[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 128 (Wednesday, September 14, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
NOMINATION OF ADM. HENRY H. MAUZ, JR., TO BE PLACED ON THE RETIRED LIST 
                        IN THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the nomination.
  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I rise today during this debate over 
the retirement of Admiral Mauz to suggest to my colleagues that they 
support the majority and support the Armed Services Committee 
recommendation with regard to Admiral Mauz and also to take just a few 
minutes to discuss the larger issue of sexual harassment in the U.S. 
Navy.
  I need tell none of my colleagues that we faced this precise issue of 
allegations earlier this year when Admiral Kelso's retirement was 
before the Senate. I voted then to give Admiral Kelso retirement at the 
four-star grade because I felt it was improper and unfair to have a 
trial of Admiral Kelso's conduct on the floor of the U.S. Senate. It 
seemed to me that we had a lot of allegations, but we had no certainty, 
we had no conviction, no process by which Admiral Kelso could defend 
himself from the allegations or where his accusers could have their 
side vindicated. It struck me at the time that the floor of the U.S. 
Senate is a very poor place to try to come to judgment on contentious 
factual issues, and I said so at the time.
  Mr. President, I have become something of an expert, if there is such 
a thing, on the subject of sexual harassment in the Navy over the last 
year, largely due to the experiences of one of my constituents, Lt. 
(jg.) Rebecca Hansen. It has now been reported all over the country 
that I ended the career of a great admiral, Adm. Stanley Arthur, when I 
held up his nomination for the commander of the U.S. Forces in the 
Pacific because of a role he did not ask for but accepted in the Hansen 
case.
  Mr. President, that is not true. The Navy did it to him, with, I 
suspect, the unwitting help of the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
But, there again, the problem is not me or even Admiral Arthur, but the 
absence of a sensible process in the Navy and in the congressional 
oversight process to handle allegations of sexual harassment.
  In the Hansen case, I asked the Navy, starting on April 7, 1993, in 
much the same way that I have asked hundreds of Federal agencies over 
16 years in the U.S. Senate, to explain how it made decisions and 
arrived at conclusions in a specific matter involving my constituent, 
Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen.
  What I experienced from April 1993 until June 1994 was, with more 
than 1 year of correspondence and meetings, some of which I was 
personally involved in, was a system that avoided responsibility, 
answered direct questions with indirect answers, and otherwise resisted 
any attempt to find out why they treated a constituent of mine the way 
they did.
  And I must say, without exaggeration--I do not need to do that 
anymore, since I am leaving this place, Mr. President--in 16 years, I 
have never seen anything like the way the Navy tried to avoid answering 
simple, direct questions in the case of Rebecca Hansen.
  Finally, in total frustration, on April 28, 1994, more than a year 
after this effort on my part began, I took what was an extraordinary 
step for me of putting a hold on Admiral Arthur's nomination. I am not 
one of the people in this place that does that sort of thing. I say it 
was an extraordinary step because with regard to constituent service 
matters, I have never been put in the position before where I had to 
resort to this particular tactic simply to get straight answers out of 
a Federal Government office. But I felt at the time that the Navy would 
not evade my questions--I hoped they would not--if I did this, and that 
the Navy would not want to put Admiral Arthur at risk.
  Mr. President, I was dead wrong. Rather than talk to me, the Navy 
called the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, or someone, and 
asked how long the nomination could be held up. And for reasons I will 
never understand, the Navy decided to withdraw the nomination rather 
than hold anyone accountable in the Hansen case. Perhaps someone else 
knows the reason why Admiral Arthur's nomination was withdrawn. But it 
is remarkable to me, in the context of today's debate, that the Navy 
would go to such lengths as withdrawing the nomination of Admiral 
Arthur in order to avoid dealing with the reaction of Navy personnel to 
the acknowledged sexual harassment in the Hansen case. It is not at all 
surprising, based on my experience, that they would lay off on me the 
responsibility for their decision.
  I want to thank especially my colleague from Virginia, Senator 
Warner, who has been a longtime member of the Armed Services Committee 
and former Secretary of the Navy, for his particular efforts and for 
those of the leadership of the committee in helping us get the real 
story of the Hansen case out after the fact.
  It is remarkable to me that the U.S. Navy, after having gone through 
the identical experience with Admiral Kelso, would now present Admiral 
Mauz' retirement without any greater efforts to get to the bottom of 
the allegations against him. I read carefully the remarks Monday of my 
colleague from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
in which he acknowledged, and I would acknowledge, the terrific efforts 
the committee went to to find out the truths of the allegations against 
Admiral Mauz.
  But with all due respect, getting the Navy's version of disputed 
facts, based on the findings of a Navy inspector general, is not a fair 
or reasonable process. It is instructive to me that a civilian court of 
law in the Paula Coughlin case recently ruled inadmissible the Navy 
inspector general's report on the grounds it was unreliable.
  I would note that in the Hansen case there was also an inspector 
general's report, but I was told, Mr. President, personally, by both 
the Navy and the staff of the Armed Services Committee I was not 
permitted to see that report. Hence, I was left to my own devices to 
get information. And to this day I have no idea if the Hansen inspector 
general's report is worth the paper it is written on.
  Mr. President, as I said in the beginning, I intend to vote to give 
Admiral Mauz his retirement at the four-star rank. And I will do so, 
albeit reluctantly, because I think it is unfair to give credence to 
mere allegations in a forum where he has no voice, the floor of the 
U.S. Senate.
  I agree with my colleague from Georgia, Senator Nunn, who said on 
Monday, and I will quote:

       An allegation is not a fact. An allegation is not proof.

  And continuing to quote my colleague:

       We need to keep that in mind. There are too many of these 
     cases now coming before the Senate where allegations are 
     being taken as tantamount to fact. That is simply not the way 
     that any deliberative body adjudicates important matters.

  I end the quote from my colleague by endorsing his analysis of the 
situation, and I agree with him.
  All I can say is that blind reliance on the Navy to investigate 
itself and report on its findings is not much better. And that is 16 
years of experience.
  So I have written a letter to my colleagues who have the 
responsibility of oversight, which is a near impossible situation given 
how fast things change in this place, suggesting to them what I will 
now suggest to all of my colleagues and to the Navy, that it is kind of 
a sad spectacle to see repeated again and again and again allegations 
coming up at a time when a person is ending an otherwise most honorable 
career in the Navy.
  It is my view that victims of harassment must have confidence that 
they have a forum to bring their complaints, a forum where they can get 
a fair hearing, where they will not be subverted by what is often 
called the old boys network, and where they will not be victimized 
further with retribution or retaliation carried out by cronies of their 
harassers.
  At the same time, those accused of sexual harassment must have a 
forum where they can defend themselves from unfair allegations, a place 
where they can clear their names and vindicate their decisions and 
their behavior, and a forum in which a traditionally and historically 
male-dominated service, in which officers retiring today are no more 
nor less sensitive than males of the same generation in other walks of 
life, can have their behavior put in perspective, so outstanding 
careers are not jeopardized by the acknowledged need to eliminate 
gender bias. This is not the place to do that.
  Finally, I say we in the Senate need a process where we are confident 
that whatever we decide in any given case, we are deciding it on the 
merits, on the true facts, after a full and fair hearing and 
deliberation.
  Mr. President, Stanley Arthur will retire from the Navy someday. He 
does not deserve to retire with any kind of a cloud over his head. He 
deserved to command the Pacific forces, but the Navy decided otherwise. 
The Navy, not I, made that decision. The Navy, not I, will cause this 
predicament to be repeated if they and the oversight committees cannot 
agree on how to deal fairly with constituent concerns and naval 
history.
  No one will be satisfied with the decision we make today, whichever 
way it goes, because there is no factual record upon which to 
deliberate, no conclusion, no conviction that we are operating with 
full knowledge of the facts.
  So I leave here and I leave it to future Congresses and the Navy to 
decide how that is to be done. My staff has been briefed by the Navy on 
their efforts to establish just such a procedure, and it appears to me 
that the Navy is making a good start. But along with that procedure we 
need to see the determination of the Navy, from the Secretary on down, 
to implement the procedure with fairness and with certainty.
  The case of Admiral Mauz does not give evidence of that 
determination. I think he deserves what he has asked of us today, and I 
support the leadership in their efforts to see that he does get it, and 
I will support that effort here today as well. I hope the next case 
that comes up will demonstrate we have chosen and are on a different 
and a better course.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator answer one question he 
raised before he leaves the floor?
  We all have a lot of thinking to do about how these nominations are 
handled. I think the Navy and the military services are going to have 
increasing cases of complaints, some of which are going to be valid. 
Inevitably, according to human nature, some of them are not going to be 
invalid. Some people are going to deserve punishment for the sexual 
harassment, and some people are going to be innocent victims of 
allegations of individuals who have not somehow made the kind of 
progress in the military they expected to make and therefore are 
looking for reasons for that and looking for ways to place blame.
  So this is a difficult area. The military has gone through difficult 
transitions before. This is going to be a difficult transition that is 
going to be with us some time, and I think our committee has urged and 
will continue to urge the Department of Defense to come up with 
expeditious, fair, and objective ways of judging these cases. And they 
are working on that.
  But I think we all have to understand that this is a challenge for 
the military. We are making positions available for women in the 
military which are overdue and which they can perform very well. But 
there are significant changes taking place here, and it is going to 
require judgment on the part of all.
  One point the Senator from Minnesota made that I think needs 
correction is he mentioned that this was strictly a Navy investigation. 
That is the normal course of events. If the DOD IG is required to 
review and supervise every service investigation of one-on-one 
misconduct, whether it is sexual or otherwise, there would be hundreds 
of thousands of cases of such in the military.
  I do not think we in this body sometimes put in perspective the 
number of people out there in the military and the number of incidents 
that take place, some of them sexual harassment-type cases, some of 
them other type cases. For instance, Admiral Mauz had under his command 
175,000 people.
  Now, Admiral Mauz right now is out there on duty in the Navy, and he 
is one of the key players in preparing for whatever may take place in 
Haiti, perhaps within the next few days or weeks. If somebody this 
morning has a one-on-one offense, whether sexual harassment or not and 
the captain of a ship under his command--he has over 200 of them--takes 
action, I personally do not want Admiral Mauz involved in that now. He 
has things he has to do. He has to supervise the security of the 
country and the Navy, the Navy's role. So I do not want the four-star 
commander out there to have to be involved and be responsible, and not 
for us to start creating the climate on the floor of the Senate that 
they are responsible to supervise and make sure that every detail of 
every administrative or even court martial proceeding against an 
individual is handled properly.
  There is a whole chain of command. They are ultimately responsible. 
The four-star admirals are responsible for supervising and for creating 
a climate, and all of that, and they should be held accountable for 
that. But if a captain of a ship makes a misjudgment in how they handle 
an administrative matter or a doctor basically--and in this case, 
according to the Navy, all the information we have, the doctor who 
recommended psychiatric confinement and examination for this particular 
complainant did not know that she had ever lodged a sexual harassment 
complaint. We have that on the word of the Secretary of the Navy. They 
looked into it.

  So, if there was a misjudgment about the doctor here, it had nothing 
to do, according to the Navy, with the sexual harassment complaint that 
this individual had filed. He did not know about it.
  I do not think this body wants to hold a four-star admiral 
responsible for that kind of detail unless we want to say to them that 
we no longer want them to worry about Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, or the 
safety of the fleet. They have responsibility for over 200 ships and 
over 175,000 people. If we start creating the climate--I know it would 
be inadvertent and not intentional--that our top military officials are 
responsible to personally supervise and intervene in virtually every 
kind of conflict out there, we are asking the impossible. We are about 
to set a kind of expectation that can cause the military services and 
our overall national security some severe jolts.
  The individuals involved in these cases need to be treated properly. 
The chain of command needs to set the tone, and needs to set the 
climate. They need to make sure that their people are carrying out the 
overall policy, and they need to take prompt action when it comes to 
their attention that something has gone wrong. They need to discipline 
people who do not adhere to the policy of the Navy.
  But to hold them responsible--I know the Senator is not in this case, 
and I recognize his remarks. I know he is supporting the committee 
position on this. But I hope we do not create a climate that is so 
unrealistic that it does damage to the top commanders' ability to do 
their No. 1 job which is, after all, to protect the security of this 
Nation. That is the number one job.
  In this case, although I do not think it happens in all cases, there 
are not enough people in the DOD IG. We would have to have tens of 
thousands of them if we are going to have the DOD IG supervise 
everything that happens in the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine level. 
But in this case, because of the significance of it, and because in 
this case the victim really was sexually harassed--there is no doubt 
about that; there is no dispute it; she was; and the persons who did 
that deserve punishment and received punishment --but in this case the 
DOD IG did review the Navy IG report in both of these matters, both the 
Taylor matter and Simmons matter.
  The Senator mentioned no one outside the Navy, but the DOD IG 
reviewed both of these cases and concurred with the Navy IG finding. I 
wanted to make that clear to the Senator. I submit that to him.
  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I intend to be brief.
  I acknowledge the contribution that my colleague from Georgia has 
made to this particular discussion that I raised this morning. Maybe I 
will just make three points as he has talked.
  First, he believes he is correct. I do not know that there is any 
priority that Haiti all of a sudden takes priority over gender bias or 
anything else. I think the responsibility--whether it is the Commander 
in Chief or a particular admiral in a particular area of 
responsibility--the responsibility is to make sure that the goals and 
the objectives that are set and the strategy are implemented by 
appropriate tactics.
  To that extent, I agree with what my colleague said about there needs 
to be a system in place. There needs to be a climate that is 
encouraged. There needs to be an environment in which people understand 
the standards of the U.S. Navy, whether the issue is gender bias or 
whether it is any other kind of an issue that involves the people, the 
professionals in that institution. That is a responsibility that 
creates a climate in order to have a system that everyone understands, 
and then to enforce that.
  Clearly, an admiral who is responsible for a large command cannot be 
responsible for something that is going on directly who said what to 
whom on a particular ship at a particular time. But it strikes me that 
admiral, he or she, is responsible in the sense that in a particular 
case rules are violated, there is a general lack of respect within a 
particular command, and that is ignored after someone complains about 
it. Of course, the person at the top is responsible whether they were 
there or they were not there. I hope that is clear.
  Second, I think it is important for people to understand that the 
response indicated it was not just the Navy that looked at it. It was 
the Department of Defense.
  I hope that my colleague from Georgia and the other members of the 
Armed Services Committee understand that we are all in this together. 
The process of transition from an all-male, basically or a male-
dominated institution to something else is a very difficult transition. 
It is more difficult in the Navy than in any other service I would 
suggest, although I as an old Army man I have a certain bias with 
regard to the subject. But it is more difficult in the services where 
people normally carve out a career, and as a tradition--which is 
hundreds of years old--it is more difficult there than IBM, or the 
company I came from, or this place. It is incredibly difficult.
  But I would hope that the Navy, the DOD, and my colleagues on the 
Armed Services Committee will acknowledge that because of the nature of 
the office that each of us holds, whether we are on the committee or 
not, we are all in this together in helping the Navy, or the armed 
services in general through this transition period. And in my 
particular case, the Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen case, I am not approached 
as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am approached in the 
traditional fashion which is as her Senator.
  So I have my own experience with how the Navy is in transition. It 
was not a very pleasant experience. But I do not want to go into the 
details of that particular case because I do not want to try that on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate, any more than I think we should try the 
Admiral Mauz case on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
  But I want my colleagues on the committee to understand. I say this 
particularly as I leave. There are always going to be 100 people, the 
Senators from Washington, Georgia, South Carolina, Minnesota, wherever 
it may be, involved at least in this body in this transition. And the 
way in which the Navy handled the Hansen case demonstrated clearly to 
me that I am not part of this transition--just the way in which they 
answered the questions, the way in which they dealt with it, the way in 
which they dealt with Stanley Arthur, laying off on me the fact that a 
great admiral, according to them, cannot get a command. They lay off on 
me because I am doing constituent service. There is no evidence that I 
would keep a hold on him forever, or over anything. They just made a 
decision to jerk him knowing that, as it turns out, half the people 
that have any experience at the Navy thinks it is my fault because I am 
a difficult politician and that is the way the politicians operate; and 
the other half think it was the Navy's fault, which happens to be right 
in this particular case.
  But I feel badly for Admiral Arthur as I do for Admiral Mauz or 
anyone else, particularly if Admiral Mauz is right in the middle of an 
invasion, which most of us are going to object to. That is a pretty 
tough line. It is hard to get down to the line when you have all of 
that sort of stuff stacked against you.
  So I want my colleague from Georgia, for whom everyone in this body 
and outside of body has such incredible respect, to understand that my 
reason for bringing up my particular experience at this time in this 
context and suggesting to my colleagues that no matter what he or they 
may think of the Mauz case, that I think the committee deserves to be 
supported in their judgment in this case. But the committee also needs 
to understand that there will always be 100 of us involved at any given 
time in this process of transition, and the Navy has to understand 
that, and the oversight process needs to reinforce that so we are not 
back here with the next admiral or the next whatever going through this 
trial by politician on the floor of the U.S.Senate.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. I do understand that. I 
understand that our committee is basically the agent of this larger 
body and that we report--in effect, to all 100 Senators--and all 100 
Senators are the only ones who can make the decisions. The committees 
make decisions. But they are all subject to the floor and all 
confirmations are subject to the floor. Every Senator has the right to 
raise these questions. And we do our very best to respond to every 
question that is raised by any Member of Senate in the correspondence 
of any nomination. We have done that over and over again. We will 
continue to.
  What we are going to discuss in just a few minutes--I do not want in 
any way to preempt the remarks of my friend and colleague from 
Washington--whether the committee should have a formal hearing on this 
nomination. I hope that the Senate will agree with the committee that 
we do not need a formal hearing.
  But we simply cannot do our job and have formal hearings on each 
contested nomination or on each nomination where there is an allegation 
or even a serious allegation. If we feel that the Navy or the 
investigating body has not done the job properly, or if we fell that we 
cannot get the information without having hearings, if we feel anyone 
is misleading the committee, or there is not good faith, I think 
hearings are in order. We have had them frequently, and we will again. 
But I hope the Senate will keep in mind our committee jurisdiction. We 
have 73 civilians that are appointed to go through our confirmation 
process in the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, those rotate. So 
73 is not a one 4-year deal; it is many more than 73 when you consider 
all of the people that drop out. We now have six nominations out here 
that have been pending, civilians, top DOD civilians, that have been 
pending for 6 weeks, top people in the Department of Defense, that one 
person or another has some problem with. In most cases, we do not even 
know what the problem is, and they are being held up. I do not know 
what the problem is, and I am chairman of the committee. We cannot get 
those passed. These are top people that are supposed to be in place 
running the Department of Defense.

