[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 134 (Thursday, September 22, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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              ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN THE NAVY

 Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, yesterday I released a General 
Accounting Office report that details how the Navy circumvented 
important procedures in the development of its new attack jet. Two 
years ago, I asked the General Accounting Office to determine whether 
the F-18 E/F is an upgrade of the existing F-18 aircraft or a new 
program stealthily hidden from standard oversight. The GAO's findings 
should be of concern to the Congress, the taxpayers, and to F-18 
aircrews who may fly the new aircraft in combat.
  Mr. President, the Navy maintains that the F-18 E/F will be only a 
larger, more capable version of today's F-18. But, the E/F version will 
have significantly different wings, fuselage, avionics, weapons 
stations, and engines. Moreover, the baseline cost estimates of about 
$95 billion for the E/F version dwarfs the $13 billion program baseline 
for today's F-18. Now, the GAO is reporting that the changes are so 
significant that the existing aircraft cannot be upgraded to the E/F 
version. In addition, a completely new and separate production line 
will be required.
  Mr. President, the GAO report says that the Defense Department 
acquisition bureaucracy determined the F-18 E/F to be only a 
modification, and that it did so within the scope of existing 
regulations. There is no precedent for this. What concerns me is the 
GAO's finding that: ``By treating this as a modification, some steps 
normally followed for new acquisitions have been skipped.'' Included in 
the steps waived, were live fire testing, definition of operational 
needs, and cost-effectiveness analysis. It is disturbing that the 
bureaucracy wastes its innovations on procedural shenanigans, instead 
of saving money or developing better capabilities.
  Some of the problems with the Navy's approach are already starting to 
become visible. For example, the cost to develop the F-18 E/F was 
estimated at $2.5 billion, but the official estimate has now doubled to 
$5 billion and independent analysts suggest that the actual development 
cost will be $7 billion to $8 billion. This dwarfs the costs of 
developing and procuring most new weapons, let alone the costs for 
developing the upgrade to existing equipment.
  Mr. President, the decision to waive the live fire testing laws is 
particularly troubling. Live fire and operational testing are the keys 
to the Congress' fly-before-buy policy. The policy states that a weapon 
should not be produced until testing shows that it works. In a system 
where bureaucratic interests carry more weight than results, realistic 
tests are vital to make sure weapons work before they are given to 
those who must depend on them in battle. I am particularly concerned 
about the Pentagon's attempt to dodge the live fire testing process on 
the F-18 E/F, since the Defense Department told the General Accounting 
Office that survivability of aircraft is a critical reason for the F-18 
E/F. The Pentagon's own live fire testing director determined that full 
live fire testing was required, but was overruled.
  Mr. President, the GAO has found that the Navy has uncovered a new 
way to circumvent good management procedures; simply define a new 
program to be an upgrade of an existing system. I find this to be 
totally consistent with the Defense Department's management problems 
that leave it incapable of fielding technology in an affordable manner 
and when needed. The vast majority of weapon acquisition programs are 
experiencing serious cost and schedule problems, and the GAO has said 
that cost overruns of 20 to 40 percent are to be expected. The cost-
overrun on today's F-18 is 56 percent.
  Mr. President, for many years, I have maintained that major cultural 
and structural reforms are needed in the Pentagon's buying system. 
Until the buying system is changed, the results won't change. I support 
the notion of streamlining the acquisition process, but in doing so the 
process must focus on results. But, the Navy's approach on the F-18 
will not demonstrate results.
  On Tuesday, the House passed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act, and I am hopeful that it will yield needed changes. But, until the 
bill is properly implemented, the GAO's report highlights the fact that 
it's still business as usual in the Pentagon.

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