[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 139 (Thursday, September 29, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         IN HARM'S WAY IN HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Roemer). Under a previous order of the 
House, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today a hand grenade was exploded 
outside the mayor's residence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti; five people 
were killed, and a large number were injured, and very close by was an 
American unit. I understand, fortunately, none of those people were 
maimed or killed.
  But the fact of the matter is they are in harm's way down there, and 
it is just a matter of time until American young men and women are 
killed or maimed. The number is something we just cannot predict right 
now. But there are going to be some young Americans killed or maimed 
down there, and it is unnecessary.
  The thing that is most disturbing to me today is an item brought to 
my attention by my colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Dornan], in an article that was in the Washington Times, and it is very 
disturbing, because it infers very clearly, in fact, it states very 
clearly that the President put our troops in harm's way for political 
purposes.
  Let me read what was said. Dante Caputo, the former Special U.N. 
Envoy on Haiti, said that he had talked to Strobe Talbott, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, and Strobe Talbott had indicated they were going 
to put troops in Haiti because they had to get the President's 
political ratings up, and it would show he had some expertise in 
foreign affairs, which the press and others had said he did not have 
because of Somalia and other things.

  Let me just read a couple of things that were in the article. The 
story said:

       Mr. Caputo had reported back to his boss, U.N. Secretary 
     General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, that the administration had 
     made up its mind in the spring,

in the spring,

     to invade Haiti and believed it would help Mr. Clinton to 
     stem the criticism of his foreign policy. Mr. Caputo, in 
     memos to Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and later in a meeting 
     with Canadian Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet, reported on 
     meetings he had with Mr. Talbott. He said United States 
     positions such as laid out by Mr. Strobe Talbott, ``Haiti 
     represents a test case for which the United States has to 
     have found a solution before November.'' He went on to say in 
     another memo administration considers that an invasion is its 
     best option. He went on to say the lesser evil and a chance 
     to show after the strong media criticism of the 
     administration the President's decisionmaking capability and 
     the firmness of leadership in international political 
     matters.

  Now, this gentleman, I understand, has impeccable credentials, and he 
is a man of integrity. That being the case, he is not lying; he is 
telling the truth.
  Now the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon], our colleague who I 
was hoping would be back here by now, has put into the Congressional 
Record several copies of these memos, I just alluded to.
  Mr. DORNAN. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from 
California.
  Mr. DORNAN. I went over to my office and got them, and they are going 
to be placed in the Record at the conclusion of this special order by 
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], and although they have 
``Confidential'' at the top, they are not confidential anymore. They 
have been published in the New York Times and other papers. We will put 
in all of them at this point.

                             [Confidential]

     Attention: The Secretary General.
     From: Dante Caputo, RSSC
       Over the past fifteen days, I had the pleasure of meeting 
     several times with Strobe Talbott and other officials of the 
     American State Department. I also had some meetings in Paris 
     with M. Alain Juppe, Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 
     Ottawa with Mr. Andre Cueller, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
     Moreover, I was able to have some informal conversations with 
     other areas of American political life.
       The conclusions that I am drawing today are as follows:
       1. The U.S. administration considers that an invasion of 
     Haiti is its best option.
       2. The principal objection to this type of action comes 
     from the act that ``if it is easy to initiate this type of 
     action, it is more difficult to exit from it.''
       3. In order to resolve this dilemma, the U.S. 
     administration will seek to act in the following manner:
       (a) set up a unilateral action, a surgical action, with the 
     eventual participation of several countries in the region so 
     as to give it a certain legitimacy;
       (b) put President Aristide back in power;
       (c) It will seek a quick replacement of the armed 
     intervention forces by the [illegible] whose mandate and 
     structure will have been redefined beforehand.
       4. This strategy would allow it to capitalize on the 
     experience with such an operation, transferring the political 
     cost on the UN.
       5. In the same fashion, the President of the United States' 
     main advisers are of the opinion that not only does this 
     option constitute the lesser evil, but that is politically 
     desirable. Thus we think that the current opposition of 
     public opinion to an armed intervention will change 
     radically, once it will have taken place. The Americans see 
     in this type of action a chance to show, after the strong 
     media criticism of the administration, the President's 
     decision making capability and the firmness of leadership in 
     international political matters.
       6. The position of the friendly countries vis a vis this 
     strategy is the following:


                                 France

       France is opposed to the use of force be it multilateral or 
     unilateral. It is ready to participate in a MINUAH under the 
     terms foreseen in July, 1993, that is to say, technical 
     assistance and participation in forming a police force. In an 
     explicit manner, France is opposed to participating in 
     whatever activity that would imply direct police action.
       France considers that it is urgent that a meeting of the 
     Four Friends take place at the department head or under 
     secretary level, preferably in New York.
       France insists as well on Argentina's participation as a 
     fifth friendly country given that it is a member of the 
     Security Council.


