[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 134 (Thursday, September 22, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                        MORE MISTAKES ON BOSNIA

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, on July 6, the five-nation contact 
group drew up a peace settlement plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. While 
it was widely viewed as rewarding Serb aggression, it was at least 
offered to those engaged in the conflict on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis, with a 2-week deadline for a clear response, and consequences 
suggested to those rejecting it. The Bosnians accepted the plan on time 
and unconditionally. The Bosnian Serbs effectively said ``no,'' and 
subsequent attacks on U.N. personnel and the massive ethnic cleansing 
of nonSerbs in northeastern Bosnia have served as an exclamation point 
to that response. This crime against humanity is continuing as I speak.
  The outcome of all of this? The July 6 plan is left open to the Serb 
militants to accept at their leisure. The arms embargo illegally 
imposed on legitimate Bosnian forces has not been lifted. The siege of 
Sarajevo has resumed, and utilities have been cut off for several days. 
Rather than take the action necessary to compel compliance with U.N. 
resolutions, however, U.N. Commander Rose has instead become enraged 
over Bosnian attempts to break the Serb stranglehold on the capital 
city, and has threatened airstrikes against Bosnian forces. Meanwhile, 
a United States general, Wesley Clark, recently held military-to-
military talks with Ratko Mladic, the leader of the illegitimate, rogue 
Serb forces responsible for this siege. General Clark went as far as to 
exchange military caps and accept gifts from this war criminal.
  The only consequence of Serb rejection of the July 6 plan was an 
agreement by contact group foreign ministers to tighten sanctions on 
the federation of Serbia and Montenegro. But now we are not even going 
to do that. Differences between Milosevic and Karadzic have shifted 
international attention away from tightening sanctions and toward 
isolating the Bosnian Serbs by rewarding Serbia. Once again, we are 
taking our Bosnia policy further and further into the realm of the 
surreal.
  The contact group countries are willing to ease sanctions on Serbia 
if it cuts supplies to the Bosnian Serb militants. They have insisted 
on monitoring the border, but agreed to Serbian terms on the number and 
character of the monitors. Only 135 nonmilitary monitors will cover a 
375-mile border with authority only to observe if a cross-border 
military supply exists, and not to stop it if it does. Lord Owen, the 
European envoy, admitted that he does not want to see these monitors be 
terribly visible. The Bosnian Vice President remarked that the effort 
is ``like having 100 police officers to control New York City.'' Last 
week, the commander of the Bosnian Armed Forces also told me this will 
not work. He is probably right. There are reports that helicopters 
violating the no-fly zone may be a new delivery route, and pontoon 
bridges are reportedly being built as well.
  There also seems to have been no attempt in this effort to get CSCE 
monitors back into Kosovo, Sandzak, or Vojvodina, or to get a 
commitment from Belgrade to cooperate with the international war crimes 
tribunal, as Representative Tom Sawyer of Ohio has recently suggested.
  When news of this latest policy shift came out, I must admit that I 
was not shocked. In fact, given past performance, I almost expected it. 
But it really is objectionable that the administration argues the 
advantages of solidarity among the contact group countries, and then 
caves in to the Russian, British, and French time after time for the 
sake of maintaining that solidarity. They agreed on consequences for 
rejecting the plan, so where was the concern of these countries for 
contact group unity when they changed their minds? Once again, where is 
U.S. leadership on this issue?
  Finally, it is important to note that this intra-Serb squabbling, 
which has done more to derail the international approach than to stop 
the war, only became manifest when the international community appeared 
to have some resolve, at least on the sanctions issue. Given the gaping 
holes in this monitoring effort, I would suggest that, if we really 
want to deny the Bosnian Serbs their supplies, we should take out their 
supply lines and supply depots with punitive airstrikes. As the Bosnian 
people prepare to enter their third winter of war, it would be the most 
humanitarian action we could take. All we need is the resolve to carry 
it out.

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