[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______


  AMERICA'S TEN DEADLY STRATEGIC GAMBLES: ARMS CONTROL OR UNILATERAL 
                              DISARMAMENT

 Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I rise today to bring a very 
important article to the attention of the Senate and the American 
people. The article, entitled ``America's ten deadly Strategic Gambles: 
Arms Control or Unilateral Disarmament,'' was written by Mr. Sven F. 
Kraemer, an individual with vast experience and sound judgment.
  Mr. Kraemer's assessments and policy recommendations are in startling 
contrast with the views prevailing in the administration, Congress, and 
the media. Mr. Kraemer served in the U.S. Government for 25 years, 
including 16 years at the National Security Council. His cogent article 
provides a critique of America's increasingly hallow strategies and 
forces. I strongly recommend it to anyone concerned about American 
national security.
  I ask that Mr. Kraemer's article be included in the Record following 
my remarks.
  The article follows:

              [From the Strategic Review, Sept. 12, 1994]

  America's Ten Deadly Strategic Gambles: Arms Control or Unilateral 
                              Disarmament?

                          (By Sven F. Kraemer)


                                IN BRIEF

       The United States is on the verge of taking a number of 
     potentially dangerous strategic disarmament gambles. The 
     Clinton Administration justifies these gambles on the basis 
     of the Cold War's end, but the potential for real damage to 
     U.S. security remains. These gambles include denying 
     strategic threats from proliferation, Russia and China; 
     dismantling the strategic ``triad'' and strategic defense 
     programs, and resting U.S. security on fragile arms control 
     agreements with unreliable partners. Each gamble has grave 
     consequences for U.S. security. Cumulatively their impact 
     could be catastrophic.
       Much-debated recent American foreign policy ventures in 
     Bosnia, Haiti and Somalia, reveal America as a confused, 
     weak, and vulnerable superpower. Far less well known, and 
     virtually undebated by the Congress, the media and the 
     American people, are America's potentially far more dangerous 
     strategic disarmament gambles, ten of them explored below. 
     These high-risk gambles are put into bold relief by North 
     Korea's emerging nuclear threat, the September 1994 U.S.-
     Russia summit, the Clinton Administration's Fall 1994 nuclear 
     posture review and its 1994 and 1995 defense budget and arms 
     control proposals.
       In a world of gathering storms, these deadly gambles deny 
     global strategic threats, dismantle America's strategic 
     triad, our nuclear deterrent and our strategic defense 
     programs, and rest our security on fragile arms control 
     agreements with unreliable partners. Each gamble has grave 
     consequences for America's security. Their cumulative impact 
     confounds the Constitutional imperative to ``provide for the 
     common defense'' and leaves America hostage to hollow 
     strategies, hollow partnerships and hollow forces. They place 
     America at the bull's eye of disaster.


                       ignoring strategic threats

     The First Gamble: Denying Strategic Threats from Proliferation

       America's first strategic gamble is to deny the 
     accelerating strategic impact of global proliferation in the 
     post-Cold War period. The Clinton Administration's Department 
     of Defense ``Bottom Up Review'' of 1993 and the 
     Administration's 1994 and 1995 defense budget proposals 
     acknowledge proliferation problems centered on ``regional'' 
     or ``theater'' threats, but none are considered strategic in 
     affecting our homeland and our vital interests, or as 
     requiring urgent responses.\1\ It is not as if America had 
     not been warned.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         Strategic Proliferation Dangers Are Greater Than Ever

       Already early in the Clinton presidency, R. James Woolsey, 
     the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
     testified that: ``More than 25 countries, many of them 
     hostile to the United States and our allies, may have or may 
     be developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons--the 
     so-called weapons of mass destruction--and the means to 
     deliver them.''\2\
       At the same time, the CIA's senior strategic force analyst, 
     Lawrence Gershwin, warned that the danger may be greater, and 
     deterence less effective, than at the height of the Cold War 
     around the time of the Cuban missile crisis. According to 
     Gershwin: ``the potential capabilities of some of these 
     countries are comparable to, and in some cases, more lethal 
     than the Soviet threat in 1960. With leaders like Quaddhafi 
     and Saddam Husayn, and in many cases weak, unstable, or 
     illegitimate governments, our classic notions of deterrence 
     hold much less promise of assuring U.S. and Western 
     security.'' (Emphasis added.)\3\
       As reported by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in 1992: 
     ``The threat is not limited just to weapons of mass 
     destruction. The global diffusion of military and dual-use 
     technologies will enable a growing number of countries to 
     field highly capable weapon systems, such as ballistic 
     missiles, stealthy cruise missiles, integrated air defenses, 
     submarines, modern command and control systems, and even 
     space-based assets. Unfortunately there are both governments 
     and individuals willing to supply proliferating countries 
     with both systems and technical expertise. As a result, our 
     regional adversaries may be armed with capabilities that in 
     the past were limited only to superpowers.'' (Emphasis 
     added.)\4\

                Middle-East and Korean Lessons Unlearned

       The threat exists now, not in some distant future. North 
     Korea reportedly has four or five nuclear weapons and 
     numerous missiles and in the Middle East alone, seven wars 
     have been fought with missiles, including the Iran-Iraq 
     inter-city missile shootouts of the 1980s, the 1991 Gulf War 
     and the Yemen war in 1994. During the Gulf War, a single 
     Iraqi SCUD missile killed 28 Americans and injured 97; other 
     SCUD attacks might easily have caused far higher casualties 
     in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Israel. A chemical or nuclear 
     warhead might have killed hundreds or even thousands and 
     changed the war's outcome with truly devastating results and 
     strategic impact on America's vital interests, including its 
     economy, its key allies and its global credibility.

         Lack of Anti-Missile Defenses and Technology Controls

       The Administration's ``Counterproliferation 
     Initiative'' cannot be serious so long as the strategic 
     implications of such threats continue to be denied through 
     two current policies. First, advanced U.S. anti-missile 
     programs, including ``upper tier'' Navy programs, air-borne 
     systems, and all strategic systems, including those based in 
     space, are being gutted or eliminated rather than accelerated 
     (see Gamble #10 below). Second, no effective technology 
     transfer control regime is in place since the Administration 
     agreed in March 1994 to the elimination of the West's 
     Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) without a 
     replacement regime. The U.S. is not able to enforce three 
     voluntary arrangements: the Missile Technology Control Regime 
     (e.g., against China), the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
     ``guidelines,'' and the Australia Group's 
     information exchanges on chemical and biological weapons 
     proliferation. The Administration's proposed Export 
     Control Act permits the transfer of advanced technologies 
     over Defense Department opposition and without effective 
     controls over re-export to third countries.\5\ The 
     ultimate military and commercial costs to America are 
     likely to be enormous, not only in future defense dollars 
     but also in American lives.

        The second gamble: Denying strategic threats from Russia

       America's second strategic gamble is to deny the reality of 
     current strategic threats from Post-Soviet Russia.\6\ Here 
     too, warnings and realities are being ignored.
       Even when moonstruck about its hopes for Russian and a 
     benign ``new world order,'' the Bush Administration was able 
     to distinguish the strategic threat inherent in Russia's 
     political instabilities and its vast nuclear arsenals. In his 
     1992 report to the U.S. Congress, Secretary of Defense Dick 
     Cheney pointedly warned that: ``Today we face no adversary 
     capable of posing a global challenge, except with respect to 
     strategic nuclear forces,...massive soviet nuclear arsenals, 
     including some 30,000 tactical weapons are of serious 
     concern.'' (Emphasis added.)\7\
       Two years later, Russia is far from democratic or 
     predictable and its inherent strategic threat remains very 
     much alive. Russia remains a nuclear superpower with over 
     9,000 strategic nuclear weapons, most designed for use 
     against us, while Russia's thousands of ``tactical'' and 
     ``theater'' nuclear weapons are under uncertain control.\8\ 
     Dangerous? Vladimir Zhirinovsky warned during his 1991 
     presidential campaign: ``What price Paris? How about London? 
     Washington? Los Angeles? How much are you willing to pay so I 
     don't wipe them from the face of the earth with SS-18s. You 
     doubt me? Want to take a chance? Let's get started.''\9\

