[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 136 (Monday, September 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: September 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL FOR INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES AT THE UNITED
NATIONS
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to once again applaud the
efforts of the United Nations in their long, hard effort to create a
position for an office of inspector general to be known as the Under
Secretary General for Internal Oversight Services at the United
Nations.
I have long advocated such an office as an essential element to
restoring trust in the administration of U.N. matters, and met at the
United Nations last spring with Ambassador Albright, U.N. Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and a number of other interested
Ambassadors from around the world.
A few weeks ago I spoke about the final resolution to create this
office which passed the General Assembly on July 29. I had asked the
General Accounting Office [GAO] to take a look at it, and they found
that, while it went a long way in setting up the office, questions
remained regarding important issues such as funding, staffing and
hiring authority, and whistleblower protection. At that point GAO
determined, and I agreed, that the way these issues would be handled in
the implementing regulations, as they should be, would be key.
I am pleased to say that these concerns were fully addressed to my
satisfaction in the implementing regulations released by the Secretary
General on Thursday, September 8. Again, I asked GAO to take a look at
those regulations to confirm this. They agreed that these binding
regulations will foster the operational independence that an office
such as this requires to be able to function effectively.
That element of independence, of reporting not only to the Secretary
General, but also to the members of the General Assembly, is crucial to
a successful IG operation, as we have found in our own U.S. Government
in reporting not only to an agency or department head, but also to the
appropriate committee of jurisdiction in the Congress.
Also, there will be a separate line item in the Secretary General's
budget for this office. While the current request is for $11.4 million
for 2 years, there is general agreement that this is totally inadequate
to fund such an office. Therefore, the Secretary General has asked for
a 21 percent increase in funding for the next biennium. This is the
largest increase requested for any section of the budget.
Additionally, the IG will have independent authority to hire and fire
his staff. In fact, Ambassador Karl Theodor Paschke, who will take his
position as the first Undersecretary General for Internal Oversight
Services on November 15, is already in the process of reviewing the
contracts of the current employees of the Office of Inspections and
Investigations [OII], the young predecessor office to the Office of
Internal Oversight Services [OIOS]. I was pleased to learn that
Ambassador Paschke does not feel obligated to retain staff with whom he
is not comfortable, thereby giving him the authority to create his own
staffing table. It is also my understanding that our own GAO will be
involved in the training of the new staff of this office.
Finally, the issue of whistleblower protection has been resolved
favorably; if a U.N. employee makes an accusation of improper conduct,
his or her confidentiality will be protected. False accusations made
willfully or knowingly will be treated as cases of misconduct
themselves. Such matters will be dealt with through the administrative
process already in place at the United Nations; however, this process
is currently undergoing intense revision to deal with broader
situations and sanctions for misconduct.
The only reservation raised by GAO was the possible reluctance of
U.N. employees to come forward with allegations of misconduct if
``willful disregard of the truth'' is not clearly defined. While this
is a valid point, this office is still in its infancy, and I am willing
to give it a chance to get up and running before further scrutinizing
procedures and safeguards. However, this is one of the items I will
keep on my checklist for that time.
In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 103-236, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994 and 1995, the
certification to release the remaining 10 percent of the U.S.
contribution to the United Nations has been made. I am pleased to say
that I wholeheartedly support the certification.
I look forward to watching this office as it develops into one as
effective as those of our own, and I further anticipate the beginning
of the term of Ambassador Paschke.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 2-page letter from
GAO be placed in the Record following my remarks.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
General Accounting Office, National Security and
International Affairs Division,
Washington, DC, September 23, 1994.
Hon. John Glenn,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Senator Glenn: This letter responds to your request
that we evaluate the U.N. Secretary-General's September 7,
1994, procedures for implementing the Office of Internal
Oversight Services (OIOS). You asked that we determine
whether the procedures address gaps in the July 29, 1994,
General Assembly's resolution establishing the Office. We
previously provided you with our comments on that resolution
in a letter dated August 8, 1994. We had concluded that if
properly implemented, the resolution allows OIOS the
operational independence to perform functions similar to
those performed by Inspectors General, as established under
the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
Our letter also noted that the President could not certify
that requirements of section 401(b) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 had been met
unless several of actions required in the resolution were
completed before September 30, 1994. These included (1) the
appointment of an Under Secretary General for Internal
Oversight Services with requisite qualifications and approval
by the General Assembly; (2) the issuance of procedures to
ensure compliance with recommendations of the Office; and (3)
the issuance of procedures to protect the identity of, and to
prevent reprisals against, any staff members making a
complaint or disclosing information, or cooperating in any
investigation or inspection by the Office.
The appointment process was completed on July 29, 1994,
when the U.N. General Assembly approved the appointment of
Ambassador Karl Paschke, a German national, as Under
Secretary General for Internal Oversight Services. According
to the State Department, Ambassador Paschke has the requisite
credentials to fulfill the legislative requirement. We found
that the Secretary-General's implementing procedures provide
regulations to ensure that OIOS is operationally independent.
The Secretary-General's procedures address compliance with
OIOS recommendations under the section entitled
``Implementation of Recommendations.'' Program managers are
instructed to ensure prompt compliance with final
recommendations and report to OIOS, on a quarterly basis, on
the status of implementation. The Under-Secretary General
responsible for the program area is to monitor the program
manger's implementation of corrective action. In addition the
procedures require investigations to be conducted with
respect for the individual rights of staff and strict regard
for fairness and due process. Further, confidential
suggestions and/or information may be used only in official
reports, without directly or indirectly naming people
involved or implicated. The procedures also enhance the
operational independence of the Office by including controls
that enable the Under Secretary-General to hire and fire
personnel and a separately identified line item for the OIOS
budget.
Finally, we note one area of the procedures that may have
an unintended consequence. Since the procedures do not
clearly define ``willful disregard of the truth'' people with
information about possible waste, fraud, or abuse may be
inhibited from coming forward lest they be accused of making
false reports. This cautionary note may prove unnecessary;
however, we believe the process should be revisited in the
future to determine whether changes are called for.
If you have any questions concerning this letter, please do
not hesitate to call me on (202) 512-2800.
Sincerely yours,
Neal Curtin,
(for Frank C. Conahan,
Assistant Comptroller General).
____________________