil Empire.''
       Thanks to Clinton's eagerness to invade Haiti, Russia--with 
     U.S. support--has been granted U.N. backing to begin to 
     reconstitute its empire. Georgia will likely prove only the 
     first step toward a new Russian assertiveness. Moscow is also 
     seeking to amend the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
     so it can move troops and armaments to its Caucasus region--
     just across the border from Georgia.
       According to well-informed experts, Russia will move next 
     on Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave, where the 
     government of Azerbaijan is already under pressure to permit 
     Russian peace-keepers and/or a ``separating'' force. Abkhazia 
     will probably be the model: Russia will in all likelihood 
     freeze Armenian gains in place and then sign an agreement 
     permitting it to establish bases.

                  Statement of U.S.-Russian Relations

       The member organizations of the Central and East European 
     Coalition are alarmed at the direction Russian foreign policy 
     has taken and United States reaction to that policy. On 
     September 21, Russia's foreign intelligence agency released a 
     disturbing report which outlines the recreation of a Russian 
     empire. The headline for this story in The Wall Street 
     Journal was ``KGB Successor Wants Rebirth of Old Empire;'' 
     The Washington Post entitled it ``Russia's Spy Chief Warns 
     West: Don't Oppose Soviet Reintegration.'' Regardless how the 
     story is titled, the fact is that this report confirms a 
     pattern of dangerous Russian activity.
       In January 1992, The New York Times reported that then 
     Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi said he would ``seek 
     a redrawing of borders that would reflect a `glorious page' 
     in the nation's past.'' Russia has indeed pursued such a 
     course of action using political and economic intimidation as 
     well as military force.
       In Tajikistan, the Russian military assisted Tajik, 
     communists in overthrowing the democratically elected 
     government. In Moldova, the Russian 14th Army, under the 
     leadership of General Lebed, has assaulted the territorial 
     integrity of Moldova with the creation of the illegal Trans-
     Dniestr Republic. In Georgia, it was the Russian military 
     which armed the Abkhazian rebellion against the Georgian 
     Government.
       Political threats and intimidation have been a chief weapon 
     in Russia's arsenal. The Russian Parliament enacted 
     legislation illegally annexing Sevastopil from Ukraine. Until 
     the United States Senate passed legislation threatening a cut 
     off of economic assistance, Russia refused to withdraw its 
     troops from the Baltic Nations on the schedule it originally 
     set. After publicly stating that he does not oppose Polish 
     membership in NATO, President Yeltsin sent letters to the 
     United States, Germany, Great Britain, and France warning 
     against allowing Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to join 
     NATO.
       Russia's main weapon against its neighbors, however, has 
     been economic warfare, especially the wielding of its energy 
     sword. While Russia claims to have raised oil prices to world 
     market levels, it has, in fact, been selling oil at different 
     prices to different nations depending on the level of the 
     country's subservience to Moscow. Ukraine has been a 
     principle target of this effort.
       In addition, Moscow has wielded the oil weapon in reverse. 
     In the case of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Russia has 
     refused to allow their oil to pass through Russian pipelines 
     until these nations granted Russia a percentage share in 
     their oil industries. Just last week, Russia publicly refused 
     to recognize an oil agreement between Azerbaijan and Western 
     oil companies.
       Russia's interference in the internal affairs of its 
     neighbors has been justified as either peacekeeping or the 
     protection of ethnic Russians in these countries, the so-
     called ``near abroad.'' In virtually all the areas of Russian 
     ``peacekeeping'' however, Russia is responsible for either 
     starting or exacerbating the conflict. In the case of 
     protection of the ``near abroad'' it should be noted that we 
     are not talking about protecting Russian citizens; we are 
     talking about foreign nationals who happen to be of Russian 
     heritage. This principle, if accepted, is a dangerous 
     precedent. Fifty-five years ago, Nazi Germany justified its 
     aggression on this basis; today, Serbia is doing likewise.
       One must also consider that there are about 25 million non-
     Russians living in the Russian Federation. Is Russia prepared 
     to accept the right of Ukraine or Germany, for instance, to 
     intervene in Russian internal affairs to defend Russian 
     citizens of Ukrainian or German heritage? This is not idle 
     speculation. There are, in fact, as many ethnic Ukrainians in 
     Russia as there are ethnic Russians in Ukraine. This 
     principle can, indeed, be a slippery slope!
       The information packet which we provided you expands on 
     these issues in greater detail. It contains disturbing quotes 
     from both Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign 
     Minister Andrei Kozyrev as well as a partial chronology of 
     what is internationally unacceptable Russian behavior toward 
     its neighbors.
       For the Coalition, however, the more disturbing issue is 
     United States acceptance of this pattern of Russian behavior. 
     When Russia helped overthrow the democratically elected 
     government of Tajikistan, Washington was silent; when Russia 
     dismantled the nation of Moldova, Washington was silent; 
     when, one year ago, Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze pleaded for 
     U.S. condemnation of Russia's actions to destabilize Georgia, 
     Washington was silent; when the economies of Kazahkstan and 
     Turkmenistan were threatened by Moscow, Washington was 
     silent; when Ukraine's territorial integrity was threatened 
     by Russia, Washington was silent.
       When President Yeltsin objected to the membership of 
     Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in NATO, the Clinton 
     Administration acquiesced. America was embarrassed when, in 
     Naples, President Clinton said Russian troops would be out of 
     the Baltic Nations by August 31 and President Yeltsin 
     countered with a firm ``nyet.'' Yet, the Clinton 
     Administration strongly opposed the actions of the United 
     States Senate which adopted, by a vote of 89 to 8, 
     legislation suspending aid to Russia if the troops were not 
     withdrawn on the schedule originally set by Russia.
       While continuing to express concern about ethnic Russians 
     outside of Russia, the Administration has yet to defend 
     ethnic non-Russians in Russia, whose rights are 
     routinely violated. If the United States accepts Russia's 
     right to protect ethnic Russians outside of Russia, as it 
     appears it has, then it must also accept Russia's right to 
     protect the three million ethnic Russians living in the 
     United States. In the not too distant future we may see 
     Russian troops in Brighton Beach!
       Most disturbing of all, however, was U.S. Ambassador 
     Madeleine Albright's September 6th speech in Moscow. 
     Ambassador Albright equated Russia, an empire for six hundred 
     years, with the United States, a democracy for over two 
     hundred years and justified Russia's interference in its 
     neighbors' internal affairs under the guise of 
     ``peacekeeping.'' In her justification, she stated that 
     Russia ``is an empire where the mother country and the 
     colonies are contiguous.'' It is troubling to the Coalition 
     that the Clinton Administration not only accepts but 
     justifies a behavior by the Russian empire that we would 
     oppose if pursued by any other nation.
       In her speech, Ambassador Albright referenced Chairman 
     Shevardnadze's request, under duress, for Russian assistance 
     but failed to mention Shevardnadze's plea, just one year ago, 
     for U.S. condemnation of Russia's campaign to destroy 
     Georgia. While praising Russian actions in Georgia, she 
     ignored her own June 21 statement where she said: ``although 
     Russia desires stability, there have been troubling aspects 
     to its policy towards the new republics. Russian military 
     units in Georgia and Moldova have exacerbated local 
     conflicts.''
       And, finally, she admitted that the United States worked to 
     insure a United Nations mandate for Russian ``peacekeeping'' 
     in Georgia. Many have suggested that the Clinton 
     Administration had, in fact, traded Georgia for Haiti at the 
     U.N.
       On September 6, The Washington Times reported the existence 
     of a State Department policy paper which states: ``It is 
     understood that a Russian sphere of influence is being 
     recognized with Europe extending to the eastern border of 
     Poland, leaving the Baltics somewhat up for grabs . . .'' At 
     the same time, in a State Department reorganization, the 
     nations of the former Soviet Union are being consolidated in 
     one bureau, thereby giving legitimacy to a Russian ``sphere 
     of influence.''
       The Coalition is concerned about this pattern of United 
     States policies which cedes the nations of Central and 
     Eastern Europe to a Russian ``sphere of influence.'' Fifty 
     years ago this February, the United States made similar 
     concessions to Russia at Yalta. That was followed by a fifty-
     year cold war. We feel that the policies being pursued by the 
     Clinton Administration are morally and politically wrong, 
     dangerous, and will result in a new cold war.

  Foreign Policy Statements by President Yeltsin and Minister Kozyrev

       1. ``Russia's economic and foreign policy priorities lie in 
     the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States . . . 
     Russia's ties with them are closer than traditional 
     neighborhood relations; rather, this is a blood relationship. 
     . . . We can't stay indifferent to the fate of our 
     countrymen. I do not mean special rights or privileges. But 
     the people of Russia will not understand if I don't say ow 
     [that] the independent states have to prove through their 
     actions that guaranteeing the human rights of national 
     minorities is indeed the cornerstone of their foreign policy. 
     And here neither selective approaches nor double standards 
     are permissible. . . . The main peacekeeping burden in the 
     territory of the former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian 
     Federation. . . . Attempts by others to use the tensions 
     between the commonwealth states for one's own advantage are 
     extremely short-sighted.'' Boris Yeltsin (address to the 
     United Nations), The Washington Post, September 27, 1994
       2. ``Nobody and nothing can free Russia from the political 
     and moral responsibility for the fate of countries and 
     peoples which for centuries have moved forward together with 
     the Russian state.'' Boris Yeltsin (address to graduates of 
     the military academies), RFE/RL Daily Report, June 28, 1994
       3. ``A strong and powerful Russian state, is also in the 
     interest of our closest neighbors. A strong Russia is the 
     most reliable and real guarantor of stability on the entire 
     territory of the former Soviet Union.
       ``It is our duty to make the year 1994 the year of close 
     attention to the problems of people of Russian extraction 
     living in neighboring states. . . . It is Russia's duty to 
     secure and to (implement) this practice in reality, not in 
     words. When it comes to the violations of the lawful rights 
     of people of Russia, this is not an exclusive internal affair 
     of some country, but also our national affair, an affair of 
     our state . . . Russia has the right to act firmly and 
     toughly when it is necessary to defend the national 
     interests.'' Boris Yeltsin, ``State of the Nation'' Address 
     before the full session of the Federal Assembly, February 24, 
     1994
       4. ``The countries of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
     States) and the Baltics--this is a region where the priority 
     vital interests of Russia are concentrated.
       ``We should not withdraw from those regions which have been 
     the sphere of Russian interests for centuries and we should 
     not fear these words (military presence).'' Andrei Kozyrev, 
     Reuter, January 18, 1994
       5. ``Dear fellow-countrymen! You are inseparable from us 
     and we from you. We were and will be together. We are 
     defending and will defend your and our common interests, 
     using the law and our solidarity. In the new year of 1994 we 
     will do so with greater energy and decisiveness.
       ``We are so indissolubly bound by history, economics and 
     our joint fate that we simply cannot live separately. Our 
     peoples just would not allow it.'' Boris Yeltsin (New Year's 
     message to ethnic Russians living outside of Russia), Reuter, 
     December 31, 1993
       6. ``Russia considers itself a great power and a successor 
     to the Soviet Union and all its might.'' Boris Yeltsin, Itar-
     Tass, December 8, 1993
       7. ``We are a great power by reason of our destiny and 
     normal good relations are in our interests . . . both in the 
     economic and military sense, we are a superpower. There is no 
     use getting angry over the perceptions of (Russia) by near 
     abroad. Anyhow, everything will get back to its old place.'' 
     Andrei Kozyrev, Rossiskaja Gazetta, December 7, 1993
       8. ``Russia has made the peacemaking, and the protection of 
     human rights, particularly that of national minorities, the 
     priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory 
     of the former USSR.
       ``Russia realizes that no international organization or 
     group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this 
     specific post-Soviet space . . . peacemaking cannot be 
     separated from the protection of human rights.'' Andrei 
     Kozyrev, Address before the United Nations Organization, 
     September 28, 1993
       9. ``The world community is increasingly coming to 
     understand Russia's special responsibility in this difficult 
     task. I think the moment has come when responsible 
     international organizations, including the United Nations, 
     should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace 
     and stability in the region of the former union.'' Boris 
     Yeltsin, The New York Times, March 1, 1993.
       10. ``Our principal task is to . . . give effect to the 
     concept of a successor state, enabling Russia as a whole 
     painlessly to take the place of the former USSR in the United 
     States and its specializing institutions, and in the whole 
     system of international relations . . . (and to) create a 
     distinctive zone around Russia of good neighborly relations 
     and cooperation . . .
       ``It should not be forgotten that the Commonwealth of 
     Independent States (CIS) brings together peoples who have 
     been linked to Russia for centuries. It is also obvious that 
     the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of 
     vital interest to us . . .
       ``The situation of the Russian-speaking population in 
     states of the former USSR presents a considerable and complex 
     problem for the Russian Federation's foreign policy and 
     diplomacy. We are counting on support from the NATO member 
     nations to help ensure protection for the rights, life and 
     dignity of the Russian minorities . . .
       ``In relations with the nations of Eastern Europe, it is 
     vital for us to achieve a fundamentally new level of 
     political and economic links, making use of previously 
     acquired positive experiences in practical aspects of 
     collaboration. The future of Eastern Europe lies in its 
     transformation--not into some kind of buffer zone, but into a 
     bridge linking the East and West of the continent 
     . . .
       ``It is essential to achieve greater practical efficiency 
     in the use of force to put out `brush fires.' Russia has 
     undertaken peacemaking operations in a whole range of 
     regions--Moldova, Georgia, Tadjikistan--providing forces and 
     resources in accordance with agreements with the appropriate 
     countries. We recognize our responsibility for stability in 
     that part of the world . . .'' Andrei Kozyrev, NATO Review, 
     Vol. 41, #1, February 1993.


                a pattern of dangerous russian policies

                                  1992

       In January, The New York Times reported that Russian Vice 
     President Aleksandr Rutskoi said he would ``seek a redrawing 
     of borders that would reflect a `glorious page' in the 
     nation's past.'' The New York Times, January 31, 1992.
       On April 4, vice President Rutskoi travelled to Crimea and 
     told naval officers in Sevastopol that Crimea must once again 
     be part of Russia. RFE/RL Daily Report, April 6, 1992.
       Russian waged a campaign to undermine the political and 
     economic independence of Ukraine. RFE/RL Daily Report, June 
     10, 1992 & June 11, 1992.
       On May 21, 1992, in violation of numerous treaties, the 
     Russian Parliament enacted legislation declaring void the 
     1954 Treaty transferring Crimea to Ukraine. The Washington 
     Post, May 22, 1992.
       Russian documents demonstrate the Russia views the Baltic 
     nations as their property and has no intention of withdrawing 
     troops. Financial Times, June 15, 1992.
       As early as June 5, there were reports that Russia's 14th 
     Army was transferring arms and ammunition to the ``Dniester'' 
     Russian insurgent forces in Moldova. RFE/RL Daily Report, 
     June 5, 1992.
       In a June 5 story, The Financial Times quoted Sergei 
     Stankevich, as adviser to President Yeltsin, as saying: ``It 
     is important for Russia to defend the legal and other rights 
     of Russians outside of Russia,'' a remark reminiscent of 
     statements made by Milosovic and Hitler. Stankevich was 
     referring to ethnic Russians and not Russian citizens. 
     Financial Times, June 5, 1992.
       On June 19, President Eduard Shevardnadze accused Russia of 
     military intervention in Georgia. The Washington Times, June 
     20, 1992.
       On June 21, Russian forces attacked the Moldovan police who 
     were responding to Russian insurgent activity. Financial 
     Times, June 1992; The Washington Post, June 22, 1992.
       Evgenii Ambartsumov, chairman of the Russian Supreme 
     Soviet's Committee on International Affairs, stated that he 
     agreed with Vice President Rutskoi's threats against Moldova 
     and Georgia. RFE/RL Daily Report, June 24, 1992.
       Sergei Stankevich stated in an article that Russia should 
     be more aggressive toward its neighbors. RFE/RL Daily Report, 
     June 24, 1992.
       President Shevardnadze of Georgia and President Mircea 
     Snegur of Moldova accused Russia of imperialism. RFE/RL Daily 
     Report, June 24, 1992.
       Referring to Crimea, Vice President Rutskoi stated that he 
     does not recognize any agreements that gave Russian land to 
     other countries. The Washington Times, August 8, 1992.
       On December 7, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies 
     questioned the status of Sevastopol as a Ukrainian city. RFE/
     RL Daily Report, December 8, 1992.

                                  1993

       Russia will open a consular office in the Trans-Dniester 
     region which will grant Russian citizenship to local citizens 
     desiring it, said General Aleksander Lebed, commander of the 
     14th Russian Army in Moldova. RFE/RL Daily Report, January 7, 
     1993.
       Marshal Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, head of the CIS, again 
     claimed all ex-Soviet nuclear weapons as belonging to Russia. 
     RFE/RL Daily, January 26, 1993.
       Russia demanded world prices from Ukraine for oil and gas. 
     Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Shokin said Ukraine 
     could have subsidized energy if it made concessions over the 
     Black Sea fleet, allowed Russian military bases to be 
     established in Ukraine, and allowed Russia to export energy 
     supplies through Ukraine's pipelines. The Financial Times, 
     February 19, 1993.
       President Boris Yeltsin declared Russia must be given the 
     freedom to act as a guarantor of peace in the former Soviet 
     bloc with special powers granted by the United Nations. The 
     Financial Times, March 1, 1993, Christian Science Monitor, 
     March 2, 1993.
       Ukraine attacked President Yeltsin's remarks as seeking 
     international endorsement for dominance in the region. The 
     Washington Times, March 2, 1993.
       Sergei Stankevich, political advisor to President Yeltsin, 
     warned Poland against developing foreign and military ties 
     with Ukraine. Other senior Russian officials told East 
     European officials not to build embassies in Kyiv, since they 
     will be downgraded to consular section in 18 months.'' The 
     Financial Times, March 17, 1994.
       Eduard Shevradnadze asserted that Georgia was forced into 
     war within the Abkhazian region. ``Separatism has taken root 
     over several decades thanks to the special interests of a 
     third force.'' The continued presence of Russian troops is 
     preventing a peaceful settlement in Abkhazia. The Financial 
     Times, April 13, 1994.
       Over one-third of the Black Sea fleet ships raised Russian 
     flags, further adding tension to the dispute between Russia 
     and Ukraine over ownership of the fleet. The New York Times, 
     The Washington Times, UPI, May 31, 1993.
       Russian President Boris Yeltsin said Estonia's citizenship 
     law was a verison of apartheid and ethnic cleansing. 
     ``Yielding to the pressure of nationalists [the Estonian 
     leadership] forgot about some geopolitical and demographic 
     realities. The Russian side has the ability to remind them of 
     it.'' The Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1993.
       Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev bluntly ruled out 
     the U.S.'s offer to mediate the Russian-Ukrainian dispute 
     over nuclear weapons with Ukraine. Grachev said the only 
     appropriate role for the U.S. is to put pressure on Ukraine 
     to force Ukraine to turn over her nuclear weapons to Russia. 
     The Star Ledger, June 7, 1993. Grachev also refused to accept 
     a plan which would place Ukraine's nuclear weapons under 
     international supervision. The Washington Post, June 7, 1993.
       Russia's Foreign Ministry dismissed suggestions that the 
     U.S. would play a more active role mediating disputes in the 
     former Soviet Union and said that Russia considers itself the 
     key player for ``maintaining stability in the region.'' The 
     Washington Post, August 14, 1993.
       Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev declared in his 
     address before the U.N. General Assembly, that no other group 
     of nations ``can replace our peace-making efforts'' along the 
     borders of the former Soviet Union. The Washington Post, 
     September 29, 1993.
       Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller warned the Clinton 
     Administration of Russian dominance in Central Asia, 
     suggesting Western aid to Russia should be linked to Russian 
     support for democracy inside and outside of Russia. A series 
     of advances by Russia across the southern belt of the former 
     Soviet Union alarm Turkish officials and businessmen in the 
     region. The Washington Times, September 25, 1993.
       Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev admitted Russian 
     peacekeeping was a method to retain Russia's sphere of 
     influence. ``There is a danger of losing a geopolitical 
     position that has been gained over centuries,'' he wrote in 
     Isvestia, October 8, 1993. The Christian Science Monitor, 
     October 22, 1993.
       President Boris Yeltsin adopted a more aggressive military 
     doctrine sanctioning the use of Russian troops beyond Russian 
     borders. It rejects the longtime Soviet promise not to use 
     nuclear weapons first, promising only not to use them against 
     non-clear states. The Washington Post, November 4, 1993.
       President Yeltsin warned NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner 
     against enlarging NATO saying that early attempts to 
     incorporate Eastern Europe would damage Russia's strategic 
     interest and damage reconciliation with the West. The 
     Washington Post, December 10, 1993.
       Two days before Russian elections, Polish Foreign Minister 
     Andrzej Olechowski urged the West to allow Poland to join 
     NATO. The West is ``too optimistic about Russia,'' he said, 
     and ``is playing into Russia's hands by not seeing the 
     signals of imperial thinking.'' The New York Times, December 
     12, 1993.
       Newly-elected Vladimir Zhirinovsky said ``he would not 
     allow Russia's borders to be shrunk further,'' but instead, 
     Russia should be recreated within its former borders. He also 
     insisted that the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, 
     the Caucuses and the Baltics must be brought back into 
     Russia's orbit. RFE/RL Daily December 14, 1993.
       Polich Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski, pleading for 
     admittance into NATO, said ``We cannot disregard the results 
     produced by Zhirinovsky . . . his agenda includes restoration 
     of the former Soviet Empire, and given how many votes he got 
     we can no longer write his opinions off as a bad joke.'' The 
     Washington Times, December 16, 1993.

                                  1994

       Polish President Lech Walecsa warned that the world risks 
     the reemergence of the Soviet bloc and communist regimes if 
     Western powers do not admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
     Republic into NATO. Such a refusal of the West to issue a 
     clear directive and timetable for admittance would be ``a 
     major tragedy'' that could lead to another Yugoslavia in 
     Europe. The Washington Post, January 4, 1994.
       President Yeltsin's press secretary, Vyacheslaw Kostikov, 
     declared President Yeltsin was alarmed by the prospect of 
     East European nations joining NATO. The Foreign Ministry said 
     Lithuania's application was ``odd'' and ``counterproductive'' 
     and that the Baltics are a ``part of the near abroad'' ``a 
     sphere of Russia's vital interest.'' RFE/RL Daily, January 7, 
     1994.
       Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that complete 
     withdrawal of troops from the Baltics would be against 
     Russia's interest because it would create a security vacuum 
     and it would leave ethnic Russians undefended. ``We should 
     not withdraw * * *.
       Russia began cutting off natural gas supplies to Ukraine 
     and Belarus, forcing metallurgical and chemical plants to 
     consider shutting down. A Ukrainian official said the effect 
     of the decision would be ``like a bomb exploding on 
     Ukraine.'' The Washington Post, March 4, 1994.
       Russia is using its vast economic leverage to reassert 
     political power in Central Asia, acquiring percentages of 
     lucrative Western energy deals in the republics surrounding 
     the Caspian Sea. ``Russia is holding Kazakstan hostage,'' 
     said an oil executive in Almaty. The Washington Post, March 
     18, 1994.
       Russia has decided to join NATO's Partnership for Peace, 
     using rape as an analogy. A Russian Security Council official 
     said that only by joining can Russia help shape the program 
     ``according to Russia's national interest.'' The Washington 
     Post, March 18, 1994.
       Russia's demand for a special status in NATO before signing 
     the Partnership for Peace plan has angered its former Warsaw 
     pact allies who worry about a repeat of the post-World War II 
     division of Europe. The Washington Times, May 22, 1994.
       Turkish leaders warned that because of Western neglect, the 
     choices for the region's countries were between renewed 
     Russian domination and an Islamic resurgence, which they say 
     is being supported by countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
     Pakistan. The New York Times, June 19, 1994.
       The Russian Parliament approved sending 3,000 peacekeeping 
     troops to Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia in a move 
     intended to assert Moscow's role in the former Soviet Union 
     territory. The Washington Post, June 22, 1994.
       U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright said that there have 
     been troubling aspects to Russia's policy towards her 
     neighbors. ``Russian military units in Georgia and Moldova 
     have exacerbated local conflicts.'' The Washington Post, June 
     21, 1994.
       Kazakhstan accused Russia of cutting off most of the 
     republic's oil exports, paralyzing its most lucrative 
     industry. The Financial Times, June 28, 1994.
       Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky, reflecting 
     disappointment in the U.S.'s policy towards East European 
     membership in NATO, said that a dangerous power vacuum has 
     been created in Eastern and Central Europe, which may attract 
     ``new imperialists'' from Russia. The Washington Times, July 
     6, 1994.
       President Boris Yeltsin, during a meeting with President 
     Clinton, when asked whether he would comply with the August 
     31 target date for withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia 
     answered, ``Nyet.'' The New York Times, July 11, 1994.
       President Yeltsin tied Russia's economic and political 
     transformation to Moscow's status in the world community and 
     its ability to conduct ``a vigorous foreign policy . . . 
     above all in the CIS.'' Recent Russian diplomatic 
     successes have turned Moscow into a ``nerve center of 
     world change.'' RFE/RL Daily, July 21, 1994.
       A five-page Russian document establishes Russia's desire to 
     re-establish a sphere of influence in Europe by gutting NATO. 
     This proposal calls for making the CSCE the primary 
     international organization in Europe, rather than NATO. One 
     diplomat said, ``Russia's objective is to go for the complete 
     dissolution of NATO.'' The Washington Times, August 16, 1994.
       Ranked as Russia's 13th most popular leader, General 
     Alexander Lebed of the Trans-Dniester's 14th Army enclave, 
     rejected the idea of Russian democracy during a recent 
     interview. ``our leader have said `for centuries our state 
     has been totalitarian but starting this minute we will be a 
     democratic state.' That is just not possible. After all we 
     are still the Soviet people.'' The Financial Times, September 
     6, 1994.
       The largest deal between foreign oil companies and 
     Azerbaijan was signed--but Russia refused to recognize the $8 
     billion dollar deal, demanding that the pipeline route should 
     pass through its territories, giving it a stranglehold over 
     energy exports from Azerbaijan. The Financial Times, 
     September 21, 1994.
       The head of Russia's foreign intelligence service, Yevgeny 
     Primakov warned the West that it must accept the re-
     integration of most of the former Soviet Union or face the 
     return of the Cold War. He released a report ``Russia--CIS 
     Does the West Need to Change Its Position?'' which calls for 
     a reintegration of the former Soviet Union and says an 
     economic union is inevitable and a defense and political 
     union is desirable. The Wall Street Journal, The Financial 
     Times, September 22, 1994.
       Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev urged the United States to 
     expand bilateral economic relations with Russia in order to 
     stabilize the CIS. He said those U.S. advisors who oppose 
     Russia's role in CIS economic integration and conflict 
     resolution ``are giving very bad, incorrect, and 
     irresponsible advice.'' RFE/RL Daily, September 22, 1994.

                  Central and East European Coalition

       Mr. Martins Zvaners, American Latvian Association, 400 
     Hurley Avenue, Rockville, MD 20850, TEL: 301-340-8174, FAX: 
     301-340-8732.
       Mr. Craig Baab, Armenian Assembly of America, 122 C Street, 
     NW., Suite 350, Washington, DC 20001, TEL: 202-393-3434, FAX: 
     202-638-4904.
       Mr. Russell Zavistovich, Belarusian Congress Committee of 
     America, 724 West Tantallon Drive, Fort Washington, MD 20744, 
     TEL: 301-292-2610, FAX: 301-292-8140.
       Mr. Radi Slavoff, Bulgarian Institute for Research and 
     Analysis, 6219 Rockhurst Road, Bethesda, MD 20817-1755, TEL: 
     301-530-8114, FAX: 301-530-0770.
       Mr. Armand Scala, Congress of Romanian Americans, 6641-A 
     Old Dominion Drive, Suite 204, Mclean, VA 22101, TEL: 703-
     356-2280, FAX: 703-356-2281.
       Mr. Otakar Horna, Czecho-Slovak Council of America, 5017 
     Del Ray Avenue, Bethesda, MD, TEL: 301-656-6987.
       Mr. Maido Kari, Estonia World Council, Inc., 19102 Stedwick 
     Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20879, TEL: 301-869-3275, FAX: 301-
     869-0519.
       Mr. Frank Koszorus, Hungarian American Coalition, 818 
     Connecticut Avenue, NW., Suite 850, Washington, DC 20006, 
     TEL: 202-296-9505, FAX: 202-775-5175.
       Mr. Avo Ora, Joint Baltic American National Committee, 400 
     Hurley Avenue, Rockville, MD 20850, TEL: 301-340-1954, FAX: 
     301-309-1406.
       Ms. Asta Banionis, Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., 
     2060 North 14th Street, Suite 108, Arlington, VA 22201, TEL: 
     703-524-0698, FAX: 703-524-0947.
       Mr. Laszlo Pasztor, National Federation of American 
     Hungarians, 717 Second Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, 
     TEL: 202-546-3003, FAX: 202-547-0392.
       Ms. Myra Lenard, Polish American Congress, 1625 K Street, 
     N.W., Suite 505, Washington, D.C. 20006, TEL: 202-296-6955, 
     FAX: 202-835-1565.
       Mr. John Karch, Slovak World Congress, 2626 Pioneer Lane, 
     Falls Church, VA 22043, TEL: 703-573-0805, FAX: 703-573-0805.
       Ms. Tamara Gallo, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 
     Inc., 214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Suite 225, Washington, 
     DC 20002, TEL: 202-547-0018, FAX: 202-543-5502.
       Mr. Eugene Iwanciw, Ukrainian National Association, Inc., 
     400 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 859, Washington, DC 
     20001, TEL: 202-347-8629, FAX: 202-347-8631.
       Mr. Linas Kojelis, US-Baltic Foundation, 1211 Connecticut 
     Avenue, N.W., Suite 506, Washington, DC 20036, TEL: 202-986-
     0380, FAX: 202-234-8130.

  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. 
Dodd] is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I will just take a couple of minutes, if I 
can, here. First of all, with regard to the resolution before us, I 
think the Senator from Georgia has properly characterized the 
resolution. I am pleased that the resolution does not have any fixed 
date here for the reason articulated, I think rather clearly, by 
General Shelton and others; that such a target date or a fixed date 
would be counterproductive and, in fact, could pose a threat to our own 
forces by requiring some acceleration of activities as they try to 
complete their mission there.
  I would secondly point out that as I read this resolution, it looks 
more like an OSHA regulation, in some ways, than a resolution on Haiti, 
since there are more reporting requirements in here than one might 
normally expect. Nonetheless, the burden will fall on those who have to 
write the reports. I hope there is as much attention paid by those who 
are insisting upon these reports when they are prepared, as when they 
required them. It is usually just a taxpayer cost and ends up on the 
shelf someplace. That has been my experience. If this is what is needed 
in order to get some consensus around here, I accept it. While I am not 
enthusiastic, as I said, about the resolution, I will nonetheless 
support it.
  Let me point out that we were pleased a few minutes ago to have the 
visit of Nelson Mandela here in the Chamber of the U.S. Senate. It was 
truly an honor for all of us that the President of the Republic of 
South Africa would be joining us. I will not belabor the point. I have 
made the point that not too many years ago, when we were debating the 
issue of sanctions on South Africa in this Chamber--which I recall 
vividly as one who participated in that debate--there was some rather 
interesting rhetoric used to describe the person that we so warmly 
welcomed in this Chamber, which is worth, I think, just referencing, 
because some of the same language has been used to describe President 
Aristide.
  I refer interested colleagues to the congressional debate of October 
1, 1986, if they are interested in reading some of the language used to 
describe Mr. Mandela.
  And I quote here.

       We also have heard repeated comments by those who favor the 
     intrusion of the U.S. Government into the affairs of South 
     Africa that Nelson Mandela is a hero. The fact is that Mr. 
     Mandela pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder. That is why 
     he was jailed. The fact also is that Mrs. Mandela boasted 
     that they had enough automobile tires and bicycle tires to 
     create enough ``necklaces'' to impose their will upon those 
     in the majority who have the courage to stand up and say ``We 
     don't want sanctions.''

