[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 133 (Wednesday, September 21, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 21, 1994]



 COMMENDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPECIAL DELEGATION TO HAITI--SENATE 
                             RESOLUTION 259

  The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to 
print in the Record at this point a letter from President Clinton 
laying out the objectives and the character of the planned deployment 
of United States Armed Forces into Haiti.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                               Washington, DC, September 18, 1994.
     Hon. Albert Gore, Jr.,
     President of the Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am providing this report, consistent 
     with the sense of Congress in section 8147(c) of the 
     Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994 (Public Law 
     103-139), to advise you of the objectives and character of 
     the planned deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti.
       (1) The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti is 
     justified by United States national security interests: to 
     restore democratic government to Haiti; to stop the brutal 
     atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians; to 
     secure our borders; to preserve stability and promote 
     democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the reliability of 
     the commitments we make and the commitments others make to 
     us.
       From the very beginning of the coup against the democratic 
     government of Haiti, the United States and the rest of the 
     international community saw the regime as a threat to our 
     interests in this hemisphere. Indeed President Bush declared 
     that the coup ``constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary 
     threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
     of the United States.''
       The United States' interest in Haiti is rooted in a 
     consistent U.S. policy, since the 1991 coup, to help restore 
     democratic government to that nation. The United States has a 
     particular interest in responding to gross abuses of human 
     rights when they occur so close to our shores.
       The departure of the coup leaders from power is also the 
     best way to stem another mass outflow of Haitians, with 
     consequences for the stability of our region and control of 
     our borders. Continuing unconstitutional rule in Haiti would 
     threaten the stability of other countries in this hemisphere 
     by emboldening elements opposed to democracy and freedom.
       The agreement regarding the transition between the de facto 
     government and the elected government, negotiated by former 
     President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin 
     Powell, will achieve the objective of facilitating the 
     departure of the coup leaders. Their departure will 
     substantially decrease the likelihood of armed resistance.
       (2) Despite this agreement, this military operation is not 
     without risk. Necessary steps have been taken to ensure the 
     safety and security of U.S. Armed Forces. Our intention is to 
     deploy a force of sufficient size to serve as a deterrent to 
     armed resistance. The force will have a highly visible and 
     robust presence with firepower ample to overwhelm any 
     localized threat. This will minimize casualties and maximize 
     our capability to ensure that essential civil order is 
     maintained and the agreement arrived at is implemented. The 
     force's rules of engagement allow for the use of necessary 
     and proportionate force to protect friendly personnel and 
     units and to provide for individual self-defense, thereby 
     ensuring that our forces can respond effectively to threats 
     and are not made targets by reason of their rules of 
     engagement.
       (3) The proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for U.S. Armed Forces, and the forces proposed 
     for deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the 
     objectives of the proposed mission. Pursuant to U.N. Security 
     Council Resolution 940, a multinational coalition has been 
     assembled to use ``all necessary means'' to restore the 
     democratic government to Haiti and to provide a stable and 
     secure environment for the implementation of the Governors 
     Island Accords. The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces is 
     required to ensure that United States national security 
     interests with respect to Haiti remain unchallenged and to 
     underscore the reliability of U.S. and UN commitments.
       This crisis affects the interests of the United States and 
     other members of the world community alike, and thus warrants 
     and has received the participation of responsible states in 
     the coalition to redress the situation. The United States is 
     playing a predominant role because it is the leading military 
     power in the hemisphere, and accordingly, has the influence 
     and military capability to lead such an operation. The 
     coalition is made up of representatives from 25 member 
     nations, including the United States. During the initial 
     phase of the operation, the force will be of sufficient size 
     to overwhelm any opposition that might arise despite the 
     existence of the agreement. In the follow-on, transitional 
     phase, forces from other members of the coalition will assume 
     increasingly important roles. At all times when U.S. forces 
     are deployed in whatever phase, they will be equipped, 
     commanded, and empowered so as to ensure their own 
     protection.
       (4) Clear objectives for the deployment have been 
     established. These limited objectives are: to facilitate the 
     departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of 
     the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the 
     legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti. We will 
     assist the Haitian government in creating a civilian-
     controlled security force. We will also ensure the protection 
     of U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities.