                                 Canada

       Canada does not wish to participate in a multilateral armed 
     intervention force. Canada thinks that in the present 
     situation, there is probably no other alternative to that 
     which the U.S. administration will adopt. In this 
     perspective, according to Minister Quellet, our problem will 
     consist of knowing how to ``manage'' this new reality. Canada 
     seems equally disposed to participate in a MINUAH whose 
     mandate will have been redefined. Canada also considers it 
     urgent to call a meeting of the Four Friends.
       7. The permanent U.S. Mission has undertaken the necessary 
     steps so that the Security Council comes to a decision very 
     soon on the MINUAH's mandate and structure.--May 23, 1994.
                                  ____


   Report of a Discussion of the Secretary General With His Special 
 Representative for Haiti at the United Nations Headquarters, Tuesday, 
                        May 24, 1994 at 6:30 pm

       Present: The Secretary General, Mr. Gharekhan, Mr. de Soto, 
     Mrs. Green, Mrs. Seguin-Horton.
     Subject: The situation in Haiti. Possibilities for a military 
         intervention by the United States.
       The Secretary General says to Mr. Caputo that he's well 
     aware of his last summary report.
       Mr. Caputo explains that he did not dare present any 
     options and policies to the Secretary General in this report. 
     The fact is that he had lately a large number of informal 
     consultations that are all going in the same direction: The 
     Americans will not be able to stand for much longer, until 
     August at the latest, the criticism of their foreign policy 
     on the domestic front. They want to do something; they are 
     going to try to intervene militarily.
       The Secretary General wonders if President Aristide could 
     invoke Article 51 of the Charter in order to call for a 
     military intervention.
       Mr. de Soto says that the constitution prevents him from 
     doing so.
       Mr. Caputo thinks that after having asked for the 
     intervention, Mr. Aristide will condemn it. Moreover, the 
     United States, that wants to obtain the Security Council's 
     blessing, is now actively studying the means to accord a 
     legal protection to this affair.
       Mr. de Soto recalls that this idea recently provoked a 
     general protest among the OAS.
       What can the United Nations Secretariat do, either to avoid 
     or to encourage this intervention?, asks the Secretary 
     General.
       Mr. Caputo predicts a disaster. The United States will make 
     the UN bear the responsibility to manage the occupation of 
     Haiti. ``With Aristide as President during two or three 
     years, it will be Hell!'' It is not so much the armed 
     intervention itself that we have to avoid. What we do not 
     want, is to inherit a ``baby''. For the Americans' are fixing 
     to leave quickly. They would not intervene if they had to 
     remain.
       Mr. Gharekhan asks Mr. Caputo what he understands by 
     leaving ``quickly''. One month, replies Mr. Caputo. Who is 
     going to replace the Americans?, asks the Secretary General.
       ``Us'', replies Mr. de Soto. The Americans will be 
     applauded and the dirty work will come back to the U.N. The 
     only thing that could discourage the United States would be 
     to not obtain the any contributing countries for mounting a 
     multinational operation.
       France, according to Mr. Juppe, is opposed to it, confirms 
     Mr. Caputo. As for Canada, it is committed to strictly 
     limiting its contribution to the formation of a new Haitian 
     police.
       The Secretary General believes that in making an effort, 
     the United States will be able to manage to obtain 2,000 
     French-African troops and a few troops from the Caribbean.
       Mr. Caputo says that the United Nations would have to work 
     with a complex force and that it would be difficult for it to 
     mount an operation in a one-month period. The Latin American 
     countries are not ready to contribute. Mr. Caputo knows that 
     Argentina, for example, is not very favorable to this idea. 
     He also doubts that Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela would be 
     tempted.
       This scenario would be fraught with consequences for the 
     United Nations as well as for this region of the world. Dante 