           Russia's reform at risk and its emerging militance

       Nothwithstanding the efforts of Boris Yeltsin and other 
     reform-minded Russians, Russia's problems have mounted and 
     leading reformers have long been pushed aside as hardliners 
     and criminal elements have gained far-reaching influence on 
     Russian government agencies. The issue is not simply one 
     of a Zhirinovsky, or of generals Rutskoi, Lebed or Gromov, 
     to name three other hardliners who bear careful 
     watching.\10\ The Russian problem is far greater and more 
     profound. Even on Bill Clinton's watch, Yeltsin may fall 
     and America may face exceptionally dangerous chaos, coups 
     and civil wars in Russia. We are more likely than not to 
     see the emergence of an aggressive national socialist 
     regime and the return of an evil empire.
       Because Russia has a shaky economy and an $80 billion 
     foreign debt, Russian officials seeking American aid 
     invariably complain of severe hardships and shortfalls and 
     point especially to Russia's military sector. At he same 
     time, Russia clearly lacks effective democratic controls, 
     economic reform strategies, or defense conversion programs 
     likely to succeed against mounting obstacles. Yet Russia's 
     generals are pressing ahead on costly programs to modernize 
     heir military forces. Yeltsin has clearly had to pay a high 
     price for his bloody October 1993 showdown against the 
     parliamentary hardliners, a price which includes the 
     assertion by his generals of an aggressive new military 
     doctrine and a defense commitment designed to assure Russia's 
     nuclear superpower status, its primary military role 
     throughout all of the lands of the former Soviet Union, and 
     its special status throughout the former empire's sphere of 
     influence.\11\

                      Russia's Strategic Programs

       Russia is dismantling few if any warheads under the 
     Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START I and II), is 
     violating biological and chemical weapons conventions and is 
     conducting a robust strategic modernization program unmatched 
     by the United States and extending far beyond any conceivable 
     defensive needs.\12\ While draconian U.S. defense cuts have 
     ruled out any comparable new American strategic systems, U.S. 
     intelligence officials reported Russia's strategic effort in 
     1993 to include numerous programs, which apparently still 
     continue in 1994, as follows: ``We expect that Russia will 
     flight test and deploy three new ballistic missiles--a road-
     mobile ICBM, a silo-based ICBM, and an SLBM--during this 
     decade. . . [and] a new ballistic missile submarine after the 
     turn of the century.''\13\ Russia also continues work on 
     improving its strategic anti-ballistic missile systems, an 
     area wherein U.S. efforts are greatly curtailed.
       The Russian generals' troublesome strategic activities 
     include vetoing advanced U.S. strategic missile defense and 
     having their Strategic Rocket Forces conduct large-scale 
     strategic exercises against the United States.\14\ Reportedly 
     also continuing are Russian's programs to improve at least 
     parts of its extensive system of several hundred deep 
     underground blast shelters, hardened to let commanders and 
     key industries survive a nuclear war. The United States has 
     only one such hardened facility (the Defense and Space 
     Command at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado). Ironically, 
     America's ``continuity of government'' facility, which was 
     not super-hardened, was closed down by President Clinton in 
     1994.\15\
       Clinton Administration officials have said little about the 
     Russian exercise or tunnelling programs, but following a 
     major exercise in 1993, some reportedly drew sober strategic 
     conclusions about the Russian military's strategic 
     intentions: ``These officials said the Russian nuclear 
     exercise, along with signs of the continued construction and 
     improvement of underground nuclear blast shelters around 
     Moscow, are signs the Russian military are still making 
     preparations to fight a nuclear war with the United States. 
     `You can't dismiss that threat,' one official said.''\16\

                       Russian Nuclear Scenarios.

       Given Russia's unpredictable path, no nuclear weapon in 
     Russia can be assumed to be under assured democratic civilian 
     control; all must be considered as potentially threatening us 
     and our allies. Russian General Staff investigators reported 
     that during the August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev, 
     generals working with Defense Minister Yazov (a trusted U.S. 
     ``reform'' favorite) removed the strategic weapons chain of 
     command from civilian control and that weapons could have 
     been launched without presidential approval.\17\ In addition, 
     Russia's 18,000 or more tactical nuclear weapons, with an 
     average destructive power equal to that of the Hiroshima 
     bomb, are described by Boris Yeltsin and by U.S. officials, 
     including the directors of the CIA (R. James Woolsey) and the 
     FBI (Louis Freeh) as increasingly vulnerable to capture and 
     proliferation by Russia's powerful criminal mafias.\18\
       Woolsey's June 27, 1994 testimony to the House Foreign 
     Affairs Committee is instructive as to the clear and present 
     danger: ``With organized crime, there is no possibility for 
     diplomacy, demarches, hotlines or summits. . . . Complicating 
     the problem . . . is the involvement of former KGB and 
     military officers in organized crime. With their KGB and 
     military background, special training, and contacts with 
     former colleagues, these individuals offer valuable skills 
     and access. . . . When the security of weapons of mass 
     destruction--nuclear, chemical, biological, advanced 
     conventional, as well as nuclear materials such as highly 
     enriched uranium and plutonium--is factored into the 
     equation, the stakes can become dangerously high for Russia 
     itself and for the United States. . . . Organized crime 
     groups certainly have the resources to bribe or threaten 
     nuclear weapons handlers or employees at facilities with 
     weapons handlers or employees at facilities with weapons 
     grade nuclear materials.''\19\ In August, July and May 1994, 
     German authorities seized plutonium and enriched uranium 
     being smuggled into Germany, possibly headed for the Middle 
     East, from sources they reported to be in Russia, possibly 
     involving ``disgruntled members of the security 
     services.''\20\

      Russia's Intelligence Activities and Further Strategic Reach

       Russia is active in a broad range of troublesome activities 
     with strategic implications, including intensive intelligence 
     activities reported by the FBI and CIA chiefs as directed 
     against the United States and focused particularly on the 
     acquisition of advanced military and commercial 
     technologies.\21\ The Ames espionage case is no exception and 
     may prove the tip of an iceberg. In June 1994, Boris Yeltsin 
     pointedly noted that: ``The absence of the idea of a `main 
     opponent' does not mean a curtailing of our intelligence-
     gathering activities in the traditional areas, mainly with 
     regard to the United States and the NATO member states.''\22\ 
     In addition, Russia's strategic reach during the past year 
     has also included opposition to U.S. policy initiatives for 
     Bosnia (air strikes against Serbs, lifting the embargo 
     against Bosnians), North Korea and Libya (tough sanctions) 
     and NATO (East European membership); sales of submarines to 
     Iran and North Korea; and peacekeeping units in Bosnia 
     (extending Russian military presence toward the Adriatic).
       In actions praised as ``stabilizing'' by President 
     Clinton,\23\ but conducted in violation of the Conventional 
     Forces in Europe Treaty, elite Russian military units and 
     mercenaries are engaged in civil wars in Georgia, Moldova, 
     Tajikistan, etc., implementing a ``peace enforcement'' role 
     reminiscent of the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968, and 
     intended to ``reintegrate,'' by force if necessary, the post-
     Soviet independent republics into the Moscow-dominated 
     Commonwealth of Independent States. Even the relatively 
     ``liberal'' senior Russian official, Foreign Minister Andrei 
     Kozyrev, publicly declared on December 7, 1993: ``Anyhow, 
     everything will get back to its old place.''\24\
     \23\
     \24\

         The Third Gamble: Denying Strategic Threats From China

       America's third strategic gamble is to deny the reality of 
     a strategic threat from China, whose strategic modernization 
     efforts, reportedly aided by hundreds of Russian specialists, 
     are clearly designed to guarantee China's role as a nuclear 
     superpower in the next century.
       Even now, China's CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles 
     (ICBMs) can reach the United States and China's strategic 
     activities continue apace. They include development of a new 
     mobile ICBM, extensive espionage directed against us and 
     three recent nuclear weapons tests, including a one-megaton 
     test in 1992 and tests in October 1993 and June 1994, while 
     the U.S. and Russia stopped testing and even as China pays 
     lip service to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
     a new Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.\25\ China also has one 
     of the world's worst records on proliferation, exporting 
     sensitive military items notably to Iran, North Korea, and 
     Pakistan and consistently opposing tough sanctions against 
     North Korean's NPT violations.
     \25\

                          Rewarding Militance

       China's assertive strategic posture raises potential 
     dangers to America and her allies substantially greater than 
     her much discussed trade and human rights abuses. Yet these 
     dangers have been ignored as China was rewarded on May 25, 
     1994 not only with Most Favored Nation status but also 
     with the transfer of advanced technologies with very high 
     military and proliferation potential, including advanced 
     computers, engines and satellites.\26\ On June 10, 1994 
     China rewarded the latest U.S. concessions by exploding an 
     H-bomb in an underground test; the White House managed to 
     say that ``The United States deeply regrets this action,'' 
     and called on China to stop its nuclear testing 
     program.\27\


            arms control or unilateral nuclear disarmament?