  In this Congress, we have had 61,112 military people come through our 
confirmation process--61,112. Out of that many, we have had 1,085 
general or flag officers--1,085. If we are going to have a hearing on, 
let us say, even 10 percent, 1 out of 10 of those we may get some 
complaint about, then we will do nothing but have hearings on general 
and flag officers. We probably will never get to the civilians.
  The scope and magnitude of what we are dealing with here is what I 
hope our colleagues will put into some context. That does not excuse 
anybody from looking into each serious allegation. I emphasize that. 
But the procedure by which we do that has to be thought through. We 
cannot have a formal hearing on all of those.
  While I have had six civilians out here that have been held up for 
some 6 weeks now, we have a hearing again this afternoon on two more 
top civilians that have not yet had a hearing. We hope to have a 
hearing and get them confirmed. But the committee gets a little 
discouraged--I do as chairman, and I know the ranking member does--when 
we are having a hearing on two more people. And what am I to tell them? 
Well, the last six are still pending from 6 weeks ago. They were on the 
floor. When the committee recommended them, there were no problems that 
we knew of. They are still pending. You are going to take a job in the 
Department of Defense--and one individual is coming out of the private 
sector. I have known him a long time. He is a very top individual. I do 
not know how much he is sacrificing, but I think it is several hundred 
thousand dollars a year. It is probably closer to a million, my staff 
tells me, having looked at the financial records. He is sacrificing 
millions of dollars, and he has already, in all likelihood, 
disassociated himself from many of the commercial activities he has. 
When he comes before the committee today, I am supposed to say to him--
and I say to my friend from Washington, it has nothing to do with this; 
I am talking about civilians now, but I am giving the scope of the 
committee activity. I am supposed to say to him or her, well, on the 
last group that came through, we do not know what the problem is. Six 
of them are on the floor and they have been held up for 6 weeks. We 
cannot get them through. And we are not going to be in but 4 more 
weeks, so we will be back next January or February, and I hope you have 
a good time in the next 3 or 4 months waiting for confirmation.
  This process is getting out of hand. Individual holds are getting out 
of hand on the floor. People are having holds on nominations for 
purposes that have nothing to do with the nominee. That is not the case 
here. This case is based on the nominee, and my comments are on my 
larger frustration and have nothing to do with the Mauz nomination. 
People are holding up nominations time after time for some larger 
strategic purpose or, in some cases, for leverage purposes, in terms of 
something they want the Department of Defense to do--sometimes 
legitimate and sometimes questionable.
  I think the process is getting out of hand. It is getting out of 
hand. My frustration is not with the Mauz nomination per se. Senator 
Murray from Washington, and others who raise questions on this 
nomination, as well as the Senator from Minnesota on the Arthur 
nomination, those were related to the nominee. Those matters dealt with 
the merits of the case on the nominee, whether we agree or disagree.
  Where the real abuse is occurring is when the hold on the nomination 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the nominee. And if we continue to do 
this in this body, then what we are going to do is we are going to end 
up lowering the quality of people willing to serve the country, not 
just in defense jobs, but other jobs. It may already be happening. But 
we have an awesome responsibility under the Constitution of the United 
States in confirming people. Our committee takes that very seriously 
and will continue to. But this whole body is going to have to take it 
seriously, too, collectively and individually.
  Somehow the leadership of this body, and all of us involved in it, 
are going to have to address this question. Again, I am not speaking on 
nominees, where there is a problem with the nomination itself, but 
particularly, the frustration is with other cases that we have going on 
right now, which have nothing to do with the nominees but simply larger 
purposes. The larger picture of what kind of people are going to be 
willing to serve this country, I think, is increasingly coming into 
play.
  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I appreciate that. For the benefit of 
the Chair and for the benefit of my colleagues, my response to my 
colleague's remarks will be brief.
  First, I acknowledge that this part of the process does get out of 
hand. I think the whole business of holds is way out of hand in this 
place. I acknowledge that. It is not just in this case, it is in every 
other case. I acknowledge that there are ideologues putting holds on 
people because they disagree on ideology. We also know that leverage 
has become an important part; leveraging something out of somebody for 
something has become another way, as my colleague has pointed out. I 
deplore both of those.
  I cannot leave the floor and leave the subject that brought me to the 
floor without restating the fact that in this particular case--and I 
talk not about the Mauz case but about how I come to the floor on the 
Mauz case because of the situation with regard to Admiral Arthur and 
Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen. All this Senator wanted out of the Navy was a 
response, not a specific action, not to reinstate her. And I did not 
want to be put in the place of Solomon, to cut the woman in half, or 
the Navy in half, or Admiral Arthur in half; I just wanted an answer. 
That is my point. I cannot get a direct answer because the Navy is on 
the defensive because of Tailhook and sexual harassment and some 
changes in command. But that is all this Senator wanted.
  That is the only reason I have ever put a hold. I rarely do it. That 
is the only reason I have ever done that in this process, to the best 
of my understanding.
  I met with the new Chief of Naval Operations at one point, and we 
went through this issue. He said, ``You should talk to the inspector 
general.'' I said, ``Fine,'' and within 2 hours the Navy inspector 
general was there and I talked to him. He said, ``Well, obviously, 
Senator, you have not read the IG report.'' I said, ``You are 
absolutely right, Admiral, I have not. Where is it?'' He said, ``I 
cannot give it to you, but they have it in the committee.'' I called 
the committee and they said, ``Yes, we got it,'' and I never got to see 
it. I do not think I should be the judge in a particular case, but at 
some point each of us has to bring some judgment to bear in each of 
these constituent cases. It was not, in my case, my constituent, right 
or wrong, because I have a responsibility to my country, to the oath I 
took, to the Navy, and to my constituents. But I could not get that job 
done in that particular context.
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. DURENBERGER. Yes, I am happy to.
  Mr. NUNN. I am informed by staff and have been for some time--and the 
Senator from Minnesota and I have not had a chance to talk on this; he 
raises a very legitimate question--that our practice in the committee 
is not to have staff read the IG report but to require Senators to read 
the IG report.
  The Senator should check with his staff. But my staff advises me that 
the Senator's staff was informed, that the Senator could read the 
report, but not his staff. I believe that was right before recess. The 
Senator was able to get on a plane to go out of town. I think the staff 
was not permitted to read the report, but the Senator is always 
entitled to read the report.
  I want to make sure to clarify that if we have any miscommunication 
between our staffs, that needs to be clarified also.
  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I acknowledge what my colleague said. 
I do not know if that is the case or is not the case.
  I merely want to say that I did not have the opportunity to read the 
report. But whether I did or I did not, and if I had read the report 
and if the Navy had responded, if the Navy had given me the answers to 
four questions as quickly as they gave the committee 2 feet of 
information within 48 hours when this issue became public, if they had 
done that, that would not be any reason to have a hold on this 
nomination.
  My point here is simple. Whether he has to go through a hearing 
process or not, Admiral Mauz will get his four stars. Stanley Arthur is 
not going to get his opportunity.
  I just want to make the point that it is not my fault, it is not 
Rebecca Hansen's fault, that he did not get it. It is the fault of the 
U.S. Navy. They made the decision to jerk him from the appointment to 
command the Pacific. For whatever reason they did that, that is their 
decision.
  But right, wrong; appropriate, inappropriate, it simply says, and I 
will leave the floor by repeating this, that the Senator from 
Washington, the Senator from Minnesota, whoever that will be next year, 
as well as the members of the Armed Services Committee, are all in this 
process together.
  I want my colleagues also to know, particularly my colleague from 
Washington, and others, that the chairman is right about the effort 
that the committee puts in on hearings. In fact, the unfortunate thing 
in the Rebecca Hansen case is, the hearing took place after the fact 
but, in fact, the committee and its staff devoted endless hours to 
trying to find out what it was that went wrong in the Hansen case.
  That is why I particularly complimented my colleague from Virginia, 
who read an entire letter, I think, to the full committee that I had 
written, and put in a lot of time looking at this matter after the 
fact. After the fact is not going to help anybody.
  Ahead of the fact, the Senator from Georgia has stated the problem: 
How many hours in the day, how many days in the week, how many weeks in 
the year do you have to discharge your responsibility as a member of 
the Armed Services Committee in its many facets? And, is it the most 
appropriate function of the committee to be dealing with sexual 
harassment charges, or anything else? Is there any other--or better--
forum in which these matters should be dealt with? I happen to think 
there should be a different forum or a different process that is 
separate and apart from this.
  With that, Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience, 
and I particularly thank my colleague from Georgia for his 
responsiveness as well.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray], 
is recognized.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I thank the President.
  Before the Senator from Minnesota leaves the floor--I do have a 
motion I am going to make in just a minute--I did want to comment that 
I agree with him. I do not want to be Solomon in the case of Admiral 
Mauz. I do not believe anyone here on this floor does.
  I believe there ought to be a fair and open process by which the 
nominations are brought to us. And I agree with the Senator from 
Minnesota that if we could rely on the Navy's responses we would not be 
requesting these kinds of hearings. But until all of us have the 
confidence of that--I share with the Senator his nonconfidence in that 
system at this point--we are going to have to rely on ourselves as a 
Senate in our process here in order to make these determinations.
  We need a fair, open process and a fair hearing for all sides, and 
that is why I am about to make the motion that I am going to make. And 
in response to several other comments that were made in the last half 
hour or 45 minutes I just feel it is imperative that we do look at the 
process. If there is a problem with the process, we should change it. 
But we are here today because there is no other process, and it is the 
process that we are required as Senators to vote on this nomination.
  I believe strongly, and I will again and again, we should not trample 
on the rights of an individual in the name of expediency. I believe 
that today and I will continue to believe it throughout my career.
  To say that Haiti is one of the reasons that we should have 
expediency, I have to say I think that not only is a red herring, but 
if we start creating a climate that young men and women within the 
service cannot count on their chain of command, then how can we count 
on them to do their job to protect the security of this Nation?


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I move that the nomination of Adm. Henry 
J. Mauz, Jr., to retire in grade be recommitted to the Committee on 
Armed Services with instructions to hold a public hearing on the 
nomination and not report the nomination back to the Senate until the 
committee has held the hearing.
  I send that to the desk.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  Does the Senator from Washington seek recognition?
  Who seeks recognition?
  The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have a very brief response to the Senator 
from Washington. Maybe I did not make my point here on Haiti.
  I did not say that Haiti was going to supersede this nomination or 
any of the issues. What I said was--and I thought I made it clear--that 
the four-star admirals in charge of the fleet cannot get involved in 
the initial outset of one-on-one type transgressions in the Navy. It 
cannot work that way. There are 172,000 people in the Navy.
  I would venture in our own offices, usually, when there is a problem 
between staff personnel, and usually our office staffs are 40, 50, or 
60 people total, depending on the size of the State, sometimes it is 
weeks before we know about those personnel problems. It depends on 
one's office. Even in our own office we have our administrative 
assistants basically to carry that out.
  My point was not, as the Senator from Washington just referenced, 
that Haiti superseded individual rights. That was not my point. If that 
was anyone's understanding of what I said, then I hope it will be 
clarified.
  My point is the top people in the military who are responsible for 
making plans for all sorts of contingencies that involve our national 
security, cannot--and I do not think we want them to--be involved in 
the beginning stages of conflicts between individuals and even court-
martial offenses. There are thousands and thousands and thousands of 
courts-martial in the military every year, and the top people have to 
set the climate and the procedures and eventually review in the chain 
of command, what is done. And when actions are taken that are unfair to 
individuals, they have a command responsibility to correct those.
  I know that is the understanding of the Senator, but they do have 
other responsibilities. That was my point.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). The Senator from Washington 
[Mrs. Murray], is recognized.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I will speak now to my motion to recommit this. I want to be very 
clear about why I am making this motion. In no way do I seek to pass 
judgment on any of the allegations that have been made regarding the 
nomination of Admiral Mauz. I think that sentence bears repeating: In 
no way do I seek to pass judgment on any of the allegations that have 
been made regarding the nomination of Admiral Mauz.

  I am making this motion because in my review of the allegations 
surrounding this nomination, more questions have been raised than 
answered. And I believe that the allegations raised against Admiral 
Mauz are sufficiently troubling to merit an open and full public 
hearing.
  Since this nomination was reported out of committee, I have devoted a 
great deal of time to reviewing this situation. After meeting with the 
Navy and the committee and reviewing what information is available to 
the public, I have concluded that the only way to resolve the 
conflicting issues is to hold an open public hearing. I know several 
other Senators agree with me, including Senators Mikulski, Moseley-
Braun, Boxer, and Feinstein, and I appreciate their support in this 
process.
  I would hope and I do continue to want to believe, that after such a 
hearing, the Senate could vote 100 to 0 to confirm Admiral Mauz in 
grade, because there would be no lingering doubts and because the 
hearing would provide a place where the record could be clarified once 
and for all.
  But before I address the specific situation with regard to Admiral 
Mauz, let me make an important point for the record with regard to how 
the Senate deals with these matters generally. I would rather not be 
here today, involved in consideration of this issue. I know this vote 
is not convenient, and it is certainly not comfortable for any of us to 
be doing this. But I strongly believe we cannot step on individuals' 
rights for the sake of expediency, as I said before.
  The rules we work by today say that the Senate must vote to confirm 
the retirement in grade of any three or four star flag officers. 
Typically, the Senate votes on these issues by voice, without debate. 
To me, the process of approving this high honor is not something we 
should do by rote, and it is not simply a formality. If we want to 
change the rules so that the Senate does not have to vote on these 
nominations, fine, let us do so. But for now, each Senator must answer 
to his or her vote. And there is another issue I need to clarify for 
the record. I have never put a hold on this nomination or sought delay. 
I have simply sought answers.
  As my colleagues know, the committee reported out the nomination on 
August 12. Shortly thereafter, I inquired as to how thorough the review 
had been of the allegations, and the extent to which members of the 
committee had formally deliberated on this nomination through a hearing 
process. I was unsatisfied that all questions had been answered.
  In good conscience, I informed the committee, I could not allow the 
nomination to be voted on by voice, and I requested a rollcall vote. At 
that point, the Navy came to me with information in an attempt to 
answer my questions. Unfortunately, as I shall clarify later in my 
remarks, some of the information provided to me by the Navy was 
conflicting and simply inaccurate.
  Other members looking at this had growing concerns. Five of us wrote 
to ask the committee to hold a hearing before asking the Senate to 
consider this nomination last week. The committee continues to 
believe a hearing is unnecessary, and that is why we are here today. 
But if the Navy had provided straight answers from the beginning, there 
is a very good chance we would not be debating this issue this morning, 
and I have made the following point in the past, and I shall make it 
here again today: The American people deserve to know that when the 
U.S. Senate votes to confer high honor on our Nation's military 
leadership, we do so with clear justification and solid grounding in 
the facts of an individual's career.