     Caputo emphasizes that it is harmful that at the conclusion 
     of the cold war, no other answer can be found for such a 
     crisis.
       In answer to the Minister's question about the consequences 
     of the American intervention in Panama, Dante Caputo replies 
     that it concerned a different time where the cold war was 
     still taking place. Today, we are right in expecting that 
     other types of means be activated. The United Nations will be 
     perceived as being impotent before the region's problems. 
     They will have to face up to a particularly difficult post-
     intervention situation.
       To the Minister's question about the existence of another 
     alternative, Dante Caputo replies that the United States 
     acted as a brake to a diplomatic solution, creating a 
     situation where the intervention became nearly inevitable.
       The Minister remarks that actually, despite the goodwill of 
     the United Nations, its credibility is jeopardized and the 
     [Haitian] military leaders are ``laughing at us'' The 
     Minister stresses the difficulties of a strict and effective 
     implementation of planned sanctions and expresses its doubt 
     over the possibility of a complete closing of the border.
       The Minister shares Dante Caputo's appreciation of the need 
     to make some arrangements in the event of a unilateral 
     intervention. However, the Minister continues to affirm that 
     Canada will not commit itself to hostile activities in Haiti. 
     Canada is ready to favorably consider a United Nations 
     request favoring a peace keeping operation with the view of 
     consolidating a democratic regime, aid programs, and 
     participation in a better equipped MUNUHA. Basically, the 
     Minister concedes that only the United States can wrestle 
     with the [Haitian] military leaders.
       To improve our image relative to President Aristide, the 
     Minister believe that the President should participate in the 
     next meeting of the Four Friends. Regarding this meeting, 
     Dante Caputo maintains that it would be preferable if it be 
     held first of all without the President, and that he not 
     participate except after the meeting. In the perspective of 
     managing the post intervention situation, Dante Caputo thinks 
     that it is important that President Aristide can consider 
     himself to be an integral part of the Four Friends' action.
       According to the Minister, President Aristide's credibility 
     risks to be stained, if he restored after the U.S. 
     intervention.
       The Minister questions himself over the composition, nature 
     and on the willingness of the countries that would be ready 
     to participate in the MINUHA.
       Dante Caputo emphasizes that France expressed the wish to 
     participate in the formation of a police force in Haiti and 
     is reticent to do ``monitoring''. Ambassador Prechette then 
     recalls the difficulties encountered at the moment of 
     recruiting the components of the operation's police force in 
     1993. Dante Caputo remarks that the question of this police 
     force's role and mandate should be determined as a function 
     of the whole and notes that the countries interested in 
     taking part remain few, in addition to Canada, the United 
     States, Argentina, and France.
       The fundamental question remains the post-intervention 
     role, multilateral action being put aside, indicates Dante 
     Caputo. Ambassador Prechette replies that in effect, the 
     United Nations will not vote for this type of action, but 
     could be in favor of a ``green light'' for a coalition of 
     States that would invite countries interested in toppling the 
     [Haitian] military leaders if a very serious incident 
     unfolded. Dante Caputo adds that this American initiative 
     could be blocked by an internal decision process.
       The Minister concludes the meeting by recalling that this 
     is an emergency, that Canada wants to play a role, and that 
     he will be guided by the advice and suggestions of Dante 
     Caputo. In the probable case where sanctions would have no 
     immediate effect and would act in the military leaders' 
     favor, the Minister remarks that it would than be necessary 
     to explain why sanctions are being maintained against 
     Haiti.--Juliette Remy, May 23, 1994.
                                  ____

