[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 138 (Wednesday, September 28, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 28, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
 SENATE RESOLUTION 270--RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

  Mr. MURKOWSKI (for himself, Mr. Robb, Mr. Brown, Mr. Pell, Mr. Helms, 
and Mr. Simon) submitted the following resolution; which was referred 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                               S.Res. 270

       Whereas the Republic of China on Taiwan (known as Taiwan) 
     is the United States' fifth largest trading partner and an 
     economic powerhouse buying more than twice as much annually 
     from the United States as do the 1.2 billion Chinese of the 
     People's Republic of China;
       Whereas European countries, with numerous ministerial 
     visits to Taipei in support of their trade promotion efforts 
     have been awarded over US$5 billion in contracts for Taiwan's 
     Six Year National Development Plan, while U.S. companies have 
     won only US$1.37 billion in contracts (1991-93);
       Whereas Taiwan is a model emerging democracy, with a free 
     press, free elections stable democratic institutions, and 
     human rights protections;
       Whereas United States interests are served by supporting 
     democracy and human rights abroad;
       Whereas United States interests are best served by policies 
     that treat Taiwan's leaders with respect and dignity;
       Whereas the results of the Executive branch review of the 
     policy of the United States toward Taiwan were announced on 
     September 7, 1994;
       Whereas the adjustments made in United States policy toward 
     Taiwan do not concretely or adequately upgrade relations.
       Therefore it is the sense of the Senate that United States 
     policy toward Taiwan should:
       (1) welcome the President of the Republic of China on 
     Taiwan and other high-level government officials to the 
     United States;
       (2) allow unrestricted office calls by all representatives 
     of Taiwan in the United States to all United States 
     departments and agencies, including the Departments of 
     Defense and State and offices in the Old Executive Office 
     Building;
       (3) send cabinet-level officials, including officials from 
     the Departments of State and Defense, to Taiwan on a regular 
     basis;
       (4) support a proposal in the 48th General Assembly of the 
     United Nations for formal observer status for Taiwan as a 
     first step toward full membership in the United Nations and 
     its specialized agencies;
       (5) support a proposal at the earliest possible time for 
     full admission for Taiwan into a wide range of international 
     organizations including, but not limited to:
       (a) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a 
     developed country, irrespective of the timetable for the 
     admission into GATT of the People's Republic of China;
       (b) the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development (IBRD or the World Bank);
       (c) the International Monetary Fund;
       (d) the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Flora 
     and Fauna (CITES);
       (e) the Montreal Protocol of the United Nations Environment 
     Programme (UNEP);
       (f) International Maritime Organization (IMO);
       (g) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
       (h) United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
       (6) change the name of Taiwan's representative office in 
     the United States to the ``Taipei Representative Office'';
       (7) approve defensive arms sales to Taiwan based solely on 
     Taiwan's self-defense needs, without qualitive or 
     quantitative restrictions;
       (8) require advice and consent of the United States Senate 
     for the highest level representative of the United States in 
     Taiwan;
       (9) upgrade the status of the existing American Institute 
     in Taiwan (AIT);
       (10) include a report by the Secretary of State to the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign 
     Affairs Committee on U.S. economic, cultural, political and 
     security relations with Taiwan on an annual basis;
       (11) support participation of the President of the Republic 
     of China on Taiwan in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
     forum; and
       (12) raise U.S. concerns about the People's Republic of 
     China threat to forcefully reunify Taiwan and the People's 
     Republic of China.

 Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am submitting this resolution 
to express the sense of the Senate concerning United States relations 
with Taiwan on behalf of myself and Senator Robb, Senator Brown, 
Senator Pell, Senator Helms, and Senator Simon.
  In July 1993, the administration indicated that it was involved in an 
interagency review of United States policy toward Taiwan. I was told on 
many occasions that an announcement about the policy review was 
imminent, but then something would come up to delay its release--and 
that something was usually the People's Republic of China. First there 
was the most-favored-nation debate, and then North Korea negotiations, 
and then Secretary Brown's trip to Beijing. Finally, on September 7, 
during the congressional recess, the policy was quietly announced.
  It is often said that you have to crawl, before you walk, before you 
run--and the administration really took that adage to heart when it 
looked at United States policy toward Taiwan. It did not even make real 
changes to the policy, only adjustments. Let me make clear: I welcome 
the mere fact that the adjustments were made at all. A review of United 
States-Taiwan relations was long overdue, and at least the changes that 
were made are tentative steps toward making our policy more rational. 
But I think bolder and more substantive steps are necessary.
  First, the policy review changed the name of the Coordination Council 
for North American Affairs to the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office. At least it has a geographical reference, but 
why not identify Taiwan?
  Second, higher-level U.S. Government officials from economic and 
technical agencies will be allowed to visit Taiwan under the revised 
policy. Of course, Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative during the 
Bush administration, visited Taiwan, so this adjustment is not breaking 
new ground. The key here is implementation.
  Third, ROC officials meeting with some high-ranking U.S. officials 
will now be able to meet in official settings rather than hotels and 
restaurants. But the policy leaves the caveat that this excludes 
meetings at the State Department, Old Executive Office Building, or the 
White House, even though AIT officials are now allowed to go to the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry in Taipei, the equivalent of our State 
Department. So we can go into theirs, but they cannot visit ours. Does 
this make sense?
  In those areas where adjustments were made, the administration at 
least acknowledged some inconsistencies. I am most concerned about 
those areas where the administration chose to keep the status quo 
intact. What did not change?
  The arms sale policy still has the inconsistency of the bucket. The 
Taiwan Relations Act says we will provide for Taiwan's self-defense 
needs, but then we told the PRC we would limit the quality and quantity 
of our sales. In practice, the bucket is an anachronism because we 
broke it with the F-16's. But by pretending to still adhere to 
arbitrary limits, our defense exporters lose sales because there are no 
ground rules for when a system will or will not be approved.
  In testimony submitted by the American League for Exporters and 
Security Assistance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearing yesterday on United States relations with Taiwan it is 
estimated that past and present defense sales lost to the Taiwan 
defense sales policy could reach as high as $20 billion in revenue and 
456,000 jobs.
  In addition, these questions remain to be answered:
  United States military planes cannot stay overnight, but must go to 
Japan. What purpose does this serve except to waste U.S. taxpayer 
dollars?
  Visas are stamped with Hong Kong rather than Taipei. What happens in 
1997?
  Official visits to the United States by President Lee and other high-
level Taiwanese officials are still prohibited.
  Government officials are still prohibited from visiting the State 
Department, the White House, and the Old Executive Office Building.
  Taiwan membership in the United Nations is not supported.
  I know that the administration will likely defend the lack of change 
as a signal that the policy has been working in the past--if it's not 
broke, don't fix it. But Mr. President, I disagree.
  This new policy might suit diplomacy 101, but it does not suit 
fairness 101. This is not a just policy for the 21 million people on 
Taiwan who lack representation in the multilateral institutions that 
want Taiwan's money and Taiwan's compliance but not their input. It is 
not a just policy for the ROC Government officials who act with great 
dignity and respect, but are not treated to the same.