  It is my firmly held belief that those whom we honor in the U.S. 
Senate should serve to a higher standard. They should serve our Nation 
beyond reproach. Each Senator should be able to say to the thousands of 
young men and women coming behind that he who is honored is in fact a 
role model for their own lives as they shape their military careers.
  We must be able to tell the American people that those who are 
honored by this body have passed the highest test--they are the figures 
to whom we as parents can point to with pride and say we want our 
children to grow up just like them. With regard to the nomination 
before us today, we simply do not have enough information, in my view, 
to determine if Admiral Mauz meets this test or not.
  As you know, Admiral Mauz is currently serving as the commander in 
chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. On May 10, 1994, he was nominated by 
President Clinton to retire in grade as a four-star admiral.
  Navy Lt. Darlene Simmons alleges inappropriate action by Admiral Mauz 
with respect to the investigation and disposition of her sexual 
harassment case. In addition, Senior Chief George Taylor alleges that 
Admiral Mauz inappropriately used Government assets and retaliated 
against him because he was a whistleblower. Both Lieutenant Simmons and 
Senior Chief Taylor have written to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, expressing the view that Admiral Mauz should not be retired 
at four stars.
  Some may ask why a hearing is necessary when the Navy has already 
conducted their own investigations into the allegations, and in both 
cases, found them to be without merit?
  Unfortunately, my answer to that is that at this point in time, the 
investigative capabilities of the Navy simply do not have the 
confidence of the public. The Senate Armed Services Committee has 
rightly assigned a special advisory board to review the investigative 
capabilities of the Defense Department generally, so that 
recommendations can be made for all the services--and especially the 
Navy--to improve their internal investigative processes. This special 
advisory board will be issuing its findings later this year. I believe 
the report of the advisory board will provide very useful guidance on 
this problem and establish a roadmap whereby Congress and the American 
people can regain confidence in investigations performed by the U.S. 
military.
  In the meantime, we are left with an imperfect process in which to 
evaluate the cases that are ultimately brought to the Senate for 
confirmation. Thus, if there is a case like the one before us, where 
serious and troubling concerns have been raised, it seems to me quite 
appropriate that a public hearing should be held, so that the views of 
all involved--all involved--can be aired.
  I want to briefly review the two cases that are relevant to Admiral 
Mauz' nomination, because it is important to understand the scope of 
the concerns raised. I think it is undisputed by the Navy and by the 
committee that in both the Taylor case and the Simmons case, the 
individuals involved were greatly wronged.
  First, let me review the case of Lt. Darlene Simmons.
  The Navy supports and has substantiated the charge by Lt. Darlene 
Simmons that she was sexually harassed while stationed abroad the 
U.S.S. Canopus. Lt. Simmons served as the legal officer of that ship. 
During her service as a lawyer there, she received repeated requests 
for dates and comments about her physical appearance from another 
officer who was her supervisor and with whom she worked closely. She 
filed a complaint to the ship's executive officer on June 1, 1992.

  On June 5, 1992, according to the Navy:

       The (offending) officer was counseled and administrative 
     action was taken. He requested retirement from the Navy as 
     was his prerogative. Unfortunately--and unacceptably--an 
     atmosphere of harassment and hostility persisted, 
     particularly as the retirement of the officer involved was 
     not effective until April 1993, and he remained on duty on 
     the ship. On October 9, 1992, an anonymous DOD IG hot line 
     call and a call by Lt. Simmons to [a member of Congress] and 
     to the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Barbara Pope, 
     raised the visibility of this case.

  Shortly thereafter, the offending officer was removed from the ship. 
The Navy maintains that once Admiral Mauz knew of the problem in 
October, he took swift and appropriate action.
  Lt. Darlene Simmons maintains, however, that Admiral Mauz knew her 
claim of sexual harassment had been substantiated by a Navy 
investigation, knew she was still being forced to work in a junior 
position to her harasser, and did nothing until the case went public to 
correct the situation. During the process, she was repeatedly 
retaliated against, and no one was ever held accountable. She 
repeatedly asked for a report to be issued on her case, but none ever 
was.
  Lieutenant Simmons testified last spring before the House Armed 
Services Committee on the general issue of sexual harassment in the 
military. Lieutenant Simmons states:

       I was sexually harassed on the Canopus from December 1991 
     until May 1992. The Navy's zero tolerance policy of sexual 
     harassment was in place in May 1992 when I made my complaint. 
     Action directed by those guidelines was not taken and 
     procedures implemented were not followed. I have attempted to 
     work within the system for over 2 years and the system has 
     failed to address the issues or to hold anyone accountable 
     for the failure.
       Despite repeated reports to my chain of command and the 
     Department of Defense Inspector General's Office there has 
     never been an independent investigation conducted into the 
     facts surrounding my complaint of sexual harassment.

  During the course of Darlene Simmons' 2-year ordeal to bring an end 
to the sexual harassment and to hold the system accountable, she was 
retaliated against in a variety of ways. Her harasser was not removed 
from his position of authority over her for many months after she filed 
her complaint. Ultimately, Lieutenant Simmons was ordered to undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation, where she was placed in a locked psychiatric 
unit. She was found fit by a Navy doctor after a 24 hour observation 
period, but she was nonetheless forced to remain locked up in the 
psychiatric unit for 4 days. And then, according to Lieutenant Simmons' 
testimony confidential information regarding her psychiatric evaluation 
was wrongfully disseminated in retaliation for her reporting of sexual 
harassment.
  Following these many humiliations, she asked her command to both stop 
the malicious gossip, and hold accountable those who were responsible 
for the wrongful disclosure. No disciplinary action was taken.
  In December 1992, Lieutenant Simmons was transferred from her ship. 
On the occasion of her transfer, she received what she viewed to be an 
adverse fitness report. Since there was nothing in her record to 
substantiate the adverse report, she concluded it was given in 
retaliation for her reporting of sexual harassment.
  By this time, she had taken her case to the office of Admiral Mauz. 
According to her testimony, an aide to Admiral Mauz said that the 
admiral was personally involved in her case, and that the ``matter 
would be handled.''
  Shortly thereafter, she received another unsatisfactory fitness 
report. According to her testimony, ``Admiral Mauz' office said they 
could do nothing to assist me.''
  From this ordeal Darlene Simmons concludes,

       I relied on my chain of command to protect me from reprisal 
     and to take swift and tough action when there was reprisal. 
     My good faith reliance was not justified; instead my chain of 
     command used the opportunity to cover up another act of 
     reprisal.

  Eventually, Lieutenant Simmons filed charges against Admiral Mauz for 
dereliction of duty.
  The Naval inspector general looked into the case and determined the 
allegations by Lieutenant Simmons' against Admiral Mauz to be without 
merit. According to the Navy, Admiral Mauz responded to the complaints 
of Lieutenant Simmons in an appropriate manner and took corrective 
action on her behalf.
  I now want to speak to the case of Senior Chief George Taylor.
  Senior Chief George Taylor is currently stationed at U.S. Naval 
Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, CA, and considers himself 
a whistleblower.
  Senior Chief Taylor maintains that he was retaliated against by 
Admiral Mauz because he ``blew the whistle on waste, fraud, and abuse 
concerning mismanagement at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Bermuda.'' 
Taylor maintains that in November 1992, Admiral Mauz abused his power 
and authority by traveling to Bermuda along with 12 other military and 
civilian personnel for a 5-day vacation. At the time, Taylor was 
serving as Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda.
  Taylor asserts:

       Admiral Mauz was flown to Bermuda at government expense 
     along with other personnel. During his time on the island his 
     entire ``official'' visit consisted of playing golf, dining 
     in the best restaurants, and shopping * * *.

  In the months following his public whistleblowing, Taylor was charged 
with over 48 offenses of violating the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, which the Navy said were ``unrelated to Bermuda.'' Ultimately, 
all charges were dismissed, but Taylor maintains they were related to 
his whistleblowing against Admiral Mauz, and that Admiral Mauz was a 
``key player'' in bringing up the charges.
  Chief Officer Taylor maintains that Mauz tried to influence and 
pressure the investigation, and to intimidate Taylor's military defense 
counsel.
  According to the Navy,

       Admiral Mauz was not involved in Senior Chief Taylor's case 
     in California. He played no role in the charges themselves or 
     in the disposition of the charges * * * Regarding Bermuda * * 
     * the Naval inspector general conducted a complete and 
     thorough investigation. The investigation did not disclose 
     any misuse of government facilities. The IG determined * * * 
     that the scheduling of the trip created the perception of 
     impropriety and * * * Admiral Mauz received informal written 
     counseling.

  So what to make of these two serious cases, where clearly two members 
of our Nation's armed forces were greatly wronged? Both have asked that 
we in the U.S. Senate hold their chain of command accountable--in this 
case, Admiral Mauz.
  I would like to make it clear that as I have attempted to sort out 
the information on these cases, the staff of the Armed Services 
Committee has been extremely helpful in attempting to get answers to my 
questions, and I commend and thank the committee for their efforts.

  In my meetings and exchanges with the Navy, however, I have been left 
with more questions than answers. At times the information provided to 
me by the Navy has been conflicting and downright inaccurate. Other 
times, it has been helpful and clear. But I would not be here today, 
requesting this hearing if the responses from the Navy had consistently 
been reliable and accurate, and that is truly unfortunate and deeply 
troubling.
  Thus, without a public hearing on these issues, and without full 
confidence in the Navy's investigative capabilities, I can not in good 
conscience bestow honor on the leadership, while brushing aside the 
concerns of a junior officer and one of our Nation's enlisted 
personnel.
  Again I find myself down here on this floor talking about leadership 
and the chain of command. I respect the chain of command. Frankly, my 
colleagues, we are part of that chain of command. The people who elect 
us are at the top. They expect us to exert leadership when we see 
problems.
  Imagine if Darlene Simmons were your daughter. She goes to law 
school; she enters the Navy. She finds herself in a situation where her 
superior is constantly propositioning her. Her work environment becomes 
unbearable so she complains to her chain of command. She gets locked up 
in a psychiatric unit. Material evidence on her case is mysteriously 
lost. Her medical information is leaked to her colleagues so that her 
working environment becomes, once again, unbearable. The Navy issues 
what she feels are adverse fitness reports and she is further 
discredited.
  If she were my daughter--or my son--I would be confused and angry. If 
she were yours, so would you.
  And we would ask questions and demand answers.
  And so I am doing so today, before I case my vote on this nomination.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in this motion to instruct, so that a 
full public hearing can be held.
  As I have said in the beginning of my statement, I am not offering 
this motion based on the allegations of these two individuals. I am 
simply standing up for the rights of our military personnel to be 
heard--and to be taken seriously.
  Let us have a hearing. We can clear the air. And then maybe we can 
vote 100 to 0 to confirm this nomination.
  In the meantime, let this debate serve as yet another plea to the 
Navy in particular, and the Defense Department more generally, to do 
whatever is required to restore confidence and integrity into the 
military's investigative capabilities.
  Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays on the motion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I spoke at length on the nomination of 
Admiral Mauz to retire in grade on Monday. That nomination was 
submitted on May 10. It has been pending now for over 4 months. It has 
been thoroughly reviewed by the Committee on Armed Services. It was 
reported favorably to the Senate on August 12, 1994, with the Senate 
voting 22 to 0 in favor of the nomination. The nomination has been 
pending in the Senate since August 12, 1994.
  I would start by saying the Senator from Washington has asked some 
legitimate questions. As she observed, we have done everything we can 
to facilitate the answer to those questions. I believe as late as last 
night we were communicating with her staff about the Navy answers to 
those questions. I hope she has gotten the answers, at least to all the 
questions that were posed to us. She is certainly entitled to that 
information. It is the committee's duty to do everything it can to 
facilitate that information. We hope we have performed that duty. I 
certainly think these are questions that needed to be answered by the 
Navy. I think the Senator was certainly within her rights and duties 
and responsibilities to pose those questions. I hope the answer to them 
has helped clarify this overall matter for the Senate.
  Admiral Mauz has had a long and distinguished career, which I 
detailed Monday. Highlights include direct combat experience in 
patrolling the rivers of Vietnam, command of the forces which conducted 
successful strikes against terrorist related targets in Libya, 
establishment of the maritime embargo against Iraq after Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, and development of the plans for naval involvement in the 
Persian Gulf war. He presently is serving as the commander in chief, 
U.S. Atlantic Command, one of the most senior and responsible positions 
in the Armed Forces of the United States.
  The Committee on Armed Services has thoroughly reviewed this 
nomination. We have considered information from the Department of 
Defense concerning informal counseling he received related to travel to 
the Naval Air Station at Bermuda. We have considered material submitted 
by the Government accountability project, a nonprofit private 
organization, which alleged: First, that Admiral Mauz retaliated 
against senior chief master-at-arms, George R. Taylor, one of the 
individuals who has spoken to the news media about travel of senior 
officers to Naval Air Station Bermuda; and second, that Admiral Mauz 
was aware of sexual harassment against Lt. Darlene Simmons, a female 
officer in a subordinate command within the Atlantic Fleet, that he 
suppressed findings of his own command's inquiry into the matter, and 
that he failed to order any corrective action on behalf of Lieutenant 
Simmons.
  The committee twice deferred action on the nomination so that the 
initial allegations from the Government accountability project, and 
subsequent material submitted by that organization, could be reviewed. 
The committee obtained detailed, factual, responses from the Department 
of the Navy on these issues, which demonstrated that Admiral Mauz had 
not retaliated against Senior Chief Taylor, and that he had taken 
reasonable actions to address the sexual harassment of Lieutenant 
Simmons.
  The committee considered this information, and voted 22 to 0 to 
recommend confirmation on the nomination. On August 12, I placed in the 
Record the communications from the Government accountability project 
and the responses from the Navy so that it would be available to all 
Senators. On Monday, I included that material in the Record, along with 
material that the Government accountability project submitted after the 
nomination was reported, and the Navy's responses to that material.

