[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 144 (Thursday, October 6, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: October 6, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
     LIMITED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES-LED FORCE IN HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rowland). Pursuant to the order of the 
House of Wednesday, October 4, 1994, and rule XXIII, the Chair declares 
the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
for the further consideration of House Joint Resolution 416.

                              {time}  1403


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 416) providing limited authorization 
for the participation of United States Armed Forces in the 
multinational force in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of 
United States Armed Forces from Haiti, with Mr. Mazzoli in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.
  The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday, 
October 5, 1994, 1 hour and 34 minutes remained in general debate. The 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] has 45 minutes remaining, 
and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] has 49 minutes remaining.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, last evening Members of the House began 
an important debate concerning the American occupation currently in 
Haiti. Members from all perspectives, recognizing the importance of our 
actions and the three alternatives before the institution, began, I 
think, a thorough review of each of the options.
  Today we continue that debate. At this point, yielding to Members on 
this side of the aisle of each perspective, while the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Gilman] does the same, I would like to begin by yielding 
5 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
  (Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs' amendment and in opposition to the Michel 
substitute.
  But I think I would like to talk a few minutes about both concerns 
and principles of United States involvement in Haiti as well as some of 
my perspective as to the role of United States intelligence in dealing 
with the problems in Haiti.
  When the United States decided to get involved in Haiti, I had some 
concerns, particularly United States involvement in a possible military 
action that could result in casualties to soldiers without 
congressional authorization.
  I also had concern about the lack of a clear mission. At the 
beginning, this mission looked rather fuzzy, it involved the policing 
and nation-building in Haiti, and it also looked like there was a lack 
of a deadline, an end point as to our role in the Haitian situation.
  Now, a lot of that has crystallized in the last few weeks, partly 
because we have had a successful military operation in Haiti. Some of 
those concerns still remain.
  However, I do think there are certain principles which govern our 
role in Haiti and are more clear today than they used to be. No. 1, the 
United States does have a historic role in preserving democracy in the 
Caribbean. We did it in Grenada, we did it in Panama. Haiti is a nation 
in chaos, and it does matter, because unless there is some order 
brought out of that chaos, there will be a continual massive amount of 
illegal immigration into the United States of America.
  We have already received tens of thousands of Haitians, in fact it 
may be hundreds of thousands, come to this country because of the 
political and economic instability of that country, particularly the 
human rights violations.
  So that flow will not stop without political stability and economic 
rebuilding. And the United States involvement to try to restore 
democracy in Haiti and move to a nonmilitary solution to some of those 
economic problems will have more to do with stopping that massive 
amount of Haitian immigration to the United States than anything else.
  So I guess my point is something I say to my constituents at home, 
that it is important to build democracy in the Caribbean for its own 
sake because that spills over to other countries, the Dominican 
Republic and maybe Cuba, which is a republic we so desperately want to 
see free. But in addition, there probably was no other way to stop this 
massive illegal immigration of Haitians into this country without some 
form of military action.

  Now our troops are there. I want to get them out as quickly as 
possible. I fear for our casualties. There is no way to absolutely 
prevent that from happening.

                              {time}  1410

  But anything that is done to jeopardize the safety of those troops I 
think is disgraceful and is something we ought not to be on record for. 
That is why I think the Committee on Foreign Affairs' resolution, which 
has a responsible, but flexible, deadline, is a lot more realistic than 
the Michel proposal which calls for basically the immediate withdrawal 
of troops which will put our troops in jeopardy and which all our 
military officers, I believe both in Haiti and in the Pentagon in our 
country, unanimously oppose doing that. They fear for the lives of the 
troops if that resolution is adopted.
  Now let me just mention quickly a word about the role of 
intelligence. Early on, before the military action took place, there 
was a lot of discussion about the fact that our intelligence, 
particularly our Central Intelligence Agency, did not have an objective 
view of Haiti or of President Aristide, and that was in fact harming 
the move towards democracy in Haiti, and quite honestly I did not find 
that to be totally true, although I do admit that at least some of the 
public perception was not particularly encouraging in terms of a clear 
position of our Government and how intelligence affected policy. But I 
will tell my colleagues that in advance of the soldiers coming to Haiti 
and in connection with their current presence our intelligence has been 
superb, and our military commanders have told us that without any kind 
of quality of intelligence, both in terms of satellite pictures and in 
terms of the information as to the nature of where Haitian military was 
located, the nature of possible insurrections taking place, that our 
soldiers would have been in harm's way much more than they currently 
are now.
  So let me just summarize by saying that I would like to see these 
troops out of there as quickly as possible, but to take them out 
tomorrow, as the Michel resolution implies, would harm them, be very 
dangerous to their lives. We need to have this action completed as 
quickly as possible, but done in a responsible way, to create the 
institutions of democracy in order to avoid a continued, massive, 
illegal immigration of Haitians into this country.
  So, given those reasons, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having been 
yielded to by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli], and I 
rise again in support of his resolution.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Iowa [Mr. Leach], a senior member of our Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  (Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, all Americans are relieved that the United 
States Armed Forces did not have to fight their way into Haiti. The 
11th-hour mission led by former President Carter at least partially 
succeeded in rescuing the administration from a diplomatic and 
political crisis of its own making: both a hostile invasion and a 
divisive constitutional debate over war powers.
  Nevertheless, the unparalleled awkwardness, indeed ad hoc oddness, of 
administration policymaking toward Haiti cries out for congressional as 
well as historical review.
  Two issues, in particular, are profoundly troubling to this Member: 
the articulation of what must be described as a new Clinton doctrine of 
geographical propinquity that is apparently to become the rudder for 
American military intervention in the Western Hemisphere, and the cul 
de sac implications of failed American diplomacy toward Haiti which 
left the administration no policy option except intervention.
  Even as we breathe a sigh of relief at a bloody invasion scenario 
avoided, it is well worth pondering not only how Washington got into 
this mess, but how we extricate ourselves from our newly assumed 
responsibility for superintending Haitian affairs. After all, the exit 
policy will surely be more difficult to craft than the entrance, with 
long-term moral and financial accountability impossible to project at 
this time.
  Like most Americans, I listened respectfully to administration 
justifications for its intervention in Haiti. The White House has its 
reasons. I just don't find them compelling.
  The principal justification advanced for the U.S. intervention is 
that the United States has a responsibility to act to put an end to 
egregious human rights abuses close to our shores. But no modern 
doctrine of U.S. foreign policy suggests that geographical proximity 
should be the basis for U.S. military intervention absent a genuine 
national security threat.
  I emphasize modern doctrine because stripped of its multilateral 
veneer, the rationale advanced for the United States intervention in 
Haiti eerily echoes the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 
which was precipitated by one President only to be repudiated a 
generation later by his fifth cousin. Specifically, in 1904 Teddy 
Roosevelt justified establishing an American protectorate over the 
Dominican Republic by issuing a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, 
committing the United States to ``the exercise of an international 
police power'' in the Caribbean in order to remedy ``flagrant cases'' 
of ``wrongdoing or impotence.'' The corollary was subsequently 
abandoned by Franklin Roosevelt with the establishment of his Good 
Neighbor Policy. FDR rightly concluded that United States intervention 
was a counterproductive means of protecting U.S. strategic interests as 
well as establishing stability and good governance in Latin America.
  Some 60 years after the demise of the Roosevelt corollary, it would 
appear gunboat diplomacy is back in vogue. The new Clinton doctrine of 
geographical propinquity in substance has committed the United States 
to again exercise an international police power in the Caribbean. The 
obvious philosophical and foreign policy question is whether there are 
any boundaries to this assertion of broad U.S. police authority in the 
Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.
  With respect to human rights, no one disputes that egregious abuses 
have occurred under the de facto Haitian regime. All Americans condemn 
such acts, as we do all human rights violations wherever they occur. 
All Americans support commonsense efforts to ameliorate and hopefully 
end the tragic suffering of others, whether it be in Cambodia, El 
Salvador, Haiti, Rwanda, or the Sudan.
  But if a combination of human rights abuses and geographical 
propinquity is the controlling standard for U.S. military intervention 
in the Western Hemisphere, is the United States also prepared to invade 
Cuba to depose Fidel Castro and remove his oppressive regime, which has 
not only been much cited for abuse of civil liberties, but is rooted in 
Marxist orthodoxy and, from time to time, export-oriented revolutionary 
zeal? Does Port-au-Prince pose a greater national security threat to 
the United States than Havana, if any at all?
  Our humanitarian rationale, as reasonable as it may be, begs the 
question of why for consistency reasons the administration would not 
now be militarily intervening to stop the bloody welter of violence in 
Bosnia, why it is not acting to stop the shocking and senseless ethnic 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands in Rwanda, or intervening in Burma 
and other countries suffering under the thumb of brutal military 
misrule.
  Policymakers might rightly point out that a healthy respect for the 
limits of American power demands prudential restraint, but nonetheless 
the manifest inconsistencies in our human rights policy are self-
apparent.

  It is also troubling that this intervention--in a setting where no 
tangible threat to international peace and security exists--may set a 
dangerous precedent for the use of force by Russia, China, or other 
regional powers such as Iran or Iraq in their own backyard. It would be 
the height of naivete to believe that Moscow has supported the United 
States action in Haiti without the full expectation that this precedent 
could be widely applied in any number of trouble spots in Russia's 
``near abroad.''
  Clearly, the precedent of United States intervention in the Caribbean 
is precisely what Moscow likes, because any United States doctrine of 
intervention implicitly can be used to prop up new versions of the 
Brezhnev doctrine. We can properly point out that United States actions 
were preceded by United Nations and Organization of American States 
approval, and that our goal is democracy building rather than 
colonialist control, but to potential hegemonists lurking in the 
Kremlin or Zhongnanhai these circumstances may be considered merely 
legalistic niceties. While process may be America's most important 
product, to aggrandizing potentates the world over the deed is more 
important than the rationalization.
  The contrast between the responsible internationalism that hallmarked 
the Bush approach to coalition building in the gulf war and this 
administration's intervention in Haiti could not be more worrisome or 
striking.
  Ironically, if one American political party has been historically 
identified with the advocacy of collective security and the 
multilateral diplomacy it implies, it is the Democratic Party. 
Collective security was the watchword of Woodrow Wilson, who literally 
drove himself to death defending the principle against strident 
critics. Franklin Roosevelt, arguably the greatest President of this 
century, insisted that collective security principles be espoused in 
the Atlantic Charter, in authoritative statements of American war aims 
in World War II and ultimately in the Charter of the United Nations.
  In this context, it is well worth recalling that in the gulf war 
President Bush courageously chose to step outside both the isolationist 
and go-it-along interventionist themes that have ambivalently 
represented much of this century's conservative tradition.
  While the campaign sloganeering of candidate Clinton promised an even 
more ``assertive multilateralism'' than practiced by his predecessor, 
the incoherence and vacillation in administration policies have left 
internationalists in full retreat. The effectiveness and prestige of 
the United Nations is in serious doubt because of the failure of 
Washington to lead and understand the obligations of power. The 
squandering of hard-earned good will and the failure to offer the world 
credible leadership has contributed to a corrosive crisis of confidence 
in the United Nations. Lacking enlightened American leadership, U.N. 
reform has become passe. Collective security, far from appearing newly 
credible, increasingly is discredited.
  The hubristic intellectual abandonment of the internationalist ideal 
has progressed so far that this administration has naively embraced a 
trendy new liberal realpolitik that would delegate world order to a few 
great powers, complete with responsibility to keep the peace in their 
spheres of influence. Such is the bottom-line rationale for this 
intervention. Such precedent can only be described as alarming for 
peoples aspiring to embrace or keep freedom in such disparate regions 
of the globe as the former Soviet Georgia, the Indian subcontinent, and 
Taiwan.
  In the context of foreign policy decision making related to Haiti, it 
is fair to ask whether there are distinctions of judgment relating to 
United States actions over the past decade in Grenada, Panama, the 
Iran-Contra affair, the Persian Gulf war, and Somalia.
  Issues of foreign policy must be considered within a broad 
philosophical rubric as well as on a case by case basis in the context 
of the times. Judgments, as in all human experience, can be close, 
sometimes inconsistent, often involving a weighing of interests and 
values themselves not easily calculable.
  This Member, for instance, was particularly vexed by the scandal of 
process as well as judgment that led to the United States intervention 
in Nicaragua and its sorry evolution into Iran-Contra. The Reagan 
administration attempted to trade arms for hostages and thence use 
certain proceeds to further a dubiously legal war in Central America 
without legislative sanction--indeed, under the Boland amendment, 
contrary to legislative guidance. Trying to out-Kissinger Kissinger, 
inexperienced geostrategists within the National Security Council 
surmised that by making overtures to Iranian moderates a basis could be 
developed for bettering relations with post-Khomeini Iran. A tale of 
immaturity and deceit ensued, which included blatant stretching of law 
and the Constitution.
  With respect to Panama, both American lives and vital interests were 
more directly at stake. The extraordinary unilateral announcement by a 
head of state, Manuel Noriega, of a state of war with the United 
States, coupled with the indefensible killing of an American 
serviceman, and existence of United States treaty rights as well as 
vital interests in the Panama Canal give President Bush no credible 
option except to take serious notice. In the background as well was the 
unprecedented circumstance that Noriega had been indicted in a U.S. 
Federal court for complicity in drug smuggling.

