[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 139 (Thursday, September 29, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             CLINTON'S MILITARY BUDGET--A DEFENSE DISASTER

                         HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 29, 1994

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I cannot in good faith support this Defense 
budget which still remains a Clinton blueprint for dismantling our 
military.
  I include for the Record a recent memo by DOD asking the services to 
terminate or delay vital new weapon systems such as the RAH-66 Comanche 
V-22 Osprey and F-22 Lightning II.
  Many of these systems are funded in this report, yet these research 
dollars could be wasted if Mr. Clinton has his way.
  The memo states that we need to fund other areas such as the pay 
raise. It is Mr. Clinton who originally cut the pay raise for the 
military. It is congress, not DOD, who restored this raise.
  If you want to find additional savings Mr. President, then consider 
cutting items such as: Summer Olympic support; humanitarian assistance; 
and foreign aid to the former Soviet Union.
  These are not DOD areas of responsibility.
  I also include for the Record my dissenting views to the Defense 
authorization bill, a draft letter to Secretary of Defense Perry 
protesting new Defense cuts, and an article outlining how the Navy has 
run out of money to train reservists this year. The Clinton Defense 
budget is a disgrace.


                                  Deputy Secretary of Defense,

                                  Washington, DC, August 18, 1994.

        [Memorandum for members of the defense resources board]

     Subject: Additional DRB Program Alternatives.
       The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) for the first phase 
     of the Fiscal Years 1996-2001 Program Review covered initial 
     adjustments to the Military Department Program Objectives 
     Memorandum (POM), as well as funding changes and policy 
     guidance in other programs such as Ballistic Missile Defense 
     and Chemical Demilitarization.
       DMI, however, did not address several areas, particularly 
     the possibility of funding a military pay raise at the ECI 
     minus 0.5 percent level. Because the desire for the pay raise 
     and for improvements in other areas such as readiness, 
     sustainability and quality of life may require us to shift 
     resources from some POM priorities, we need to review several 
     programs. What follows is list of the program options that 
     the relevant Department of Defense component should prepare 
     for review by the Defense Resources Board (DRB) in September. 
     Each of the components should provide a written summary of 
     its program options to me by September 7, 1994, and be 
     prepared to brief the DRB. This effort should not interfere 
     with submittal of the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) as 
     scheduled on September 9, 1994.


                         department of the army

       Comanche helicopter program. The Army should develop a 
     program alternative that terminates the Comanche.
       Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS). The Army should 
     develop a program alternative that terminates AFAS and 
     replaces it with additional upgrades to the Paladin system.


                      department of the air force

       Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) program. The 
     Air Force should develop at least two program alternatives 
     for JPATS: (1) deferring introduction of the JPATS trainer 
     for up to seven year and (2) reducing cost by increased 
     reliance on commercial practices, a slower procurement 
     profile, and enhanced joint training.
       F-22 fighter program. The Air Force should develop a 
     program alternative that delays the initial procurement of F-
     22 fighters by up to four years.
       Precision-Guided Munition (PGMs). The Air Force should 
     develop at least two alternative programs: (1) cancelling the 
     Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) and procuring 
     other PGMs to perform the mission and (2) retaining TSSAM, 
     but adding $100 million per year to near-term PGM programs.


                         department of the navy

       Medium Lift Replacement. From the September Defense 
     Acquisition Board meeting on medium lift programs, the Navy 
     and Marine Corps should submit for DRB consideration the most 
     promising alternative that cancels the V-22 and replaces it 
     with a helicopter alternative.
       DDG-51 Destroyers. The Navy should develop two program 
     alternatives for DDG-51 procurement in the FY 1996-01 period: 
     (1) 2.5 per year beginning with two in FY 1996 and (2) two 
     per year beginning in FY 1996. (In both alternatives 
     procurement would return to three per year after 2001.
       New Attack Submarine. The Navy should submit an alternative 
     NSSN program that does not include a submarine in FY 2001.
       Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). The Navy and 
     Marine Corps should develop a program alternative that 
     cancels the AAAV.
       JPATS and PGMS. The Navy should develop alternatives that 
     reflect the impact of the different Air Force JPATS and TSSAM 
     alternatives on the navy.


                          other dod components

       In addition to the options prepared by the Military 
     Department, the DoD comptroller should identify potential 
     reductions in overhead and infrastructure. These options 
     should include personnel reductions in the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense and related defense support activities 
     and operating agencies greater than four percent per year.
                                                   John M. Deutch.

  I also insert for the Record my extended remarks and a letter to 
Secretary Perry that I am circulating for signatures.