  If I took away Mandela, you will find similar remarks have been made 
about President Aristide. The debate goes on with numerous references 
to Mr. Mandela's communism, his strong support for Lenin and Marx 
ideals.
  Those are hardly the remarks we heard earlier today from the 
President of South Africa talking about democracy and the fight for it.
  I merely point out the mere coincidence of events that on the day 
that we welcome, and properly so, and welcome as warmly as we have, 
Nelson Mandela for his courageous effort over the years, 27 of them 
spent incarcerated in his country, that we are debating a resolution 
regarding Haiti, another nation seeking its freedom and its democracy, 
in this case not thousands of miles from our shores in South Africa but 
a mere 200 or so from our shores where they have also faced repression 
of a similar kind in their own nation. And that much of the same 
language used to describe Nelson Mandela some 8 years ago is being used 
today too frequently to describe President Aristide.
  In my view, the time will come when President Aristide will be 
received as warmly for his struggle and his fight for democracy in his 
country as Nelson Mandela is, properly so, today in his nation.
  Again, I would hope that we can adopt this resolution, that our 
troops will get out of Haiti as soon as possible, that there will be a 
restoration of civilian government, a new police force and a military 
in that country that will respect civilian government. And that small 
country will have a chance for freedom, just as South Africa had never 
had a chance of true democracy and freedom for itself until President 
De Klerk, who in my view deserves in many ways as much credit for the 
achievements in South Africa--it is remarkable what he did as the 
President of that nation--and accompanied now by President Mandela, 
such as has been in Haiti for these last number of years where they 
have also never known freedom and democracy but are on the brink of 
having a chance at it.
  The hard work will be ahead in trying to provide economic opportunity 
for people--jobs, decent housing, and so forth--that makes democracy 
thrive and succeed. But they ought to be given first a chance to speak 
freely, elect their chosen leaders without fear of intimidation. In the 
next week or so we will see unprecedented action of a duly elected 
President, thrown out of his nation in a military coup, going back to 
his nation to be received warmly by the overwhelming majority.
  I might point out that in a recent visit, including a group which I 
took to Haiti last year, even members of the business community who 
forcibly told us they had not supported President Aristide, politically 
urged his immediate return to the country so they will have a chance of 
stability and the restoration of democracy.
  Again, after this resolution, which I am confident will be adopted, 
we will adjourn, and the military force will withdraw and the 
multilateral forces will assume the lion's share of the responsibility. 
And we will all look back on this, despite our disagreements of how the 
military ended up in Haiti, supporting the overall outcome and the 
results that I am hopeful will occur in Haiti in these coming weeks and 
months.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to the senior Senator 
from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. 
Smith] is recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank my colleague for yielding.
  Before the Senator from Connecticut leaves the floor, it would be 
interesting after Mr. Aristide has assumed power to look ahead 10 years 
and see how much democracy there is in Haiti
  I think most of us would agree that the past track record does not 
bode too well for the future of democracy in Haiti, which really brings 
me to the point.
  I do support this resolution, but in doing so I want to point out 
that the administration policy, in my opinion, toward Haiti is an 
unmitigated disaster. We do not have any national security interests in 
Haiti. We have no economic interests in Haiti. We do not have a clear 
military objective in Haiti. And rather than training to fight and win 
wars, our Nation's premier rapid deployment forces are serving as 
police officers in a foreign land with no clear rules of engagement. 
Their mission is unclear to the American people, and that mission, if 
there is one, seems to evolve and change on a daily basis. They are 
risking their lives every day, every minute as we speak, and they 
already have been risking their lives, for a cause that is suspect and 
a policy that is undefined. That is simply wrong.
  Perhaps most outrageous is the fact that the President never sought 
the approval of the American people, through their elected officials, 
for this reckless endeavor. It is ironic and, frankly, offensive to me, 
speaking personally, that the President would tout the authorization of 
the United Nations for his Haiti policy, yet not seek congressional 
approval. In effect, the President is saying that his action is 
justified because Boutros Ghali approved it, and at the same time he 
did not seek the approval of the U.S. Congress, the elected 
representatives of the American people. The last time I read the 
Constitution it vested these authorities in the Congress, not the 
United Nations.
  There was no emergency in Haiti, no United States citizens in 
imminent danger, and no requirement to act prior to congressional 
approval. In fact, it is clear that the reason President Clinton did 
not seek congressional endorsement was because he knew that this policy 
would have been rejected by the Congress. That is hardly a legitimate 
reason, Mr. President, to commit U.S. military forces, the best of 
America, in harm's way.
  Is that legitimate reason to do that? I think not. It was not a 
reason to commit them, and it is not a reason to keep them there any 
longer.
  Mr. President, the resolution before the Senate is very clear. It is 
a rejection of the Clinton policy, pure and simple. It states that the 
President should have sought congressional approval prior to deploying 
troops to Haiti and that they should be brought home as soon as 
possible. It is responsible in the sense that it does not put a 
specific date which could, in fact, risk the lives of American troops. 
Importantly, it also requires the President, once and for all, to go on 
the record in a report to Congress and outline what the national 
security objectives are, what is it that he is pursuing in Haiti, what 
is he trying to do. As Senator Nunn has so eloquently said, how can you 
restore democracy where there has never been democracy. There has to be 
democracy at some point in the past before you can restore it in the 
future.
  The truth is all we have heard so far from the administration is the 
excuse that we had to occupy Haiti because the President had threatened 
to invade so many times that we would lose face if we failed to deliver 
on that threat. That is a pretty pathetic and unacceptable rationale 
for risking American lives. I reject it categorically, and based on the 
abundance of mail and telephone calls I have received from New 
Hampshire and, frankly, from around the country, so do the American 
people reject it.
  No one ever said that conducting foreign policy would be simple or 
easy. It is not. We do not need 535 Secretaries of State. But as a 
Presidential candidate, the President sought to trivialize his 
inexperience and disinterest in foreign affairs. Now we are living with 
the consequences. They are disastrous. Our credibility throughout the 
world is in question. Our troops are being stretched to the limit to 
implement the agenda of the United Nations and some humanitarian 
interest rather than the national security interests of our Nation.
  The American military, I say to our colleagues, is a national 
treasure. It is the thing that works the best in all of the U.S. 
Government. Think of any other Government agency, any other Government 
entity that works better than the military. It is not a law-enforcement 
agency to be contracted out wherever or whenever the United Nations 
sees fit. Mr. President, it is time to bring our troops home.
  I want to close by commending those troops. They are the best. I have 
been out there in the field with them on many occasions, not in Haiti 
as my colleague was, but I have seen the job they do. I have witnessed 
it firsthand. I have been a member of the military, and I express my 
absolute commitment to do everything possible to secure their safe and 
expeditious return. But while they are in harm's way we should provide 
them with whatever they need.
  I adamantly oppose the occupation of Haiti by American troops, and I 
oppose the policy of sending them there and offering them up as 
policemen without clear objectives. But they are there--they are there, 
and they need our unequivocal support. We do not need another situation 
as we had in Vietnam.
  As Americans, we have an obligation to do every single thing we can 
to give them the maximum support, encouragement and equipment they need 
to defend themselves and to get home safely. That is what I want to 
happen.
  I would just say, Mr. President, if any American soldier were to lose 
his or her life I would have to say, for what? For what?
  Mr. President, let us bring the troops home and bring them home 
quickly. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, will the Chair advise me how much time is 
remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from New 
Hampshire that he controls 54 minutes and the Senator from Connecticut 
controls 50 minutes.
  Mr. GREGG. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, under the unanimous-consent agreement, I 
believe I have 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls 15 minutes 
in his own right under the unanimous-consent agreement.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator does not have to yield me any time. According 
to the unanimous consent agreement, I have 15 minutes. I appreciate the 
generosity of the Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. President, I state emphatically, I did not support the 
President's proposal to intervene in Haiti. I do not support his policy 
now.
  If the Democratic leadership had given the Senate an opportunity to 
vote on this matter before our troops landed in Haiti, I would have 
voted against it. A majority of this body, in my view, would have voted 
against it. The American people would have voted against it. I found it 
extremely distressing that when the Senate found an opportunity to 
offer an amendment on this issue before our troops were dispatched to 
Haiti, we were prevented from voting.
  Mr. President, I have ventilated that situation often enough that I 
will not review how that transpired.
  But the fact is that I believe the administration made a very, very 
serious error in committing American troops to an enterprise in which 
the American people did not give significant or at least majority 
support.
  Years ago, after the Vietnam war, Mr. President, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 
who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Kennedy, 
and later as Ambassador to South Vietnam, said, in the review of that 
tragic chapter in American history, that there are certain criteria 
that need to be met before sending American troops overseas in a 
military engagement. Among those were a clear strategy for prosecuting 
that enterprise, a clear exit strategy, and most importantly the 
support of the American people.
  Because we found out during the Vietnam war that, over time, that no 
matter how efficiently the performance of our men and women in the 
military, no matter how overwhelming our military superiority may be, 
without the support of the American people, as soon as casualties 
mount, public support will dissipate. By the way, the time for the 
information on the number of casualties becomes less and less as we get 
instantaneous information. I can remember during the Vietnam war that 
it was incredible to many Americans that we would receive information 
from the battlefields of Vietnam as short a time as 24 hours after the 
recording of those events took place. Now, as we know, we receive that 
information instantaneously.
  In fact, if it was not rather tragic, it would be a little amusing, 
as we see as many cameramen as troops in some incidents that have 
transpired during our occupation of Haiti.
  But the fundamental premise remains, Mr. President, that you have to 
have the support of the American people.
  Now, there are various precedents that we can look at in citing the 
need for this support. I suggest that Vietnam is one where that support 
was not secured and the Persian Gulf engagement was one in which the 
support of the American people was obtained.
  In fact, at the time of the invasion of Kuwait, only 37 percent of 
the American people supported sending United States troops to liberate 
Kuwait. The President of the United States then went to the United 
Nations, he went to the American people, and he went to the Congress, 
the representatives of the American people, both here and in the other 
body. He did, in my view, a superior, in fact, a superb job of 
convincing the American people that our vital national security 
interests were indeed at stake in the Persian Gulf.
  In that previous poll that I mentioned, where only 37 percent of the 
American people supported our engagement in the Persian Gulf, at the 
end of the debate and vote here in the U.S. Senate--which some, I was 
not one of them, but some called perhaps the Senate's finest hour in 
recent years, where this issue was ventilated in spirited debate and, 
frankly, extremely insightful discussion--then the American people did 
support it, as did a majority of this body and a majority of the other 
body. So that when later American lives were placed at risk, where 
American casualties were sustained, we saw an outpouring of patriotism, 
of support, of concern, and love that perhaps we had not seen since 
World War II.
  We certainly did not see this kind of support during the Vietnam war, 
and there was very little of it manifested in the Korean war.
  At the conclusion of the engagement in the Persian Gulf, we greeted 
those men and women who served with such distinction with parades and 
with an upsurge of patriotism that was heartening to all Americans.
  Mr. President, I am sorry to predict to you today that none of that 
will happen in Haiti, because the majority of the American people today 
do not believe that our vital national security interests are 
threatened in Haiti.
  The American people do believe, as I do, that we have an interest in 
Haiti. We have an interest in stopping human rights abuses in Haiti. We 
have an interest in restoring President Aristide. We have an interest 
in trying to uplift the grinding poverty that afflicts most of the 
citizens of that unhappy and tragic land.
  We also have an interest in stopping the killing in Rwanda. We have 
an interest in stopping the killing in Liberia. We have an interest in 
stopping the killing in Bosnia, which many predict will get worse as 
this winter wears on.
  Many of us have an interest in stopping the killing in Azerbaijan. 
Many of us have an interest in stopping conflicts in some 47 places in 
the world where armed conflicts are taking place today, as I speak.
  However, the people of the United States have not made the profound 
and difficult decision that our interests in Haiti are so compelling 
that we risk our treasure and our most precious blood, that of 
America's youth. I believe that since the occupation of Haiti, the 
President of the United States and his administration have still not 
made, or even attempted to make a case, to the American people that our 
vital national security interests are involved and that the problems of 
Haiti require our military involvement.
  Mr. President, I do not pretend to be a military strategist or even 
tactician. I once served, obviously, as is well known. But that does 
not mean that I pretend to have the talents of so many enlightened and 
educated people who spend their lives in this business. But I do pay 
attention to their opinions and their views. And I have yet to meet a 
person who is a military historian, who is a tactician or a strategist, 
who can tell me how this situation can end beneficially either for the 
people of Haiti or the people of the United States.
  One of the reasons many of these experts are convinced that this 
situation is one which is increasingly difficult to solve is because of 
the fact that we were there once before. We were there once before. We 
were supposed to be there for a few months and we stayed 19 years. 
Admittedly, there were significantly different circumstances. But the 
motivation to maintain order was fundamentally the same on the part of 
President Woodrow Wilson as it is today on the part of President 
William Clinton.
  I believe this bipartisan solution should have made clear that we 
should not have intervened in the first place, but this resolution does 
make two very important points in a manner which will not undermine the 
safety of our troops or their performance of the mission they have been 
ordered to perform.
  First, the President should have sought congressional approval before 
employing United States Armed Forces to Haiti. Second, the resolution 
offers support for the withdrawal of United States Armed Forces as soon 
as possible. In my view that does not mean as soon as order is restored 
to Haiti. It does not mean as soon as democracy is flourishing in 
Haiti. It does not mean as soon as we have established a viable nation 
in Haiti. As soon as possible means as soon we can get out of Haiti 
without losing any American lives.
  There may be different interpretations of this resolution on the 
other side of the aisle because I think clearly this resolution will be 
approved overwhelmingly in the upcoming vote. But it is my view, and I 
think the majority of the American people's view, and I want to make it 
clear, that as soon as possible means as soon as possible, exactly what 
those words say.
  In addition, the provisions of this resolution require the President 
to report to Congress on the policy objectives, mission, and rules of 
engagement in Haiti. This information will help Congress to keep track 
of the evolution of our mission, otherwise known as mission creep.
  This resolution will not, however, prevent mission creep. Congress 
may monitor the situation and encourage the President to limit the 
mission of our troops in Haiti. But it is ultimately the Commander in 
Chief's responsibility.
  I am deeply concerned that the mission has already begun a Somalia-
like evolution. Our original mission in Haiti was based on cooperation 
with the Haitian military and police--a very unsound basis, I will 
admit, but it was the stated mission upon the arrival of American 
troops. The Haitians were to police themselves. But the cooperation 
that was to prevent mission creep has not materialized and United 
States troops have assumed a greater and greater responsibility for 
policing Haiti. Despite the obvious shift in the mission, 
administration officials reassure us constantly that our troops are not 
involved in police work. Yet we all see on CNN what they are doing. Day 
by day their mission expands. American military personnel have been 
tasked with preventing looting, stopping Haitian on Haitian violence, 
protecting private property, and arresting attaches.
  Perhaps my definition of policing is very different from that of the 
administration, but I would call all of this police work, and I would 
call it all very, very dangerous.
  Our success in limiting Haitian on Haitian violence and United States 
casualties are at best tactical successes. It will be months or years 
before we can evaluate any progress toward accomplishing the loosely 
stated mission of establishing order and democracy.
  I also want to point out the practical problems we are already 
hearing from our military people in Haiti. They are supposed to prevent 
violence, but only too much violence. They are supposed to stand aside 
if something happens, but if someone's life is in danger then they are 
supposed to intervene. It is very, very difficult for an American 
military person on the spot, viewing a disturbance, to know when that 
fight or beating or whatever it is, crosses a line between harassment 
and a life-threatening situation. What our people on the ground there 
are telling us is they are faced with decisions that have to be made at 
the moment on the scene. Clearly their mission and role there is very 
ill-defined.
  There is an aspect of this I want to discuss again that has the 
American people confused and I believe is a very, very significant 
contribution to the lack of support for this effort. One night not too 
long ago the President of the United States comes on national 
television and says to the American people: These are thugs, these are 
murderers, they are rapists, these are human rights abusers; their time 
has come. ``You must go.''
  That is a clear-cut, unequivocal statement on the part of the 
President of the United States that unless these people leave power, 
and indeed leave the country as was later elaborated by administration 
people on national talk shows the following Sunday, then we are going 
to invade.
  Much to the astonishment and amazement of many Americans, the next 
day we did not invade. We sent a delegation--which is certainly 
laudable. But the results of that delegation were that it came back to 
tell the American people that these murdering, raping thugs are now 
honorable military men who need to have honorable military 
retirements--that these are men whose rights under international law 
would be violated if they were forced to leave the country. And the 
chief negotiator, former President Carter, said he was ashamed of the 
President's policy.
  Not only are the American people confused--I keep track of these 
events and I am confused. Are these people murdering thugs or are they 
honorable military people? I would like to know, which is which? Are 
they going to be forced to leave Haiti or are they going to have an 
honorable retirement? Frankly, one of the most respected persons I know 
is saying: Well, you can say what you want. Once you get there and you 
have taken over the country it does not matter. What happens the next 
time we face a problem and we send people down to negotiate? Are they 
going to look back and say: You told them in Haiti certain things would 
happen, but once you got there they did not happen?
  Who are these people? Who is President Aristide? I suggest his 
autobiography ought to be read. It is full of Marxist ideology and 
liberation theology. I have seen films where he extolls the virtues of 
necklacing. Who is the enemy in Haiti and who is the friend? The 
American people, I think, need to know that. Who are we supporting and 
who are we opposing?
  Mr. President, has my time nearly expired?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. McCAIN. I support the resolution and appreciate the indulgence of 
the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
North Carolina, the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], 
is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at this moment more than 21,000 U.S. 
service men and women have been sent to occupy Haiti. They have no 
business being there and we should get them out right away.
  I am deeply concerned when at any time and for any reason United 
States troops are placed in harm's way and I am especially concerned 
because the United States has absolutely no vital interest at stake in 
Haiti.
  I heard a report which was on television, and followed up by a report 
in the New York Times, about apprehensions about the venereal disease 
AIDS. The astonishing percentage of people in Haiti who have AIDS is 
enough to make the President and all the rest of us who had anything 
whatsoever to do with sending those troops down there think again about 
what we have done to our own people.
  I am especially mindful that many thousands of these troops in Haiti 
today come from 29 separate military units, and they reside in my home 
State of North Carolina. Tonight, from Fort Bragg to Camp Lejeune, the 
loved ones are waiting and wondering and praying for the husbands and 
fathers and mothers and wives and sons and daughters to come home 
safely.
  Many Senators have spoken about the morale of our troops in Haiti, 
commenting that they appear well prepared and that they are in good 
spirits. And of course they do and they are. Notwithstanding the 
vigorous efforts of liberals in the Congress of the United States to 
destroy it, the American military remains the finest fighting force on 
Earth. Our troops are, indeed, well trained and well equipped because 
under the vision and leadership of Ronald Reagan the United States made 
a commitment to rebuild our military, a military which had been allowed 
to fall into a state of such deep disrepair the soldiers could not 
fight and ships could not sail and airplanes could not fly. So it 
should be no surprise that our troops are well prepared for their 
mission in Haiti, thanks to Ronald Reagan.
  But Senators need to be reminded that the central question is not the 
morale of those splendid men and women whom we have sent to Haiti. The 
question is, why are they there in the first place? I will repeat what 
I have said on this floor since the issue was first debated in October 
of last year, 12 months ago.
  The United States has no national security interest in Haiti, and 
removing the warlords who have run Haiti for the past 3 years is not 
worth one American life, nor is installing into power on the shoulders 
of 21,000 U.S. servicemen and women, a sworn enemy of America, Jean 
Bertrand Aristide. It just does not make any sense.
  I also find it intriguing that many of the Senators who are showering 
praise today upon Gen. Hugh Shelton and the rest of our military 
personnel in Haiti are, in many instances, the very same Senators who 
have unfailingly voted to slash defense spending. If they had had their 
way, our armed services today would be so hollow that we might find it 
difficult to mobilize a force to occupy even a defenseless island like 
Haiti. So it is ironic, when you stop to think about it, that liberals 
who attempted during the past 12 years to weaken the readiness of our 
armed services are so committed to our occupation of this tiny island.
  By way of example, perhaps I should mention that when Communist 
guerrillas threatened to destroy democracy in El Salvador where our 
Nation's security was truly at risk, liberals prohibited more than 55 
U.S. military advisers--55 people--to go inside that country. They 
would not let them go. Today, many of these same liberals argue that we 
must keep 21,000 servicemen and women indefinitely in a nation which is 
of no security interest to the United States whatsoever.
  In addition to the cost in U.S. personnel lives, which may be high, 
the financial cost of restoring Mr. Aristide to office is an abuse of 
American taxpayers' money. Last week, I submitted in the Congressional 
Record a list of 17 separate categories of U.S. expenditures totaling 
more than $891 million, and these costs continue to skyrocket. The 
Pentagon now believes its mission alone will cost more than $1 billion, 
and that does not include more than $300 million in foreign aid that 
the President intends to give to Haiti over the next 12 months. Nor 
does it include at least $70 million which U.S. taxpayers will be 
expected to cough up as our contribution to the U.N. force involved in 
Haiti. And with a national debt of $4,692,749,910,013.32, as of 
yesterday afternoon, our Nation can ill-afford to take on new debt, 
additional debt to install Mr. Aristide to power.
  So the situation now in Haiti is an accident waiting to happen. 
President Clinton has failed to provide our troops and the American 
people with anything remotely appearing to be a definition of our 
mission there. When our troops entered Haiti about 2 weeks ago, we were 
told that the Haitian military alone would be responsible for disarming 
the Haitian thugs. Now American troops serve as the policemen of Haiti, 
intervening in fist fights among the looters and the raiders and they 
are trying to disarm the thugs.
  I am not going to dwell further on these points because I, and many 
other Senators, have made them before, but allow me to say that the 
President and his advisors have made a grave mistake by placing United 
States troops in Haiti. We simply cannot afford the cost of this 
occupation financially, but far more important, the President will 
never be able to justify the cost of this occupation in terms of 
American life and American dollars.
  Mr. President, please get our troops out of Haiti now before they 
begin coming home in body bags.
  Finally, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a listing of all 
North Carolina based military personnel be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

    NORTH CAROLINA-BASED MILITARY PERSONNEL ORDERED TO INVADE HAITI

       Marine Corps Forces:
       1. Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force--Caribbean 
     of approx. 1,800 Marines, Camp Lejeune.
       Army Forces:
       1. 1st Corps Support Command, Ft. Bragg.
       2. 16th Military Police Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
       3. 503rd Military Police Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       4. 2-159 Medium Lift Helicopter Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       5. 20th Engineer Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
       6. 27th Engineer Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       7. 37th Engineer Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       8. 525th Military Intelligence Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
       9. 319th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       10. 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       11. 2nd Material Movement Center, Ft. Bragg.
       12. 330th Material Movement Center, Ft. Bragg.
       13. 46th Corps Support Group, Ft. Bragg.
       14. 264th Corps Support Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       15. 18th Finance Group, Ft. Bragg.
       16. 18th Personnel Service Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       17. 44th Medical Brigade, Ft. Bragg.
       18. 55th Medical Group, Ft. Bragg.
       19. 28th Combat Support Hospital, Ft. Bragg.
       20. 261st Area Support Medical Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       21. 32nd Medical Logistic Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       22. 56th Medical Battalion, Ft. Bragg.
       U.S. Army Reserve:
       1. 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion Support Element, 
     Greensboro.
       Air Force Units:
       1. 4th Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB.
       2. 23rd Wing, Pope AFB.
       Air Force Reserve:
       1. 53 Aerial Port Sq., Fayetteville.
       2. 916 ARG, KC-10A, Goldsboro.
       National Guard Units:
       1. 145 AG, C-130, Charlotte.

  Mr. HELMS. If I have any time remaining, I yield it back and I 
suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator suggests the absence of a quorum. 
Does either Senator yield time at this point?
  Mr. HELMS. I withdraw, unless----
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
that the time be charged to both sides equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I want to thank my 
colleague from New Hampshire and also my colleague from Connecticut for 
putting forth this bipartisan resolution. I think it is very important 
that those of us who believe that the mission to Haiti should never 
have been embarked on speak out loudly and clearly so that the 
President and the administration know that this mission must come to a 
close at the earliest possible moment.
  I originally opposed the invasion of Haiti because I was simply not 
convinced that there is any threat to our national interest that is 
significant enough to warrant the loss of even one American life. 
Administration officials have suggested that we are prepared for 
casualties in Haiti during this occupation. Mr. President, I am not. I 
was not prepared to accept United States casualties resulting from an 
invasion of Haiti, and I am certainly not prepared for casualties 
resulting from the occupation of Haiti.
  On September 24, in the first fire-fight of the American intervention 
in Haiti, a United States Navy interpreter was wounded and 10 armed 
Haitians, policemen or attaches, were killed by Marines outside a 
police station in the north coast city of Cap-Haitien. We have had the 
first United States casualty and the first Haitians killed as a result 
of our intervention.
  Since then, Haitian-on-Haitian violence has escalated rather than 
abated. Looting has become widespread, and the tension between our 
troops and parts of the populace have increased. One American soldier 
has been shot in the abdomen. This is a very similar pattern, Mr. 
President, to what took place in Somalia. At first, the Somalis 
welcomed us. Then they took up arms against us, with disastrous 
results.
  On September 29, an explosion at a political rally killed five 
Haitians and wounded many more. U.S. soldiers were in close proximity 
to the explosion and luckily none were killed or injured.
  On September 30, two U.S. photographers were injured by mob violence. 
The President has yet to report to Congress and answer our serious 
concerns and questions regarding this mission.
  I am becoming increasingly troubled by the apparent mission creep 
which characterized our involvement in Somalia and is becoming apparent 
in Haiti as well. Originally, administration officials briefed the 
Senate that United States forces would be routed around Haitian-on-
Haitian acts of violence. Now the violence is finding our troops much 
as it did in Somalia. In addition, the policy regarding our troops' 
intervention in acts of violence between Haitians has been changed. The 
new policy puts our troops between the two opposing sides. The only 
outcome of this can be more American casualties.

  Mr. President, I believe it is important to reiterate this point. The 
President chose not to seek congressional approval prior to sending 
combat troops into Haiti when there was absolutely no national security 
interest and no reason to do that. There was no U.S. citizen being 
threatened.
  Then the President's representatives briefed the Congress that we 
would not involve our troops in violence between Haitians. Now the 
President has said, again without seeking congressional approval, that 
this policy is altered and our troops are directly in harm's way. Let 
us not forget that President Bush ordered United States troops into 
Somalia for the purely humanitarian purpose of ending a politically 
imposed famine. It was the Clinton administration that changed the 
mission to one of nation building.
  We are all familiar with the tragic outcome of that intervention. We 
lost precious American lives. It appears that our military is once 
again being plagued by mission creep as part of a misguided cause of 
nation building. I think that nation building is a term that reflects 
the arrogance of many in this country who think that Haiti or Somalia 
can have democracy imposed upon them at the point of a bayonet.
  I am sure my office is not unique in the Senate. I have received 
hundreds of thoughtful letters, phone calls, and telegrams since 
President Clinton addressed the Nation. The one theme which 
predominates is that the President has simply failed to present a clear 
and convincing case that there is, indeed, a vital national security 
interest in Haiti.
  Advocates of an interventionist foreign policy have always advanced 
lofty goals, but in the final analysis these goals must be achievable 
and they must be worth the price we pay.
  Even if democracy in Haiti were achievable at the point of a bayonet, 
is it worth the life of one American soldier or marine? This is an 
internal decision that must be made by the Haitian people. Is it worth 
the estimated 500 million to 850 million taxpayer dollars that will be 
added to our deficit for this intervention?
  One of the many thoughtful letters that came into my office was from 
a retired colonel, Richard Platt, of Universal City, TX. He wrote:

       I have served my country as a soldier for 35 years, 
     including two tours of duty in Vietnam. I had hoped that we 
     as a nation had learned from our mistakes. Apparently I was 
     wrong. It appears that we have again committed brave young 
     Americans in a disastrous mission in support of inept 
     political policies. The United States has absolutely no vital 
     national interests in Haiti, and it is not worth a single 
     American life. It is time to speak up--loudly.

  That is what he wrote to me. Mr. President, I am taking Mr. Platt's 
advice, and I am speaking. I am going to speak loudly, as I have in the 
past, because I think that is the best way to send the message to the 
President.
  This mission must be defined. It must be defined clearly and 
narrowly. And the American people must understand it. Most of all, Mr. 
President, I hope by speaking out, we will shorten this mission to the 
very briefest possible time that our troops would be in harm's way. I 
am going to speak to try to make that happen.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. With the consent of the floor leader, Senator Dodd, I 
yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized 
for 10 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
  As we debate the Mitchell-Dole resolution regarding the United States 
policy toward Haiti, I would like to discuss an issue that goes beyond 
the specific military operation and calls attention to the disturbing 
institutional process by which we arrived at this point.
  Today, there are over 19,500 United States troops in Haiti. This is a 
U.S.-led mission with phenomenal contributions from other nations and 
is scheduled for transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force for phase 2, 
which is to be responsible for maintaining public order, 
professionalization of the police force, and assisting in the 
legislative election.
  Mr. President, simply speaking, the United Nations authorized this 
mission, but the U.S. Congress never did.
  We have debated and voted on the issue of United States troops in 
Haiti on several occasions in the past year. We have also voted on a 
series of haphazard and ad hoc resolutions relating to the United 
States troops in several other conflicts such as Haiti, Bosnia, and the 
Golan Heights.
  Mr. President, it has been a sloppy and ineffective approach to war 
powers.
  I believe that Congress should have had a central role in authorizing 
the Haiti mission because it is a large military operation where our 
troops may face imminent hostility. For that reason, I introduced a 
resolution 2 weeks ago, shortly after our troops went into Haiti, 
calling for an up or down vote on the deployment of United States 
forces in Haiti on or before October 15, 1994, when the mission in 
Haiti can obviously become more perilous. I strongly believe that 
Congress has a responsibility to vote up or down on this particular 
mission.
  I compliment the House Foreign Affairs Committee for taking up a 
resolution which did take a position on this issue. They voted to 
authorize the mission until March 1, 1995. Now, Mr. President, I am not 
at all sure I agree with the authorization or the withdrawal date 
chosen, but at least that committee faced the issue head on.
  There, Chairman Lee Hamilton noted:

       The presence of more than 15,000 U.S. troops in Haiti is a 
     significant foreign policy action. It is important for 
     Congress to vote to authorize the deployment of U.S. troops 
     overseas whenever they are placed in situations where there 
     is the potential for combat.

  Obviously, Mr. President, the Haiti situation is such a situation.
  Despite what has turned out to be a political battle, war powers 
should not be a partisan issue. The underlying issue is not simply 
whether Members of this Congress support or oppose President Clinton's 
decision on Haiti. It is what power we would have if a different 
President in the future would decide to deploy 50,000 troops, for 
example, to Costa Rica for inappropriate or obscure reasons. That is 
why I am focusing on this issue. With the precedent we are setting in 
Haiti, such abuse by a less well-meaning President could well occur.
  Our Founding Fathers did not leave these kinds of decisions to one 
person. The Constitution mandates a balance of powers, in most cases, 
of the use of Armed Forces. In this case, though, only the Chief 
Executive ordered the deployment of 19,000 Americans into combat. He 
also unilaterally decided that he did not have to seek congressional 
authorization to do it.
  Mr. President, I was particularly troubled by the legal rationale the 
administration offered for the President's deployment of forces to 
Haiti. In a letter from Walter Dellinger in the Office of Legal Counsel 
at the Department of Justice to Senators Dole, Cohen, Thurmond, and 
Simpson, the administration cited some legal justification for this 
unilateral action, including an argument that the deployment was in 
accordance with a sense-of-the-Congress resolution attached to the 
Department of Defense appropriations bill in October 1993.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                      Office of Legal Counsel,

                               Washington, DC, September 27, 1994.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Hon. Alan K. Simpson,
     Hon. Strom Thurmond,
     Hon. William S. Cohen,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators, I write in response to your letter of 
     September 15, 1994, in which you requested a copy or summary 
     of any legal opinion that may have been rendered, orally or 
     in writing, by this Office concerning the lawfulness of the 
     President's planned deployment of United States military 
     forces into Haiti. After giving substantial thought to these 
     abiding issues of Presidential and congressional authority, 
     we concluded that the President possessed the legal authority 
     to order that deployment.
       In this case, a combination of three factors provided legal 
     justification for the planned deployment. First, the planned 
     deployment accorded with the sense of Congress, as expressed 
     in section 8147 of the Department of Defense Appropriations 
     Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1418, 1474 (1993). 
     That resolution expressed Congress's sense that the President 
     would not require express prior statutory authorization for 
     deploying troops into Haiti provided that he first made 
     certain findings and reported them to Congress. The President 
     did make the required findings and reported them. We 
     concluded that the resolution ``evince[d] legislative intent 
     to accord the President broad discretion'' and ```invite[d]' 
     measures on independent presidential responsibility.'' Dames 
     & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (quoting 
     Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 
     (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Second, the planned 
     deployment satisfied the requirements of the War Powers 
     Resolution. Finally, after examining the circumstances, 
     nature, scope and duration of the anticipated deployment, we 
     determined that it was not a ``war'' in the constitutional 
     sense. Specifically, the planned deployment was to take place 
     with the full consent of the legitimate government, and did 
     not involve the risk of major or prolonged hostilities or 
     serious casualties to either the United States or Haiti. For 
     those reasons, which are set out in detail below, we 
     concluded that the President had legal and constitutional 
     authority to order United States troops to be deployed into 
     Haiti.


                                   i.

       First, the Haitian deployment accorded with the sense of 
     Congress, as expressed in section 8147 of the Department of 
     Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139.\1\ 
     That provision was sponsored by, among others, Senators Dole, 
     Simpson and Thurmond. See 139 Cong. Rec. S14,021-22 (daily 
     ed. Oct. 20, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Section 8147(b), 107 Stat. 1474, of the Act states the 
     sense of Congress that ``funds appropriated by this Act 
     should not be obligated or expended for United States 
     military operations in Haiti'' unless certain conditions 
     (including, in the alternative, prior Congressional 
     authorization) were met. Section 8147(c), 107 Stat. 1475, 
     however, added that
       [i]t is the sense of Congress that the limitation in 
     subsection (b) should not apply if the President reports in 
     advance to Congress that the intended deployment of United 
     States Armed Forces into Haiti--
       (1) is justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure the safety and security of United States 
     Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States 
     Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of 
     their rules of engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than 
     civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
       (B) that the United States Armed Forces proposed for 
     deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the 
     objectives of the proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       In short, it was the sense of Congress that the President 
     need not seek prior authorization for the deployment in Haiti 
     provided that he made certain specific findings and reported 
     them to Congress in advance of the deployment. The President 
     made the appropriate findings and detailed them to Congress 
     in conformity with the terms of the resolution. See Letter to 
     the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives 
     from the President (Sept. 18, 1994). Accordingly, this is 
     not, for constitutional purposes, a situation in which the 
     President has ``take[n] measures incompatible with the 
     expressed or implied will of Congress,'' Youngstown Sheet & 
     Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., 
     concurring). Rather, it is either a case in which the 
     President has acted ``pursuant to an . . . implied 
     authorization of Congress,'' so that ``his authority is at 
     its maximum,'' id. at 635, or at least a case in which he may 
     ``rely upon his own independent powers'' in a matter where 
     Congress has ``enable[d], if not invite[d], measures on 
     independent presidential responsibility.'' Id. at 637.


                                  ii.

       Furthermore, the structure of the War Powers Resolution 
     (WPR) recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral 
     Presidential authority to deploy armed forces ``into 
     hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in 
     hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' 50 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1543(a)(1). The WPR requires that, in the absence 
     of a declaration of war, the President must report to 
     Congress within 48 hours of introducing armed forces into 
     such circumstances and must terminate the use of United 
     States armed forces within 60 days (or 90 days, if military 
     necessity requires additional time to effect a withdrawal) 
     unless Congress permits otherwise. Id. Sec. 1544(b). This 
     structure makes sense only if the President may introduce 
     troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without 
     prior authorization by the Congress: the WPR regulates such 
     action by the President and seeks to set limits to it.\2\
       To be sure, the WPR declares that it should not be 
     ``construed as granting any authority to the President with 
     respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces 
     into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in 
     hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'' 50 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1547(d)(2). But just as clearly, the WPR assumes 
     that the President already has such authority, and indeed the 
     WPR states that it is not ``intended to alter the 
     constitutional authority of the . . . President.'' Id. 
     Sec. 1547(d)(1). Furthermore, although the WPR announces 
     that, in the absence of specific authorization from Congress, 
     the President may introduce armed forces into hostilities 
     only in ``a national emergency created by attack upon the 
     United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed 
     forces,'' id. Sec. 1541(c), even the defenders of the WPR 
     concede that this declaration--found in the ``Purpose and 
     Policy'' section of the WPR--either is incomplete or is not 
     meant to be binding. See e.g., Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the 
     Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers 
     Resolution, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79, 81 (1984).\3\
       The WPR was enacted against a background that was ``replete 
     with instances of presidential uses of military force abroad 
     in the absence of prior congressional approval.'' 
     Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without 
     Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980). While 
     Congress obviously sought to structure and regulate such 
     unilateral deployments,\4\ its overriding interest was to 
     prevent the United States from being engaged, without express 
     congressional authorization, in major, prolonged conflicts 
     such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea, rather than to 
     prohibit the President from using or threatening to use 
     troops to achieve important diplomatic objectives where the 
     risk of sustained military conflict was negligible.
       Further, in establishing the funding a military force that 
     is capable of being projected anywhere around the globe, 
     Congress has given the President, as Commander in Chief, 
     considerable discretion in deciding how that force is to be 
     deployed.\5\ See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 
     (1950); cf. Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 515-16 
     (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., concurring) (President 
     ``may direct any revenue cutter to cruise in any waters in 
     order to perform any duty of the service''). By declining, in 
     the WPR or other statutory law, to prohibit the President 
     from using his conjoint statutory and constitutional powers 
     to deploy troops into situations like that in Haiti, Congress 
     has left the President both the authority and the means to 
     take such initiatives.
       In this case, the President reported to Congress, 
     consistent with the WPR, that United States military forces, 
     together with units supplied by foreign allies, began 
     operations in Haitian territory, including its territorial 
     waters and airspace. The President stated in his report that 
     he undertook those measures ``to further the national 
     security interests of the United States; to stop the brutal 
     atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to 
     secure our borders; to preserve stability and promote 
     democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of 
     the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to 
     us, including the Governors Island Agreement and the 
     agreement concluded on September 18 in Haiti.'' Letter to the 
     Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from 
     the President, at 2 (Sept. 21, 1994). We believed that the 
     deployment was fully consistent with the WPR, and with the 
     authority Congress reserved to itself under that statute to 
     consider whether affirmative legislative authorization for 
     the continuance of the deployment should be provided.


                                  iii.

       Finally, in our judgment, the Declaration of War Clause, 
     U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 11 (``[t]he Congress shall 
     have Power . . . [t]o declare War''), did not of its own 
     force require specific prior congressional authorization for 
     the deployment of troops at issue here. That deployment was 
     characterized by circumstances that sufficed to show that the 
     operation was not a ``war'' within the meaning of the 
     Declaration of War Clause.\6\ The deployment was to have 
     taken place, and did in fact take place, with the full 
     consent of the legitimate government of the country 
     involved.\7\ Taking that and other circumstances into 
     account, the President, together with his military and 
     intelligence advisors, determined that the nature, scope and 
     duration of the deployment were not consistent with the 
     conclusion that the event was a ``war.''
       In reaching that conclusion, we were guided by the initial 
     premise, articulated by Justice Robert Jackson, that the 
     President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, ``is 
     exclusively responsible'' for the ``conduct of diplomatic and 
     foreign affairs,'' and accordingly that he may, absent 
     specific legislative restriction, deploy United States armed 
     forces ``abroad or to any particular region.'' Johnson v. 
     Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789. Presidents have often utilized 
     this authority, in the absence of specific legislative 
     authorization, to deploy United States military personnel 
     into foreign countries at the invitation of the legitimate 
     governments of those countries. For example, during President 
     Taft's Administration, the recognized government of Nicaragua 
     called upon the United States to intervene because of civil 
     disturbance. According to President Taft, ``[t]his led to the 
     landing of marines and quite a campaign. . . . This was not 
     an act of war, because it was done with the consent of the 
     lawful authorities of the territory where it took place.'' 
     William Howard Taft, The Presidency 88-89(1916).\8\
       In 1940, after the fall of Denmark to Germany, President 
     Franklin Roosevelt ordered United States troops to occupy 
     Greenland, a Danish possession in the North Atlantic of vital 
     strategic interest to the United States. This was done 
     pursuant to an agreement between the United States and the 
     Danish Minister in Washington, and was welcomed by the local 
     officials on Greenland.\9\ Congress was not consulted or even 
     directly informed. See James Grafton Rogers, World Policing 
     and the Constitution 69-70 (1945). Later, in 1941, the 
     President ordered United States troops to occupy Iceland, an 
     independent nation, pursuant to an agreement between himself 
     and the Prime Minister of Iceland. The President relied upon 
     his authority as Commander in Chief, and notified Congress 
     only after the event. Id. at 70-71. More recently, in 1989, 
     at the request of President Corazon Aquino, President Bush 
     authorized military assistance to the Philippine government 
     to suppress a coup attempt. Pub. Papers of George Bush 1615 
     (1989).
       Such a pattern of Executive conduct, made under claim of 
     right, extended over many decades and engaged in by 
     Presidents of both parties, ``evidences the existence of 
     broad constitutional power.'' Presidential Power to Use the 
     Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. 
     O.L.C. at 187.
       We are not suggesting, however, that the United States 
     cannot be said to engage in ``war'' whenever it deploys 
     troops into a country at the invitation of that country's 
     legitimate government. Rather, we believe that ``war'' does 
     not exist where United States troops are deployed at the 
     invitation of a fully legitimate government in circumstances 
     in which the nature, scope, and duration of the deployment 
     are such that the use of force involved does not rise to 
     the level of ``war.''
       In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for 
     the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary, the 
     President was entitled to take into account the anticipated 
     nature, scope and duration of the planned deployment, and in 
     particular the limited antecedent risk that United States 
     forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer 
     or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the 
     deployment.\10\ Indeed, it was the President's hope, since 
     vindicated by the event, that the Haitian military leadership 
     would agree to step down before exchanges of fire occurred. 
     Moreover, while it would not be appropriate here to discuss 
     operational details, other aspects of the planned deployment, 
     including the fact that it would not involve extreme use of 
     force, as for example preparatory bombardment, were also 
     relevant to the judgment that it was not a ``war.''
       On the basis of the reasoning detailed above, we concluded 
     that the President had the constitutional authority to deploy 
     troops into Haiti even prior to the September 18 agreement.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Walter Dellinger.

