[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 139 (Thursday, September 29, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
           CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, as our military forces remain bogged 
down in Haiti, and as the morale of our troops stretches to the 
breaking point--and past it, in the case of one unfortunate soldier who 
apparently took his own life--and as we use more and more of our 
resources in support of the mission in Haiti, I become increasingly 
concerned that we will be bogged down there, and may not be able to 
respond to a real emergency.
  I am particularly concerned with American interests in regions which 
are always unstable, such as Korea or in the Persian Gulf, where 
radicals still rule Iran and Iraq.
  For example, if a crisis erupts in the Persian Gulf, once again 
threatening the world's oil supplies, will America be as ready to act 
as we were when George Bush told Saddam Hussien that his aggression 
would not stand? Or will our military be too busy policing the streets 
of Port-au-Prince in order to make Haiti safe for a radical leftist 
anti-American named Aristide?
  Will soldiers who already have seen duty and witnessed death in both 
Somalia and Haiti be at their best if rapidly redeployed back to the 
desert? Would there be any other choice than to redeploy the same brave 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines? Or has our President cut our 
forces so far, so fast, that we don't have enough other troops to 
rotate into duty?
  I fear that this Haitian experiment could be very costly, because the 
evidence indicates that our forces have indeed been spread too thin. 
That's a dangerous position at any time, but being distracted by this 
voodoo to-do makes the danger to our real national interests far 
greater still.
  More than a year ago, in a September 1, 1993 speech at the Heritage 
Foundation, I warned about just such circumstances. I said then, and I 
repeat today, that the morale of our sailors, soldiers, Marines, and 
airmen is essential to an effective fighting force. Yet, by not 
diminishing the calls on our service people, while at the same time 
reducing the size of our forces, we directly threaten that morale by 
ensuring longer and more frequent deployment of a smaller number of 
ships, planes, and armament.
  In that same speech, more than a year before we deployed not one but 
two aircraft carriers to subdue the great Haitian superpower, I warned 
against just such an invasion. I quoted Mr. Aristide, accurately, as 
encouraging the necklacing of opponents with burning, gasoline-soaked 
tires, calling it chic, classy, elegant and snappy. ``It smells good,'' 
he said, ``and wherever you go you want to smell it.'' Then I asked the 
key questions, which still reverberate around this mission:

       Is Aristide worth the risk of a single American life? Will 
     President Clinton wish to explain the death of an American 
     serviceman or woman killed on this mission to his or her 
     mother?

  The answer, then and now, is a resounding no.
  Two weeks ago, on the day before the planned invasion, I repeated my 
arguments on a national radio response to President Clinton. I said 
that even if Mr. Aristide were more to our liking, Haiti still would be 
a quagmire not worth hundreds of millions of dollars of our tax money, 
much less American lives.
  Mr. Speaker, now, though, our troops are there watching as Haitians 
kill Haitians, themselves being forced to kill Haitians when provoked, 
aware of the comparison to Somalia, and risking their own lives in the 
process.
  For the Record, I submit three columns, including one by former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and another by Donald Lambro of the 
Washington Times, both of which argue that we should exit from Haiti as 
soon as is humanly possible. I endorse their reasoning and add my own 
strong belief that Haiti is a dangerous distraction and a waste of 
military resources already spread too thin.
  The third article suggests, unfortunately, the likelihood of civil 
war in Haiti once Aristide returns.
  Mr. Speaker, Mr. Aristide has $39 million left in his bank account. 
Instead of wasting it on his own comfort and his slew of high-priced 
lobbyists, he should use it to hire his own soldiers. Meanwhile, we in 
America should withdraw our fighting men from Aristide's island, before 
the civil war begins, and save them for causes more worthy of the 
world's only remaining superpower.
  If we don't, America can become a paper tiger, incapable of 
confronting other more meaningful challenges on the geopolitical stage.
  We must not let that happen. Let's remedy this foolish mistake and 
get our troops out fast.
  Mr. Speaker, the documents referred to in my remarks are as follows:

                           Out of Haiti--Fast

                          (By Henry Kissinger)