                ``Why I Oppose the 1995 Defense Budget''

       It is with some regret that I find myself, as a member of 
     the House Armed Services Committee, opposing the recent 
     House-Senate Conference Report on the FY 1995 Defense 
     Authorization Bill. While there were some very positive steps 
     taken by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees 
     towards maintaining and even improving U.S. military combat 
     readiness, I fear that Congress has again lost a ``golden'' 
     opportunity to influence the short-sighted policies of this 
     present Administration with regards to the U.S. armed forces.
       The military policies and budget set forth by this 
     Administration simply do not make sense. During a time of 
     drastically declining defense resources, when we should be 
     requiring the highest standards of performance and capability 
     from those few retained on active duty, this president has 
     decided to turn the military into a social laboratory. From 
     lifting the ban against homosexuals to opening up combat 
     positions to women, the president has sought to use our 
     military as a domestic political tool rather than even 
     addressing whether or not such policy decisions would improve 
     combat readiness.
       In addition to these narrow minded political decisions, 
     there is a dangerous hypocrisy resulting from a mismatch 
     between the president's vague but growing foreign policy 
     initiatives and continuing cuts to already reduced defense 
     forces. Without clearly defining U.S. national interests or 
     specific military objectives, the president has decided to 
     offer U.S. military forces as the on call ``911'' forces of 
     the U.N. and the rest of the world. Meanwhile, as the tempo 
     for operations for our military continues to increase, 
     including time away from home and family, the resources 
     devoted to rewarding, training, and equipping these personnel 
     continue to diminish at alarming rates.
       This Administration supposedly cannot find enough funding 
     within the Federal budget to provide our military with a 
     modest 2.6 percent pay raise; it cannot provide enough 
     dollars for Army tank battalion commanders to exercise units 
     above the platoon level; it cannot buy additional B-2 bombers 
     to replace aging B-52 aircraft. However, in spite of these 
     defense budgetary constraints, the president can find more 
     than enough funding from the Department of Defense for 
     humanitarian assistance, foreign aid, and defense conversion 
     projects. How do these programs directly improve U.S. combat 
     readiness? How do these programs help our forces cope with 
     the ever increasing tempo of operations as a result of 
     increased foreign commitments? If the president wants to use 
     our military forces as instruments of his foreign policy, 
     then he must give them the funding necessary to perform their 
     mission including adequate pay, adequate training, and new 
     and improved weapons systems. If the Administration continues 
     to gut the defense budget, then it must not continue to offer 
     the U.S. military as the ``911'' force of the U.N. and the 
     world!
       What then, should Congress do to correct such shortcomings 
     on the part of the executive branch?
       First, we should demand that the Administration utilize 
     some type of solid criteria before using military force and 
     endangering lives. Any time we send troops abroad, whether it 
     be for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or direct 
     combat, we must anticipate that the result could eventually 
     be armed conflict. While we do not want to prohibit the 
     President from acting as commander in chief, we do want to 
     ensure that U.S. troops are not sent into areas where there 
     are no vital interests or specific military objectives (i.e. 
     Somalia and Haiti). I would suggest using criteria first 
     outlined in a November 28, 1994 speech by then Secretary of 
     Defense Caspar Weinberger. I have expanded on his six 
     guidelines in developing my own ten commandments for the use 
     of U.S. military force. Included in these commandments are:
       Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless the 
     situation is vital to U.S. or allied national interests.
       What, for example, are the specific national interests at 
     stake in Haiti?
       Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless there are 
     clearly defined political and military objectives.
       If we send troops to Bosnia, some estimates as great as 
     25,000, what will their objectives be? What do we 
     specifically intend to accomplish with military force? When 
     can these forces depart?
       Thou shall not commit U.S. combat forces unless under the 
     operational command of American commanders or allied 
     commanders under a ratified treaty.
       Clinton foreign policy, including PDD-25, seeks to expand 
     U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping operations 
     under foreign command. Lessons of Somalia clearly indicate 
     that such command arrangements can be disastrous. Unless such 
     command arrangement are with long-standing allies such as 
     NATO countries, foreign command should not even be 
     considered.
       Next, we in Congress must address the growing threat of 
     proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, 
     and chemical (NBC) weapons/warheads. No other weapons can so 
     directly threaten the United States, our allies, and forward 
     deployed forces, as can these devastating weapons of mass 
     destruction. Fortunately, the only direct defense against 
     such weapons is now within our grasp, ballistic missile 
     defense (BMD). However, both this Administration and this 
     Congress have failed to provide adequate funding for even 
     near term/low cost systems such as sea-based missile defense. 
     We should immediately provide additional dollars for the 
     handful of promising technologies that could deter, and if 
     necessary defeat, the growing threat of ballistic missile 
     attack from North Korea, Iraq, and elsewhere. Upper-tier sea-
     based systems on board Navy Aegis ships, Army theater high 
     altitude area defense (THAAD), and Air Force boost phase 
     intercept systems, all are technologies that should be 
     developed and deployed now, not later when it may be too 
     late.
       In addition, we should immediately seek to repeal the 
     outdated Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (a treaty with 
     an evil empire that no longer exists) which threatens, as an 
     obsolete political document, to limit the capability of even 
     these modest BMD systems.
       Finally, we must be more selective in approving which 
     programs will relieve scare defense funds. We should evaluate 
     every defense dollar and policy decision in terms of combat 
     readiness. If a program or proposal does nothing to enhance 
     our military's ability to deploy, fight, win and survive on 
     the field of battle, we should consider opposing the program. 
     In a tight budgetary period and a rapidly evolving world 
     political environment, we cannot afford non-defense issues or 
     programs to interfere with the much more pressing demands of 
     troop morale, combat training, and weapons modernization.
       Perhaps George Washington, our first President and first 
     great military leader, said it best: ``To be prepared for war 
     is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.''
       Congress should heed Washington's advice and ensure that 
     every precious defense dollar is used to train, equip, 
     maintain, and prepare our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
     Marines for war.
                                  ____