       (5) An exit strategy for ending the deployment has been 
     identified. Our presence in Haiti will not be open-ended. 
     After a period of months, the coalition will be replaced by a 
     UN peacekeeping force (UNMIH). By that time, the bulk of U.S. 
     forces will have departed. Some U.S. forces will make up a 
     portion of the UNMIH and will be present in Haiti for the 
     duration of the U.N. mission. The entire U.N. mission will 
     withdraw from Haiti after elections are held next year and a 
     new Haitian Government takes office in early 1996, consistent 
     with U.N. Security Council Resolution 940.
       (6) The financial costs of the deployment are estimated to 
     be the following. A conservative, preliminary estimate of 
     Department of Defense and Department of State incremental 
     costs for U.S. military operations, U.S. support for the 
     multinational coalition, and the follow-on U.N. peacekeeping 
     operation is projected at $500-$600 million through February 
     1996. This covers potential costs to be incurred in FY 1994, 
     FY 1995, and FY 1996. Final deployment-related costs could 
     vary from this estimate depending on how operations proceed 
     in the first few weeks, how fast civic order is restored, and 
     when the operation is replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping 
     operation. A preliminary estimate of U.S. nondeployment-
     related costs--migrant operations, sanctions enforcement, 
     police training, and economic reconstruction--will be 
     provided separately. The Congress will be provided more 
     complete estimates as they become available.
           Sincerely,
                                               William J. Clinton.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remarks of 
Secretary Perry be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Sec. Perry. Good afternoon. I was pleased and privileged to 
     be able to welcome President Aristide on his first visit to 
     the Pentagon. While he was here we had a brief discussion in 
     my office and then went down to the Operational Briefing Room 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and took the opportunity then, 
     to brief President Aristide on the current and the planned 
     details of the military operations in Haiti.
       Among other things, we explained to him that we will have 
     by the end of the day 8,000 military forces in Haiti, and a 
     large contingent at the Port-au-Prince airport, a large 
     contingent at the Port-au-Prince port, and we now have a 
     large group of marines in Cap-Haitien. In addition to that we 
     have a company of Bradley fighting vehicles, dozens of 
     assault helicopters, gunships, and we are landing C-141s and 
     C-5s.
       After the briefing, we had a very good discussion on the 
     current situation in Haiti. I emphasized, reaffirmed 
     President Aristide our commitment to a quick, peaceful return 
     of the president to Haiti. I told him about the steps that we 
     are taking to prevent violence and retain order in Haiti.
       We deplored the abhorrent acts of violence that took place 
     yesterday, and I described to him the steps we are taking to 
     minimize the recurrence of those sort of events. In 
     particular, today we arrived and now have fully operational 
     more than 1,000 military police.
       I should emphasize the forces that landed Monday and 
     Tuesday were primarily combat forces whose job was to protect 
     themselves in the event that the entry was not peaceful. 
     Since then we have brought in a large number, more than a 
     thousand, I said, of military police, and they will have the 
     specific function of overseeing and monitoring the 
     functioning of the Haiti police force to ensure that they do 
     not use unreasonable restraint in trying to deal with crowd 
     control problems.
       We also described to him that we have now a quick reaction 
     force assembled of combat forces and Bradley fighting 
     vehicles available to be called out in the event there's a 
     general breakdown of order. And we also described the 
     discussion that General Shelton had this morning with General 
     Cedras explaining to him the importance of maintaining 
     restraint of the police and making arrangements for how our 
     military police would be used to facilitate that proper 
     functioning, to ensure that proper functioning of the police 
     force.
       We had very good discussions with President Aristide, but 
     rather than my describing to you his response to our 
     discussions, I would like to now turn the podium over to 
     President Aristide and let him describe his impressions.
       Mr. President?
       President Aristide. Secretary of State Mr. William Perry, 
     Undersecretary of State Mr. Strobe Talbott, National Security 
     Adviser Mr. Tony Lake, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
     General Shalikashvili, ladies and gentlemen:
       In these past three days something has happened in Haiti. 
     Operation Uphold Democracy was peacefully deployed. President 
     Clinton, this is the result of the decision that you made. 
     This is the result of your leadership.
       Thank you, and the people of the United States, for your 
     commitment to lead a multinational effort in carrying out the 
     will of the United Nations to help restore democracy in 
     Haiti.