                               footnotes

     \1\In speaking of the deployment, we should be understood to 
     include, not only the actual deployment begun on September 
     19, but the military operation that was planned, and in part 
     initiated, before an agreement with the Haitian military 
     leadership was negotiated on September 18 by former President 
     Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin Powell (the 
     ``September 18 agreement''). As the President noted in his 
     televised address of September 18, that agreement ``was 
     signed after Haiti received evidence that paratroopers from 
     our 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, North 
     Carolina, had begun to load up to begin the invasion which I 
     had ordered to start this evening.'' Text of Clinton's 
     Address, The Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1994, at A17.
     \2\It should be emphasized that this Administration has not 
     yet had to face the difficult constitutional issues raised by 
     the provision of the WPR, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1544(b), that 
     requires withdrawal of forces after 60 days involvement in 
     hostilities, absent congressional authorization.
     \3\The WPR omits, for example, any mention of the President's 
     power to rescue Americans; yet even the Comptroller General, 
     as agent of Congress, has acknowledged both that ``the weight 
     of authority'' supports the position that ``the President 
     does possess some unilateral constitutional power to use 
     force to rescue Americans,'' and that Sec. 1541(c) ``does not 
     in a strict sense operate to restrict such authority.'' 55 
     Comp. Gen. 1081, 1083, 1085 (1976). See also Peter Raven-
     Hansen and William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
     Commander in Chief, 80 Va. L. Rev. 833, 879 (1994) (``[a] 
     custom of executive deployment of armed force for rescue and 
     protection of Americans abroad has developed at least since 
     1790''); id. at 917-18 (``since 1868 the so-called Hostage 
     Act has authorized and required the President to `use such 
     means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think 
     necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate [the] release' 
     of American citizens `unjustly deprived of [their] liberty by 
     or under the authority of any foreign government.' . . . 
     [T]he Hostage Act lends further support to custom and may 
     constitute congressional authorization for at least this 
     limited defensive war power.'').
     \4\Even though the President has the inherent power to deploy 
     troops abroad, including into situations of hostilities, 
     Congress may, within constitutional limits, regulate the 
     exercise of that power. See, e.g., Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 
     U.S. 260,266 (1909) (President had power to institute 
     military government in occupied territories until further 
     action by Congress); The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 
     421, 427-28 (1814).
     \5\We recognize, of course, that the WPR provides that 
     authority to introduce the armed forces into hostilities or 
     situations where hostilities are clearly indicated may not be 
     inferred from an appropriation act, unless that statute 
     ``states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory 
     authorization within the meaning of this chapter.'' 50 U.C.S. 
     Sec. 1547(a).
     \6\See Note, Congress, The President, And The Power To Commit 
     Forces To Combat, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1771, 1790 (1968) 
     (describing other limited interventions and suggesting 
     conclusion that ```war' in the sense of article I, section 8, 
     requiring congressional sanction, does not include 
     interventions to maintain order in weak countries where a 
     severe contest at arms with another nation is likely to 
     result''). Here, of course, there is still less reason to 
     consider the deployment a ``war,'' since it was undertaken at 
     the request of the recognized, democratically-elected 
     government, and not merely to ``maintain order.''
     \7\Moreover, the deployment accorded with United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution No. 940 (1994). There can thus be 
     no question but that the deployment is lawful as a matter of 
     international law.
     \8\President Grover Cleveland had also opined that a 
     ``military demonstration'' on the soil of a foreign country 
     was not an ``act of war'' if it was ``made either with the 
     consent of the [foreign] government . . . or for the bona 
     fide purpose of protecting the imperiled lives and property 
     of citizens of the United States.'' 9 Messages and Papers of 
     the Presidents 1789-1897 466 (James Richardson ed., 1898).
     \9\The Danish King and ministers were in German hands at the 
     time.
     \10\Although the President found that the deployment would 
     not be without risk, he and his senior advisers had also 
     determined that the United States would introduce a force of 
     sufficient size to deter armed resistance by the Haitian 
     military and thus to hold both United States and Haitian 
     casualties to a minimum. The fact that the United States 
     planned to deploy up to 20,000 troops is not in itself 
     dispositive on the question whether the operation was a 
     ``war'' in the constitutional sense, since the very size of 
     the force was designed to reduce or eliminate the likelihood 
     of armed resistance.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
  Now, while Mr. Dellinger cites an escape clause for the President to 
act in dire circumstances, he seemingly ignores the fact that the 
principal purpose of the resolution passed by this body was to ensure 
that ``funds should not be obligated or expended for United States 
military operation in Haiti'' unless authorized in advance by Congress 
or under certain limited emergency situations where there was not time 
to seek and receive congressional authorization.
  I have to say that I am dismayed at the line of reasoning propounded 
by the administration. A sense-of-Congress resolution which was clearly 
designed to limit the use of appropriated funds for a military 
operation in Haiti without prior congressional approval was 
intentionally interpreted to authorize an unauthorized expedition.
  The language cited by Mr. Dellinger in his September 27 justification 
refers to an exception to the general limitation in the resolution 
which allowed such deployment if the President reported in advance to 
the Congress on a number of conditions.
  What, in fact, happened is that the President ordered the invasion on 
Sunday, September 18, and sometime close to midnight--well after the 
decision had been made and implemented--he transmitted to Congress a 
report advising Congress of the objectives and charter of the 
deployment. To argue that a report submitted after an invasion order 
had been issued was compliance with the advance report requirement 
makes a mockery of congressional intent.
  Mr. President, Mr. Dellinger's letter makes two other arguments for 
the legal justification for the deployment without congressional 
authorization which I would like to touch on briefly.
  First, he refers to the War Powers Resolution and states that its 
structure makes sense only if the President has authority introduce 
troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior 
authorization by Congress. He argues that the War Powers Resolution 
simply regulates such action by the President and seeks to set limits 
to it. The letter goes on in my view to minimize the War Powers 
Resolution by suggesting that while Congress obviously sought to 
structure and regulate unilateral deployments, ``its overriding 
interest was to prevent the United States from being engaged, without 
expressed congressional authorization, in major prolonged conflicts 
such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea.'' I found it astounding that the 
administration does not recognize the link between the evolution of 
both Korea and Vietnam from limited actions to major wars.
  The final argument that article I, section 8 of the Constitution does 
not require specific prior congressional authorization for the 
deployment of troops at issue here must also be challenged. I believe 
that when the United States deploys almost 20,000 troops, combat-ready, 
in the circumstances at hand, it is a word-game to assert that 
congressional authorization under article I is not at issue.
  Given that the invasion of Haiti contained no pretense of an element 
of surprise, there was no reason to circumvent the original intent of 
the resolution: That the President should seek congressional 
authorization prior to an invasion such as the one conducted in Haiti. 
I voted for the resolution invoked by Mr. Dellinger, but since the 
administration has demonstrated that it does not recognize a 
fundamental role for Congress in the use of force, I will be far more 
reluctant in the future to vote for any other resolutions on specific 
missions which provide or will be construed to provide a mechanism for 
the administration to circumvent the need for congressional approval of 
military deployments.
  Mr. President, we should not let this action go unchallenged. A 
provision in the Mitchell-Dole resolution we are considering today, 
which states that ``It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. Armed 
Forces to Haiti,'' acknowledges the problem.
  However, the resolution does not go ahead and authorize the 
deployment. The resolution also avoids the opportunity to authorize 
phase II, the UNMIH mission. Another provision explicitly states that 
``Nothing in this resolution should be construed or interpreted to 
constitute congressional approval or disapproval of the participation 
of the U.S. Armed Forces in the United Nations Mission in Haiti.'' 
Obviously, Mr. President, if we are going to authorize United States 
participation in the UNMIH mission, now is the time to do it.
  However, with the circumstances before us today--when United States 
Forces are already deployed--it appears that the Senate is going to 
sidestep a direct up or down vote on the United States mission in 
Haiti. This is precisely the reason we are in dire need of an overhaul 
of the War Powers Resolution, which has proven unworkable.
  To conclude, Mr. President, I am hopeful that next Congress, when we 
have finally grown tired of the seat-of-the-pants amendments on the use 
of force, our committees will delve into this issue and we will be able 
to develop a process where, in concert with the administration, the use 
of force is a shared decision, as envisioned under the Constitution, 
between the executive and legislative branches, not just the decision 
of one person, the Commander in Chief.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). Who yields time?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the President pro 
tempore, Senator Byrd.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time does Mr. Brown wish?
  Mr. BROWN. Ten minutes.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that I may yield the floor, without 
losing my right to the floor, to Mr. Brown for not to exceed 10 
minutes, and then to Mr. Dorgan for not to exceed 10 minutes, that I 
then be recognized, and that the intervening time not be charged to the 
time under my control.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Colorado is recognized for up to 10 minutes on time 
chargeable to the Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, let me thank the distinguished Senator from 
West Virginia. I appreciate his courtesy, and I want to also commend 
the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for his thoughtful comments. 
He has been consistent on this subject. He is one who has spoken out 
both on the floor and in the Foreign Relations Committee on which we 
both serve. I commend him for not only a consistent but a thoughtful 
approach.
  Mr. President, as one Republican who supports the War Powers Act, I 
share his concern about the procedures that have been followed in the 
deployment of United States combat forces into Haiti. Specifically, Mr. 
President, I think it is unfortunate, even tragic that the President 
refused to seek the approval of the U.S. Congress before this 
deployment was made--this in spite of the fact that this Senate made it 
quite clear that they expected to be consulted and involved in the 
decision to commit U.S. forces to combat.
  Moreover, Mr. President, let me be specific. It is my belief that the 
timing of the sending of those forces was partly associated with an 
effort to avoid votes which were scheduled that following week in both 
Houses of Congress. In other words, part of the rationale for deploying 
forces without prior congressional approval was an attempt by the 
executive branch to circumvent the President's responsibility to 
consult Congress. Making the circumvention even more deplorable was the 
fact that the Congress had clearly expressed its wish to be involved in 
any decision to commit U.S. forces.
  Some will say the War Powers Act allows the Commander in Chief to 
deploy forces in a variety of situations, and that is quite true. But 
one should not think about these War Powers provisions without noting 
what made the Haitian adventure different. It did not involve an 
emergency or an unexpected circumstance. As a matter of fact, this 
invasion has been talked about by the President for many, many months. 
Clearly, one cannot justify the deployment of forces on the basis that 
it involved emergency action. It did not. The deployment cannot be 
justified on the basis that there was an urgent need for secrecy or 
that the secrecy of the operation would be jeopardized by going to 
Congress. Clearly, it would not. No secret was made of the plan to 
invade.
  The simple fact is that the deployment of forces was completed in 
such a manner as to avoid congressional involvement. Mr. President, I 
think it was a mistake. I think it was a mistake because the 
Constitution is quite clear in giving Congress the power to declare 
war. The War Powers Act is quite clear in setting forth 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the Congress has been quite clear in its 
resolve and its interest that the President seek prior authorization 
from Congress before we deploy our forces in the field of combat in 
Haiti.
  Mr. President, I am concerned about the decision to deploy United 
States forces to Haiti for two additional reasons. One, we did not have 
a clear mission, and deployment in Haiti was not vital to our national 
security interests. If we have learned one thing from our experience in 
Vietnam, in Lebanon, in Somalia, it is that it is a mistake to deploy 
United States combat forces around the world without a commitment to 
win, without clear objectives, without a clear purpose. How many 
tragedies do we have to endure before we learn that about U.S. overseas 
deployments?
  The second issue is one that should concern all Americans. That is, 
the administration's implied message that the authorization by the 
United Nations Security Council was adequate for the deployment of U.S. 
forces, and the implication that the approval of the U.S. Congress was 
not needed.
  Mr. President, this is a dangerous precedent. The forces that serve 
the United States are not only paid for by the U.S. taxpayers, but fall 
under the purview of the U.S. Constitution and the system of government 
we have established. We do not have American forces subject to United 
Nations authorization. They are subject to American authorization. To 
use the United Nations to circumvent the Congress of the United States 
is a mistake--a mistake for this President, and for other Presidents 
who might do so.
  There are two parts of this resolution that are very important and 
are part of the reason why I will support the final text. Section 1, 
subparagraph (b) says this:

       The President should have sought and welcomed congressional 
     approval before deploying U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti.

  I believe that is absolutely correct. Is it a tough criticism of the 
President? Yes, I think it is. Hopefully, however, it is a policy the 
President will learn to adopt.
  There is a separate section, section 5, that is helpful:

       Report on U.S. agreements. Not later than November 15, 
     1994, the Secretary of State shall provide a comprehensive 
     report to Congress on all the agreements of the United States 
     entered into with other nations, including any assistance 
     pledged or provided in connection with the United States 
     efforts in Haiti. Such reports shall include information on 
     any agreements or commitments relating to the United Nations 
     Security Council actions concerning Haiti since 1992.

  Mr. President, we have not had full disclosure from the 
administration as to what commitments and agreements were made in 
ancillary discussions to secure the support and participation of other 
nations. The American people are entitled to know what commitments were 
made or what verbal understandings were reached, and this resolution 
makes it clear that all of this information is called for. As one of 
the chief authors of this section, it is particularly important that 
the Congress receive effective reporting on all verbal or written 
agreements entered into by the executive branch to secure other nations 
support.
  Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that this 
resolution comes to the floor without the ability to amend it. A strong 
effort was made in this body to avoid amendment in the original 
resolution after U.S. forces were deployed to Haiti. The implication 
was that if we insisted on amendments, no resolution would have been 
brought forth. That was the case when we first considered a Haiti 
resolution, and it is the case this time.
  It is a mistake to prevent amendment and to coverup the deep feelings 
of many Members on this issue. Members of this body, I think, should 
have a chance to offer amendments. I had hoped to offer one that added 
to the sense of the Congress: The United States does not have vital 
national security interests which justify the military occupation of 
Haiti.
  Mr. President, the fact is the Deputy Secretary of State, in a 
writing in 1992 in Time Magazine, said the following:

       Once a country utterly loses its ability to govern itself, 
     it also loses its claim to sovereignty and should become a 
     ward of the United Nations.

  Mr. President, I do not agree with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott. I do not think we ought to have countries all over the world 
who become the ward of the United Nations. The United States, the 
United Nations' largest financier, should not have to pay the bill for 
all of those countries. Secretary Talbott suggests in those articles 
that making Somalia and similar anticountries, as he describes them, 
U.N. protectorates or trust territories is a good idea.
  It would be a disaster. The American population should not have to 
pay the bills for all those other countries that ``loses [their] 
ability to govern'' themselves. Should we help? Certainly, under 
circumstances where we can.
  Second, Mr. President, asking the approval of Congress before we send 
our men and women into harm's way is not just an issue that deals with 
the powers of Congress or the powers of the President. Perhaps we think 
about it in those terms. Nonetheless, I am convinced that it deals with 
the very heart and fiber of the commitment we have to the American 
fighting men and women who put on the uniform in this country.
  We should not put our people in harm's way. We should not put them in 
combat without making sure we are committed to the objective they are 
risking their lives for. To put them in harm's way as has been done in 
Haiti, and in Somalia, shows a callous disregard for the commitment and 
the devotion of the fighting men and women of this country.
  We owe them a clear commitment. We owe them a clear objective. We owe 
them our resolve and support. One of the tragedies of Vietnam is that 
the men and women who served in the uniform of this country in Vietnam 
served with a great deal more commitment than our Congress did. Our 
Congress never laid out a clear commitment to win in that combat. The 
Presidents of both parties who directed our country during that time 
period never made a final commitment to the objectives they were 
willing to risk the lives of American soldiers for.
  I think it is wrong for politicians to send young men and women to 
war without clear objectives, without the clear support of the Congress 
and without any indication that the country is committed to them and to 
their mission. Avoiding a vote in Congress is a way of avoiding putting 
Congress on the line. We should never do it again.
  Let us pray that the commitment and the courage displayed by our men 
and women in Haiti, and in service around the world, is matched in the 
future by our political leaders, who seem so willing to risk their 
lives.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] is recognized for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Is this time to be 
charged to Senator Dodd.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is to be charged to the majority 
leader or his designee.
  Mr. GREGG. Thank you.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I do not think this is so much a debate as 
it is a discussion, because I do not think there is great disagreement 
on the floor of the Senate on this issue.
  I felt that we should not have committed armed forces to an invasion 
of Haiti. I wrote the President to tell him this in early August. I 
still feel that way. I feel now that we ought to find a way to withdraw 
our forces from Haiti as quickly as possible.
  I do not think there is much disagreement on this point. This 
resolution really moves in that direction and, frankly, I think most 
Members would agree with me when I say that our troops should come home 
soon.
  However, I came to the floor to talk not so much about the use of 
military strength, or about vital security and national interests, but 
about life in Haiti. I am not an expert on Haiti, but I have been 
there.
  I want to tell you that before we began this debate today, and after 
this debate will end this evening, and 5 months ago, and 5 months from 
now, the dominant condition affecting the lives of the people who live 
in Haiti is gripping, wrenching poverty. This debate will not change 
that. American troops will not change that.
  I went to an area in Haiti with my late friend, Congressman Mickey 
Leland, on a hunger trip. We viewed a project that the U.S. Agency for 
International Development was sponsoring. Briefly, it was a project 
dealing with hogs. It came about because Haitians had had to kill all 
the hogs in Haiti because of disease. All the hogs in Haiti had been 
eradicated.
  So the Agency for International Development was reintroducing hogs in 
Haiti, and they had a hog project. And they would bring together little 
groups of about 15 to 20 families, who collectively would receive a sow 
and own it. Their responsibility was to feed it, and then they would 
take it walking over the island to where they could get this sow bred, 
and they would continue to feed the sow, and the sow would have 
piglets.
  The promise was that if you and other people like you, a number of 
families, get together, and you take this sow that we will give you, if 
you get the sow bred and feed it, you will have a dozen other pigs, and 
you will increase the stock of wealth for food, for sustenance, for the 
future. USAID showed us this project, and they were very proud of it.
  They showed us a Haitian who had this pig. After we saw this pig, a 
woman took me aside, and she said to me, ``You know, they want us to 
feed this pig because they tell us that if we do that we will get more 
piglets. We will all be better. But I cannot feed my children.'' With 
tears in her eyes, she said: ``I do not have food for my children. But 
to be better off in the future, I should feed this pig now.''
  This was a wonderful project, but it demonstrated the gripping 
problem of Haiti. You will find people, with tears in their eyes, who 
cannot get food to eat, who cannot get medical treatment for their 
children. Congressman Leland and I went to some of the few neonatal 
clinics in Haiti. We held in our arms children who were dying.
  Now, I represent a part of the country that produces more food than 
we need. Yet if I get on a plane today, I can fly to Haiti as quickly 
as I can fly to Bismarck, ND, in my State. When we talk about Haiti, we 
are talking about a neighbor.
  I hope the debate here today is not whether we care about a neighbor, 
whether we care about Haiti. The debate is about the use of military 
force and vital security interests. I understand all of that.
  As I said before, I think the introduction of troops in Haiti is not 
going to change a bit the dominant feature of Haitian life, which is 
that people are desperately poor. They will be desperately poor unless 
we decide that that condition of human poverty in our neighborhood can 
be remedied. We can do a much, much better job, all of us, through the 
multilateral agencies, the World Bank, and the IMF, and the Agriculture 
Department, and other means, to try to improve the human condition in 
Haiti. The Haitian people are neighbors of ours.
  People say let us deal with things here at home first. Yes, I agree 
with all of that. But we cannot stand here and say it does not matter 
to us that in our hemisphere close to our borders live people in some 
of the most gripping, wrenching poverty anywhere in the world.
  We can change that. The interesting thing in Haiti, as my friend from 
Connecticut will know, is when you fly into Haiti, you see an island 
that looks from the air to be about half brown and half green. The 
green part of the island is the Dominican Republic and the brown part 
is Haiti. In Haiti, they cut down much of the vegetation for fuel.
  You wonder to yourself: if you were in charge of Haiti, how on Earth 
could you get out of this? How can you deal with these problems on your 
own? These problems require America's attention. Our military force, 
no, not in my judgment, but our attention, yes.
  We need to understand that when our forces leave, there will still be 
ways to help people in our neighborhood who very much need our help.
  Does anyone here understand what kind of courage it must take for a 
group of people, including children, to get in a small boat, which may 
not be seaworthy, and put out to sea and try to sail to America? I know 
many people consider the Haitian boat people a nuisance. They do pose a 
problem for our country, but they are in many, many cases very brave 
people risking their lives to try to better their condition.
  The best way to improve the lives of Haitians is for us to find ways 
to help Haiti, not with military force, but in other ways.
  I would say to my colleagues that all of this relates to hunger. 
Hunger in the world creates instability.
  My friend, the late Harry Chapin, the wonderful singer, used to say 
if you could solve the hunger problems of the world you would correct 
most of the problems that now require military action.
  Hunger creates instability. It is in our own enlightened self-
interest to tackle this problem.
  When I began, I noted that it is a paradox that we are the bread 
basket of the world, and we produce all of this wonderful food, yet we 
have in our neighborhood people dying, people in Haiti with children 
who do not have enough to eat. In Cite Soleil, near the Port-au-Prince 
airport, a slum of 250,000 people, children were playing in garbage 
dumps, in open sewers. Haiti has some of the worst poverty you see 
anywhere around the globe.
  We talk about national security interests and the use of force. There 
is not much debate about that because most of us feel we ought to 
withdraw the troops very quickly. Those who say that we have a national 
security interest in Haiti have a pretty thin case. But it is not a 
thin case to suggest that we, all of us, have a responsibility to look 
out for our neighborhood, to help people who desperately need it, and 
to decide there are some things we can do through the aid agencies that 
exist.
  I would make one other observation. We have enacted an embargo around 
Haiti, an embargo that now has been lifted. Embargoes, by and large, 
strangle the poorest people in the countries where embargoes have been 
imposed. And that is certainly true in Haiti.
  But let me tell my colleagues what just happened this morning. A 
missionary friend of mine, who is now in Haiti, called to tell me there 
are a million and a half pounds of desperately needed food and medicine 
in a ship sitting at the pier in Port-au-Prince. The missionaries 
cannot get it off loaded for various reasons. So I spent some time on 
the phone trying to figure out how to get that million and a half 
pounds of food and medicine off the ship that is now at the pier.
  This is the sort of thing that we must speed up if we are to help the 
human condition in Haiti.
  I am not a foreign policy expert. The foreign policy experts here 
will discuss a lot of higher sounding things. But in the final 
analysis, the question for the people of Haiti is what will their life 
be like tomorrow or the next day? What will life be like, for 
themselves and those they love?
  The answer to that question will largely be determined by whether the 
Haitian people have enough to eat, and whether the hospitals and 
clinics in Haiti are able to treat those who are sick.
  We, and others in the world in our situation, can and should help the 
Haitian people out of this terrible, terrible predicament in which they 
find themselves.
  Let me thank the Senator from West Virginia for the patience and 
courtesy he has extended to me.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Under the most recently adopted unanimous-consent agreement, the 
President pro tempore is recognized, and under the previous order the 
President pro tempore controls up to 1 hour.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Chair.
  I understand that Mr. Gorton wishes to speak for 5 minutes and Mr. 
DeConcini wishes to speak for 7 minutes.
  I ask unanimous consent that my rights to the floor may be protected 
while I yield a total of 12 minutes, not against my time, but I yield 
12 minutes of our time so that those two Senators may be recognized and 
they will get time from my own side appropriately and then I may then 
be recognized again.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Gregg.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Washington.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, the resolution before us is a fairly good 
response to a terrible solution. The majority leadership prohibited 
this body from taking effective action before the occupation of Haiti, 
almost certainly because that kind of occupation would have been 
repudiated by the vast majority of the Members here. Today, however, we 
are faced with a profoundly different set of challenges. We are faced 
with an occupation in being.
  Domestic discord under circumstances like this will almost inevitably 
damage the morale of our armed services in Haiti, perhaps eventually 
our effectiveness, and may itself result in American casualties. It 
should, therefore, be avoided.
  I have expressed my strong objections to our mission in Haiti on a 
number of occasions, but those objections in no way reflect upon my 
admiration for the troops we have there today. They have done a 
remarkable job, and they certainly have my full support and I believe 
that of all of the Members of this body.
  Since the President plans to keep them there until at least March, 
however, I believe it most appropriate that we now turn our attention 
to returning those troops safely and as promptly as possible.
  The first part of any such effort is implicit in the resolution 
before us now. While many Senators, including this one, want to see the 
troops brought home as soon as possible, our senior military commanders 
warn that a mandated, date certain withdrawal might well jeopardize 
soldier, sailor and marine lives. I defer, therefore, and am willing to 
let the military determine the manner and the date on which the troops 
can best be removed.
  I also consider it important that we help the administration clarify 
its goals. The objective that it has offered--the creation of an 
environment in which democracy can be restored--is at least a moving 
target. It is highly questionable that there has ever been a democracy 
in Haiti which could be restored.
  First, our military had originally considered the de facto military 
forces in place to be their greatest obstacle, but it is now the pro-
Aristide forces hungry for quick justice that occupied attention. In a 
similar vein, our military has been forced to relinquish its plan to 
work with the Haitian military and has intensified the search for guns 
by buy-back or confiscation. Each of these policy shifts could possibly 
endanger American lives, and may still do so. If we can clarify our 
overall goals, therefore, and what is required of our armed services 
precisely, we can minimize the danger to our troops.
  Finally, even when we do clarify these goals, it may very well be 
left to this body to decide whether we can ever reach the apparent 
goals that this administration has laid out for our military.
  Some 75 percent of Haiti's population is unemployed and a third 
relies on aid for food and health care. After 200 years of despotic 
government, featuring coups, assassinations, and corruption, there is 
little civil society to rebuild in Haiti. Congress may need to 
intervene, as it did with Somalia, to prevent our soldiers from 
pursuing a mission that can only be achieved at unacceptable cost, if, 
indeed, it can be achieved at all. Bayonets are not generally a good 
foundation for a new democracy.
  Since these three issues cannot be effectively addressed as most of 
the Senate would have hoped--through a debate over a Presidential 
request for congressional authorization--we are left to do what we can 
now that the occupation is in place. On the whole, I consider the 
resolution we have before us helpful: It will demonstrate this body's 
support for the troops, express our disappointment with the 
administration for not seeking congressional authorization, and demand 
that the administration clarify its goals in Haiti. I certainly will 
vote in its favor. But, as this occupation continues into its third 
week, I stress to this administration that we have placed our troops in 
danger in order to pursue a probably unattainable goal, one not in the 
vital interests of the United States, and that if our troops linger too 
long in Haiti it will be difficult to sustain bipartisan support for 
their presence there. Clear goals and a prompt removal are very, very 
much in order.

  I thank the distinguished Senator from West Virginia for yielding.
  Mr. DeCONCINI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Arizona, Senator DeConcini, is recognized for up to 7 minutes, with 
time chargeable to the majority leader or his designee.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I believe I have time under the 
unanimous consent agreement for up to 15 minutes. I suggest the time be 
charged against that time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 7 minutes that the Senator has requested 
will be chargeable to the Senator. And the Senator is recognized under 
the order in his own right.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Chair and I thank the distinguished 
President pro tempore for this time.
  Mr. President, I have listened to some of the debate here. I am 
pleased to see that there is going to be, I believe, unanimous support 
for the resolution before us concerning Haiti.
  What disturbs me, Mr. President, is the tremendous amount of rhetoric 
and I think politicking that has gone on here directed towards 
President Clinton and his policy in Haiti.
  Mr. President, I do not need to remind anybody that President Clinton 
is our Commander in Chief and deserves the support of this body and the 
support of the American people.
  We cannot both stand up and praise our troops and then run down the 
President of the United States for his policy in Haiti. That only 
serves to undermine our troops. Our men and women serving in Haiti 
deserve our strongest praise and support. That they have performed 
their mission with tremendous professionalism is reflected in the great 
warmth with which they have been received by the Haitian people.
  The mission in Haiti, by any assessment, has been highly successful. 
It is clear that the criticism is purely and simply a political attack 
against this President. Despite all evidence of the success of the 
mission, opponents continue to exploit the issue for the November 
elections.
  I support this resolution. It is very reasonable and does not set a 
time certain, but expresses the concern of all of us, No. 1, that 
Congress should be involved; No. 2, that we should get out as soon as 
we can; and, No. 3, as I read it, that the policy of the Clinton 
administration is succeeding. It is an important issue that merits the 
reasonable discussion that we are having today. But, Mr. President, I 
believe we jeopardize our mission and our approximately 20,000 troops 
that are in Haiti if we let this continue to be a politicized.
  I understand what the Democratic leadership had to agree to in order 
to ensure that no date certain for the withdrawal of our troops was 
included in this resolution. However, I must point out that the 
Republicans would never have tolerated this type of micromanaging 
resolution with a Republican in the White House. And I have been here 
long enough to experience exactly what I just said.
  The distinguished Republican leader, Senator Dole, when he was 
speaking of the failed coup attempt against Noriega, said:

       A good part of what went wrong did not happen last weekend. 
     It started happening many years ago when Congress first 
     decided to start telling the President how he ought to manage 
     a crisis.

  Yet, many of our colleagues continue to tell this President how he 
ought to manage this situation, as if they were President. Well, some 
of them will run for President. Let them then make those decisions.
  It is President Clinton's leadership which allowed our troops to go 
into Haiti, not as an invasion force but peacefully. It is President 
Clinton who has begun to achieve what was sought by the Bush 
administration--the restoration of a legitimately elected President of 
Haiti and the building of democratic institutions in that country.
  It was President Bush who said, in September of 1991, after the coup 
in Haiti:

       This constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
     national security, foreign policy and economy of the United 
     States.

  After 3 years of negotiations and other peaceful attempts to get 
General Cedras and the other leaders of the coup to step aside, 
President Clinton made a decision that it was time to bring an end to 
the terror and impoverishment that the military in Haiti were 
perpetrating against the Haitian people.
  He was prepared to send in troops to restore democracy, a policy 
articulated by President Bush and then Secretary Baker.
  The coup by Cedras and Co. snuffed out overnight the democracy that 
the Haitian people were beginning to build for the first time, in their 
history. Efforts to peacefully restore the democratically elected 
Government of Haiti were met with lies, broken promises, and arrogant 
disregard by Cedras and his groups.
  During the debate in this Chamber before our troops went into Haiti, 
many Republicans claimed that the President was motivated by a desire 
to bolster his numbers in the polls. That, of course, did not happen. 
So the continued harping on this policy is surely, in part, motivated 
by a desire to affect the November election this year.
  The 180-degree turn made by those Republicans attempting to tie the 
hands of a Democratic President, after they argued that two previous 
Republican occupants of the White House should remain unfettered, is 
astounding.
  Where were these Republicans during the Panama, Grenada, and Persian 
Gulf operations? If Senator Dole's comments during those debates are 
any indication, they were arguing that the Democrats should not 
interfere in the President's foreign policy.
  During that debate, the distinguished minority leader said:

       I think my own view is the President of the United States 
     has to make the final decision.

  Continuing with the quotation:

       . . . the primary thing is not pleasing all Members of 
     Congress, it's protecting American lives in that area and 
     restoring democracy. You can't please every Member of 
     Congress, whatever you do, though I think in this case it 
     should be almost unanimous.

  While I think it is appropriate to debate the issue of congressional 
participation on such issues, it should not be made a political issue, 
once a decision has been made, as a decision has been made here.
  After the debate and the vote in the Persian Gulf, every Senator 
voted--I believe every Senator, except maybe one--to support the 
President completely, as we did during the Grenada and Panama 
invasions. And that is the proper role of this body and that is what we 
ought to do now.
  Mr. President, the President's policy in Haiti deserves praise, not 
politically motivated criticism. The military thugs who forced the 
democratically elected government from power are no longer terrorizing 
Haitian citizens, and great progress has been made toward restoring 
civil order, building the foundations for democracy, and monitoring and 
training the Haitian police.
  While I want our troops to come home as soon as possible, a fixed 
date for their return, in my view, would be unsound. It is the generals 
who need to be consulted and the President who has to make the final 
decision.
  I thank, again, the distinguished President pro tempore for 
permitting the 7 minutes that he so graciously did, as he always does, 
in giving time to Senators and putting their preferences before his 
own.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Under the 
previous order, the President pro tempore is recognized for up to 1 
hour.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I cannot 
support the joint resolution offered by the majority leader and the 
minority leader.
  Mr. President, some 20,000 American troops are now deployed in Haiti. 
This formidable force is intended to maintain order during the 
transition of power and return of the democratically elected Government 
of Haiti. According to current plans, lesser numbers of United States 
troops, perhaps 2,000 to 3,000, will remain in Haiti after the 
peacekeeping mission shifts to a U.N.-run operation. And the United 
Nations mission will remain in Haiti until the next democratically 
elected President of Haiti is inaugurated in February 1996. So, the 
President and the administration have committed the United States to a 
substantial and long-term operation. This commitment is not risk-free, 
either, as the events of Saturday, September 25, proved, when one 
American soldier was wounded and 10 Haitians were killed, or on Sunday, 
October 3, when a United States soldier was wounded in a deliberate 
attack.
  Creating a stable environment in Haiti that allows for the return of 
the migrants now housed at Guantanamo, Cuba, and which allows Haitians 
to live in peace in Haiti, is a result that they, and we, should hope 
for. But, inevitably, there are costs involved. The military costs of 
intervening in Haiti are estimated at about $120 million for the 
remainder of fiscal year 1994 and about $300 million in fiscal year 
1995, according to the Department of Defense. U.S. reconstruction and 
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 1995 will total some $200 
million, according to preliminary figures provided by the Office of 
Management and Budget. Some estimates of the combined cost of United 
States actions in Haiti from different think tanks have ranged as high 
as $1.5 billion through 1996--that is billion spelled with a ``b''--
including costs already incurred for sanctions enforcement and 
migration-related costs.
  These are substantial sums, and are yet another reason why the 
Congress should be actively involved in these decisions. Thus, this 
commitment in Haiti raises important questions, not only about our 
actions toward that nation, but also about the way this body and the 
executive branch make decisions on matters of war, peace, intervention, 
foreign policy, and coalition-building.
  In my view, regarding the matter of Haiti, prior to the military 
action ordered by the President on Sunday, September 18, there were far 
too many mixed signals, far too much overblown rhetoric, and far too 
many threats to take military action without the full force of 
congressional and public support behind them. And then in the end, with 
an invasion that was launched on a Sunday and pulled back, the Congress 
was faced with a fait accompli, an invasion ordered to begin at 
midnight on a Sunday night, when Congress was not in session, before 
expected congressional action early in the following week. While last 
minute negotiations fortunately altered the invasion and transformed 
it into an agreed-to, and relatively trouble-free, occupation, the fact 
remains that U.S. troops were committed to an action in a sovereign 
nation without the authorization of Congress.

  But for those last minute negotiations there would have been an 
invasion.
  I now read from a letter written by Abraham Lincoln on February 15, 
1848, addressed to a friend, William H. Herendon. The letter is to be 
found in the collected works of Abraham Lincoln.

       * * * Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation 
     whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and 
     you allow him to do so whenever he may choose to say he deems 
     it necessary for such purpose, and you allow him to make war 
     at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his 
     power in this respect, after having given him so much as you 
     propose. If today he should choose to say he thinks it 
     necessary to invade Canada to prevent the British from 
     invading us, how could you stop him? You may say to him, ``I 
     see no probability of the British invading us''; but he will 
     say to you. ``Be silent: I see it, if you don't.''