      The Fourth Gamble: Unilaterally Implementing START I and II

       America's fourth strategic gamble is the Clinton 
     Administration's unilateral implementation of the flawed 
     Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties.
       Three years after the July 1991 signing of the first 
     Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) by Presidents Bush 
     and Gorbachev, the treaty was still not in force pending 
     resolution of Russian-Ukrainian disputes and its reductions 
     were being only very slowly implemented by Russia. Yet the 
     Clinton Administration declared in January 1994 that the 
     United States had by then already unilaterally implemented 90 
     percent of the U.S. reductions proposed for the treaty's 
     seven-year period, the remainder to be completed in 1994.\28\

              START I: fundamental Flaws and Poison Pills

       The START I treaty is fundamentally flawed by outdated Cold 
     War concessions made by the Bush Administration to the 
     hardline Soviet generals who determined Gorbachev's arms 
     control positions, concessions manifest in provisions whose 
     risks are significantly magnified by Russia's current 
     strategic programs and political uncertainties.\29\ Thus, for 
     example, START I does not require the dismantlement of a 
     single one of the Russian warheads to be reduced, retired or 
     ``off-loaded'' under the treaty. Thus, key treaty provisions 
     on mobile missile limits, ``retired'' systems, bomber 
     loadings and sea-launched cruise missiles, cannot be 
     verified effectively (i.e., with high confidence) and, in 
     a reversal of a major Reagan START position, hundreds of 
     Russia's intercontinental range Backfire bombers are not 
     counted as strategic. In another reversal of a key Reagan 
     START position, his proposed ban on mobile missiles, START 
     permits over a thousand warheads to be deployed under the 
     treaty on such hard-to-find, strategically destabilizing 
     missiles, of which Russia has many hundreds and the United 
     States has none.\30\
       START I's gambles are doubly dangerous because the treaty 
     involves a poison pill declaration of June 13, 1991, through 
     which Moscow officially makes its START I compliance 
     explicitly dependent on U.S. compliance with the Anti-
     Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Yet, this Cold War 
     treaty bars the advanced defenses against strategic missiles 
     that could uniquely safeguard the American people and the 
     world against Russian cheating or global proliferation.

                         START II's fatal flaws

       START II, signed in January 1993, is being implemented 
     unilaterally by the United States by way of the Clinton 
     Administration's budget proposals and planned strategic cuts. 
     Yet START II, on which the U.S. Senate has permitted no 
     critics to testify, has been ratified neither by Russia's 
     parliament nor by the U.S. Congress and START II has not 
     corrected START I's basic flaws. START II's own flaws, 
     including ``downloading'' and ``conversion'' provisions which 
     cannot be effectively verified and which are reversible, are 
     compounded by Russia's political unpredictability. 
     Furthermore, START II cannot legally come into force until 
     START I has done so.
       But even if START II were ratified by the U.S. Congress, 
     were legally in force and were fully implemented by Russia, 
     Russia would still retain 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear 
     weapons by the year 2002, or by the year 2000 if the U.S. 
     provides substantial moneys and assistance to Russia. Most of 
     these Russian weapons would be mobile and reloadable to high-
     level multiple-warhead configurations. This inherently 
     threatening strategic reality would remain as described by 
     former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
     Colin Powell, speaking to senior Russian generals in 
     Moscow when START I was signed in 1991: ``Even with the 
     START treaty you will have the capability to destroy us in 
     30 minutes.''\31\ Against this threat, the Clinton 
     Administration's strategic disarmament gambles leave the 
     American people with questionable deterrent power and 
     without the safeguard of protection against strategic 
     missile attack.

  The Fifth Gamble: Forcing Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament on Ukraine

       America's fifth strategic gamble is that in implementing 
     the START treaties, the Administration has added to Russia's 
     strategic pressure on Ukraine and Eastern Europe.
       With Ukraine, as Zbigniew Brzezinski has noted, Russia can 
     be an empire, without Ukraine it cannot. Russian officials 
     understand this, refuse to acknowledge full Ukrainian 
     sovereignty if Ukraine retains nuclear weapons, and uniformly 
     demand the ``reintegration'' of Crimea and all of the rest of 
     Ukraine, a 52-million-strong nation the size of France, into 
     Moscow's ``Commonwealth.'' Toward that end, Russia demands 
     that all nuclear weapons in Ukraine be rapidly surrendered to 
     Russia, and Russia has rattled its nuclear saber at Ukraine 
     and demonstrated its ability to cut off Ukraine's vital 
     energy supplies.

               The Strategic Costs of Ukraine's Surrender

       Having given up 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia in 
     1992 in a futile effort to trade weapons for assured peace 
     and security, Ukraine's president and parliament have sought 
     two critical security steps in signing on to START I in 
     Lisbon in May 1992 and in ratifying START and preparing to 
     accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 1) ``step by 
     step'' Ukrainian nuclear reductions, with international 
     fiscal support and with internationally supervised 
     dismantlements of the more than 1,600 strategic weapons in 
     Ukraine demanded by a Russia which already had a five-to-one 
     nuclear strategic superiority over Ukraine; and 2) 
     international security guarantees of Ukraine's independence, 
     e.g., through Ukraine's membership in NATO.\32\ Russia 
     strongly opposed both of these conditions and in the January 
     1994 Trilateral Agreement between Russia, Ukraine and the 
     United States, President Clinton joined Russia's generals 
     in imposing rapid unilateral nuclear disarmament on 
     Ukraine.\33\
       A U.S. offer of $300 million came with nonbinding 
     ``security'' arrangements offered through the ``Partnership 
     for Peace'' and the terminally weak Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty. In return, Ukraine is to surrender the only decisive 
     lever it possesses to assure its future sovereignty and the 
     West loses a potent strategic buffer and deterrent against a 
     likely renewal of Russian military pressure on Eastern 
     Europe. As for NATO, Russia itself wants to be a member, but 
     with NATO to be placed under the consensus-determined 
     Conference on Security and Confidence Building in Europe 
     (CSCE) and thus rendered militarily ineffective.

  The Sixth Gamble: Counting on Legislation and Nuclear Purchases to 
                     Close the START Gap in Russia

       The sixth strategic gamble is to rely on recent 
     Congressional legislation and U.S.-Russian nuclear materials 
     agreements to close START's arms reduction gaps and to assure 
     the early dismantlement of Russia's strategic arsenals.
       The visionary ``Nuclear Threat Reduction'' Act initiated in 
     1991 and sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar 
     attempts to close the huge arms reduction gaps left by the 
     START treaties. Under this act, the United States Congress 
     had appropriated $1.2 billion by 1994, with $400 million more 
     to come in FY 1995, to dismantle nuclear (and chemical) 
     weapons in Russia and other successor states. But chemical 
     weapons dismantlements have made only a small dent in 
     Russia's CW stockpiles and the U.S. taxpayers' support for 
     storage and transportation of Russian nuclear weapons and 
     materials has thus far enhanced Russia's nuclear capability. 
     Bureaucratic confusion in Washington and Moscow and lack of 
     U.S. insistence on American presence during the nuclear 
     dismantlements we are paying for in Russia mean that few, if 
     any, nuclear weapons have been or are likely to be verifiably 
     dismantled in Russia in the near future.\34\ Under the 
     principles that `'we pay therefore we should inspect,'' and 
     that Russia lacks the assuance of Americas democratic 
     civilian controls, we should insist on the physical U.S. 
     supervision of Russian dismantlements, without granting 
     reciprocal inspections in the United States.

                  U.S.-Russian Nuclear Materials Deals

       January 1994 agreements with Russia for the U.S. purchase 
     of $12 billion in fissile (nuclear) materials rflect a 
     further effort to get beyond the flawed START treaties.\35\ 
     But while the new agreement potentially provides billions of 
     U.S. taxpayer dollars to Russian officials, many of whom are 
     likely to be inefficient or corrupt, it does not provide for 
     continuous American presence at nuclear plants or 
     dismantlement facilities and thus cannot come close to 
     assuring that we will have accurate data on inventories, 
     activities, violations, etc. Furthermore, even if fully 
     imlemented, the agreement would have only a marginal impact 
     on Russia's vast nuclear weapons stockpiles over the next 
     decade. As described below, the agreement also marks a 
     dangerous first step toward the international control and 
     elimination of American nuclear weapns production.

     The Seventh Gamble: Denuclearizing America's Deterrent Forces

       The seventh strategic gamble leaves the United States 
     incapable of producing or testing any nuclear weapons, 
     relying instead on fatally weak international arrangements 
     and the goodwill of other nations. Like the muddle-headed 
     anti-defense ``nuclear freeze'' proposals of an earlier day, 
     an intended result is to eliminate America's nuclear 
     deterrent in the foreseeable future. The unintended result 
     will be to increase global proliferation incentives.