  On Monday, I informed Senators that if they had further questions 
about this matter, I would endeavor to obtain official responses from 
the Navy. Senator Murray provided me with a number of questions on 
behalf of herself and a number of other Senators.
  I would like to note, Mr. President, that the questions raised by 
Senator Murray identified areas in which further clarification was 
desirable. Since the nomination was reported, Senator Murray and her 
staff have endeavored to keep the committee informed of her concerns.
  The issue of sexual harassment is important, and we have had the 
opportunity to work closely with Senator Murray, Senator Moseley-Braun, 
and others in crafting key reforms in this year's Defense authorization 
bill on the issues of investigations and protections against reprisals. 
Their initiative, their involvement, and cooperation has been very 
helpful in developing legislation to deal with this difficult issue.
  We received responses from the Navy last evening to the questions we 
received yesterday, and provided the material to Senator Murray and the 
other Senators who had participated in drafting the questions. We then 
worked with those Senators last evening to develop followup questions, 
which were also answered last night. The responses to both sets of 
questions confirm the committee's view that Admiral Mauz took 
appropriate action with respect to the issue of sexual harassment 
against Lieutenant Simmons, and that he had no involvement in the 
proceedings against Senior Chief Taylor.
  I think one thing that has come to the attention of the committee 
since Monday--I do not know whether our colleagues have focused on 
this, demonstrates to some degree what we are having to deal with here. 
After debate concluded on Monday, the committee received a copy of a 
``Dear Senator'' letter from the Government accountability project 
which apparently was distributed to all Senators. This letter, dated 
September 9, 1994, concerns a new issue, an entirely new issue--I have 
not discussed this at all with the Senator from Washington--involving 
Admiral Mauz. The letter from the Government accountability project 
encloses excerpts from an investigation into inappropriate racial and 
ethnic remarks from a naval commander not under Admiral Mauz's direct 
supervision--under his overall command but not his direct supervision--
who was the commanding officer of an air antisubmarine squadron, a 
subordinate command in the Atlantic Fleet.
  The investigation substantiated that the remarks were made. The 
officer retired. The individual who submitted the complaint had an 
adverse performance evaluation removed from the file.
  The letter from the Government accountability project attempts to tie 
Admiral Mauz to this matter by asserting,

       Admiral Mauz took no action to discipline Commander Brower. 
     Admiral Mauz allowed Commander Brower to retire honorably, 
     without any disciplinary action, at full pay and benefits. * 
     * * Admiral Mauz' turning a blind eye toward racial 
     harassment is demonstrative of a larger pattern.

  This is from the Government accountability project. That sounds 
pretty bad. It sounds like Admiral Mauz personally condoned racial 
harassment. The facts do not support such a conclusion.
  I come back to the fact we have to distinguish between allegations 
and facts, and that is always an important distinction. Navy Secretary 
Dalton, after we submitted that letter, as we did on others to him, 
advised the committee that the matter--this matter, on the racial 
improprieties--was handled entirely through inspector general channels 
and by a subordinate command. The matter never came to the attention of 
Admiral Mauz.
  There was no requirement in regulation or practice for it to be 
brought to his attention. The Government accountability project asked 
us to hold Admiral Mauz accountable for the manner in which a 
subordinate unit handled a disciplinary matter, a matter which he never 
knew about, never came to his attention.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Government 
accountability project and the response to these issues from Secretary 
Dalton be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the fact this incident did not come to 
Admiral Mauz' attention should come as no surprise. As Secretary Dalton 
notes in his letter, there were three levels of command between him and 
the command where the incident took place. These matters are not 
handled by the four-star top people, they are handled at a lower level. 
As the commander in chief of the Atlantic Command, Admiral Mauz has 
under his command 224 ships, 1,480 aircraft, 27 bases, 12,000 military 
officers, 125,000 enlisted personnel, 10,000 DOD civilians. How many of 
us in our office with 50 or 60 people look into every allegation 
against anybody in our office by another person?
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. NUNN. I say zero, until it gets to a level we have to review it 
because it has not been able to be solved at a lower level. We are 
responsible to set the climate. We are responsible for fairness, 
equity, and justice in our office. We are responsible in the final 
review when matters are not settled at a lower level. But if we were 
responsible for every personnel dispute in an office of 50 or 60 and we 
sat there and looked at them all day long, which we would do, we would 
never get to the floor of the Senate, probably never get to a committee 
meeting.
  Admiral Mauz had 125,000 enlisted people and 10,000 DOD civilians 
under his command. He also is doing things that some people in this 
country might think are significant: Supporting the Haiti embargo, the 
war on drugs, Cuban migration operations, providing forces for possible 
Haitian contingency, and providing forces for deployment to the 
Mediterranean and Central Command areas. I am just saying, Mr. 
President, and I will yield to my friend from Arizona----
  Mr. McCAIN. Just for a question.
  Mr. NUNN. We have to put this in perspective. There are thousands of 
personnel actions taken everyday with respect to members of the Armed 
Forces. Although our forces are the best trained and best disciplined 
in history, there are still many disciplinary problems, and there 
always will be and always have been in the history of the military 
forces. Military commanders convene over 9,000 courts-martial per year. 
They administer over 80,000 nonjudicial punishments. The responsibility 
for disciplinary action is exercised primarily by subordinate 
commanders, not by fleet commanders-in-chief.
  I yield to my friend for a question.
  Mr. McCAIN. I would like to ask a question of the Senator from 
Georgia. I heard and I believe the Senator from Washington said the 
U.S. Senate is in the chain of command. I do not know if the Senator 
from Georgia heard that.
  Mr. NUNN. I did not hear that. What I interpreted was the Senator was 
saying overall responsibility. I do not know whether she used the words 
``chain of command.''
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Washington obviously does not understand 
the meaning of ``chain of command.'' The chain of command is clear. I 
think she should be provided with what the chain of command is: It 
flows from the Commander in Chief, who is the President of the United 
States, and the fact is when the Senator from Washington does not even 
know what chain of command means, it gives some damage to the 
credibility of her argument.
  Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield to my colleague, the Senator from Washington, for a 
question or brief observation. I want to retain my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields for a question.
  Mrs. MURRAY. First of all, I inform my colleague from Arizona, I am 
capable of answering a question.
  In response to your question, I am talking about responsibility, and 
I believe strongly we are in the chain of command in terms of 
responsibility: Responsible to our constituents who we serve and 
responsibility to the members of the armed services when they have 
legitimate complaints.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my point is, to hold our commanders in chief 
in the field responsible for each disciplinary proceeding undertaken by 
their subordinate commanders would set an impossible standard. It is 
impossible. Anybody looking at it would know it is impossible.
  The latest communication from the Government accountability project 
is helpful in putting the issues surrounding Admiral Mauz in 
perspective. Allegations of misconduct are easily made, but before we 
adopt those allegations as fact, we need to think carefully. We must 
hold our military officers to a high standard. We must ensure 
allegations are investigated. Some are substantiated. Many are not.
  Reading the latest letter from the Government accountability project, 
one would think Admiral Mauz was involved in the investigation, the 
review, and condoning improper racial remarks, but the facts are he was 
not.
  Likewise, there was no evidence--no evidence--that he was involved in 
a reprisal against Senior Chief Taylor. We have to rely on the Navy to 
investigate these matters. We cannot become, in our committee, a 
factual arbiter trying to determine the facts in each case. If we do, 
we will never be able to perform our duties. That is, basically, an 
administrative or judicial function. The legislative bodies have 
investigating subcommittees. I head one and I know. I know something 
about what it takes to investigate in terms of the facts. You have to 
put people under oath. You have to swear them in. You have to have 
depositions, witnesses, you have to know what is happening in each 
case. You have to look at all the data so you can cross-examine.
  This is not a normal function for a committee. Every now and then you 
get into it. The Judiciary Committee has gotten into it a couple of 
times when they, I am sure, would have preferred not to. Sometimes it 
happens. When it does, you better recognize and you better get yourself 
some investigators and investigative staff. You better put on your 
judicial outfits because it is a different kind of hearing.
  You are trying to decide who is telling the truth in various 
situations. That is something we cannot do on nominations unless the 
executive branch has demonstrated they cannot handle it themselves. In 
those cases, sometimes we have to do it. But if it becomes the rule 
rather than the rare exception, then we are going to change the 
fundamental nature of the nomination process.
  With respect to Lieutenant Simmons--and that is the focus, I know, of 
some very legitimate concern here on the floor--the evidence is that 
when the matter was brought to Admiral Mauz' attention, he took 
reasonable actions to monitor the investigation and he took reasonable 
actions to monitor the actions of subordinate commanders. He did not 
simply delegate this matter to subordinate command. He gave it his 
personal attention.
  The direct involvement of his personal assistant for women's affairs, 
Comdr. Cathleen Miller, led to the prompt removal of the offending 
officer from Lieutenant Simmons' ship. Admiral Mauz personally 
intervened two times with the Chief of Naval Personnel to ensure 
Lieutenant Simmons was retained on active duty. She was a Reserve 
officer. He took that action twice. Through Commander Miller, his aide, 
he ensured that Lieutenant Simmons had an opportunity to communicate 
directly with his office throughout the conduct and review of this 
investigation.
  He implemented a series of specific training and policy actions to 
combat sexual harassment. Some may argue he should have done more. Some 
may argue that. I do not agree. But it simply cannot be argued with any 
factual basis that Admiral Mauz turned a blind eye toward sexual 
harassment. The facts do not support that.
  Mr. President, turning briefly to the motion. The motion is, as I 
understand the motion that has been made that we will vote on, is that 
the nomination of Henry J. Mauz, Jr., to retire in grade, be 
recommitted to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to 
hold a public hearing on the nomination and not report the nomination 
back to the Senate until the committee holds the hearing.
  The first observation I would make is to ask my colleagues, do we 
really want to have public hearings on these kind of matters? Do we 
want Admiral Mauz, who has served 35 years in his career, to come up 
when the committee by 22 to 0 has already reported that there is not a 
factual basis because the Navy has found there is not a factual basis--
and we have relied on the Navy in the factual matters here--do we want 
to have a committee have the allegations come up and all be made again 
against Admiral Mauz and have him come up, pull him out of the Atlantic 
and say, ``Come up and answer these things again. We have gone through 
this for 2\1/2\ months. We have your answers and the Navy's answers, 
but we want to do this in the public.'' Do we really want to do that?
  I do not think we do. With respect to Lieutenant Simmons--she was a 
victim in this case, there is no doubt about that. She was a victim. 
She was mistreated. The people who mistreated her were dealt with. 
Maybe not as severely, maybe not as promptly as should have been done, 
but they were dealt with. They were dealt with. Admiral Mauz was not 
responsible for her victimization. He did what he could when it came to 
his attention to deal with it. Do we want her to come up? Do we want 
the doctor to come up who the Navy now tells us--the doctor who 
confined her--that he did not know about the sexual harassment charges?
  Admiral Mauz did not know about the confinement. The doctor who 
confined her did not know she had brought sexual harassment charges. Do 
we want to have a public hearing? Do we really want to do that 
concerning Lieutenant Simmons and her private medical matters?
  The committee made no judgment on any of that. We did not think it 
was necessary to make any judgment on her medical condition because she 
was an innocent victim. That would come up in terms of a defendant 
saying that she had some alleged medical problem. That would be a 
defense argument. She was the innocent victim from our point of view. 
She does not, in my opinion, deserve to be called up before the Senate. 
She testified before the House on the general issue of sexual 
harassment. I do not think her medical record was put into play there.
  This is a matter of privacy. If she comes up and if the allegation is 
that Admiral Mauz was somehow behind the doctor's confinement of her 
for 3 or 4 days in some type of psychiatric environment, then her 
medical record has to be put in play and the doctor who made that 
decision is going to have to be brought up.
  We are not talking about a day's hearing. We are talking about weeks. 
We are talking about weeks. I do not think we could finish this kind of 
hearing in any kind of responsible way in the next 2 or 3 or 4 weeks. I 
think the only responsible way to do an investigation the way this 
resolution envisions it is to take depositions. We have to know what is 
public and what is private. I do not want to be responsible, as the 
chairman of the committee, to have a doctor come up and talk about why 
he confined a patient without knowing in advance of what exactly he is 
going to say.
  This means we have to take depositions. That is the only responsible 
way to do it. That is the way I run an investigative committee. We do 
not bring up witnesses without advance preparation. We do not bring 
people in to make allegations that we are not familiar with. We do not 
want to become a forum for people to take potshots at anyone else in a 
free publicity forum so that, without investigating in advance, we 
bring up a witness who can make any kind of charge. Those things have 
to be done in advance with affidavits and depositions.
  My staff right here, with all the things going on in the world, some 
of my key people have spent the last 6 days not doing anything but 
working on nominations--not just this one, but this has been one of the 
main ones.
  Mr. President, there are responsible ways to have hearings. I think 
the Senate of the United States learned it is difficult to have a 
factual kind of dispute before the Senate of the United States in a 
committee. The Judiciary Committee found that out in the Anita Hill 
case. You have to know when to go into a private hearing. You have to 
know when matters go into the personal reputation of individuals which, 
in accordance with the Senate rules, allow closed hearings.
  Closed hearings, under the Senate rules, are hearings where the 
committee has the authority to make a determination--and I think 
responsibility--``when matters will tend to charge an individual with 
crime or misconduct or disgrace or injure the professional standing of 
an individual or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt 
or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an 
individual.''
  Mr. President, if we have hearings on this matter, I can assure you 
that we are going to have to do it correctly. If we have hearings on 
the matter, we are not going to go in and just bring up witnesses. You 
have to have some idea of where you are going in a hearing and what has 
to be closed and what gets into invasion of privacy. The very people 
who are basically being addressed here in terms of concern could end up 
being the very people who have their own rights of privacy violated.
  Mr. President, there is a lot more to this than people might think. 
There are all sorts of other reasons why I differ with this motion. I 
disagree with the suggestion that the committee did not do everything 
we were supposed to do and can do in this case. We have spent 3 months 
on it.
  The committee adhered to our well-established procedures to ensure 
appropriate review of the allegations concerning Admiral Mauz by both 
the Department of Defense and the committee. The Navy provided detailed 
responses to the allegations concerning Admiral Mauz. With respect to 
the allegations concerning Lieutenant Simmons, the Navy concluded: 
``Admiral Mauz did not suppress the evidence of any inquiry, did not 
fail to take corrective action on behalf of Liuetenant Simmons, nor did 
he fail to follow proper procedures in inquiring into allegations.'' 
With respect to the allegations concerning Senior Chief Taylor, the 
Navy concluded: ``There is simply no basis whatsoever for any claim 
that Admiral Mauz took a personal interest in the case involving Senior 
Chief Taylor.'' The material provided by the Navy cites detailed, 
specific facts in support of these conclusions.
  The committee in this case relied on the procedures it has used in 
the past, both with respect to nominations that have been recommended 
for approval and nominations that have been rejected. There has been no 
showing that the circumstances of the Mauz nomination require the use 
of different procedures.
  We have answered or gotten answers to every question that has been 
asked. To bring Admiral Mauz back in here now and to put him up on the 
witness stand in front of the committee in public and have him 
basically again have to go over everything and all these allegations, 
when we already have gotten answers to each allegation, just does not 
make any sense.
  Mr. President, I will not belabor the point. There are other people 
who want to speak on this matter. I would just conclude by saying that 
I think it would be unfair to Admiral Mauz, as well as others, to have 
such a proceeding. He has served his country faithfully and with 
distinction for over 35 years, including combat services in Vietnam, as 
well as in key operational roles in the Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf. He continues to serve as Commander in Chief of the Atlantic 
Fleet. He has been there when America needed him over the years, and he 
is right there now when America needs him.
  His service has not been perfect or without fault. I doubt if there 
are many officers or many of us who have served without fault. In his 
case, his lack of perfection was demonstrated by the counseling he 
received in connection with travel to the Bermuda Naval Air Station. In 
my judgment, however, that lapse in judgment pales in significance when 
compared to his 35 years of outstanding service. His retirement should 
be a time to honor his service, while certainly looking at any 
allegations against him, which we have done.
  A public hearing on this nomination, regardless of the result, I 
think would be a very bitter and undeserved end to that career. In my 
judgment, a public hearing at this time on allegations which have been 
found to be unsubstantiated in accordance with the committee's standard 
procedures would be inappropriate.
  So I oppose the motion on the nomination. I wish to also include in 
the Record Secretary of Defense Bill Perry's letter to the committee 
dated September 12. Secretary Perry, speaking for the Clinton 
administration, stated:

        Admiral Mauz has served his nation for over 35 years. His 
     proven record of exemplary service has * * * clearly earned 
     the honor of retirement with four stars.

  Secretary Perry added:

       Admiral Mauz's relief has been confirmed by the full Senate 
     and is ready to assume command. The operational demands of 
     the Atlantic Fleet area of responsibility make it essential 
     that we proceed with a smooth and timely transition. I 
     strongly endorse the administration's and the committee's 
     recommendation that Admiral Mauz be confirmed to retire in 
     his four star grade and request expeditious Senate action.