  The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to 
Congress was dictated, as I understand it--this is what Lincoln is 
saying to his friend--by the following reasons: Kings had always been 
involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, 
if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our 
convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly 
oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one 
man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.
  The invasion of Haiti was launched when Congress was not in session, 
near the close of the fiscal year, near the close of the session of 
Congress.
  My problem with this pending resolution is not that I disagree with 
its provisions. In fact, I agree with them. I certainly agree that the 
President should have sought and welcomed congressional approval before 
deploying United States Armed Forces into Haiti. I believe, of course, 
that it is unlikely that such authorization would have been given by 
the Congress.
  And what would that tell you? That would say that the American people 
were not behind such an invasion. This is the ``people's branch'' and 
the administration well knew that the people's branch would not give it 
authorization, would not authorize an invasion because the people's 
branch accurately represented the opposition of the people to such an 
invasion.
  The President, having chosen to deploy forces without such 
authorization, is in the difficult position of having not secured 
congressional support for the commitment he has undertaken for the 
Nation. I believe this is politically unwise for any President, because 
if unexpected calamities occur, such as happened in Somalia last year 
and in Beirut a decade ago, then the commitment of forces can become 
politically untenable overnight, forcing an embarrassing withdrawal.
  I also agree that our forces should be withdrawn from Haiti in a 
``prompt and orderly'' manner. In fact, I voted for an earlier 
resolution offered by the two leaders on this matter, with identical 
language, on September 21, 1994. Further, I believe the resolution 
before us contains very useful reporting requirements as regards costs, 
the planned follow-on U.N. operation, security, duration, and other 
matters. But resolutions such as this one, and the one on September 21, 
are not binding, and they do not substitute for the constitutional role 
that the Congress has with regard to matters of war.
  In fact, there is much in the pending resolution that I agree with. 
My concern is that it does not go far enough. The resolution does not 
include the setting of specific parameters on the duration and scope of 
this operation, which was done in the cases of both Somalia and Rwanda, 
and done in both instances at my urging and on my amendments. I believe 
that we should stand and take the responsibility to fund this 
operation, if we support it, and for a specific timeframe. Afterward 
the operation would transition to the United Nations, or end entirely, 
or be extended if the President requested such an extension and 
appropriate funding, and Congress approved the request and the funds. I 
believe that is the way to discharge our responsibilities and our 
constitutional role, and it would serve as a mechanism for the 
President to develop what support he can for his policy.
  The President sought the United Nations' support, but not the 
Congress' support, not the elected representatives of the American 
people. Go to the United Nations, yes; get their OK, get their 
approval, get their blessing. But do not ask the Congress for its 
approval or for the funds. That was the course that was followed.
  Madison wanted the power of the Commander in Chief to be kept 
separate from the power to take a nation to war. In ``The Writings of 
James Madison,'' volume VI, page 148, Madison states as follows:

       Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of 
     things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be 
     commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the 
     latter functions by a great principle in free government, 
     analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, 
     or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.

  Jefferson praised the transfer of war power, as we find in ``The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson,'' volume V, page 123:

       We have already given an example, one effectual check to 
     the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose 
     from the executive to the legislative body, from those who 
     are to spend to those who are to pay.

  Section 2 of article II of the U.S. Constitution--Mr. President, we 
ought to read that document once in a while. Alexander the Great, who 
was a friend of Aristotle and a student of Aristotle, admired most, of 
all literature, the ``Iliad,'' written by Homer. Alexander asked 
Aristotle to correct a copy of the ``Iliad'' for him. Plutarch tells us 
that Alexander the Great slept always with his dagger and a copy of 
Aristotle's corrected version under his pillow--under Alexander's 
pillow.
  Mr. President, I do not sleep with a copy of the Constitution under 
my pillow, nor do I sleep with a copy of the ``Iliad'' under my pillow, 
but I always keep a copy of the Constitution near, if not in my 
pocket--and it is not always there--but nearby, along with the Bible 
and a copy of ``Plutarch's Lives.'' I try to retire to that 
Constitution, as I do to the Bible, and other books, from time to time, 
and each time I find something in them I did not find before.
  Section 2 of article II of the U.S. Constitution I am well acquainted 
with. It is not something I discovered yesterday or the day before. 
Here is what it says:

       The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
     Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several 
     States, when called into the actual service of the United 
     States * * *
  But the actual calling of the militia into service is done by the 
Congress, not by the President. As we note in paragraph 15 of section 8 
of article 1, the Congress shall have the power ``to provide for 
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions; * * *.''
  We are accustomed to the now familiar pattern of most recent chief 
executives; namely, that of invoking the title ``Commander in Chief'' 
and descriptions of him as being the sole organ of foreign relations or 
chief of administration, to suggest a conclusion of constitutional 
invulnerability. No statutory or court decision of authority is ever 
volunteered in support of the conclusion. At its heart, this issue is a 
separation of powers issue.
  Then, at the heels of any introduction of forces, comes the cry not 
to legislate any timeframe or other criteria governing the scope or 
duration of the operation, or invasion, on the claim that we have to 
``support our troops on the ground.'' ``Don't jerk the rug out from 
under our troops; we have to support them.'' So the administration gets 
them in on a Sunday and then they are in. We heard that for nearly a 
decade in Vietnam, some of my colleagues will recall. It is as if the 
introduction of forces somehow somehow, somehow, suspends the operation 
of our constitutional distribution of powers.
  The Constitution divides governmental powers into three areas; 
legislative, executive, and judicial. And distributes these powers 
among three co-equal branches: Congress, the President, and the Courts; 
and it provides a system of checks and balances to keep the powers 
separate and the branches equal. Underlying this scheme of government 
in the area of immediate concern is the desire to establish 
interdependence between Congress and the Executive in hopes of 
fostering cooperation and consensus in the supersensitive areas of 
national security and foreign affairs. As Commander in Chief, and the 
chief spokesman in the field of foreign relations, the President has 
independent powers, not simply those conferred on him by statutes. But, 
at the same time, by virtue of its power over the purse and its powers 
to raise and support armies, and its powers to provide and maintain a 
navy, and its power to regulate both, Congress has broad constitutional 
powers implicating both national security and foreign affairs.
  The separation of powers principle is not intended to benefit me, or 
this branch in particular, or any other Members who temporarily hold 
this high office. It is meant to protect individual liberty--the 
individual liberty of the people who come here and visit in the 
galleries, who walk the streets and toil in the mines, and who sweat in 
the fields of this country.

  The purpose of the separation of powers and checks and balances is to 
protect the individual liberty of every man, woman, and child in this 
great country. That is why the Framers separated those powers. That is 
why the Framers wrote into that great document the checks and balances, 
the main balance wheel of which is the power over the purse.
  The separation of powers principle is intended to prevent one branch 
of government from enhancing its position at the expense of another 
branch and, thus, disturb the delicate balance of powers that the 
Framers assumed as the best safeguard against autocracy. The President 
certainly has command of the army and navy and the militia, and he may 
respond to an attack upon the United States or deal with a sudden and 
unexpected emergency without any previous authorization by the 
Congress. He has that inherent power to act in a sudden, unexpected 
emergency to protect this country against an invasion. There is also 
authority for the proposition that he has inherent power to act to 
safeguard American lives and property abroad. It should be noted, 
however, that Congress is under no legal obligation, Congress is under 
no constitutional obligation, to fund any foreign or military policy 
advocated by this President, the last President, or any President of 
the United States, and the President is totally dependent upon Congress 
for authority or money, and usually both, to implement any policy. 
Congress is under no legal obligation or constitutional obligation to 
supply either or both. While Congress cannot deprive the President of 
command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him with an 
army, or a navy, or a militia, to command.
  The Constitution in article I, section 1, states, ``all legislative 
powers''--not just a few, not just some, not many, not most but all, 
all legislative powers--``herein granted''--here--``shall be vested''--
not may be vested, shall be vested--``in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.''
  Now, I know around here in many instances it depends on whose kettle 
is calling the pot black, and we will rise in indignation if it is the 
President of the other party doing something but few will rise in 
indignation and support this Constitution when it is a President of 
one's own party. It is a great tendency to point the finger, stand on 
the sideline and be the first to criticize if something goes wrong. Why 
not read the Constitution. We take an oath to support and to defend it, 
to live by that Constitution. The Constitution is always there. It does 
not sleep. It does not rest. It does not take recess. And it is for me, 
it is for our President, whether he is a Republican or Democrat, and it 
is for this Congress now, yesterday, and forever to abide by.
  The Constitution in section 9, article I, paragraph 7 states, ``No 
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by law.'' This provision is a restriction upon the 
disbursing authority of the executive branch, and it means that no 
money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated 
by an act of Congress. Accordingly, the absolute control of the moneys 
of the United States is in Congress--that is what this Constitution 
says--and Congress is responsible for its exercise of this great power 
only to the American people--not to any political party, but to the 
American people; not to any President, not to any general but to the 
American people; not to any newspaper but to the American people.
  The power to make appropriations includes the authority not only to 
designate the purposes of the appropriations, but also the terms and 
conditions under which the executive department of the Government may 
expend appropriations. The terms and conditions under which 
appropriations are made are solely in the hands of Congress, with the 
President allowed one thing--the right to veto a bill in its entirety--
and it is the plain duty of the executive branch of the Government to 
comply with those terms and conditions set forth by the Congress. The 
power of the purse provides the most effective basis for ensuring 
compliance by the executive branch.
  Now we have before us another nonbinding measure in the form of a 
joint resolution offered by the majority leader and the minority 
leader. This language in this resolution neither defines the mission of 
the United States operation in Haiti nor places any limits on how long 
it may last, nor how may troops might be committed, nor how much money 
might be spent.
  The administration has stated that United States forces should help 
stabilize the security situation in Haiti so that orderly progress can 
be made in transferring the functions of government to the 
democratically elected Government of Haiti. This joint resolution does 
not help to keep the mission limited to this reasonable goal. It simply 
requires the President to prepare and submit to the Congress within 7 
days a statement on the administrative policy on Haiti, the military 
mission, and on the general rules of engagement. Any changes to the 
policy, the military mission, or to the rules of engagement are to be 
reported to the Congress within 48 hours. And so, if the Congress were 
to disapprove of the policy, or to any changes in the policy, mission, 
or rules of engagement, additional extraordinary effort would be 
necessary to register disapproval or to legislatively limit the 
administration after the fact.
  The administration's stated goal is a reasonable one, given the 
situation in Haiti, but I believe that unless it is linked to a 
definite termination point, and a funding cutoff, this mission could 
keep United States troops in Haiti for a very long time, as they were 
earlier so engaged for 19 years in this century, trying to stabilize 
the situation. There is nothing in this joint resolution to stop the 
administration from leaving U.S. troops there indefinitely. I do not 
believe that the President intends to mire the United States in an 
indefinite nation-building exercise--in fact, I am sure he does not--
nor am I saying that the democratically elected Haitian Government 
cannot smoothly take over the functions of government and maintain 
order. Indeed, I pray that they can, but we cannot predict what 
problems might arise. Karl von Clauswitz astutely observed in 1832 
that, ``War is the province of uncertainty; three-fourths of the things 
on which action in war is based lie hidden in the fog of a greater or 
lesser degree of certainty.'' If the mission that has been outlined by 
the President cannot be accomplished within a reasonable amount of 
time, then I think the Congress, the administration, and the American 
people ought seriously to consider the long-term prospects for success 
in this operation.

  Linking a defined mission to a definite end, enforced by a funding 
cutoff, can be a positive tool. As we have learned from previous United 
States military missions abroad, most recently in Somalia and Rwanda, 
it prevents mission creep, the gradual expansion of a mission from one 
of limited and well defined tasks to one that gradually expands to all-
inclusive and long-term nation-building. Having committed the prestige 
of the United States to this mission in Haiti, it becomes all too easy 
to keep gradually expanding our mission there in an attempt to 
guarantee the long-term success of the operation. I believe that it 
would be useful for the administration, and for the Congress, to 
exercise the tool of restraint in regard to the Haiti operation.
  We must take care to prevent the United States military mission in 
Haiti from expanding into nation-building. Defining, and thereby 
limiting, the mission and duration of the operation effectively 
prevents mission creep. Our mission is not democracy-building. We heard 
all this talk in the beginning about restoring democracy. We are not 
restoring democracy. One cannot restore that which does not already 
exist.
  Our mission is not democracy building.
  I hope the people of Haiti can build a strong, sound democracy. The 
early success of the operation in Haiti bodes well for this difficult 
effort. But it is not a job for the U.S. military, and not the job of 
the Department of Defense.
  This joint resolution before us also requires monthly reports on the 
progress being made toward a transition to the U.N. mission in Haiti. I 
agree with this goal of a speedy transition to the United Nations. But 
without the possibility of a firm date for the U.S. mission to end, 
what incentive is there for the United Nations to take over? The 
mission in Haiti now is paid for exclusively by the nations 
participating in the operation, which means that the United States is 
paying nearly all of the costs. When the United Nations assumes its 
role in Haiti, if it ever does, the United Nations must not only find 
the troops for the mission, but it must find the funds. The United 
States pays just over 30 percent of the prospective U.N. operation in 
Haiti. So what incentive is there for the United Nations to move 
quickly to take over in Haiti? If they can stall long enough, the 
United States could remain in Haiti, almost alone, until the 
inauguration of the next President of Haiti, in February 1996. That is 
the target day for the end of the U.N. mission in Haiti. Anything less 
than a fixed date for a United States withdrawal risks keeping far 
larger numbers of United States troops in Haiti than would otherwise be 
the case.
  The lack of any definitive date for an end to the United States 
operation in Haiti puts our troops there at greater, not lesser, risk. 
I know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary 
of Defense, among others, have argued that setting a fixed date for the 
end of the U.S. mission ``puts our troops on the ground at risk.'' 
Well, a fixed date for withdrawal did not have that effect in Somalia, 
and it did not have that effect in Rwanda. I do not believe it will in 
this case, either. In fact, the lack of a foreseeable end to what 
virtually amounts to a United States occupation of Haiti may actually 
put our troops at greater risk. Elements in Haiti that want to see us 
pull out in a panic know that all they have to do is to stage a bloody 
and vicious attack on our troops, as happened in Somalia. That would 
change the mood on this floor pretty dramatically, and there would be 
lots of support for an amendment to withdraw immediately. Although 
there seems to be little support for such a measure now, I believe that 
it would be much better to act reasonably and calmly to establish 
limits now, rather than to wait for panic later.
  In addition to ``putting our troops on the ground at risk,'' 
opponents of a date certain for a U.S. withdrawal argue that setting a 
date hurts the morale of the troops.
  Of all of the laughable excuses that I have seen trotted out by the 
administration in support of the action that has been taken, it is this 
one. Setting a date might hurt the morale of the troops. That is 
nonsense.
  I have difficulty understanding how active duty troops sitting in the 
hot sun in Haiti, far from their families, or reservists called away 
from their families and from their jobs, could fault their elected 
representatives for demonstrating concern about keeping their mission 
limited in scope and concern about bringing them home as quickly as 
possible. I do not think they want to be in Haiti forever, any more 
than I think the people of Haiti want United States forces in Haiti 
forever. I think the families of American troops in Haiti also want to 
know that the Congress is keeping a watchful guard on their loved ones, 
as well as on their tax dollars.
  Mr. President, we have heard a lot of concern expressed here for the 
threats to military readiness, and how all these peacekeeping missions 
are eating into the military's operations and maintenance accounts, and 
into military training accounts and the like. On many occasions, 
Senators from both sides of the aisle have come to the floor to warn 
against anything that would threaten our readiness or let the military 
slip back into a ``hollow force.'' In the fiscal year that just ended, 
the need to divert funds from training, operations, and maintenance 
accounts to cover the incremental costs of unbudgeted peacekeeping, 
humanitarian, and other crisis operations left many military units too 
short of funding to continue training, keep up flying hours, or to 
maintain their equipment. Secretary of Defense Perry was forced to 
invoke the venerable Feed and Forage Act. That act, dating back to 
1820, allows the Department of Defense to incur funding deficiencies to 
continue basic support for the military.
  The Senate Appropriations Committee has tried to assist the 
Department of Defense in dealing with these funding shortfalls by 
including supplemental funding in the foreign operations and defense 
appropriations bills to replace funds expended for the incremental 
costs of operations in Rwanda, Cuba, and Korea. Yet, here we are, in 
this resolution, accepting an open-ended military operation over which 
the Congress exerts no control, where the Congress accepts a commitment 
of troops for an indefinite period--and that is why I will not vote for 
this resolution--and where the administration--given so much 
flexibility in terms of mission and duration--is merely directed to 
report on its plan for ``financing the costs of the operation and the 
impact on readiness without supplemental funding.'' Let me repeat that: 
``without supplemental funding.'' In an era of sharply declining 
budgets, it seems highly unlikely that this administration--or any 
administration--can pay for the incremental costs of a substantial 
military operation without either supplemental funding or more cuts in 
training, operations and maintenance, or R&D and procurement programs. 
This is true for other Government agencies and departments as well. 
Without supplemental funding for new initiatives in Haiti, for 
reconstruction and development aid that will keep Haiti on the path 
toward long-term stability and dissuade ``economic refugees'' from 
again seeking United States shores, other priority programs will 
suffer. Without supplemental funding for the Department of State, the 
Department of Justice, or the Agency for International Development, 
important counterproliferation and counternarcotics programs, and aid 
to Russia and the former Soviet States, might all suffer.
  If we are serious in this body about our constitutional prerogatives 
and our responsibilities, we have got to exert our authority and 
fulfill those responsibilities. We cannot hide behind what are 
virtually toothless, hortatory resolutions and claim that we have, 
thereby, lived up to our constitutional duties. A failure to do so 
merely opens the door for the ``mission creep'' we all claim that we so 
worry about, particularly in missions of this type which are 
nontraditional and which call upon our fighting men to perform tasks to 
which they are unaccustomed.
  Destroy their morale? Impair their morale? Well, I will laugh all the 
way home. I would not want one of my grandsons or granddaughters in 
Haiti this afternoon. I do not think it would destroy or hurt their 
morale to have a cutoff date, or a cutoff of funds. Let me say 
parenthetically that I would not support cutoff dates, or a cutoff of 
funds if our military forces were engaged in any military conflict that 
involved the security interests of this country--never. I would not be 
a party to drawing the line and cutting off funds where the security 
interests of this country were engaged. But the security interests of 
this Nation are not involved in Haiti. Haiti is not a threat to the 
security of this country. There is no sudden unanticipated emergency 
requiring the use of troops, without the approval of Congress.
  I have no doubt that President Clinton fully intends to try to remove 
our troops in a timely fashion, but there is always the tendency to 
want to stay just a little longer in missions such as this, as we 
stayed too long in Somalia.
  Once our troops are in a country, then you can be sure that this 
administration, or any administration--I have been here through several 
administrations and they are all alike in that respect--will find some 
reason, some excuse to go further, or some excuse as to why Congress 
should not act. Well, do not jerk the rug out from under our President, 
they say. Do not jerk the rug out from under our troops. Do not do 
anything to hurt the morale of our troops. Do not do anything to put 
them at great risk.
  I believe a time certain for withdrawal would be a constructive act 
by this body, and one which would reassure the mothers and fathers of 
our service men and women about the length of time we will ask their 
children to remain in harm's way.
  We in the Senate often like to have it both ways on matters 
pertaining to war and foreign policy. Not too many days ago dozens of 
Senators took to this floor to excoriate the administration on the 
proposal to commit troops to Haiti. The rhetoric was hot--oh, sweet 
rhetoric--hot, heavy, and angry, and the warnings of doom reverberated 
throughout the rafters of this Chamber. Now, only weeks later, because 
no lives have yet been lost in combat, the heat of the moment has 
become the warm glow of complacency about this matter. How magically 
the passion cools here. How quickly things change.
  But constitutional responsibilities do not change, and our duty to 
act in the people's best interests never alters. And the words of 
Members in this Senate must confuse and confound when we excoriate on 
one day and shrug shoulders on the next.
  That, in my view, is what this resolution amounts to, in terms of any 
real assertion of the constitutional role of the Congress--a shrug of 
the shoulders.
  I would find little comfort in reports and mission definitions if one 
of my fine grandsons or granddaughters were in Haiti today. This 
resolution--this piece of paper would bring me little comfort--little 
comfort. No wonder the American people are disgusted with the men and 
women who run away from their constitutional duties. Reports are 
useful, but they are no guarantee of a speedy return home for our young 
men and women like an end date certain, backed up by a cutoff of funds, 
enforced by a vote in this body.
  The President can always come back, state his case, make a good 
justification for our extending the date, ask for more funds, and if a 
good case has been made, Congress can vote to provide the moneys, 
undoubtedly.
  I believe that the setting of such a date is our solemn 
responsibility. I believe that the setting of such a date is a 
constructive act which would help focus and tighten the scope of the 
mission.
  I believe that the setting of such a date will help the United 
Nations to get its act together and prepare to move into Haiti as 
quickly as possible.
  My amendment on Rwanda helped the military to focus and to complete 
that mission ahead of schedule and with considerable savings in cost. I 
believe that my amendment on Somalia ended a situation wherein the 
original stated mission had not only crept beyond its boundaries but 
galloped totally out of control. Both of those measures contained 
certain end dates with a cutoff of funds on those dates.
  To me our duty is clear. While I opposed a United States invasion of 
Haiti, and so stated well in advance, I do not propose to hamstring our 
troops in the field or the rest of the Department of Defense by 
supporting language that could clearly undermine our readiness, and 
that is what this language in this resolution can do--undermine our 
readiness, because we continue to draw down funds that are needed by 
our military forces to keep our military forces ready. Nor do I want to 
support language that might cause other important foreign policy or 
Justice Department initiatives to be robbed to pay for programs in 
Haiti. I remain consistent in my belief that the Congress has a greater 
role to play in this matter than the feeble one--the feeble one 
outlined in this resolution.
  Madam President, I yield whatever time remains to the two sides, and 
I ask unanimous consent that it be divided equally among the two sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The 7 minutes will be equally divided.
  The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. May I ask how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 22 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from 
South Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I wish to thank the able Senator for 
his kindness.