       The ink was barely dry on the agreement negotiated by 
     President Carter's team in Haiti when second-guessing 
     developed. It came as a shock to many that the administration 
     postponed its proclaimed goal of overthrowing the junta and 
     that the landing in Haiti was brought about with the 
     cooperation of leaders described by President Clinton as mass 
     murderers only 72 hours earlier.
       But the criticism should focus not so much on the 
     culmination of the crisis as on the policy that left no other 
     option except military invasion by a high-tech superpower of 
     a practically unarmed country and the poorest nation of the 
     Western Hemisphere. The agreement negotiated by the Carter 
     team saves American and Haitian lives, removes the Haitian 
     junta, albeit with a slight delay, and returns the deposed 
     elected leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, to power, sacrificing 
     only grandiloquent statements that should never have been 
     made. Most important, the brief interval in which these 
     changes take place provides an opportunity for sober 
     reflection about just how deeply America should launch itself 
     into the Haitian morass.
       In my view, any prolonged military occupation must be 
     avoided; another attempt at nation-building will trap us in 
     an endless enterprise before it ends in a fiasco. Too much 
     has already been staked; some relationship between means and 
     ends must be reestablished.
       The basic dilemmas of postwar American foreign policy have 
     been the result of enterprises undertaken lightly, with 
     little if any opposition and from which extrication proved 
     hellishly difficult. The Carter mission has eased the entry 
     of American troops--a success that is also an admission 
     ticket to the far more complex danger of American forces 
     finding themselves engulfed in the passions and conflicts of 
     Haitian factions much more practiced in violence than in 
     pluralism and which may yet undermine the agreement. A 
     prolonged U.S. military occupation of Haiti would almost 
     guarantee that the hatreds accumulated over decades would 
     overwhelm the purposes for which we entered.
       I have always had grave doubts about military intervention 
     to restore Aristide. That America should favor an elected 
     president over the murderous junta was inherent in our 
     values, and justified diplomatic pressure and embargoes of 
     the kind that had, after all, contributed to the overthrow of 
     the Duvalier dictatorship. But American lives should be 
     risked only when there is a demonstrable threat to the 
     national security, on behalf of clearly defined objectives 
     and with forces proportionate to the objective.
       The administration policy failed all three tests. Haiti 
     posed no conceivable direct threat. Contrary to 
     administration statements, the junta represented no model any 
     Western Hemisphere nation might be tempted to follow. The 
     stated objectives were vague, and the force deployed was 
     disproportionate to any sensible goal. When CNN shows daily 
     briefings by the press officer of the American Embassy in 
     Port-au-Prince describing locations from which to view the 
     planned invasion of the country to which he was accredited 
     and promising the arrival of additional personnel to 
     handle the overflow demand for invasion coverage, the 
     argument that the threat represented by Haiti cannot wait 
     for the operation of less drastic measures becomes hardly 
     plausible. (Moreover, it raises the question of how to 
     curb public relations efforts whose proconsular character 
     undermines America's relations with the other nations of 
     this hemisphere.)
       Ambassador Madeleine Albright's invocation of moral 
     absolutes that transcend all practical considerations is 
     belied by the actual record. The administration did not 
     intervene in Bosnia or Rwanda, where the atrocities were far 
     greater; in Rwanda, President Clinton stood apart from 
     genocide with the argument that America could not serve as 
     the world's policeman and that it had no national interest in 
     that part of Africa. The current administration, like any 
     other, cannot escape the need for selectivity.
       Thus the principal achievement of the Carter mission is 
     that it provides a graceful exit from becoming engulfed in 
     the vortex of Haitian domestic politics. It is senseless to 
     talk of the ``restoration'' of democracy in a country that 
     has never known democracy, or to equate the fact that 
     Aristide was elected with a certificate of democratic 
     practices--as Sen. Nunn has wisely pointed out. To turn Haiti 
     into a pluralistic society may take a decade or more and 
     cannot be achieved by military occupation.
       Even the limited task of disarming Haiti's armed forces 
     implies difficult decisions: How, when and by whom is the 
     army to be disarmed or restrained? To whom do we provide 
     protection once Aristide is back in power? What precisely are 
     the terms of the amnesty and which parliament approves it--
     the existing one or that emerging from future elections? Will 
     Aristide abide by the amnesty despite his opposition, and 
     what is America's obligation to enforce the Carter agreement?
       Nor can the dilemmas of a prolonged military operation be 
     avoided by turning nation-building over to the United 
     Nations. I hope that President Clinton was speaking 
     euphemistically when he presented America's policy on Haiti 
     as relfecting some kind of international political consensus. 