  At the crux of the Iraq crisis was an undisguised threat to every 
linchpin norm of civilized international behavior. Iraq's brutal bid 
for regional hegemony threatened not only security in the Persian Gulf 
but the integrity of the international system itself. The United States 
and the world community simply had a compelling interest in preventing 
Saddam Hussein and his fellow Iraqi militarists from swallowing a 
neighboring state, brutally oppressing its population, as well as 
developing a nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction.
  While the international community countenanced (in retrospect, too 
readily) Saddam Hussein's internal human rights abuses, it could not 
responsibly tolerate external aggression, particularly where it so 
clearly involved a bold strategy to control such a large part of the 
world's crude oil supply.
  Somalia was from the beginning a high-risk intervention. At its 
inception the United States stood on unprecedentedly high moral ground. 
For the first time in modern history a great power's military 
capabilities were marshalled for a singular humanitarian objective: to 
feed a population in a country of negligible strategic interest. 
Problems, however, soon developed as one of the significant power 
groups in Somalia refused to cooperate with diplomatic efforts to 
develop consensus power sharing. As violence mounted, the 
administration, without thinking through the consequences, allowed U.S. 
forces to be dragged into taking sides in an ongoing civil war with the 
goal and therefore the broader responsibility of nation-building. 
Feeding we did well; nation-building proved more difficult. As the 
American people looked at television reports of the struggle in 
Somalia, they came to the conclusion that vital American interests were 
not at issue. Hence: withdrawal, blamesmanship (particularly of the 
United Nations, and the specter of an American ambassador abandoning 
his embassy, with a note stuck to the door: ``Americans advised to 
leave the country.''
  While distributions of food in Somalia could be supported, 
jeopardization of American lives could not.
  In real life, things are never as clear-cut--nor as funny--as they 
are in the movies. But I was concerned a decade ago that Grenada would 
turn out to be a rerun of the comedy, ``The Mouse That Roared.'' In the 
film, a tiny nation provoked a war with the United States in order to 
be the beneficiary of the billions of dollars in aid America 
traditionally lavishes on its vanquished adversaries.
  In real life, there are also gray areas where human judgments must be 
made, just as there are gray areas in the law where legality is ill-
defined. In Grenada a Marxist-leaning head of state had been brutally 
deposed and murdered by leftist thugs who feared he was countenancing 
moderation. President Reagan chose to reconstitute gunboat diplomacy 
and while the intervention proved to be controversial in the hemisphere 
and, to some extent in Great Britain, the good news is it appears to 
have worked, with the people of Grenada even erecting a statue to the 
former president.
  Haiti could prove as successful, but there are aspects of history and 
Haitian culture which make intervention in this French and Creole 
speaking island with its voodoo-influenced culture substantially more 
difficult than in Grenada.
  Cautionary evidence is amply supplied by previous United States 
experience this century with military intervention in Haiti. The United 
States invasion of Haiti in 1915 and subsequent 19-year occupation 
ultimately failed to build a stable basis for democratic and 
representative self-government. According to the February 7, 1930 
report of the so-called Forbes Commission to President Hoover on 
conditions in Haiti, ``the failure of the occupation to understand the 
social problems of Haiti, its brusque attempt to plant democracy there 
by drill and harrow, its determination to set up a middle-class--
however wise and necessary it may seem to Americans--all these explain 
why, in part, the high hopes of our good works in this land have not 
been realized.''
  As it did by blithely expanding the United States and U.N. mission in 
Somalia from humanitarian assistance to side-choosing nation-building, 
the administration also risks undercutting U.S. domestic support for 
the United Nations that President Bush's U.N.-authorized action in the 
Persian Gulf did so much to establish. There can be little doubt that 
support for the United Nations at home is more likely to be undermined 
than advanced if it is put in a no-win situation as the United Stats 
presses to withdraw and have our presence replace by others even more 
reluctant to take responsibility. The setting is complicated further by 
the fact countries on the Security Council--but not the elected Members 
of the U.S. Congress--were asked by the administration in advance to 
authorize the potential use of American military power.
  The administration has suggested that it was obligated to intervene 
in order to stop the outflow of Haitian refugees and asylum seekers. 
Common sense suggests that we have a clear interest in controlling our 
borders. But common sense also indicates that American military 
intervention is neither the most appropriate nor effective means of 
controlling illegal refugee flows. Such reasoning might suggest we 
intervene in every democracy as well as dictatorship in this 
hemisphere. The way to deal with problems of illegal economic migration 
is through trade and economic development, not the U.S. Marines.

  In this regard, refugee outflows from Haiti were in part precipitated 
by the on-again, off-again offer to screen Haitian boat people aboard 
leased ocean liners as well as United States naval vessels, and until 
now the crippling international economic embargo against the 
hemisphere's most cruelly impoverished country.
  The administration also has contended that the United States must 
intervene with military force to ``preserve stability and promote 
democracy in our hemisphere.'' But, as demonstrated in Haiti's own 
cultural experiences, there are few examples in world history of the 
successful establishment of democratic institutions at the point of 
another country's guns.
  The goal of promoting social stability and democratic governance in 
Latin America is not a subject of serious debate. Such has been 
consensus, bipartisan policy for decades. The issue in Haiti is means, 
not ends.
  To the extent that a new Clinton Doctrine of democracy building has 
been established for American military intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere, could it possibly be appropriate to use the awesome 
military power of the United States to intervene in Venezuela or Peru, 
where certain constitutional safeguards have been suspended, or in 
Guatemala or El Salvador or even Mexico should serious political 
instability threaten to rend those fragile democratic societies? This 
Member is doubtful.
  The administration seems to equate the forcible restoration of 
President Aristide with the institutionalization of Haitian democracy. 
But bringing democracy to Haiti entails far more than the forcible 
return and military protection of a flawed political leader. If we are 
indeed committed to building a civil society and ensconcing democratic 
norms in Haiti--a country largely lacking traditions of temperate 
governance--then surely the President must forthrightly explain to the 
American people that the achievement of that objective can only occur 
over a protracted period of time and will necessitate the commitment of 
substantial American resources.
  The final administration argument for intervening in Haiti rests on 
the assumption that American credibility was at stake. More precisely, 
Presidential, as contrasted with United States, credibility became an 
issue because of the cul de sac implications of administration policy. 
The administration trapped itself in a policy box of its own making. 
Once sanctions were imposed and once they proved unsuccessful levers 
for toppling the de facto government; once force was suggested and the 
international community asked to approve; once sanction-driven refugee 
flows increased, the administration had the option of either lifting or 
substantially modify its sanctions policy and threatened use of force--
that is, admitting failure--or intervening--that is, risking American 
lives. It chose the latter over the former, and only President Carter's 
mission averted a blood-letting landing.
  Accordingly, it is none too soon to commence a reassessment of the 
policies with which this President backed himself into the military 
option. Such a review is particularly appropriate because it appears 
that in the final measure the determination which led to the decision 
to intervene related primarily to concern for Presidential pride rather 
than the U.S. national interest.
  From a broad historical perspective, this has been a century of 
American leadership. One reason the world embraced our leadership is 
that when limb and purse have been on the line, Americans have always 
shown resolve. Now, ironically, the world is watching in bewilderment 
as Americans demonstrate a reluctance to accept the leadership of their 
own President. Absent in the public today is a sense of confidence in 
this administration's stewardship of U.S. foreign policy. Innately the 
public senses that the administration's policies are bereft of 
conviction, commitment and purpose.
  In the contest of assessing a President groping for identity, and 
what appears to be a desire to wield the symbols of power, the question 
must be asked: What is North Korea or any other potentially hostile 
country going to make of a circumstance in which American purpose is 
described in a Presidential address, only to be changed a few hours 
later by a former President?
  As much as I would like to give the benefit of doubt to this 
President in an awkward foreign policy dilemma, it is nonetheless 
impossible in an awkward foreign policy dilemma, it is nonetheless 
impossible to do anything except register substantial concerns not only 
about the ongoing United States intervention and occupation of Haiti, 
but the intellectual rigor and methodology of decisionmaking that led 
to it.
  In sum, no compelling United States national interest is at stake in 
Haiti; no modern doctrine of American foreign policy supports 
intervention; no attention seems to have been given to the unfortunate 
precedent established for sphere of influence interventions by other 
less-well-motivated powers in other parts of the world; no clear 
strategy exists for extricating the United States military from a 
potential Somalia-like quagmire; and no one has prepared the American 
people for the long- as well as short-term financial costs at issue.
  While the intervention may have appeared low-risk in the wake of the 
Carter mission, events of recent days have shown there is serious 
potential for American troops being trapped in a dangerous crossfire of 
intra-Haitian strife.
  A misjudgment has been made. Let us recognize the dedication, 
competence and courage of our Armed Forces, but bring our young men and 
women home as soon as possible
  The Michel approach best represents American views, American 
heritage, and American values.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Rangel].
  (Mr. RANGEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Torricelli], the subcommittee chairman, for extending me this time 
on this serious subject matter, especially since it is so close to the 
time that we have just heard from Nelson Mandela, and I think all of us 
in this Chamber felt a sense of pride in seeing how a bloodless 
revolution had taken place in South Africa and to hear him say that, 
while he was a prisoner in his cell, the inspiration that he received, 
and even today as he comes back as President, the feeling that he has 
knowing that the United States of America, a country that truly knew 
and understood what freedom was all about, its willingness to fight and 
win it, how he comes back here now depending on our support.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the sense that we feel as Americans when we 
find other countries' freedom in jeopardy, that no matter what 
differences we have as Democrats or Republicans, that we do feel a 
sense of pride when we see the countries waving their flags of 
democracy and to know that we played a part of that. Whether we are 
talking what happened in World War I or World War II, America has 
always been there and always stood as a symbol for justice, and that is 
why I think that when for the first time they had elections in Haiti it 
was the United States that was able to sit down with the military and 
to play a meaningful role in making certain that they, for the first 
time, will have elections.
  My God, with all of the problems that African-Americans have had in 
this country to be able to vote, even our people never had to suffer 
what Haitians did as they heroically went to the polls, were being shot 
down, but standing up and going right back again, determined that they 
were going to vote.

                              {time}  1420

  When it settled and we looked around, even though the candidate that 
was supported by the United States secretly did not win, still there 
was for the first time in recent history or in the history of Haiti a 
duly-elected person was elected as President, and that was President 
Aristide. It was rough. Maybe he did not do some of the things that 
Americans would like to see him do. Maybe he was not an American type 
of President. Maybe he was not what some of the Republicans or 
Democrats would have had running in their national convention. But one 
thing was abundantly clear, that as it related to what the Haitian 
people want, this man received an overwhelming vote, something that we 
would say in our elections was indeed a mandate.
  In the middle of the night, a handful of military officers, all of 
them trained in the United States, as we might suspect, went in 
collusion with the ruling class in Haiti and together they were able to 
overthrow the Presidency and to have this President run into exile.
  It was no great surprise when President Bush stood up and said, not 
in this hemisphere do you do this. It was President Bush that said that 
no fragile democracy would have to fear ambitious generals in this 
hemisphere. And behind him came our present President, Bill Clinton, 
and reiterated what America stood for.
  Oh, there was a lot of talk as to what was in our national interest. 
Should we put our troops in harm? There were reports from the CIA that 
the man was in hospitals in countries that he never visited. There was 
a terrible thing going against his character and reputation but, 
nevertheless, we stood our guard and we said that we will go to 
Governors Island, and we will sign an agreement. And we will 
participate with civilized nations saying that Aristide would return 
and democracy would return and America would be on the side of 
democracy.
  And the whole world heard what we were saying. The Organization of 
American States heard what we were saying. The United Nations heard 
what we were saying. And we said we would back it up.
  Well, I do not know what is in our national interest. I never told 
Bush to say he was leader of the free world. I never told this 
President to say that he was prepared to assume that responsibility. 
I never wrote the new world order. I never told fragile governments to 
depend on the United States of America to protect their freedom. But it 
was said and we were proud of the fact that they said it.