       U.S. Nucler Weapons and Nuclear Materials Production Halts

       The United States stopped producing nuclear weapons 
     materials in 1991, has no active production capacity and no 
     longer makes the critical element tritium, without which many 
     of our weapons will be unuseable in some ten to twenty years. 
     As the base dissipates for our nuclear weapons materials, 
     experts, labs and industry, and in violation of informed 
     American opinion,\36\ America will lack a credible 
     deterrent or a timely strategic nuclear reconstitution 
     capability at the very time we can expect new nuclear 
     buildups and proliferation threats across the globe.

                       Banning Fissile Materials

       The January 1994 U.S.-Russian fissile materials agreement 
     reflects the Clinton Administration's high-risk intention 
     soon to place U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, and thus U.S. 
     security, under multilateral international control going well 
     beyond current limited voluntary U.S. participation in a 
     number of non-military International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA) safeguards. The new agreement provides U.S. visits to 
     Tomsk in Russia and, reportedly to the Pentagon's surprise, 
     Russian visits to the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in Texas; 
     it is seen as ``. . .`the beginning of an international 
     control regime over plutonium,' the basic building block of 
     nuclear weapons, an Administration official said.''\37\ The 
     Administration formally supports negotiation, at the Geneva 
     Conference on Disarmament, of a multilateral fissile material 
     production ban which would ``halt the production of plutonium 
     and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five 
     declared nuclear-weapons states.''\38\

         U.S. Denuclearization Increases Proliferation Dangers

       The Clinton Administration argues that U.S. 
     denuclearization and new anti-testing regimes foster 
     international arms control ``norms'' which reduce 
     proliferation incentives.\39\ Yet the opposite result is far 
     more likely since U.S. nuclear disarmament could prove a very 
     strong incentive for aggressive rogue state leaders (e.g., in 
     North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya) or for criminal groups in 
     Russia confident that even a limited arsenal of nuclear 
     weapons and longer-range missiles would gain them enormous 
     leverage in deterring and paralyzing us and our allies.
       For friendly nations (e.g., Japan, Germany, South Korea and 
     Taiwan) which have forgone nuclear weapons because they could 
     depend on an effective American nuclear umbrella, U.S. 
     denuclearization will inevitably produce increasing worry 
     about the U.S. umbrella's sufficiency and credibility. In 
     such circumstances, our friends, (and not just Israel) are 
     likely to believe it increasingly critical that they have 
     their own nuclear weapons to deter proliferating nuclear 
     threats.

                  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

       Iraq, North Korea and other states, and those who assist 
     them, have demonstrated that the ``norms'' supposedly 
     established by non-proliferation and anti-nuclear-testing 
     treaties are easy to violate or circumvent and can neither 
     deter nor protect against, those determined not to abide by 
     them. Yet, ``the President attaches the highest importance to 
     indefinite and unconditional extension'' of the fatally weak 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 at an April 
     1995 review conference.\40\ Here America's strategic gamble 
     is compounded by not insisting on first strengthening the 
     twenty-five year-old NPT and the NPT-related International 
     Atomic Energy Inspection Agency (IAEA) with inspections and 
     sanctions teeth to include compulsory inspection and 
     enforcement power against non-compliant states. The abuse of 
     NPT membership by such states, and their continuing deception 
     and denial activities, plus the reality that scores of non-
     signatory nations and non-state terrorist or criminal 
     organizations would remain beyond the pale of the treaty, 
     expose the NPT treaty as one of the single least effective 
     arms control arrangements in history.

                   The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

       Even weaker, less enforceable and more fateful than the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the illusory 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which the Clinton 
     Administration wants the United States to join no later than 
     1996. The CTBT would permanently extend the high-risk U.S. 
     policy ``temporarily'' halting even the small underground 
     tests permitted by the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). 
     Even in the post-Cold War period, senior U.S. defense 
     officials, reportedly including President Clinton's Deputy 
     Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, have considered such tests 
     indispensable to maintaining the safety and effectiveness of 
     the nuclear weapons on which the U.S. and those relying on 
     its nuclear umbrella will continue to depend for 
     deterrence in the foreseeable future.\41\ Yet the 
     ineffective CTB would come into force and would bind the 
     United States to stop testing, and thus rapidly to 
     denuclearize, even if adopted by only a third of the 
     world's nations. This would reverse the understanding of 
     past American presidents and other senior officials that 
     the CTB's lack of effective verification and enforcement 
     mechanisms against violators would bring enormous 
     instabilities, further increased by America's expected 
     unilateral CTB compliance in a dangerous nuclear 
     world.\42\

     The Eighth Gamble: ``Banning'' Chemical and Biological Weapons

       The eighth strategic gamble is the failure to strengthen 
     existing treaties on chemical weapons (CW) and biological 
     weapons (BW), while supporting ineffective, but very 
     expensive new steps likely to weaken American defenses 
     against such weapons.
       The United States has forsworn the use of chemical weapons, 
     no longer produces them, and is dismantling its stocks. 
     Meanwhile, some twenty-five nations are officially estimated 
     to have chemical weapons, and Iraq, Libya, and Russia have 
     notably violated the weak existing CW conventions of 1925 and 
     1972 forbidding CW use. Russia, which has a poor record on CW 
     and BW compliance and officially admits it cannot implement 
     the treaty's dismantlement schedule, has recently imprisoned 
     some of its own experts for telling the world about current 
     Russian CW/BW coverups.\43\
       Notwithstanding the fateful strategic implications of such 
     cheating, which has continued since the Bush Administration 
     over-optimistically signed a weak new treaty, the Clinton 
     Administration is pressing the U.S. Senate to ratify the 
     exceptionally expensive and fatally flawed convention for a 
     supposedly ``comprehensive'' global ban on possession of such 
     weapons and their precursors.

                  Neither Comprehensive Nor Effective

       As detailed by defense experts, the proposed CW treaty will 
     be neither comprehensive nor effective; in today's world, its 
     illusions and its price would, indeed, be dangerous to our 
     security.\44\ It excludes major chemical warfare agents used 
     in World War I (chlorine and hydrogen cyanide), lacks 
     mandatory sanctions, does not require inspection of 
     suspect sites, and would bind the United States even if 
     adopted by only 65 of the world's nations, thus leaving 
     numerous rogue regimes outside it nominal scope. Although 
     the treaty cannot be effectively enforced abroad, it would 
     surely be fully, even if unilaterally, implemented by the 
     U.S. and would call into question the possession of even a 
     small U.S. CW stockpile required for defensive anti-CW 
     testing. Treaty implementation would require 
     extraordinarily intrustive and expensive regulations and 
     inspections of the U.S. chemical industry and would 
     require massive U.S. technical and financial support of 
     Russia's multi-billion-dollar CW dismantlement costs.
       The United States long ago forswore development of 
     biological weapons, but has had no demonstrated success in 
     enforcing the existing 1925 and 1972 BW conventions against 
     violators such as Russia (as admitted by Boris Yeltsin), 
     Iraq, Iran and Libya. Now, the Geneva-based Conference on 
     Disarmament is to consider twenty-one ``confidence building 
     measures'' to strengthen the BW conventions. But although 
     none of the proposed measures could make a ``ban'' 
     effectively verifiable or enforcable, the Clinton 
     Administration is placing much confidence in this fatally 
     illusory effort ``to strengthen the international norm 
     against a scourge that could well become the next weapon of 
     mass destruction of choice.''\45\