     For the international support we elicited was a tribute to 
     America's power, not to its purposes. With the exception of 
     Argentina, it included not a single major country of Latin 
     America. Most of the nations participating from outside the 
     hemisphere do so because of the economic strength of the 
     United States, as a quid pro quo for past or future 
     American security assistance, or to gain some influence 
     over actions they far from approve. Neither Bangladesh nor 
     Israel has heretofore exhibited any major political and 
     security interests in the Caribbean. Thus there is no 
     other group to which this assignment can be turned over. 
     International support of a military occupation may provide 
     a few auxiliaries and a modicum of financial help. But in 
     the real world, the military occupation of Haiti will 
     remain America's problem.
       The artificial nature of this international support has 
     already levied an exorbitant toll. One of the most hallowed 
     principles of American foreign policy has been to keep the 
     military power of other continents out of the Western 
     Hemisphere. From the Monroe Doctrine to the 1947 Rio Treaty 
     setting up a collective security system for the Western 
     Hemisphere and in the decades since, every U.S. 
     administration has insisted that hemispheric problems be 
     settled by the nations of this hemisphere. Yet the 
     administration recoiled from involving the institution 
     specifically designed for that purpose--the Organization of 
     American States--because it realized that our partners in 
     this hemisphere would never approve military intervention, 
     though they would and did support diplomatic and economic 
     measures short of it. Appealing for the military assistance 
     of nations outside the hemisphere on an inter-American issue 
     sets a precedent that future American administrations may 
     well come to regret.
       Another such booby trap is inherent in the Security Council 
     resolution authorizing the use of force for the purpose of 
     replacing the Haitian junta, a resolution that passed with 
     Russian support. The precedent for Moscow's ambitions in what 
     Russia calls the ``near abroad'' is hard to miss--the 
     worrisome policy of forcing the republics of the former 
     Soviet Union to return to the imperial fold. That this tacit 
     quid pro quo is understood in Washington is reflected in 
     pronouncements by Ambassador Albright and President Clinton 
     stating that each major power has a special responsibility 
     for peace-keeping and stability in ``its own back yard.''
       It is a dangerous doctrine. America's actions in Haiti, 
     however ill-advised, do not affect overall security. 
     America's interventions in this hemisphere have been short-
     lived; Russia's military advances have tended to be 
     permanent. They are certain to rekindle ancient fears and 
     tensions. Three conclusions follow.
       America's military presence in Haiti ought to be brought to 
     a rapid conclusion, preferably by the end of this year. We 
     will have restored an elected president. By then, we will 
     have disarmed or neutralized those Haitian armed forces 
     threatening his rule. Aristide should be able to maintain 
     himself after that by his own efforts, helped by generous 
     American economic aid.
       If our armed forces stay beyond this mandate, they will 
     either become spectators in a bloody spectacle or 
     participants in struggles where it may not be easy to tell 
     which side to back--rebellious crowds or forces appearing in 
     the guise of law and order. In the end, even Aristide will 
     turn on the United States, if only to demonstrate that he is 
     a genuine nationalist and not America's instrument--a 
     tendency already implicit in his conduct.
       Once American forces--except for a small training mission--
     are withdrawn, the remaining tasks can be assigned to inter-
     American institutions, which, when freed of the Latin 
     American fear of U.S. military intervention, could prove 
     quite effective. Governmental reform could be assigned to the 
     OAS, economic assistance to the inter-American financial 
     institutions--backed up, of course, by a continuing U.S. 
     interest.
       The Haitian crisis provides an occasion for the 
     administration to review the practices that have produced 
     such stark alternatives and such an obsession with public 
     relations. Symbolic of these tendencies is the decision to 
     launch the 82nd Airborne Division while American emissaries 
     were still on the ground in Haiti. Given the possibility of 
     glitches in any military operation, what was the hurry? What 
     if the Haitian junta had not yielded, the attack had 
     proceeded, and Carter's plane had blown a tire on takeoff? 
     What if the junta, learning of the launch--as it is said to 
     have done--had taken the American delegation as hostages? 
     Surely there was no need for surprise when the projected 
     landing sites could be seen on television. If the purpose was 
     to land before Congress could pass a resolution of 
     disapproval the next day, the enterprise marked an 
     astonishing disintegration of the executive-congressional 
     relationship.
       It is painful to come to such conclusions while a military 
     operation is underway. But the greatest risk we now face is 
     an open-ended commitment of military forces to tasks for 
     which they are not designed. The greatest need is a 
     bipartisan reassessment of our foreign policy and above all a 
     prudent definition of the circumstances in which American 
     power is to be engaged.