  Then all of a sudden, it appeared as though those who signed that 
agreement at Governors Island decided that they were not going to keep 
it. And they chased away a battleship that was not just the American 
flag but the flag of all civilized nations in the international 
community. And the military went on to kill the officers that were in 
the Aristide cabinet, to kill the people who were innocent, to kill the 
people in the villages and the towns that supported Aristide. And even 
though the unpopularity continued, even though there were certain 
people that continued to create something like we were dealing with a 
lunatic and not the head of a nation, even though heads of nations who 
had met Aristide said he was sane, even though President Clinton said 
that this man was responsible, still the political drums continued to 
beat and people were saying that we should not go into Haiti.
  I will not go into the record, but I know many of my Members will go 
into the record to see how is it that we can change so fast politically 
and to determine what is in our national security interest this time 
under this President and why things were so different under another 
President. And today we debate the question as to whether or not you, 
you, and you should supersede the intelligence of our military that are 
there in Haiti and for you to tell them what time they have to come 
back home.
  On November 30, 1950, some Chinese whom I do not know saw fit to 
shoot me in North Korea while I was there in the second infantry 
division as a part of United Nations forces. How we would have felt at 
a time when we were trying to defend the ground that we fought for that 
you who sent us there would tell us what time we had to get out.
  It just seems to me that there comes a time where we have to take our 
party labels and put them aside and say that if indeed the President, 
Republican or Democrat, is indeed the commander in chief, why do we not 
leave it up to him. Why would we threaten our troops that are there in 
harm's way and tell them that we have a better idea?
  How many of us are involved in knowing what the situation is, what 
the strategy is? How would we know how many people are there just to 
test the will of the people of the United States to make certain they 
know what they will and will not do. What was our national security 
interest when we invaded Grenada with international forces and how many 
Members stood up on the floor that are standing up today and willing to 
say that we ought to get them out right away or they should never go 
there in the first place.
  And the biggest hoax of them all, the invasion of Panama. Was it not 
to stop narcotics flow? Was it to get rid of General Noriega? Was it to 
protect the canal? Was it because an American was injured. Give me a 
break.
  We did it because we had the power to do it. We did it because we 
said we were going to do it, and nobody here said what time we had to 
get out. And nobody here even knows whether they are still there in 
Panama.
  And also I would like to say that when we went into the Persian Gulf, 
I do not know how many people got letters from their relatives saying 
let their people go. I do not know how many rallies you had within your 
district. I do not even know how your heart just burst with pride as we 
protected the royal family in Kuwait. But I can only think of three 
reasons why we went into the Persian Gulf: oil, oil, and more oil. And 
no one said it was time for us to get out from protecting that oil.
  But all of a sudden in this country, which is half of an island in 
the Caribbean, we are now saying that we know what is best for Haiti. 
We who sometimes are not even being considerate of the fact that we 
knew what was best for the Haitian people whomever to elect.
  Somebody on that side of the aisle called this President some of the 
most vicious names we ever called the head of a friendly government. He 
is not on this floor today. But I hope he will come back now and say 
that I hope he has more respect for at least our military people than 
he did for a person that was elected.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. RANGEL. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are asking about what our national security 
interests were in Grenada, for example. Was it not true that they were 
building an air base that was capable of taking Russian bombers? Were 
not the people that assassinated the leader there in Grenada actually 
in alliance with the Soviet Union and would have indeed put military 
bombers on the ground?
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I was impressed with the argument that we 
had 20 white students that got caught up in Grenada and we had to 
rescue them. That moved me. But cut it out on the airport.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young].
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I was a little disappointed in 
the last statement of my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Rangel], about the 20 white students in Grenada. I do not know whether 
they are white or black or what they were. But I know there were far 
more than 20 and I know that they felt that their lives were in danger, 
whether or not they were black or white, we had a right to support and 
defend and protect and rescue them from the people who were running 
Grenada who were allied with Fidel Castro and the Kremlin in Moscow.
  That should not be an issue at all whether they were black or white. 
I am disappointed that the gentleman even raised that issue.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to apologize to my 
distinguished friend. I took the occasion to check out their 
background. To me it would not have made any difference at all. I was 
only stating that as a matter of fact, that they were white. But I 
would agree with the gentleman. I would be more emotionally upset if 
they were white or black than telling me about the Air Force.
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I thank the gentleman. I knew that that was not 
what was in his heart. It just came out in the heat of the debate.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman made another comment. That is why I asked 
to follow the gentleman from New York [Mr. Rangel]. He said we should 
listen to our troops about what should be happening in Haiti.
  But our troops are not making the decisions about what is happening 
in Haiti. The decisions are being made here in Washington. Many of them 
are being made based on what press reports they are getting back from 
Haiti.
  I would rather have our troops make the decision about what we do in 
Haiti than some of the people who are making them, because I think they 
are making wrong decisions. Our troops should not have been there in 
the first place.
  I would say to the gentleman, he made the point we should not impose 
our decision on the troops in Haiti. They do not want to be there. I 
was there Saturday with the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha], 
our distinguished chairman. We talked to the troops. Many had just come 
from Somalia. They have been deployed all over the world. They have had 
very little time off between deployments.
  This administration is sending American troops to do police actions 
and other types of actions around the world as they are diminishing the 
number of troops available to do it.
  Mr. Chairman, we cannot do more with less. This Congress, with the 
help of the administration, is providing a lot less, but we are making 
a lot more commitments and a lot more deployments. That is not right. 
That is not in the best interests of our American troops. I can tell 
the Members that they told us over there their morale is not very high.
  Now about the difference in Haiti and Grenada or Haiti and Lebanon 
under President Reagan. I did not vote to support Reagan in going to 
Lebanon, because I saw the mistake there. I did not vote to expand our 
mission in Somalia, because I saw the mistake there.
  We cannot take soldiers who are warriors, who are there to defend us 
and our national interest, and turn them into policemen, or burial 
details, or messengers. That is not what they were trained for, it is 
not what they were hired for.
  As the bottom-up review has brought our assets down, we have to be 
careful how we commit those assets in the future.
  Mr. TORRICELLI: Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding time 
to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I stand here in support of an amendment which is to be 
offered at a later moment, known as the Murtha-Dellums amendment. 
First, however, Mr. Chairman, let me say with the deepest of sincerity 
that I have the highest admiration for the young men and young women in 
the American uniforms now serving in Haiti. They are there representing 
our country, carrying the American flag.
  They have proven themselves to be able, to be highly trained, to be 
well motivated. They are performing their tasks as the true 
professionals that they are. I think as a Nation, regardless of how any 
of us come down on this issue, we should thank those service men and 
women for their capable and professional job that they are doing.
  They are operating in an extremely dangerous situation. They are 
performing a difficult and unprecedented mission. They are showing 
extremely good judgment, and they are showing restraint, and all 
Americans in this body and elsewhere should be proud of them for their 
service to their nation and to the uniforms that they wear.
  We should say no, Mr. Chairman, to a date certain. If I may review my 
record on the issue of Haiti with this body, I was pleased that the 
Haitian occupation by the Americans was not hostile. I was very 
concerned that Americans could have been injured or killed.
  I commend former President Carter, Senator Nunn, and General Powell 
for their diplomatic victory last month. I had a longstanding 
opposition to our occupation of Haiti. Last July I wrote President 
Clinton, cautioning him against invasion, but I also added in that 
letter that should he find it necessary to do so, that we should go in, 
complete the mission, and withdraw our troops.
  I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we should get our troops and our 
military out of Haiti as soon as possible when our mission has been 
accomplished.
  There is a critical nature to the situation in Haiti. Our troops are 
taking down the military and disarming security forces. American 
military policemen are starting to gain control of the streets. The 
coalition of military forces are beginning to replace the American 
troops. Haitian refugees are beginning to return to Haiti. President 
Aristide is about to return and resume his democratic control.
  It is not up to us to tie the hands of the military commanders. If we 
were to come up with a date certain, it would give advantage to the 
enemies of democracy in Haiti. They know they can wait the United 
States out.
  It says we do not have the staying power, endangering the lives of 
our service men and women. It invites personal attacks by Haitians on 
our troops, it restricts our soldiers doing their jobs and forces them 
to work under an arbitrary drop-dead date to do their tough mission. It 
ties the hands of General Shelton to control events and influence 
action by the new Haitian Government, and defeats our exit strategy.
  The date certain imposes an artificial obstacle that hinders our 
military forces in achieving our long-term objectives in Haiti. They 
are there. That is a fact of life. We should give the military leaders 
the opportunity without a drop-dead date to do their job and to do it 
well.
  I commend them on an excellent performance thus far, and I know that 
they will complete their mission, come back home to America with the 
appreciation of all of the people here in our country.
  Mr. Chairman, Harry Truman once displayed on his desk a small sign, 
and we can see this same sign at the Truman Library in Independence, 
MO. It says ``The buck stops here.'' Truman's expression applies to 
everyone who has ever occupied that Oval Office. It now applies to this 
Commander-in-Chief.
  I know what Harry Truman would tell us: The buck stops with this 
President. He would say that the Congress should not tie his hands, 
especially when American service men and women are making progress in 
achieving our objectives in Haiti. Their mission is clear. When they 
have completed it, I want them to come home as soon as possible.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Sam Johnson].
  Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, there have been so many 
unanswered questions regarding this situation in Haiti. I wish we had 
had this debate before we made the decision to go, because there is no 
defined national interest, in spite of what people say, none to warrant 
us being there.
  Now that we are there, by the way, without the consent of the 
Congress, or the American people, for that matter, I think the highest 
priority that we need to ask is, what is our purpose in Haiti? What is 
our mission? Why does the White House have to clarify and alter the 
mission day by day? Things keep changing.
  What are the responsibilities of our troops in Haiti? I know they 
have said they do not really know in some cases. Why did we only send 
U.S. combat troops to what is supposed to be an international 
peacekeeping mission?
  The President keeps constantly referring to the U.N. resolution 
regarding Haiti, which states it is an international mission with 
international backing. Where are the international troops and support 
we need, when there are 19,000 United States troops in Haiti right now 
and no U.N. troops involved? Maybe a few from the Caribbean republics 
are starting to filter in in small digit numbers.
  With an ill-defined mission our troops are wondering every day what 
their duties are. Are they there to stop violence, to stop looting and 
chaos in the streets? Are they there to be a Haitian police force? If 
so, when did these duties become the job description of the U.S. 
military? They are trained as combat troops.
  Today we learned the American taxpayer is going to pay Haitian police 
force wages for a couple of months. Wow.
  Are our troops there to ransack people's homes looking for guns, or 
are they there to pay $50 to $300 in U.S. taxpayer dollars for guns and 
rocket launchers? I do not think so.
  In the latest reports today we learned that our own CIA helped 
assemble the anti-Aristide police force that we are now trying to 
disarm. I ask again, what is our purpose in Haiti?
  What is the cost of this mission? The money for 1994 was transferred 
out of our military operations budget, preventing our troops from 
training, and in my view, severely hampering our U.S. military 
readiness. We still have no idea what it is going to cost us in 1995.
  Must the American taxpayer again fund more supplemental 
appropriations, just to support this ill-formed mission? We need full 
details of how much this mission will cost.
  Why are we restoring Aristide? He is an accused drug trafficker. He 
is certainly not supporting the United States. He is refusing to sign 
an agreement not to hold our forces liable for their actions. He is the 
one who asked us to intervene. Where is his support now?

                              {time}  1440

  Are these not valid questions we ought to ask and we ought to get 
answers to? This administration continues to involve our Armed Forces 
in conflicts with no clear or consistent mission or goal. Americans do 
not want, do not need and do not deserve this sort of defense. This 
kind of policy-making is dangerous to our servicemen and women and 
dangerous to the future of America.
  With so many unanswered questions, it is imperative that we remove 
our troops from Haiti immediately. I ask Members to support that 
resolution. Let us get them out of there now.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oregon [Mr. DeFazio].
  (Mr. DeFAZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, today we are belatedly considering the matter of the 
U.S. intervention in Haiti. This debate comes a little too late. The 
President clearly should have come to Congress for authorization for 
his use of the Armed Forces before the troops were on their way to an 
armed invasion.
  And though I share the Nation's relief at the lack of hostilities and 
the apparent cooperation of Haiti's military rulers, I fundamentally 
disagree with the policy pursued by the administration. I do not 
believe United States Armed Forces should be serving as a de facto 
police force in Haiti. I disagree with the arrogant premise that we can 
march into this sorry nation and build democratic institutions where 
they have never existed. I am concerned about the open-ended financial 
commitment we are taking on when we take responsibility for the Western 
Hemisphere's economic basket case.
  The administration has no apparent policy other than one of reacting 
to the latest outbreaks of violence. I cannot in good conscience 
support this risky, expensive, and probably futile police action. I 
cannot give my seal of approval to this operation, which is what the 
resolution offered by Mr. Torricelli seems to do.
  I am voting today against the resolution offered by the Republican 
leader, Mr. Michel, in favor of the resolution offered by Mr. Dellums 
and Mr. Murtha.
  I agree with the Republican leader's basic contention: That the 
President should not have ordered United States troops into Haiti. In 
particular, it is quite clear to me that the President was prepared to 
invade Haiti without congressional authorization. The President and his 
advisers are wrong--dead wrong--in their view that congressional 
authorization for an act of war is less important than the 
authorization of the United Nations.
  However, I am disturbed by the change of heart among many of my 
Republican colleagues on the limits to the President's power to make 
war. When Ronald Reagan and George Bush occupied the White House, 
Republicans in Congress were nearly unanimous in their support for 
almost unlimited presidential warmaking powers. They fought attempts by 
me and others in this body to limit Presidential wars. It is amazing 
how many Republican Members of this institution have gotten religion on 
the subject of war powers now that a Democrat is in the White House
  The unfortunate truth is that our troops are now in Haiti. Both the 
Michel and Dellums resolutions call for a prompt, safe, and early 
withdrawal of those troops. Both resolutions require an accounting to 
Congress of the cost of this policy. I agree with both resolutions on 
these points.

  Mr. Dellums, to his credit, has maintained a principled and 
consistent position on the question of Congress' role in these matters. 
I will support his resolution. The Republican proposal, on the other 
hand, adds nothing of substance to the Dellums resolution. What is 
worse, it reeks of partisan politics. I will vote against it on those 
grounds.
  This episode underscores the need for Congress to revisit the War 
Powers Resolution. I have introduced legislation in every one of the 
last four Congresses to substantially amend the War Powers Resolution 
and make it a more effective instrument for restraining illegal 
Presidential warmaking. If my Republican colleagues are serious about 
their new-found belief in Congress' role in warmaking, they should join 
me in my efforts to strengthen the War Powers Resolution.
  Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, first let me address the issue that 
this is some type of partisan attack on the President. Everybody in 
this body realizes that the decision to send troops into Haiti had very 
much more to do with the President's own political position in the 
United States than it had to do with the national security interests of 
this country. That is why he went to the United Nations rather than 
coming to Congress to plead his case to justify this mission.
  We all know that he unjustly attacked President Bush during the last 
election over his Haitian policy, and President Clinton has been doing 
handstands and acrobatic moves ever since then trying to get himself 
out of the predicament that he put himself into by unjustly attacking 
President Bush's policy.
  This invasion happened because he painted himself into a political 
corner. Now our military people are having to pay by putting themselves 
in danger's way. Today we are in effect being asked to authorize the 
military occupation of Haiti retroactively.
  Mr. President, you are a little late. It leaves a bitter taste in the 
mouth of the American people to see that the President of the United 
States now feels more obligated to seek approval from the United 
Nations than from the Congress of the United States when ordering the 
use of the United States military.
  Mr. Chairman, neither the President nor anyone else has justified 
this military occupation in regard to our own country's national 
interest. It just has not been justified at all. Using boat people, as 
we heard earlier today, to justify the expense and the danger to our 
own military personnel is a joke. It is transparent. It is obvious to 
anyone that the administration's own economic blockade of Haiti is what 
caused the exodus in the first place. It is what caused the crisis. 
This was a crisis of President Clinton's own making. The cold war is 
over. The American people deserve a break. We have shouldered the 
defense and the stability of the world for decades.
  Yes, during the cold war there was some justification for the use of 
our military personnel in different parts of the world. The Communists 
were dedicated to destroying democracy. They were a major threat to the 
Western World, as was fascism, Naziism and Japanese militarism before 
that. The cold war is over. The American people can no longer afford 
to police the world. We cannot afford to right every wrong by force of 
arms. It is not fair to our defenders to try to make them do so. It 
will break our bank, it will cause a loss of life with no justification 
to our own national security.

  Furthermore, this policy--which apparently is our policy now, if 
democracy is in trouble anywhere, we can send in American troops--will 
not succeed unless our own vital interests are at stake. We should not 
be committing American military personnel.
  This is not to say that we should not always be on the side of 
freedom and democracy and human rights. These are universalities that 
we should side with. That does not mean, however, that we should be 
committing our troops every time democracy is in the balance.
  The fact is, the issue of freedom, the issue of democracy, even in 
this case, if we say that is a justification, it is not so clear cut in 
Haiti that this is a justification. President Aristide, who we are 
trying to place back into power by putting our own people's lives in 
danger and spending probably $1 billion in the process, is an unstable, 
anti-American Marxist. The conflict that led to his exile was a dispute 
with his own elected Parliament. Yes, he was elected. So was his 
Parliament.
  Yes, by and large the forces of General Cedras are the bad guys, 
there is no doubt about that, but it is not so clear that Mr. Aristide, 
who threatened to burn to death his opponents, is the good guy. What 
should be evident is that this is not our fight. It is not in our 
national interest. Our troops should never have been sent. Now Congress 
should do everything we can to get our military personnel home now as 
soon as possible.
  Let us make sure that our troops, our people who defend our lives, 
our well-being in the United States of America--for Pete's sake, let us 
get them home so they can spend the holidays with their families. At 
Thanksgiving and Christmastime, they should be home with their families 
unless it is in the national security interest of our country, and 
Haiti is not worth the life of one American soldier.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
the time.
  (Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, one thing we are all certainly sure of 
on both sides, and one would hardly have to mention, is the fact that 
Republicans and Democrats united have massive concern for the welfare 
and the safe return of all our troops. That is not a real topic of 
debate. The question is, what is the best use of national policy right 
now and military power? I say this with some sadness as to 
distinguished colleagues on the Republican side that from time to time 
I have worked occasionally, occasionally critically of the President on 
some very major foreign policy issues, and I really respect their past 
help and current goodwill.