       The Secretary General recalls that in the past, the United 
     States was able to show that it could mount a multinational 
     force, if only in appearance. ``Must we say that we think 
     that a military intervention in Haiti would be negative?''
       Mr. de Soto thinks that insinuating the possibility of an 
     armed intervention is working to produce a certain effect in 
     Haiti. The [Haitian] military leaders are nervous. * * * It 
     would thus be politically dangerous to publicly discourage 
     this menace.
       According to Mr. Caputo, it must first be proposed that the 
     President of the Security Council ask for a closing of the 
     border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This measure 
     will have a certain economic and psychological impact.
       The Secretary General wonders how it is possible to really 
     close this border. A very clear commitment on the part of the 
     Dominican authorities must be required, replies Mr. Caputo. 
     The Secretary General think that the Dominican government 
     does not have the means to prevent infiltration.
       Mr. Caputo considers that the land or sea routes can be 
     controlled if the authorities accept to play the game. In 
     this regard, Mr. Caputo informs the Secretary General that 
     the Americans have proposed to him to accompany them tomorrow 
     to meet President Balaguer in Santo Domingo. Mr. Caputo has 
     not yet replied, but he thinks that he must accept this offer 
     in order to show that he is being active on the diplomatic 
     front.
       Replying to a question from the Secretary General, Mr. 
     Gharckhan makes the point that the Security Council 
     specifically mentioned the border in his presidential 
     declaration.
       Mr. de Soto thinks that the other friends of Haiti must be 
     made to participate at this meeting, if only through their 
     ambassadors in Santo Domingo.
       Moreover, Mr. Caputo pointed out that the Republicans have 
     the tendency to keep their distance vis a vis the idea of 
     intervening thinking that President Clinton would be 
     committing a monumental error there.
       Nobody can tell if such an operation will succeed or fail, 
     notes the Secretary General. In addition to closing the 
     border, continues Mr. Caputo, we will have to keep the 
     same political framework set up two months ago if the 
     United States requests.
       The Secretary General asks Mr. Caputo if he still believes 
     that after 17 month spent in his position, if the United 
     States can conduct diplomacy. The Americans are still deeply 
     divided on the Haitian question; there are supporters and 
     detractors of President Aristide.
       Mr. Caputo thinks that it is now or never to show the 
     Americans that there is a political alternative to American 
     intervention.
       Mr. de Soto wonders if in fact Mr. Caputo should not go to 
     Port au Prince to challenge the military leaders and try to 
     convince Mr. Cedras, who pretends to be a ``negotiator''.
       Mr. Caputo affirms that he is ready to go to Haiti. The 
     problem is that if his visit fails, and that if it is 
     accompanied by demonstrations by the BRAPH and by a definite 
     ``no'' from Mr. Cedras, we risk provoking an armed 
     intervention.
       Mr. Gbarekahan thinks that, in effect, the Americans could 
     feel justified to intervene.
       According to Mr. de Soto, this would be the case if it were 
     already August, but if we try now, we still have time, he 
     says.
       Mr. Caputo declares that he likes this idea because the 
     United Nations seems to be making every possible effort on 
     the diplomatic front on the condition, of course, of 
     obtaining a meeting with Mr. Cedras. In reply to a question 
     from the Secretary General, he has the means to contact him.
       Moreover, Mr. Caputo points out that the French insist a 
     lot on including Argentina in the Group of the Secretary 
     General's Friends. Argentina, who was rather tepid two or 
     three months ago, now seems interested in the question.