                     If Past Comments Are Prologue

                           (By Donald Lambro)

       As debate over Bill Clinton's long-term military occupation 
     of Haiti intensifies, little attention is being paid to what 
     will happen when exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide is restored to power.
       Now, as the countdown nears the Oct. 15 deadline when 
     Haiti's military rulers must relinquish power, some long 
     overdue attention may begin to focus on this leftist 
     revolutionary whose heroes include Fidel Castro's henchman 
     Che Guevara, Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende and 
     the French Revolution's Maximilien Robespierre.
       Most Americans are justifiably opposed to occupying a 
     nation that has been a hotbed of political turmoil and 
     bloodshed over its nearly 200 years of independence. We have 
     no national security interests in Haiti and do not belong 
     there.
       But beyond the obvious risks to young U.S. servicemen in 
     Haiti, we might also consider the disastrous economic 
     consequences that are certain to flow from the 
     anticapitalist, class-struggle policies that Mr. Aristide 
     intends to impose on his country.
       Haiti is one of the most impoverished countries in our 
     hemisphere, made even poorer by Mr. Clinton's misguided 
     economic sanctions.
       What will likely follow will be years of continued poverty, 
     desperation and further unrest, only this time the United 
     States will be the one imposing the sentence upon the poor 
     people of Haiti.
       Only someone like Mr. Clinton, who has played the politics 
     of class envy and believes there is a government solution to 
     every problem, could put the United States in the position of 
     supporting such a bizarre and radical figure who loves 
     socialism and hates capitalism.
       Most Americans know little about the man we are putting 
     back into power because the Clinton administration has chosen 
     to keep the focus away from his past, and the national news 
     media has gently treated him as a benign political figure.
       But an examination of Mr. Aristide's past statements 
     ``raises serious questions about whether the United States 
     should be betting the lives of Americans and its 
     international credibility on him,'' says foreign policy 
     specialist Lawrence Di Rita in an eye-opening analysis for 
     the Heritage Foundation.
       He is bitterly anti-American and has spoken lovingly of 
     incinerating his political enemies with gasoline-filled tires 
     placed around their necks, a tactic known as ``necklacing.''
       Consider these coldblooded remarks from an address that Mr. 
     Aristide gave at the National Palace that was broadcast over 
     Radio Nationale in Port-au-Prince on Sept. 27, 1991:
       ``What a nice tool! [Necklacing] What a nice instrument! 
     [Loud cheers from crowd.] What a nice divice! It is a pretty 
     one. It is elegant, attractive, splendorous, graceful and 
     dazzling. It smells good. Wherever you go, you feel like 
     smelling it. [The crowd cheers.]''
       Little wonder that this former Roman Catholic priest was 
     dismissed from his order in 1988 for ``incitement to hatred 
     and violence.'' His passion for hate did not change when he 
     went into politics.
       ``Although eledted democratically, Aristide governed quite 
     undemocratically,'' says Mr. Di Rita. ``He established a 
     reputation, in the words of New York Times correspondent 
     Howard French, as `an insular and menacing leader who saw his 
     own raw popularity as a substitute for the give and take of 
     politics.'''
       His far-left brand of economics also tells us much about 
     his hatred for the United States and the direction in which 
     he wants to take Haiti. Consider these statements from his 
     autobiography:
       ``Socialism in Haiti is not a new thing: Its practice is 
     rooted in the period of our first independence.''
       ``The colonial powers, including the United States, must 
     make amends for the wrong inflicted on the colony or 
     protectorate in those days. The debt experts, when they speak 
     of our liabilities, need to add up the second column of their 
     own accountability.''
       ``Economic efficiency is not compatible with justice, 
     except at the price of a permanent struggle against all the 
     seeds of corruption.''
       ``Economic liberalism, which democrats and technocrats have 
     made a panacea, I find intolerable.''
       ``The wealthy have often become what they are by virtue of 
     exploiting others.''
       Here is Mr. Aristide on the men he most admires:
       ``I did not invent class struggle, no more than Karl Marx 
     did. . . . But who can avoid encountering class struggle in 
     the heart of Port-au-Prince.
       ``I . . . welcome those ideas that rest on the values of 
     beauty, dignity, respect and love. Che Guevara . . . 
     certainly incorporated some of those values, as did Allende. 
     . . . I feel more affection and sympathy for them than I do 
     for many others.''
       ``There is no question that there are common denominators 
     between us and the makers of the French Revolution. . . . How 
     much I owe to the makers of the French Revolution!''
       Is this the man and are these the ideas that are worth 
     risking one American life? Apparently Bill Clinton thinks so. 
     What do you think?

    Aristide Opposes Blanket Amnesty; Cedras Says He Sees Civil War 
                              Possibility

       Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide said today he 
     opposes blanket amnesty for the military rulers who overthrew 
     him. Aristide said on CNN that he holds Haiti's military 
     responsible for thousands of deaths and he urged the Haitian 
     parliament not to grant blanket amnesty for those crimes. 
     Aristide said he favors amnesty only for political crimes 
     committed against him at the time of the coup in September 
     1991.
       Meanwhile, Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras said on CNN: ``I see the 
     specter of civil war in this country now. * * * People in 
     this country are very scared. Many people do not want peace, 
     do not want reconcilation.''

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