       It is certain--it is certain that every action that stops 
     the flow of even a single drop of blood is a step towards 
     lasting peace which we envision. I extend my thanks to 
     President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn.
       General Shalikashvili, when U.S. men and women arrived in 
     Haiti on Monday, they encountered a nation of people ready to 
     embrace peace. To you, your commander in the field, General 
     Shelton, and the thousands of American soldiers both in Haiti 
     and on their way to Haiti on behalf of my nation, my many 
     thanks for joining in this endeavor for peace. Your wives, 
     husbands, parents, family and friends, may take comfort 
     knowing that your presence is a contribution to the justice 
     and democracy that we seek, principles that ran deep in the 
     traditions of the United States.
       We, who stood side by side with you in the battle of 
     Savannah, Georgia, to fight for the independence of the 
     United States, are happy that today you stand side by side 
     with us to uphold democracy in Haiti. The light of peace must 
     shine through Haiti. The world must see this light shine in 
     Haiti day and night for every single citizen. Nothing must 
     block this light of peace--neither violence nor vengeance, 
     guns nor provocation, impunity nor retaliation. Peace must 
     flourish in Haiti. The success of this mission is directly 
     tied to the process of disarmament. As I said on February 
     7, 1991, the day of my inauguration, not another drop of 
     blood must flow in Haiti. No to violence, no to vengeance; 
     yes to reconciliation, yes to justice.
       People of Haiti, continue to uphold democracy, be vigilant 
     and guard against provocation. While we move towards 
     dialogue, mutual respect, enjoyment of civil liberties and 
     political stability, we call on all senators, deputies, 
     members of administrative consuls, municipal consuls, 
     departmental consuls, mayors and others elected officials, to 
     resume their offices, as peaceful environment is 
     indispensable for those duly elected officials and the 
     political parties to function.
       To help foster this environment, I have created a 
     transition team headed by our minister of defense, General 
     Jean Beliotte. They will assess conditions in Haiti and 
     recommend the next steps to be taken to ensure the quick 
     restoration of constitutional order. Here in Washington, I 
     will continue to meet and work with the National Security 
     Adviser, Mr. Anthony Lake, and special adviser on Haiti, 
     Reverend Bill Gray, and you, General Shalikashvili, chairman 
     of the joint chiefs of staff, to outline the steps that it 
     will take to guarantee the restoration of democracy, which 
     will bring peace to all, reconciliation among all, respect 
     and justice for every single citizens in Haiti.
       In less than 24 days, I will join you in Haiti. There, we 
     will continue working as peacemakers, peacekeepers and peace 
     lovers.
       Thank you.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I intend to vote for this resolution.
  I am relieved that a full scale invasion has been avoided as a result 
of negotiations by President Carter, Senator Nunn, and Colin Powell. 
The threat of military forces created an environment in which a short-
term diplomatic solution could succeed. Lives were saved by avoiding a 
full scale invasion, and that was a positive development. I 
congratulate President Clinton and the Carter delegation for this 
success.
  I am, however, still concerned about the thousands of American 
soldiers who will be part of the occupation forces under this 
agreement. They do not know how long they will be in Haiti or what 
their long-term role will be. The very nature of their mission is 
replete with contradictions. Our soldiers thought they were going to 
Haiti to help the Haitian people; now, they are essentially required to 
work with the leaders America's original military mission sought to 
remove. Just yesterday, they had to stand by helplessly and watch the 
police brutally attack and kill Haitians who had come to welcome our 
troops to their shore.
  My broader concern, Mr. President, is that although the military is 
now in Haiti, their mission is essentially diplomatic. While I share 
the diplomatic goal of restoring a democratically elected leader in 
Haiti, I am not persuaded that the U.S. military can succeed, in the 
long-run, in ensuring that democracy will prevail in Haiti. Although 
our military is second-to-none, it is not their role--nor are they 
able--to build nations as we saw in Somalia. I'm wary about our troops 
getting involved in a similar mission in Haiti.
  Like many, I am dismayed by the way General Cedras and the Haitian 
military stole the election from President Aristide. I too have been 
profoundly saddened by the brutality of the human rights violations the 
Haitian dictators have perpetrated against so many innocents. The 
Haitian people who long for the restoration of their democracy have 
inspired me. It is a difficult task to know what we can do to help them 
without imposing unreasonable risks to our soldiers or costs to our 
nation.