       The French find in effect that the Argentina's presence 
     would allow a better balance * * * Security Council, among 
     the Group of Friends. Venezuela would not be excluded for as 
     much.
       Aware of the risk of displeasing Brazil who is also a 
     member of the Security Council, the Secretary General 
     proposes to use the criteria of Argentina's active 
     participation in the search of a solution to the Haitian 
     problem. Isn't Argentina a frigate that sails in the region 
     to check on the embargo's enforcement?
       Mr. Gharekton believes that he remembers that Mr. Goulding 
     was totally opposed to this idea.
       In answer to the Secretary General's question, Mr. de Soto 
     says that Mr. Goulding thinks that including Argentina would 
     bother Brazil.
       Mr. Caputo suggests consulting Brazil.
       Mr. de Soto points out that Mr. Lula da Silva, Brazil's 
     presidential candidate, has come out in favor of intervention 
     . . .
       Summarizing the situation, the Secretary General proposes 
     to act in the following manner: 1) Mr. Caputo reports 
     tomorrow at Santo Domingo to discuss the border; 2) He makes 
     contact with Mr. Cedras to set up an appointment with him; 3) 
     He goes to Haiti to strengthen his credibility; 4) The 
     Secretariat contacts Brazil to announce the decision to 
     invite Argentina to be part of the Group of Friends, 5) The 
     Secretariat invites Argentina.
       Evoking the role of the United Nation's mission in Haiti 
     (MINUAH), Mr. Caputo recalls that the American plan is to 
     intervene, leave quickly and pass the torch to the U.N. But, 
     if they saw how difficult it is to mount a UN operation on 
     the spot, they would perhaps reflect some more before 
     intervening.
       Mr. de Soto emphasizes that the MINUAH mandates exists. The 
     United States has met with officers from the [illegible] 
     Department for Peace Keeping to study means of renewing, 
     redefining, and strengthening the Mission. Replying to the 
     Secretary General, Mr. de Soto indicates that the initial 
     mandate foresees 700 to 800 men. The United States is in the 
     process of broadening the scope of MINUAH to a mission, not 
     only of technical assistance, but also one peace keeping. 
     This would thus be a way to discourage the United States to 
     intervene in showing them how difficult it is to set up the 
     Mission that it would like to see following its intervention.
       Mr. Gharakhan thinks that the Secretariat cannot highlight 
     this difficulty since the United States has the means to 
     obtain the necessary troops.
       The Secretary General fears that the United States will 
     take a unilateral decision and that it will repeat the 
     Somalian experience. The main question remains knowing what 
     to do to avoid this unpleasant role for the United Nations.
       According to Mr. de Soto, the Security Council's backing 
     can be politically costly to the United States in so far as 
     it will cause the United States to make concessions.
       The Secretary General points out that the United States can 
     even choose to leave forces behind.
       Mr. de Soto says that the closest analogy is the one of 
     Panama. The United States knows that the Latin American 
     countries will protest out of principle while at the same 
     time they will be relieved to get rid of Mr. Cedras.
       Suggesting to proceed by stages, the Secretary General 
     concludes that they agree on the five points mentioned above. 
     These points already will allow for movement. Mrs. Green, 
     having asked if Mr. Aristide was going to be contacted, the 
     Secretary General replies in the affirmative. He agrees to 
     telephone Mr. Aristide. He suggests to put off until later 
     the more substantial reflections on the question, but keeps 
     in mind the fact that there is a risk of escalation. It 
     should not be forgotten that the Haitian people suffer 
     because of those sanctions.--Fabienne Seguin-Horton, May 25, 
     1994.
                                  ____