  Madam President, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this 
resolution.
  Many Members of the Senate worked hard, in a bipartisan manner, to 
develop the resolution we are considering today. The resolution 
contains all the elements I believe to be necessary.
  The resolution commends the men and women of the Armed Forces who are 
performing a difficult mission in an outstanding manner. Our young men 
and women are once again demonstrating to the world that they can 
accomplish the most complex missions and do them very well. Every day 
we, and the world, see disciplined military personnel who understand 
their jobs and perform those jobs under adverse circumstances. I am 
proud of these young Americans. I know the American people are proud of 
them too. I hope our friends and enemies around the world are also 
watching. Both should be confident of America's capabilities.
  Madam President, these magnificent young people of our military 
forces deserve to know why they are there and what they are to 
accomplish. The American people deserve this as well. That is why we 
have asked the President to clearly define the national security 
objectives and the military mission of our forces in Haiti. These 
markers must be established for all to know. I am concerned that we are 
already witnessing mission creep. We were told that only 15,500 U.S. 
Forces would be necessary in Haiti. Today there are about 25,000 and 
some Marines have been redeployed. We were told that U.S. Forces would 
not become Haiti's police force. Yet we see American soldiers arresting 
Haitians, patrolling streets and performing crowd control duties. We 
were told U.S. Forces would not be an occupying force. We see our 
military taking over radio stations and running electric power plants. 
This sounds like an occupation to me.
  Our troops also deserve to know they have the full backing of the 
American people whenever they are committed to a difficult and 
dangerous mission. This backing is most clearly manifest by a 
congressional resolution prior to committing U.S. Forces to a 
nonemergency situation. Such a resolution demonstrates the support and 
resolve of the American people and helps to sustain the national 
commitment if the situation becomes more difficult than anticipated. 
The administration passed up the opportunity for such a resolution. 
Today, we express the sense of the Congress that the President should 
have sought congressional approval.
  Madam President, we have not established a specific date for the 
withdrawal of our forces. We do, however, express the sense of the 
Congress that all U.S. Forces should be withdrawn from Haiti in a 
prompt and orderly manner as soon as possible. This is an important 
point. Our military commanders need the flexibility and latitude to 
conduct their operations. Military commanders should be working toward 
accomplishing their mission, not against an arbitrary time table. At 
the same time, I think the resolution is very clear that we do not 
intend to have U.S. Forces in Haiti for a protracted time. If there is 
not significant progress toward withdrawal by the time Congress returns 
in January, I am sure we would consider more stringent measures.
  As I have said before here on the floor of the Senate, I urge the 
President to work with the Organization of American States to develop a 
plan for the humanitarian, economic, and political recovery in Haiti. 
This resolution recognizes the lifting of the economic embargo and the 
President's efforts to persuade the United Nations to lift their 
sanctions. These are positive steps. I hope to see more positive 
initiatives on the political and economic fronts from the United States 
unilaterally and from our regional partners.
  The resolution also requires detailed monthly reports as long as our 
forces are in Haiti. The most important of these reports are the costs 
and sources being used to fund the operation. The longer we are 
involved in Haiti, the more scarce resources needed for military 
readiness are consumed. Even if there is a supplemental appropriation 
later next year, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units will have 
missed critical training opportunities and readiness will have begun to 
erode. Money alone cannot bring back the lost training or degraded 
readiness.
  In conclusion, Madam President, Joint Resolution 229 is a good 
resolution which preserves the flexibility of the military commanders 
and expresses, in a clear, concise manner, the sense of the Congress on 
the withdrawal of U.S. Forces; the necessary departure of the de facto 
government; and the orderly transition to the legitimate government of 
Haiti. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, we have no Senators over here at this 
moment. We expect several to arrive momentarily.
  In the meantime, if my colleague from New Hampshire does not object, 
I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the 
time be charged against both sides equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. EXON. Madam President, I ask the manager of the bill on this side 
of the aisle to yield me 5 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I am happy to yield to my colleague from 
Nebraska 5 minutes, or some additional time if he so needs it.
  Mr. EXON. I thank my friend from the great State of Connecticut, and 
I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, I am going to be very brief on this because I think 
probably most of the issues from almost every perspective have been 
addressed already on this matter.
  I wish to associate myself with the remarks just made by my great 
friend and colleague from South Carolina. I think Senator Thurmond 
summed up the whole situation very, very well.
  I would also say that I think there has been a very good debate on 
this matter. Many important things have been brought out. Certainly, 
the very well put remarks by the President pro tempore, the senior 
Senator from West Virginia, should be listened to and understood by 
all.
  I was very much impressed by the remarks made by Senator DeConcini, 
the Senator from Arizona. I thought some excellent points were made 
earlier in the debate, and I have been able to listen to most of it, by 
the junior Senator from North Dakota.
  I think that there has been some good input on the matter that 
confronts us.
  From the very beginning of this controversy, though, Madam President, 
I would simply like to say that this Senator from the State of Nebraska 
did not feel that troops should have been sent to Haiti in the first 
instance, but that is by the boards. The Commander in Chief made that 
decision. The Commander in Chief's decision may turn out to be right. 
But we have an obligation to express our views on this matter.
  I am particularly impressed by the fact that with all of the other 
controversy and rancor that we have had in this body in the last few 
days, and especially the last few weeks of this session, the majority 
leader and the minority leader, with the assistance of many other 
Senators, have come to what I think is the right and proper action in 
the nonamendable joint resolution that is before us.
  From the very beginning of some of the actions that have been 
suggested on this matter, I was shocked and amazed of what I thought 
was an inappropriate, ill-timed, ill-conceived resolution that came out 
of the House of Representatives on this. And I hope that a little more 
cautious look by the Members of the House of Representatives will see 
the wisdom of the very laborious, the very detailed, joint resolution 
that has been presented by the majority and the minority leaders.
  Among anything else, it indicates to me that we can get together on 
some things that are most important. I do not know of anything more 
important than backing the troops that are there now, who are doing a 
truly outstanding job. And I believe that this Senate previously, and 
the people of the United States as a whole, while they do not always 
agree with the actions that are taken, are fully committed to the great 
men and women who are carrying on that action in Haiti today.
  Let us pray, let us hope that they will be successful; that things 
can be worked out. And if that happens without bloodshed, then I think 
we can look back on this as, once again, the U.S. Senate doing its 
proper action by bringing this matter up for debate.
  The whole war powers situation confronts us time and time again. We 
have never solved that to the satisfaction of this Senator. However, I 
think it would be very unwise for us to do anything more than what we 
are doing with this resolution.
  By and large, I think that the leadership that we have seen from many 
of our senior Members of this body, especially including the senior 
Senator from South Carolina, who I think summed up my situation as 
about as well could be summed up in the remarks that he made a few 
minutes ago on the floor of the Senate. I congratulate Senator Thurmond 
once again. It has been a pleasure to work with him over the years. 
Here was a case where I think he was right on point.
  I simply hope that we would overwhelmingly pass this bipartisan joint 
measure that has been hammered out by the majority leader and the 
minority leader and get on with other pressing business that we have to 
face.
  Once again, I thank the hard work of all that made it possible to 
come to this bipartisan compromise. I hope it will receive resounding 
support when we vote on it in about an hour in the Senate.
  I thank my friend from Connecticut for yielding me this 5 minutes.
  I yield back any remaining time.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
McCain be added as an original cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with 
the time being charged against both sides.
  Mr. EXON. Will the Senator withhold?
  Mr. GREGG. Yes.
  Mr. EXON. I would like to be allowed to continue for 1 more minute, 
on the time of the of the Senator from Connecticut.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. EXON. At the close of my statement, I had intended to give some 
additional remarks, but I was afraid I was running out of time. 
Therefore, I asked for an additional 1 minute.
  Madam President, there has been no harder worker than Senator Chris 
Dodd from Connecticut on this whole matter. He has gone down to Haiti. 
Before he went down there and since he came back, his advice, his 
counsel, his carrying the ball on this measure has been very impressive 
to this Senator from Nebraska.
  Among those that I wish to single out for special commendation and 
for a job well done, it is my friend and colleague from Connecticut, 
Senator Dodd.
  I yield back any remaining time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from 
Nebraska that he cannot technically put in a quorum call.
  The Chair would ask the Senator from Connecticut if he wishes to do 
so.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
that the time be divided equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, how much time remains on this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 19 minutes left.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, I want to begin by agreeing with several 
things said by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Senator 
Byrd. I guess it was inevitable in writing a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution related to Haiti that if we were going to get most Members 
of this body to agree with it, if we were going to have bipartisanship, 
it was ultimately going to be what the distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia called it, and that is a toothless resolution.
  I am in agreement with the Senator from West Virginia. I never 
supported sending American troops into Haiti. I want to get them out as 
quickly as possible, and I would like to set a time limit on their stay 
in Haiti. I would like to say to the President that as of a certain 
date, we want our troops out of Haiti.
  There are those who argue that to set a time limit is to endanger 
American lives and, based on that argument, though it is an argument I 
do not agree with, I have withheld my support for an effort that would 
set a deadline for withdrawing American troops. But in reality exactly 
the opposite is true. I agree with the Senator from West Virginia. I 
believe that terrorist elements in Haiti on both sides of this conflict 
clearly understand that engaging in terrorist acts against Americans 
will affect our policy.
  I have watched what is going on in Haiti, and I have visited with 
Members of the Senate who have gone to Haiti and who have brought us 
back reports. I have concluded the same thing that the American people 
concluded before we ever went into Haiti; that we have put American 
troops into an unwinable situation.
  I am also deeply concerned that we are slowing down training 
functions all over America, as we siphon off money to pay for this 
police action in Haiti. I am concerned about it for two reasons. No. 1, 
I want to maintain our readiness and our training. But, second, it 
tells you something about the level of defense cuts that the Clinton 
administration has imposed on the Nation, when routine training 
missions must be sliced to pay for an operation consisting of but 
20,000 troops sent into Haiti.
  I can remember during the Carter administration when our planes did 
not fly, and our ships did not sail because we did not have the money. 
I am concerned that not only do we have President Carter setting 
foreign policy in Haiti, but more ominously, are also adopting 
President Carter's defense policy.
  I am concerned that what we are witnessing, and what many Members of 
this body have participated in, is the destruction of the greatest 
defense that the world has ever known. I urge my colleagues who have 
voted to cut defense in order to fund social programs to look at the 
training missions we are canceling in order to pay for a 20,000-person 
police action in Haiti. If that does not tell you something about where 
we are in defense, if that does not send up a red flag or set off an 
alarm, then I do not think Members of the Senate are awake.
  In terms of Haiti, I believe each of us, in carrying out our 
constitutional responsibilities, have to ask one--and really only one--
relevant question when we are talking about whether or not America 
ought to intervene militarily. There are many ways you can express it. 
You can talk about America's dominant interest. You can talk about 
whether or not the President has a plan to get out at least as detailed 
as the plan he is using to get in. You can ask the question of whether 
or not things are going to be permanently different once you leave 
compared to when you got into this action. I think the answer to each 
and every one of those questions is no.
  But there is a more fundamental question, and for those of us who 
have children, as I do, it is probably an easier question to 
understand. I have a son 21 and a son 19. I think the relevant 
question, in sending 20,000 American troops into Haiti to basically be 
police officers, is: Would I be willing to send one of my own sons?
  It seems to me, when we know with virtual certainty that if we stay 
in Haiti long enough, floundering around without a workable policy, in 
the midst of what clearly is going to become a crossfire, Americans are 
going to be killed. And the question is, if our sons or daughters were 
there, would we be satisfied with the mission? Would we be satisfied 
with what we are trying to achieve? Would it be worth the risk? Would 
it be worth the potential sacrifice?
  I think the answer to these questions was ``no'' long before the 
President sent in our troops. I think it is ``no'' today. I am 
reluctantly going to join my colleagues in voting for this sense-of-
the-Senate resolution. But the bottom line is, it does not change 
policy and I want this policy changed.
  I do not want to try to play President when somebody else was elected 
President. There is no doubt about the fact that President Clinton, as 
Commander in Chief, has the authority to send American troops into 
Haiti. That is not the question. The question is, is it a wise policy? 
Is it a workable policy? Can we change things in Haiti?
  I think the answer in each case is no.
  I want to get American troops out of Haiti as quickly as we can get 
them out. I would like to set a time limit on American involvement in 
Haiti. But because members of our military have urged us not to do it, 
because so many in the administration believe it is a mistake, I am 
going to withhold. The Congress is going to adjourn tomorrow. The 
President will then, obviously, not have Congress around to second-
guess his decisions. But when we come back in January with a new 
Congress, and I hope a dramatically different Congress, if we are still 
in the same situation in Haiti, I want to go on record as saying at 
that point I am going to support an effort to set a time limit on this 
involvement. I urge the President to get American troops out of Haiti.
  I have watched the television pictures of what is happening in Haiti. 
I was stunned, as I am sure other Americans were, at the recent 
newspaper photo where a Haitian protester with a knife in his hand 
grabbed a dove away from a person who was marching for peace, and bit 
the bird's head off. Are we going to sell that person on democracy 
using American military power?
  I am not sure if there are good guys in this struggle. I do not 
believe what we are going to achieve in Haiti is worth the loss of a 
single American life. I want American troops out of Haiti. I did not 
support sending them there. The President cannot get them out too soon 
to suit me. But if we come back in January and American troops are 
still in Haiti, the President can be prepared for the United States 
Senate to vote on setting a time limit to pull our troops out.
  If our troops are still in Haiti in January, the President can expect 
a vote at some point to cut off funds for this operation. The President 
had a right to start the involvement; we have a right and an 
obligation, in my opinion, to terminate it. If the President does not 
make the decision to bring our troops home, at some point we are going 
to make that decision for him.
  Madam President, I reserve for our ranking member the remainder of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from New 
Hampshire has 7 minutes 20 seconds remaining.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
that the time run against both sides equally.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Mikulski). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that 5 minutes of 
the time under the unanimous-consent agreement which was yielded to 
Senator Warner be yielded to Senator Faircloth.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from North Carolina may proceed.
  Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Madam President, before coming to the Senate, I spent 
45 years of my life in the private sector meeting a payroll as a 
businessman and farmer. The private sector is a world that rewards 
common sense and hard work. But I learned very quickly, coming into 
Washington, ideas which make absolutely no sense to the working people 
of America seem perfectly reasonable to career bureaucrats in 
Washington who have become further and further removed from the 
realities of the understanding of everyday American working people.
  Madam President, I can think of no better example of an utter lack of 
common sense than Bill Clinton's decision to send our troops to Haiti. 
The people of America know that it does not make common sense to say 
that you want to restore democracy by occupying an island nation with a 
history of being ruled by voodoo priests, witchdoctors, and blood-
thirsty dictators.
  The American people know that it does not make common sense to put 
the lives of young American men and women at risk in order to install a 
Haitian President who encourages his followers to put burning tires 
around the necks of his political opponents.
  The American people know that it does not make common sense to think 
that this occupation will permanently change anything about Haitian 
society. They know that we have occupied Haiti before, and the last 
time we were there it took us 19 years before we could withdraw our 
troops. They know that despite that earlier occupation, Haiti is a 
squalid, wretched place that only the Haitian people themselves can 
ever hope to fix.
  The common sense possessed by the American people seems to elude 
their Commander in Chief, Bill Clinton.
  To him, and to his fellow Rhodes scholar elitists at the State 
Department, the world is a geopolitical chess game, and American 
soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen are pawns in the game. Bill 
Clinton believes that it makes common sense to try to control the fate 
of everything from America's health care system to the future of 
backward island nations with a history of voodoo worship makes perfect 
sense.
  It does not matter to Bill Clinton that the American people do not 
want this occupation. It does not matter to Bill Clinton that Congress 
was blocked from having a vote as he led us to the brink of war. He 
actually believes that he should be able to impose his will on the 
lives of individuals whenever he pleases, and Congress and the American 
public have no choice but to follow blindly along, like lemmings into 
the sea. That is wrong!
  Mr. President, an administration with a Commerce Secretary, Ron 
Brown, who was a lobbyist for the bloody Duvalier dictatorship in 
Haiti, has no moral authority to now pontificate about human rights in 
Haiti.
  An administration that will not repudiate Marion Barry, the crack 
cocaine-smoking candidate for Mayor of the Capital of the United States 
of America, has no moral authority to preach about drug dealing in 
Haiti.
  And an administration with a Surgeon General, Joycelyn Elders, who 
has insulted and demeaned the Catholic Church, has no moral authority 
to now piously invoke the term ``Father Aristide'' to try to legitimize 
the mentally unbalanced man they want to install in power.
  As a young man I visited Haiti on several occasions. I saw first hand 
the violence and death that has plagued that island nation for hundreds 
of years. On one occasion I saw two people brutally gunned down in the 
street by the ton-ton macoutes--the savage band of killers and thugs 
that are the traditional enforcers for the dictators, witchdoctors, and 
voodoo priests that have long controlled this tiny island nation.
  The United States has absolutely no reason to be in Haiti. We have no 
vital interests in Haiti. Our National security is not at stake. We 
have no guarantee that an invasion will curtail immigration to the 
United States, or solve Haiti's political problems.
  All we have gotten so far for the millions of American tax dollars 
spent, and the thousands of American lives put at risk, is the sight of 
United States that are forced to stand by and watch Haitians being 
beaten in the streets.
  All we have gotten so far is the specter of the mentally unbalanced 
Mr. Aristide complaining about the American President who has tried to 
put him in office in Haiti, and of Jimmy Carter telling Mr. Cedras on 
Haitian soil that he was ashamed of America's foreign policy.
  We now learn that the American taxpayers are going to be actually 
paying the Haitian military that Bill Clinton was going to wage war 
against only days ago. Is there any wonder that the world has lost 
confidence in an American foreign policy that changes every day?
  I can tell you, Madam President, that Haiti is not worth one drop of 
American sweat, much less American blood. I will support American 
troops as long as they are in Haiti, but I will not support the 
decision to send them there in the first place.
  The tragedy of Haiti will not end until the Haitians, themselves, end 
it. Until that happens, no amount of American intervention will make a 
bit of difference in the long run. Let us hope that the tragedy of 
Haiti does not become an American tragedy as well.
  I yield my time.
  I thank the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia now controls 13 
minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, first, I ask unanimous consent that 
among those listed as cosponsors on this resolution, the name of the 
Senator from Virginia follow that of the distinguished ranking member 
of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Thurmond. Senator Thurmond 
worked very hard on this resolution together with his staff under the 
direction of General Reynard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Now, Madam President, I first wish to commend the 
leadership of the Senate reaching a consensus on this very important 
resolution. I was privileged to work with them in that effort. I also 
wish to commend the codel leader, Senator Dodd, of Connecticut, joined 
by Senator Pell, Senator Levin, myself, Senator Coverdell, and the 
current manager of our time, Senator Gregg, in our work down there. It 
was a pleasure to be with these gentlemen.
  Now, Madam President, I am going to be fairly reserved in my remarks 
even though I have some very strong feelings on this issue. I do so 
because I wish to put myself at this very moment into the combat boots 
of several thousand United States soldiers patrolling the dangerous 
streets and villages and towns of Haiti. We must regard the remarks we 
make here as such that they can be heard and perhaps even 
misinterpreted by some in Haiti. So let us use a measure of caution, 
that we not in any way through this debate raise the level of risk to a 
single United States soldier or, indeed, others trying to bring about 
some resolve of this crisis in Haiti.
  As I mentioned, I traveled to Haiti with our codel, which enabled me 
to gain some valuable perspectives about this problem.
  At the outset, I want to say what pride I take as an American in 
those wearing the uniform of our Nation, carrying out the orders of the 
Commander in Chief, whether it be on land, on sea, or in the air.
  Every American can take pride in the manner in which they are 
carrying out a mission, a mission which has really no textbook or 
manual precedent. Throughout our 200-year military history, many books 
have been written on how to conduct various military operations. I 
studied them myself. But the manual--the textbook for this mission--is 
still being written. Fortunately, we have excellent troops, well 
trained, well disciplined, good morale. Whatever we do here has to be 
supportive of that. And they are under the leadership of very able 
senior officers. We should take pride in what they are trying to do. 
General Shelton, commander of the U.S. forces, multinational forces in 
Haiti; Vice Admiral Johnson, commander of the naval forces in the joint 
task force; and, Major General Meade, commander of the 10th Mountain 
Division.
  Mr. President, I support this resolution. I appreciate having had the 
opportunity to work on it. The resolution most significantly does not 
contain a date certain for withdrawal of our troops. I do not say that 
as criticism to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia and 
others. I respect their views. But my opinion on this was gained from 
talking with our military commanders, not just General Shelton, but 
right down to the lieutenants and the sergeants and the troops 
themselves, that the members of the codel had the opportunity to visit 
with on a one-on-one basis. We do not want to say anything here, nor do 
we want to put anything in the resolution which would raise that risk. 
And there are certain dynamics generated by a date certain which could 
raise that risk. So I am pleased that this resolution does not have a 
date certain. And if it did, I could not support it.
  Also a date certain could have complicated General Shelton's plans to 
carry out this mission as best he can in what he views as the time 
available to him. We all want our troops to come home safely as soon as 
possible. Many of us, including the Senator from Virginia, stood on 
this very floor and said in a respectful way to the Commander in Chief, 
the President, do not send U.S. troops to Haiti. But that has been done 
through the exercise of the President's powers under the Constitution. 
So we start from that point of how best to address that situation. Our 
first priority is the safety of our men and women. And then the mission 
must be carried forward in such a manner that will enhance, I repeat 
enhance, not discredit the foreign policy of this country.
  This mission is not clearly defined. It changes from day to day. We 
are fortunate that we have had only two casualties insofar as I know as 
of this moment. But the President has the authority under the 
Constitution and he has put the troops there.
  I say that the second consideration is our foreign policy. If for any 
reason the world perceives--and particularly those other nations who 
are now committed to joining us in this operation--if the world 
perceives that we carried this policy out in a manner other than 
showing leadership and resolve, then what will the North Koreans say 
when we go and lay down a set of conditions to resolve that problem, a 
problem I regard a hundredfold more serious than Haiti?
  All along I have joined with those that questioned whether we have 
any vital security interest in Haiti. But that debate is for a later 
day from where we are now.
  So those are the two reasons that guide me in supporting this 
resolution. First, to keep our troops safe; and, second, I want our 
Nation to be viewed by the world as a credible working partner in 
resolving those problems where hopefully henceforth we have a vital 
national security interest.
  While we were there in Haiti, we met with General Cedras. I am sure 
Senator Dodd has outlined in detail the groups with whom we met. We 
were assured by the general that he would leave office--I stress 
office, not the country--by October 15. And all of us are hopeful that 
the return of President Aristide will be conducted in a spirit of 
reconciliation to the extent it can be achieved. Reconciliation--that 
is the atmosphere in which we can bring our troops back with the least 
amount of risk and harm.
  The parliament has been working throughout the day. I do not know 
what they may or may not have resolved. In my own judgment, they will 
probably have a resolution which will not be clearly specific, which 
will not perhaps meet the objectives and goals that many of us would 
like to see. Perhaps it is going to be left vague and ambiguous on 
purpose so they can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps, so that a 
spirit of reconciliation can be achieved to avoid further loss of life 
and injury, not only to the troops of the United States but the troops 
and police of other nations, and, of course, to the people of Haiti.
  I would like to address another issue. This word ``disarmament'' 
should never have been used in the context of the province of Haiti. 
You go to the dictionary, go to the history books. Disarmament relates 
to the conferences primarily after World War I when the Nation's sat 
down and tried to figure out how to disarm themselves--the Naval 
Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Conference, and to get rid 
of mechanized weapons. You are never going to disarm Haiti totally. 
There are weapons under almost every bed, hand grenades squirreled away 
here and there. And to think that our troops should ever be given the 
mission to go into a house for search and seizure is absolutely wrong. 
We learned that lesson in Somalia. Our troops are doing the best they 
can to remove the weapons where they have good intelligence to know 
there are caches and repositories of some magnitude. That they can do, 
although the risk is great. Never underestimate the risk to our troops 
down there.
  Our delegation traveled through the streets. On one street corner 
they would wave. On the next corner they would shake their fists. And 
if you did a U-turn, when you passed by the corner where they waved 
their hand, they would raise the fist and those that raised their fist 
would wave. It changes that quickly. It is a situation where anything 
can erupt at any time.
  So let us be very careful in the use of the word ``disarmament'' and 
not convey the impression to the people of Haiti or to the people of 
that hemisphere or to the people in this country that our troops are 
going to be able to withdraw these weapons and make this a tranquil 
land. It is not achievable. But--our troops, to the extent they can--
will provide an orderly means perhaps through the weapons buy-back 
program, or otherwise, to get the weapons out of the hands of people. 
Every weapon seized, every weapon bought back in some manner diminishes 
the risk to our people.
  Then, Madam President, we have to turn to the question of the cost 
estimate. It is incalculable at this time. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee received estimates of perhaps more than $1 billion. We do not 
know. But that is a cost we have to watch and watch carefully. It is a 
cost that should be borne by other nations of the world, because we 
have problems here at home. We have pockets of poverty and despair here 
in the United States which parallel, in many respects, what we saw in 
Haiti last Saturday. These dollars are needed here at home as badly as 
they are needed abroad.
  Mr. President, I remain concerned about a number of issues which are 
as yet unsettled. The Haitian Parliament has not yet agreed on the type 
of amnesty to be granted or the form it will take. This is key to an 
orderly transition in Haiti.
  What will be the extent of the United States role in the United 
Nations mission in Haiti [UNMIH] and how long with the United States 
forces be involved? I recall well that it was after the United Nations 
took over the operation in Somalia that much of the risks to our troops 
began there: The mission creep, the hunt for Aideed and finally the 
battle of October 3-4 1993, where 18 United States soldiers were killed 
and 83 were wounded. While we were supplying humanitarian relief with 
one hand, the other was entrapped into combat operations.
  The latest cost estimates indicate that our efforts in Haiti will 
cost upward of $1 billion. I am not optimistic that the long-term 
outcome of our endeavor to instill democracy in Haiti, where it never 
has existed, will prove worthy of the cost in dollars as well as the 
efforts and sacrifices of our men and women in uniform and their 
families. Many of our troops in Haiti were in Somalia last year. We are 
asking a lot of these brave soldiers. I hope and pray for the rapid and 
safe return of all those we have committed to the operation in Haiti.
  Mr. President, in closing, I am compelled to make one final 
observation. I fear that we have focussed a disproportionate level of 
our attention on Haiti, where we have no clear national security 
interests. Now that we have committed our Armed Forces, however, we 
must focus our attention there in the interests of the safety of the 
men and women we have committed to that effort.
  Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has just expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, that is a very dramatic announcement. I 
accept that, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida, Mr. Graham, is 
recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield. If I am correct, the 
Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes, or something like that, remaining 
in his time and he is prepared to yield that back, unless the 
leadership would like to have that time.
  I will yield my time to the Senator from Iowa, from the 7 minutes 
reserved for the Senator from Arizona. I ask unanimous consent that 
that occur.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I support this resolution. Although it 
is not the resolution which I would have written, it represents a fair 
consensus on an issue of great national importance.
  Principally, I support this resolution because of what it does not 
say. What it does not say is a specific time for withdrawal of our 
troops from Haiti. The safety of our troops depends upon the restraint 
of not establishing in advance a specific date for their withdrawal. If 
our enemies knew that we had a date certain for withdrawal, they would 
take advantage of that deadline and endanger the security of our men 
and women in uniform.
  The safety of our troops must be our principal priority. We should be 
proud as a Nation of what our troops are accomplishing in Haiti. They 
are doing their jobs in a professional and efficient way.
  Frankly, I am disturbed and surprised by the comments of some of my 
colleagues this afternoon, who seem to be disappointed by the success 
that our troops have had in Haiti. Obviously, this is a mission which 
is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. Gratefully, we are 
appreciative for the treatment of our troops to date, and that we have 
been able to accomplish this difficult, complex and, as the Senator 
from Virginia stated, almost unprecedented mission, with minimal 
casualties. But we understand that no one should underestimate the 
jeopardy of the circumstances in which our troops are placed in Haiti.
  Madam President, many of us today, and millions around the world, 
heard the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela. He 
stated that we--and particularly the United States of America, with its 
special responsibility--are embarked on a principled and courageous 
endeavor to support democracy in the world. Haiti is another example of 
that principled and courageous endeavor to support democracy.
  Our United States national interests are clearly at stake in the 
circumstances of Haiti. Some of those interests include the signal that 
we are sending to the hemisphere and to the world that we are ready to 
stand by our commitments in support of democratic principles. I fear 
that had we vacillated in Haiti, it would have become the first of a 
series of attacks upon democratic regimes, particularly the new and 
fragile regimes of the Western Hemisphere.
  Madam President, as in South Africa, we are standing by the 
principles that are older than our Nation itself, in support of human 
rights around the world. One of the fundamental principles of Thomas 
Jefferson, in writing the Declaration of Independence, was that he was 
not writing a statement for only those colonialists who lived on the 
Atlantic shore of North America; rather, he was writing a document of 
universal principles. We stood by those universal principles of human 
rights in South Africa. We are doing so again in Haiti and, when we do 
so, we are standing for the very best in our Nation's tradition. 
Because Haiti is part of the neighborhood of the Western Hemisphere, we 
are standing by our own self interests in protecting democracy and 
human rights in Haiti. As we have tragically learned, when conditions 
deteriorate in our neighborhood, we are not immune to the adverse 
consequences, whether they be in the form of persons fleeing from 
persecution and abject poverty, seeking to reach this country, to the 
sale and sovereignty of the country, to the drug traffickers, to the 
endangerment of the United States citizens in that country. All of 
those, and more, become at risk when democracy and human rights are 
challenged in the Western Hemisphere.
  So, Madam President, I am disappointed that some of my colleagues 
continue to criticize the President while our troops are on the ground 
in a vulnerable circumstance, while they are taking all the risk. I 
want to be recorded in full support of the courageous decision by the 
President. I want to be recorded in full support of our courageous, 
highly professional, and patriotic men and women who are carrying out 
this mission. It is at times like this that we should come together as 
Americans, beyond partisan bickering, and fashion our support for our 
troops who are committed to this mission and to some of the most 
fundamental principles, the protection of democracy, and a commitment 
to universal human rights.
  I am proud of what America is doing in Haiti. And tonight I look 
forward to our continued contribution toward building in that nation 
institutions that will make it a peaceful, human rights-respecting 
country with a sense of future and prosperity for its people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I am about to yield 5 minutes to our 
colleague from South Dakota. I am confident he will express strong 
support for the present situation in Haiti.
  Before I do so, let me just commend my colleague from Florida for an 
excellent set of remarks. He is very knowledgeable about the situation 
in Haiti, and his comparison to the situation in Haiti and what 
transpired in South Africa--coincidently, this resolution occurring on 
the very day that Nelson Mandela addressed a joint meeting of 
Congress--I think is appropriate.
  I also commend our colleague from Virginia, Senator Warner, who 
accompanied Senator Gregg and me on our trip last week to Haiti. While 
I disagree with a couple of points, I think he properly and carefully 
identified the appropriate military questions and issues as well as the 
foreign policy issues, and I commend him for his remarks.
  I am glad to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from South 
Dakota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 2 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. GREGG. I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from South 
Dakota also, and I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his courtesy 
in yielding to the Senator from South Dakota 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, I thank the accommodation for 7 
minutes. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his kindness.
  Madam President, I have been very, very concerned about an issue 
recently reported in the New York Times. President Clinton said on June 
8 that one of the reasons for possibly invading Haiti was because of 
that country's involvement in the drug trade. I ask unanimous consent 
to insert this article in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                U.S. Says Haiti's Military Runs Cocaine

                         (By Howard W. French)

       Port-au-Prince, Haiti, June 7.--Haiti's military leaders 
     have been working with Colombian traffickers for the past 
     four years to help move hundreds of pounds of cocaine each 
     month from South and Central America to the United States, 
     American diplomats and other officials say.
       In their first detailed account of the role of the Haitian 
     armed forces in international narcotics traffic, American 
     officials said that much of Haiti's military leadership, 
     including its commander, Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, either has 
     been actively involved with Colombian drug dealers or has 
     turned a blind eye to their trafficking in cocaine, accepting 
     payments for their cooperation.
       For months, United States officials have discounted reports 
     of drug trafficking by senior Haitian officers, and some see 
     the sudden turnabout as an attempt to lay the groundwork for 
     a possible invasion to restore the exiled Haitian President, 
     the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
       The American officials are now saying that the Haitian 
     officers are earning hundreds of thousands of dollars each 
     month for allowing their country to be used as a 
     transshipment center by the main Colombian drug rings in Cali 
     and Medellin.


                       haitian military informers

       The officials who discussed the role of Haitian Army 
     leaders said that their information had been developed in 
     recent months in large part thanks to cooperation from 
     members of the Haitian military itself.
       ``These sources have been very specific about the dates, 
     the sources and the quantities of narcotics involved, and we 
     have this first hand now,'' said one American official, who 
     spoke on the condition of anonymity. Asked if the evidence 
     against Haiti's military was sufficiently strong to take 
     legal action against them, the official said, ``We are pretty 
     close.''
       The disclosure of the investigation comes three weeks after 
     President Clinton cited Haiti's involvement in the narcotics 
     trade as one of the national security concerns that had 
     convinced him that international military action might be 
     required in Haiti.
       In recent days, as speculation has grown about a possible 
     United States-led military action to oust the country's 
     military leaders, members of the Haitian high command have 
     begun consultations here with lawyers who represented Manuel 
     Antonio Noriega, the former Panamanian leader who is serving 
     a 40-year sentence in a Federal penitentiary.
       General Noriega, who was accused by the United States of 
     involvement in international narcotics trafficking and money 
     laundering, was captured in an American military intervention 
     in 1989 and brought to the United States for trial.


                            Generals 'r' Us

       Two of General Noriega's lawyers, Frank Rubino and John 
     May, acknowledged today that they had recently been in Haiti 
     for talks with the military. Refusing to discuss further any 
     details of their involvement here, Mr. May, who was contacted 
     by telephone in Miami, said, ``Generals are our business.''


                         Congressmen Skeptical

       Haitian military officials have denied any involvement in 
     the narcotics traffic. Following a recent cocaine seizure, 
     Col. Antoine Atouriste, the officer in charge of Haiti's 
     antidrug force, said that reports about the drug running role 
     of the Haitian military were part of an international 
     campaign to destroy it.
       Father Aristide has long asserted that his country's army 
     had been kept in power by narcotics profits.
       Members of Congress who are opposed to the use of American 
     force to reinstate Father Aristide say that they are 
     skeptical of the case being put together against Haiti's 
     military leaders and say they suspect political motives lie 
     behind the charges.
       ``There is less true concern over the narcotics problem 
     that there is to lay a foundation for some kind of military 
     action in Haiti,'' said Robert Torricelli, Democrat of New 
     Jersey, who heads the House Foreign Relations subcommittee on 
     Western hemisphere affairs. ``There is a problem with 
     narcotics in Haiti, but it is no larger than any number of 
     other places.''
       Officials who discussed details of the Haitian military's 
     role in cocaine trafficking said that until the recent 
     embargo was placed on the country, cocaine was regularly air-
     dropped into Haiti or delivered by ships from Panama and 
     Colombia.
       The role of the Haitian military, the officials said, was 
     to provide protected landing strips and ports, assuring that 
     the unloading of the cocaine was undisturbed.
       ``Then it is taken to other locations by waiting vehicles, 
     distributed to other points around the country and held until 
     it can be shipped onwards in loads of 50 to 100 kilograms,'' 
     an official said.
       Because of the international embargo against Haiti, 
     officials said they believed the country had an unusually 
     large stockpile of cocaine on hand, which it was unable to 
     export.

  Mr. PRESSLER. This allegation about Haiti was repeated by the 
President and other administration officials several times. Then 
suddenly they stopped saying it and there was no further discussion of 
it.
  I would like to know what they found out or why they have dropped 
that subject. Maybe they found out that Haiti did not have any 
involvement in the drug trade. Or maybe they found out that the door 
led to some embarrassing places.
  Madam President, I am concerned that the reason the administration 
suddenly stopped citing Haitian drug trafficking as a justification for 
invading Haiti was because of reports that, while President of Haiti 
several years ago, Jean-Bertrand Aristide may have taken bribes from 
Colombian drug dealers to permit drug smuggling routes to operate 
through Haiti. These serious allegations have not been thoroughly 
investigated by the U.S. Government. At a time when United States 
troops are putting their lives on the line in Haiti preparing to 
restore Aristide to power, these allegations must be thoroughly 
examined.
  Madam President, today I have written to President Clinton expressing 
my concerns. Yesterday, in the Judiciary Committee I asked Lee Brown, 
the drug czar about this matter. He said he did not know anything about 
it, that it would not be his office's concern.
  Someone in the White House must know because they were citing the 
drug trade in Haiti as a reason to invade that country earlier this 
year. They were investigating Haitian drug trafficking, then suddenly 
they became silent. Is it possible that one of the doors--one of the 
paths of corruption led someplace that they did not wish?
  Again, I have written to the President today expressing my concerns. 
I have previously written to Janet Reno and others about it as well. 
Included with the letter is a list of questions which I think deserves 
to be fully disclosed.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my letter to the President be 
printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, October 6, 1994.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am deeply disturbed by recent 
     allegations that, while President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide accepted payments from foreign drug traffickers. It 
     is my understanding that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 
     acting on orders from the White House or the Justice 
     Department, recently investigated drug trafficking in Haiti. 
     During the course of the investigation, the DEA ostensibly 
     uncovered information linking Mr. Aristide to Colombian drug 
     money. If true, these charges pose serious questions about 
     American involvement in the effort to return Mr. Aristide to 
     power.
       I have previously written to Attorney General Janet Reno 
     asking her to provide any information concerning the 
     allegation that the Justice Department denied a request from 
     DEA field agents to interview Mr. Aristide. I have also asked 
     Senators Biden and Hatch, as Chairman and Ranking Member of 
     the Senate Judiciary Committee, to hold hearings on this 
     matter.
       Let me say that I was not the first to raise the issues I 
     am discussing today. These allegations first appeared in the 
     press and they need to be addressed publicly by the 
     Administration. Cloaking any of this information under a 
     heavy blanket of top secret security clearances is not 
     acceptable. The American public has the right to know. They 
     are paying for the Haiti operation. Their sons and daughters 
     are serving there. Enclosed is a list of questions which I 
     think deserve to be answered. I would greatly appreciate a 
     prompt response from your Administration.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Larry Pressler,
                                                     U.S. Senator.
                                  ____

       Enclosure.

 Senator Larry Pressler--Questions to President Clinton Regarding the 
            DEA investigation into Drug Trafficking in Haiti

       (1) Was an investigation of drug trafficking in Haiti 
     conducted by the DEA, FBI, CIA, State, or Justice 
     Departments?
       If so, who ordered the investigation and when? Who in the 
     Justice Department or the White House was involved? Was it 
     the result of a classified memo drafted in early April by 
     Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark Richard directing 
     federal agencies to investigate rumors of Haitian drug 
     trafficking?
       (2) Is the investigation ongoing or has it been concluded? 
     If it has been concluded, why was this done?
       (3) What was the original purpose of the investigation? Has 
     the purpose changed over time? If so, why?
       (4) Whom did the investigation target? Who in the Haitian 
     government or military have been or are now the subject of 
     this investigation?
       (5) What have been the results of the investigation, to 
     date?
       Was any evidence uncovered that suggested that Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide, or those closely associated with him, 
     accepted payments from foreign drug traffickers?
       If so, who in the Administration was informed of the 
     results of the investigation to date? When was each person 
     informed? Was anyone in the White House or the Justice 
     Department informed, and if so, who and when?
       (6) During the course of the investigation, was there a 
     request from DEA field agents conducting the investigation to 
     interview personally, or otherwise question in any form, 
     Jean-Bertrand Aristide regarding these accusations? If the 
     request was made, explain fully the circumstances surrounding 
     the request.
       Who made the request? To whom was it made? When was the 
     request made?
       In what form was the request made? If in written or 
     electronic form, please provide a copy of the request and any 
     notes or memorandum concerning it which the DEA has in its 
     possession.
       (7) Who within the Administration, both inside and outside 
     the DEA, was aware of the request to question Aristide?
       (8) Was the request to question Aristide ultimately denied? 
     If so, who denied it. When was the denial made? Why was the 
     denial made? Was the denial based on political factors?
       Prior to the final decision not to question President 
     Aristide, was the request submitted to an ``oversight 
     committee'' composed of members from the DEA, the Justice 
     Department and/or others? If so, who were the members of the 
     ``oversight committee''? On what dates did they meet to 
     discuss the request? What was the committee's determination?
       Prior to the final decision not to question President 
     Aristide, was any Administration official in the Justice 
     Department, the White House, or any other government agency 
     consulted or contacted regarding the request? If so, who was 
     consulted? On what dates did the consultations occur?
       At any time during the consideration of the request to 
     question President Aristide, did any Administration official 
     suggest reasons for denying the request based, in whole or in 
     part, on political considerations. If so, which 
     Administration officials made the suggestion? When was the 
     suggestion made?
       (9) In the course of the investigation, did DEA field 
     agents, or other law enforcement officials interview a Mr. 
     Molina, a former lieutenant of the Medellin drug cartel 
     regarding an allegation that Aristide, while in power, 
     accepted drug money from the cartel?
       What did Molina tell DEA field agents? Did he allege that 
     Jean--Bertrand Aristide accepted money from the Medellin drug 
     cartel?
       Was Molina ever given a polygraph or other lie detector 
     test? If so, who administered the test? What were the 
     results? Who in the Administration was informed of the 
     results?
       Did the DEA agents, under the direction of the Justice 
     Department, offer a deal to Molina in return for his 
     cooperation?
       If so, who in the Administration authorized the deal? What 
     were the precise details of the deal offered to him? Were 
     drug charges against Molina, pending in the U.S., dropped as 
     a result?
       Was Molina ever brought to the United States for 
     questioning? If so, is Molina still in U.S. custody? If not, 
     where is he and why was he released? Was Molina allowed to 
     leave the U.S. as a condition of the deal offered to him?
       (10) Did the DEA, or other U.S. law enforcement agency, 
     ever interviewed any other individual who substantiated the 
     allegation that Aristide, or those close to him accepted, 
     payments from foreign drug traffickers?
       If so, who was interviewed? What was said? When did the 
     interview or interviews occur?
  Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, let me say I am not the first to raise 
the issues I am discussing today. These allegations first appeared in 
the press, and they need to be addressed publicly by the 
administration. Cloaking any of this information under a heavy blanket 
of top secret security clearance is not acceptable. The American public 
has a right to know. They are paying for the military operation in 
Haiti. Their sons and daughters are at risk there.
  Let me briefly outline my concerns. On May 21 of this year, the 
Washington Post reported that Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark 
Richards drafted a classified memo directing Federal agencies, 
including the DEA, CIA, FBI, State and Justice Departments to 
investigate narcotics trafficking in Haiti.
  I ask consent to insert this article in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, May 21, 1994]

       U.S. Investigates Allegations of Haitian Drug Trafficking

                           (By Pierre Thomas)

       The Justice Department is investigating allegations that 
     top Haitian military officers have been heavily involved in 
     cocaine trafficking since the mid-1980s, administration 
     sources said yesterday.
       Federal law enforcement officials have received tips that 
     the officers protected or allowed cocaine shipments to enter 
     and leave the country freely, federal sources said. The 
     sources described the inquiry as being at a preliminary, 
     ``fishing expedition'' stage.
       ``There have been rumors for years, and now given the 
     current heightened concern, this has emerged as a priority,'' 
     said one high-ranking administrator who asked not to be 
     named.
       The Haitian military has come under increasing scrutiny 
     since its overthrow of democratically elected President Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. The military has 
     repeatedly ignored international calls for the restoration of 
     Aristide to power.
       Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark M. Richard drafted a 
     classified memo in early April requesting that federal 
     agencies, including the FBI, the State Department, Drug 
     Enforcement Administration and CIA, comb their files for 
     information about Haiti drug trafficking, sources said.
       The investigation is centering on Max Paul, Haiti's 
     director of ports, and more than a dozen military officials 
     including: Lt. Col. Michel Francois, the head of police in 
     Port-au-Prince, the capital city; Brig. Gen. Jean-Claude 
     Duperval; and Col. Antoine Atouriste. Francois previously has 
     strongly denied any involvement in drug trafficking.
       But several administration sources stressed there is little 
     concrete evidence so far tying these Haitian officials to any 
     specific wrongdoing.
       ``We are a long way from confirming any of this,'' said one 
     official. ``We are a long way from indicting these people and 
     having enough evidence to present to a court. We think that 
     some of these people are dirty. So far we just don't have 
     it.''
       Other administration sources also pointed out that drug 
     trafficking in Haiti is small compared to the volumes of 
     drugs moved through other transshipment points in the region.
       A recent State Department report on international drug 
     trafficking said: ``Haiti continues to be used by Colombian 
     trafficking organizations as a base of operations and 
     transshipment point for the movement of South American 
     cocaine to the United States. The government of Haiti has had 
     little success in attacking the problem and clearly has an 
     inadequate interdiction and enforcement capability.''
       While noting that Haitian officials are ``susceptible'' to 
     corruption--presumably because of the country's impoverished 
     condition--the State Department report said the ``United 
     States government does not have evidence directly linking 
     senior [Haitian] officials to drug trafficking.'' The report 
     also said that ``compared to trafficking indicators in other 
     areas such as the Bahamas or Mexico, the current level of 
     detected air and maritime drug-related activity in Haiti is 
     low.''
  Mr. PRESSLER. During the course of this investigation, it is my 
understanding the DEA uncovered allegations that Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
accepted payments from Colombian drug traffickers while President of 
Haiti. The allegations were made by an informant interviewed by the 
Drug Enforcement Agency and deemed credible by the Miami DEA office.
  I further understand that the Miami office of the DEA requested an 
interview with Aristide to substantiate the charges. This request was 
denied by officials in Washington on the advice of an interdepartmental 
oversight committee composed of officials from the DEA, Justice 
Department, and other Federal agencies.
  The decision to not question Aristide disturbs me deeply. In effect, 
the decision prevents DEA investigators in the field from doing their 
job.
  I want to know why this decision was made by the Justice Department 
and the DEA. Was the decision based on political factors? Is the 
administration attempting to suppress an investigation which could 
prove embarrassing to Mr. Aristide?
  Why has the administration stopped citing Haitian drug traffic as a 
reason to invade Haiti? They did earlier this year.
  A New York Times article dated May 20, 1994 quoted President Clinton 
as citing drug trafficking as one of the reasons why the United States 
might have to invade Haiti.
  I ask unanimous consent to print this article in the Record at this 
point.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, May 20, 1994]

             President Lists Reasons To Use Force in Haiti

                           (By Douglas Jehl)

       Washington.--President Clinton today offered the clearest 
     explanation yet of why his Administration is considering the 
     use of military force in Haiti while resisting it elsewhere 
     in the world.
       ``It's in our backyard,'' the President said at a White 
     House news conference as he ticked off the first in a list of 
     six reasons why he is weighing military action to oust 
     Haiti's leaders if economic sanctions do not force them to 
     step down.
       He said Haiti's proximity to the United States and the 
     danger that more of its citizens could seek refuge in 
     southern Florida meant that his Administration had an 
     obligation to force an end to the military dictatorship 
     there.
       Mr. Clinton's comments, in response to a question at a 
     joint appearance with India's Prime Minister, also 
     represented a response to Republican critics who say it would 
     be wrong to risk American lives to restore the exiled 
     President, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
       With a tighter United Nations embargo on Haiti to take 
     effect at midnight on Saturday, aides to Mr. Clinton 
     emphasized that no American military action there was 
     imminent. After facing criticism on past occasions in which 
     the Administration has appeared to back away from tough talk 
     on Bosnia, the aides said no decision on whether to use 
     military force in Haiti will be made until the sanctions have 
     been given time to work.
       But with opinion polls showing mounting public 
     dissatisfaction with his conduct of foreign policy, the aides 
     say that Mr. Clinton has grown concerned that he has failed 
     to cast the challenges he faces in proper context and that, 
     in particular, he has not adequately explained why his 
     Administration is suddenly devoting so much attention to 
     Haiti after 32 months of military tyranny there.
       A senior White House official who said Mr. Clinton had 
     planned his answer described it as part of an effort to build 
     public support for military action in Haiti that would allow 
     him to act even if other countries remain opposed to such a 
     mission.
       Among the six reasons Mr. Clinton mentioned today as adding 
     up to a ``significant'' American interest in restoring 
     democracy to Haiti were its proximity and the fact that Haiti 
     had been used as a staging area for drug shipments bound for 
     the United States. In addition, he said Haiti was now the 
     only country in the Western Hemisphere where military leaders 
     have seized power from an elected leader, making it and Cuba 
     the hemishere's only remaining non-democracies.


                         massive outflow feared

       He also mentioned the several thousand Americans who live 
     in Haiti and the one million Haitian-Americans who live in 
     the United States as reasons Americans should be intent on 
     restoring democracy there.
       But Mr. Clinton saved his strongest warning for what he 
     described as ``the continuous possibility'' that Haitians 
     left poor and desperate under military rule would join in a 
     ``massive outflow'' and seek refuge in the United States.
       Mr. Clinton spoke after a meeting with Prime Minister P. V. 
     Narasimha Rao of India on a day in which he devoted unusual 
     attention to security issues. He had back-to-back meetings 
     with his top foreign policy advisers and with American 
     military commanders from around the globe.
       His meeting with Mr. Rao was the first between an American 
     President and an Indian Prime Minister in seven years, a lag 
     emblematic of the uneasiness between the two countries after 
     successive Administrations have spoken disapprovingly of 
     India's human rights record and its development of nuclear 
     weapons.
       Outside the White House today, hundreds marched in 
     opposition to India's policies in Kashmir and other northern 
     regions, and Mr. Clinton acknowledged that the United States 
     and India still had differences over human rights and the 
     spread of nuclear weapons.
       But the President praised India for having overcome 
     internal strife and remaining the world's second largest 
     democracy, and he said of the disagreements that ``in the 
     content of our common interests and our common values, we 
     believe they can be managed in a constructive way.''
       The yearlong American standoff with North Korea over 
     nuclear weapons still has the potential to become the 
     Administration's biggest foreign policy crisis. But Mr. 
     Clinton and his aides have made clear in recent weeks that 
     they are looking with more impatience at the intransigence of 
     Haiti's military leaders, who seized power in September 1991 
     from Father Aristide, the democratically elected President, 
     and have refused since last fall to honor an agreement in 
     which they pledged to step down.
       The strict United Nations sanctions that are to be imposed 
     on Saturday represent a new effort by the United States and 
     other powers to force Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras and his fellow 
     commanders from power. But the President has been forthright 
     in saying he would consider using military force to oust them 
     if the sanctions fall, and Administration officials say the 
     misery the embargo may inflict means that the White House 
     could reach that point of decision as soon as this time next 
     month.