                                                  October 5, 1994.
     Hon. William Perry,
     Secretary of Defense,
     The Pentagon,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: We are extremely concerned over recent 
     efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD) to identify 
     additional weapons modernization programs for possible delay 
     or outright cancellation in order to achieve additional cuts 
     to an already greatly reduced defense budget.
       An August 18 memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense 
     John Deutch to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) identifies 
     nine programs in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air 
     Force that would be considered for delay or termination. 
     According to the memorandum, ``Because the desire for the pay 
     raise and for improvements in other areas such as readiness, 
     sustainability and quality of life may require us to shift 
     resources from some POM priorities, we need to review several 
     programs.''
       We find the stated rationale for cutting these programs 
     absurd. First, it was this administration which initially 
     cancelled the regularly scheduled pay raise for members of 
     the military in both 1993 and 1994. It was then only through 
     congressional action that this pay raise was fully restored.
       Next, no apparent consideration is being given to 
     identifying other potential sources of cost savings that 
     could be used instead of cutting back combat systems which 
     address clear military requirements. There are an increasing 
     number of programs currently funded by the DoD that are more 
     properly the function of other agencies or departments and 
     could be reduced or eliminated with far less consequences for 
     DoD's combat mission.
       For example, a September 1994 Congressional Research 
     Service report identifies over $11 billion in FY 1995 defense 
     funding that may not be directly related to traditional 
     military capabilities. Included in this report are non-
     defense operations and maintenance programs ($1.4 billion), 
     environmental activities ($5.6 billion) and defense 
     conversion programs ($3.4 billion). In this era of rapidly 
     declining defense resources, we should consider every defense 
     dollar and policy decision in terms of combat readiness. If a 
     program does nothing to enhance our ability to deploy, fight, 
     win and survive on the field of battle, we should consider 
     terminating that program before considering further 
     modernization cuts. We simply can no longer afford non-
     defense programs to drain resources from the much more 
     pressing demands of troop morale, combat training, and 
     modernization.
       It is becoming increasingly obvious that the 
     administration's current defense budget plan cannot pay for 
     the Bottom-Up Review two MRC (major regional contingency) 
     strategy and associated force structures. Therefore, the 
     operative consideration should be how to properly resource 
     the Department of Defense budget, not how to make further 
     reductions.
       We remain committed to providing our armed forces with the 
     best and highest quality troops, training, and technology 
     possible. This requires continued pay raises to recruit and 
     retain highly motivated young men and women, increased 
     funding for combat training and equipment maintenance, and 
     continued development and fielding of new weapon systems 
     designed to improve the effectiveness and survivability of 
     U.S. armed forces on the battlefield. We believe any attempts 
     to cancel or delay the few remaining systems still left in 
     the current DoD acquisition plan instead of first cutting 
     non-defense programs or increasing the overall defense 
     budget, to be shortsighted and directly counter-productive to 
     promoting combat readiness.
       We therefore urge you to immediately reconsider cancelling 
     or delaying these new weapons programs and instead consider 
     other available alternatives to address pressing Department 
     of Defense budgetary shortfalls.
       Best regards,
                                                 Robert K. Dornan.