                             [Confidential]

     Note for the File--MEETING BETWEEN MR. DANTE CAPUTO, SREG FOR 
         HAITI WITH MR. ANDRE QUELLET, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER OF 
         CANADA, OTTAWA, MAY 19, 1994
       Present: Mr. Stanley E. Gooch, Assistant Vice Minister, 
     Latin American and Caribbean Desk, Mrs.; Louise Prechatte, 
     Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations.
       After being warmly welcomed by the Minister. Dante Caputo 
     stresses, first of all, the different options for a solution 
     and relates, for the Minister's benefit, the reactions 
     observed in Paris and Washington. The first option consists 
     of waiting for sanctions put in place to produce the desired 
     effect: the military leaders' departure. In this regard, 
     France and the United States have the same worry of seeing 
     that the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti be 
     hermetically sealed.
       However, stresses Dante Caputo, the United States would not 
     be ready to wait several months for this to produce the 
     desired effect. The second option, consists of using the 
     sanctions as an instrument to support a political strategy. 
     France is in favor of such a scenario and, in this regard, 
     supports the idea of a high level meeting of the Secretary 
     General's Four Friends Countries. The third option consists 
     of using unilateral force, multilateral force, or a 
     combination of the two. France is opposed to this. Concerning 
     the United States position, such as laid out by Strobe 
     Talbot, Dante Caputo thinks that time is short, and that the 
     situation today cannot last beyond July. Dante Caputo 
     emphasizes that Haiti represents a test case for which the 
     United States has to have found a solution before November. 
     The United States supports the return of a reinforced MINUAH 
     (self defense, protecting sites) without specifying the 
     probable means for the [Haitian] military leaders' departure.
       Dante Caputo gives his personal impression of the strategy 
     that the United States would get ready to implement. 
     According to him, the United States cannot wait any longer to 
     obtain the benefits of an action in favor of Haiti for a just 
     cause; it would intervene punctually in order to then cede 
     its place to the MINUAH.
       This scenario would be fraught with consequences for the 
     United Nations as well as for this region of the world. Dante 
     Caputo emphasized that it is a shame that at the end of the 
     Cold War, another response cannot be given to a crisis of 
     this type.
       To the minister's question on the consequences of the 
     American intervention in Panama, Dante Caputo responded that 
     it was a different time, when the Cold War was still a 
     reality. Today, one has the right to expect other types of 
     means to be implemented. The United Nations will be perceived 
     as being powerless regarding the problems of the region. It 
     would have to deal with a particularly difficult post-
     intervention situation.
       To the minister's question on the existence of another 
     alternative, Dante Caputo answered that the U.S. has served 
     as a restraint for a diplomatic solution, creating a 
     situation where intervention has become almost inevitable.
       The minister remarked that in fact, despite the good will 
     of the United Nations, its credibility is being questioned 
     and the military is laughing at us.'' The minister underlined 
     the difficulties of a strict and effective implementation of 
     the sanctions planned and shared his doubt regarding the 
     possibility of a total closure of the border.
       The minister shared Dante Caputo's view regarding the need 
     to take steps in the case of a unilateral intervention. 
     Nevertheless the minister stated that Canada will not engage 
     in activities hostile to Haiti. Canada is ready to favorably 
     study a U.N. request for a peace-keeping operation, with a 
     view to consolidating a democratic regime, assistance 
     programs, and participation of a better equipped U.N Mission 
     for Haiti. Basically, the minister conceded that just the 
     U.S. can engage in arm wrestling with the military.
       In order to improve our image regarding President Aristide, 
     the minister felt that the president should participate in 
     the upcoming meeting of the four friendly nations. Regarding 
     this meeting, Dante Caputo stated that it would be preferable 
     for it to take place initially without the president and that 
     he not participate except subsequent to the meeting. In the 
     perspective of the question of the post-intervention 
     situation, Dante Caputo felt that it is important that 
     President Aristide be able to consider himself an integral 
     part of the action of the four friendly nations.
       According to the minister, if he is reestablished after the 
     U.S. intervention, President Aristide's credibility risks 
     being blemished.
       The minister asked about the composition, nature and will 
     of the countries that would be willing to participate in the 
     U.N. Mission for Haiti.
       Dante Caputo emphasized that France has expressed the 
     desire to participate in the formation of the police in Haiti 
     and shows a reluctance to doing monitoring. Ambassador 
     Frechette then recalled the difficulties encountered at the 
     time of recruitment of the elements of the police for the 
     1993 operation. Dante Caputo remarked that the question of 
     the role and mandate of these policemen should be determined 
     according to the panorama and noted that the countries 
     interested in participating are few, namely Canada, the 
     U.S., Argentina and France.
       The basic question is the post-intervention rule, 
     multilateral action being rejected, Dante Caputo indicated. 
     Ambassador Frechette responded that in fact, the U.N. will 
     not vote for this type of action but it could be in favor of 
     a ``green light'' for a coalition of states that would invite 
     the countries interested in removing the military from 
     government, if a very serious incident took place. Dante 
     Caputo added that this American initiative could be blocked 
     by an internal decision-making process failing.
       The minister concluded the meeting by recalling that there 
     is urgency, that Canada is anxious to play a role and that it 
     will be guided by the advice and suggestions of Dante Caputo. 
     In the probable case where the sanctions did not have an 
     immediate effect and worked in favor of the military, the 
     minister remarked that it would then be necessary to explain 
     why the sanctions are being maintained against Haiti.--
     Juliette Remy, May 23, 1994.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I appreciate my colleague bringing those to 
the floor. As I said before, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Weldon] put them in the Record, I believe, previously.
  Let me just say this, if this is true, if this is true, Strobe 
Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State, should be summarily fired, 
removed from his position, because they have intentionally put our 
young people in harm's way for political purposes and for no other 
reason.
  Almost 80 percent of the American people did not want our young 
people sent to Haiti, because there was no national interest. Over 75 
percent of the Congress did not want our young people in Haiti, and yet 
the President went to the United Nations and got the approval of 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali without coming to the Congress and decided by 
himself to send our troops down there.
  Now we find out that he did it for political purposes, and it was 
planned back in the spring of this year.
  I want to tell you, Strobe Talbott should be fired. I am going to 
send a letter to the President tomorrow signed by many of my 
colleagues, I am sure, asking for his resignation.
  Mr. DORNAN. I will sign it.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. In addition to that, the President should be 
taken to task if that was his purpose in putting our troops down there. 
They are in harm's way. Some of them undoubtedly are going to be killed 
or maimed, and this guy is doing it for political purposes. That is 
unthinkable, unthinkable.
  Mr. DORNAN. Here, I say to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], 
is a line from these memos. Some of these memos are meetings with Mr. 
Caputo and the French Ambassadors up at the United Nations their staff. 
By the way, everybody up there is paid their massive salaries tax-free 
from every country in the world including the United States of America; 
actually, to get around theirs being tax-free, we pay their taxes, the 
U.S. taxpayer.

                          ____________________