                          time for them to go

       Mr. Clinton said recently of the military commanders that 
     ``it's time for them to go,'' and aides have described him in 
     recent weeks as increasingly determined to see democracy 
     restored.
       The President's new special adviser on Haiti, William Gray, 
     held a well-publicized meeting here today with Father 
     Aristide in a sign of the White House's commitment to 
     stepping up its efforts on his behalf.
       Asked today why he appeared to be putting Haiti in a 
     different category from Bosnia and Rwanda, where he has ruled 
     out putting United States forces in ground combat roles, Mr. 
     Clinton said he was not prepared ``to discuss hypothetical 
     uses of force.'' But he went on to make clear that he 
     believed that the American interests in Haiti set that 
     country apart from more distant trouble spots.
       His remarks seemed intended in part as an answer to critics 
     like Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the Republican leader, who 
     this week said an American invasion of Haiti ``would be the 
     wrong act at the wrong time for the wrong reason.'' Senator 
     Dole and other Republicans have called on Mr. Clinton to seek 
     a compromise with Haiti's military leaders that would restore 
     democracy without providing for Father Aristide's return, but 
     that is a step the White House has been unwilling to take.
  Mr. PRESSLER. In fact, during this past spring, other members of the 
administration were using drug trafficking as an excuse to intervene in 
Haiti. Then suddenly, we heard no more from the administration about 
drug trafficking in Haiti. It was as if the stage went dark. Was this 
because of information uncovered by the DEA investigation? Did 
information come to light implicating Jean-Bertrand Aristide?
  Allegations to this effect were made by a Colombian national, a Mr. 
Molina, reputedly a major lieutenant of Pablo Escobar, the former head 
of the Medellin, Colombia, drug cartel. Mr. Molina allegedly named 
Haitian generals among those who accepted cash payments from the 
Colombian drug cartel. More importantly, Mr. Molina also allegedly 
named Mr. Aristide. I understand that when Mr. Molina provided this 
information, he was given a lie detector test by the DEA. He passed.
  In return for his cooperation, I understand Mr. Molina was offered a 
deal by the Justice Department. Apparently, Mr. Molina was facing at 
least one indictment in the United States for operating a ``continuing 
criminal enterprise.'' If convicted, he would have faced life in 
prison. Instead, the charges against Mr. Molina were dropped and he was 
allowed to return to Colombia.
  I have also received information alleging that a second informant has 
substantiated the allegations against Jean-Bertrand Aristide. This case 
is still pending.
  Such cases are frequently murky. Nevertheless, allegations having 
been made, the U.S. Government has the responsibility to pursue them. 
Mr. Molina has been described as being ``reliable'' in other DEA cases. 
Would it not be better to put to rest allegations against Mr. Aristide 
by allowing him to be interviewed by the DEA? Instead, the Government 
has decided not to allow Mr. Aristide to be questioned.
  As each day passes, more information comes to light. The allegations 
against Mr. Aristide have been the subject of two ABC news stories, as 
well as articles which have appeared in the Wall Street Journal and the 
Washington Times.
  I ask unanimous consent to print these articles in the Record at this 
point.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Transcript of ABC news report on ``Good Morning America,'' September 
                                18, 1994

       ABC News has learned that Federal law enforcement officials 
     have been investigating a report that Haitian President Jean 
     Bertrand Aristide may have been involved in Payoffs to 
     Haitian officials by Colombian drug traffickers. The 
     allegations came from a Colombian drug dealer cooperating 
     with the Drug Enforcement Agency. ABC'S Jim Angle has more:
       As the U.S. pushed to return Aristide to power, 
     administration officials were wrestling with a potential 
     public relations disaster. The DEA had uncovered allegations 
     that Aristide, while in office, took payoffs from a cocaine 
     cartel. Law enforcement sources told ABC News that when 
     Agents asked to question Aristide, Washington squelched the 
     idea.
       That was denied by Defense Secretary William Perry on 
     ``This Week with David Brinkley:
       ``There have been uncorroborated Allegations made by an 
     informant about President Aristide. Those were investigated 
     by the Justice Department. Nobody was told that they couldn't 
     do it.''
       The informant a former member of Pablo Escobar's cartel, 
     told the DEA that payoffs were going not only to Haiti's top 
     three military leaders--President Raoul Cedras, Army Chief of 
     Staff Phillipe Biamby, and chief of Police, Michel Francois . 
     . . but also to President Aristide himself. Justice 
     Department sources say there is no other information to back 
     up the claims and Aristide supporters were outraged:
       ``There is no truth to any allegations that President 
     Aristide has been involved in drug trafficking or drug 
     payoffs or anything of the kind. This is absolute garbage.''
       Justice Department officials say the investigation has not 
     been closed but now that Haiti's military leaders have agreed 
     to depart, allegations about the past are likely to be far 
     less important than questions about Haiti's future.
                                  ____


Transcript of ABC News Report on ``World News Tonight,'' September 19, 
                                  1994

       With the United States on the verge of invading Haiti to 
     return President Aristide to power, there was one last-minute 
     embarrassment--the DEA had recent information that Aristide, 
     while in office, took payoffs from the Pablo Escobar cocaine 
     cartel.
       And law enforcement sources told ABC that when agents asked 
     to question Aristide, Washington killed the idea. That was 
     denied by Defense Secretary William Perry on ``This Week with 
     David Brinkley'':
       ``There have been uncorroborated allegations made by an 
     informant about President Aristide. Those were investigated 
     by the Justice Department. Nobody was told that they couldn't 
     do it.''
       The informant was one of Pablo Escobar's lieutenants who is 
     now cooperating with the DEA * * *. He said that payoffs were 
     going to Haiti's top three military leaders--President Raoul 
     Cedras, Army Chief of Staff Phillipe Biamby, and Chief of 
     Police, Michael Francois.
       But the Colombian informant also said his Haitian 
     connection, Franz Biamby, a cousin of the Army Chief of 
     Staff, saw Aristide take a suitcase filled with several 
     hundred thousand dollars in payoffs.
       Franz Biamby, now in jail in Miami, admitted to authorities 
     that he smuggled cocaine. And he implicated other Haitian 
     officials--but not the top three military leaders * * *. or 
     President Aristide.
       The administration was hoping to do to Haiti's military 
     leaders * * * what the United States did to Panamanian leader 
     Manuel Noriega--arrest them and put them in jail.
       The administration had cast a wide net in an effort to 
     build a drug case against the military leaders * * * The last 
     thing it wanted to hear were new allegations against 
     Aristide.
       Defense Secretary Perry said today the matter is closed:
       ``The Justice Department made a very detailed investigation 
     of this. They concluded that the evidence did not support 
     this allegation by one informant.''
       But other sources tell ABC News the investigation is still 
     open.
       Justice Department officials met last Thursday, even as the 
     United States was preparing Haitians for an invasion, to 
     decide how to handle this political hot potato.
       This evidence was flimsy * * * but officials couldn't stop 
     the investigation without appearing to interfere * * * just 
     as the United States was preparing to put lives on the line 
     to return Aristide to power.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 22, 1994]

U.S. Faces Dilemma on Restoring Haiti's Leader, As Americans Wonder if 
                        Aristide Is Good or Evil

                       (By Robert S. Greenberger)

       Washington.--When President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns 
     to Haiti, the question here is will he go back as the good 
     guy or the villain?
       The Clinton administration policy is anchored on restoring 
     President Aristide as Haiti's elected leader by Oct. 15. But 
     four days into the U.S.'s peaceful occupation of the 
     Caribbean nation, support for that goal is in danger of 
     eroding.
       President Aristide finally delivered a belated ``thank 
     you'' to the U.S. yesterday for its efforts to restore him to 
     power. But his three-day delay in doing so has only fueled 
     concerns in the U.S. that the administration is saddled with 
     an unreliable and temperamental partner.


                         aristide is criticized

       Democrats in the past few days have begun attacking the 
     Haitian leader as an ingrate. ``The proper response from Mr. 
     Aristide is not to second guess or nitpick. The proper 
     response is two words: `thank you,''' Rep. David Obey of 
     Wisconsin, one of the few members of his party who had 
     advocated an invasion of Haiti, said earlier this week.
       Meantime, critics from the right are pressing a campaign to 
     demonize the Haitian priest, circulating stories about his 
     involvement in violence and unfounded rumors about drug 
     payoffs and even murder. On the night President Clinton gave 
     his nationally televised speech on Haiti, the American 
     Conservative Union aired a TV ad showing a 1991 Aristide 
     speech--in Creole--that appeared to encourage ``necklacing,'' 
     or putting a tire around a political opponent's neck and 
     setting the tire on fire.
       Efforts to tar Mr. Aristide in the public mind could prove 
     critical to the long-term success of the U.S. mission in 
     Haiti. Americans only support such military endeavors when 
     they have a clear sense of battling evil. Former President 
     Carter fogged that distinction by extolling the ``bad 
     guy,''--Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras--as a patriot and a man of 
     honor just a few days after President Clinton had labeled the 
     same general a thug and a murderer. An effective attack on 
     President Aristide, the supposed ``good guy'' in this 
     international melodrama, could push public patience over the 
     edge.
       ``It's my impression that the events of the last few days 
     have really changed the way Aristide and Cedras are viewed as 
     hero and villain,'' says Christopher Caldwell, assistant 
     managing editor of the American Spectator and author of a 
     scathing attack on President Aristide in that conservative 
     magazine's July issue. In response, President Aristide's 
     defenders, and paid publicists, are pressing to polish his 
     image among Americans and counter the attacks.


                         exaggeration or truth?

       Many of the charges surfacing against Mr. Aristide from Mr. 
     Caldwell and others on the right clearly are the product of 
     innuendo and exaggeration. Reed Irvine, who heads Accuracy in 
     Media, a conservative watchdog group, passes on a ``tip'' 
     that President Aristide ordered the killing of a Haitian 
     priest earlier this summer, to put the spotlight back on 
     Haiti instead of the Cuba crisis. Mr. Irvine concedes he 
     heard the story from someone he doesn't know, who claims to 
     have Pentagon connections. Nevertheless, a small Washington 
     newspaper ran the story.
       But the 41-year-old President Aristide also has given his 
     opponents plenty of material to work with. He is a radical 
     Roman Catholic priest who has fought with his church and 
     often spewed anti-American statements. His stubbornness and 
     independence continue to drive U.S. officials to distraction. 
     Although his human-rights record during his short tenure as 
     Haiti's elected president was vastly superior to what came 
     before and after, he clearly encouraged, or in some cases 
     didn't act to prevent, mob violence. In one instance, he 
     stalled an investigation of the murders of five jailed 
     youths.


                         targeting legislators

       Much of the anti-Aristide efforts are directed toward 
     Congress, a fertile field for anti-interventionist sentiment. 
     When House leaders were negotiating the language of a 
     resolution praising the negotiated agreement in Haiti, 
     Republicans insisted that the document wouldn't praise 
     President Aristide. Democrats agreed. On the Senate floor, 
     GOP Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas, citing descriptions of 
     President Aristide as a ``anti-American Marxist demagogue,'' 
     declared, ``I don't see a good guy in Haiti.''
       President Aristide isn't unarmed in this battle of 
     perceptions. A bevy of highly paid aides has been peppering 
     the airwaves, noting that President Aristide was 
     democratically elected with nearly 70% of the vote and was 
     beginning to bring real reform to Haiti's impoverished 
     masses when he was ousted by the military in September 
     1991.
       The public-relations firm of McKinney & McDowell received 
     $191,000 during a seven-month period that ended in April, 
     according to the most recent filing with the U.S. Justice 
     Department. And the Miami law firm of Kurzban Kurzban & 
     Weinger, P.A., acting on behalf of President Aristide, 
     dispersed $594,500, to several law firms and individuals. 
     Among the most prominent spokespeople is former Democratic 
     Rep. Michael Barnes, whose law firm receives a monthly 
     retainer of $27,500. The money comes from Haitian government 
     bank accounts in the U.S. that were frozen following the 
     military coup and that now are controlled by President 
     Aristide.


                     favorable human-rights record

       Beyond the public relations, President Aristide had a 
     generally favorable human-rights record during his seven 
     months in office, says Kenneth Roth, executive director of 
     Human Rights Watch, a private group. Nevertheless, he adds, 
     President Aristide has one ``large blight on his record.'' In 
     July 1991, five youths were arrested by police and later 
     murdered; President Aristide blocked an investigation of a 
     leading suspect, the police chief, who was a strong Aristide 
     supporter.
       The State Department's human-rights report for 1991 
     concluded that, ``although there were few institutional 
     advances made to improve respect for human rights during the 
     Aristide government, there were fewer instances of abuse by 
     soldiers, which resulted in a greater sense of personal 
     security.''
       President Aristide's history with his church is also 
     somewhat mixed. According to a spokesman for the National 
     Council of Catholic Bishops, he was expelled from his order, 
     the Salesians of Don Bosco, in November 1988 because he no 
     longer was living up to the principles and the restrictions 
     of the order, which primarily is focused on the needs of the 
     poor. Prior to the expulsion, which later was approved by 
     Rome, he was given several warnings by his superiors for 
     preaching violence. The Salesians, however, say President 
     Aristide chose to leave because of the order's restriction 
     against mixing religion and politics.


                        allegations of drug ties

       Another recent attack on President Aristide involves 
     allegations of ties to the drug trade. In a letter to 
     Attorney General Janet Reno, written the day after the U.S. 
     reached agreement with Gen. Cedras in Haiti, Sen. Larry 
     Pressler, a South Dakota Republican, citing an ABC News 
     report, called for an investigation of charges that President 
     Aristide received money from drug dealers.
       Carl Stern, a Justice Department spokesman, says the 
     charges, which weren't new, had been investigated and ``there 
     was no basis found for going further.''
       But such charges are kept alive by a network of 
     conservatives that includes talk-radio shows. Armstrong 
     Williams, host of ``The Right Side,'' says he receives 
     hundreds of calls from listeners who characterize President 
     Aristide as a criminal and unfit for U.S. support. Mr. 
     Williams, in turn, passes on tidbits that buttress that 
     perception. ``Aristide,'' he says, ``is my favorite subject 
     these days.''
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, Oct. 4, 1994]

Pressler Urges Panel to Probe Claim That Aristide Took Bribe, Asks Why 
               DEA Interview of Ousted Leader Was Barred

                            (By Jerry Seper)

       Sen. Larry Pressler wants the Senate Judiciary Committee to 
     investigate accusations that deposed Haitian President Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide and his top aides took payoffs from 
     Colombian drug dealers to keep Haitian smuggling routes to 
     the United States open.
       In a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. 
     Joseph R. Biden Jr., Delaware Democrat, and Sen. Orrin G. 
     Hatch of Utah, the ranking Republican on the panel, the South 
     Dakota Republican described the accusations as ``extremely 
     serious.''
       ``Such allegations, if true, are extremely troubling given 
     the administration's strong support for President Aristide 
     and his return to power,'' Mr. Pressler said.
       In a separate letter to Attorney General Janet Reno, Mr. 
     Pressler sought information on the Justice Department's role 
     in an ongoing Aristide investigation and asked if the 
     department had refused to allow U.S. Drug Enforcement 
     Administration agents in Miami to question the ousted 
     president.
       ``I also wish to know whether the Justice Department 
     refused DEA permission to interview President Aristide, the 
     department's reasons for denying such a request and the name 
     of the department official responsible for that decision,'' 
     said Mr. Pressler, himself a Judiciary Committee member.
       The Aristide accusations surfaced this year when a former 
     member of the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia told the DEA 
     Mr. Aristide and several aides took bribes from cartel 
     leaders to guarantee cocaine smuggling routes through Haiti 
     to the United States.
       The former Medellin lieutenant and top aide to Pablo 
     Escobar, the cartel's late boss, told DEA agents in Miami 
     that the payoff was given to Mr. Aristide in the months 
     before his ouster in September 1991 by a military coup.
       The informant, now a government witness, described the 
     suspected Aristide payoff and payment of bribes to key aides 
     during interviews earlier this year, first reported last 
     month by ABC News.
       An investigation is under way, although a request by DEA 
     agents in Miami to question Mr. Aristide in the probe was 
     rejected last month by a Justice Department oversight 
     committee. The Undercover Review Committee challenged the 
     informant's credibility but did not stop the investigation.
       Justice Department sources said the informant could not 
     provide specific corroboration and showed ``some deception'' 
     in a polygraph test administered by the DEA. Some department 
     officials said the polygraph findings were ``mixed'' but not 
     disqualifying.
       Although the decision not to question Mr. Aristide came at 
     a time the Clinton administration was considering using 
     military force to return him to power, Miss Reno has denied 
     that politics played any role.
       Mr. Aristide has denied the accusations. A spokesman 
     described statements by the informant as ``nonsense.''
       The informant, the sources said, told the DEA that the 
     Aristide payoff was delivered by Franz Biamby, the Medellin 
     cartel's Haitian connection. Mr. Biamby, a suspected drug 
     smuggler, is a cousin of Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby, chief of 
     staff to Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's military leader.
       The sources said Mr. Biamby told the informant he 
     personally delivered a money-filled suitcase to Mr. Aristide. 
     The information came during an investigation of Mr. Biamby's 
     suspected ties to Haitian drug smugglers, along with that of 
     other former and current Haitian civilian and military 
     leaders, they said.
       ``It's hard to believe the Clinton administration would 
     seek an investigation of Haiti's military leadership and 
     their roles in drug smuggling and not know the DEA would also 
     come up with the Aristide connection,'' said one source close 
     to the investigation.
       In his letter to Miss Reno, Mr. Pressler said he understood 
     the DEA discovered Mr. Aristide's suspected ties to the 
     Medellin cartel after the White House had directed the agency 
     to ``investigate allegations of profiteering from drug 
     trafficking'' by military officials in Haiti, including Gen. 
     Cedras.
       ``During the course of this investigation, the DEA 
     ostensibly uncovered information linking not only Haitian 
     military officials to drug money, but also President 
     Aristide,'' he said.
       In May, the Justice Department confirmed it was 
     investigating drug trafficking by the Haitian military, 
     naming 14 top military officers, Haiti's port director and 
     the Haitian National Intelligence Service as investigative 
     targets.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Times, Oct. 3, 1994]

                Escobar Aide Tells DEA of Aristide Bribe

                            (By Jerry Seper)

       A former member of a Colombian drug cartel, now a 
     government informant, has told the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
     Administration that ousted Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide personally took a bribe from cartel leaders to 
     guarantee that cocaine smuggling routes through Haiti to the 
     United States would remain open.
       The unidentified informant, according to Justice Department 
     sources, told DEA agents in Miami that the cash--several 
     thousands of dollars stuffed in a suitcase--was given to Mr. 
     Aristide in 1991 by members of the Medellin drug cartel, 
     headed at the time by Pablo Escobar.
       The informant is deemed ``credible'' by Justice Department 
     officials in other pending cases, the sources said.
       A former Medellin cartel lieutenant and top Escobar aide, 
     the informant described the suspected Aristide payoff and the 
     payment of bribes to other Haitian officials, including key 
     Aristide aides, during several interviews this year with DEA 
     officials.
       An investigation into the accusations is continuing, 
     although a request by DEA agents in Miami to question Mr. 
     Aristide in the probe was rejected last month by a Justice 
     Department oversight committee. The Undercover Review 
     Committee challenged the informant's credibility but did not 
     stop the probe.
       The sources said the informant could not provide specific 
     corroboration and showed ``some deception'' in a polygraph 
     test administered by the DEA. Some Justice Department 
     officials said the polygraph findings were ``mixed'' but not 
     disqualifying.
       The informant told agents in Miami that the Aristide payoff 
     was delivered by Franz Biamby, the Medellin cartel's Haitian 
     connection, the sources said. Mr. Biamby, a suspected drug 
     smuggler, is a cousin of Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby. Gen. 
     Biamby is chief of staff to Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's 
     military leader.
       According to the sources, the informant said Mr. Biamby 
     told him he had personally delivered the money-filled 
     suitcase to Mr. Aristide. The information, they said, came 
     during an investigation of Mr. Biamby's suspected role in 
     drug smuggling in Haiti, along with that of other former and 
     current Haitian civilian and military leaders.
       The sources said the informant often served as a ``bagman'' 
     for Escobar, the notorious Medellin boss who was killed in a 
     shootout with Colombian police last year.
       At one time, Escobar headed a drug trafficking operation 
     out of Medellin, Colombia, and had a net worth of more than 
     $2.5 billion. He was blamed for the deaths of hundreds of 
     people--including presidential candidates, judges and 
     police--in a series of assassinations and car bombings.
       Justice Department officials have denied that politics 
     played any role in the decision to turn down the interview 
     request, although it came at a time when the Clinton 
     administration was considering using military force to return 
     Mr. Aristide to power.
       Attorney General Janet Reno said last week the decision to 
     reject the Aristide interview was made by the department's 
     undercover review committee. She said committee members, 
     including criminal division lawyers who are assigned to the 
     panel, were ``participating in a DEA structure, and I've 
     tried to do it the way it's always done to make sure that 
     there is no political interference.''
       DEA spokesman Bill Ruzzimenti has declined comment, saying 
     that, as a matter of policy, the agency will neither confirm 
     nor deny that anyone is the subject of an active 
     investigation.
       Mr. Aristide has denied accusations that he was involved in 
     drug payoffs. A spokesman described statements by the 
     informant as ``nonsense.''
       White House spokesman David Levy did not return calls to 
     his office last week seeking answers on what and when 
     administration officials knew about the Aristide 
     investigation.
       The DEA informant accused Mr. Aristide and his aides of 
     using Haitian military officers and others to protect 
     incoming drug flights and outgoing shipments, the Justice 
     Department sources said.
       Haiti has long been a suspected transshipment point for 
     cocaine headed to the United States from South America. 
     Haitian officials and military leaders, according to law 
     enforcement authorities, have long been involved in an 
     international smuggling network that uses freighters, small 
     boats, commercial airliners and smaller aircraft to smuggle 
     drugs to the United States. Its remote landing strips are 
     easily accessible to small planes flying too low to be 
     detected by radar.
       The DEA has estimated that a ton of cocaine is smuggled 
     through Haiti to the United States each month. A 1992 State 
     Department report described Haiti as a ``transshipment point 
     of illegal narcotics, especially cocaine, into the United 
     States.''
       Mr. Aristide is a Roman Catholic priest who was expelled in 
     1988 from the Salesian order, one of the church's largest, 
     for using religion to incite hatred and violence. He was 
     elected president in December 1990 and overthrown nine months 
     later in a military coup. He is expected to return to Haiti 
     after coup leaders step down Oct. 15.
       As president, he repeatedly used implicit threats of mob 
     violence to intimidate his opponents in the business class, 
     the National Assembly and the military.
       In September 1991, shortly before his ouster, he invoked 
     ``God's justice'' in urging his followers to ``necklace'' 
     opponents--hang discarded, gasoline-filled tires around their 
     necks and set them ablaze. He did not mention burning tires 
     explicitly but referred to the smell of something burning.
       Mr. Aristide is still a priest in the eyes of the church 
     because he never officially received a dispensation from his 
     vows. Church law bars priests from holding elected office, 
     except in unusual circumstances.
                                  ____


              [From the Washington Times, Sept. 30, 1994]

 DEA Probes Report of Aristide Drug Link--Colombian Smugglers Said to 
                               Use Haiti

                            (By Jerry Seper)

       U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents are 
     investigating accusations that deposed Haitian President 
     Jean-Bertrand Aristide took bribes from Colombian drug 
     dealers to ensure that longstanding Haitian smuggling routes 
     into the United States remained open.
       The DEA probe, according to Justice Department sources, has 
     focused on the ousted president and several top aides. They 
     are suspected of accepting payoffs during the Aristide 
     presidency to guarantee Haiti's use as a transshipment point 
     for millions of dollars in cocaine bound for the United 
     States.
       Mr. Aristide and his aides, some of whom stayed in Haiti 
     after the Aristide government was overthrown in September 
     1991, were accused by a DEA informant of using Haitian 
     military officers and others to protect incoming drug flights 
     and outgoing shipments, the sources said.
       The probe is continuing despite a department decision last 
     month rejecting a DEA request to question Mr. Aristide in the 
     case. The sources said the department's Undercover Review 
     Committee, which oversees high-profile cases, rejected the 
     request after challenging the informant's credibility.
       The interview request was rejected as the Clinton 
     administration was considering using military force to return 
     Mr. Aristide to power, although Attorney General Janet Reno 
     yesterday denied that politics played a role in the decision.
       A militant Roman Catholic priest, Mr. Aristide was elected 
     president in December 1990 and overthrown nine months later 
     in a military coup. He is expected to return to Haiti after 
     coup leaders step down Oct. 15.
       The Aristide investigation began after information on the 
     suspected payoffs was given to DEA agents by the informant, 
     who has been described as reliable in other cases. The 
     sources said the unidentified informant was unable to provide 
     specific corroboration and showed ``some deception'' in a 
     polygraph test administered by the agency.
       ``We get allegations, we pursue them in every way we can 
     without any political interference,'' Miss Reno said during 
     her weekly press briefing yesterday. ``DEA has a structure 
     for making informed decisions . . . to ensure there is no 
     political interference, and I insisted that it be done that 
     way.''
       Initially, she said the DEA made the decision not to 
     question Mr. Aristide: ``DEA made a decision; it was not made 
     by the department.'' Later, however, she acknowledged the 
     decision had been made by a committee within her department.
       DEA spokesman Bill Ruzzimenti declined comment yesterday, 
     saying that, as a matter of policy, the agency will neither 
     confirm nor deny that anyone is the subject of an active 
     investigation.
       White House spokesman David Levy did not return a call to 
     his office yesterday seeking answers on what and when 
     administration officials knew about the Aristide 
     investigation.
       Haiti has long been a suspected transshipment point for 
     cocaine headed to the United States from South America. 
     Haitian officials and military leaders, according to law 
     enforcement authorities, have been involved in smuggling 
     since the 1980s.
       The DEA investigation, according to Justice Department 
     officials, has focused on a suspected Haitian-Colombian 
     smuggling network established by Haitian Col. Jean-Claude 
     Paul, who died in 1988 under suspicious circumstances.
       Col. Paul, who at one time provided protection for Mr. 
     Aristide during the priest's rise to political prominence in 
     Haiti, was suspected by U.S. drug agents of making $40 
     million by facilitating cocaine shipments for the Medellin 
     cartel between December 1986 and his death in November 1988.
       Indicted in March 1988 by a federal grand jury in Miami on 
     charges of aiding drug traffickers, Col. Paul died nine 
     months later of poisoning at his home in Port-au-Prince. He 
     had been accused of conspiring to import 200 pounds of 
     cocaine into the United States. Also indicated were his 
     brother, Antonio Paul, and his ex-wife, Marie Merielle 
     Delnois.
       As commander of the powerful Dessalines Barracks in Port-
     au-Prince, he was accused of using one of his personal 
     airstrips in Haiti to ferry Colombian cocaine into the United 
     States. The indictment came after a DEA informant, Osvaldo 
     Quintana, outlined the suspected smuggling operations to a 
     grand jury.
       The 49-year-old colonel became one of the most powerful 
     army officers in Haiti after the fall of the Duvalier family 
     dictatorship in February 1986. He remained a key figure after 
     being forced into retirement and managed to avoid being sent 
     to the United States for trial.
       Col. Paul died Nov. 6, 1988, after eating a bowl of soup 
     containing a ``toxic substance,'' which was not identified. A 
     maid and gardener were arrested but not charged.
       Fritz Pierre-Louis, a former Haitian army lieutenant who 
     later defected, told a Senate subcommittee in 1988 that he 
     personally turned over confiscated cocaine to Col. Paul only 
     to have it disappear. Mr. Pierre-Louis said 70 percent of the 
     colonel's Dessalines Barracks forces was involved in the drug 
     trafficking.
       Haiti is a key part of an international smuggling network 
     that has long used freighters, small boats, commercial 
     airliners and smaller airplanes to smuggle drugs to the 
     United States. Its remote landing strips are easily 
     accessible to small planes flying below radar level.
       The DEA has estimated that a ton of cocaine is smuggled 
     through Haiti to the United States each month, although 
     shipments have been slowed by the recent U.S. embargo. A 1992 
     State Department report described Haiti as a ``transshipment 
     point of illegal narcotics, especially cocaine into the 
     United States.''
       Mr. Aristide has denied any involvement in drug trafficking 
     and has publicly condemned suspected trafficking within the 
     Haitian military leadership that overthrew him. During his 
     exile in Washington, he said the military leaders who deposed 
     him were responsible for $500 million in smuggling annually.
       Seizures of cocaine in Haiti, however, dropped from 3,812 
     pounds in 1990, the year before Mr. Aristide assumed power, 
     to 415 pounds in 1991, after he took over as president.
       In May, the Justice Department said it was investigating 
     drug trafficking within the Haitian military. It said 
     prosecutors had evidence that military officers were 
     continuing to protect incoming and outgoing cocaine 
     shipments.
       A six-page memo named 14 top military officers. Haiti's 
     port director and the Haitian National Intelligence Service 
     as targets of the Justice Department probe. The memo said 
     authorities had established ``that the Haitian military have 
     been closely involved in the facilitation of drug trafficking 
     since at least the early 1980's.''
       The memo, which said indictments were not expected in the 
     immediate future, said drugs confiscated from smugglers often 
     were sold to other traffickers for delivery in the United 
     States. It also said Haitian officers were closely involved 
     with Colombian smugglers, although it did not identify the 
     dealers.
       According to the memo, the key target was Lt. Col. Michel 
     Francois, chief of police in Port-au-Prince. Col. Francois, 
     not the nation's military chief, Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, was 
     identified as the most powerful figure in the regime that 
     overthrew Mr. Aristide.
       The memo does not mention Gen. Cedras as an investigative 
     target. A confidential Senate report last year said the 
     general's role in smuggling was not clear:

  Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, this decision not to interview Mr. 
Aristide is even more disturbing since American military forces are 
currently occupying Haiti and, according to a recent New York Times 
article, we are spending $5 million on covert activities to restore 
Aristide to power.
  I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the New York Times 
article at this point.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the New York Times, Sept. 27, 1994]

                C.I.A. Reportedly Taking a Role in Haiti

                          (By Elaine Sciolino)

       Washington, Sept. 27.--In a move that some lawmakers 
     believe could subvert the democratic process in Haiti, 
     President Clinton has approved a secret contingency plan that 
     authorities unspecified political activities to neutralize 
     the opponents of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, senior 
     Administration officials said today.
       In addition, the $5 million plan authorizes the Central 
     Intelligence Agency to spend $1 million on propaganda 
     activities to help ease Father Aristide's return and to use 
     covert means to protect American forces there from hostile 
     military groups, the officials added.
       To avoid charges that the United States is interfering, the 
     C.I.A. does not have the authority to undertake political 
     activities on its own, the officials added. But the vague 
     nature of the term ``political actions'' has alarmed some 
     lawmakers who fear that money could be used to corrupt 
     politics in Haiti.
       Administration officials briefed key lawmakers last 
     Wednesday about Mr. Clinton's order, known as a finding, as 
     required by law. Since then, the C.I.A. has begun to use some 
     of the $1 million earmarked for propaganda for covert radio 
     broadcasts and to penetrate military groups that might seek 
     to harm American troops.
       The officials briefing Congress told lawmakers that one of 
     the goals was to ``create a political climate'' that would 
     help put into effect the agreement that former President 
     Jimmy Carter reached with Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, Haiti's 
     military leader, on Sept. 18.
       Under that agreement, General Cedras and other military 
     leaders must relinquish power after the parliament approves a 
     general amnesty, or by Oct. 15, whichever comes earlier. The 
     Clinton Administration supports an amnesty so that it does 
     not have to forcibly remove the Haitian leaders if they 
     refuse to leave.
       A number of lawmakers said they were convinced that under 
     the covert operation, pro-military legislators elected under 
     disputed circumstances could be paid off to step aside, and 
     that the C.I.A. had the authority to pay expenses, provide 
     security or give other incentives to parliamentarians who do 
     not want to vote for amnesty.
       ``I cannot discuss intelligence matters, but it would not 
     be uncommon for the United States to get involved in some 
     manner in promoting free and fair elections,'' said Senator 
     Dennis DeConcini, Democrat of Arizona. ``To me this could be 
     done in many ways. I would think an open overt way would be 
     the best. The institutions are there.''
       Senior Administration officials familiar with the 
     Presidential finding insisted that it did not authorize the 
     C.I.A. to bribe officials or try to influence the vote on 
     amnesty.
       ``We have specifically excluded paying people off or 
     getting involved in the political process in an intrusive 
     way,'' said one senior Administration official. ``We took 
     those activities out. We have done absolutely zero in this 
     domain, and I seriously doubt whether we will pursue this at 
     all.''
       But a number of Administration officials conceded that 
     there could be circumstances in which the United States might 
     want to take action to stop the military from paralyzing 
     Haitian politics, as it did last year in blocking the 
     Governors Island accord, under which the military was to step 
     down.
       ``Our concern is that the bad guys are going to bribe 
     people, intimidate people, keep people away from the 
     parliament,'' said one senior United States official. ``On a 
     limited basis, we may have to do things to counter that.''
       For example, if the United States uncovered a coup plot 
     against Father Aristide, Washington could take measures to 
     thwart it, officials said. And although, on paper at least, 
     payments to deputies are not allowed, officials said they 
     could be offered protection, transportation to and from 
     parliament and other help.
       Some lawmakers familiar with the plan also expressed 
     concern about spending $1 million on C.I.A.-generated 
     propaganda when Washington is already supporting an overt 
     program, including two radio stations that broadcast messages 
     from Father Aristide and the distribution of millions of pro-
     Aristide leaflets.
       Administration officials countered that the covert 
     propaganda program gives the Administration maximum 
     flexibility and provides funds for activities like 
     newspapers.
       The secret order renders invalid an earlier $12 million 
     secret plan to offer Haiti's three top military leaders a 
     comfortable life in exile and to conduct covert activities 
     that might undermine them.
       Administration spokesmen officially refused to confirm or 
     deny the existence of the secret programs. ``Consistent with 
     this Administration's steadfast practice, we do not comment 
     one way or another on alleged intelligence activities,'' said 
     Michael McCurry, the State Department spokesman.
       As part of the plan, Mr. Clinton authorized the C.I.A. to 
     introduce agents inside Haiti to detect plots to assassinate 
     American soldiers or take them hostage.
       In a formal review after the mission in Somalia, where 18 
     American troops were killed last October while trying to 
     capture a clan leader, the President's Foreign Intelligence 
     Advisory Board concluded `that there was not sufficient 
     support by the C.I.A., and that authority for covert 
     operations should be in place whenever American forces were 
     deployed in a potentially hostile environment, senior 
     officials said.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Apparently, we are spending millions of dollars in 
overt and covert aid to get rid of opponents of Mr. Aristide in order 
to return Mr. Aristide to power. Some of his opponents are alleged to 
have been involved in drug smuggling activities, and now there are 
allegations about Mr. Aristide as well.
  It is unsettling to me that we are investing such large sums of money 
and putting U.S. servicemen in possible jeopardy on behalf of Mr. 
Aristide, yet the U.S. Government decides not to interview him about 
the allegations of an informant who is considered reliable.
  I had hoped to appear before the Committee on Government Operations 
in the other body tomorrow to ask questions of the DEA Administrator, 
Tom Constantine. Regrettably, the chairman of that committee has 
refused my request to ask questions at the hearing.
  Therefore, I have submitted my questions to the President. I want to 
know the results of the investigation into Haitian drug trafficking. 
What information has been uncovered? Who in the White House was 
notified of this information and when? Did the White House or the 
Justice Department make the decision not to question Mr. Aristide? Was 
the decision based on political factors?
  Did the DEA interview Mr. Molina? Did the Justice Department cut a 
deal with him? If so, what were the details of the deal? Did he pass a 
lie detector test? Where is Mr. Molina now?
  Madam President, what I want is simple. I want the administration to 
give a clear strong, unreserved statement that they know of no evidence 
that Jean-Bertrand Aristide, or anyone closely associated with him, 
accepted money from foreign drug traffickers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Presiding Officer wishes to advise the 
Senator from South Dakota his time has expired.
  The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I want quickly, if I can, before yielding 
to the colleague from Iowa, to say with all due respect to my friend 
and colleague from South Dakota, that this is nothing new. Every day 
there was some new allegation raised about President Aristide.
  Let me just inform my colleagues that we have received very credible 
evidence that the so-called source that our colleague from South Dakota 
refers to is totally unreliable, has been unreliable in dozens of cases 
before; that the major source of paid information that was received by 
our Government regarding Mr. Aristide came, in fact, from the very 
people who we are now trying to disarm in that country; that, in fact, 
a careful reading of the information from our Embassy in Haiti between 
January or February 1991 and the end of September 1991, when President 
Aristide was ousted in the coup, points to a clear, strong cooperation 
between the Aristide government and our Drug Enforcement Agency, and 
officials; that, in fact, the problem has resided in the very people we 
are trying to get rid of.
  Colonel Francois, the head of police, the only job he had as a police 
officer, just moved into a $250,000 home in the Dominican Republic. He 
did not buy the place with a policeman's salary.
  The problem is with the element we are trying to get rid of. I 
believe had there been further and serious allegations involving 
President Aristide and drugs, you would have heard of them a long time 
ago, given the effort to try and assassinate the character of this 
individual.
  So I want the record to be clear for my colleagues.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
  Mr. DODD. I will not yield.
  There is absolutely no truth whatsoever to these 11th hour 
allegations regarding President Aristide and anyone who spends 5 
minutes looking at it will draw the same conclusion.
  Madam President, I am glad to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Iowa.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes remaining.
  The Senator from Connecticut has 2 minutes. The Senator from Iowa has 
7 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. I yield 9 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  Again, Madam President, there has been more disinformation and 
character assassination and rumor mongering about President Aristide 
than anybody I have ever seen.
  This latest allegation of President Aristide and drug running has 
been leveled before. I am surprised by my friend and colleague from 
South Dakota, who is a good individual and an intelligent individual, 
to keep this kind of rumor mongering going. In fact, the article in the 
Washington Times dated October 3, to which my colleague refers, says 
that the information really came from Francois Biamby, who is the 
cousin of, guess who, Brig. Gen. Philippe Biamby. General Biamby is one 
of the heads of the military junta along with General Cedras. He is the 
one saying he delivered the money-filled suitcase to Mr. Aristide
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. The Senator had his time. I will finish my statement.
  I remember a year ago up in the secret office in room 407 when the 
CIA came in to give a briefing. I think the Senator from South Dakota 
may have been in on that briefing. At that time it was alleged that Mr. 
Aristide had taken drugs.
  Well, guess where we got that information? After President Aristide 
was overthrown in the coup, Cedras and the military turned over to our 
people what they said were drugs that they had taken from President 
Aristide's residence. Based on that, the CIA gives us this information 
that he takes drugs.
  Then we heard that President Aristide had been treated in a mental 
hospital in Canada. Well, it took me probably 45 days to 2 months to 
track that down. I finally did. This allegation has been totally, 
totally shown to be false. We had a person with an affidavit from 
President Aristide saying he could get any and all information from any 
hospital in Canada regarding any treatments he ever received. Armed 
with that, this individual went up to Canada to the hospitals and, of 
course, they said they had absolutely no record of ever treating him.
  Just to show you the amount of disinformation the CIA can 
disseminate, when they first told us the year President Aristide had 
been in a mental hospital in Canada, it turned out that President 
Aristide was not even in Canada. He was studying biblical history in 
Israel. So you have to take this all into account.
  I will tell you, there has been a campaign against President Aristide 
the likes of which I have never seen.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will my friend yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, there has been a lot of talk today about 
President Clinton. I want to say, Madam President, that President 
Clinton has done the right thing, the honorable thing, the good thing, 
and he has done it correctly.
  President Clinton went the extra mile after he came into office to 
carry forward the policies of President Bush regarding Haiti. He went 
the extra mile to seek a peaceful solution. We had the Governors Island 
Accord. General Cedras signed it. Then there was the Harlan County 
incident. Rather than send our unarmed troops in there in harm's way, 
President Clinton sent them back and tried to seek a peaceful solution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator from Iowa withhold?
  It is difficult to hear the Senator from Iowa because of other 
conversations in the Chamber. The Presiding Officer would ask that 
other conversations cease.
  Mr. HARKIN. President Clinton continued the negotiations. Then we put 
on the embargo. And then when it was clear that the Haitian generals 
would not leave, did President Clinton go off Lone Ranger-like to take 
care of Haiti? No. He went to the United Nations. He went to get other 
countries to support us. And, in fact, we have more nations supporting 
what we are doing in Haiti than we did in the Gulf war. So President 
Clinton went the extra mile.
  And then, finally, he said, ``Enough is enough, they have to go.'' 
And then, at the last minute, he sent a negotiating team down to Haiti 
for one last chance. And the negotiating team succeeded.
  You know, Madam President, memories are short around here. I remember 
when Ronald Reagan went into Grenada. He did not go to the U.N. He did 
not go to seek any help. He went down there Lone Ranger-like; a country 
of 100,000 people. We lost 19 troops when we invaded Grenada. No one 
talks about that.
  When we went after Noriega in Panama, we lost 24 U.S. soldiers. No 
one talks about that. I happened to have supported that. The day after 
Grenada, I got on the floor and supported it. I supported President 
Bush when he went to Panama.
  And yet, while we are here in Haiti, while we are disarming the 
military and paramilitary Forces, while we are bringing Aristide back, 
we have not lost one American soldier and hope to God we do not lose 
any. Yet, for all of that, people get on the floor today and castigate 
President Clinton as though he did something wrong.
  I want you to know I am proud of this President and I am proud of 
what he has done. We have finally taken steps to root out one of the 
worst dictatorships, terrorist organizations in this hemisphere and to 
stick up for the people of Haiti.
  You do not have to take my word for it. Read the newspapers. Every 
day wherever our troops are in Haiti, the people come out and treat 
them as liberators, embrace them, turn over their guns to them.
  As long as our troops are on the side of the Haitian people, they 
will not be harmed. The only harm that could possibly come to our 
troops would be from FRAPH and other paramilitary entities that are 
down there.
  Finally, Madam President, I also want to praise President Aristide. 
His entire life has been one of fighting for the poor, those without 
power, those who suffered under the dictator Duvalier, the Tonton 
Macoutes and the repressive military. Here is a man who was elected in 
a free election with 67 percent of the vote. Under Aristide, human 
rights abuses dwindled precipitously in the 8 months he was in office.
  There was not one case of necklacing during his entire tenure in 
office. Oh, we always hear about that, but the fact remains, there was 
not one case of necklacing when President Aristide was in office. That 
happened before he assumed office.
  Under his brief tenure, President Aristide stopped the drug 
trafficking, he halted abuses by the military, he paid off their 
foreign debts, he took away Government enterprises and turned them over 
to the private sector.
  It was the military and the elite that said, ``No, he had to go,'' 
and 8 months later he was overthrown in a coup. Since that time, a 
disinformation campaign the likes of which we have never seen has been 
continuing, trying to discredit him and tear him down.
  The closest I can come to what has happened to President Aristide is 
Nelson Mandela. Today, President Mandela addressed a joint meeting of 
Congress. We all stood and applauded, wildly enthusiastic. But just a 
few years ago he was branded by some people here as a Communist 
terrorist, someone who, if let out and got power would unleash 
bloodletting throughout South Africa to seek vengeance. Madam 
President, it did not happen then.
  President Aristide has vowed reconciliation without vengeance and 
that is what he will do.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague from Iowa yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. I am delighted to yield.
  Mr. DODD. I just got off the phone with someone in the Deputy 
Attorney General's office, who called because he was disturbed over 
some of the comments made on the floor regarding the Justice 
Department's alleged interference with the Drug Enforcement Agency's 
handling the allegations regarding President Aristide's involvement 
with narcotics. He told me that at the briefings with Senator Hatch of 
Utah and Senator Biden of Delaware, the chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, they are satisfied that the Drug Enforcement Agency made the 
decision on their own based on the fact there was no merit whatsoever 
to the allegations not to interview President Aristide. The Justice 
Department was not involved. Two of our colleagues, senior members of 
the Judiciary Committee, have been briefed on this point.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will my friend yield?
  Mr. DODD. And, in fact, as to the allegations raised by our 
colleagues, for three times attempts have been made to communicate the 
same information and the calls have not been returned.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One minute and 30 seconds.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Will my colleague yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. I do not have the time to yield.
  Madam President, there is story that will come out in The Nation 
magazine tomorrow that paints a terrible picture of FRAPH, the right 
wing terrorist organization in Haiti, and the fact that it has close 
ties to our Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence 
Agency.
  Madam President, if these charges are indeed true, it raises very 
serious questions as to what our CIA is doing in Haiti right now. I 
raised this issue here on the floor a week ago. Well, certain elements 
of the CIA who have been spreading disinformation about President 
Aristide are now back in Haiti again.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this article from The 
Nation magazine be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            Behind Haiti's Paramilitaries: Our Man in FRAPH