                              {time}  1450

  But Mr. Chairman, truly it boggles my mind given the situation and 
the possibly, I say possibly extreme perils that our troops could be in 
in Haiti right now, to have a major House contingent on that side of 
the aisle to speak and demand not leaving the place on a date certain, 
not at any particular time in the future after greater stabilization, 
but in essence to start it now, and if it does not start now to have an 
absolute binding mandate passed, come January 21 to remove all U.S. 
forces immediately. I am very curious, for example, if there were deep 
consultations on the Republican side with people of immense respect on 
a bipartisan basis such as General Powell. Quite frankly, I doubt it.
  There is no doubt that President Clinton could have acted on this in 
a better and more direct way. I agree that he should have brought it to 
the Congress and educated the American people and asked for a vote, and 
we all would have abided by that vote. But the fact is the forces are 
there now. We cannot say we do not have an interest in a significant 
country so close to our shores. The refugees washing up on the shores 
of Florida have been a problem for the population, the authorities of 
Florida, to say the least.
  The brutality that is going on has been going on in Haitian torture 
chambers and our troops have acted very bravely and in essence as 
saviors and liberators. Also the simple fact is that we have made a 
commitment in this area. It should be stopped in a rational and 
intelligent way. Surely we can trust the President, our top military 
and State Department authorities, so to speak, to make that judgment. 
Everyone wants them out, but we want them out in a stable and dignified 
way, hopefully with greater peace in that region.
  As to Aristide's credentials, regardless of any fault in his 
background, even my dear friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Rohrabacher], has admitted that he is surely less the bad guy, and I do 
not consider Aristide a bad guy, than General Cedras. It is General 
Cedras's prisons that are being liberated. He is still the 
overwhelmingly popular President of Haiti.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. Meyers], a member of our Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.
  Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I must express my opposition to 
the idea of retroactively authorizing President Clinton's ill-advised 
military operation in Haiti. The President did not feel it was 
necessary to ask Congress for this authorization before he ordered the 
invasion--indeed in his speech to the Nation he did not even once 
mention Congress--and we should not authorize after the fact what 
Congress would not have voted to authorize before the fact.
  We have voted to support the troops, and commend General Powell, 
Senator Nunn, and President Carter for negotiating the agreement that 
prevented an invasion. As General Powell said, this agreement saved us 
from seeing American youngster killing and being killed by Haitian 
youngsters. But the purely military phase of the operation was never in 
doubt--everyone knew that the Haitian armed forces would put up no more 
than a feeble fight against the American troops. But now that we have 
entered the Haitian quagmire, the problem is getting out of the morass 
and getting our forces home.
  Congress must now assert its constitutional authority and demand our 
military be withdrawn from Haiti as quickly as possible. I accept the 
concerns expressed by our military leaders when they urge us not to set 
a specific cutoff date for the mission. But we must make it clear that 
Congress stands with the American people in opposition to the 
commitment of American military forces in Haiti. This mission does not 
serve our vital national interests, and inhibits our abilities to react 
to true threats to our national security that may emerge.
  Despite the assurances given to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott just last week, ``Mission 
Creep'' has already occurred. Our military people are having to assume 
control over functions in Haiti that they did not plan to.
  Our mission is now even more confusing and ambiguous than it would 
have been after an invasion. If we had forced our way in, our troops 
could have maintained order under occupation procedures that are well 
established under international law and that the military could 
implement until there was legitimate civil authority to hand it over 
to. On the other hand, the agreement requires our troops to cooperate 
with the de facto authorities--the very ones we have come to force out 
of office. Meanwhile, President Aristide is dragging his feet on 
signing a Status of Forces Agreement that would provide guidance on the 
policy for our military presence. So our young military men and women 
now must stand between the forces of thuggish repression on one hand 
and the forces of lynch mob justice on the other.
  Finally, I would like to express my concern about the unfortunate 
attempts by some participants in the debate over the months to paint 
opposition to sending troops to Haiti as being racially motivated. 
Other proposed military interventions, such as Bosnia, have generated 
controversy as well. It is wrong to make accusations that differences 
of opinion on crucial issues of national security are generated by vile 
prejudice. Surely, we can debate this issue on a higher plane.
  We have a choice, we can insist on pulling our troops out quickly, or 
we can submit to the Clinton administration keeping our young men and 
women in Haiti for years. And we will indeed be there for years. The 
President himself said so. He said most of our troops would be out 
quickly--that means some of them will not.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Ohio.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized 
for 4 minutes.
  (Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, Harry Truman was brought up in this 
debate. As Commander in Chief, Harry Truman did absolutely not one 
thing without the approval of Congress. The Congress of the United 
States declared war and said, ``Commander in Chief, you're the boss. 
But now we give you authority to go over there.''
  I want to take this debate a little bit back to what I think is 
problem with our policy. No one person in America can declare war or 
place America's troops in harm's way. That is clearly the 
constitutional mandate of the people, the Congress. We have turned our 
backs so long that we have delegated that power to the White House.
  I am not knocking President Clinton. I believe President Clinton is 
doing what he thinks is right. I think we have gone too far in allowing 
this type of business to go on, and it has got to stop. We have become 
the policemen for the world. To tell the truth, after it is over, we 
will stay on as the neighborhood crime watch. We put the lives of our 
young people at stake, and we throw billions of dollars overseas and no 
one has taken a look at this minimum wage country over here with 25,000 
murders a year and the American people screaming for Congress to help 
us.
  Congress, get back to the Constitution.
  But now I want to talk about Haiti. Regardless of how we feel, the 
President made a commitment. We are over there. We have now really put 
our hands on Cedras. We have overpowered them.
  The United Nations is supposed to come in as soon as we do that. I 
stand here today as a Democrat. I support the Michel-Gilman substitute. 
United Nations, go now and bring our 20,000 troops home, now. That is 
what the people in my district want. That is what is just.
  We did not turn our backs on the Haitians. But now Congress cannot 
keep turning the other check and delegating to the White House this 
power this is truly ours.
  There are several other things I want to talk about. There have been 
troubling connections revolving around Aristide. Drug informants 
considered to be reliable say he is connected with the Colombian 
cocaine cartel and had agreements with Escobar.
  I talked to my friends on both sides and they said, ``We don't think 
that's true, Jim. We think Aristide is solid.'' I am not the Secretary 
of State. I do not know. But let my say this: Our noble intent is to 
help establish democracy in Haiti.

                              {time}  1500

  Let us make sure we at least investigate these at least rumors to 
make sure we are not helping some drug cartel send more drugs to this 
country.
  I think now our troops have gone in and they have put out the fire. 
We pay billions of dollars to the United Nations. The United Nations go 
in now and do some peacekeeping. Bring our troops home now.
  For my Democrat friends, I do not know if the Michel-Gilman 
substitute is going to pass. If it does not pass, I will support the 
initiatives to do something, to at least put some process by the 
Congress of the United States into this mix.
  Ladies and gentlemen, it is the people's Government. They empowered 
us to make those types of decisions, and we are allowing Presidents to 
take our foreign policy and put it in harm's way outside of 
constitutional authority. I even think we should review this War Powers 
Act.
  I think enough is enough.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Barrett].
  Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House 
Joint Resolution 416, or any attempt to set an arbitrary deadline to 
withdraw our troops from Haiti.
  This is not an easy position for me to take today because I am 
probably going against the wishes of my leadership. But I fear politics 
may be a blinding reason today.
  Military leaders have asked Congress, and Gen. Collin Powell has told 
us directly, to give the President's policy in Haiti a chance to work. 
While we can raise concerns and questions about how this administration 
develops and implements foreign policy, our men and women in uniform 
should not pay the price for our dissatisfaction.
  I staunchly opposed President Clinton's Haitian policy and his 
decision to send our troops to Haiti. But it is now a fact of life that 
those troops are there, and they must have our full support to carry 
out their mission.
  I want to see our troops withdrawn as soon as possible. I join my 
colleagues in demanding that President Clinton clearly define our 
policy in Haiti, and there are provisions in this resolution to do 
that.
  But this resolution also authorizes United States troops in Haiti 
until March 1, 1995. Where is the information about their mission, or 
the details of an exit plan, which we should have in hand before making 
any decision about when to pull our troops back home. We should press 
the President for answers and information, but we should not hamstring 
our troops with an arbitrary deadline.
  This resolution I fear is an attempt to embarrass the President and 
gain votes in an election. Of all issues with which to play politics, I 
urge my colleagues to leave this one alone. We Republicans have always 
supported our military and fought here on the House floor to provide 
our commanders the resources necessary to carry out their missions. 
Sadly, it appears that this may not be the case today.
  I urge my colleagues to resist the political temptation to vote for 
this resolution. Support our troops and vote ``no.''
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], the distinguished deputy majority whip.
  (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, let me first commend the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Barrett] for the excellent statement that he just made.
  I think it is critically important that when it comes to issues 
affecting American national security and American troops, we must try 
as much as we can to keep politics out of it. Let me say that I think 
all of us, Republicans and Democrats, a majority in this body, are 
pleased that the United States did not have to resort to an invasion of 
Haiti. I think for that, we owe President Carter and Sam Nunn and Colin 
Powell a debt of gratitude. I think we can all be united on that and 
that we should do everything we can to protect the agreement that they 
negotiated. That agreement calls for an October 15 withdrawal of the 
Haitian military leaders, the return of Aristide, an amnesty provision, 
and political stabilization plan of safety guaranteed by American 
troops.
  I think the Republican substitute explicitly repudiates that policy 
and all current American policy on Haiti with an immediate withdrawal. 
This provision, needless to say, the Republican substitute, is strongly 
opposed by the American military, and I have a letter written by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and William Perry, the Secretary 
of Defense, to the Speaker underscoring that.
  I think what would happen if we had immediate withdrawal is, first, 
we would jeopardize the safety of American troops. We would undermine 
the Carter-Nunn-Powell agreement. We would damage American credibility 
in the world. We would send a signal to Haiti's military leaders that 
they can come back and perhaps plan their return. In the end, we would 
really be ending Haiti's quest for democracy.
  We would also undermine President Aristide's return, and we recognize 
that some questions have been raised by his leadership. I think, 
however, that the man has grown in the last 2 years and recognizes the 
need for reconciliation. I think he is ready to be a good President.
  Mr. Chairman, of all the approaches today that we are debating, I 
think that the Torricelli-Hamilton approach and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs approach is the soundest. The Foreign Affairs approach 
sets a March 1 deadline for the authorization of United States troops 
in Haiti. That does not mean that they all have to get out on that 
date. It means that on March 1, we can review the situation and debate 
it again. It also paves the way to move into the multinational phase, 
the U.N. phase, of the peacekeeping operation.
  What the Torricelli language also does is establish a clear, strictly 
limited mission for American forces. I think we need to do that because 
there has been confusion about what their role is. Are they police or 
peacekeepers? The language also requires that American troops serve 
only under U.S. commanders.
  I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] and his approach 
is a good one, too, and can be supported, but the Torricelli approach 
reflects more what the American people want. They do want us to end our 
mission in Haiti, to ensure that American troops are not killed, but 
they want us to make sure that we contribute to Haiti's democracy. They 
want to make sure that we have a positive role helping to end the 
quagmire that has been set up by the Haitian military leaders.
  We must not damage the President's credibility. We must not proceed 
with a policy that feels best right now, but isn't the best policy. We 
must adopt policy that is reasonable, that sets a goal for withdrawal, 
that respects international obligations, that respects the will of the 
American people and that protects our troops. Most importantly, we 
should adopt a policy that our troops support and that the American 
military commanders support.
  I think the Torricelli-Foreign Affairs approach is supported by our 
foreign policy establishment. Perhaps they cannot say that; perhaps 
they are saying that they do not want any fixed deadline, but the March 
1 deadline in the Torricelli language is not a deadline. It is 
basically a call for the Congress to again assume its rightful role in 
the war-making powers and debate this issue once again.
  But clearly the immediate withdrawal language in the Republican 
substitute is not good foreign policy, is not good for American 
credibility, it is opposed by the American military, and I think it 
would not send a good signal to our troops in the field.
  Mr. Chairman, I am placing in the Record at this point the letter to 
the Speaker from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of Defense, as follows:

     Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
     Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: We are writing to express our opposition 
     to any legislation that would require U.S. military 
     operations in Haiti to end on a fixed date.
       We have developed a phased plan that encompasses the 
     introduction of U.S. forces, establishment of public order, 
     gradual reduction in U.S. force level, transition to a U.N. 
     mission, and withdrawal of U.S. troops. According to this 
     plan, the initial phase of predominant American involvement 
     will end in a matter of months, and the UNMIH phase will end 
     with the inauguration of a new, democratically elected 
     President of Haiti in early 1996.
       However, it is too early in the operation to set fixed 
     dates. For the operation to succeed and meet the intended 
     schedule with minimum risk to U.S. personnel, our military 
     forces need to proceed with achieving objectives, not meeting 
     fixed deadlines. The success of the operation to date is due 
     largely to the force commander having the freedom both to 
     devise and implement military plans and to make necessary 
     adjustments as circumstances change on this ground. A fixed 
     end date would deprive us of this advantage.
       More important, a legislatively required withdrawal date 
     would change the dynamic on the ground and affect the actions 
     of our friends and those who oppose us. Those who oppose us 
     will find reasons to try to outlast us. Our friends--
     including those who would support us in the MNF and those who 
     would relieve us in UNMIH--might find excuses not to join us. 
     Also, if Congress were to direct a withdrawal from Haiti now, 
     our troops would lose an important psychological advantage 
     they now enjoy. The bottom line is that the dynamic created 
     by a mandated withdrawal date could make the situation more 
     dangerous to our troops.
           Sincerely,
     John M. Shalikashvili,
       Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     William J. Perry,
       Secretary of Defense.

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young].
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time and for the additional time that he has given me 
this afternoon.
  About the speaker who just left the well, I want to compliment him 
for the personal effort that he made prior to this issue becoming full 
blown. He tried hard to try to make this thing work without having to 
have a military intervention, and I take my hat off to him. I am just 
sorry it did not work.
  I have to disagree with that speaker though about his support of the 
particular resolution that would have us keep things status quo today 
and debate it again March 1. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to have this 
debate again on March 1.
  I want those Americans who are in Haiti to be out of Haiti long 
before March 1, and we should not have to debate this again.
  I am also opposed to setting a specific date. Some of you may be 
surprised at that, but I have never supported setting a specific date 
to withdraw American troops from anywhere, that is dangerous. It puts 
American troops who are trying to withdraw in a dangerous position, 
because the other side, the potential threat, have a target. They know 
when something is going to happen. They can melt into the woodwork and 
come out at a time that they decide to make it difficult for the 
Americans as they do withdraw. And that is dangerous.

