[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 132 (Tuesday, September 20, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 20, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                     USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE

  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, United States troops are on the ground 
in Port-au-Prince, and any time United States troops are present on 
foreign soil, all of us want to voice our support for them. Whatever we 
say and whatever we do, we want to make it clear that the safety of 
Americans and their success is something that we want to support. So I 
do not want anything I say this evening to be misconstrued as in any 
way pulling the rug out from under our troops who are present in Haiti. 
We do support them, and we will support them. Their safety and success 
will henceforth be of paramount interest for each one of us.
  Having said that, I would like to voice my concerns about what we are 
up to as a country. A lot of people were voicing concerns last week 
about Haiti and about American policy with respect to Haiti, and then 
the announcement was made about the success of President Carter's 
mission.
  I have a high regard for President Carter, and certainly for our 
colleague, Senator Nunn, and for General Powell as well. But I must say 
that I did not share in the widespread euphoria that was expressed 
about President Carter's mission because it seemed to me that what that 
mission accomplished for us was to assure that there would be an easy 
entry of American troops into Haiti. But nobody ever really thought 
that it would be anything other than an easy entry of American troops 
into Haiti.
  I do not remember hearing anybody say that we were going to have a 
lot of casualties when our soldiers landed in that country. Most people 
believed that it would be simple; that the Haitian army amounted to 
very little; that it was poorly trained and poorly equipped; and that 
it was no match whatever for a full-fledged use of American force. The 
concern was not about the introduction of American troops into Haiti. 
The concern was about something else, and I would like to speak about 
that something else tonight.
  Since the war in Vietnam, the question that has been before our 
country has been what are the limits of the use of American military 
force? I thought the limiting factor that was established during and at 
the end of the war in Vietnam was that American troops would be 
deployed only where our national interests were at stake; that if the 
test of national interest is abandoned, then there are no limiting 
criteria to be used with respect to the use of military force.
  Now, in the case of Somalia, we did depart from the national interest 
test, but we did so on the belief that we had a very limited mission, 
and that limited mission was to save lives; that we could save a lot of 
lives by feeding people; and that our military would be agents of 
feeding people and keeping them alive; that we could keep many, many 
people alive and there would be almost no risk to American life.
  It was a departure from the national interest test because we had no 
interest in Somalia. At the time, I was concerned about that departure, 
but I for one was willing to go along with it because it was such a 
limited mission and because so many lives would be saved.
  Then once we got into Somalia, we changed our mission, and we 
undertook something much different from feeding people, much different 
from the simple humanitarian task of keeping people alive. We got into 
the business of what we call nation building, and when we got into the 
business of nation building we got into real trouble and people started 
to get killed. Our people started to get killed. And then, finally, we 
got out of Somalia.
  Now the debate began with this very long buildup on the part of the 
President and his administration about Haiti. This was different from 
Somalia because it was not a food crisis. We did not have people who 
were starving to death who could be fed by our soldiers. No, the 
concern for Haiti was about the nature of the Haitian Government or 
whoever was in control of the Haitian Government. We did not like them. 
We did not like the kind of people they were. We do not like them. We 
said that they were brutal; that they were not democratic; that they 
had overthrown a democratic government; and that that was wrong.
  This was not a humanitarian mission which was the justification of 
our departure from the national interest test in Somalia. This was a 
matter of us not liking their government, the regime, General Cedras. 
And so we had this long buildup of saber rattling and threats, and 
maybe if we threaten them enough they will do something and General 
Cedras will leave the country.
  The threats got more and more bellicose, and before you knew it we 
could not do anything about it. The President decided that he made the 
threat and nothing was happening. So then he felt compelled to say, in 
effect, well, we really do mean it, and if you do not move we are going 
to send in the Army.
  We did send in the Army. But what was accomplished by President 
Carter and his mission was simply the terms of the military 
intervention, the terms of the introduction of U.S. troops. It was 
still a military intervention. It was still the use of our Army in 
order to interfere in the internal affairs of another country.
  If that is to be the new policy of the United States, it really is 
not any answer to say, well, the policy of this other country is really 
a terrible policy, and it is no answer to say, well, these people are 
really terrible people. Obviously, we would never intervene militarily 
in the affairs of another country if we thought that they were good 
people, or if we thought that they were a democracy, if we thought they 
were just like we are.
  So what we did was send in the Army because we did not like their 
regime, and we did not like their leadership, and we did not like the 
way they were conducting their internal affairs.
  There was no real argument of national interest. There was a kind of 
bogus argument of national interest. It was said, well, it is our 
national interest to have democracies. It is our national interest to 
have people around who agree with us, who are like us. But that is not 
a real interest test because if that is the test, then we could 
intervene anywhere in the world, militarily, where there is not a 
democracy.
  It was said, well, Haitians are taking to their boats, and if we got 
rid of Cedras they would not be taking to their boats. But why were 
they taking to their boats in the first place? Most of them were on 
those boats trying to get away from Haiti because of an economic 
blockade that we had put in place. It was our policy that got them in 
the boats in the first place.
  So there was not any national interest unless it was to try to 
somehow remedy some situation that we created ourselves.
  We sent in the Army. President Carter went to Port-au-Prince and he 
met with General Cedras. What did he accomplish? He accomplished the 
safe arrival of American troops. That is all he accomplished. But any 
concessions, if indeed there were concessions by the military regime in 
Haiti, were concessions that were accomplished at the point of a gun.