                            (By Allan Nairn)

       Emmanuel Constant, the leader of Haiti's FRAPH hit squad, 
     is a protege of US intelligence. Interviews with Constant and 
     with U.S. officials who have worked directly with him confirm 
     that Constant recently worked for the C.I.A. and that U.S. 
     intelligence helped him launch the organization that became 
     the FRAPH. Documentary evidence obtained from other sources 
     and confirmed in part by Constant also indicates that a group 
     of attaches--some of them implicated in some of Haiti's most 
     notorious crimes--have been paid for several years by a U.S. 
     government-funded project that maintains sensitive files on 
     the movements of the Haitian poor.
       In my October 3 Nation article [``The Eagle Is Landing''] I 
     quoted a U.S. intelligence official praising Constant as a 
     ``young, pro-Western intellectual . . . no further right than 
     a young Republican'' and saying that U.S. intelligence had 
     ``encouraged'' Constant to form the group that emerged as 
     FRAPH. Reached at his home on the night of September 26, 
     Constant confirmed the U.S. official's account. He said that 
     his first U.S. handler was Col. Patrick Collins, the U.S. 
     Defense Intelligence Agency attache, who he described as ``a 
     very good friend of mine'' (Constant spoke of dealing later 
     with another official he called ``[the US's] best liaison,'' 
     but he refused to give a name). Constant said that colonel 
     Collins had first approached him while Constant was teaching 
     a training course at the headquarters of the CIA-run SIN 
     (National Intelligence Service) and was also (at the Bureau 
     of Information and Coordination [BIC] in the General 
     Headquarters of the Haitian coupe regime) building a computer 
     data base for Haiti's notorious rural Section Chiefs.
       Giving an account that dovetailed closely with that of the 
     US official, Constant said that Collins began pushing him to 
     organize a front ``that could balance the Aristide movement'' 
     and do ``intelligence'' work against it. He said their 
     discussions had begun soon after Aristide fell in September 
     1991, They resulted in Constant forming what later evolved 
     into FRAPH, a group that was known initially as the Haitian 
     Resistance League.
       Constant at first refused to go beyond his usual public 
     statements on the FRAPH, but opened up after I told him that 
     I understood that he knew Col. Collins. Our initial interview 
     took place on the first day of the bold anti-FRAPH protests 
     on the streets of Port au Prince. Constant said that he 
     wanted to offer his men as ``guides'' for the occupation 
     force, saying that ``I've participated in the stabilization 
     of this country for the past three years, and the US knows it 
     very well, no matter what agency you talk to.''
       Two days after that, as a crowd marched past FRAPH 
     headquarters, FRAPH gunmen opened fire killing one of the 
     demonstrators. Five days later, in the wake of embarrassing 
     coverage about both continued mayhem by the FRAPH and a US 
     raid on a supposed pro-Aristide terrorist camp (that was 
     actually--as it turned out--a world-famous dancing school). 
     US occupation forces raided FRAPH's downtown Port Au Prince 
     headquarters, carting away two dozen street-level gunmen (and 
     women) as live cameras and cheering crowds looked on. Some US 
     reporters proclaimed that this was the death of the terror 
     system, and CNN's Richard Blystone, announcing that there was 
     more crackdown to come, said that Constant was now ``at 
     large'' (a claim also made by the next morning's New York 
     Times).
       Five minutes after Blystone's CNN broadcast, I reached 
     Constant by telephone at his Port-au-Prince home. He said 
     that the arrests had only been of low-level FRAPH people, and 
     that he still intended to put his men at US disposal. He said 
     that there were no US troops outside his house and worried 
     that it might be set upon by mobs. Then he said that he had, 
     just then, to leave for a meeting (on the street, he said) 
     with a US Embassy staffer who was hitherto unknown to him but 
     who he thought might be from the CIA.
       He said that he would call back after the meeting, but he 
     didn't, and I couldn't reach him again. But the next day 
     Constant appeared in public guarded--for the first time--by 
     US Marines, and stated his fealty to the occupation and his 
     support for the return of Aristide.
       Much of the US press played this as a stunning about-face, 
     but, in fact, Constant had been saying those things in public 
     and to me all week. He had told me that the Carter/Powell/
     Nunn-Cedras pact, was ``the last chance for Haiti,'' and had 
     expressed no worry about the return of Aristide, saying that 
     the new Parliament, to be chosen in December, would be 
     constituted in a way that would hem him in.
       Col. Collins is now back in Haiti (his last tour ended in 
     1992). The Clinton administration has brought him back for 
     the occupation, and he has refused to comment on the 
     record. But a well-informed intelligence official 
     (speaking before the FRAPH furor broke) confirmed that 
     Collins had worked with Constant and had, as Constant 
     says, guided him and urged him on. Collins has, in recent 
     weeks, spoken quite highly of Constant and has said that 
     Constant's mission from the United States was to counter 
     the ``extreme'' of Aristide. Collins has also said that, 
     when he first approached him, Constant ``was not in 
     position to do anything . . . [but] things evolved and 
     eventually he did come up, [and] what had been sort of an 
     idea and technically open for business--all of a sudden, 
     boom, it takes on national significance.''
       When the relationship started, Constant was working for the 
     CIA, teaching a course at the Agency-run SIN on ``The 
     Theology of Liberation'' and ``Animation and Mobilization.'' 
     The SIN, at that time, was engaged in terrorist attacks on 
     Aristide supporters, as were Constant's pupils, army S--2 
     field intelligence officers. The targets included, among 
     others, popular church cathecists. Constant says that the 
     message of the SIN course was that though communism is dead, 
     ``the extreme left,'' through ti legliz, the grass-roots 
     Haitian ``little church,'' was attempting ``to convince the 
     people that in the name of God everything is possible'' and 
     that, therefore, it was right for the people to kill soldiers 
     and the rich. Constant says he taught that ``Aristide is not 
     the only one: there are tens of Aristides.''
       Collins has recently acknowledged that FRAPH has indeed 
     carried out many killings, but he has said that they have not 
     been as numerous as the press and human rights groups claim. 
     He has said that one approach is that ``the only way you're 
     going to solve this is . . . [that] it'll all end in some big 
     bloodbath and there'll be somebody who emerges from it who 
     will establish a society of sorts and a judicial system and 
     he's going to say: O.K., you own the land, you don't--that's 
     it, whether it's fair or not.''
       Though most U.S. officials would never speak that way, it's 
     universally acknowledged that FRAPH is an arm of the brutal 
     Haitian security system, which the US has built and 
     supervised and whose leaders it has trained, and often paid. 
     When I asked Constant, for example, about the anti-Aristide 
     coup, he said that as it was happening Col. Collins and 
     Donald Terry (the C.I.A. Station Chief who also ran the SIN) 
     ``were inside the [General] Headquarters.'' But he insisted 
     that this was ``normal;'' the CIA and DIA were always there.
       A foreign diplomat who knows the system well says that it 
     is from those very headquarters that Haiti's army, with the 
     police and the FRAPH have run a web of clandestine torture 
     houses (one of them in a private home at #43 Fontamara), some 
     of which are said to still be working as this article is 
     written on the occupation's 17th day. According to the 
     diplomat--who quoted internal documents as he spoke--the 
     walkie-talkies of house personnel are routinely monitored by 
     the U.S. Embassy, which, he said, also listened in on those 
     of the U.N. Civilian Mission. Some interrogators wear shirts 
     marked ``Camp de Aplicacion'' (an army base). The 
     diplomat also detailed a structure of seven chief attaches 
     who have run killings and brought victims to the torture 
     houses.
       Four of those senior attaches (as well as other, lower-
     ranking ones), according to documents and interviews, appear 
     to have worked out of the Centers for Development and Health 
     (C.D.S.), a large multiservice clinic funded mainly by the 
     U.S. Agency for International Development. One of them, Gros 
     Sergo (who was killed in September, 1993), listed C.D.S. on 
     his resume, writing that he worked in the archives and was a 
     ``Trainer of Associates'' there. Another, Fritz Joseph--who, 
     Constant says, is the key FRAPH recruiter Cite Soleil and 
     who, according to official records, has been a chief attache 
     since the coup--is acknowledged by the C.D.S. director to 
     have worked at C.D.S. for many years. The two others, Marc 
     Arthur and Gros Fanfan (implicated by the UN in the murder of 
     Antoine Izmery), have been named in sworn statements as 
     having regularly received cash payments from C.D.S. Constant 
     confirms that FRAPH leaders and attaches are working inside 
     C.D.S. (and says specifically that Marc Arthur has worked 
     there) and says he speaks often on the phone with the 
     clinic's director, Dr. Reginald Boulos. Boulos denies that he 
     speaks to Constant, says that Sergo's resume is wrong, says 
     he does not knowingly employ attaches, and says that he did 
     not know until recently that Fritz Joseph was a FRAPH leader 
     but that he fired him when critics pointed out that he was. 
     Boulos said that C.D.S. files track ``every family in Cite 
     Soleil'' but insisted that, as far as he knows, attaches 
     don't have access to the archives. Boulos said he hadn't seen 
     Sergo in years, and when told of an entry from Sergo's 
     calendar that appeared to contradict that, he said it was 
     mistaken. He also downplayed the fact that Sergo had listed 
     him as a personal reference, along with coup leader General 
     Raoul Cedras (Another AID-funded unit Haiti, Planning 
     Associates, has also said, in AID meetings in Washington, 
     that it employs FRAPH personnel).
       Sergo's papers indicate that he reported to Police Chief 
     Michel Francois (he has a pass, written on the back of 
     Francois' card, authorizing him and Marc Arthur ``to see the 
     Chief of Police at all hours of the day and night''), that he 
     and his squad organized anti-Aristide demonstrations, that, 
     just before C.D.S., he was in the Interior Ministry's 
     ``intelligence police,'' and that he had appointments to meet 
     with the CIA's SIN chief, Col. Sylvain Diderot, and with 
     members of the Mevs. one of Haiti's ruling families.
       Though some Haitian officials claim that Francois was on 
     the CIA payroll, this is denied by Lawrence Pezzullo, the 
     former US Special Envoy in Haiti, but Pezzullo did reveal 
     that the CIA paid Francois' brother, Evans, now a Haitian 
     diplomat in the Domincian Republic (Pezzullo joked, as to the 
     Colonel himself, ``you couldn't pay him enough to buy him.'')
       FRAPH emerged as a national force in the latter months of 
     1993 when it staged a series of murders, public beatings, and 
     arson raids on poor neighborhoods. In one attack, Mrs. Alert 
     Belance had her right hand severed by FRAPH machetes.
       President Clinton, when it was convenient, later used 
     photos of these macabre assaults to (accurately) brand 
     Haiti's rulers as ``armed thugs [who] have conducted a reign 
     of terror.'' But, in the moment when that terror was actually 
     at its height, Clinton used the FRAPH killings to harshly 
     pressure Aristide to ``broaden'' his already-broad cabinet in 
     a ``power-sharing'' deal. Pezzullo, in part echoing Collins' 
     original vision for Constant (though he denies any knowledge 
     of the arrangement), says that FRAPH was ``a political offset 
     to Lavalas'' and that as the ``bodies were starting to 
     appear'' ``We said [to Aristide]: the only people seen 
     operating politically now are the FRAPHistas,'' and that they 
     had to ``fill that gap with another force with the private 
     sector, otherwise these FRAPH people will be the only game in 
     town.''
       It is often pointed out that FRAPH embarrassed the US by 
     chasing off the Harlan County, but in that case, US officials 
     could not agree about whether the ship should even be there. 
     Constant says he got no US guidance, but he openly announced 
     his dockside rally the day before and he apparently did not 
     get any US warning to call it off.
       On the fundamentals, though, US officials have been united 
     in pressing Aristide from the right. Constant said, in our 
     first interview (well before his Marine press conference), 
     that he might now be ``too high profile'' for the US. But 
     even if he is, US intelligence is a system. And--as Constant 
     once taught about Aristide--there are others in the wings.
  Mr. HARKIN. I also ask unanimous consent that a paper, entitled 
``Background on FRAPH,'' also be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  [From the International Liaison Office for President Jean-Bertrand 
                               Aristide]

                          Background on FRAPH

       FRAPH (Haitian Front for Advancement and Progress) is a 
     right-wing, extremist, paramilitary organization comprised 
     largely of current and former members of the security forces 
     and their civilian collaborators. Members of FRAPH have 
     carried out numerous illegal ``arrests,'' beatings, torture, 
     intimidation and murders of supporters democracy, often 
     taking the victims to the local military barracks for 
     incarceration. In most parts of the country, local FRAPH 
     organizations work in very close collaboration with the 
     military, and at times are better armed than the military. 
     Military officials often claim that ``FRAPH is we, we are 
     FRAPH.''
       The acronym FRAPH sounds like the French and Creole words 
     for ``hit'' and the group's symbol is a fist. The 
     organization first came to international attention in October 
     of 1993, when it organized to oppose the planned return of 
     President Aristide under the Governors Island Accord. Since 
     then FRAPH has worked to consolidate itself as a political 
     front organization for the military coup regime. It recruits 
     members through intimidation, seeking to convince Haitians 
     that democracy will never return and that the only way to 
     survive is to join FRAPH. FRAPH revives Duvalier's Tonton 
     Macoute organization to fit the current political needs of 
     coup leaders.


                          fraph's leadership:

       FRAPH is ``loyal primarily to the nation's shadowy police 
     commander, Lt. Col. Michel Francois.'' (Douglas Farah, 
     Washington Post, 1/26/94).
       Emannual Constant, FRAPH leader, is the son of a former 
     army commander under Francois Duvalier. (Bella Stumbo, Vanity 
     Fair, 2/94)
       FRAPH's secretary general Jodel Chamblain is a former 
     Tonton Macoute. (Pamela Constable, Boston Globe, 1/22/94; 
     Stumbo, 2/94). He reportedly participated in the massacre of 
     voters in the election of November 29, 1987, as well as in 
     Roger Lafontant's failed coup d'etat of January 1991.
       Lynn Garrison, an advisor to Lt. Gen. Cedras and the 
     Haitian military, a Canadian who also reportedly holds a U.S. 
     passport and owns a Haitian art gallery in Los Angeles, 
     claims he helped to found FRAPH. (Stumbo, 2/94).


                            fraph's origins

       FRAPH was consolidated when it organized a small group of 
     thugs and turned back the U.S.S. Harlan County, arriving with 
     an international mission as specified under the Governors 
     Island Accord. To quote Emannual Constant: ``I still can't 
     believe we succeeded * * * We were all so scared. My people 
     kept wanting to run away. But I took the gamble and urged 
     them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! We were 
     astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born . . . 
     now we know (Aristide) is never going to return.'' 
     (Stumbo, 2/94).


                        FRAPH's FUNDING AND ARMS

       Michel Francois controls black market in gasoline and 
     funnels resources into FRAPH. (Farah, 1/26/94).
       FRAPH ``receives funding from Francois and a few 
     ultraconservative members of Haiti's elite.'' (Farah, 1/26/
     94).
       The military supplies FRAPH with weapons (an obvious point, 
     given that there is no other source of weapons in Haiti). 
     (Farah, 1/26/94).
       Many members of FRAPH (section chiefs, paramilitary 
     attaches, and former Tonton Macoutes), now reportedly carry 
     i.d. cards signed by army officers. (Haiti Info. Feb. 6, 
     1994).


                     FRAPH's ACTIVITIES AND TACTICS

       The U.N. International Civilian Mission to Haiti has 
     identified FRAPH as being involved in extensive human rights 
     violations. For example, in reference to repression of a 
     youth group the Mission states: ``Other members of the 
     organization were reported to have been illegally arrested by 
     members of the Duvalierist political organization Front pour 
     I ` advancement et le progress haitien (FRAPH) on the day of 
     their general strike, 7 October, and taken to . . . the site 
     of a mass grave during the Duvalier era where bodies have 
     regularly been discovered since the coup d'etat. One person . 
     . . was questioned about the activities of supporters of 
     President Aristide and shown photographs of several people . 
     . . whom his interrogators said they were going to kill; he 
     also saw some 20 bodies at the site.'' (Supplementary Report 
     of the International Civilian Mission, Nov. 18, 1993).
       FRAPH is responsible for burning down an estimated 250 
     homes in Cite Soleil, a large slum in Port-au-Prince, on 
     December 27, 1993. Haitian human rights groups estimate 70 
     people murdered. According to the Boston Globe, ``Driving 
     residents out with clubs, they torched shacks with gasoline 
     and grenades.'' (Constable, 1/22).
       FRAPH members prevented the fire department from putting 
     out the fire. After the fire, FRAPH members have been alleged 
     to be present at offices where aid was being distributed to 
     victims. (Report by the National Justice and Peace 
     Commission, January 1994.)
       FRAPH members gather intelligence for the military. (Farah, 
     1/26/94).
       FRAPH organizes violent public demonstrations against 
     democracy. (Stumbo. 2/94; Farah, 1/26/94).
       FRAPH members make explicit death threats against President 
     Aristide and his followers. For example: FRAPH leader 
     Berniche Elysee of Jeremie stated ``If Aristide comes back . 
     . . I personally will kill him;'' FRAPH member Joel Avril of 
     Jeremie stated ``If (Aristide) comes here, he is dead.'' 
     Also, FRAPH member Frenel Jean stated, ``It is better that 
     1,000 Aristide supporters die than one Macoute.'' (Farah, 1/
     26/94).
       FRAPH uses U.S. flags at demonstrations and often chants 
     pro-U.S. slogans. Constant has a large U.S. flag in his 
     house. (Farah, 1/26/94).


                       FRAPH's POLITICAL STRATEGY

       FRAPH is expanding and consolidating its membership through 
     the use of terror. ``FRAPH has been opening dozens of offices 
     around the country and signing up members with fear, free 
     food and promises to end Haiti's crisis.'' (Susan Benesch, 
     Miami Harald, 3/7/94) As one resident of Cite Soleil stated; 
     ``If you don't become a member of FRAPH, you had better leave 
     or you'll be dead,'' (Haiti Info, Feb. 6, 1994)
       FRAPH's political strategy appears to be: (1) prevent the 
     return of President Aristide; (2) establish a reign of terror 
     and wipe out democratic organizations in civil society; (3) 
     consolidate itself as an organization; (4) attempt to take on 
     the appearance of a legitimate political party in order to 
     institutionalize its hold on power and gain international 
     acceptance, probably through elections.
       FRAPH is now beginning to attempt to portray itself as 
     legitimate, civilian organization not directed by the 
     military in ``a bid to clean up its thuggish image.'' 
     (Benesch 3/7/94). Emmanuel Constant ``said the days of 
     holding rallies surrounded by men with automatic weapons had 
     passed, but that in the beginning `people needed to feel a 
     little fear.''' (Farah, 1/26/94).
       Constant also said that ``FRAPH's first goal was to do 
     `whatever is necessary' to keep Aristide out'' and that ``now 
     the organization of the population is the second objective.'' 
     (Benesch, 3/7/94).
       To appear less violent ``Constant said he recently obeyed 
     Francois' request that FRAPH keep its weapons hidden.'' 
     (Benesch, 3/1/94).
       FRAPH is pushing for elections. Emmanuel Constant ``would 
     like to run for president and thinks he can win.'' (Farah. 1/
     26/94).

  Mr. HARKIN. Madam President, what we are considering here is a 
resolution supporting our President and supporting our troops in Haiti. 
This troubled land needs some time. It needs our help. It needs our 
military there to make sure that violence is not wreaked upon the 
people of Haiti by the paramilitary groups. If we can not stick up for 
democracies in our own hemisphere, God help us. If we cannot stand on 
the side of the Haitian people who have welcomed us as liberators, to 
help them throw out the yoke of repression and to help them build a 
functioning democracy, then we have no right to claim leadership in the 
world or in this hemisphere.
  Madam President, this resolution deserves the support of everyone 
here. We hope and pray that our troops will continue to do the same 
kind of work that they are doing in disarming and dismantling these 
groups. We hope and pray that the paramilitary groups in Haiti will not 
resort to the violence to which they have become accustomed in the 
past.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. HARKIN. This resolution deserves overwhelming support and 
approval by the Senate.


                                 haiti

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, events in Haiti continue to unfold 
amidst great uncertainty and danger for U.S. troops there. Although the 
United States-led United Nations effort offers hope to the people of 
Haiti that peace and democracy can come to their troubled homeland, the 
success of our current effort is by no means assured. I know I state 
the obvious, and voice the feelings of many in this chamber, when I say 
we must take great care not to be drawn into a protracted and largely 
unilateral effort to achieve noble but ill-defined goals of stability 
and democracy in Haiti.
  I welcomed the agreement reached by President Carter and his 
delegation with the military authorities in Haiti and commend President 
Carter, General Powell and Senator Nunn. Clearly, United States Forces 
faced a much less threatening situation in Haiti upon arrival than they 
would if they had to fight their way ashore. While the agreement is not 
perfect, it may prove to be a basis for an orderly transition from 
authoritarian rule back to democracy.
  The political stability and economic progress of our hemisphere are, 
in my view, solidly in our national interest. Our own domestic 
prosperity depends on having democratic societies with which to trade 
and which do not threaten our shores with massive waves of immigrants.
  Three years ago, Haitian President Aristide was overthrown by a 
military junta. No matter what one thinks of Aristide personally, he 
was overwhelming elected president and still has the support of the 
majority of the Haitian people. Following the coup, the military 
government brutally suppressed Aristide supporters while human rights 
abuses on the island skyrocketed.
  I supported the intensive diplomatic efforts by the United States and 
the international community to convince the unlawful military-led 
government in Haiti to step aside and allow a peaceful return to 
democracy. Unfortunately the Haitian military leaders refused to 
implement the Governor's Island Accords they signed last summer and 
have stonewalled all diplomatic efforts since then.
  The United Nations has threatened and sanctioned the use of force to 
remove the illegal government from Haiti. And having made that threat, 
we--the United States and the international community--had to be 
willing to carry it out.
  The on-going violence in Haiti is deeply troubling to me, and one of 
our objectives must be to see that it does not continue. Clearly the 
task of gaining concrete operational control over the Haitian police 
force is well underway. This process must be completed and these 
functions must be turned over to a U.N. force as soon as possible.
  We need look no further than the immediate region to see an example 
of how this approach to ending a civil war can be successful. El 
Salvador, while different from Haiti, in many significant ways, 
provides a guide for successful demilitarization and separation of 
military and police forces. We can also look to Honduras, traditionally 
the second poorest country in the hemisphere after Haiti, for 
encouragement that a poor country, when it has a commitment to 
democracy, can make great progress in asserting civilian control over 
the military. The economy of Honduras is slowly, steadily gathering 
strength and attracting investment as the stability of democracy 
creates a more healthy economic environment. With some assistance, this 
too, could happen in Haiti.
  As we look to the swift completion of the United States military 
mission in Haiti and a replacement of U.S. soldiers with U.N. forces, I 
propose that we pause for a moment to look beyond Haiti, to think for a 
moment about what our national priorities and goals really are. Many of 
my colleagues do not see reinstatement of democracy in Haiti as in our 
vital national interest. I have argued that if we take the long-range 
view, it certainly is. This disagreement points up the need for better 
formulation and then clearer articulation of our vision of our place in 
the world. In the absence of a clear understanding of our role, it is 
impossible to sort out which trouble spots should get our attention and 
where we should expend our limited resources. I urge the President and 
the Congress to take up the challenge that this debate--as well as 
discussions of the tragedy in Bosnia--has so poignantly illuminated and 
begin the very difficult work of formulating a new expression of our 
national goals and priorities for the coming years.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I would like to take a moment to explain 
why I am compelled to vote against the leadership's resolution on 
Haiti.
  There is much in this resolution I agree with. For example, it states 
that, ``the men and women of the United States Armed Forces in Haiti 
who are performing with professional excellence and dedicated 
patriotism are to be commended.'' I could not agree more.
  It also says, ``the President should have sought and welcomed 
Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed Forces to 
Haiti.'' Again, I fully agree.
  This resolution also asserts that, ``the departure from power of the 
de facto authorities in Haiti, and Haitian efforts to achieve national 
reconciliation, democracy, and the rule of law are in the best 
interests of the Haitian people.'' Who could argue with that?
  However, the heart of this resolution is the statement that, 
``Congress supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United 
States Armed Forces from Haiti as soon as possible.''
  Mr. President, this is not good enough. Our troops must come home by 
a specific date, not at some indefinite future time. As our experience 
in Somalia demonstrated, we need to set a legal deadline for United 
States withdrawal if this is to be anything more than a warm and fuzzy 
statement of good intentions. Without a legal deadline, U.S. 
decisionmaking will not develop and implement a plan for withdrawal. A 
sense of Congress that the troops should come home ``as soon as 
possible'' is not enough.
  This is not a question of rushing the United States out of Haiti, 
leaving it to descend back into chaos. It is a question of setting the 
clock ticking so that the administration will have to formulate and 
implement a plan to turn over the job of policing Haiti to police.
  In Somalia, our military went in with one mission, then saw it 
transformed into something very different. The result was tragedy. In 
Haiti, we are seeing the same phenomenon. Our troops were initially 
trained as invaders, then told they were partners with the Haitian 
authorities, and now have been transformed into police. Every day in 
Haiti brings an unforeseen circumstance which leads to a change in the 
mission.
  Let me just list a few examples:
  September 18: The Carter-Cedras agreement states, ``the Haitian 
military and police forces will work in close cooperation with the U.S. 
Military Mission.''
  September 20: After U.S. soldiers watched Haitian police beat a pro-
Artistide demonstrator to death, General Shalikashvili said, ``We are 
not in the business of doing day-to-day law and order.''
  September 21: An unnamed ``senior administration official'' is quoted 
by the Washington Post describing a new approach: ``Where a military 
personnel observes grave abuses by the Haitian police or military that 
threatens the life of a victim * * * he may be authorized to intervene 
by the senior United States commander on the ground.''
  September 22: U.S. troops seize the Haitian army's heavy weapons.
  September 24-26: After a firefight in Cap Haitien and the resulting 
chaos, U.S. troops seize police stations, assume police 
responsibilities in the north of the country. General Shalikashvili 
announces that U.S. troops will intervene ``if mob violence begins to 
threaten the overall stability of the country.''
  September 27: U.S. forces assume responsibility for security at the 
Parliament building.
  September 30: Administration officials announce that the troop 
ceiling will be raised from 15,000 to 19,600.
  October 1: U.S. forces move to disarm paramilitary groups. An unnamed 
senior official says the decision whether or not to intervene is 
tactical; that is, to be taken on a case-by-case basis.
  October 2-3: U.S. forces seize paramilitary leaders.
  October 5: The Washington Post quotes a United States official in 
Port-au-Prince as saying, ``clearly, the United States has been drawn 
into doing more traditional police work than originally intended. There 
was a real assumption the Haitians would carry out their functions. 
Were we naive? I guess to some degree.''
  I opposed the use of American troops in Haiti absent a compelling 
rationale. Without a clear definition of the goals, means, contingency 
plans, and exit strategy, the administration should not deploy American 
troops. From the continuing mission creep we are witnessing in Haiti, 
it is clear that the administration does not have a clear goal, means, 
contingency plans, or exit strategy.
  Mr. President, combat troops should not be turned into police. The 
two roles are totally different. One uses overwhelming force to crush a 
uniformed enemy; the other uses minimal force to control a civilian 
population. One requires fury, the other restraint.
  History is filled with examples of the difficulty of using combat 
troops to try to impose civil order. We need look no farther than 
Israel's experience with the Palestinian intifada. The early days of 
the uprising in 1987 and 1988 were marked by high Palestinian 
casualties, in large part because Israel's magnificent combat troops 
were unsuited to the task of civilian riot control. Only after Israel 
deployed border police and other units trained in police functions did 
the casualty numbers drop.
  Mr. President, I will vote against this resolution because I support 
our troops. I support them too much to go on record favoring their 
continued use as policemen in Haiti.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I intend to vote for this resolution. 
But that vote is not a vote for, or an endorsement of, our policy in 
Haiti.
  I should begin by observing that I agree with the resolution's claim 
that the President should have come to Congress for authorization prior 
to committing American troops to an invasion or long-term mission in 
Haiti. Frankly, Mr. President, I would not have authorized such action. 
I am not persuaded that vital national security interests were at stake 
in Haiti. Nor am I persuaded that the military can succeed, in the long 
run, in restoring and preserving democracy in Haiti for the long term.
  Admirable as our motives for wanting to see democracy restored are, 
in my mind they do not justify the use of military force. Military 
force is not just an extension of diplomacy; it is the ultimate 
response to a direct and significant threat to our national security 
interests. Much as I despise what the dictators did in Haiti, I do not 
believe that their actions were a direct and significant threat to 
America's national security.
  One of the reasons I would not have authorized our action in Haiti is 
the ambiguity that continues to surround our mission there. We have 
seen American soldiers standing by while Haitians slaughtered each 
other, and we have been appalled by that image. But when American 
soldiers intervene to prevent such action, they inevitably become 
involved in keeping civil order. This is not a military mission, it is 
a civilian mission. And when our military performs civilian missions, 
they also become bogged down in civilian political disputes. Hopefully 
the multiple reporting requirements mandated by this resolution will 
help us avoid a gradual expansion of our mission into the sort of ill-
fated nation building exercise which ended so tragically in Somalia.
  Now, Mr. President, I have been pleasantly surprised by our success 
in Haiti so far. Things seem to be moving in the right direction. That 
is, in my mind, a sound reason to get out while the getting is good, 
not a reason to stay there until things turn sour. I want our men and 
women out of Haiti as soon as possible. This resolution does not 
accomplish that goal but it at least brings us closer to it. And in 
that spirit, I will support it.
  One final point, Mr. President. I am disturbed by the possible 
precedent that is being established by our decisions to intervene 
militarily. In Haiti, despite a brief bow at the United Nations and 
none to the United States Congress, and a sustained effort to create a 
facade of multilateral support, the United States essentially decided 
to go in because we were disturbed by what was happening there and by 
the failure of diplomacy to achieve the results we wanted. Mr. 
President, if we adopt that as a rationale for military action, how can 
we prevent other countries from using it as well? If Russia objects to 
the behavior or internal politics of the New Independent States 
surrounding her and decides to intervene, how can we object? How will 
we distinguish our justification for using force from theirs?
  That is not to suggest, of course, that unilateral American military 
action can never be appropriate. It is. But since it is a recourse of 
the state, it ought to be a last recourse, one which is used sparingly 
and only when the central interests of the United States hang in the 
balance. That is not the case in Haiti. And even if, as we all hope, 
things turn out well there, that ought not be the lesson we learn from 
our involvement in Haiti.