                              {time}  1510

  Mr. Chairman, my main concern is not putting Aristide back in the 
president's palace; my main concern is the safety of the Americans who 
are in Haiti today, and getting them out of harm's way as soon as we 
possibly can.
  Those of us from Florida have a fairly long history of working with 
the problems dealing with Haiti. We know there are problems there. We 
deal with them a lot in our own State.
  But I have to say this: That as sad as the conditions are in Haiti, 
and they are very sad, the standard of living, the lifestyle, the 
poverty, that is sad. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that if we were to 
annex Haiti as a territory or a State of the United States, we probably 
could not make a massive change in that sad situation in one or two 
generations. It is that bad.
  The other problem is there are many places like Haiti in our own 
hemisphere. And in fact right here in America there is some of that 
same poverty. We ought to be concerned, as concerned about that as we 
are about Haiti.
  The point I am making is Haiti did not threaten the national security 
of the United States, Haiti did not threaten any of our national 
interests here at home or abroad.
  The entire mission, based on the meetings that I have had the 
opportunity to sit in as a member of the Committee on Intelligence and 
the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, the whole mission is to put 
Aristide back in power. Well, our friend from Ohio, Mr. Traficant, I 
thought made a very powerful statement in questioning whether Mr. 
Aristide is the right person for us to put our bets on.
  I have an idea that if the full record were known and if some of the 
policymakers were listening to their intelligence community, they would 
recognize that if Cedras is bad, and I am sure he is, that Aristide is 
probably every bit as bad. I believe some of the reports of our 
intelligence community that tell us that.
  Now, there is something that bothers me, the comments about 
partisanship. You can go back through the record in the time that 
Chairman Dellums and Chairman Mazzoli and I came to the House together, 
look at the record, and you will not find a partisan statement by this 
Member on any issue. I disagreed with the War Powers Act, for example. 
I offered a substitute. I did not think the President should have that 
much power.
  I disagreed with President Reagan sending the Marines to Lebanon. And 
that policy was proved wrong. So there has been no partisanship on my 
part. I have stayed out of the partisan fights. My job has been doing 
things that were right, my job has been in intelligence and national 
security since I have been here doing what is in the best interest of 
the United States.
  If we send troops to war, send them with the best training possible 
and with the best equipment and technology possible, but do not send 
American troops to places where they are in harm's way for no reason 
relative to the mission of the United States military and for no reason 
other than to become a police officer on some street in Port-au-Prince, 
Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it all, we just cannot do it all. We 
should not be turning our military forces into policemen. They are 
trained to defend this Nation, and the people of our Nation and their 
interests wherever they might be. But they are not trained to become 
policemen in a battle between Cedras and company, Aristide and company, 
the FRAPH, the FAH'O the attaches or whoever they might be. The 
unfortunate issue here is that the numbers of military personnel we 
have in uniform today have decreased to a dangerous level, yet they are 
being assigned to more and more missions.
  As we visited with our troops last Saturday in Haiti, we found some 
of these young men had just come from another mission, another 
deployment. You have got to give the military some time at home with 
their families. You cannot keep them on constant deployment.
  Protect our men, bring them home, and let us not try to be policemen 
of the world's problems.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
the Virgin Islands [Mr. de Lugo].
  Mr. de LUGO. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak to my friends in this House on 
both sides of the aisle. I would like to address them as both an 
American and as a Caribbean person.
  I was here at the time of the invasion of Grenada. I remember what it 
was like. I remember that on my side of the aisle there were many, many 
questions about that invasion. I supported it because I knew what was 
going on down there. And I remember that the House sent a delegation 
there, and I remember that the present Speaker of the House was a 
member of that delegation, Dick Cheney, who was a Member of the House 
at that time, was a member of that delegation, and I was also.
  We investigated it and we came back, and I remember that this House 
and particularly this side of the aisle did nothing to undermine our 
President or our troops.
  We must support our President. I must admire the gentleman from 
Nebraska for his statement this morning, the courage that it took.
  We have to take politics out of these issues. Politics must end at 
the water's edge.
  Our young President showed tremendous courage when he called back 
those planes and accepted that agreement. That took political courage, 
and our troops were able to enter Haiti without a shot being fired.
  We have to be very proud of our military; how much they have learned 
and now they are conducting themselves. Look at what is going on in 
Haiti and the way these young soldiers, men and women, are conducing 
themselves and making our country look good.
  Just a little while ago all of us were here in the House and we were 
applauding President Mandela. Did we hear what he was saying? How could 
we applaud Mandela sincerely and take some of the positions that are 
being espoused here on this floor today?
  And remember this, that President Aristide was elected democratically 
by the people of Haiti. We, the United States, yes, we stand as a great 
chance for the people of Haiti. And they are good people.
  Mr. Chairman, they need this chance. Do we want this responsibility? 
No, we do not want it, but we are the only superpower in the world, and 
with that comes a lot of responsibility.
  Are the American people up to it? That is what we are going to find 
out.
  Should we have a date certain? Should we tell the American troops, 
``We want you out now, start pulling out''?
  Everyone of you knows that that would be the worst possible thing 
that we could do for our troops, for our country.
  Let us stand behind our President and stand behind the troops.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Ballenger].
  Mr. BALLENGER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my opposition to President 
Clinton's ill-advised policy in Haiti. The President ordered 15,000 
United States troops to Haiti in a blatant disregard for congressional 
consultation and approval. Unlike the case of Grenada, American lives 
were not at risk. Unlike Panama, our national security interests were 
not threatened. And unlike the Persian Gulf, the President acted 
without congressional approval. While I support our troops, we must set 
a timetable to bring our service men and women home and eliminate the 
huge costs this occupation promises to accrue.
  Let me quote from the Forbes Commission's report on the United States 
occupation of Haiti 65 years ago: ``The educated public opinion and 
literate minority in Haiti are so small that any government formed in 
these circumstances is liable to become an oligarchy. Until the basis 
of political structure is broadened by education--a matter of years--
the government must necessarily be more or less unstable and in 
constant danger of political upheavals.''--I stress a matter of years, 
folks. In 1994, with 64 percent of the population illiterate and annual 
per capita income at $320--are we prepared for ``a matter of years?''
  Sixty-five years ago, the United States built roads, railroads, and 
sewage systems. However, Haiti remained mired in poverty. Today, as the 
Haitian political problems continue to deepen, the country's physical 
infrastructure--roads and bridges--continues to erode and will require 
large investments of capital in the near future to assist the country. 
Are we ready for such an investment?
  Mr. Chairman, we invaded Haiti in 1915--an occupation that lasted 19 
years. The similarities between the State of Haiti then and the State 
of Haiti today in 1994 are striking. Do we know what we are getting 
ourselves into today? Are we prepared for a 19-year occupation? Is 
history destined to repeat itself? I hope not.
  I am opposed to House Joint Resolution 416 primarily because it 
grants retroactive authorization for the President's decision to send 
troops to Haiti. I support Gilman-Michel that provides for House and 
Senate votes under expedited procedures no later than January 21, 1995, 
on a resolution requiring the withdrawal of United States forces from 
Haiti within 30 days after the date of enactment. More importantly, the 
resolution states the sense of Congress that President Clinton 
initially should not have ordered the occupation of Haiti.

                              {time}  1520

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Florida [Mrs. Fowler].
  (Mrs. FOWLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.]
  Mrs. FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, I am distressed at the magnitude of human 
suffering that has been endured by the Haitian people since the coup 
which toppled President Aristide from power. However, I believe that 
our Nation's military policy must be dictated by factors other than 
sympathy. Factors like the safety of American lives and the security of 
American interests. And the fact is that the United States has no 
national interest in Haiti which justifies our military presence there.
  Haiti's military is tiny, ill-equipped, and poorly trained. And Haiti 
is 736 miles from the United States. Let's face it: Haiti is not a 
threat to us in any way. What it is, is a disaster waiting to happen, 
and it is foolish to believe otherwise.
  As much as I wish it were not so, the truth is that Haiti has never 
had true democracy. In all their troubled history, the Haitian people 
have been oppressed, exploited, and terrorized by a succession of 
dictators, and the results of one democratic election--even backed up 
by the armed might of the United States--are not enough to establish 
the rule of reason and democracy in Haiti.
  Although I am relieved that we did not actually invade Haiti, I think 
we have jumped into the middle of a minefield and we must tread very 
carefully. There was never any doubt that we could carry out a 
successful invasion of Haiti--the question all along has been: What to 
do once we were on the ground? In spite of my opposition and the 
opposition of the American people to taking that initial step, we are 
on the ground now. What are we going to do? The last time we went into 
Haiti, we were there for 17 years.

  I am extremely concerned for the safety of our young men and women in 
uniform, who are facing situation where the rules are always changing, 
and a landscape which is unfamiliar and fraught with danger. I do not 
want to see another Mogadishu, and I believe that our military 
involvement should be short-lived.
  I do not support setting a firm withdrawal date, since that would 
further jeopardize our troops, but I do think we should invite the 
multilateral forces from the United Nations into Haiti now and withdraw 
our troops as soon as possible thereafter. We have no national interest 
in Haiti. We should not have gone there in the first place. And we 
should get out as soon as we can.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from Florida [Mrs. 
Fowler] for her supporting remarks. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
  (Mr. RAMSTAD asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, the President seems to be repeating the 
tragic mistakes made in Somalia by putting our Armed Forces in a 
dangerous situation with an unclear mission.
  Congress must not stand idly by.
  As one who has always stood firmly behind our brave troops, I am 
increasingly alarmed about their safety as part of the occupying force 
in Haiti.
  It is unfortunate that Congress was not given the opportunity to vote 
on the Haiti operation until today.
  The President has clearly put a higher priority on consulting the 
United Nation, whose approval he sought months ago, than in consulting 
the U.S. Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, the resolution before us today is a Sham. Although its 
retroactive authorization of the Haiti operation expires next March--
over 5 months from now--the President can extend the authorization 
permanently.
  In fact, the President has said that United States troops might 
remain in Haiti until 1996 as part of a U.N. ``nation-building'' force.
  Let us be up front about what is happening today. There is only one 
purpose for this resolution--to provide cover for some Members of this 
body before they go home for elections.
  It simply does not provide the needed congressional oversight of 
President Clinton's misguided, open-ended and ill-defined policy in 
Haiti.
  Congress should not abdicate its responsibility to the American 
people. We must not simply write the President a blank check for the 
Haiti operation and adjourn for the year.
  With this resolution the President can spend billions of taxpayer 
dollars to order United States troops to serve as Haiti's police force 
or even as Aristide's personal security force.
  Mr. Chairman, ``mission creep'' has already started. Our brave 
soldiers trained for battle have become Haiti's cops.
  It was just 1 year ago, when the United States suffered severe 
casualties in Somalia. How can the President forget so soon the lessons 
that were learned in Somalia?
  It was not until the United States became a nation builder in Somalia 
that serious problems arose and United States soldiers were killed and 
wounded.
  Our goal today should be to end the Haiti mission and begin the 
orderly withdrawal of United States troops immediately. Let's get our 
troops out now.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Maryland [Mr. Gilchrest].
  Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] for yielding this time to me.
  As the debate on Haiti continues throughout the day, every once in a 
while we do hear some partisan snipes, not from everybody certainly, 
but every once in a while that does occur, and I want to make two quick 
remarks.
  In 1965, Mr. Chairman, I was with a battalion of marines that landed 
in the Dominican Republic to protect them from a coup sponsored by 
Castro. I was 19, and I can tell my colleagues all of the ground troops 
at that particular point did not care anything about partisanship in 
Washington, and we can be sure that none of those troops down in Haiti 
care anything about partisan snipes. So let us keep the debate in my 
judgment where it ought to be: what we can do for the troops in Haiti.
  Many of us were against the initial invasion. I know I was. No one 
here wants United States occupation of Haiti. No one wants United 
States troops to become police forces for the Haitians, or for Mr. 
Aristide, or for anybody. All of us want our troops home in an orderly 
manner, and we want them to come home safe; we want the mission to be a 
success; and we want an orderly, safe withdrawal of our troops home 
soon, and we all want, and we should work for, the Haitians to accept 
the responsibility of their own country and to restore their own 
democracy.
  We have troops in Haiti now; we want those troops home, and the last 
comment I want to make is that if we want the mission to be a success, 
if we want the transition to be taken over by the United Nations, if we 
want our troops home safe, and while they are there we want them to 
remain safe and in an organized, orderly operation; I emphasize, and I 
cannot emphasize this enough, we should not place a date on their 
withdrawal.
  We should make sure that the President tells us everything that is 
going on, including what the mission is, the status of our troops, what 
our troops are doing, what the cost is, where the money is coming from. 
We should be apprised of this situation almost on a daily basis. But we 
should not, for our troops' sake, set a date for their withdrawal. Let 
us bring them home soon.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Manzullo], a member of our committee.
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Chairman, the time to get out of Haiti is now. We 
have no business being there. Every day we're there is another chance 
one of our brave military personnel could be killed or wounded.
  The President has embarked on a dangerous and reckless course of 
action--a mission without a policy.
  Don't we even have memories that last more than 1 year? Remember how 
all the Somalians rejoiced at our initial intervention. We vainly 
thought that we could do anything in Somalia. Yet, what happened? The 
minute we went beyond administering humanitarian aid and began 
tinkering with Somalian society our soldiers were ambushed, killed, and 
dragged through the streets.
  Who can forget those images? Yet, we're repeating those very same 
mistakes in Haiti. What happens once Mr. Aristide assumes power on 
October 15, conveniently after we adjourn? Will U.S. military personnel 
be caught in firefights between pro-Aristide forces and the Haitian 
military. What if General Cedras does not leave Haiti? Will we decide 
to fight the Haitian military and police?
  And when we win, what will we do then? Call on the United Nations? 
What a joke. Our military will become the law enforcement arm of Mr. 
Aristide. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, said Mr. Aristide 
has been given a ``bum rap.''
  How ironic. We're using U.S. military personnel to reinstall a priest 
defrocked because of his belief in violence; a charismatic leftist 
anti-American leader who supports autocratic ways of setting disputes, 
including putting burning tires on a person's neck and inciting mob 
violence to intimidate opponents. This is the man chosen by President 
Clinton to ``restore'' democracy, the man who, in violation of the 
Haitian Constitution, replaced members of the Haitian Supreme Court and 
local mayors with his supporters. This is the man who extols the 
virtues of Che Guevera, Castro's minister of revolutionary terrorism? 
And we put the lives of our fighting forces at Stake for him? How long 
will it be until he stirs up the Haitian people to say, ``Yankee Go 
Home?'' Will American troops be targeted by these mobs?
  It's time we get out. The sooner the better. I encourage all my 
colleagues to vote for any resolution that sends a message to this 
administration: Get our forces out of Haiti. Get them out now, before 
one gets killed; now, before anymore are wounded.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bonilla].
  (Mr. BONILLA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.
  Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, politics stop at the border. Each and 
every Member of Congress, each and every American must always stand 
united in confronting any foreign foe.
  Our military personnel who stand on the frontlines of these struggles 
must have our full and uncompromising support.
  Those Americans in harm's way always have our full support. They also 
deserve our measured judgment not to put their lives at risk unless the 
national security of the United States is at stake.
  We must simultaneously respect the President's prerogatives as 
Commander-in Chief and fully exercise Congress' power of the purse.
  I believe we can do both. It is a solemn responsibility that falls on 
us today. We must exercise it properly.
  We will be failing our troops, failing their families, and failing 
the American people if we fail to answer the following simple questions 
posed by my constituents.
  Is there a national security interest in Haiti? Do we have goals and 
objectives for our forces? Is there a strategy which would lead to the 
withdrawal of our forces? Is our policy consistent with the Monroe 
Doctrine, which has been an unaltered part of our policy in this 
hemisphere for nearly two centuries? The answer to these questions is 
no, no, no, and no.
  No, we should not involve ourselves in the occupation of a country 
where we have no national interest, no clear objectives, and no exit 
strategy.

