[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 130 (Friday, September 16, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 16, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  CLINTON'S RUSSIA POLICY: YALTA REDUX

                                 ______


                        HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, September 16, 1994

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, let the record show that the Clinton 
administration is preparing to sell out Russia's neighbors for the sake 
of appeasing Russia. I insert for the Record a September 6 Washington 
Times piece which reveals that a policy paper circulating within the 
administration and the State Department proposes to grant Russia 
hegemony over the former Soviet states including, possibly, the 
Baltics.
  This is, of course, outrageous. It is morally unthinkable that we 
would sell these people out again, Mr. Speaker. In 1938, Munich. In 
1945, Yalta. In the 1970's detente. Every time we have ceded Russia or 
Germany hegemony over these areas, disaster has followed.
  And now we have President Clinton's Yalta redux. According to the 
policy paper, today is different because of the ``de-ideologization of 
Russian foreign policy.'' Further, the paper states that a ``Russian 
foreign policy based on national interest and power politics is 
acceptable to the U.S. as long as vital U.S. interests are not 
adversely impacted.'' While it is true that Russian foreign policy is 
no longer based on the Soviet ideology of world socialism, the recent 
Russian policy of power politics can and does impact negatively on our 
national interests.
  For starters, NATO. Russia has been busy lately attempting to 
subjugate NATO, the cornerstone of our defense for decades, to the 
useful but ultimately feckless CSCE. Most recently, Russia has declined 
to take part in joint NATO-PFP peacekeeping maneuvers, with some 
officials describing the operations as a return to the ``bloc 
mentality.'' Old thinking still pervades Russian decisionmaking circles 
Mr. Speaker, and Russia's attitude toward NATO makes it clear that 
Russia is not, as the paper asserts, a ``strategic partner.'' I ask, 
does the administration consider NATO a vital interest?
  Or how about Ukraine? As Zbigniew Brzezinski has put it, a Russia 
without Ukraine is just another powerful country; a Russia with Ukraine 
is an empire. A Russian foreign policy based on power politics can and 
does seek to bring Ukraine into at least Russia's foreign policy orbit. 
Now, Ukraine is not so vital to us as to warrant a NATO security 
guarantee, in my view. But should we really be telling the Russians 
that they can have Ukraine back, just because it is power politics, not 
communist ideology, that is driving Russia? Given Ukraine's importance 
as a buffer state to the West, and as a platform for power projection 
for Russia, I should think not. Besides, the view that Ukraine is 
Russian territory is held so fervently by some Russian generals and 
politicians that it borders on messianism and is thus nearly 
indistinguishable from ideology. And those who hold this view clearly 
have an anti-Western ideological bent.
  The paper goes on to say that the United States would not object to 
Russia pursuing its goals ``within the confines'' of international law 
and ``absent a clear and present danger of resurgent Russian 
imperialism.'' Since the administration has not objected to any of 
Russia's actions in the ``near abroad'' to date, we can only assume 
that the administration considers military occupation, divide and rule 
tactics, subterfuge, and economic warfare against weaker neighbors who 
have done no harm to Russia to be ``within the confines'' of 
international law. I disagree, and so should this Congress. Russia's 
actions along her periphery are simply not equivalent to our actions in 
the Western Hemisphere, not legally and especially not morally.

  As to resurgent Russian nationalism, by the time we conclude that 
there is definitely a ``clear and present danger,'' it will be too 
late. We should be acting now to discourage the emergence of a clear 
and present danger. The warning signs are all there, Mr. Speaker. The 
overwhelming majority of Russian leaders today, even the so-called 
democrats, increasingly pine for the Soviet Union and fail to regard 
the New Independent States as sovereign entities. The armed forces beg 
for a return to the past, and polls show that military personnel only 
view two men in Russia positively: Generals Alexander Lebed and Boris 
Gromov, both reactionary and both of the opinion that the breakup of 
the U.S.S.R. was a mistake. Worst of all, polls show that a majority of 
Russians share this view.
  The danger, while perhaps not present, is indeed clear. The re-
creation of the Russian empire in any form would be catastrophic for 
all concerned, including the Russians, who have more important tasks at 
hand. This administration has done nothing, and obviously intends to do 
nothing, to let the Russians know that we would view this as 
unacceptable.
  Why? Well, the last paragraph of the article explains that, Mr. 
Speaker. Listen to this. The Clinton policy paper predicts that 
American leadership ``will be limited by the extent to which others can 
assume responsible authority without adversely impacting U.S. 
interests.'' That is almost as pathetic as the notorious Clinton State 
Department cable bragging about ``taking the lead in passing 
responsibility to the U.N.''
  It is obvious that this administration simply doesn't want America to 
lead. America is indeed limited these days, Mr. Speaker. But not by 
anything other than the barrenness and flaccidity of the Clinton 
foreign policy.

               [From the Washington Times, Sept. 6, 1994]

                        Yalta II or Realpolitik

       The United States is prepared to accept an expanded Russian 
     sphere of influence, including to some extent the Baltics, as 
     long as it respects international law and Washington's 
     interests ``are not adversely affected,'' according to a 
     State Department policy paper circulating in high diplomatic 
     circles
       Some cynics at State are calling the paper ``Yalta II,'' 
     but others say the Clinton administration is outlining a 
     pragmatic approach to Moscow as the White House prepares for 
     the visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin later this 
     month.
       Peter Tarnoff, undersecretary of state for political 
     affairs, sent the paper to Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher in July. The paper apparently cleared the White 
     House before reaching diplomatic hands, said one official.
       The official said the paper ``clearly shows [the 
     administration] knows where we [the United States] are going, 
     but it also shows there is little we can do about it.''
       Quoting from the paper, the official said, ``it is 
     understood that a Russian sphere of influence is being 
     recognized with Europe extending to the eastern border of 
     Poland, leaving the Baltics somewhat up for grabs * * * .''
       The comment on the three Baltic states, which recently 
     regained independence after 50 years of domination from 
     Moscow, is not explained further, the official said.
       The paper goes on to say, ``What differentiates this at-
     first disturbing picture from the Cold War is the de-
     ideologization of Russian foreign policy,'' meaning it is no 
     longer committed to communism and world revolution.
       The paper explains that a ``Russian foreign policy based on 
     national interest and power politics is acceptable to the 
     U.S. as long as vital U.S. interests are not adversely 
     impacted * * *.''
       The United States would not object to Russia pursuing its 
     foreign policy goals ``within the confines'' of international 
     law and ``absent a clear and present danger of resurgent 
     Russian imperialism,'' the paper says.
       The paper says the United States shares with Russia a goal 
     of maintaining the stability of the more than 180 countries 
     in the world today.
       It draws a distinction between supporting ``self-
     determination'' and opposing ``separatism'' but does not 
     attempt to define either term clearly.
       The paper refers to a ``highly unstable'' world and a 
     ``strategic partnership'' between the United States and 
     Russia. It opposes any further breakup of Russia and favors 
     ``preventing further fragmentation of control of Russia's 
     nuclear forces.''
       It recognizes the decreasing U.S. military ability to 
     police the world and predicts that American leadership ``will 
     be limited by the extent to which others can assume 
     responsible authority without over-long adversely impacting 
     U.S. interests.''

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