  While I share the goals of restoring democracy for the Haitian people 
and snuffing out human rights abuses, I am not persuaded that a policy 
which attempts to turn our military into a diplomatic corps can succeed 
in the long-run. Now that the President has decided to move forward, 
however, I do hope and pray the policy will succeed. I pray that no 
lives will be lost, and that our soldiers will return to America soon.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, all of us are appalled by the desperate 
economic and human rights conditions prevailing in Haiti. As of 
February 1994, the United Nations reported there had been some 3,000 
deaths of Haitian civilians since the September 1991 military coup. The 
Cedras regime's human rights record--its cynical use of murder, rape 
and torture to intimidate the Haitian population--is currently the 
worst in this hemisphere. I sympathize with the Haitian people who have 
suffered for years both from the atmosphere of intimidation prevailing 
in Haiti and from the economic hardships resulting from the U.N.-
mandated economic embargo.
  These are tragic conditions for Haiti. But they are not a national 
security threat to the United States. I sympathize with the plight of 
Haitians, but I question whether we can or should right Haiti's 
multiple wrongs with military force.
  The United States has the best military forces in the world. Our 
finest young men and women staff it; our most advanced technology and 
billions in tax dollars have gone into their equipment. Our military 
forces are prepared and capable of defending the broad security 
interests of the United States.
  This means that our Armed Forces also are capable of accomplishing a 
wide variety of tasks, whether it is to arrest a narcotics kingpin in 
Panama, stop a disease epidemic in Rwanda, facilitate food distribution 
to starving Somalians, provide humanitarian relief in Bosnia and 
northern Iraq, or rescue American students from political instability 
in Grenada.

  However, just because the United States military can accomplish a 
particular mission does not mean it should be ordered to tackle the 
enormously complex range of missions required in Haiti.
  The Founding Fathers intended that the President's role as Commander 
in Chief be constrained by the responsibility to seek congressional 
approval to make war. The President does have the power to act in 
emergencies, but the long-festering problems in Haiti did not fall into 
that category. Throughout this developing crisis in Haiti, I have 
always believed and stated that the President should come to Congress 
for authority prior to an invasion of Haiti by United States forces.
  When President Bush proposed to use military force to repel Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, I--together with many of my Senate 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle--argued that the President should 
seek congressional authority. Presidents Reagan and Bush did not seek 
congressional authorization for military operations in Grenada and 
Panama. Congressional authorization is always preferable when possible, 
but the protection of U.S. security interests in those circumstances 
required secrecy and speed.
  There was no emergency or imminent threat to American lives in Haiti. 
The President had been warning the Haitian junta for months that U.N. 
military action was imminent. Recruitment of a multinational invasion 
force and our own preparations for use of force was conducted in a 
deliberate and public manner.
  But all that is past. The President began the invasion without 
congressional authorization and, fortunately, halted it once an 
agreement had been reached between the military junta and the 
delegation headed by former President Jimmy Carter. All Americans are 
grateful that an invasion, with the likelihood of casualties, was 
averted, and we are all thankful that the U.S. occupation has proceeded 
up to this point with no loss of American lives.
  Still, the question remains as to what our goals in Haiti are, and 
how long our troops will remain in that country. That is the key issue 
for the American people. I have no quarrel with this resolution, and it 
has bipartisan support, but it should not signal the end of 
congressional involvement in this issue. While maintaining our strong 
support for the United States troops on the ground in Haiti, and 
providing them with every piece of equipment they will need to carry 
out their mission as long as they are there, we must now get answers 
about what their goals are, how they will be achieved, and on our exit 
strategy. All Americans are deeply concerned that if our stay in Haiti 
goes on too long, we will be inexorably drawn into a police action that 
is fraught with danger to our troops, and for which there is no clearly 
achievable end result.
  One final word concerning Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. I 
share the disappointment of many Americans that President Aristide 
failed to quickly and publicly thank our country for putting the lives 
of our soldiers in harm's way on his behalf. Any problems he has with 
the Carter accord pale in comparison to the courage exemplified by our 
military forces, and he, of all people, should have recognized that 
fact and said so right away.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I support Senate Resolution 259 because, 
like all Americans, I am greatly relieved that the deployment of United 
States troops to Haiti occurred under peaceful rather than hostile 
circumstances. As a result, many Haitian as well as American lives have 
been spared.