  We owe it to our troops to vote for their immediate withdrawal. We 
owe it to our troops for no missions without objectives. We owe it to 
our troops to vote never to place their lives in the hands of the 
United Nations. Each and every one of us was elected to fulfill these 
responsibilities. We owe it to the American people and to the troops to 
do no less.
  On July 28, I authored a bipartisan letter urging the President not 
to occupy Haiti and not to violate the Monroe Doctrine by placing U.N. 
forces in that violent land. The President unfortunately chose a 
different path.
  I cannot in good conscience reverse course and support a policy which 
risks American lives and compromises our historic traditions without an 
explanation of the threat to our national security.
  Mr. Chairman, I say to my colleagues, there should only be two 
considerations when you vote today, the safety of our troops and the 
well-being of our Republic.
  Only one of the amendments before us meets this test. Only the Michel 
amendment calls for the immediate withdrawal of our forces and provides 
a mechanism to insure their withdrawal. Only the Michel amendment 
upholds the Monroe Doctrine by rejecting U.N. command. Only the Michel 
amendment puts our troops and America first. I ask my colleagues to 
please join me in voting for our troops and for our democracy. Please 
join me in voting for the Michel amendment.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Owens].
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, this debate on the United States liberation 
of Haiti is a very significant one. It is basically a nonpartisan 
debate, and this is a debate where some minds may truly be changed. 
Some of the Members of this body are sincerely searching for a way to 
fully develop an updated Western Hemisphere foreign policy approach for 
the new world order. As we go into the new world order, we must resolve 
to never allow a band of armed criminals to hijack a nation as they did 
in Haiti.
  We must never again allow the United States CIA or any other agency 
of our Government to support armed criminals in the overthrow of a 
democratically elected government
  The United States has always dominated the political and economic 
life of Haiti, since the time of Thomas Jefferson. The Haitian Army was 
created by the occupation force of the United States Marines. Most of 
the foreign businesses in Haiti are American owned. Thousands of 
Haitian refugees seeking entry to this country have confronted our 
Nation with a moral dilemma of great magnitude. Our posture in the 
world and our vital interests are very much interwoven with the future 
of Haiti. We have dominated Haiti in the past but this liberation 
action, fostered by President Clinton, should be a new beginning.
  Without wholesale interference in its affairs, Haiti can manage its 
own affairs. Haiti is not Somalia. Haiti has a constitution. The people 
of Haiti are not divided down the middle. There is not a civil war 
raging in Haiti.
  President Jean-Bertrand Aristide is the people's choice, and Aristide 
is a great man, trusted and revered by the Haitian people. Aristide has 
a cabinet and there is a legislature. Haiti has a middle class which 
can produce the necessary diplomats and technicians. There are 
thousands of Haitians who live in New York and Paris and across the 
world who are willing to go home to help rebuild their nation. There is 
no need for a long occupation of Haiti. We are removing the criminals 
and the killers and that is the primary purpose of the United States 
liberation of Haiti.
  I oppose any resolution setting a date certain for the withdrawal, 
but the people of America should be reassured that the Haitians will 
repay this investment. They will go it alone. They can go it alone. 
They can rebuild their nation.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Walsh].
  Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished colleague, the 
gentleman from New York, for yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I was opposed to invasion, and I am opposed to 
occupation of Haiti. Even Mr. Aristide, the man who we would restore to 
power, opposed this action. Indeed, even after our troops landed and 
took control of the streets, Mr. Aristide had to be pressed by our 
diplomats to say thank you. Imagine, our forces in harm's way, and this 
man offering a half-hearted thank you and faint praise for their 
efforts.
  As officials of our government, we should never undermine our troops, 
and we do not. We stand squarely with them. We need to make sure that 
if they need additional support, materiel, weaponry, or armor, similar 
to what happened in Somalia, we should make sure that they get it.
  We need to understand that history does repeat itself, sometimes more 
rapidly than others. We need to understand that those who refuse to 
learn from history are forced to repeat it.
  One year ago I stood in this well and I called for Mr. Aspin's 
resignation after the debacle in Somalia. I do not want to have to 
repeat history again with another Secretary of Defense. We need to set 
a deadline, all right. The deadline that we need to set is for Mr. 
Aristide to go back to Haiti.
  It is about time that that gentleman took up his own responsibilities 
and returned to his homeland and led those people. I cannot believe 
that he stays here in Washington under armed guard, living in the lap 
of luxury, while our troops are putting out fires and disarming the 
people of Haiti. He travels with an entourage. Our troops travel with 
M-16's. Support the Michel-Gilman amendment. Let us have a vote in 
January to require an orderly and staged withdrawal of our troops and a 
United Nations takeover of that situation.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, thank God for the 
Congressional Record. I was afraid that the memory loss that affects us 
as we age was affecting me at an unduly rapid rate. Having gotten here 
in 1981, I was ready to swear that I had heard the overwhelming 
majority of Republicans assert that the President had the right to send 
troops into foreign countries when he thought it was in the national 
interest without congressional authorization.
  I had this distinct recollection that Republicans said ``When we 
invade a country, especially in our hemisphere, to restore democracy 
and to confront a dictator, that is a very good thing.'' Then I saw 
President Clinton doing exactly what I had heard, I thought I had heard 
the Republicans talking about for 14 years, and I began to worry 
whether or not I was hearing voices; worse, I was hearing Republican 
voices say things that they did not believe.
  However, some people on my staff fortunately got out the 
Congressional Record. I found that no, my memory is not deteriorating 
any more rapidly than my age would indicate.
  In the case of Lebanon, in the case of Panama, in the case of 
Grenada, in the case of Kuwait, Republican Members consistently used 
arguments which today they are repudiating because one thing has 
changed: The partisan nature of the person in the Presidency.
  Republicans have said ``Let us eschew partisanship.'' They have been 
engaged in it consistently throughout.
  Let me, for instance, say, when people talk about liberation versus 
invasion, ``If you cannot distinguish between force for subjugation and 
force for liberation, then it is difficult to discuss this matter with 
you.'' That is not me, that is the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]. 
It is the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] who said ``If you cannot 
distinguish between force for subjugation and force for liberation, it 
is difficult to discuss this matter with you.'' Well, maybe he is not 
discussing the matter with himself.
  We were told that to go into Grenada and free up the people from an 
oppressive regime was a good thing. People have said, ``Aristide is not 
a perfect Democrat.'' He is not, but compared to the Emir of Kuwait, he 
is Ghandi.
  People would argue that going into Kuwait was a great thing for human 
rights, to restore that repressive regime, but I do not think the 
Iraqis should have invaded. The Emir of Kuwait is better for the people 
of Kuwait than Saddam Hussein, but if he was a Democrat, I am a 
pumpkin.
  However, we are told that Aristide, who won an election, does not 
deserve this kind of support. We have sent troops into a country where 
their arrival has been able to be accomplished without any American 
deaths due to our being there, where the people are overwhelmingly 
happy, where the result will be to restore an elected president.
  I think, Mr. Chairman, that there is only one thing that makes my 
Republican friends angrier than when President Clinton does something 
that they think is wrong. It is when he does something that looks 
right. That is what we have here.
  We have a situation where, applying principles that Republicans 
themselves have argued for 14 years, President Clinton has taken an 
action that has made Americans very popular in Haiti and that, with no 
loss of American life and with savings of Haitian life, is going to 
restore democracy. That is what they do not like, that Bill Clinton is 
accomplishing it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time I have 
remaining?
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman] has 6 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Torricelli] has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding we are now ending the general 
debate provided under the unanimous-consent request, and are about to 
engage in a 1-hour debate on the rule.
  Mr. Chairman, the President acted on his own in committing United 
States forces to occupy Haiti. Each of us is now being given the 
opportunity to decide for ourselves whether the President acted wisely.
  Though we respect the arguments expressed so eloquently by the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] on his resolution, House 
Joint Resolution 416, I have come to a different conclusion about just 
what his proposal will accomplish.
  Mr. Chairman, let us be certain about what the House will be doing if 
it adopts the Torricelli resolution. It is important to know that 
supporting the Torricelli resolution means we would be retroactively 
authorizing the deployment of United States troops in Haiti. In 
approving the Torricelli resolution, we would be blessing a mission 
that we know to be dangerously vague and a policy that long ago 
substituted force for diplomacy.
  We would also be accepting President Clinton's definition of what our 
troops should be doing in Haiti, even though ambiguous objectives, 
improvised rules of engagement, and ever-expanding tasks laid upon our 
military have rendered that definition virtually open-ended. That, Mr. 
Chairman, is a recipe for disaster.
  Second, the March 1 termination of authorization in the Torricelli 
resolution has no teeth. On March 1, the President can--if he chooses--
simply continue with his plan to deploy 2,000 to 3,000 U.S. troops in a 
U.N. peacekeeping mission through February 1996.
  Under the rule we will be considering in a few minutes, that March 1 
date in the Torricelli resolution would be watered-down even further by 
giving the President yet another escape hatch to extend our 
authorization unilaterally and permanently.
  Third, the Torricelli resolution does not protect our troops from 
being placed under foreign command in a U.N. peacekeeping mission.
  Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, we can do much better. The 
Michel-Gilman substitute, made in order under the proposed rule, will 
better reflect the will of the American people. Our substitute differs 
from the Torricelli resolution in the following significant and 
positive ways:
  For one, it does not authorize this mission in Haiti. To the 
contrary, it expresses the sense of the Congress that the President 
``should immediately commence the safe and orderly withdrawal of'' our 
troops from Haiti.
  Second, our resolution does not authorize U.S. participation in U.N. 
peacekeeping.
  Third, the Michel-Gilman resolution requires that any United States 
military personnel in Haiti ``shall remain under the command and 
control of'' United States officers at all times.
  Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on 
Torricelli. Save your vote for the Michel-Gilman substitute. Our 
alternative reflects the will of the American people and protects our 
troops by calling for their immediate withdrawal from Haiti.
  Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time on this segment of 
our unanimous consent request.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Olver] is 
recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly support bringing our troops home as soon as 
possible, but I come to the well to ask my colleagues to give their 
full support to the members of the armed services and to make their 
jobs, which they are performing very well, as easy as possible.
  Unfortunately, some Members seem to want to go against the best 
judgment of our military commanders by setting a specific deadline for 
withdrawing U.S. troops. It does not take a rocket scientist to 
understand the words of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and I quote: 
``Setting an arbitrary deadline to complete this mission will endanger 
these military forces.''
  If that is too hard to understand, General Shelton, the commander of 
our forces in Haiti, put it much more simply when he said, ``We would 
endanger our forces by moving too fast.''

                              {time}  1550

  We are debating the safety of American service men and women while 
they execute a mission clearly in the long-term interest of the United 
States.
  This country has used U.S. forces overseas in support of our 
interests 234 times since the founding of our country and only in 3 
cases has the Congress set a deadline for troop withdrawal. Over the 
past 200 years, Congress has overwhelmingly understood that we should 
avoid micromanagement of military operations. By setting a withdrawal 
date, Congress instantly changes the dynamic in the field and makes it 
harder for those troops. Furthermore, if we demonstrate a lack of 
resolve, we are simply inviting more attacks on our troops wherever 
they are in the world.
  However, I want to draw attention to the magnificent job our troops 
are doing. Who can fail to be moved by the images of a jubilant Haitian 
people immensely grateful for being freed from a vicious oppression, 
and yet restraining themselves from taking retribution? Who can fail to 
be moved by Haitian citizens taking the weapons that have been used to 
kill their friends, relatives, and neighbors and turning them over to 
our marines?
  I believe it is wrong to claim that we have no interest in supporting 
a peaceful transition from the thugs who brutalized Haiti to the 
legitimate elected government.
  I want to remind my colleagues that Haiti's elections, which were 
internationally monitored and certified as free, Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
ran in a field of 11 and received 70 percent of the vote. That is a 
popular mandate unmatched by any leader in the western hemisphere and 
no American President has ever received such a mandate. The people of 
Haiti certainly thought that they were on the road to democracy in that 
election.
  My colleagues should also remember that during the election process 
and while President Aristide was in office in Haiti, very few Haitians 
were attempting to leave the island compared to the thousands upon 
thousands who fled the cruel repression of the attaches and fraph.
  Clearly it is in our interests to have a law-abiding government that 
provides the routine government services which make everyday life and 
commerce possible in any country.
  We need a stable government in Haiti, not an outlaw regime driving 
huge numbers of refugees into neighboring countries.
  I commend the President for restoring a legitimate, stable government 
in Haiti through negotiations. I support bringing our troops home and 
tell my colleagues that the way to do that is not to set a deadline 
that puts more American lives at risk, it is to let them do their jobs. 
Support the Dellums-Murtha substitute.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired. Pursuant to 
the order of the House of Representatives on Wednesday, October 5, 
1994, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs. 
Mink of Hawaii) having assumed the chair, Mr. Mazzoli, Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that 
that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution--
House Joint Resolution 416--providing limited authorization for the 
participation of United States Armed Forces in the multinational force 
in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of United States Armed 
Forces from Haiti, had come to no resolution thereon.


  providing for further consideration of house joint resolution 416, 
     limited authorization for the united states-led force in haiti

  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on 
Rules, I call up House Resolution 570 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 570