  This is not a just policy for a country like the United States that 
claims to stand for democracy and human rights. This is not a just 
policy for President Clinton who made democracy a cornerstone of his 
foreign policy. This is the President who said: ``We need new 
leadership that will stand with the forces of democratic change . . . a 
President who will utilize our economic, political and cultural 
resources to assist the new forces of freedom emerging around the 
world.'' Why does this apply to Haiti, but not Taiwan?
  Mr. President, I find it ironic and sad that this administration is 
willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to restore Aristide to 
power in Haiti under the guise of democracy, but is not willing to 
ruffle the PRC's feathers by rewarding democracy and human rights in 
Taiwan. The United States continues to turn a cold shoulder toward 
Taiwan, even as the world itself is warming up. Our Taiwan policy is a 
relic of the cold war.
  Back in 1978, when the United States broke off diplomatic relations 
with the ROC and recognized the PRC we lived in a very different world. 
A wall still divided the two Germanys, the Soviet Union was the ``evil 
empire'' and the people of Taiwan lived under martial law. This was the 
state of the world when the United States passed the Taiwan Relations 
Act. Although the world has changed dramatically since then, our policy 
has not.
  Taiwan has emerged as a model democracy: martial law was lifted, 
press curbs were lifted, and opposition parties were made legal. 
Popular presidential elections are scheduled for 1996.
  Taiwan has emerged as an economic powerhouse: the world's 13th 
largest trading economy with the largest foreign reserves, our 5th 
largest trading partner, despite power buying trips led by Secretary of 
Commerce Brown, Taiwan still buys twice as much from the United States 
as the PRC.
  Taiwan and the PRC have allowed economic and social contact. In 1993, 
the ROC became the second largest investor in the PRC. 1.5 million 
residents of Taiwan traveled to the mainland last year.
  But rather than reward Taiwan for the enormous, positive changes it 
has undertaken, the United States has chosen to treat it like an 
international pariah. We are all familiar with the unfortunate incident 
when President Lee's request for an overnight stay in Hawaii en route 
to Costa Rica was denied after protests from the PRC Embassy. There are 
many of us in Congress who feel very strongly that not only should 
President Lee be permitted to stay overnight on U.S. soil, he should be 
welcomed as a guest.
  After all, this administration has seen the benefit to having Yasser 
Arafat, head of the PLO and not a recognized government leader, visit 
the White House. Similarly, Gerry Adams, head of Sinn Fein, the 
political wing of the Irish Republican Army, visited the United States. 
In each of these cases, there were certainly objections. In fact, I am 
told that the United States has recently granted Gerry Adams a 2-week 
visa to visit several cities, over the objections of the U.K. 
Similarly, Tibet's exiled leader, the Dalai Lama called on Vice-
President Gore at the White House. The PRC strongly objected to this 
visit. But the administration rightly went ahead with the visit. Why 
not President Lee?
  The administration's new policy explicitly states that it will not 
support Taiwan's bid to enter the United Nations, presumably because 
the PRC would object. I disagree with this rationale. With 
organizations like the GATT, the United States looked for ways where 
both Taiwan and China could join. Taiwan agreed to call itself a 
customs territory and the GATT members, under United States leadership, 
have worked out an arrangement where the two will likely enter the GATT 
together. Certainly the United States could be a leader for creative 
diplomacy in the U.N. arena as well. Other countries would follow our 
lead, but if the United States does not take the moral high ground, 
other countries will not want to be bold.
  We saw a recent example of this when the Japanese, under intense 
pressure from Beijing, asked President Lee not to attend the Asian 
Games, even after the invitation was extended. If the United States 
were to allow President Lee to visit the United States for an event 
such as accepting an honorary degree from Cornell, however, Japan may 
find the backbone to allow President Lee to attend international sports 
events.
  However, the United States must be willing to risk a little PRC 
bellowing. The PRC has grown arrogant because every time they yell, we 
back down. This appeasement only compels them to seek greater 
concessions. This must stop. We all look forward to the day that the 
PRC is important because it is governed freely and that it uses its 
long tradition and culture, not just its immense size, to garner 
respect. But the PRC is not there yet. Clearly, the United States has 
important interests in maintaining relations with the mainland, but 
that does not mean that our foreign policy can be held hostage by the 
PRC. The United States stands for democracy and freedom. We must not 
turn our backs on the people of Taiwan. If the administration will not 
turn United States-Taiwan relations loose, the United States Congress 
must.

  Therefore, Mr. President, along with Senators Robb, Brown, Pell, 
Helms, and Simon, I am introducing this resolution to express the sense 
of the Senate concerning United States relations with Taiwan. It states 
that it is the sense of the Senate that United States policy toward 
Taiwan should include 12 policy changes to improve United States-Taiwan 
relations, many of which I have just mentioned.
  Specifically, the United States should welcome the President of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan and other high-level government officials 
to visit the United States. Reciprocally, the United States should send 
cabinet-level officials, including officials from the Departments of 
State and Defense, to Taiwan on a regular basis. The United States 
should support a proposal for observer status at the United Nations for 
Taiwan, and membership in other international organizations.
  If the United States takes these and the other steps listed in this 
resolution, United States policy toward Taiwan will head in the right 
direction. I urge my colleagues to fully support this 
resolution.

                          ____________________