      DISMANTLING THE STRATEGIC TRIAD, DENYING STRATEGIC DEFENSES

        The Ninth Gamble: Dismantling America's Strategic Triad

       The ninth strategic gamble is to cut deeply into the marrow 
     of America's strategic triad of air-, land-, and sea-forces 
     which have maintained strategic peace for four decades and 
     which remain an indispensable deterrent in a nuclear world, 
     particularly one which includes another, quite turbulent, 
     nuclear superpower.\46\
       The entire U.S. strategic nuclear bomber force is off alert 
     and will be reduced to at most 20 nuclear-armed B-2 
     ``stealth'' bombers, of which only two were operational in 
     mid-1994. The United States is planning no new bombers and 
     the bulk of the nuclear weapons to be carried by U.S. bombers 
     will be old-style gravity bombs rather than precision guided 
     missiles. Fewer than 50 B-52H bombers and 72 B-1B bombers 
     will remain operational, but all will be converted from 
     nuclear-armed strategic roles to conventionally-armed non-
     strategic aircraft. ``Reconstitution reserve'' bombers will 
     lack ground crews, training programs and spare parts.\47\
       The U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missile 
     (ICBM) force is losing its ability to deter potential Russian 
     nuclear blackmail by holding most of Russia's missile force 
     at risk. It could also have a future problem deterring a 
     strategically robust China. All 50 U.S. MX ICBMs, each with 
     10 advanced warheads capable of defeating Russia's hardest 
     silos, are being eliminated, as are all 350 U.S. Minuteman II 
     ICBMs. Only 500 Minuteman IIIs will remain deployed, each 
     ``downloaded'' from three warheads to a single warhead and 
     vulnerable to a first-strike threat, since none will be 
     mobile and none will be protected by strategic defenses. 
     China, in contrast, is developing mobile ICBMs and Russia 
     will retain many of its mobile ICBMs, has SA-10 and mobile 
     SA-12 strategic anti-missile systems developed around Moscow, 
     and has the production base for deploying more mobile 
     missiles and a national strategic defense system.
       U.S. Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) dropped 
     from 33 in 1990 to 16 in 1994 and may drop further to only 10 
     or 11. Through elimination, retirement and ``downloading,'' 
     the total warheads carried on these submarines' missiles will 
     be reduced by about half, not all of which will be the modern 
     Trident D-5 system which can hold even the hardest silos at 
     risk. The United States is planning no new ballistic missile 
     submarines or new submarine-launched ballistic missiles while 
     Russia is reported to be developing a new submarine-launched 
     ballistic missile, had 66 ballistic missile submarines 
     deployed in 1992 and was expected to retain 24 Delta IV an 6 
     Typhoon submarines under START I. U.S. attack submarine 
     numbers are being cut in half to the low 40s, with only one 
     or two new Seawolf submarines assured, while Russia will 
     maintain a far larger, modernized fleet. Even with START 
     II, according to Rear Admiral Thomas Ryan, director of the 
     U.S. Navy's submarine requirements office: ``in ten years 
     we are likely to face a Russian submarine force that is 
     comparable in quality to our own and may exceed ours in 
     numbers by about 40 percent.''\48\

               C\3\I, Launch Capacity, Computer Security

       Major U.S. command, control, communications and 
     intelligence (C3I) and satellite and satellite launch rocket 
     programs that support our triad are being cut or eliminated, 
     including advanced technology systems based in space.\49\ The 
     United States no longer even maintains ``Looking Glass,'' its 
     flying strategic command post, constantly airborne. In 
     strategic intelligence, according to CIA Director Woolsey: 
     ``The Intelligence Community has reduced its resources 
     devoted to Russian military development across the board. 
     But, in reality, there are now no fewer questions being put 
     to us by the Executive Branch and Congress. . . . ''\50\ A 
     serious new danger to U.S. security, according to the Senate 
     Arms Services Committee, is that through the Internet 
     ``information highway'': ``Over the last six months, unknown 
     intruders have repeatedly gained entry into computers and 
     computer networks at numerous, sensitive military 
     installations. The intruders took control of computers that 
     directly support deployed forces and research and 
     development, installed capabilities to ensure they could 
     reenter the computers at will, read and stole data files 
     (including software under development for future weapons 
     systems) and, in some cases, destroyed data files.''\51\

                        Detargeting, Retargeting

       While visiting Moscow on January 14, 1994, President 
     Clinton agreed to order the ``detargeting'' of all U.S. 
     strategic missiles away from Russia--with the targeting 
     information removed from the Trident I and Trident II sea-
     based missiles and the MX ICBM, and with the Minuteman III 
     ICBM set to ocean-area targets. Intended to be only 
     ``symbolic,'' ``confidence-building'' measure this is, in 
     fact, a high-risk, step which sharply reduces U.S. strategic 
     confidence and deterrent capability, since the United 
     States has no effective verification or enforcement 
     mechanisms to ensure corresponding retargeting by Russia's 
     generals.\52\ America's democratic political system makes 
     it very difficult to contemplate resumption of U.S. 
     targeting of Russia's missile bases, even in a crisis. 
     Russia's military commanders, in contrast, lack comparable 
     democratic civilian oversight or debate. They can either 
     continue to target us at will or can retarget temporarily 
     ``detargeted'' missiles against us again in a matter of 
     minutes.

    Keeping Bombers Off Alert and Removing Tactical Nuclear Weapons

       In a 1991 decision that should reexamined, the Bush 
     Administration took all U.S. strategic bombers off alert and 
     removed all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from 
     operational forces, a substantial loss of U.S. contingency 
     options. Corresponding Russian actions, if any, cannot be 
     verified with confidence and, even if fully implemented, 
     would be politically very much easier for Russia's generals 
     to reverse than would be the case in the United States.

 The Tenth Strategic Gamble: Clinton's ``MAD'' Opposition to Strategic 
                            Missile Defenses

       The tenth U.S. strategic disarmament gamble is the 
     President's radical opposition to strategic defense systems 
     and to the increased protection and strategic stability they 
     could uniquely provide to the American people and their 
     friends and allies around the globe.
       This deadly gamble rests on the Clinton Administration's 
     faith in the long-broken\53\ and long-obsolete Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and its associated Cold War 
     doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). During the Cold 
     War, MAD supporters such as Robert McNamara and the self-
     styled arms control lobby argued that the threat of mutual 
     nuclear annihilation was the most effective deterrent to 
     nuclear war. This awful Cold War theory assumed the dubious 
     ethics of nuclear suicide and gambled on the existence of 
     rational authorities in Moscow and an unbreakably tight 
     control over the nuclear chain of command. The 
     Strangelovian MAD theory was bad for defense during the 
     Cold War and today remains the Cold War's single most 
     dangerous strategic relic. MAD cannot account for Russia's 
     breach of the ABM treaty in 1983, the lack of assured 
     control of Russia's nuclear weapons, the breakdown of 
     deterrence in recent Middle East wars, or the accelerating 
     global risks of proliferation.

                       Gutting Strategic Defenses

       Bound by the missile-Maginot line ABM Treaty and its MAD 
     theory, and joining the Russian generals in walking back 
     Boris Yeltsin's 1992 endorsement of a global defense 
     system,\54\ the Clinton Administration has cut by more than 
     half the anti-missile program requests of the Bush 
     Administration for the next five years. Bush proposed $39 
     billion to field a global defense system against limited 
     attack beginning in the mid-1990s, as required by the Missile 
     Defense Act of 1991 passed by the U.S. Congress in the wake 
     of the Gulf War. The Clinton Administration has cut this to 
     $18 billion or less to pay for a very restricted (reduced 
     THAAD) system barely able to counter even limited tactical or 
     theater threats and rendered deliberately incapable of 
     defending the American people and key allies against 
     strategic missile attack, whether purposeful, unauthorized or 
     accidental.\55\ In little-noticed negotiations leading up to 
     the September 1994 U.S.-Russia summit, the Administration 
     granted Russian generals at the Standing Consultative 
     Commission in Geneva veto over advanced ``theater'' defenses 
     based on the ground and on any advanced defenses, theater or 
     strategic, based on the sea, in the air or in space.\56\
       The ABM Treaty provides that a signatory can withdraw from 
     it with six months notice on grounds of jeopardized supreme 
     interests.\57\ Given mounting nuclear dangers and the long 
     lead times required to deploy strategic missile defenses, 
     such a step would end MAD and would surely be the logical 
     post-Cold War strategic update of the Missile Defense Act of 
     1991 calling for early defenses and a secure response to 
     volatile missile threats in Russia and other global hot 
     spots.


         bottom up, belly up, or bottom line american defenses?

       The Clinton Administartion's strategic gambles reflected in 
     its 1993 ``Bottom Up Defense Review,'' its FY 1994 and FY 
     1995 defense budgets, its nuclear posture reviews and its 
     missile defense and arms control proposals, turn out to be 
     more like a ``Belly Up Review.'' They are deadly in their 
     unrealistic perspective of the post-Cold War world and in 
     their ``emperor's-new-clothes'' illusions about what amounts 
     to a ``lowest common defense denominator'' policy which 
     underlies their ``cooperative defense'' and disarmament 
     approach even toward the world's non-democratic and rogue 
     regimes. If, as is more likely than not, these strategic 
     assumptions are proved wrong, and the strategic gambles are 
     lost, America will lack the necessary defense safeguards.
       America and the American people are worth protecting. They 
     urgently require in-depth, blinders-off reviews of global 
     realities, of U.S. options, and of the means of reversing our 
     nation's deadly strategic gambles. Independent red-team 
     reassessments and critical Congressional hearings would help, 
     supported by a Congress awakening to new global dangers and 
     by the concerns of an increasingly security conscious public. 
     In the tenth straight year of declining U.S. defense 
     investment and at a time of a MAD strategy and of precipitous 
     further cuts which are reducing U.S. defense investment below 
     pre-Pearl Harbor levels, it is time to recall that weakness 
     invariably provokes aggression and that the task of providing 
     for our people's common defense must quickly get the priority 
     attention and resources it deserves.\58\ Given the very real 
     threats we face and the catastrophic risks of national 
     defense failures, anything less will catapult America into 
     the deadliest of the globe's gathering storms.