  The announcement that was made of the apparent willingness of General 
Cedras to step down at a future date was made when he found out that 
American paratroopers were in the air flying in from Fort Bragg, NC. 
That is a military action. The fact that guns were not shot, that 
people were not killed, does not make it any less a military action. It 
was a military incursion into another country for the purpose of 
changing the internal structure of that other country. That is all it 
was. As such, it was a departure from the basic principle that we had 
put in place to try to restrain American military adventurism around 
the world.
  Now we ask ourselves, after the cold war, well, what is the purpose 
of America's military force? I hope that we are now something more than 
a country with a strong military looking for some purpose for that 
military. But it would appear to me that the new policy is that now 
that we do not have the Soviet Union to worry about anymore, the 
purpose of the military is to gain our will in countries that we do not 
like. So that is what we have attempted to achieve in Haiti.
  The first point I want to make tonight is that I think this is a bad 
policy. I think that it is a bad precedent for the United States to see 
our military as the instrument of achieving changes in foreign 
countries where there is no plausible national interest of the United 
States.
  The second point that I want to make is one that a lot of people have 
made; that is, it is much easier to get into another country than it is 
to get out of another country. That was the lesson in Vietnam, of 
course. It was the lesson in Somalia. It is easier to get in than it is 
to get out. And it is particularly hard to get out when the purpose of 
getting in in the first place is to accomplish political change within 
a country. If the purpose of getting in there with all of our troops in 
the first place is to accomplish political change, then do we not vouch 
for whatever political change occurs? It is our political change. We 
are the ones who have done it, at the point of a gun.
  So how do we leave unless the change that we ourselves have brought 
about is one that is firmly in place? I believe that the United States 
now has taken upon itself a responsibility for the future of Haiti, of 
all places. It is our thing. It is our responsibility. We are for 
democracy, and we are there with our military to establish and to prop 
up democracy in Haiti.
  Many people have pointed out that democracy does not spring from 
nowhere. Democracy generally is developed on the basis of a culture, on 
the basis of a tradition. In our country, it was a tradition that went 
back to ancient times in Europe, in England, in particular. There is no 
such tradition in Haiti.
  So we are supposed to plant the seed of democracy on the rock of 
Haiti and hope that something flourishes. I do not think that is likely 
to happen. But we are there and we are vouching for it.
  We are so pleased that American troops, when they entered Haiti, were 
not shot at, and that this was accomplished by President Carter, that 
we are about to take up a resolution thanking President Carter for his 
efforts. And I am happy to thank President Carter. I think he is a 
very, very admirable person in many, many ways.
  But in order to protect our soldiers from being killed on the way 
in--and it would be an easy exercise, and probably not many would be 
killed--what did we do? We embraced General Cedras and we now describe 
him as our ``partner.'' We are cooperating with General Cedras, of all 
people, in our military enterprise.
  So it is somehow that we are pleased that it became the Clinton-
Cedras military exercise for the purpose of interfering with the 
Government of Haiti. And, by the way, part of the deal is that the 
Parliament of Haiti has to do something, namely grant amnesty for the 
military leaders.
  The Parliament of Haiti is not exactly the Senate of the United 
States. The Parliament of Haiti is not exactly the paragon of 
democratic values. This is Cedras' Parliament. We are saying we are 
there with our military force, and one of the objectives that we are 
trying to achieve in the name of democracy is a specific action on the 
part of the Parliament of Haiti.
  It is ironic in the extreme that a mission for the stated purpose of 
establishing democracy is utilizing a government which we say is not 
democratic.
  I want to reiterate that we support our troops on the ground, and we 
are loyal to them. We are going to do what is necessary to support them 
and to protect them. For that reason, once we have engaged in an 
operation, it is very hard to disengage. It is even harder to disengage 
when we are vouching for a governmental system which we want to be able 
to describe to the people of our country as consistent with our own 
American values. I do not think that will ever come to an end.
  Mr. President, I hope we are not there long. I know that when we were 
in Somalia and the military operation in Somalia turned from keeping 
people alive by feeding them into nation building Senator Byrd 
successfully led an effort to try to place a limitation on the duration 
of our military presence in Somalia. And I believe that there should be 
some appropriate limitation on the duration of our stay in Haiti as 
well because, otherwise, we are going to be there forever. And it is 
not going to be easy to get out. Particularly, it is not going to be 
easy to get out if we do not much like the people we have left behind. 
It is never easy to get out.

  (Mr. CAMPBELL assumed the chair.)
  Mr. DANFORTH. At the time of the Vietnam war, there was a great 
debate about how we could get out once we got in, how we could get out 
with honor. And there were those who concluded at that time that the 
only way to get out was to just get out. I believe that time is going 
to come in Haiti and that it should come in Haiti in the foreseeable 
future.
  Somehow we have blundered into a situation here without really 
thinking about what we were doing--maybe we did think about it, but 
just not very well. We have adopted a practice of using American 
military power for the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs 
of a country in which we have no national interest. We sent our troops 
in in a way which was intended to create democracy in a country that 
does not have any history of democracy. I think it was a terrible, 
terrible mistake.
  I understand the great euphoria from President Carter's mission, and 
I understand further that when American troops accomplish something, 
people are proud of those troops. But, Mr. President, it is not really 
much of an accomplishment to land soldiers in Haiti.
  So I wanted to voice my own concern about what we are doing, to 
express the hope that we are going to extricate ourselves from this 
situation in the foreseeable future, and especially to express the hope 
that the utilization of American troops for the purpose of nation 
building is not going to be the standard practice of our country in the 
future.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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