  Mr. President, this is not simply the Navy supporting Admiral Mauz. 
This is also the Secretary of Defense. Now, I am the first one to say, 
when the military is wrong, when the Navy is wrong, when the Secretary 
of Defense makes errors, this committee has a responsibility to correct 
them. We have no information that would lead us to conclude that the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Chief of Naval 
Operations have made errors. We have no indication of that. In another 
case we do have indications they made errors, the Glosson case. We sent 
it back for another whole review with an independent panel. We did not 
try to resolve all that factual dispute ourselves. We sent it back over 
to the Department of Defense because we did not think they had done an 
adequate job and asked them to have an independent panel.
  In this case, there is no indication that the Navy or that the 
Secretary of Defense or others in the responsible overall command did 
not do a thorough job of investigating each of these allegations, and I 
hope that our colleagues will agree that this nomination should be 
approved and approved today.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: It is my understanding that the 
     retirement in grade confirmation of Admiral Henry H. Mauz, 
     Jr. will be debated and voted on by the full Senate some time 
     this week.
       Admiral Mauz has served his nation for over thirty-five 
     years. His proven record of exemplary service has included 
     combat and positions of significant responsibility. Notably, 
     Admiral Mauz commanded River Patrol Boats during the war in 
     Vietnam, commanded USS AMERICA Battle Group in 1986 during 
     the air strikes against terrorist related targets in Libya, 
     served as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command during 
     Operation Desert Shield, and, as Commander in Chief, U.S. 
     Atlantic Fleet, has been responsible for operations ranging 
     from the Arctic North to South America, including Haiti, Cuba 
     and the War on Drugs. Admiral Mauz has clearly earned the 
     honor of retirement with four starts.
       This nomination was sent to the Senate four months ago and 
     was cleared by the Armed Services Committee last month by a 
     unanimous vote. Recently, a recorded vote on the confirmation 
     was requested because of the allegations raised by two Navy 
     servicemembers. These cases were exhaustively addressed by 
     the Department of the Navy prior to submission of the 
     confirmation, and the specific subsequent allegations were 
     investigated in response to several queries from the 
     Committee. After its own thorough investigation, the 
     Committee concluded that these allegations were 
     unsubstantiated.
       The Administration believes that the Committee has 
     conducted a thorough and impartial investigation of this 
     matter and agrees with the Committee's conclusions that 
     further inquiry is simply not warranted.
       As you know, Admiral Mauz's relief has been confirmed by 
     the full Senate and is ready to assume command. The 
     operational demands of the Atlantic Fleet are of 
     responsibility make it essential that we proceed with a 
     smooth and timely transition. I strongly endorse the 
     Administration's and the Committee's recommendation that 
     Admiral Mauz be confirmed to retire in his four star grade 
     and request expeditious Senate action.
       I have sent a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.

                               Exhibit 1

                                         Government Accountability


                                     Project, National Office,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 1994.
       Dear Senator: The Government Accountability Project 
     (G.A.P.) is a non-profit, whistleblower protection 
     organization. G.A.P. is gravely concerned about the pending 
     retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz at the four-star level. 
     Admiral Mauz has repeatedly failed to discipline officers in 
     his command who have been found guilty of racial, sexual and 
     whistleblower harassment.
       Attached is documentation of Admiral Mauz's failure to hold 
     an officer in his command accountable for an outrageous 
     pattern of racial harassment and discrimination. The case 
     involves Petty Officer Steven Barr, a 17-year veteran of the 
     U.S. Navy with an unblemished record. Although the Navy did 
     remove a retaliatory adverse performance evaluation from 
     Petty Officer Barr's record, the Navy's statement that, 
     ``Appropriate corrective action has been taken'' is 
     incorrect. Admiral Mauz took no action to discipline 
     Commander Brower. Admiral Mauz allowed Commander Brower to 
     retire honorably, without any disciplinary action, at full 
     pay and benefits.
       Please read these excepts from the Navy's investigation 
     into Commander Brower's record of racial harassment and 
     decide if Admiral Mauz did the right thing.
       Admiral Mauz's turning a blind eye toward racial harassment 
     is demonstrative of a larger pattern. As G.A.P. has informed 
     the Senate, Admiral Mauz has a history of failing to hold 
     officers accountable for their actions of sexual and 
     whistleblower harassment:
       Lieutenant Darlene Simmons was sexually harassed aboard the 
     U.S.S. Canopus in 1992. Despite her requests for relief that 
     she filed up the chain of command--all the way to Admiral 
     Mauz--she was forced to endure a retaliatory psychiatric 
     lock-up and remained under her harasser's command for weeks. 
     Although Simmons was ultimately vindicated and received a 
     letter of apology from the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral 
     Mauz failed to punish the officers responsible.
       Senior Chief George Randell Taylor blew the whistle on the 
     improper use of Naval Air Station Bermuda as a resort for 
     high-level Navy officers and specifically implicated Admiral 
     Mauz. Since his transfer to Port Hueneme, California, Taylor 
     has been a target for harassment that includes being charged 
     with forty-eight counts of dereliction of duty. Although 
     Taylor has been cleared of any wrongdoing, G.A.P. has 
     evidence that Admiral Mauz has directly and improperly 
     interfered in Taylor's case.
       These cases demonstrate that Admiral Mauz has repeatedly 
     condoned violations of the law and naval regulations by 
     officers in his command. Unfortunately, the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee has never held a hearing concerning 
     Admiral Mauz's record. His lack of respect for the law--and 
     sailors who report violations--offers ample justification for 
     the Senate to deny the high honor of four-star retirement.
       Thank you for your consideration. Further documentation of 
     the cases involving Petty Officer Barr, Lieutenant Darlene 
     Simmons and Senior Chief Taylor are available upon request. 
     Please contact Jeff Ruch or Christy Law at G.A.P. if we may 
     be of further service.
                                  ____


       Defense/Navy Hotline Completion Report as of 3 August 1992

       1. Name of Official Conducting the Investigation;
       2. Rank and Grade of Official;
       3. Duty Position and Contact Telephone Number of Official;
       4. Organization of Official;
       5. Hotline Control Number: DOD Hotline 920483
       6. Scope of Examination, Conclusions, and Recommendations:
       a. An unidentified caller made allegations concerning 
     racial statements made by Commander Michael R. Brower, USN, 
     Commanding Officer, Air Anti-Submarine Squadron Two Two (VS-
     22). The source alleged that Commander Brower made racial 
     statements such as the following:
       ``Black personnel should be concerned about drugs because 
     all blacks do drugs and sooner or later they will be wiped 
     off the planet.''
       In conjunction with the Dr. Martin Luther King holiday 
     during which the squadron was in a working status, ``I do not 
     have any blacks in VS-22, just sailors.''
       ``I am the White Knight of this squadron.''
       ``Drugs came to this country from black musicians who 
     performed overseas and brought drugs back to us.''
       While talking to a junior officer who said he may have the 
     HIV virus, ``I will make you a tall black basketball player, 
     then you can have AIDS.''
       Routinely telling black personnel, ``You are a credit to 
     your race,'' or if a black service member came to mast, ``You 
     are a disgrace to your race.''
       Used the term ``nigger''.
       During a meeting of first class petty officers at which a 
     report that a black airman had allegedly stolen a car was 
     mentioned, ``Black petty officers should hold their heads 
     down because it does not look good on you that a black person 
     stole.''
       ``I am now your Great White Father.''
       ``Blacks are more likely to do drugs than anyone else.''
       b. It was alleged that Commander Brower ordered certain 
     personnel to go to schools to talk about Black History Month 
     because Commander Brower knew he was in trouble.
       c. It was alleged that Commander Brower was unfair towards 
     * * *
       d. AMH1 Steven A. Barr, USN, alleged unfair treatment as a 
     result of a special adverse evaluation and withdrawal of AMHC 
     recommendation resulting from his inability to complete 
     Enlisted Aviation Warfare Specialist (EAWS) qualifications 
     within Commander Brower's time-frame.
       e. An investigation of each allegation was completed. The 
     investigation consisted of review of available documents as 
     well as personal interviews with 35 squadron personnel. The 
     persons interviewed included individuals of all ethnic 
     backgrounds.
       h. Findings as to allegations that racial statements were 
     made.
       (1) A substantial number of the personnel interviewed 
     indicated they heard Commander Brower say some of the alleged 
     statements in some form. Additionally, some interviewees 
     reported hearing Commander Brower make the following 
     additional statements:
       (a) Refer to various squadron members as a ``fat nigger'', 
     ``black nigger'', and ``jew boy.''
       (b) ``Catholics are fish-eaters. Non-catholics are 
     pagans.''
       (2) Various motivations were attributed to these 
     statements. Some personnel believe Commander Brower to be a 
     racist, others believed he was trying so hard not to be a 
     racist that he wound up sounding like one.
       (3) There was a climate within the command that allowed a 
     perception that racism existed. Interviewees reported that 
     other people, particularly * * * used terms like ``nigger'' 
     and ``blue gums'' without any adverse consequences.
       i. Findings as to the allegation that AMH1 Barr was given 
     an unwarranted adverse evaluation.
       k. Additional findings:
       (1) Commander Brower's Change of Command was 22 April 1992. 
     He is presently under training for ultimate assignment as the 
     Air Department Head on board USS CONSTELLATION homeported in 
     San Diego, California.
       (2) * * *A number of enlisted personnel stated that they 
     were embarrassed during the endless ``dressing down'' of 
     junior officers that occurred in their presence. Several 
     enlisted personnel stated he would turn to them and say, ``I 
     eat officers for breakfast.'' Junior officers were afraid to 
     bring anything controversial up the chain of command. 
     Feelings of racial disharmony would not be discussed up the 
     chain of command. This further alienated enlisted personnel.
       (3) Commander Brower has submitted a Letter of Retirement 
     to be effective June 1993.
                                  ____

                                           Department of the Navy,


                                      Naval Inspector General,

                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 1993.
     AMH1 Steven Barr, USN,
     Jacksonville, FL.
       Dear Petty Officer Barr: I am responding to your complaint 
     of reprisal and inappropriate racial behavior on the part of 
     Commander Brower, your former Commanding Officer at VS-22.
       An investigation conducted at my request by the Commander 
     in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, found your allegations to be 
     substantiated. Appropriate corrective action has been taken. 
     Additionally, I have been informed that the adverse 
     performance evaluation that was drafted by CDR Brower was 
     never issued to you. My staff confirmed with BUPERS that the 
     performance evaluation was not submitted; however, there is 
     no record of a performance report for that same period of 
     time (1 Dec 91-3 Apr 92). I would appreciate it if you would 
     provide my office with a copy of the evaluation you 
     eventually received for the time in question.
       Pursuant to DOD Directive 7050.6, I have enclosed a 
     redacted copy of the report of investigation for your 
     information and retention. Be assured that the Navy will not 
     tolerate such improper behavior on the part of commanding 
     officers, nor will it allow any type of reprisal against 
     sailors reporting the improper behavior.
       Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.
           Sincerely,
                                                      D.M. Bennett
                                  ____



                                    The Secretary of the Navy,

                                Washington, DC,September 13, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding at the request of your 
     Committee to the Government Accountability project letter of 
     September 9, 1994 which raises allegations regarding Admiral 
     Mauz's involvement in the case of Petty Officer Steven Barr. 
     Petty Officer Barr initiated this case with a call to the 
     Naval Inspector General on April 10, 1992. Admiral Mauz 
     assumed command of the Atlantic Fleet on July 13, 1992.
       Petty Officer Barr's complaint to the Naval Inspector 
     General concerned racially insensitive comments made by his 
     then-Commanding Officer of Air Anti-Submarine Squadron Twenty 
     Two (VS 22), Commander Brower. The Naval Inspector General 
     assigned the investigation to the Atlantic Fleet Inspector 
     General who, in turn, assigned the investigation to 
     Commander, Strike-fighter Wings, Atlantic 
     (COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT), the first flag officer in the chain 
     of command.
       The investigation was completed on August 3, 1992 and 
     forwarded via the chain of command to the Naval IG by 
     Commander, Strike-Fighter Wings, Atlantic on August 10, 1992. 
     In enclosure (1), COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT concluded that some of 
     the statements alleged to have been made by Petty Officer 
     Barr's commanding officer were substantiated. 
     COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT personally counselled Commander Brower 
     on August 6, 1992 regarding ``. . . his unacceptable use of 
     language and his insensitivity to the creation of a command 
     environment unquestionably supportive of equal opportunity . 
     . . .''
       The results of the investigation were forwarded by 
     enclosures (2) and (3) to the Naval Inspector General. The 
     Naval IG approved the results of the investigation involving 
     the actions taken against Commander Brower, closed the case 
     and informed Petty Officer Barr of the results. As noted by 
     the informed Petty Officer Barr of the results. As noted by 
     the CINCLANTFLT IG in enclosure (3), Commander Brower was no 
     longer in command and had submitted a Letter of Retirement, 
     on April 22, 1992, to be effective June 1993. Commander 
     Brower's change of command was also on April 22, 1992, 12 
     days after Petty Officer Barr's complaint to the Naval IG.
       This case was appropriately addressed by the Naval 
     Inspector General and the chain of command. There were three 
     levels of command between CINCLANTFLT and the Commanding 
     Officer of VS 22. Admiral Mauz had no personal involvement 
     with this case and acted appropriately in relying on officers 
     and flag officers within his chain of command to resolve the 
     matter. It is important to note that the Naval Inspector 
     General letter of July 30, 1993 (included in the GAP letter) 
     advised Petty Officer Barr of the results of the 
     investigation. Petty Officer Barr has never expressed concern 
     or dissatisfaction of the Naval IG with the results or the 
     outcome of the investigation.
       In sum, after reviewing the allegations raised by the 
     Government Accountability Project and the Navy's actions, I 
     am satisfied that Admiral Mauz had no personal involvement 
     with this case and that it was handled by the Naval Inspector 
     General and the chain of command.
       I have sent a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John H. Dalton.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that correspondence 
concerning the Mauz nomination be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the Congressional Record, Sept. 12, 1994]


                            Government Accountability Project,

                                    Washington, DC, July 11, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Russell Senate 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: On behalf of the Government 
     Accountability Project (GAP) I am writing to bring 
     information to the attention of your committee bearing on the 
     merits of the retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz at the ``four 
     star'' level.
       GAP is a non-partisan, non-profit whistleblower protection 
     organization. GAP provides legal representation and other 
     support services to workers both within and outside federal 
     service. Two of our clients, Senior Chief Master-at-Arms 
     George R. Taylor and Lt. Darlene S. Simmons, JAGC, USNR, have 
     had direct, recent experiences with Admiral Mauz and their 
     letters are attached for your consideration [Attachments 1 
     and 2].
       As Senior Chief Taylor's letter indicates, Admiral Mauz 
     misused government facilities and property at the Bermuda 
     Naval Air Station for his and his family's personal use. When 
     these actions were brought to public attention, Admiral Mauz 
     and his staff retaliated against Taylor, stripping him of his 
     duties and attempting to prosecute him for insubordination. 
     Following his transfer to the base at Port Hueneme, 
     California, Taylor was faced with a 48-count court martial on 
     a supposedly unrelated matter. This incident was closely 
     monitored by Admiral Mauz's legal staff for the Atlantic 
     Fleet. All charges against Taylor were subsequently 
     dismissed.
       As Lt. Simmons's letter indicates, Admiral Mauz was aware 
     of sexual harassment against Lt. Simmons and the failure of 
     her command to take proper action. Admiral Mauz suppressed 
     the findings of his own command's inquiry into the issue. 
     Despite his personal involvement and knowledge of the 
     situation, Admiral Mauz failed to order any corrective action 
     to be taken on behalf of Lt. Simmons. Finally, the Vice Chief 
     of Naval Operations, Admiral S.R. Arthur, refused to accept a 
     formal complaint from Lt. Simmons alleging dereliction of 
     duty in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
     against Admiral Mauz.
       While the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Dalton, recently 
     ordered corrective action on behalf of Lt. Simmons (an 
     apology, clearing her record, a new duty station and letters 
     of censure for three officers in her former chain of command 
     [see Attachment 3]), no action was taken against any flag 
     commander who was responsible for the ongoing development of 
     this situation over several months.
       Besides reprisal for the reporting of wrongdoing, there is 
     one additional common element in these two cases--the role 
     played by the Inspector General of the Atlantic Fleet to 
     cover up the nature and extent of the underlying problems and 
     prevent any further remedial actions.
       These two cases, in our minds, bear directly on the merits 
     of the decision before your committee with respect to the 
     appropriate level of retirement grade for Admiral Mauz.
       Regardless of how this particular question is resolved, it 
     is clear that the system of accountability within the 
     military and the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, in 
     particular, are broken and in dire need of repair. GAP 
     strongly urges that a comprehensive review of these issues be 
     undertaken by the Armed Services Committee as soon as it is 
     practicable.
           Cordially,
                                                  Jeffrey P. Ruch,
                                                  Policy Director.
                                  ____