                               footnotes

     \1\The Clinton Administration's Bottom Up Review: Forces for 
     a New Era, published on September 1, 1993 by Secretary of 
     Defense Les Aspin's Pentagon, begins as follows: ``The Cold 
     War is gone. The Soviet Union is no longer. The threat that 
     drove our defense decision-making . . . is gone.'' Its maps 
     of potential crisis or threat areas around the globe exclude 
     the entire area of the former Soviet Union. The 
     Administration's first Secretary of Defense Annual Report to 
     the Congress, published in January 1994, follows this 
     pattern.
     \2\R. James Woolsey, Testimony to Governmental Affairs 
     Committee, United States Senate, February 24, 1993. More 
     recent assessments by Woolsey and other senior officials 
     contain essentially the same numbers.
     \3\Lawrence Gershwin, Senior Analyst for Strategic Forces, 
     Central Intelligence Agency, Center for Security Policy, 
     Washington, DC, symposium on strategic defense, March 23, 
     1993. Prepared statement.
     \4\Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the 
     President and the Congress, Department of Defense, February 
     1992, p. 5.
     \5\William Clements, Director, Nonproliferation and Export 
     Controls, National Security Council and Barry E. Carter, 
     Acting Under Secretary for the Bureau of Export 
     Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; statements at 
     American Bar Association conference on ``Nonproliferation of 
     Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' Washington, DC, June 10, 1994. 
     Among numerous criticisms of the Administration's laxity, is 
     one entitled ``Don't Sell our Spy Technology,'' which states 
     that ``the Administration went too far in liberalizing sales 
     of satellite imaging technology itself, as well as 
     sophisticated machine tools and large-rocket technology, 
     which are likely to be put to military use. And it missed a 
     chance to require companies to disclose the sales now 
     exempted from licensing, as well as the identity of ultimate 
     buyers, enabling it to keep track of technology flows. . . . 
     The Administration has not just waived controls on many dual-
     use exports. It has also established new administrative 
     procedures to expedite licensing decisions. . . . There is 
     need for vigilance.  . . .'' New York Times, March 12, 1994, 
     p. 20. On congressional concerns, see Philip Finnegan and 
     Theresa Hitchins, ``Control of Dual-Use Exports Splits Two 
     House Committees,'' Defense News, June 20-26, 1994, p. 10.
     \6\See Note 1 above.
     \7\Cheney, DoD Annual Report--1992, op. cit., p. 2. A year 
     later, Cheney's DoD Annual Report--1993 set it as U.S. policy 
     to preclude ``the reemergence of a global threat,'' (p. 3), 
     and to have sufficient ``reconstitution'' capability to 
     ``cope with'' a ``global threat from a single aggressor or 
     some emergent alliance of aggressive regional powers'' (p. 
     6).
     \8\Because of continued Russian military secrecy, and 
     inadequate U.S. intelligence, the potentially life-or-death 
     issue of the number of nuclear weapons now in Russia (and the 
     other nuclear successor republics) remains a mystery, but is 
     likely to be greater than the 9,000 strategic and 18,000 
     tactical/theater weapons numbers generally used by U.S. 
     officials. In 1993, Russia's Minister for Atomic Energy, 
     Victor Mikhailov, revealed that the Soviet Union's mid-1980s 
     nuclear arsenal included 45,000 warheads, i.e., 15,000 more 
     than had been estimated by the U.S. Central Intelligence 
     Agency. See Bill Gertz, ``Russia's Nuclear Admission Confirms 
     Hawk's Fears,'' Washington Times, October 7, 1993.
     \9\``New Foe on Right May Challenge for Presidency,'' 
     Washington Times, December 14, 1993, p. A-1. Zhirinovsky has 
     similarly publicly threatened Germany and Japan with nuclear 
     annihilation.
     \10\The charismatic General Alexander Lebed commands Russia's 
     9,000-man 14th Army in Moldova in support of pro-Russia 
     elements in the ``Trans-Dniester Republic,'' an enclave in 
     Moldova just west of Ukraine. Using the pseudo ``Republic'' 
     as a military base, the 14th Army has pulled, or pushed 
     Moldova back into union with Russia through Moscow's 
     Commonwealth of Independent States. General Boris Gromov, 
     considered by some a future ``Red Napoleon,'' is currently 
     Russia's Deputy Defense Minister. Alexander Rutskoi, better 
     known in the United States as Boris Yeltsin's former Vice 
     President, who led the parliamentary revolt and coup attempt 
     against Yeltsin in October 1993, is a former Soviet general. 
     All three are so-called ``Afghanistan'' generals, war heroes 
     who energetically pursued the Soviet Union's aggressive war 
     from 1979 to 1989.
     \11\The doctrine, an apparent payoff to Russia's hardline 
     military and KGB elements, was approved by President Yeltsin 
     and Russia's National Security Council on October 4, 1993, as 
     street battles were raging between forces backing Yeltsin and 
     those backing the hardliners. The doctrine was publicized in 
     November 1993, but few Western officials have commented on 
     it. The author's analysis is based, inter alia, on Radio Free 
     Europe/Radio Liberty's invaluable Daily Reports. The doctrine 
     includes the reversal of Brezhnev's pledge not to be the 
     first to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power. In 
     addition to strategic programs, other payoffs to the military 
     reported by RFE/RL include Yeltsin's support of doubled 
     military wages, exemption from income taxes, and major 
     procurement programs to equip modern, highly mobile forces.
     \12\On Russia's chemical and biological weapons violations, 
     see discussion in Gamble #8 and in Note 43.
     \13\Gershwin, op. cit. Also see Lt. General James Clapper, 
     Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency: ``Currently, the 
     strategic forces are relatively well financed and adequately 
     trained to perform their mission, and their modernization 
     efforts are continuing,'' public testimony to the Senate 
     Committee on Intelligence, January 25, 1994.
     \14\On Russia's strategic defense veto, see Gamble #10. On 
     Russian strategic exercises, see William Gertz, ``Russian 
     Nuclear Exercises Include Mock Hit on U.S.,'' Washington 
     Times, September 14, 1993, pp. 1, 24.
     \15\Russia's network of superhardened deep tunnels and 
     command and control bunkers is designed for nuclear war-
     fighting and survival and remains strategically significant. 
     In January 1994 President Clinton ordered the October 1, 1994 
     shut down of the single (non-hardened) U.S. ``Continuity of 
     Government'' facility established by President Reagan in 
     1983. See Tim Weiner, ``Pentagon Book for Doomsday is to be 
     Closed,'' New York Times, April 18, 1994, pp. A1, 12.
     \16\Gertz, op. cit., p. 24.
     \17\See Michael Dobbs, ``During the Soviet Coup, Who Held 
     Nuclear Control: Gorbachev Lost Command, Probers Say,'' 
     Washington Post, August 23, 1992, pp. A1, 24. According to 
     Dobbs, the Russian General Staff ``investigators argue that 
     it also would have been technically possible for nuclear 
     commanders to launch a first strike without the president's 
     permission.''(p. 24).
     \18\In 1993 Yeltsin labeled Russia ``a superpower of crime,'' 
     and in 1994 described the situation as having gotten worse. 
     (See e.g., Candice Hughes, ``Yeltsin: Russia a `Superpower of 
     Crime','' Washington Times, June 7, 1994, p. A12. Freeh has 
     testified to the Senate Government Affairs Committee that 
     these organized crime groups pose ``a mounting threat to the 
     safety and well-being of Americans, not only because of the 
     crimes but also because the groups could obtain nuclear 
     weapons materials or a completed nuclear bomb. Such stolen 
     weapons could be sold potentially to terrorists who could use 
     them against us.'' Cited by R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Freeh Warns 
     of a New Russian Threat,'' Washington Post, May 26, 1994.
     \19\R. James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 
     House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 27, 1994, prepared 
     remarks, pp. 3, 4, 9.
     \20\Craig R. Whitney, ``Germans Seize 3rd Atom Sample, 
     Smuggled by Plane from Russia,'' New York Times, August 14, 
     1994, pp. 1, 12.
     \21\The Bush Administration's FBI Director, William Sessions 
     publicly spoke out on intensified Russian intelligence 
     activities, but Clinton Administration officials, optimistic 
     about Russia and burned by the Ames case, have said little in 
     public. A detailed assessment demonstrating that little has 
     changed since Soviet days, is provided in ``The KGB & Its 
     Successors,'' an article by J. Michael Waller, Senior Fellow, 
     American Foreign Policy Council, in Perspective, a 
     publication of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
     Ideology and Policy, Boston University, April/May 1994, pp. 
     5-9.