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for further 
     consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 416) 
     providing limited authorization for the participation of 
     United States Armed Forces in the multinational force in 
     Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of United 
     States Armed Forces from Haiti. All time for general debate 
     under the terms of any previous order of the House shall be 
     considered as expired. After further general debate, which 
     shall be confined to the joint resolution and the amendments 
     made in order by this resolution and shall not exceed two 
     hours equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
     ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
     the joint resolution shall be considered for amendment under 
     the five-minute rule and shall be considered as read. The 
     amendments printed in part 1 of the report of the Committee 
     on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be considered as 
     adopted in the House and the Committee of the Whole. No 
     further amendment shall be in order in the House or in the 
     Committee of the Whole except those printed in part 2 of the 
     report of the Committee on Rules. Each further amendment may 
     be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be 
     offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
     considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified 
     in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent 
     and an opponent, and shall not be subject to amendment except 
     as specified in the report. All points of order against the 
     amendments printed in the report are waived. If more than one 
     of the amendments printed in part 2 of the report is adopted, 
     only the last to be adopted shall be considered as finally 
     adopted and reported to the House. At the conclusion of 
     consideration of the joint resolution for amendment the 
     Committee shall rise and report the joint resolution to the 
     House with such amendment as may have been finally adopted. 
     The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the 
     joint resolution and any amendment thereto to final passage 
     without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with 
     or without instructions.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hall] is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Madam Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I 
yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Goss], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate only.
  (Mr. HALL of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. HALL of Ohio. Madam Speaker, House Resolution 570 is the rule 
providing for the consideration of House Joint Resolution 416, 
providing limited authorization for the United States-led force in 
Haiti, and providing for the prompt withdrawal of the United States 
Armed Forces from Haiti. Under this rule all time for general debate 
under any previous order of the House shall be considered as expired. 
The rule provides further general debate of 2 hours, and it provides 
that the joint resolution shall be considered as read. Under the rule, 
the amendments printed in part 1 of the Rules Committee's report to 
accompany this resolution shall be considered as adopted in the House 
and in the Committee of the Whole.
  Madam Speaker, no further amendment, except those amendments printed 
in part 2 of the report of the Committee on Rules are in order in the 
House and in the Committee of the Whole. The part 2 amendments are to 
be considered in the order and manner specified in the report, with 
debate time also specified in the report. These amendments, Madam 
Speaker, are as follows: First, a substitute amendment by Mr. Michel; 
second, a substitute amendment by Mr. Dellums, Murtha, Hastings, and 
Dicks; third, a substitute amendment to be offered by Mr. Torricelli 
and Hamilton. These part 2 amendments are not subject to amendment 
except as specified in the report, are considered as read, and are not 
subject to a demand for a division of the question. The rule waives all 
points of order against the amendments in the report. The rule also 
provides for the consideration of the part 2 amendments under the 
procedure known as king-of-the-hill in which the last amendment to 
pass, shall be considered as finally adopted and reported to the House. 
Finally, the rule provides a motion to recommit with or without 
instructions.
  Madam Speaker, this rule expeditiously brings to the floor the 
important resolution which provides limited authorization for the 
participation of United States troops in the multinational force in 
Haiti, and provides for the prompt withdrawal of our troops when it is 
time to go home. Debate was started yesterday through a unanimous 
consent agreement and this rule will allow all further consideration of 
this important foreign policy issue.
  As one who has spent a good portion of my time fighting poverty and 
hunger, I must say I am deeply concerned about our policy in Haiti. 
Early on I advised the administration that I did not think we should 
invade Haiti. Haiti was not a threat to U.S. interests and security, 
and our record of previous occupation after the 1915 invasion was not a 
successful one.
  However, Haiti's people are suffering. Their poverty and helplessness 
is beyond most people's comprehension. Haiti's hospitals have no 
medicine, its people have very little food, and the infrastructure is 
almost nonexistent.
  As a matter of fact, during this debate there has been hardly a word 
said about the poverty of these people.
  Madam Speaker, for many years, I have heard people in this country, 
many in this House of Representatives, cry out for democratic systems 
of government. And rightfully so. Now that our troops are on Haiti's 
soil, helping to keep order and stability so a democratically-elected 
government can return, and humanitarian assistance can flow, we must 
support them. To pull the rug out from under our troops now is not fair 
to men and women who are doing good jobs. Nor is it fair to the people 
of Haiti, who have perhaps the only shot they will get at democracy, 
and the hope of a better standard of living. We need to complete our 
mission and get out. This is not the time to shift direction in mid-
course.
  It is the time, however, to call upon our allies to provide some 
help. Peacekeeping and humanitarian responsibilities should not fall 
upon the United States alone. The United States has provided over one 
million meals every day to children, pregnant and lactating mothers, 
orphans, and the old and sick in Haiti over the last 3 years. The 
United States has always responded to its moral obligations to help the 
poorest of the poor countries. But just as we cannot be the world's 
policemen, we cannot be the world's only humanitarians. Our allies must 
help, and I intend to continue to call upon them.
  Madam Speaker, this resolution is a carefully crafted one which 
provides for fair consideration of this difficult issue. I urge my 
colleagues to join me in adopting the rule.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. GOSS. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks, and to include extraneous material.)
  Mr. GOSS. Madam Speaker, exactly 1 year ago today I stood in this 
well and implored the Clinton administration to re-think its misguided 
approach toward the developing crisis in Haiti. At that time, the 
U.S.S. Harlan County was preparing to carry more than 600 United States 
troops to Haiti, in anticipation of the transition date under the 
Governors' Island Accord.
  One year ago I raised a question that I believe is still valid today, 
as we watch more than 20,000 American troops occupy Haiti and prepare 
for yet another planned transition date. On that day I said, ``Let us 
ask this question of the administration: Could you look your son or 
daughter in the eye and say `This is why you are going to Haiti?' There 
is no Answer.'' Today there is still no good answer.
  The administration would have us believe we are restoring democracy--
at the barrel of a gun--and reinstalling a democratically elected--if 
erratic--President who was overthrown by Haitians 3 years ago. In 
reality, we are perilously close to taking sides and getting hopelessly 
entangled in a longstanding, sometimes vicious civil war.
  Over the course of the past year I have followed the machinations of 
this bungled foreign policy, seeking at many junctures to offer 
thoughtful criticism and reasonable alternatives. Yet the 
administration turned a deaf ear--not just to me, but to the entire 
Congress and to most of America, preferring instead to take us further 
down the road toward military entanglement in Haiti.
  Now, finally, the Congress is being brought into the debate. Today we 
are belatedly being asked to provide an after-the-fact authorization 
for a policy that has no clear definition, a very unconvincing and 
fuzzy rationale and almost complete lack of support among the American 
people.
  I think most Members understand that the appropriate time for this 
debate in Congress would have been before 20,000 young Americans were 
sent to Haiti to serve as referees, police forces, and nation-builders 
in a country where brutality, instability, and civil war have ruled for 
200 years. But that debate never took place.
  Instead, now that troops are already in harm's way, the House 
Democratic leadership is finally moving. We are now presented with the 
Torricelli proposal, a measure designed to offer retroactive cover to a 
failed policy and make this Congress complicit in a series of terrible 
decisions.
  I strongly oppose the Torricelli resolution. Instead, I urge my 
colleagues to examine the Michel-Gilman substitute--a proposal that 
explicitly rejects the decision of the President to send United States 
troops to Haiti and withholds any sort of authorization for this Haiti 
policy.
  The Michel-Gilman language calls for an immediate commencement of 
withdrawal of United States troops from Haiti. It establishes a 
timetable for the administration to report to Congress about the Haiti 
mission and its costs--information that has so far been practically 
impossible to gather. In my view, the Michel-Gilman proposal is a much 
more accurate reflection of American public opinion on this subject, 
and this House should adopt it.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, the rule before us today is stacked 
against adoption of the Michel proposal. It uses the arcane but 
wickedly effective process known as king-of-the-hill to give Mr. 
Torricelli a chance to trump the Michel-Gilman proposal, as well as a 
third option to be offered by Messrs. Dellums, Murtha, Hastings, and 
Dicks. Up in the Rules Committee my friend Mr. Dreier sought to level 
the playing field by stipulating that the proposal with the most votes 
should prevail--but we were outvoted. So, king of the hill it is.
  Mr. Speaker, I am also troubled that this rule self-executes some 
additional language into the base text of the Torricelli proposal--
language that will no doubt be hard for some Members to swallow, given 
its explicit authorization of the mission, its provision of a giant out 
for the President from the get-out-of-Haiti termination date and its 
assessment of the War Powers Act. I urge Members to read the fine print 
of this rule very carefully to be sure you know what you are voting 
for--since a ``yes'' vote on the rule is also a ``yes'' vote on an 
authorization that terminates March 1, 1995, unless the President 
certifies that additional time is needed; and it is a ``yes'' vote on 
language presented by Mr. Skaggs that says the Constitution would have 
required the President to gain prior approval from Congress before 
committing U.S. troops.

  Finally, Mr. Speaker, this rule has shut out several worthwhile 
proposals offered by Mr. Cox and Mr. Royce--one dealing with specific 
requests for cost estimates of the Haiti mission and one seeking to 
ensure that U.S. troops do not get sucked into some nebulous U.N. chain 
of operations.
  Overall, Mr. Speaker, although I am gratified that at long last this 
House is being given the chance to seriously debate our foreign policy 
vis-a-vis Haiti, I regret that it has come about in such a convoluted 
and belated way. I am upset at the contortions and contrivance all for 
the purpose of trying to make the Clinton administration look better; 
history will never be kind to the ineptness, mismanagement, and 
indecision of this odyssey of inconsistency. I do oppose this rule 
because of its structure--and I oppose the Torricelli resolution 
because it is toothless about getting our troops out and it tries to 
paint a smile on an operation I can't smile about.
  Mr. Speaker, I support our troops. America stands behind them and we 
urge their earliest possible return.
  I include for the Record rollcall votes in the Committee on Rules on 
House Joint Resolution 416, as follows:

 Roll Call Votes in the Rules Committee on the Rule for H.J. Res. 416, 
       Haiti Authorization Resolution, Wednesday, October 5, 1994

       1. Dreier En Bloc Motion to Make in Order 2 Cox 
     Amendments--Amendments by Rep. Cox (CA) to: (1) Express sense 
     of House that it disapproves the policy of military 
     occupation of Haiti which was undertaken without 
     congressional approval; and (2) That the President should 
     submit to Congress within 5 days after enactment a complete 
     accounting of funds expended in Haiti and a specific 
     authorization for funds in the remainder of the fiscal year. 
     Rejected: 4-7. Yeas. Solomon, Quillen, Dreier, Goss. Nays: 
     Moakley, Beilenson, Frost, Bonior, Hall, Gordon, Slaughter. 
     Not Voting: Derrick, Wheat.
       2. Dreier Motion to Make in Order Royce Amendment--by Rep. 
     Royce (CA) would prohibit any U.S. troops in Haiti to be 
     under foreign command. Rejected: 4-7. Yeas: Solomon, Quillen, 
     Dreier, Goss. Nays: Moakley, Beilenson, Frost, Bonior, Hall, 
     Gordon, Slaughter. Not Voting: Derrick, Wheat.
       3. Dreier Motion to Change King-of-Hill Procedure--Rule 
     would be amended to provide that the substitute adopted 
     receiving the most affirmative votes, instead of the last 
     adopted, shall be the one considered as finally adopted and 
     reported to the House. Rejected: 4-7. Yeas: Solomon, Quillen, 
     Dreier, Goss. Nays: Moakley, Beilenson, Frost, Bonior, Hall, 
     Gordon, Slaughter. Not Voting: Derrick, Wheat.

              OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES 95TH-103D CONG.             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Open rules       Restrictive rules
  Congress (years)   Total rules ---------------------------------------
                      granted\1\  Number  Percent\2\  Number  Percent\3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
95th (1977-78).....          211     179         85       32         15 
96th (1979-80).....          214     161         75       53         25 
97th (1981-82).....          120      90         75       30         25 
98th (1983-84).....          155     105         68       50         32 
99th (1985-86).....          115      65         57       50         43 
100th (1987-88)....          123      66         54       57         46 
101st (1989-90)....          104      47         45       57         55 
102d (1991-92).....          109      37         34       72         66 
103d (1993-94).....          103      31         30       72         70 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Total rules counted are all order of business resolutions reported   
  from the Rules Committee which provide for the initial consideration  
  of legislation, except rules on appropriations bills which only waive 
  points of order. Original jurisdiction measures reported as privileged
  are also not counted.                                                 
\2\Open rules are those which permit any Member to offer any germane    
  amendment to a measure so long as it is otherwise in compliance with  
  the rules of the House. The parenthetical percentages are open rules  
  as a percent of total rules granted.                                  
\3\Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments     
  which can be offered, and include so-called modified open and modified
  closed rules, as well as completely closed rule, and rules providing  
  for consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the     
  Whole. The parenthetical percentages are restrictive rules as a       
  percent of total rules granted.                                       
                                                                        
Sources: ``Rules Committee Calendars & Surveys of Activities,'' 95th-   
  102d Cong.; ``Notices of Action Taken,'' Committee on Rules, 103d     
  Cong., through Oct. 5, 1994.                                          