  I am also greatly relieved that General Cedras and the ruling 
military Junta in Haiti have agreed to relinquish their grip on 
government and, thanks to the compelling argument of former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Colin Powell, cooperate in a peaceful transition 
of power.
  Mr. President, I commend America's military men and women for their 
excellent performance in carrying out their duties, fully support them 
in their complex and difficult mission, and pray for their safe and 
quick return.
  I fear, however, that our most difficult days lie not behind us but 
ahead.
  Mr. President, the occupation, not the invasion, of Haiti has always 
been recognized as the more difficult part of this mission. In many 
respects, that occupation has now been made more difficult by the 
circumstances under which it has occurred.
  The Haitian population is by no means at peace, the institutions of 
civil government have yet to be established, and democracy is far from 
assured. In other words, the task we face in Haiti is not one of 
restoring democracy but of building a nation. And, as we tragically 
learned in Somalia, that is not an appropriate mission for the United 
States military.
  For those reasons, Mr. President, as well as the fact that no United 
States national interest is at stake in Haiti, I opposed a United 
States invasion of Haiti. For the same reasons, Mr. President, I now 
urge a timely conclusion to the United States occupation of Haiti, and 
the speedy withdrawal of all United States forces.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the order, the Republican leader is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, first of all, all Americans join in praising 
former President Jimmy Carter, retired Gen. Colin Powell, and the 
senior Senator from Georgia, Senator Sam Nunn.
  I must say if it had not been for their diplomatic mission we might 
have been on the floor here today talking about a lot of different 
things but not have pleasant ones, in my view. So they averted a 
potentially tragic military confrontation to place American troops into 
Haiti.
  The Carter delegation obviously found the General Cedras willing to 
negotiate. I am pleased the President accepted suggestions and sent an 
independent commission to Haiti. I believe the whole country heaved a 
sigh of relief that an unnecessary invasion did not occur.
  I must say there is still a lot of confusion, but I think at least we 
had a new entrance strategy. We do not have an exit strategy yet. I 
hope we will be addressing that maybe before we leave, hopefully not 
later than October 7.
  I do not see how anybody can oppose an invasion and support a 
military occupation. That is my view. If you oppose the invasion, you 
have to oppose the occupation. You support the forces there, but you do 
not support the occupation.
  How much do we have to do for Aristide. I guess today he said ``thank 
you.'' How much do you have to do for this person? We are going to have 
15,000 Americans committed there. We are going to spend millions and 
millions and millions of dollars, and we are even going to pay some of 
their military. There will be all kinds of nation building. Who knows 
what the final tab will be.
  So I guess the bottom line is there never was a problem getting in; 
there may be a problem getting out.
  I think events of yesterday, even though we did not participate, show 
how tragic the consequences can be. We had graphic Haitian-on-Haitian 
violence which may call for greater United States involvement. I do not 
know how the American people will understand when they watch television 
and see American soldiers standing by and someone being clubbed and 
clubbed and clubbed. How does that resonate in America, if some 
innocent person is being beaten to death or clubbed to death? I have to 
believe this is a pretty tricky situation we are in right now.
  But before we decide to disarm the Haitian military and police, we 
would do well to remember the lessons of Somalia. And we should also 
remember that today's oppressed can quickly become tomorrow's 
oppressor.
  I can understand if the American people are a little confused about 
the recent changes in U.S. policy. President Clinton last Thursday told 
Haiti's leaders: ``Your time is up. Leave now or we will force you from 
power.'' Now, they learn that General Cedras may be in power until 
October 15. Last week, the Haitian military was described as rapists 
and killers. This week, they are our partners in occupation.
  This is going to take more than a 30-second sound bite to explain to 
the American people.
  Last week President Clinton said diplomacy had been exhausted. But 
over the weekend, a diplomatic mission rapidly reached an agreement. 
The newspaper headlines said a deal had been made and an invasion 
averted. Yet thousands of heavily armed United States soldiers have 
landed in Haiti. And the United States is still enforcing an economic 
embargo against a country we just occupied.