     \22\Friedrich Kuehn, ``New Aims Keep East European Spies 
     Busy,'' Washington Times, June 6, 1994, p. A13.
     \23\Zbigniew Brzezinski points to the invidious problem as 
     follows: ``. . . the joint Clinton-Yeltsin communique at the 
     January [1994] summit did not dispute Russia's interpretation 
     of its `peacekeeping' mission in the `near abroad.' Going 
     still further, President Clinton, addressing the Russian 
     people, not only described the Russian military as having 
     been `instrumental in stabilizing' the political situation in 
     Georgia, but even added that `you will be more likely to be 
     involved in some of these areas near you, just like the 
     United States has been involved in the last several years in 
     Panama and Grenada near our area'.'' Brzezinski, ``The 
     Premature Partnership,'' Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, 
     p. 70.
     \24\Cited by Brzezinski, ibid., p. 76.
     \25\China's nuclear tests have been widely reported. On 
     China's strategic programs, note: ``The Chinese have deployed 
     a small force of nuclear-tipped ICBMS, some of which are 
     aimed at the United States, as well as a small force of 
     intermediate-range ballistic missiles, that could be targeted 
     against our allies and our forces in Asia. China plans to 
     update this force with new missiles. We expect that a new 
     mobile ICBM and additional regional nuclear forces will 
     probably be fielded during the 1990's.'' Lawrence Gershwin, 
     CIA, Center for Security Policy symposium, March 23, 1993, 
     op. cit.
     \26\E.g., on the Administration-approved sale of advanced 
     engines: ``Within the Department of Defense Technology 
     Security Administration, specialists are worried that the 
     engine is perfectly suited to powering a long-range cruise 
     missile. CIA studies have warned that . . .China will gain 
     high-quality military technology, which could be used for a 
     new generation of cruise missiles . . . [which] would put 
     most of the rest of Asia within range of Chinese nuclear 
     attack.'' Elaine Shannon and Kenneth R. Timmerman, 
     ``Confounded by the Chinese Puzzle: A Prospective Arms Sale 
     Leaves Beijing  and Much of Washington Mystified About U.S. 
     Policy,'' Time, April 25, 1994, p. 39. Neither President 
     Clinton's statement nor Secretary of State Christopher's 
     report of May 26, 1994 on the renewal of MFN trade status for 
     China, mentions nuclear tests, arms trade, sanctions 
     weaknesses, etc., as issues of concern to the United States.
     \27\Patrick E. Tyler, ``China Explodes H-Bomb Underground as 
     Test,'' New York Times, June 11, 1994, p. 7. According to 
     Tyler, ``the overall improvement of China's strategic 
     weaponry only adds to regional and Wesern concerns about the 
     nature of China's political-military development in the 
     future.''
     \28\Les Aspin, Annual DoD Report  1994, op. cit., p. 45.
     \29\For a detailed critique of the START I and START II 
     treaties and the Catch-22 relationship between these treaties 
     and other agreements, see Sven F. Kraemer, ``START; Advise, 
     Don't Consent,'' The Nataional Interest, Fall 1992. The 
     realities of the hard-line Soviet military's stance, later 
     manifested in their 1991 coup attempt but neglected by the 
     Bush Administration as it was pressing towards START, are 
     described in Sven F. Kraemer, ``Soft-pedaling Soviet Stance 
     Ignores Confrontation Peril,'' Signal, December 1990.
     \3\Mobile missiles are ideal for cheating and breakout 
     scenarios and for launching attacks with good chances of 
     escaping counter attack. In violation of the Intermediate 
     Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, the Soviet Union 
     successfully hid 72 shorter-range mobile SS-23 missile 
     launchers (and probably twice that many missiles) in East 
     Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria--missiles not discovered 
     until after the anti-Communist revolutions. In Iraq, some 
     5,000 U.S. Air Force anti-SCUD sorties were unable to 
     discover a single one of Iraq's mobile SCUD launchers. In 
     Russia's eleven time zones it is relatively easy to hide 
     extra mobile missiles and to confuse the START categories of 
     which are ``retired,'' ``reduced'' on ``exercises,'' etc.
     \31\Quoted by Eleanor Randolph, ``Powell: Soviet Military 
     `Oversized','' Washington Post, July 25, 1991.
     \32\See text of Lisbon Protocol to START Treaty and 
     accompanying side letter from Ukrainian President Kravchuck. 
     On ratification issues also Paul Bedard, ``Clinton Warns 
     Ukraine on START Pact,'' Washington Times, November 30, 1993, 
     pp. Al, 8.
     \33\The Ukrainian surrender to the two nuclear superpowers is 
     notably clear in the opening remarks of Presidents Clinton 
     and Kravchuck at a January 12, 1994 press conference in Kiev 
     and in the text of the Trilateral Statement and Annex issued 
     by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine 
     in Moscow, January 14, 1994. See U.S. Department of State, 
     Dispatch Supplement, January 1994, Vol. 5, Supplement 1, pp. 
     13-19. The Partnership for Peace concept explicitly rejected 
     NATO-type guarantees; the false security of the NPT is 
     discussed in Gamble #9. Ukraine's new Presendent, Leonid 
     Kuchma, who took office in July 1994, is considered pro-
     Russian.
     \24\On non-fulfillment of Nunn-Lugar's promise see, inter 
     alia, the most recent ``Semi-Annual Report on Weapon 
     Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and 
     Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union,'' dated April 
     30, 1994 and sent to Vice President Gore and the U.S. 
     Congress on May 14, 1994 by Secretary of Defense William 
     Perry. The report indicated that as of April only $130 
     million of the funds had even been obligated, that ``the FSU 
     states still have the ability to produce weapons of mass 
     destruction and their components,'' that ``conversion'' funds 
     were just ``seed money,'' that the Moscow International 
     Science and Technology Center [to seek peaceful nuclear 
     research] was just beginning its work and that the Ukrainian 
     center had not yet been established.
     \35\See statement issued by White House, Office of the Press 
     Secretary, Moscow, January 14, 1994. U.S. Department of 
     State, Dispatches, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
     \36\According to a scientific poll conducted between June 
     1993 and March 1994 of 1,226 scientists at U.S. nuclear 
     laboratories and of 1,155 members of the Union of Concerned 
     Scientists: ``59 percent thought it was not feasible to 
     eliminate nuclear weapons in the next 25 years. But if that 
     occurred, 85 percent thought it would be extremely difficult 
     to keep other countries from rebuilding them. The threat of 
     nuclear terrorism now and in the future also was rated 
     high.'' See Associated Press report, cited in ``Nuclear Fears 
     Rise Among Americans Despite Soviet Fall,'' Washington Times, 
     July 8, 1994.
     \37\On the Pentagon's surprise on the Russian inspections, 
     see Thomas W. Lippman and R. Jeffrey Smith, ``Arms Wrestling 
     with the Pentagon,'' Washington Post, August 4, 1994, p. 29. 
     On the Administration's building block view, see Thomas W. 
     Lippman, ``Accord Set on Nuclear Inspections,'' Washington 
     Post, March 16, 1994, p. 14.
     \38\John D. Hollum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency, Address to the Geneva-based Conference on 
     Disarmament, January 25, 1994, U.S. Department of State, 
     Dispatches, Vol. 5, No. 5., p. 44.
     \39\Ibid, pp. 43-44.
     \40\U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Issues Brief, 
     ``Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,'' March 13, 1994, p. 4.
     \41\``Deutch has pressed for a continuation of small-scale 
     nuclear tests and wants the Energy Department to invest 
     immediately in a new facility to produce tritium, a key 
     nuclear weapons ingredient, on the assumption that the U.S. 
     arsenal will not go much lower than current projected 
     levels.'' Thomas W. Lippman and R. Jeffrey Smith,``Arms 
     Wrestling . . .'' op. cit. In a letter to the Clinton 
     Administration's anti-nuclear Secretary of Energy, Hazel R. 
     O'Leary, it is reported, ``Deutch questioned whether the 
     Energy Department was allocating enough money to the weapons 
     program `to maintain the technological capability that is 
     required for future nuclear weapons missions'.'' Ibid.
     \42\The Reagan and Bush Administrations, for example adhered 
     to the ultimate goal of a CTB only in the context of a world 
     of effective verification and in which America no longer 
     needed to rely on nuclear deterrence, conditions they and 
     most of their senior defense colleagues understood as 
     essentially utopian. The Bush Administration's last major 
     policy position on nuclear testing was announced in July 1992 
     and described as follows by Secretary of Defense Cheney in 
     his Annual Report to the Congress in January 1993, pp. 15-16. 
     ``The policy stated that as long as nuclear weapons and 