                                                        OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.                                                       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Rule                                      Amendments                                                                  
   Rule number date reported      type       Bill number and subject         submitted         Amendments allowed         Disposition of rule and date  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 58, Feb. 2, 1993......  MC        H.R. 1: Family and medical     30 (D-5; R-25)..  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. (Feb. 3,
                                           leave.                                                                       1993).                          
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993......  MC        H.R. 2: National Voter         19 (D-1; R-18)..  1 (D-0; R-1)..............  PQ: 248-171. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4,
                                           Registration Act.                                                            1993).                          
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993....  C         H.R. 920: Unemployment         7 (D-2; R-5)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb.   
                                           compensation.                                                                24, 1993).                      
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments  9 (D-1; R-8)....  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3,
                                                                                                                        1993).                          
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization     13 (d-4; R-9)...  8 (D-3; R-5)..............  PQ: 247-170. A: 248-170. (Mar.   
                                           Act of 1993.                                                                 10, 1993).                      
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 1335: Emergency           37 (D-8; R-29)..  1(not submitted) (D-1; R-   A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).     
                                           supplemental Appropriations.                     0).                                                         
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993....  MC        H. Con. Res. 64: Budget        14 (D-2; R-12)..  4 (1-D not submitted) (D-   PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar.   
                                           resolution.                                      2; R-2).                    18, 1993).                      
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993....  MC        H.R. 670: Family planning      20 (D-8; R-12)..  9 (D-4; R-5)..............  PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar.   
                                           amendments.                                                                  24, 1993).                      
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993....  C         H.R. 1430: Increase Public     6 (D-1; R-5)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1,
                                           debt limit.                                                                  1993).                          
H. Res. 149 Apr. 1, 1993......  MC        H.R. 1578: Expedited           8 (D-1; R-7)....  3 (D-1; R-2)..............  A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).     
                                           Rescission Act of 1993.                                                                                      
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993......  O         H.R. 820: Nate                 NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (May 5, 1993).    
                                           Competitiveness Act.                                                                                         
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993.....  O         H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act   NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).   
                                           of 1993.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993.....  O         H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel    NA..............  NA........................  A: 308-0 (May 24, 1993).         
                                           Safety Act.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 173 May 18, 1993......  MC        S.J. Res. 45: United States    6 (D-1; R-5)....  6 (D-1; R-5)..............  A: Voice Vote (May 20, 1993)     
                                           forces in Somalia.                                                                                           
H. Res. 183, May 25, 1993.....  O         H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental     NA..............  NA........................  A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).      
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget      51 (D-19; R-32).  8 (D-7; R-1)..............  PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194 (May 27, 
                                           reconciliation.                                                              1993).                          
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 2348: Legislative branch  50 (D-6; R-44)..  6 (D-3; R-3)..............  PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June   
                                           appropriations.                                                              10, 1993).                      
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993....  O         H.R. 2200: NASA authorization  NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 14, 1993).  
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993....  MC        H.R. 5: Striker replacement..  7 (D-4; R-3)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  A: 244-176.. (June 15, 1993).    
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2333: State Department.   53 (D-20; R-33).  27 (D-12; R-15)...........  A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).     
                                           H.R. 2404: Foreign aid.                                                                                      
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993....  C         H.R. 1876: Ext. of ``Fast      NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 22, 1993).  
                                           Track''.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2295: Foreign operations  33 (D-11; R-22).  5 (D-1; R-4)..............  A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).     
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993....  O         H.R. 2403: Treasury-postal     NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 17, 1993).  
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2445: Energy and Water    NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 23, 1993).  
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 206, June 23, 1993....  O         H.R. 2150: Coast Guard         NA..............  NA........................  A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).       
                                           authorization.                                                                                               
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2010: National Service    NA..............  NA........................  A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).     
                                           Trust Act.                                                                                                   
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2667: Disaster            14 (D-8; R-6)...  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July   
                                           assistance supplemental.                                                     22, 1993).                      
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2667: Disaster            15 (D-8; R-7)...  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).     
                                           assistance supplemental.                                                                                     
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2330: Intelligence        NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (Aug. 3, 1993).   
                                           Authority Act, fiscal year                                                                                   
                                           1994.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993....  O         H.R. 1964: Maritime            NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (July 29, 1993).  
                                           Administration authority.                                                                                    
H. Res. 246, Aug. 6, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 2401: National Defense    149 (D-109; R-    ..........................  A: 246-172. (Sept. 8, 1993).     
                                           authority.                     40).                                                                          
H. Res. 248, Sept. 9, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2401: National defense    ................  ..........................  PQ: 237-169. A: 234-169. (Sept.  
                                           authorization.                                                               13, 1993).                      
H. Res. 250, Sept. 13, 1993...  MC        H.R. 1340: RTC Completion Act  12 (D-3; R-9)...  1 (D-1; R-0)..............  A: 213-191-1. (Sept. 14, 1993).  
H. Res. 254, Sept. 22, 1993...  MO        H.R. 2401: National Defense    ................  91 (D-67; R-24)...........  A: 241-182. (Sept. 28, 1993).    
                                           authorization.                                                                                               
H. Res. 262, Sept. 28, 1993...  O         H.R. 1845: National            NA..............  NA........................  A: 238-188 (10/06/93).           
                                           Biological Survey Act.                                                                                       
H. Res. 264, Sept. 28, 1993...  MC        H.R. 2351: Arts, humanities,   7 (D-0; R-7)....  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 240-185. A: 225-195. (Oct.   
                                           museums.                                                                     14, 1993).                      
H. Res. 265, Sept. 29, 1993...  MC        H.R. 3167: Unemployment        3 (D-1; R-2)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  A: 239-150. (Oct. 15, 1993).     
                                           compensation amendments.                                                                                     
H. Res. 269, Oct. 6, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 2739: Aviation            N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 7, 1993).   
                                           infrastructure investment.                                                                                   
H. Res. 273, Oct. 12, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3167: Unemployment        3 (D-1; R-2)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  PQ: 235-187. F: 149-254. (Oct.   
                                           compensation amendments.                                                     14, 1993).                      
H. Res. 274, Oct. 12, 1993....  MC        H.R. 1804: Goals 2000 Educate  15 (D-7; R-7; I-  10 (D-7; R-3).............  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 13, 1993).  
                                           America Act.                   1).                                                                           
H. Res. 282, Oct. 20, 1993....  C         H.J. Res. 281: Continuing      N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 21, 1993).  
                                           appropriations through Oct.                                                                                  
                                           28, 1993.                                                                                                    
H. Res. 286, Oct. 27, 1993....  O         H.R. 334: Lumbee Recognition   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 28, 1993).  
                                           Act.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 287, Oct. 27, 1993....  C         H.J. Res. 283: Continuing      1 (D-0; R-0)....  0.........................  A: 252-170. (Oct. 28, 1993).     
                                           appropriations resolution.                                                                                   
H. Res. 289, Oct. 28, 1993....  O         H.R. 2151: Maritime Security   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 3, 1993).   
                                           Act of 1993.                                                                                                 
H. Res. 293, Nov. 4, 1993.....  MC        H. Con. Res. 170: Troop        N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 390-8. (Nov. 8, 1993).        
                                           withdrawal Somalia.                                                                                          
H. Res. 299, Nov. 8, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 1036: Employee            2 (D-1; R-1)....  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 9, 1993).   
                                           Retirement Act-1993.                                                                                         
H. Res. 302, Nov. 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 1025: Brady handgun bill  17 (D-6; R-11)..  4 (D-1; R-3)..............  A: 238-182. (Nov. 10, 1993).     
H. Res. 303, Nov. 9, 1993.....  O         H.R. 322: Mineral exploration  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 16, 1993).  
H. Res. 304, Nov. 9, 1993.....  C         H.J. Res. 288: Further CR, FY  N/A.............  N/A.......................  .................................
                                           1994.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 312, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3425: EPA Cabinet Status  27 (D-8; R-19)..  9 (D-1; R-8)..............  F: 191-227. (Feb. 2, 1994).      
H. Res. 313, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 796: Freedom Access to    15 (D-9; R-6)...  4 (D-1; R-3)..............  A: 233-192. (Nov. 18, 1993).     
                                           Clinics.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 314, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3351: Alt Methods Young   21 (D-7; R-14)..  6 (D-3; R-3)..............  A: 238-179. (Nov. 19, 1993).     
                                           Offenders.                                                                                                   
H. Res. 316, Nov. 19, 1993....  C         H.R. 51: D.C. statehood bill.  1 (D-1; R-0)....  N/A.......................  A: 252-172. (Nov. 20, 1993).     
H. Res. 319, Nov. 20, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3: Campaign Finance       35 (D-6; R-29)..  1 (D-0; R-1)..............  A: 220-207. (Nov. 21, 1993).     
                                           Reform.                                                                                                      
H. Res. 320, Nov. 20, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3400: Reinventing         34 (D-15; R-19).  3 (D-3; R-0)..............  A: 247-183. (Nov. 22, 1993).     
                                           Government.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 336, Feb. 2, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 3759: Emergency           14 (D-8; R-5; I-  5 (D-3; R-2)..............  PQ: 244-168. A: 342-65. (Feb. 3, 
                                           Supplemental Appropriations.   1).                                           1994).                          
H. Res. 352, Feb. 8, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 811: Independent Counsel  27 (D-8; R-19)..  10 (D-4; R-6).............  PQ: 249-174. A: 242-174. (Feb. 9,
                                           Act.                                                                         1994).                          
H. Res. 357, Feb. 9, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 3345: Federal Workforce   3 (D-2; R-1)....  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  A: VV (Feb. 10, 1994).           
                                           Restructuring.                                                                                               
H. Res. 366, Feb. 23, 1994....  MO        H.R. 6: Improving America's    NA..............  NA........................  A: VV (Feb. 24, 1994).           
                                           Schools.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 384, Mar. 9, 1994.....  MC        H. Con. Res. 218: Budget       14 (D-5; R-9)...  5 (D-3; R-2)..............  A: 245-171 (Mar. 10, 1994).      
                                           Resolution FY 1995-99.                                                                                       
H. Res. 401, Apr. 12, 1994....  MO        H.R. 4092: Violent Crime       180 (D-98; R-82)  68 (D-47; R-21)...........  A: 244-176 (Apr. 13, 1994).      
                                           Control.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 410, Apr. 21, 1994....  MO        H.R. 3221: Iraqi Claims Act..  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Apr. 28, 1994).   
H. Res. 414, Apr. 28, 1994....  O         H.R. 3254: NSF Auth. Act.....  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 3, 1994).     
H. Res. 416, May 4, 1994......  C         H.R. 4296: Assault Weapons     7 (D-5; R-2)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  A: 220-209 (May 5, 1994).        
                                           Ban Act.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 420, May 5, 1994......  O         H.R. 2442: EDA                 N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 10, 1994).    
                                           Reauthorization.                                                                                             
H. Res. 422, May 11, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 518: California Desert    N/A.............  N/A.......................  PQ: 245-172 A: 248-165 (May 17,  
                                           Protection.                                                                  1994).                          
H. Res. 423, May 11, 1994.....  O         H.R. 2473: Montana Wilderness  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 12, 1994).    
                                           Act.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 428, May 17, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 2108: Black Lung          4 (D-1; R-3)....  N/A.......................  A: VV (May 19, 1994).            
                                           Benefits Act.                                                                                                
H. Res. 429, May 17, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY   173 (D-115; R-    ..........................  A: 369-49 (May 18, 1994).        
                                           1995.                          58).                                                                          
H. Res. 431, May 20, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY   ................  100 (D-80; R-20)..........  A: Voice Vote (May 23, 1994).    
                                           1995.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 440, May 24, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4385: Natl Hiway System   16 (D-10; R-6)..  5 (D-5; R-0)..............  A: Voice Vote (May 25, 1994).    
                                           Designation.                                                                                                 
H. Res. 443, May 25, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4426: For. Ops. Approps,  39 (D-11; R-28).  8 (D-3; R-5)..............  PQ: 233-191 A: 244-181 (May 25,  
                                           FY 1995.                                                                     1994).                          
H. Res. 444, May 25, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4454: Leg Branch Approp,  43 (D-10; R-33).  12 (D-8; R-4).............  A: 249-177 (May 26, 1994).       
                                           FY 1995.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 447, June 8, 1994.....  O         H.R. 4539: Treasury/Postal     N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 236-177 (June 9, 1994).       
                                           Approps 1995.                                                                                                
H. Res. 467, June 28, 1994....  MC        H.R. 4600: Expedited           N/A.............  N/A.......................  PQ: 240-185 A:Voice Vote (July   
                                           Rescissions Act.                                                             14, 1994).                      
H. Res. 468, June 28, 1994....  MO        H.R. 4299: Intelligence        N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 19, 1994).   
                                           Auth., FY 1995.                                                                                              
H. Res. 474, July 12, 1994....  MO        H.R. 3937: Export Admin. Act   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 14, 1994).   
                                           of 1994.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 475, July 12, 1994....  O         H.R. 1188: Anti. Redlining in  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 20, 1994).   
                                           Ins.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 482, July 20, 1994....  O         H.R. 3838: Housing & Comm.     N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 21, 1994).   
                                           Dev. Act.                                                                                                    
H. Res. 483, July 20, 1994....  O         H.R. 3870: Environ. Tech. Act  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 26, 1994).   
                                           of 1994.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 484, July 20, 1994....  MC        H.R. 4604: Budget Control Act  3 (D-2; R-1)....  3 (D-2; R-1)..............  PQ: 245-180 A: Voice Vote (July  
                                           of 1994.                                                                     21, 1994).                      
H. Res. 491, July 27, 1994....  O         H.R. 2448: Radon Disclosure    N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 28, 1994).   
                                           Act.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 492, July 27, 1994....  O         S. 208: NPS Concession Policy  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (July 28, 1994).   
H. Res. 494, July 28, 1994....  MC        H.R. 4801: SBA Reauth &        10 (D-5; R-5)...  6 (D-4; R-2)..............  PQ: 215-169 A: 221-161 (July 29, 
                                           Amdmts. Act.                                                                 1994).                          
H. Res. 500, Aug. 1, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 4003: Maritime Admin.     N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 336-77 (Aug. 2, 1994).        
                                           Reauth..                                                                                                     
H. Res. 501, Aug. 1, 1994.....  O         S. 1357: Little Traverse Bay   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 3, 1994).    
                                           Bands.                                                                                                       
H. Res. 502, Aug. 1, 1994.....  O         H.R. 1066: Pokagon Band of     N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 3, 1994).    
                                           Potawatomi.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 507, Aug. 4, 1994.....  O         H.R. 4217: Federal Crop        N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 5, 1994).    
                                           Insurance.                                                                                                   
H. Res. 509, Aug. 5, 1994.....  MC        H.J. Res. 373/H.R. 4590: MFN   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 9, 1994).    
                                           China Policy.                                                                                                
H. Res. 513, Aug. 9, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4906: Emergency Spending  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 17, 1994).   
                                           Control Act.                                                                                                 
H. Res. 512, Aug. 9, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4907: Full Budget         N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 255-178 (Aug. 11, 1994).      
                                           Disclosure Act.                                                                                              
H. Res. 514, Aug. 9, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4822: Cong.               33 (D-16; R-17).  16 (D-10; R-6)............  PQ: 247-185 A: Voice Vote (Aug.  
                                           Accountability.                                                              10, 1994).                      
H. Res. 515, Aug. 10, 1994....  O         H.R. 4908: Hydrogen Etc.       N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 19, 1994).   
                                           Research Act.                                                                                                
H. Res. 516, Aug. 10, 1994....  MC        H.R. 3433: Presidio            12 (D-2; R-10)..  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Aug. 19, 1994).   
                                           Management.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 532, Sept. 20, 1994...  O         H.R. 4448: Lowell Natl. Park.  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 26, 1994).  
H. Res. 535, Sept. 20, 1994...  O         H.R. 4422: Coast Guard         N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 22, 1994).  
                                           Authorization.                                                                                               
H. Res. 536, Sept. 20, 1994...  MC        H.R. 2866: Headwaters Forest   16 (D-5; R-11)..  9 (D-3; R-6)..............  PQ: 245-175 A: 246-174 (Sept. 21,
                                           Act.                                                                         1994).                          
H. Res. 542, Sept. 23, 1994...  O         H.R. 4008: NOAA Auth. Act....  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 26, 1994).  
H. Res. 543, Sept. 23, 1994...  O         H.R. 4926: Natl. Treatment in  N/A.............  N/A.......................  .................................
                                           Banking.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 544, Sept. 23, 1994...  O         H.R. 3171: Ag. Dept.           N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 28, 1994).  
                                           Reorganization.                                                                                              
H. Res. 551, Sept. 27, 1994...  MO        H.R. 4779: Interstate Waste    22 (D-15; R-7)..  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 28, 1994).  
                                           Control.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 552, Sept. 27, 1994...  O         H.R. 4683: Flow Control Act..  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Sept. 29, 1994).  
H. Res. 562, Oct. 3, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 5044: Amer. Heritage      N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Oct. 5, 1994).    
                                           Areas.                                                                                                       
H. Res. 563, Oct. 4, 1994.....  MC        H. Con. Res. 301: SoC Re:      N/A.............  N/A.......................  F: 83-339 (Oct. 5, 1994).        
                                           Entitlements.                                                                                                
H. Res. 565, Oct. 4, 1994.....  MC        S. 455: Payments in Lieu of    N/A.............  N/A.......................                                   
                                           Taxes.                                                                                                       
H. Res. 570, Oct. 5, 1994.....  MC        H. J. Res. 416: U.S. in Haiti  N/A.............  N/A ......................                                   
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Note.--Code: C-Closed; MC-Modified closed; MO-Modified open; O-Open; D-Democrat; R-Republican; PQ: Previous question; A-Adopted; F-Failed.              

  Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

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                                                   N O T I C E                                                  
                                                                                                                
              Incomplete record of House proceedings. Except for concluding business which follows,             
                  today's House proceedings will be continued in the next issue of the Record.                  
                                                                                                                
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