  Why should there be an embargo on a country we occupied? That is one 
of the problems. It is the poorest country in the hemisphere. We 
laterally are starving people to death with economic sanctions. Now we 
occupy it. And this is part of the agreement, but we still have not 
lifted the sanctions.
  The American people heard a lot about a multinational force, but the 
only foreign troops in Haiti are American right now. That is all. The 
American people heard about the importance of restoring Aristide to 
power, and we are about to thank the Carter delegation for their 
efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution. Strangely, it took Aristide 
longer to say thank you than it took the Carter team to negotiate the 
accord.
  According to some news reports, Aristide was reluctant to even 
support the latest U.S. policy conducted on his behalf.
  In the midst of all this confusion, the only clarity came from 
President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn. They took open 
minds and went to Haiti. I listened to them earlier this week. They 
spoke about what they learned in Haiti: About how respected the 
provisional President is and how he was central to the deal. They spoke 
about General Cedras' honor and dignity. They spoke about the depth of 
anti-Aristide feeling. And they spoke about the folly of having a U.S. 
economic embargo on a country under U.S. military occupation. Right or 
wrong, all these views challenge the foundations of the Clinton 
administration's Haitian policy. Either they are wrong or he was wrong, 
and I have to believe since they are there they may have a better 
insight than the President.
  The efforts of the Carter delegation are commended in the resolution 
before the Senate. Their fresh look averted immediate bloodshed. The 
task now is to avert bloodshed over the long term.
  I am again not certain that the American people realize the United 
States forces--either under United States or U.N. command--will be in 
Haiti until at least 1996, not 1995, until that is 1996. The potential 
for the occupation to generate American casualties is great.
  The last American occupation of Haiti lasted almost two decades. 
Because the President and his advisers have avoided coming to Congress, 
the first sign of trouble is likely to result in pressure for an 
immediate and embarrassing withdrawal.
  The Carter mission prevented bloodshed in the first few days of the 
United States occupation of Haiti. For that, all Americans can be 
grateful. But what is needed now is a U.S. policy that does not react 
to the image of the moment or to the emotional appeal of week.
  The ousted special envoy for Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo, laid out the 
one principle for a sound policy in the New York Times this morning. In 
sum, he argued the United States should push Haitians to resolve their 
differences on their own--not make every issue a matter of United 
States prestige.
  Ambassador Pezzullo concluded by writing, ``Only a very carefully 
calibrated policy will guard against Haiti's slipping from military 
dictatorship under General Cedras to populist authoritarianism under 
Father Aristide, presided over by a U.S. praetorian guard.'' 
Unfortunately, 19 months of this administration's failed Haitian policy 
does not leave much hope for future improvement.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that New York Times article by 
Lawrence Pezzullo be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Seven Ways to Avoid a Long, Painful, Pointless Occupation

                         (By Lawrence Pezzullo)

       Despite the 11th-hour success of the peace-making mission 
     headed by Jimmy Carter, the arrival of thousands of United 
     States troops in Haiti since Monday represents the bitter 
     fruits of diplomatic blundering by the Clinton 
     Administration. Whether because of guilt, weakness or lack of 
     rigor in carrying out its policies, the Administration has 
     taken on the impossible burden of turning a country with no 
     democratic traditions into a functioning democracy.
       The quiet resignation on Friday of the United Nations 
     special envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo, represented a kind of 
     punctuation mark to the Administration's hopeless diplomacy. 
     Mr. Caputo has long held the view that the situation must be 
     resolved by Haitians, not by military intervention.
       The role of U.S. troops now, before the Rev. Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide returns to power, involves relatively little risk. 
     But our soldiers, under orders not to intercede even when 
     they see Haitian police beating pro-Aristide demonstrators, 
     will find themselves in an increasingly difficult position. 
     To prevent worse clashes, a multinational force to retrain 
     and monitor the police is urgently needed.
       The multinational negotiations that began soon after Father 
     Aristide was overthrown in September 1991 were hampered by 
     the unwillingness of the two protagonists to deal with each 
     other. Lieut. Gen. Raoul Cedras, who emerged as Haiti's de 
     facto ruler, felt he could outlast the international pressure 
     to restore the elected Government. Father Aristide, exiled to 
     Washington, expected the United States to restore him to 
     power on his terms.