     nuclear deterrence continue to be important elements of U.S. 
     and NATO security strategy, the United States would need to 
     conduct an underground nuclear testing program. However, we 
     would restrict the purpose . . . to maintain and improve the 
     safety and reliability of our forces. We do not anticipate 
     under currently foreseen circumstances conducting more than 
     six nuclear tests per year. We also do not anticipate 
     conducting more than three tests per year above 35 
     kilotons.'' Cheney also reported the Administration's 
     opposition to September 1992 Congressional restrictions 
     proposing a five test per year limit until October 1996 and a 
     ban on tests after that date unless another state tested 
     after that time. Said Cheney: ``. . . the United States must 
     conduct a modest number of nuclear weapons tests to ensure 
     the safety and reliability of our forces.''
     \43\Each of the Reagan and Bush Administration's 
     Congressionally mandated annual reports on Soviet/Russian 
     noncompliance with arms control agreements identified serious 
     violations of the CW and BW conventions. In 1993 the Russian 
     scientist Vil Mirzayanov was imprisoned for revealing 
     Moscow's continued development of binary weapons. See J. 
     Michael Waller, ``Trials of a New Russian Dissident,'' Wall 
     Street Journal, February 4, 1994. In March 1994 Valery 
     Menshikov, a consultant of Russia's Security Council, exposed 
     a major Russian military cover up of hidden stocks and false 
     data. See Marcus Warren, ``Russian Admits Deception on 
     Chemical Arms Stocks,'' Washington Times, March 21, 1994, p. 
     8. Also see Associated Press report, ``Russia Lags on 
     Destroying Chemical Weapons, GAO Reports,'' Washington Post, 
     April 11, 1994, p. 20.
     \44\In his September 1993 United Nations address President 
     Clinton urged that the treaty enter into force by January 
     1995, requiring ratification and deposit of treaty 
     instruments with the U.N. Secretary General by July 17, 1994. 
     Critics, all former senior Department of Defense officials, 
     were for the first time permitted to testify on the treaty 
     before the Senate, at a Foreign Relations Committee hearing 
     on June 9, 1994. See the testimony of Kathleen Bailey, 
     Amoretta Hoeber and Frank Gaffney. Detailed treaty critiques 
     are available through the Center for Security Policy (Issues 
     Papers) and The Heritage Foundation (a study by Baker 
     Spring).
     \45\John Hollum, Director ACDA, op. cit., p. 45.
     \46\The cited numbers in this section of text are derived 
     from official sources including Secretary of Defense 
     briefings on the ``Bottom Up Review,'' the Secretary's Annual 
     Report to the Congress, the Department of Defense Budget 
     Briefings and Congressional hearings on the U.S. defense 
     budget.
     \47\The general numbers on bombers are provided in the 
     Clinton Administration's Bottom Up Review, Annual Defense 
     Report, budget proposals, etc. A comprehensive discussion of 
     roles, options, short-falls, etc. was provided by Air Force 
     officers and private defense experts at a ``Roundtable on the 
     Future of the Manned Bomber'' sponsored by the Center for 
     Security Policy, in Washington, D.C. on June 8, 1994.
     \48\Cited by Robert Holzer, ``U.S. Fears New Russian Sub 
     Threat,'' Defense News, June 20-26, 1994, p. 3.
     \49\To take one example, according to the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee's Report on the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for FY 1995, June 14, 1994, at p. 87: ``The 
     Secretary [of Defense] responded by limiting additional 
     defense support program (DSP) satellite procurement to one 
     satellite; cancelling the follow-on early warning system 
     (FEWS); initiating a cheaper alternative to FEWS . . . and 
     reduced the scope of the Brilliant Eyes mid-course tracking 
     program.''
     \50\R. James Woolsey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 
     Testimony on START Treaty, Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee, June 24, 1993.
     \51\Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Report 
     on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994, June 
     14, 1994, p. 111.
     \52\The official U.S. statement issued in Moscow provides 
     this information along with the note that ``Russia has told 
     the United States that their detargeting measures are 
     comparable.'' (Emphasis added).
     \53\For the details of the Soviet violations of the ABM 
     Treaty and a discussion of continued U.S. weakness and self-
     deception in failing to insist on compliance with valid 
     existing arms control treaties, see Sven F. Kraemer, ``The 
     Krasnoyarsk Saga,'' Strategic Review, Winter 1990, pp. 25-38.
     \54\On January 29, 1992 Yeltsin stated that ``the time has 
     come to consider creating a global defense system for the 
     world community. It could be based on a reorientation of the 
     U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. . . .'' For an extended 
     discussion, see Keith Payne, et al., ``Evolving Russian Views 
     on Defense . . .,'' Strategic Review, Winter 1993, pp. 61-72. 
     While Yeltsin's position, subsequently rejected by his 
     generals, endorses a joint U.S.-Russian program rather than 
     an American program, it reflects mutual concerns about global 
     proliferation, unauthorized launches, etc.
     \55\America's future THAAD will have less capability than 
     Russia's currently deployed SA-12, or the commercial version 
     of the SA-12, the S-300, a fact touted by Russian arms 
     salesmen. (See U.S. Government publication JPRS-TAC-94-L, 
     March 31, 1994, p. 34 quoting an article by Aleksander 
     Savelyev.) Strategic ballistic missiles have velocities over 
     7 km/sec as they attack their targets on the ground. The 
     Russian SCC proposal (which the U.S. negotiator agreed to in 
     May 1994), limits defensive missiles to a velocity of only 3 
     km/second and to an ability to counter missiles coming at us 
     at the rate of less than 5 km/sec. This U.S. concession, if 
     approved by the U.S. Senate, and as now reflected in U.S. 
     development and testing programs, would mark a deliberate MAD 
     decision permanently to prevent our government from 
     protecting the American people against strategic missile 
     attack.
     \56\See ``Wallop Says U.S. Offered Russia a Permanent Space 
     Defense Ban,'' Aerospace Daily, May 4, 1994, p. 185B; and 
     Theresa Hutchins and Robert Holzer, ``DoD Protest Mars 
     Missile Talks With Russia,'' Defense News, June 20-26, 1994.
     \57\In a May 9, 1972 U.S. Statement on ``Withdrawal from the 
     ABM Treaty,'' Ambassador Gerald Smith declared that: ``If an 
     agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive 
     arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. 
     supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it 
     would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM 
     Treaty.'' (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms 
     Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1990, p. 165.) Twenty-two 
     years later, Russia was still modernizing rather than 
     eliminating large numbers of strategic offensive arms under 
     the START treaties (which are not in force), and no strategic 
     offensive arms limitations were being achieved with regard to 
     global proliferation. These extraordinary developments very 
     clearly jeopardize our supreme national security interests 
     and require putting aside the long-breached ABM Treaty and 
     committing to the accelerated deployment of U.S. strategic 
     defenses.
     \58\U.S. defense funding, materiel and readiness short-falls 
     are becoming increasingly evident. Bill Clinton's pre-
     election declaration to cut an additional $60 billion from 
     the already much-reduced U.S. defense budget over the next 
     five years was subsequently doubled to at least a $129 
     billion cut. Military procurement is cut by 60%, as Army 
     divisions and Navy ships are cut by one-third and Air Force 
     wings are reduced by half. These cuts result in forces below 
     those called for by the Administration's own, September 1993 
     ``Bottom Up Review,'' and far below the Joint Chief's 1992 
     proposals for a post-Cold War ``Base Force'' able to handle 
     potential future contingencies. In July 1994, Secretary of 
     Defense Perry stated publicly that the U.S. military could 
     not fight and win two near simultaneous regional wars and the 
     U.S. General Accounting Office informed Congress that funding 
     for the Perry Pentagon's new five-year plan was now $150 
     billion short of the real costs, thus requiring even more 
     draconian military cuts. (The Pentagon officially 
     acknowledged a $40 billion shortfall; others considered the 
     GAO estimate close to the mark.) See Bradley Graham and John 
     F. Harris, ``Can the Pentagon Afford its Future? Goals of 
     `Bottom Up Review' in Doubt Because of Budget Gap,'' 
     Washington Post, August 8, 1994, pp. A-1, A-6.

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