[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 138 (Wednesday, September 28, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 28, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
     JAPAN'S BID FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ON THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

  Mr. ROTH. Madam President, since the end of the cold war, the United 
Nations and its most important decisionmaking body, the Security 
Council, have assumed more prominent roles in addressing global 
problems.
  During the past 5 years, the Security Council has authorized more 
peacekeeping operations and passed almost half as many resolutions as 
it did during its first 45 years. Despite the increased activity, the 
Security Council has remained essentially unchanged since it was 
established at the end of World War II.
  To enable the Security Council to better address the expanded range 
and number of problems it now confronts, the General Assembly last year 
adopted a resolution requesting that all member nations provide 
suggestions on restructuring the Security Council. Close to 80 
countries responded. More than 40 suggested that Japan take a permanent 
seat on the Security Council.
  After all, with the world's second largest economy, Japan would seem 
a logical choice for permanent membership in a restructured Security 
Council. In it statement of support, the United States said that Japan 
should gain a permanent seat because Tokyo has achieved a level of 
global influence greater than most of the current permanent members.
  Other supporters pointed to Japan's position as the United Nation's 
second largest financial contributor and the world's largest provider 
of overseas development assistance.
  Yesterday, Japan's Foreign Minister, in a speech before the U.N. 
General Assembly, made the most direct official statement ever on 
Japan's desire to gain a permanent seat on the Security Council.
  The Foreign Minister, however, began his speech by stating what Japan 
would not do as a permanent member of the Security Council, rather than 
listing the activities which it would perform in such a capacity.
  Today, the United States Ambassador to Japan, Fritz Mondale, made 
plain President Clinton's backing for Japan's position.
  The Ambassador said that United States ``Government support is rock 
solid,'' and that the United States sees no requirement ``that 
permanent members of the Security Council participate in U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.''
  Fritz is an old friend of mine, and a man I hold in great respect. 
Yet I believe he overstated his case: Since January of this year the 
Senate has twice passed resolutions suggesting United States support 
for Japan's bid for a permanent seat, but only contingent on Tokyo 
taking steps necessary for the country to fully engage in any form of 
U.N. peacekeeping or peacemaking operation. Japan currently is 
incapable of such engagement.
  And given the Foreign Minister's speech, Tokyo now clearly has no 
intention of removing obstacles to its full engagement in such 
operations. Therefore, the only solid opinion expressed by the Senate--
that of opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent seat under these 
circumstances--has only been hardened.
  As I have stated before, and as my colleagues in this body have 
unanimously agreed, the special status conferred by permanent 
membership entails special responsibilities. In particular, permanent 
members must be able to participate in any form of operation they 
themselves authorize through the Security Council, including any form 
of peacekeeping or peacemaking operation.
  If Japan were to obtain a permanent seat now, the country would be 
given an opportunity to endorse U.N. missions that endangered the lives 
of citizens of other countries but in which Japan itself could play no 
role. Not only would Japan be courting the sort of criticism it 
received during the gulf war, other countries could well encounter 
greater domestic opposition to putting their own personnel at risk.
  In either case, the effectiveness of the Security Council in handling 
the United Nations' most important work--that of making decisions on 
guarding the peace--would be compromised.
  The Japanese Foreign Minister's remarks yesterday were premised on 
currently accepted interpretations of the country's Constitution as 
forever renouncing the use of force--even under U.N. mandate--as a 
means of problem solving.
  What is crucial to recognize, however, is that Japan's current 
interpretation of its constitution was shaped as much--if not more--by 
the country's economic self-interest than by any idealistic desire to 
serve as a model peaceful state. In the aftermath of World War II, had 
Japan accepted an interpretation permitting it to participate in 
collective security arrangements, precious resources would have been 
diverted from the country's push to regain economic strength and 
achieve its century-old goal of catching up with the West.
  Now that the goal has been realized, it is more important than ever 
to understand that the American framers of Japan's Constitution never 
intended to prohibit Japan from participating in collective security 
arrangements or U.N. peacekeeping activities.
  Moreover, the key Japanese official involved in fostering the 
currently accepted constitutional interpretation, Prime Minister 
Shigeru Yoshida, foresaw the need for Japan to take on added 
responsibilities once the country prospered. Yoshida believed that 
other nations would never tolerate Japan receiving special 
international status once it caught up economically with the West.
  Prime Minister Yoshida's strategy of avoiding collective security 
arrangements through constitutional interpretation brilliantly laid the 
groundwork for Japan's remarkable postwar economic success. I believe 
his views on how Japan's international role, and hence constitutional 
interpretation, would have to change after that success was achieved 
were just as farseeing.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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