       The agreement signed at Governors Island in July 1993, 
     which set a timetable for Father Aristide's return to power, 
     contained two central elements: the transfer of power from 
     the military to a democratic, constitutional government and 
     the creation of a broad-based political coalition.
       The Haitian Constitution of 1987, which balances executive 
     power with Parliament's--essential in a country with a long 
     history of abusive strongmen--requires that the President 
     build a working majority in the legislature. It was precisely 
     Father Aristide's estrangement from the elected Parliament, 
     coupled with his chilly relationship with business leaders 
     and the military, that led to his overthrow in 1991, just 
     seven months after he took office.
       Without a broader governing coalition and an operating 
     majority in the Parliament, Father Aristide could face a 
     repetition of the conflict that turned violent in 1991, or he 
     could circumvent the Constitution by ruling by decree. In 
     either case, the United States, with it troops on the ground 
     in Haiti, would find itself in an untenable position.
       By unwisely putting its own credibility on the line rather 
     than keeping the pressure on the Haitian protagonists to 
     resolve the crisis on their own, the Administration has 
     shouldered an obligation to sustain the return to democratic 
     rule. That will require staying the course and ignoring the 
     advice of those who argue for an early exit. Surely it would 
     be wise for the U.S., with its multilateral partners, to stay 
     in place through the presidential elections in January 1996.
       To preserve the integrity of its policy, the Administration 
     must insist that all Haitian parties, especially Father 
     Aristide's, comply scrupulously in word and spirit with the 
     1987 Constitution. Further, the U.S. should insure that all 
     members of Parliament elected in 1990 are protected and 
     allowed to assembly as soon as possible in a secure 
     environment.
       When he resumes the presidency, it will be essential that 
     Father Aristide cooperate with the Parliament on the 
     following measures to build a truly democratic system:
       The early confirmation of a prime minister who can build 
     and maintain a majority in the Parliament. This will require 
     reaching out to political adversaries, who earlier this year 
     showed a willingness to build such a majority.
       The nomination and confirmation of a new commander in chief 
     to replace General Cedras. Haiti's Constitution allows the 
     President to pick one from senior military officers. Some of 
     the current group remain untainted by the coup and have clean 
     human rights records.
       The enactment of an amnesty law, the specific details of 
     which would be worked out between Parliament and the 
     executive branch. The issue of whether General Cedras and 
     other military commanders should be forced into exile must 
     also be left to the Haitians themselves.
       The creation of an independent civilian police force, which 
     was stipulated in the Governors Island agreement and is 
     required under the Constitution. The U.S. and Canada have 
     already pledged to assist in their training.
       The confirmation of a new civilian police chief.
       The enactment of legislation requiring that all 
     paramilitary gangs be disarmed.
       The establishment of a bipartisan electoral commission to 
     organize and oversee the parliamentary elections scheduled 
     for this winter and the presidential elections next year.
       The Clinton Administration must recognize that a failure to 
     insure that Haitians work together and compromise to resolve 
     their own political difficulties will not only compound the 
     tragedy of that troubled country but also involve the U.S. in 
     a painful and pointless occupation. Only a very carefully 
     calibrated policy will guard against Haiti's slipping from 
     military dictatorship under General Cedras to populist 
     authoritarianism under Father Aristide, presided over by U.S. 
     praetorian guard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of my 
leader's time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President and Members of the Senate, the resolution 
on which the Senate will shortly vote is direct, simple, and easily 
understood. It commends President Clinton. It commends former President 
Carter, retired General Powell and Senator Nunn. It supports the men 
and women of the United States Armed Forces in Haiti. It supports the 
departure from power of the de facto authorities in Haiti and Haitian 
efforts to achieve reconciliation, democracy and the rule of law. It 
supports lifting of the economic sanctions on Haiti and supports a 
prompt and orderly withdrawal of United States forces from Haiti as 
soon as possible.
  There is no conceivable reason why any Senator would vote against 
this resolution. It is obvious that the events in Haiti have developed 
in a way that will in fact encourage the restoration of the 
democratically elected government and the departure of the illegal 
government. That is an objective which I believe all Americans share.
  Mr. President and Members of the Senate, we have heard a lot of 
debate here in the Senate about this or that aspect as policy.