                resolution on u.s. involvement in haiti

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my full support for 
the resolution that is now before us. This resolution is not 
restrictive in nature or an attempt to undermine, in any way, the 
efforts of our military forces who are carrying out their orders with 
impeccable skill. Rather, this resolution is clearly a request for 
essential information to be provided to the U.S. Congress on a matter 
of supreme importance.
  Members from both Houses of Congress, Republican and Democrat alike, 
have been demanding a clearer explanation from the Clinton 
administration for the commitment of United States troops to resolve 
the Haitian situation.
  Public opinion polls and media analysis throughout this ordeal have 
reflected frustration with what appears to be the development of 
American foreign policy and the commitment of U.S. armed forces without 
defined parameters. The questions posed by this resolution are an 
attempt by Congress to assist the Clinton administration in more 
clearly setting forth its goals in Haiti.
  It would be troubling indeed if the administration were unable to 
respond to these questions publicly to Congress and to the American 
people. If such explanations could not be provided, it would be a 
disturbing indication that the administration is itself unclear about 
the foreign policy it is pursuing in Haiti and about the correct use of 
military power. I do not think, therefore, that the Clinton 
administration should view this resolution as unreasonable or onerous.
  Mr. President, along with the great majority of my fellow Utahns, I 
was strongly opposed to employing United States troops to resolve the 
political and social problems of Haiti. I do not believe that U.S. 
troops should be used for nation-building. Our painful experiences with 
mission creep and nation-building attempts in Somalia surely have not 
been erased or forgotten in such a short time. We cannot correct 
history, but we certainly can learn from it.
  We find ourselves the biggest world power at a time of worldwide 
uncertainty. But certain principles remain fast. The administration is 
accountable to the American people and to their Representatives in 
Congress. The administration must communicate its policies promptly and 
is obligated to explain the rationale for its single-handed commitment 
of U.S. forces and, as of yet, untold hundreds of millions of dollars.
  What precisely is the plan in Haiti? Our troops have been there 
nearly a month, and what do we know?
  Vague generalities of a generic mission statement have been 
published. Unknown amounts of taxpayer funds have been committed. What 
is our explicit obligation to President Aristide? What is President 
Clinton's criteria for calling the mission completed and bringing our 
U.S. troops home?
  You can't expect to run a successful business without a business 
plan. The American people want to know exactly what President Clinton's 
plan is for Haiti. Their money and their sons and daughters are the 
collateral for this U.S. investment, and it is understandable that they 
want to know both the risks and the returns.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.


the clinton administration's policy on haiti--more questions and still 
                               no answers

  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, since September 19, 1994, ten 
thousand U.S. ground forces have been engaged in peacekeeping in 
Haiti--with another ten thousand or more members of the armed services 
on board ships in waters off the Haitian coast.
  We are all extremely proud of the way that our men and women in 
uniform are conducting themselves in Operation Uphold Democracy. We 
were also proud of their conduct most recently in Somalia and in 
Rwanda.
  There is nothing missing with respect to the dedication and loyalty 
of the United States forces now in Haiti. What is missing is leadership 
at the top.
  This absence of leadership was evident in the Clinton 
administration's failure to consult with Congress before going to 
Haiti. As the Clinton administration failed to consult with Congress 
before turning what was a successful humanitarian mission in Somalia 
into a manhunt for Aideed and a disastrous nation-building project.
  Failure to consult with Congress has deprived the American people of 
a full discussion of what the United States' interest is in Haiti and 
why we are there--if the Clinton administration knows.
  If there is a present administration policy toward Haiti--both in the 
short term and the long run--it certainly has not been articulated to 
Congress or to the American people.
  President Clinton's actions with respect to Haiti raise numerous 
question but provides no answers.
  However, you can be sure that the United States will be feeding over 
one million Haitians a day. By next February or March the Clinton 
administration will be submitting a supplemental appropriation request 
for hundreds of millions of dollars just for food and other 
humanitarian assistance.
  As has been the budgetary strategy in the past, there probably will 
be a huge supplemental appropriation to pay for the cost of our 
military presence in Haiti. But will the American people be willing to 
pay the bill next year?
  What is happening now in the Pentagon is that money is being taken 
from accounts intended for other purposes and used to pay for our 
military presence in Haiti. This is an approach reminiscent of robbing 
Peter to pay Paul.
  A Department of Defense estimate provided to Congress set the cost at 
$427 million over normal operating expenditures for the first 7 months 
of the operation.
  Another estimate--apparently based on Department of Defense internal 
documents but not officially confirmed by DOD--estimated that it would 
cost $1.5 billion to invade Haiti and to maintain United States forces 
in Haiti through 1995.
  However, these are only estimates. When have estimates of this nature 
ever been correct? The final bill will probably be millions or billions 
of dollars more than any estimate provided by the present 
administration.
  What the peacekeeping budget of the United Nations? About one third 
of that budget is paid by the United States. How much is the United 
Nations going to contribute to nation-building in Haiti?
  And what is the international community doing to provide money and 
personnel to support the return of democracy to Haiti? We are told that 
21 nations are expected to provide troops as well as law enforcement 
and technical personnel.
  If what we are told actually happens, then some time in the near 
future there will be a U.N. force in Haiti comprised of persons from 
Bangladesh, Jordan, Poland, and Argentina as well as other countries.
  Will these nations be willing to participate on a long/term basis in 
Haiti in support of what are basically United States domestic 
immigration interests?
  What will the implications of our presence in Haiti be for other 
leaders in other parts of the world?
  For instance, Boris Yeltsin says that he is now forced to have a 
sphere of Russian influence in the republics of the former Soviet Union 
since we have declared one through the United Nations in the Caribbean.
  The American people and their elected representatives in Congress 
deserve answers to the many unanswered questions involved in the 
forcible return of Aristide to power.
  We need to know what assurances we have that the Aristide regime will 
respect human rights and democratic values.
  If the preservation of human rights is an issue of vital importance 
to the Clinton administration, why are we placing out trust solely in 
one man--Aristide? The past human rights record of the Aristide 
government was dismal.
  The last time the United States occupied Haiti, United States troops 
were stationed in that country for almost two decades.
  What plan does the administration have for bringing the U.S. troops 
home?
  And what plan does the administration have for maintaining democracy 
and economic stability in Haiti over the long haul? And will the 
American taxpayers be willing to pay the bill?
  United States aid to Nicaragua and El Salvador has dramatically 
decreased with the return of democracy to these countries.
  Our total aid to Nicaragua in fiscal year 1990 was $262.2 million--
the year Violeta Chamorro was elected president of that country. Our 
total aid to Nicaragua in fiscal year 1994 had dwindled to $56.7 
million.
  The same pattern is true for El Salvador. Total United States aid to 
El Salvador in fiscal year 1990 was $326.4 million and the total United 
States aid in fiscal year 1994--after the peace was restored--had 
declined to $97.3 million.
  It looks as though our total aid to Haiti will drastically increase 
with the return of Aristide--the democratically elected president. This 
is in contrast to our severely declining assistance for democratic 
governments in Central America. This important paradox needs some 
explanation.
  Can the United States afford to undertake the rebuilding of one of 
the poorest and most economically backward countries of the Western 
Hemisphere?
  The answer to that question is clear. We cannot afford to rebuild 
Haiti at the expense of neglecting our many other obligations 
throughout the world.
  The establishment of a true democracy in Haiti cannot occur 
immediately by force of arms. As is the case with other nations in the 
region, the nurturing of democracy takes time and will require broad-
based support of the Haitian people.
  It is Haitians that must rebuild Haiti. Not the United States.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.


                                 Haiti

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I would like to talk briefly about my 
concerns about our mission in Haiti.
  My colleagues will recall that I opposed a full-scale invasion of 
Haiti. I wrote President Clinton to express my concern that violent 
intervention may not help solve the difficult problems that Haiti 
faces. I told him that I did not support an invasion.
  I did this because I do not believe that we have a national interest 
at stake in Haiti, American citizens are not in danger. The Haitian 
military threatens the Haitian people, but it does not threaten anyone 
else. Haiti does not control any resources that we depend on, and we 
don't have any bases there. So I did not see the rationale for an 
invasion, and I do not see a rationale for our current involvement.
  However, now that almost 20,000 of our troops are in Haiti, I am glad 
that they have faced little violence or combat so far. But I want to 
say for the record that I think our troops should return home as soon 
as possible.
  Let me just discuss briefly why I feel this way.
  We have seen from bitter experience in Lebanon and Somalia that it is 
a lot easier to send troops into a chaotic country than it is to limit 
their mission while they are here. It goes without saying that the more 
deeply we get involved, the more dangerous our mission becomes.
  The media reports clearly show that a climate of violence exists in 
Haiti. It is almost a climate of mob rule. If more looting and disorder 
occur, our troops may be forced by circumstances to protect one side or 
another. We have already had one casualty on this mission; taking sides 
among Haiti's factions will cause more bloodshed.
  It also looks as if we might get bogged down in chasing people and 
weapons. I am very concerned that we are now trying to disarm Haiti's 
thugs and attaches. We are conducting searches for arms. To those of us 
who remember what led, a year ago, to the tragic deaths of 18 American 
Rangers in Mogadishu, these reports are troubling. While our intentions 
may be honorable, the consequences of our actions may be fatal.
  Another lesson we learned in Somalia is that it is difficult to try 
to rebuild a shattered nation. The task might be easier in Haiti; Haiti 
has not suffered the civil war that Somalia did. Yet we are setting 
ourselves the challenge of reforming Haiti's military and police force, 
safeguarding Haiti's democratically elected leaders, and ensuring that 
next year's elections in Haiti are free and fair. The problem with all 
this is that when our mission involves reforming a nation's 
institutions, or any other nation-building activities, we are on a 
slippery slope to long-term involvement in that nation's affairs.
  For all of these reasons, we should withdraw our troops and make way 
for a multinational or United Nations force as soon as possible. I 
might add that during that transition, the lines of communication and 
command must be extremely clear, so that there is no confusion at the 
operational level.
  In closing, let me just say to my colleagues that our military will 
have virtually no role in solving Haiti's worst problem--its crushing, 
grinding poverty. I have toured these slums. I have seen how awful the 
poverty in Port-au-Prince can be. This poverty, which is the root of 
all of Haiti's troubles, cannot be addressed by an invasion. We can 
alleviate the poverty in Haiti only through a long effort of providing 
assistance through multinational development banks and private 
voluntary organizations.
  The World Bank and other development and lending institutions should 
be providing the economic development experience, training and 
equipment that Haiti needs. Our military does not have any of these 
capabilities. The fact speaks volumes about who should be in Haiti, and 
who should not.
  Mr. President, I thank the Presiding Officer and I yield the floor.


                                 haiti

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I will support the pending resolution 
but I do so with some reluctance. I would have preferred to vote for a 
resolution that stated clearly that the United States of America has no 
national security interest in Haiti. In fact, the only vital national 
interest we have in Haiti today is the 20,000 American troops sent to 
that poor country.
  I find the pending resolution a bit confused. Let me be clear. The 
resolution now before the Senate states, ``the President should have 
sought and welcomed congressional approval before deploying United 
States Armed Forces to Haiti.'' At the same time, the resolution 
concludes with the statement, ``Nothing in this resolution should be 
construed or interpreted to constitute congressional approval or 
disapproval of the participation of United States Armed Forces in the 
United Nations Mission in Haiti.''
  It seems as though the U.S. Senate is willing to criticize the 
President for not seeking prior approval but we are not willing to take 
a stand, yes or no, regarding this deployment of U.S. Armed Forces. Mr. 
President, this is shameful.
  A number of my colleagues have already come the floor of the Senate 
to make the point that it is not worth the life of one American soldier 
to try to bring democracy to Haiti. I concur with this view because I 
believe Haiti has no history of democracy and it is naive to think that 
the temporary presence of American occupation forces and American 
economic aid will change the violent culture of Haitian politics.
  I am also very troubled by the situation the President of the United 
States has put us in. To begin with, the invasion of Haiti that was 
averted by the courage and diplomatic skill of former President Carter, 
Senator Sam Nunn and General Powell was clearly timed to prevent the 
Congress from voting to disapprove of this act. Then, after thousands 
of United States troops have occupied Haiti, we are told we cannot vote 
to limit this occupation because we will endanger the lives of the 
American military personnel in Haiti. So the President prevented the 
Congress from voting to stop this invasion and now he says we can't 
vote to end this dangerous occupation. I completely reject this view.
  As we saw in Somalia, the Congress can vote to force the withdrawal 
of United States troops from a situation in which our men and women in 
uniform are needlessly put at risk. In the case of Somalia, Senator 
Byrd's amendment forced the administration to bring our troops home and 
that act of Congress did not endanger our troops. I believe we can and 
should do the same thing in Haiti.
  I will support the pending resolution to affirm my support for the 
brave American military personnel currently serving in Haiti. I will, 
however, continue to work to bring our troops home as soon as possible. 
In my view, that is what we should be voting on today.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.


                                 HAITI

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the sons and daughters of America find 
themselves on foreign soil today in an effort to create the conditions 
which might make possible the development of democracy in the troubled 
land of Haiti. The people of Haiti deserve the opportunity to establish 
a democratic government which will respect the rights of all Haitians 
and give the much-oppressed people of Haiti a chance to live in peace.
  But I continue to believe it is wrong to use the young men and women 
in our armed forces to carry out this mission. In that sense and many 
others, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd]. Are American 
national interests at stake in Haiti? I do not believe they are. Should 
we send our troops to each of the many countries in the world where 
there is not democracy? Certainly not.
  I commend the men and women of our military services who have 
answered the call of their Commander in Chief as they always have in 
the past. I want to do nothing today or in the days ahead which might 
put our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen at any greater risk than 
they already are in Haiti. I applaud the authors of this resolution for 
making the very first element of it a commendation of our men and women 
who are serving with distinction in and around Haiti today.
  I also applaud the authors for noting that ``the President should 
have sought and welcomed congressional approval before deploying United 
States Armed Forces to Haiti.'' I have made this argument in the past 
months and the Record will note that I made the same argument to 
President Bush in 1990 and 1991 before the Persian Gulf War. When the 
American people are about to engage in war, unless the circumstances 
demand immediate action to protect American personnel or interests, the 
President owes it to the American people, the Constitution and the 
brave men and women he is prepared to commit to combat to come to the 
Congress and seek approval. I regret that the President did not come to 
us before he deployed our forces to Haiti. I hope that he will respond 
to this resolution promptly and ensure that the reports required in the 
resolution do, in fact, give us the full benefit of his thinking on the 
missions our people are supposed to perform.
  I am also concerned, as the authors of the resolution are, with the 
costs of this operation. There will be real costs--at least one-half a 
billion dollars--for the deployment, the operation, and other forms of 
aid which we will provide in the days ahead. There are also real and 
potential costs in the readiness of our forces and their ability to 
respond to the next crisis which involves our national interests. We 
cannot continue to reduce the size and capabilities of our forces while 
simultaneously increasing their involvement in operations around the 
world. Ultimately, something must give. Equipment will wear out and we 
will not be able to replace it. Modernization--the essential means of 
ensuring our forces are ready to fight and win in the next decade and 
the next century--will continue to be underfunded. The men and women of 
the Armed Forces will be run into the ground and they will begin to 
ask, as many already have, is it really worth it for me to deprive my 
family and risk my life with deployment after deployment and little 
time at home in between? Ultimately, we will be unprepared when a 
genuine threat to American security occurs.
  Operation Uphold Democracy is underway. I thank God that our forces 
did not have to confront hostile forces as they entered Haiti and that 
casualties and losses have thus far been very low. But I worry about 
their safety next week and next months and their ability to do all that 
they have been, and perhaps will be, asked to do. I would like our 
forces not to have been sent in the first place. But they are there now 
and I will give them the support they need to come home quickly and 
safely with their heads held high and their fellow countrymen 
appreciative of their efforts.
  Mr. President, I am going to vote for this resolution because it 
supports our troops who are in Haiti today, reinforces the 
constitutional authority of the Congress to declare war, and calls for 
a prompt withdrawal of our forces as soon as possible.
  We must recognize the dangers inherent in the course we are on in 
Haiti and around the world today. All of us in this country must 
address the question of our role as a world power and when we should 
use our military forces. There are other ways to support democracy than 
with American soldiers.
  We can support democracy through economic sanctions as we did in 
South Africa, or through political aid as we did via the National 
Endowment for Democracy in Eastern Europe, or even through the 
provision of military equipment and training as we did for the anti-
Communist freedom fighters in Afghanistan.

  We need not and cannot send American troops to every country in the 
world where democracy is under siege. That, I hope, is the lesson we 
will learn from Haiti as we move quickly, according to this resolution, 
to bring our troops home.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I rise in opposition to this resolution
  The President did not seek my approval for occupying Haiti. And he 
will not get my approval now.
  The American soldiers involved in this mission have performed 
admirably. They have shown themselves, and our country, as skilled in 
military tactics and noble in goals. They have carried this mission out 
brilliantly. But every day carries the same risk President Reagan ran 
in Lebanon, and the same risk Presidents Bush and Clinton ran in 
Somalia. Haiti is full of armed, violent people. Snipers who shoot out 
of warehouses. Murderers with grenades that they toss into crowds. 
Thugs who may at any minute turn their weapons on a jeep full of 18- 
and 20-year-old marines. It is unacceptable.
  And I do not believe this mission has a chance to succeed in the long 
run. Even if we suffer no disaster or casualty at any point in our 
occupation of Haiti, the problem in Haiti is a political issue which 
Haitians themselves must solve through a national reconciliation. That 
will not happen as long as American troops are enforcing order and 
government. The longer we stay, the longer any true solution to Haiti's 
problems will be delayed.
  Every day we remain in Haiti is a day in which we continue placing 
our soldiers in a dangerous and explosive situation. And I think the 
mission should come to an end not ``as soon as possible,'' as the 
resolution says, but on a certain, specific and imminent date. the only 
thing this resolution will accomplish is to force people at the State 
Department to fill out paperwork reports to Congress. It is not good 
enough.
  Instead of voting on this, we should be setting a date certain to 
withdraw from Haiti. And we should back that up by withdrawing funds 
for the operation the day afterward.
  I will vote ``no,'' and I thank you, Mr. President.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, the United States mission in Haiti 
has two core objectives: First, to meet our commitment to restoring 
democracy to Haiti, and second, to meet that commitment peacefully, if 
possible. I support that policy and those commitments.
  While it is still premature to assess the success of our actions in 
Haiti, the results so far are at least somewhat encouraging. Let's take 
a look at the facts.
  United States troops have entered Haiti peacefully. Only one of our 
soldiers has been wounded to date.
  American soldiers have begun to take arms off the streets through 
selective raids at locations arms have been stockpiled, and through a 
buy back program.
  American soldiers are making substantial headway toward ending the 
indiscriminate violence and terror that ruled the streets in Haiti, and 
had sown fear among pro-democracy activists. Freedom is being restored.
  Democracy, however, is more than the absence of violence. Democracy 
means that different voices have a forum to be heard. Democracy means 
that people with different ideas and views about how to govern agree to 
disagree. Democracy provides the rule of law and access to justice.
  As Senator Nunn said to the Haitian generals, democracy is much more 
than the return of one man, President Aristide.
  Because American forces entered Haiti, parliamentarians who had fled 
the country returned to their jobs.
  Evans Paul, the mayor of Port-au-Prince, has been able to come out of 
hiding, and has returned to city hall.
  We all know that for the fledgling democracy in Haiti to succeed, the 
streets must be safer, there must be greater stability, and the Haitian 
economy must begin to function again.
  The United States has lifted the trade embargo against Haiti, and is 
allowing money transfers to resume, and the United Nations has followed 
suit.
  The Haitian people have begun to hope again. People dance and march 
in the streets. Two weeks ago, ordinary Haitians through their only 
chance was to leave their country, even if that meant taking the 
terrible risk of going to sea in very small boats and rafts.
  Now, that has begun to change. Two thousand Haitian refugees at 
Guantanamo Bay have volunteered to return to their homeland.
  But much work remains to be done. The peaceful entry of our military 
forces into that country does not end our job.
  The agreement negotiated by President Carter, General Powell, and 
Senator Nunn, has a number of points that will require future 
interpretation.
  I share the view of General Powell, who said when he returned from 
Haiti, That all of the details ``will be worked out in due course.''
  With our troops on the ground, I am confident that the agreement will 
be interpreted and implemented in a manner fully consistent with the 
United States view of that agreement. That is what we have seen so far, 
and there is good reason to believe that is what we will continue to 
see.
  I also agree with General Powell's statement that we should ``not 
lose sight of the overall achievement''. While there will continue to 
be difficult moments in Haiti, and while there are still substantial 
risks that we must continue to be aware of, we should not forget that 
the U.N. resolutions are being implemented. President Aristide will 
soon return. And, as General Powell noted, we do have the opportunity 
for a future of peace and democracy in Haiti and a better relationship 
between our two countries.

  General Powell's analysis is a good one. The agreement and the 
peaceful entry of our forces into Haiti was a real achievement. It does 
open real opportunities, and it does enhance the prospects for the 
future success of our policies in Haiti.
  Our military leadership has set out two phases for operation uphold 
democracy. In the first phase, the Americans will establish order. Then 
in phase two, the forces of 28 nations will join us to maintain order 
and hold elections.
  This first phase will only end when three conditions are met: No 
organized resistance remains, President Aristide returns, and a police 
force is present.
  At that point, phase two will introduce a U.N. force with a much 
smaller American contingent, but one that is under American command.
  But it is important to do the job properly. General Shalikashvili has 
said that setting a date certain for withdrawal will put our troops at 
risk, because it would change the dynamics on the ground. I am pleased, 
therefore, that the resolution before the Senate today does not set a 
specific date for the withdrawal of our forces, although I share the 
view expressed in the resolution that our forces should leave Haiti as 
soon as possible.
  I would very much like to avoid putting any U.S. forces at risk. No 
one wants to see young American soldiers, sailors, or air force 
personnel wounded or killed.
  In this situation, however, backing up our diplomacy with our Armed 
Forces was essential, not just to have any hope of achieving our 
objective or restoring democratic government to Haiti, but also because 
U.S. credibility was at stake. Failure to honor the commitments made by 
both this administration and the Bush administration would have 
repercussions for the United States around the world.
  But the U.S. has kept its commitment, and in so doing, we have once 
again renewed our commitment to the principles that make the United 
States so unique on the world stage. In Haiti, we are demonstrating 
that we mean what we say, and that we are prepared to act based on our 
principles and our core values.
  I want to commend the President for his leadership, for sending 
President Carter, Senator Nunn and General Powell, for their successful 
negotiations, which no doubt saved many lives of both Haitians and 
Americans.
  But mostly, I want to commend the men and women of the U.S. military 
for the fine job they are doing in Haiti. We must allow them to 
complete their mission.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, is leader time reserved?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has the right to use his leader 
time.
  Mr. DOLE. I yield 2 minutes of that time to the Senator from South 
Dakota, Senator Pressler.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, may we have order, please?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct; the Senate is not in 
order.
  The Republican leader has yielded 2 minutes of his time to the 
Senator from South Dakota.
  We ask the Senate be in order.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Madam President, the question I was trying to ask 
earlier is to invite my friends on the other side of the aisle to join 
with me in the letter to the President so we can lay this investigation 
out in the open. The Senator from Connecticut said that the ranking 
member of the Judiciary Committee was satisfied. I am told by staff, he 
has not necessarily said that. There is a very serious question about 
Mr. Aristide's involvement with drug traffickers that needs to be 
answered. The DEA's office in Miami was investigating this issue. 
Apparently, one of the roads, one of the paths they investigated led to 
the allegation that President Aristide himself took a bribe from 
Colombian drug traffickers.
  I think we should have a definitive statement from the administration 
on that. They keep telling me to ``take a classified briefing.'' 
Yesterday, administration officials gave a briefing to the chairman and 
ranking member of the Judiciary Committee. According to the Senator 
from Connecticut, the administration told him that the ranking member, 
the Senator from Utah [Mr. Hatch], was totally satisfied. I believe 
that is a mischaracterization of his view. Perhaps he will come to the 
floor and speak for himself.
  But I still do not understand why my colleagues on the other side of 
the aisle will not join me in my letter to the President, asking these 
basic questions. They would not even yield to me several minutes ago. 
The administration wants me to take a classified briefing because they 
know that if I do, I will not be able to repeat what was said. The 
American people need to know if Jean-Bertrand Aristide took a bribe 
regarding drugs when he was in office. Earlier this year, the 
administration cited Haitian drug trafficking as one of the reasons for 
invading Haiti. Then all of a sudden they stopped talking about it. And 
I want to know why. Why will not the administration discuss the DEA 
investigation in public? Where did the investigation lead? What did 
they find? Who was involved in it? If it was the Haitian generals, say 
so. If it was President Aristide, say so. Instead, the administration 
says, ``This is all classified; you can get a classified briefing.'' 
The American people want a public briefing.
  My point is our troops are in Haiti. The American people need to know 
if they are being asked to restore a drug trafficker. Did Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide ever take a bribe for drugs when he was President or 
thereafter, or in any relationship? Did DEA field agents in Miami want 
to question Aristide and the White House prevented them? These are 
important questions which deserve to be answered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bryan). The time allocated to the Senator 
has expired.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my colleague 
from South Dakota for raising what I consider to be a very important 
question that should be answered, if not today, then tomorrow or very 
soon, by someone who--if anyone has the information. If not, there 
should be an investigation.
  Let me say, first of all, this is a bipartisan resolution. It took a 
lot of doing by Members on both sides of the aisle. It can be 
interpreted by Members on either side of the aisle in a different way.
  It is this Senator's opinion that we have no security interest in 
Haiti, no national interest in Haiti, and we should not be in Haiti. We 
made a mistake. And I do not think a careful reading of this resolution 
will give the administration much comfort.
  But I must say I did not support setting an arbitrary withdrawal 
date, with which I think the President agreed we should not have a 
date. Members on both sides agreed we should not have a date.
  First of all, it might increase the risk to young men and women 
there. But, second, it might imply, if some of us agreed on a date, say 
March 1, that we were buying into this policy for the next several 
months, and that is not the case. I am not buying into any of this 
policy. It is a mistake. It is a bad policy. We should not be there and 
we ought to come home. It is going to cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars. We are risking American lives every day. I just suggest maybe 
when Aristide goes back next week would be a good time for American 
troops to get out.
  He has been restored. That is what it has been all about. Let us 
restore Aristide, and when he is restored, let us go home. Let us come 
home. Let us not risk any additional American lives.
  We have heard administration officials say the last few days the 
mission in Haiti has not changed. I guess it is no surprise the 
American people are confused about United States policy toward Haiti 
when the administration denies the obvious. Everyone with access to a 
television knows U.S. policy in Haiti changes as fast as you can change 
the channel.
  First, the policy was that police and army are allies in keeping 
order. Then we arrest and gag Haitian police. We were told that United 
States policy will be to stay neutral in Haitian violence. Then we were 
told American soldiers will intervene in certain cases of Haitian 
violence in certain circumstances. We were told United States Armed 
Forces would not be Haiti's police force, and then we see Americans 
patrolling streets, detaining Haitians, and stopping looters. This 
week, American forces added disarming Haitians to their mission.
  If this is not a mission change, I do not know what it is. It is not 
just mission creep, it is mission leap. The only exit strategy in Haiti 
is for United States troops to change helmets from American green to 
United Nations blue, and that sounds more like a shell game than an 
exit strategy.
  I have serious doubts the United Nations peacekeepers will be able to 
perform any better in Haiti than they have in Somalia or Bosnia. I 
stand second to no one in supporting American Armed Forces. The young 
men ordered to occupy Haiti have a difficult task. Some have called it 
Mission Impossible, bringing stability and democracy to a country that 
has little of either. American troops should not be used on missions 
that cannot be achieved in places where America does not have a vital 
interest.
  It is ironic to hear some opponents of the United States policy in 
Central America defend the occupation in Haiti. We never sent more than 
55 Americans to El Salvador, for example. Now we have 20,000 Americans 
in Haiti, and nobody says a word on the other side. I remember the 
arguments day after day after day on this Senate floor. It seems to me 
they used to say El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam. Fortunately, they 
did not have their way, and El Salvador is peaceful and democratic 
today.
  But, unfortunately, the occupation of Haiti shows the lessons of 
Somalia have not been learned. Like Somalia, our objectives are vague. 
Our mission is constantly changing. Like Somalia, we have embarked on 
nation building and we are relying on the United Nations to call the 
shots down the road. It is hard to avoid the observation that ``Haiti 
is Creole for Somalia.''
  The President chose not to come to Congress before sending American 
troops to occupy Haiti. In fact, if you read this week's Time magazine, 
it was all designed. The President wanted to get the troops in there 
before Congress came back on a Monday, because we might possibly vote 
up or down. He chose to send troops without the support of the American 
people. It is a high-risk course to jump into a military adventure 
without the parachute of the public and congressional support.
  But having said that, let me end where I started. This resolution has 
been worked out on a bipartisan basis. It can, as this Senator said, be 
interpreted by different Members on either side in different ways. But 
I must say I think it is a pretty fair resolution. It does not answer 
every argument somebody might have. It does not have in there that it 
is not in our national interest. Some of us would like to have had that 
inserted in the resolution.
  But overall, it seems to me it is a statement that needs to be made 
and should be made and should have the full support of our colleagues 
in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to use the 
remainder of my leader time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I encourage all Senators to vote for 
this resolution. It is, in large measure, repetitious of that which the 
Senate has previously voted in favor of. I expect and hope that most 
Senators will vote for the resolution, so I will not address myself to 
that directly at this moment.
  But I would like to express my disappointment, indeed my dismay, at 
many of the remarks that have been made during this debate. There seems 
to be almost a sense of sadness by some of our colleagues that things 
have gone so well in Haiti.
  There seems to be almost a sense of disappointment that things have 
gone so well in Haiti. A few weeks ago, the illegal government had 
unlimited prospects and the democratically elected government had no 
prospects. As a result of President Clinton's decisive leadership and 
swift action by the United States, that situation has been reversed.
  The argument is made that the President should have sought the 
approval of Congress. I believe he should have. I felt that way with 
respect to Panama, and I felt that way with respect to Grenada. But 
none of the three Presidents involved agreed with my view.
  President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama without prior 
congressional approval. More than 20 Americans were killed. There was 
not a single bit of second-guessing and nitpicking about that from the 
people who are here today doing the second-guessing and nitpicking 
about President Clinton.
  President Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada without any prior 
congressional approval. Several Americans were killed in that 
operation. There was not a single bit of second-guessing and nitpicking 
about that by the same people who are here second-guessing and 
nitpicking about President Clinton.
  If ever there has been a double standard at work here in the Senate, 
it has been in the reaction of those events, and very few Democrats--
very few--if any, engaged in the kind of nitpicking and second-guessing 
on Presidents Bush and Reagan in those two incidents that our 
colleagues have engaged in here today.
  Let us face it, this thing has worked. Not a single American has been 
killed as a result of this action, and we are going to have a 
democratically elected government restored. Is it so hard for our 
colleagues to acknowledge that something has worked and say a decent 
word about the President? Is it so difficult to refrain from this kind 
of nitpicking and second-guessing and trying to find fault?
  This has been an instructive debate, Mr. President, not about the 
resolution, not about the Haiti operation, but about an attitude that 
has become so ingrained it seems virtually impossible for some of our 
colleagues to do anything except second-guess, nitpick, find fault, and 
try to criticize the President, whatever the circumstance. I regret it. 
I believe that all Americans, or at least most Americans, regret it.
  I hope that this resolution will pass and this debate will conclude.
  I yield the floor. I believe all time is up, and we are prepared to 
vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the question is on 
the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.
  The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading 
and was read the third time.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the 
third time, the question is, Shall the joint resolution, regarding 
United States policy toward Haiti, pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 91, nays 8, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 323 Leg.]

                                YEAS--91

     Akaka
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--8

     Baucus
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Byrd
     Feingold
     Hatfield
     Pressler
     Wallop

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Stevens
       
  So the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 229) was passed, as follows:

                             S.J. Res. 229

       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, 

     SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES OPERATIONS IN HAITI.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (a) The men and women of the United States Armed Forces in 
     Haiti who are performing with professional excellence and 
     dedicated patriotism are to be commended;
       (b) the President should have sought and welcomed 
     Congressional approval before deploying United States Armed 
     Forces to Haiti;
       (c) the departure from power of the de facto authorities in 
     Haiti, and Haitian efforts to achieve national 
     reconciliation, democracy and the rule of law are in the best 
     interests of the Haitian people;
       (d) the President's lifting of the unilateral economic 
     sanctions on Haiti, and his efforts to bring about the 
     lifting of economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations 
     are appropriate; and
       (e) Congress supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal of 
     all United States Armed Forces from Haiti as soon as 
     possible.

     SEC. 2. PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   OBJECTIVES.

       The President shall prepare and submit to the President Pro 
     Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives (hereafter, ``Congress'') not later than 
     seven days after enactment of this resolution a statement of 
     the national security objectives to be achieved by Operation 
     Uphold Democracy, and a detailed description of United States 
     policy, the military mission and the general rules of 
     engagement under which operations of United States Armed 
     Forces are conducted in and around Haiti, including the role 
     of United Armed Forces regarding Haitian on Haitian violence, 
     and efforts to disarm Haitian military or police forces, or 
     civilians. Changes or modifications to such objectives, 
     policy, military mission, or general rules of engagement 
     shall be submitted to Congress within forty-eight hours of 
     approval.

     SEC. 3. REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HAITI.

       Not later than November 1, 1994, and monthly thereafter 
     until the cessation of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 
     President shall submit a report to Congress on the situation 
     in Haiti, including--
       (a) a listing of the units of the United States Armed 
     Forces and of the police and military units of other nations 
     participating in operations in and around Haiti;
       (b) the estimated duration of Operation Uphold Democracy 
     and progress toward the withdrawal of all United States Armed 
     Forces from Haiti consistent with the goal of section 1(e) of 
     this resolution;
       (c) armed incidents or the use of force in or around Haiti 
     involving United States Armed Forces or Coast Guard personnel 
     in the time period covered by the report;
       (d) the estimated cumulative incremental cost of all United 
     States activities subsequent to September 30, 1993 in and 
     around Haiti, including but not limited to--
       (1) the cost of all deployments of United States Armed 
     Forces and Coast Guard personnel, training, exercises, 
     mobilization, and preparation activities, including the 
     preparation of police and military units of the other nations 
     of the multinational force involved in enforcement of 
     sanctions, limits on migration, establishment and maintenance 
     of migrant facilities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and 
     all other activities relating to operations in and around 
     Haiti; and
       (2) the costs of all other activities relating to United 
     States policy toward Haiti, including humanitarian 
     assistance, reconstruction, aid and other financial 
     assistance, and all other costs to the United States 
     Government;
       (e) a detailed accounting of the source of funds obligated 
     or expended to meet the costs described in subparagraph (d), 
     including--
       (1) in the case of funds expended from the Department of 
     Defense budget, a breakdown by military service or defense 
     agency, line item and program, and
       (2) in the case of funds expended from the budgets of 
     departments and agencies other than the Department of 
     Defense, by department or agency and program;
       (f) the Administration plan for financing the costs of the 
     operations and the impact on readiness without supplemental 
     funding;
       (g) a description of the situation in Haiti, including--
       (1) the security situation;
       (2) the progress made in transferring the functions of 
     government to the democratically elected government of Haiti; 
     and
       (3) progress toward holding free and fair parliamentary 
     elections;
       (h) a description of issues relating to the United Nations 
     Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), including--
       (1) the preparedness of the United Nations Mission in Haiti 
     (UNMIH) to deploy to Haiti to assume its functions;
       (2) troop commitments by other nations to UNMIH;
       (3) the anticipated cost to the United States of 
     participation in UNMIH, including payments to the United 
     Nations and financial, material and other assistance to 
     UNMIH;
       (4) proposed or actual participation of United States Armed 
     Forces in UNMIH;
       (5) proposed command arrangements for UNMIH, including 
     proposed or actual placement of United States Armed Forces 
     under foreign command; and
       (6) the anticipated duration of UNMIH.

     SEC. 4. REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

       Not later than January 1, 1995, the Secretary of State 
     shall report to Congress on the participation or involvement 
     of any member of the de jure or de facto Haitian government 
     in violations of internationally-recognized human rights from 
     December 15, 1990 to December 15, 1994.

     SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS.

       Not later than November 15, 1994, the Secretary of State 
     shall provide a comprehensive report to Congress on all 
     agreements the United States has entered into with other 
     nations, including any assistance pledged or provided, in 
     connection with United States efforts in Haiti. Such report 
     shall also include information on any agreements or 
     commitments relating to United Nations Security Council 
     actions concerning Haiti since 1992.

     SEC. 6. TRANSITION TO UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI.

       Nothing in this resolution should be construed or 
     interpreted to constitute Congressional approval or 
     disapproval of the participation of United States Armed 
     Forces in the United Nations Mission in Haiti.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the joint resolution was passed.
  Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.

                          ____________________