                                              Ponte Vedra, FL,

                                                     July 8, 1994.
     Senator Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Armed Services Committee, Russell Senate Office 
         Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: I am writing this letter to express my 
     concern that Admiral Henry Mauz may retire at the Four Star 
     Level, a distinction indicative of extraordinary service. I 
     request that during the deliberation process of this issue 
     the information regarding Admiral Mauz's involvement in the 
     handling of my sexual harassment case be considered. I 
     believe Admiral Mauz was (1) Derelict in his Duty through his 
     culpable inefficient and negligent handling of my case of 
     sexual harassment. (2) Admiral Mauz failed to act on my 
     report of sexual harassment, retaliation and reprisal. I 
     specifically report to you that Admiral Mauz failed to follow 
     those procedures directed by the Department of Defense and 
     the Department of the Navy. (3) Admiral Mauz in his position 
     as Commander In Chief of the Atlantic Fleet Mauz 
     intentionally allowed sexual harassment, retaliation and 
     reprisal by senior officers in my chain of command to go 
     unchecked. Admiral Mauz used his official position to protect 
     those guilty of sexual harassment and then to cover up his 
     inefficient handling of the matter.
       Admiral Mauz had knowledge in October 1992 that I was 
     sexually harassed. This harassment was substantiated by a 
     member of his staff, Commander Cathleen Miller. Admiral Mauz 
     was also aware of the failure of my chain of command to 
     handle the matter from May 1992 until October 1992. A command 
     inquiry was conducted in October 1992. This command inquiry 
     substantiated the sexual harassment which I had reported in 
     May 1992. The command inquiry also substantiated the 
     existence of a hostile environment in which I worked from May 
     1992 until October 1992. Admiral Mauz was familiar with those 
     substantiated facts and took no action.
       On December 28, 1992 I suffered reprisal for my report of 
     sexual harassment when I received an adverse fitness report. 
     I reported this retaliation and reprisal directly to the aide 
     of Admiral Mauz. I was assured on that same day that Admiral 
     Mauz was personally involved and that proper corrective 
     action would follow. I relied in good faith on these 
     assurances. My good faith reliance was not justified. Instead 
     of taking corrective action the reprisal was covered up. 
     Admiral Mauz was personally involved in this negligent 
     handling of my report of reprisal. Admiral Mauz was the 
     highest level of leadership in my chain of command.
       I then reported the failure by my entire chain of command 
     to properly handle my report of sexual harassment and 
     reprisal to the Department of Defense, Inspector General's 
     office. This report was then referred to the Navy Inspector 
     General. I believe that Admiral Mauz used his position to 
     influence the report from the Navy Inspector General's office 
     in order to protect himself because he knew that he and the 
     chain of command had failed to take appropriate action in my 
     case of sexual harassment.
       I actually swore to these facts on a charge sheet for 
     violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 92 
     by Admiral Mauz. This charge sheet and supporting memorandum 
     was returned to me without any investigation whatsoever. This 
     too was inappropriate and not in accordance with applicable 
     instructions and orders.
       I believe Admiral Mauz has perpetuated the discrimination 
     against women in the U.S. Navy with his failure to take swift 
     and tough action against sexual harassment. I believe his 
     failure to hold anyone accountable in my case of sexual 
     harassment was Dereliction of his duties. One who is derelict 
     in the performance of duty should not be rewarded for 
     extraordinary service.
           Sincerely,
                                               Darlene S. Simmons.
                                  ____

                                           Department of the Navy,


                                      Office of the Secretary,

                                     Washington, DC, May 12, 1994.
     Lt. Darlene S. Simmons, JAGC, USNR,
     Naval Legal Service Office, Naval Station, Mayport, FL.
       Dear Lieutenant Simmons: I am writing to discuss your 
     future in the U.S. Navy. Before doing so, however, I wish to 
     express my profound regret over the harassment that you 
     unfortunately experienced. No one in our Navy or Marine Corps 
     should be treated as you were. My goal is to send the message 
     to every Sailor, Marine, and civilian in our Department that 
     we are to treat others with the same respect and dignity we 
     expect ourselves.
       I believe we have made significant progress during the past 
     18 months to implement a comprehensive program aimed at 
     eliminating sexual harassment from the workforce. As you 
     know, we issued our revised policy guidance in January 1993 
     and also established an Advice and Counseling Line and an 
     Informal Resolution System. Our Department-wide Reporting and 
     Tracking System will provide us with information on formal 
     complaints, results of investigations and administrative and 
     judicial actions taken to resolve complaints. In March, we 
     released the ``Commander's Handbook,'' a single reference for 
     commanders that addresses investigation, resolution, and 
     prevention of sexual harassment. I thank you for your lessons 
     learned, which were integrated into the first edition. While 
     we have done much, I realize we still have far to go.
       After you testified, I directed my staff to thoroughly 
     review the circumstances of your case. Our review leads me to 
     conclude that: you were sexually harassed by a fellow officer 
     aboard USS CANOPUS; he retaliated against you by fostering a 
     hostile work environment and polarizing the wardroom against 
     you; the shipboard chain of command did not correct this 
     environment; and your fitness report for the period 9 
     February 1992 to 28 December 1992 was improperly handled by 
     the command.
       As a result of my review of your case, I am issuing a 
     Secretarial letter of censure to the officer who committed 
     the harassment. The Chief of Naval Operations is also taking 
     action with regard to two other officers in your former chain 
     of command who did not measure up to our standards.
       With regard to your specific situation, I recognize that 
     your harassment, and the energy required on your part to 
     address issues springing from it, impaired your ability to 
     demonstrate fully what you can contribute to the Navy. 
     Therefore, I have directed that the Navy make available to 
     you the option to transfer to a new duty station with orders 
     that you be retained on active duty until 1 September 1996. 
     This represents an additional two years beyond the date 
     currently established for your departure from active duty, 
     and will afford you the opportunity to compete again for 
     augmentation to the Regular Navy.
       I have been informed that you have applied to the Board for 
     Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) in accordance with 10 
     U.S.C. 1552 to correct any injustice in your performance 
     records. I have final authority to review the BCNR's 
     recommendation and will direct action to correct your 
     military record as necessary.
       While my actions can never wipe the slate clean, they 
     reflect my genuine desire that you have the opportunity to 
     continue to serve, if you wish. Should you nevertheless 
     decide to leave active duty on 1 September 1994, however, I 
     want you to know that you have my respect and gratitude for 
     your Navy service.
       I have directed Rear Admiral H.E. Grant, the Judge Advocate 
     General of the Navy, to meet personally with you to discuss 
     your decision.
                                                   John H. Dalton,
                                            Secretary of the Navy.
                                  ____

                                                     July 8, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: I would like to introduce myself. My 
     name is George R. Taylor. I am a Senior Chief Petty Officer 
     (E-8) currently on active duty with the U.S. Navy stationed 
     at the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port 
     Hueneme, California. Additionally, I am a whistleblower.
       Sir, In December 1992, I blew the whistle on fraud, waste, 
     and abuse concerning mismanagement at the U.S. Naval Air 
     Station Bermuda. I would like to give you a very brief 
     rundown on some of the events that transpired and are 
     continuing to unfold in regards to Admiral Henry Mauz Jr., 
     USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
       In November 1992, Admiral Mauz abused his power and 
     authority as CINCLANTFLT by traveling to NAS Bermuda along 
     with 12 other military and civilian personnel for a five day 
     vacation.
       Admiral Mauz was flown to Bermuda at government expense 
     along with the other personnel. During his time on the 
     island, his entire ``official'' visit consisted of playing 
     golf, dining in the best restaurants, and shopping. This was 
     in fact exposed on national television on ABC New's 
     ``Primetime Live'' program. I appeared on the show and 
     commented on the behavior of not only Admiral Mauz but 
     numerous flag officers within the Armed Forces who had 
     visited the beautiful island at taxpayer's expense. 
     Additionally, Senator McCain had visited the island with a 
     large group of family members and the nanny for his 
     grandchildren all at taxpayer's expense or at a reduced rate.
       As you know, this was not a popular thing for me to do. I 
     was not politically correct. Needless to say, numerous high 
     ranking officers within the Department of Defense were 
     offended. Representative Schroder made arrangements for me to 
     be transferred to NCBC Port Hueneme, CA. I was very naive, I 
     believed in the system. However, I have very little faith 
     left at this time. During the past 18 months numerous things 
     have occurred that in my opinion and the opinion of my 
     attorney have been nothing short of criminal.
       Admiral Mauz in my opinion has not only abused his power 
     but is a disgrace to the uniform of the Naval Service. He was 
     a key player in me being charged with over 48 offenses of 
     violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a supposed 
     ``unrelated to Bermuda situation''. His attorney requested 
     and received all legal documents and a brief in regards to my 
     status. All charges were dismissed by Admiral Kelley, 
     CINCPACFLT, 8 months later. Admiral Mauz took a personal 
     interest in the prosecution of a case where nothing had been 
     done wrong.
       Senator, there is no doubt that if you or I committed some 
     of the things that Admiral Mauz has, we would have been ran 
     out of town.
       As you know, the Navy has gone through a lot. However, I do 
     believe with the current leadership in the Navy things will 
     improve, but in order to correct wrongs and to ensure that 
     senior, military officers do not continue to abuse their 
     power and authority, you should take the lead in retiring 
     Admiral Mauz at a two-star level.
       You sir, are in the position to send a message to the 
     entire Armed Forces announcing that misconduct at any level 
     will not be tolerated, also that everyone in the Armed Forces 
     from E1 to O-10 will be held accountable for their actions.
       Sir, if you or your staff needs additional information feel 
     free to call me at (805) 388-3915 or my attorney, Jeff Ruch 
     at (202) 408-0034.
           Very Respectfully,
                                                George R. Taylor, 
                                                     MACS(SW) USN.
                                  ____