  If one reads the American Constitution, one will find reference to 
one President of the United States. But if one observes the American 
Government in a time of foreign policy crisis, one would think that 
there were 50 or 60 Presidents of the United States. This is the world 
champion forum for nit-picking, second-guessing and should-have-done.
  Senators urge the President to do A, and when the President does A, 
they say he should have done B. If he does B, then they come up with C. 
There is no event so trivial, no place so distant that Senators do not 
have a better idea of how it should be done; so long, of course, as 
they have no responsibility for the outcome if things go bad.
  And to hear some of the speeches that we have heard here today, why, 
there is almost a regret that this thing has worked out so well.
  The fact of the matter is, it was the determination and leadership of 
President Clinton that has caused the removal of the illegal government 
in Haiti and the forthcoming restoration of the democratically elected 
Government of Haiti.
  I was interested to hear all of the praise of the delegation that 
went to Haiti--all of which is deserved--but a grudging unwillingness 
to even acknowledge that it was President Clinton who sent them to 
Haiti, who directed their actions in Haiti, and whose policy they were 
implementing in Haiti.
  Is the hostility and the antagonism for the President so great among 
some of our colleagues that they cannot even acknowledge that it was, 
in fact, President Clinton who made the decision to send the delegation 
to Haiti, who established the policy which they took with them to 
Haiti, and who stood firm at the critical moment in insisting on an 
absolute time certain and a deadline for the removal of the illegal 
government from Haiti?
  I hope that every Member of the Senate will vote for this resolution. 
And I hope that every Member of the Senate will permit this policy to 
take effect without seeking to make political hay out of every twist 
and turn in the road and the inevitable difficulties that result in 
such a complex and dangerous operation.
  Certainly, risks remain. Certainly, there is a potential for damage, 
danger, casualty, injury, and death. But the fact of the matter is, 
right now democracy in Haiti has a future which it did not have a week 
ago today. And right now, the illegal government of Haiti does not have 
the future that it had one week ago. That is the direct and exclusive 
result of the actions of President Clinton and the leadership of 
President Clinton. We ought not to be so grudging as to refuse to 
acknowledge that simple fact.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I believe, all time having been used, we are prepared for the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on the adoption of Senate 
Resolution 259. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
Thurmond] is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] would vote ``yea.''
  The result was announced--yeas 94, nays 5, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 301 Leg.]

                                YEAS--94

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--5

     Danforth
     Faircloth
     Hatfield
     Pressler
     Wallop

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Thurmond
       
  So the resolution (S. Res. 259) was agreed to, as follows:

                              S. Res. 259

       Whereas the special delegation sent to Haiti on September 
     17, 1994, has succeeded in convincing the de facto 
     authorities in Haiti to agree to leave power;
       Whereas on September 18, 1994, after an agreement was 
     reached in Port-au-Prince that day, the President ordered the 
     present deployment of men and women of the United States 
     Armed Forces in and around Haiti;
       Whereas U.S. and multilateral sanctions have imposed a 
     heavy burden on the Haitian people; and
       Whereas the Congress and the people of the United States 
     have great pride in the men and women of the United States 
     Armed Forces and fully support them in all their efforts 
     overseas, including those in Haiti: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That the Senate--
       (1) commends the efforts of the President in sending former 
     President Jimmy Carter, retired General Colin Powell and 
     Senator Sam Nunn to Haiti in an effort to avoid the loss of 
     American lives;
       (2) fully supports the men and women of the United States 
     Armed Forces in Haiti who are performing with professional 
     excellence and dedicated patriotism;
       (3) supports the departure from power of the de facto 
     authorities in Haiti, and Haitian efforts to achieve national 
     reconciliation, democracy, and the rule of law;
       (4) supports lifting without delay of U.S. unilateral 
     economic sanctions on Haiti, and lifting without delay of 
     economic sanctions imposed pursuant to U.N. resolutions in 
     accordance with such resolutions; and
       (5) supports a prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United 
     States Armed Forces from Haiti as soon as possible.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the preamble is 
agreed to.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to 
proceed as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, the Senate is not in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
  The Senator may proceed.
  Mr. REID. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Reid pertaining to the submission of S. Res. 263 
are located in today's Record under ``Submission of Concurrent and 
Senate Resolutions.'')
  Mr. KOHL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The Senator from Wisconsin.

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