                                    Chief of Naval Operations,

                                                    July 27, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding to your letter of July 
     21, 1994 to the Secretary of the Navy which enclosed a letter 
     from the Government Accountability Project, concerning the 
     retirement confirmation of Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S. 
     Navy. I have reviewed the letter as well as the letters from 
     Lieutenant Darlene Simmons and Senior Chief George Taylor 
     that were included. It is my judgment that the allegations in 
     these letters are not correct. Admiral Mauz has served 
     faithfully and well in every assignment including this final 
     one as a four star officer and deserves to retire in grade.
       Before turning to these allegations, I want to state that 
     Admiral Mauz is completing a career that exceeds thirty-five 
     years of dedicated service to our Nation. He is scheduled to 
     retire and desires to do so. His relief has been confirmed 
     and is ready to assume the duties of Commander in Chief, U.S. 
     Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Mauz's plans to enter the next phase 
     of his personal and professional life are being delayed as is 
     the assumption of command by the relieving officer. Admiral 
     Mauz's performance has been outstanding throughout his career 
     including, especially including, this final tour as Commander 
     in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
       With regard to LT Simmons, Admiral Mauz did not suppress 
     the evidence of any inquiry, did not fail to take corrective 
     action on behalf of LT Simmons, nor did he fail to follow 
     proper procedures in inquiring into allegations. Further, the 
     Inspector General of the Atlantic Fleet did not cover-up the 
     nature and extent of underlying problems nor prevent 
     appropriate remedial action in the case.
       The case of LT Simmons is an involved one with several 
     complaints, overlapping in time, and inquiries that took 
     place over nearly two years. It is clear that in 1992 LT 
     Simmons was sexually harassed while stationed aboard USS 
     CANOPUS (AS-34). While serving as Legal Officer in that ship 
     she received repeated requests for dates and comments about 
     her physical appearance from another officer who was one rank 
     senior to her and with whom she worked closely in the 
     performance of her duties.
       The case was initiated at the shipboard level on 1 June 
     1992, when LT Simmons reported to the ship's Executive 
     Officer that she was being sexually harassed by another 
     officer. The allegations involved repeated requests for dates 
     and comments about her physical appearance. On 5 June 1992, 
     the officer was counseled and administrative action was 
     taken. He requested retirement from the Navy as was his 
     prerogative.
       Unfortunately--and unacceptably--an atmosphere of 
     harassment and hostility persisted, particularly as the 
     retirement of the officer involved was not effective until 
     April 1993, and he remained on duty on the ship. On 9 October 
     1992, an anonymous DOD IG hot line call and a call by LT 
     Simmons to Congresswoman Schroeder and to the then Assistant 
     Secretary of the Navy, Barbara Pope, raised the visibility of 
     this case.
       Admiral Mauz responded promptly when informed of the matter 
     as a result of these calls. To assure fairness and high-level 
     attention, he directed his Special Assistant for Women's 
     Affairs, CDR Miller, to join an investigation by COMSUBGRU 
     10. Following a briefing by Commander Miller, the offending 
     officer was moved off the ship by the Commanding Officer in 
     October 1992. The CO assembled all officers and told them 
     that LT Simmons had been sexually harassed, condemned this 
     behavior, and emphasized that any harassment would not be 
     tolerated.
       LT Simmons states in her letter that Commander Miller 
     substantiated the sexual harassment. That is true. There is 
     no question that LT Simmons was sexually harassed. As the 
     Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Mauz acted 
     promptly and appropriately. He directed the necessary actions 
     to ensure a thorough and timely response to LT Simmons's 
     allegations. The expeditious assignment of Commander Miller 
     to examine the case and ensure that LT Simmons had a direct 
     conduit to his clearly substantiates his personal concern and 
     direct involvement in investigating LT Simmons's allegations.
       Nor was this the end of Admiral Mauz's concern. In December 
     1992, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter. He personally 
     intervened with the Chief of Naval Personnel to extend LT 
     Simmons on active duty and assure her assignment to another 
     command.
       At this time also, LT Simmons complained that her transfer 
     fitness report was issued in reprisal. The Inspector General 
     investigation, completed in the spring of 1993, substantiated 
     LT Simmons's original allegations of sexual harassment and 
     also concluded the Commanding Officer of CANOPUS failed to 
     recognize the development of a hostile command climate. 
     Accordingly, the Commanding Officer was counseled by his 
     immediate superior. While the Inspector General concluded the 
     fitness report was not reprisal, the Secretary of the Navy 
     later concluded that he would review, through the Board for 
     Correction of Naval Records, any alleged injustice in her 
     military record and that LT Simmons would be given the option 
     of a new duty station with orders retaining her on active 
     duty until September 1996. The Secretary stated that his 
     decision was based on his recognition that ``* * * your [LT 
     Simmons] harassment, and the energy required on your part to 
     address issues springing from it, impaired your ability to 
     demonstrate fully what you can contribute to the Navy.'' The 
     Secretary's action in correcting the fitness report, intended 
     to provide LT Simmons with an opportunity to continue her 
     naval career, was a decision that only the Secretary is 
     empowered to make.
       On his own initiative, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter 
     for a third time in 1993. In a series of actions he 
     manifested his concern that improvements should be made in 
     handling cases of this kind. To effect change in this regard, 
     Admiral Mauz, in April of 1993, issued a policy statement for 
     the ``Prevention of Sexual Harassment'' to all Atlantic Fleet 
     activities. It addressed Department of the Navy policy and 
     the need for training in place. It tasked every manager, 
     supervisor, and employee, military and civilian, within 
     Admiral Mauz's command with the responsibility for carrying 
     out the DON policy on prevention of sexual harassment.
       In June 1993, Admiral Mauz signed a combined LANT/
     PACFLTINST 5354.1 (Equal Opportunity) that revised the 
     Command Managed Equal Opportunity program and incorporated 
     sexual harassment requirements from a new SECNAVINST.
       In September 1993, Admiral Mauz issued a PERSONAL FOR to 
     ensure each commander was cognizant of the contents of the 
     combined LANT/PAC Equal Opportunity instruction. He directed 
     each commander to review the implementation of the program, 
     including sexual harassment, in his command to ensure 
     compliance. ISIC's were directed to include this as a special 
     interest item for command inspections, and were directed to 
     utilize Equal Opportunity Program Specialists in their 
     inspections to the maximum extent possible.
       Going well beyond normal bureaucratic requirements, in 
     April 1994, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter again. To 
     assure that fleet priorities and procedures would be as good 
     as they could be, he personally conducted a training session 
     for all flag officers assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. The 
     subject was a case study in sexual harassment, and on 
     addressing it, Admiral Mauz used both information obtained 
     from the inquiry about LT Simmons case and information 
     provided by LT Simmons herself. Finally, Admiral Mauz 
     recognized that additional training was needed beyond what 
     the initial curriculum in sexual harassment provided. 
     Accordingly, he directed the development and distribution of 
     a kit to assist commanders with the investigation and 
     disposition of sexual harassment complaints. This kit formed 
     the nucleus for the newly published Navy Sexual Harassment 
     Handbook.
       In January 1994, LT Simmons forwarded allegations of 
     criminal dereliction by Admiral Mauz in the handling of her 
     case. As the facts of the case did not, in fact, justify 
     criminal charges, they were determined to be more appropriate 
     for resolution under the provisions of Article 1150, U.S. 
     Navy Regulations, Redress of Wrong Committed by a Senior, 
     than under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The 
     allegations were accordingly returned to LT Simmons by the 
     Vice Chief of Naval Operations, on advice of counsel, for 
     forwarding as a matter under Article 1150. In response, LT 
     Simmons indicated she did not desire to pursue an Article 
     1150 complaint. Nevertheless, LT Simmon's allegations were 
     referred to the Naval Inspector General. The Inspector 
     General found the allegations against Admiral Mauz to be 
     without merit. Admiral Mauz did not influence or attempt to 
     influence, the Inspector General's decision in this matter.
       With regard to Senior Chief Taylor, the allegation that 
     Admiral Mauz influenced the charges against Senior Chief 
     Taylor after Senior Chief Taylor arrived at Port Hueneme, 
     California, is without basis.
       By way of background, there were charges brought against 
     Senior Chief Taylor after he began his tour of duty in 
     California. These charges addressed irregularities in the 
     manner in which Senior Chief Taylor performed his duties. 
     Senior Chief Taylor declined to have his case heard under 
     Article 15 of the UCMJ, as was his right. As a result, 
     charges were referred to a special court-martial. After 
     charges were referred, Senior Chief Taylor's chain of command 
     in the Pacific decided it was appropriate to move the case 
     out of the Port Hueneme area to ensure an independent review 
     of the case. Accordingly, the charges were considered by a 
     Flag Officer in command in the San Diego area.
       Following a newspaper account which stated that the charges 
     against Senior Chief Taylor had been withdrawn in response to 
     allegations of retaliation for his whistle-blowing activity 
     in Bermuda, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant asked the 
     senior Staff Judge Advocate to call his counterpart at Port 
     Hueneme for additional information. A call was made and the 
     situation was clarified. The senior Staff Judge Advocate 
     verbally reported his findings to the Executive Assistant who 
     then back briefed Admiral Mauz as to the action he had taken. 
     There was no influence on the case and, in fact, the charged 
     has already been withdrawn at the time of the call.
       Subsequently, unbeknownst to either the senior Staff Judge 
     Advocate or Admiral Mauz, a junior Staff Judge Advocate 
     obtained a copy of the defense motion that was the basis for 
     withdrawal of the charges, as well as a copy of the charge 
     sheets, from a friend who was then Officer in Charge, Navy 
     Legal Service Office, Port Hueneme. The Officer in Charge 
     believed that in providing that documentation, he was 
     responding to an official request from Admiral Mauz's staff 
     and acting quite properly he informed Senior Chief Taylor's 
     military counsel of the actions he had taken to comply with 
     that request. While these documents were shared with the 
     senior Staff Judge Advocate, he did not speak of them to any 
     other staff member. Clearly, the junior staff Judge 
     Advocate's inquiry and receipt of documents did not stem from 
     Admiral Mauz. In fact, Admiral Mauz did not become aware of 
     the documents until their existence was revealed during my 
     inquiry into Senior Chief Taylor's allegation preparatory to 
     making this letter response. In this vein, Admiral Mauz's 
     statement to Navy Times on July 21, 1994, that ``I don't 
     really recall this, but I think I said ok,'' to an inquiry 
     regarding the newspaper account was not an accurate 
     recollection. In fact, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant 
     states that he, independently and without Admiral Mauz's 
     knowledge, instituted that lawyer's inquiry into the 
     newspaper article. These matters taking place after the 
     withdrawal of charges at Fort Hueneme, could not have had any 
     impact in any event.
       The San Diego commander convened an Investigation under 
     Article 32 of the UCMJ to inquire into the matter and make 
     recommendations as to the appropriate disposition. The senior 
     Judge Advocate assigned to conduct the Article 32 
     Investigation concluded there were reasonable grounds to 
     believe that four offenses should be charged, with a total of 
     seven specifications thereunder. The senior Judge Advocate 
     recommended that the charges be adjudicated under Article 15 
     of the UCMJ, but noted that should Senior Chief Taylor 
     decline Article 15, referral of the charges to special court-
     martial would be appropriate. The Commander in Chief of U.S. 
     Pacific Fleet, however, determined that the nature of charges 
     did not warrant referral to court-martial and directed 
     counseling as the appropriate remedy, thereby closing the 
     case.
       In summary, Admiral Mauz was not involved in Senior Chief 
     Taylor's case in California. He played no role in the charges 
     themselves or in the disposition of the charges.
       Senior Chief Taylor had accused Admiral Mauz of misconduct 
     with regard to Admiral Mauz's travel to Bermuda. As a result 
     of Senior Chief Taylor's allegations regarding Admiral Mauz's 
     travel to Bermuda, the Naval Inspector General conducted a 
     complete and thorough investigation. The investigation did 
     not disclose any misuse of government facilities. The 
     Inspector General determined that Admiral Mauz conducted 
     significant official business while in Bermuda, including an 
     inspection of the air station's facilities, addressing base 
     personnel at an ``All Hands'' meeting and making calls on the 
     U.S. Consul General and the Governor of Bermuda. Admiral Mauz 
     took two days of leave while in Bermuda, in compliance with 
     Navy guidelines for combining leave and official travel. The 
     Inspector General determined that the scheduling of the trip 
     created the perception of impropriety and that there was a 
     violation in the use of government drivers during the period 
     of time that Admiral Mauz was on leave, as a result of which 
     Admiral Mauz received informal written counseling.
       Admiral Mauz did not remove Senior Chief Taylor from his 
     duties or attempt to prosecute Senior Chief Taylor for 
     insubordination as a result of Senior Chief Taylor having 
     publicly accused Admiral Mauz of misconduct, as alleged by 
     Mr. Ruch of the Government Accountability Project. Senior 
     Chief Taylor originally alleged that his Commanding Officer 
     in Bermuda had taken those actions as reprisals for his 
     whistle-blowing activity in Bermuda. After a thorough 
     investigation of the facts surrounding those actions, 
     however, the DoD IG concluded that the actions were warranted 
     under the circumstances and did not constitute reprisal. In 
     fact, at the time the actions were taken, no one was aware of 
     Senior Chief Taylor's whistle-blowing activity. The 
     difficulties Senior Chief Taylor was experiencing in Bermuda 
     preceded any knowledge by naval personnel, including his 
     Commanding Officer and Admiral Mauz regarding his complaints.
       Admiral Mauz has served his Navy and Nation for over 
     thirty-five years. He has served in positions of great 
     responsibility and he has served his Nation well.
       I have discussed this letter with the Secretary of the Navy 
     and he and I are in complete agreement that Admiral Mauz 
     should be confirmed to retire in his four star grade and that 
     he should be permitted to depart his command in a timely 
     manner.
       I am, of course, prepared to provide you any additional 
     information that you or the other members of the Committee 
     may require. Thank you for your consideration. I have sent an 
     identical letter to Senator Thurmond.
           Very respectfully,
                                                      J.M. Boorda,
                                               Admiral, U.S. Navy.
                                  ____


                              Attachment 3


                            Government Accountability Project,

                                                   August 3, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: Last month my client, Senior Chief 
     Master-at-Arms George R. Taylor (USN) wrote to you concerning 
     the pending four-star retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz. In 
     his letter, Senior Chief Taylor wrote that Admiral Mauz had 
     taken ``a personal interest'' in the prosecution, that was 
     later dismissed, against Senior Chief Taylor and the members 
     of his security detachment. This personal interest raised 
     questions concerning retaliatory motive since the attempted 
     prosecution took place within the Pacific Command at a time 
     when Admiral Mauz served as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet.
       In the August 1, 1994 edition of Navy Times, Admiral Mauz 
     told reporter Patrick Pexton that Taylor's allegation was 
     ``without foundation'' and ``nonsense.'' Mauz told the 
     reporter that his staff contacted Port Hueneme authorities 
     only once and then only for the purposes of learning the 
     status of the case. In fact, Captain Joseph Baggett, the 
     legal advisor to Admiral Mauz, did contact the legal advisor 
     for the base at Port Hueneme after the withdrawal of the 48-
     count court martial against Taylor and his detachment on 
     April 9, 1994.
       Prior to Captain Baggett's call to Port Hueneme, however, 
     Lt. Noreen Hagerty-Ford, a JAG attorney on Admiral Mauz's 
     staff, contacted Lt. John Tamboer, the supervisor of Taylor's 
     military defense counsel, Lt. Carter Brod. Lt. Hagerty-Ford 
     asked Lt. Tamboer to provide her with a copy of a motion 
     filed by Lt. Brod seeking dismissal of all charges against 
     Taylor on the grounds of ``vindictive prosecution'' 
     [attached]. Lt. Tamboer refused her request, on the grounds 
     that the Atlantic Fleet had no legitimate reason to obtain 
     defense filings. Lt. Hagerty-Ford called Lt. Tamboer later 
     that same day and demanded a copy of the motion stating that 
     her call was at the personal request of Admiral Mauz. Lt. 
     Tamboer acceded to this direct request from a flag officer 
     and provided a copy of the motion to Lt. Hagerty-Ford.
       Admiral Mauz's public statements with respect to his role 
     and the role of his personal staff in the Taylor prosecution 
     do not square with the facts. The lack of candor displayed 
     here is consistent with the ``damage control'' approach to 
     high profile personnel cases Admiral Mauz has exhibited. More 
     disturbingly, these repeated contacts represent an attempt to 
     influence the prosecution of Taylor and to intimidate his 
     military defense counsel.
       As always, if you or your staff desire any further 
     information from my clients, please do not hesitate to 
     contact me.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Jeffrey P. Ruch,
                                                  Policy Director.
                                  ____


  Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Southwest Judicial Circuit, Port 
                              Hueneme, CA

       United States versus Taylor, George R., MACS/E-8, 000-00-
     0000, U.S. Navy.
       Special Court-Martial: Motion to Dismiss for Vindictive 
     Prosecution Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
       Date: 23 March 1994.
       1. Nature of Motion. This is a Motion to Dismiss for 
     Vindictive Prosecution filed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment 
     of the U.S. Constitution. This motion is filed as a direct 
     result of an unlawful decision by Commander, Naval 
     Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, to prosecute 
     MACS George R. Taylor, USN, the accused in this case.
       2. Summary of Facts.


                prior to MACS taylor's reporting at ncbc

       a. In 1992, MACS George R. Taylor, USN, held the position 
     of Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda. 
     While serving at NAS Bermuda, MACS Taylor produced evidence 
     that the air station existed as a resort for top military 
     officials at the expense of taxpayers. MACS Taylor and 
     another ``whistleblower'' were featured on the 10 December 
     1992 episode of ABC's ``Primetime Live'' (tape of which will 
     be hereinafter referred to as ``the Bermuda tape''), which 
     prompted Defense and Inspector General investigations. As a 
     result of MACS Taylor's activities, Congress voted to close 
     the Bermuda base in 1995.
       b. MACS Taylor was transferred to Naval Construction 
     Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, (hereinafter ``NCBC''), in 
     January 1993, under the protection of the Military 
     Whistleblowers Protection Act.
       c. Before MACS Taylor arrived at NCBC, members of the base 
     security department posted an article about MACS Taylor's 
     activities in Bermuda on the security department bulletin 
     board. In addition, members of the security department 
     gathered in a conference room to view the Bermuda Tape.
       d. Before MACS Taylor arrived, a file was sent to NCBC from 
     Bermuda which included a non-punitive letter of caution and 
     materials related to MACS Taylor's activities at Bermuda.
       e. Prior to MACS Taylor's arrival at NCBC, RADM David Nash, 
     USN, Commanding Officer of NCBC, requested a copy of the 
     Bermuda tape from Kari Lee Patterson, a civilian employee at 
     NCBC. Ms. Patterson delivered the tape to Mr. W.E. Hudson, 
     NCBC Security Officer, who delivered the tape to RADM Nash.


                        after reporting at ncbc

       f. Upon MACS Taylor's arrival, RADM Nash held a meeting 
     with top base officials to discuss the arrival of MACS 
     Taylor.
       g. Upon reporting on board NCBC, MACS Taylor was taken to 
     Executive Officer's Inquiry for activities in Bermuda. At the 
     XOI, Taylor was awarded the Nonpunitive Letter of Caution 
     sent from Bermuda. The charge was for disrespect to a 
     commissioned officer at Bermuda.
       h. Immediately upon arriving at NCBC, MACS Taylor was 
     directed to meet with LCDR Cole in his office. At that 
     meeting, which was attended by BMCS Kossman, LCDR Cole told 
     MACS Taylor that ``this isn't Bermuda'' and ``You aren't 
     going to get away with that s--t here'', or words to that 
     effect.
       i. In January 1993, LCDR Cole was called by Jeff Ruch, an 
     attorney with the Government Accountability Project, a public 
     interest organization which was involved with the incident in 
     Bermuda. Mr. Ruch called LCDR Cole to discuss the pending 
     Captain's Mast for Disrespect in Bermuda. After the phone 
     conversation, LCDR Cole confronted MACS Taylor, saying he had 
     just gotten a call from his ``liberal lawyers'' and ``this is 
     bulls--t,'' or words to that effect. LCDR Cole told MACS 
     Taylor that ``they're not gonna get you out of this. * * * 
     This package was sent here. We're going to adjudicate this 
     here'', or words to that effect.
       j. Approximately one month after MACS Taylor reported 
     aboard, MACS Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that one of his 
     practices was improper. LCDR Cole had, on several occasions, 
     sent sailors to the Long Beach Brig with full knowledge that 
     there would never be a court-martial. This was typically done 
     on a Friday afternoon, where the magistrate would be unable 
     to release the sailor until the following Monday. When MACS 
     Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that this practice was 
     improper, LCDR Cole became incensed, telling MACS Taylor 
     ``I'm the f---ing lawyer on this base; who made you the base 
     lawyer?'', or words to that effect.
       k. A meeting to discuss Workman's Compensation issues was 
     held in September 1993 and was attended by LCDR Cole, MACS 
     Taylor, NCBC Executive Officer, NCBC Command Master Chief, 
     and other officials. At the meeting, LCDR Cole confronted 
     MACS Taylor due to rumors he had heard about members of the 
     Special Investigations Unit, of which Taylor was a member, 
     being deputized by the federal government. MACS Taylor denied 
     ever spreading the rumor. LCDR Cole responded by admonishing 
     MACS Taylor for not addressing him as ``Sir'' when making a 
     statement.
       l. In a Memorandum dated 5 September 1993, LCDR Cole 
     requested to the Commanding Officer, NCBC, that MACS Taylor 
     be relieved of his duties. RADM Nash, however, declined to 
     carry out LCDR Cole's request.
       m. MACS Taylor has also had numerous personal 
     confrontations with Mr. W.E. Hudson, NCBC Security Officer, 
     since reporting aboard. Mr. Hudson is MACS Taylor's direct 
     superior in the Security Department.
       n. On 30 September 1993, MACS Taylor received a performance 
     evaluation which covered the period since MACS Taylor's 
     arrival on board NCBC and was signed by RADM Nash. Taylor 
     received straight 4.0 evaluations on this evaluation. There 
     was no mention whatsoever of any problems with MACS Taylor's 
     performance. MACS Taylor was described as having ``great 
     depth of professional knowledge'' and a ``keen sense of 
     responsibility''. He was praised for ``drafting and immediate 
     implementation of the department's quality-focused Standard 
     Operating Procedures.'' He was also praised for conducting a 
     special task force to curtail the flow of drugs onto the base 
     and for assisting civilian police in drug operations.


                           16 november arrest

       o. On 16 November 1993, MACS Taylor participated in the 
     arrest of CE3 Richard Miller, USN, a deserter who had escaped 
     from the Long Beach Brig. There were three other NCBC police 
     officers at the scene. The arrest took place in the City of 
     Oxnard with the participation of the Oxnard Police. No 
     complaints were made by any persons involved in the arrest. 
     Officers Ernie Eglin and L.E. Robertson of Oxnard Police 
     executed the arrest and believe that MACS Taylor acted 
     entirely properly.
       p. On 17 November 1993, Mr. Hudson called MACS Taylor into 
     his office and accused him of acting improperly during the 
     previous night's arrest. Mr. Hudson then discussed with MACS 
     Taylor the possibility of an early retirement for MACS 
     Taylor.
       q. On 18 November 1993, Mr. Hudson met with LCDR Cole to 
     discuss this situation. At this meeting, the two men agreed 
     to have Naval Investigative Service investigate MACS Taylor's 
     activities on the night of the arrest.
       r. On 22 November 1993, Mr. Hudson informed MACS Taylor 
     that he planned to have NIS investigate the arrest.
       s. Pursuant to advice from military defense attorneys, MACS 
     Taylor and each of the other three officers consistently 
     invoked his right to remain silent during the investigation.
       t. On 3 January 1994, MACS Taylor was given a Report Chit 
     citing one specification of violation of Article 92 related 
     to the arrest of CE3 Miller. LCDR Cole's signature appears on 
     the Chit for ``person submitting report''. Along with the 
     Report Chit, MACS Taylor received formal notification of 
     contemplated Nonjudicial Punishment.
       u. On numerous occasions after the Report Chit was drafted, 
     LCDR Cole attempted to persuade MACS Taylor and the other 
     three NCBC officers involved to answer questions about the 
     arrest. On or about 3 January 1994, LCDR Cole informed MACS 
     Taylor that the Incident Complaint Report for the incident in 
     question had never been received, and he gave MACS Taylor a 
     direct order to write a report describing what happened on 
     the night in question. MACS Taylor has consistently 
     maintained that he submitted the report immediately after the 
     arrest. Pursuant to advice from LT Carter F. Brod, JAGC, 
     USNR, Defense Counsel, MACS Taylor nevertheless prepared a 
     new report to avoid violating a direct order.
       v. When discussing with MACS Taylor his potential Captain's 
     Mast, LCDR Cole ordered MACS Taylor to sit locked at 
     attention. LCDR Cole told MACS Taylor that he would ``add 
     twenty more f--king charges'' if Taylor refused Captain's 
     Mast.
       w. On or about 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole called LT Brod and 
     asked LT Brod to give MACS Taylor pre-Mast advice. LCDR Cole 
     told LT Brod that MACS Taylor was being really stupid in his 
     attitude and that if he did not accept Mast then they were 
     going to ``throw the book at him.'' LCDR Cole told LT Brod 
     that, if MACS Taylor refused Mast, ``we have lots of other 
     stuff on him to use which we will throw on there'', or words 
     to that effect.
       x. On 10 January 1994, MACS Taylor refused Nonjudicial 
     Punishment.
       y. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts to persuade the 
     other three NCBC officers to discuss the details of the 
     arrest. On 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole told LT Brod in a 
     telephone conversation that ``the command is unlikely to 
     dismiss the charges against Senior Chief Taylor but would 
     probably dismiss on the others if they opened up.''
       z. In a telephone conversation with civilian police 
     lieutenant Byron Frank, which lasted over one hour, LCDR Cole 
     told Lt. Frank that ``if you all had just cooperated with the 
     NIS investigation, then you would have just gotten a slap on 
     the wrist'', or words to that effect. LCDR Cole stated that 
     ``Senior Chief Taylor is manipulating the other three 
     officers. I feel really sorry for them'', or words to that 
     effect. LCDR Cole stated that ``ABC bailed his a-- out in 
     Bermuda. They won't come to his rescue now'', or words to 
     that effect. LCDR Cole asked Lt. Frank, who was also an 
     African-American, ``why won't you just tell me what happened? 
     I'm the smartest black attorney in the JAG Corps. Let's just 
     talk brother to brother'', or words to that effect.
       aa. On 21 January 1994, 48 specifications of UCMJ 
     violations were preferred against MACS Taylor. Many of the 
     specifications related to the 16 November arrest, but 16 of 
     the 47 new specifications related to incidents in April, May 
     and June of 1993.
       bb. Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducted an 
     extensive investigation of the charges against MACS Taylor. 
     Included as part of the NCIS investigation were interviews of 
     over twenty-one witnesses. Many of the witnesses, including 
     Petty Officer Pringle, Detective Wunsch and Lieutenant Frank, 
     were asked questions about MACS Taylor's activities in 
     Bermuda.
       cc. LT Robert P. Morean, JAGC, USNR, Trial Counsel, 
     conducted several witness interviews at NCBC on or about 15 
     February 1994. LCDR Cole was present for many of these 
     interviews and occasionally participated in questioning. In 
     the Interview with BMCS Kossman, USN, LCDR Cole corrected 
     BMCS Kossman for giving an answer LCDR Cole believed was 
     incorrect. When MS3(SS) Doyle was interviewed, LCDR Cole was 
     ``right there, only two feet away from me.'' When MS3 Doyle 
     told LT Morean that he felt MACS Taylor was an excellent cop 
     and excellent leader, LCDR Cole stormed out of the meeting 
     and slammed the door. LCDR Cole also assisted LT Morean in 
     the questioning of Dan Gordon, Security Department Training 
     Officer.
       dd. On 9 February 1994, LCDR Cole approached DT3 Fredia 
     Wright, USN, who had a son living on base who had been barred 
     from the base for juvenile delinquency. LCDR Cole offered DT3 
     Wright that her son could continue to live on the base if he 
     would testify in the court-martial of MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole 
     told her that she could disregard the barring notice if her 
     son would cooperate.
       ee. On or about 18 February 1994, LCDR Cole discussed the 
     16 November arrest while teaching a class to new NCBC 
     security officers. While teaching this class, LCDR Cole 
     referred to the four officers who made the 16 November arrest 
     as ``the four'', and used their arrest as an example of 
     illegal police activities.


                   other similar NCBC security cases

       ff. In the past, there have been several other arrests by 
     NCBC Police with the same characteristics as the 16 November 
     arrest. No prosecution or disciplinary action was taken in 
     any of the other arrests. There have also been egregious 
     cases of clear dereliction of duty by NCBC Military Police 
     where no prosecution was undertaken.
       gg. On 23 September 1992, NCBC Detective A. Carpenter, MA1 
     Woods, USN, and NCBC Detective P. Wunsch arrested EOCN Jason 
     S. Tyree, USN, a deserter from NMCB-40, off-base in the City 
     of Oxnard. The facts of that arrest were effectively 
     identical to those in the case at bar. There was no 
     disciplinary action of any kind taken against any of the 
     officers.
       hh. In December 1993, a complaint was filed alleging that 
     GSM2 E.J. Beman used unlawful force in an arrest of a female 
     suspect. The investigation of the incident was handled 
     internally; NCIS was never asked to investigate. Beman was 
     not court-martialed for his actions.
       ii. In mid-1992, evidence existed that civilian NCBC police 
     officer Carlos Tangonan used unnecessary force by hitting a 
     suspect in the mouth with a baton. No investigation of any 
     kind was undertaken, and no disciplinary action followed.
       jj. On 21 January 1992, F.D. Forbes, a civilian NCBC police 
     officer, arrested a suspect in the City of Port Hueneme by 
     pursuing him on an off-base street, drawing his service 
     revolver and ordering the suspect to freeze. The suspect was 
     unarmed and seen climbing over the base fence from on-base to 
     off-base, which is not an offense under any criminal code. 
     The ``suspect'' was not charged with any crime. Forbes was 
     not disciplined in any way for making this off-base arrest.
       kk. Many members of the NCBC Security Department believe 
     that, based on their knowledge of the facts, the 16 November 
     arrest was entirely legal and consistent with NCBC policy 
     practices.


                              recent facts

       ll. On 11 February 1994, LCDR Cole offered LT Brod that 
     MACS Taylor could still go to Captain's Mast if he wanted. 
     LCDR Cole told LT Brod that, if MACS Taylor accepted Mast, 
     the charges would include only two specifications of 
     dereliction of duty.
       mm. On 9 March 1994, LCDR Cole ordered an administrative 
     questioning of Byron Frank regarding the arrest of 16 
     November 1993. LT Morean told LT Caroline Goldner, JAGC, 
     USNR, that this was done as a ``discovery tool'' for the 
     court-martial of MACS Taylor.
       nn. On 17 March 1994, LT Morean told LT Brod in a telephone 
     conversation, that ``it is my understanding that if everyone 
     had been forthcoming, there would have been no charges. The 
     Admiral just got ticked when everyone clammed up.''
       3. Statement of Law.
       a. R.C.M. 907, MCM 1984. Motions to Dismiss.
       b. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. ``No person 
     shall be * * * compelled in any case to be a witness against 
     himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
     without due process of law.''
       c. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). ``To punish 
     a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him 
     to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.''
       d. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). For an agent 
     of the state to pursue a course of action whose object is to 
     penalize a person's reliance on his constitutional rights is 
     ``patently unconstitutional.''
       e. U.S. v. Davis, 18 M.J. 820 (AFCMR 1984). For a claim of 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness to succeed, it must be 
     established that the decision to prosecute was based on 
     impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the 
     desire to prevent the exercise of a legal right. ``In the 
     classic prosecutorial vindictiveness case the subsequent 
     charges are harsher variations of the same decision to 
     prosecute.'' See Also U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 
     1983), Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
       f. U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 1983). ``To help 
     simplify prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, the Supreme 
     Court developed a `presumption of vindictiveness'.'' 719 F.2d 
     at 361. ``Courts in this circuit construing post-Blackledge 
     decisions have held that whenever a prosecutor brings more 
     serious charges following the exercise of procedural rights, 
     `vindictiveness' is presumed, provided that the circumstances 
     demonstrate either actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear 
     of vindictiveness.'' 719 F.2d at 361.
       g. U.S. v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1983). If the 
     defendant challenges as vindictive a prosecutorial decision 
     to increase the number or severity of charges following the 
     exercise of a legal right, the court must examine the 
     prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire 
     proceedings. If ``the course of events provides no objective 
     indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the 
     defendant that the more serious charge was vindictive, i.e. 
     inspired by a determination to `punish a pesky defendant for 
     exercising his legal rights,' a presumption of vindictiveness 
     applies which cannot be overcome unless the government proves 
     by a preponderance of the evidence occurring since the time 
     of the original charge decision altered that initial exercise 
     of the prosecutor's discretion.'' 718 F.2d at 1365.
       h. U.S. v. Blanchette, 17 M.J. 512 (AFCMR 1983). ``The test 
     for prosecutorial vindictiveness is whether, in a particular 
     factual situation, there is a realistic likelihood of 
     vindictiveness for the preferral of charges against the 
     accused.'' 17 M.J. at 514.
       i. U.S. v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (CMA 1987). Once a prima facie 
     case of vindictiveness is made out, the burden shifts to the 
     prosecution to disprove the misconduct. See Also U.S. v. 
     Garwood, 20 M.J. at 154 (CMA 1985).
       j. U.S. v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973). If a 
     defendant alleges intentional or purposeful discrimination 
     and presents facts to raise a reasonable doubt about the 
     prosecutor's purpose, then the prosecutor can be called to 
     the stand to testify.
       k. U.S. v. Green, 37 M.J. at 384 (CMA 1993). ``This Court 
     has previously stated that `in referring a case to trial, a 
     convening authority is functioning in a prosecutorial 
     role'''. See Also U.S. v.  Fernandez, 24 M.J. at 78 (CMA 
     1987), Cooke v. Orser, 12 MJ 335 (CMA 1982), U.S. v. Hardin, 
     6 M.J. at 404 (CMA 1979).
       l. In assessing a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, 
     the Supreme Court focusses on practices which tend to chill 
     the assertion of defendant's rights. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 
     U.S. 21 (1974), NC v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), 
     Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
       4. Discussion.
       a. There are essentially three independent bases upon which 
     the prosecution of MACS Taylor is vindictive. The first basis 
     is due to retaliation for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing in 
     Bermuda and his personal relationship with the convening 
     authority's attorney, LCDR Cole. These two issues have been 
     grouped together because they support the premise that MACS 
     Taylor is being prosecuted for who he is, not what he has 
     done. Second, MACS Taylor is being prosecuted for exercising 
     his Constitutional right to remain silent. Third, MACS Taylor 
     is being prosecuted for exercising his right to refuse 
     Captain's Mast.
       b. In light of the nature of these charges, the fact that 
     forty-eight total specifications were preferred in this case, 
     in itself, is strong evidence of the government's 
     vindictiveness. An inference can be drawn that by charging 
     MACS Taylor with such a large number of charges, the 
     government intended to intimidate him, ``show'' him, or 
     otherwise ``retaliate'' against him for any one of the three 
     bases supporting this motion. The context of these charges, 
     including the content and tone of statements made by the 
     convening authority's attorney, further clarifies that this 
     prosecution was undertaken with a vindictive purpose.


               BASIS 1: BERMUDA AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

       c. Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all 
     charges pending against MACS Taylor. None of these charges 
     would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing 
     in Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole. 
     Pursuant to U.S. v. Davis and Blackledge v. Perry, these are 
     both impermissible bases for undertaking a prosecution.
       d. There is substantial evidence that the convening 
     authority knew about MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda and 
     had distaste for those activities. RADM Nash requested a copy 
     of the Bermuda tape before MACS Taylor arrived. Articles were 
     posted and the tape was watched at the security department 
     prior to MACS Taylor's arrival. LCDR Cole's statements to 
     MACS Taylor when he arrived at NCBC shows his distaste for 
     MACS Taylor's prior whistleblowing. MACS Taylor was taken to 
     XOI by the convening authority for activities in Bermuda. The 
     convening authority awarded him a letter of caution at this 
     XOI for activities in Bermuda. NCIS, in conducting the 
     investigation of these charges for the convening authority, 
     asked numerous witnesses if they knew anything about the 
     Bermuda incident. Furthermore, LCDR Cole's statement that 
     ``ABC bailed him out of Bermuda, they won't come to his 
     rescue here'', shows the vindictive tone of LCDR Cole based 
     on MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda.
       e. There is also substantial evidence that LCDR Cole had a 
     personal animosity for MACS Taylor. The statements by LCDR 
     Cole at the meeting upon MACS Taylor's arrival is evidence of 
     that animosity. MACS Taylor questioned LCDR Cole's 
     professionalism by challenging his practice with regard to 
     pretrial confinees. LCDR Cole was incensed at MACS Taylor's 
     complaint. The 5 September 1993 memorandum shows that prior 
     to this arrest, LCDR Cole sought to have MACS Taylor fired 
     from his job. Ever since the first meeting when MACS Taylor 
     reported at NCBC, there have been continual confrontations 
     between the two men.
       f. In addition to the evidence of vindictiveness, there is 
     considerable evidence of fact situations similar to those in 
     the case at bar that were not prosecuted. The off-base 
     arrests involving detectives Forbes and Wunsch were very 
     similar to this arrest, and no disciplinary action followed. 
     There was evidence of dereliction by GSM2 Beman, but no 
     disciplinary action was initiated. There was evidence of 
     dereliction by Officer Tangonan, and no investigation was 
     initiated. An examination of these other situations 
     demonstrates that the government would not have ordinarily 
     prosecuted this case but for MACS Taylor's activities in 
     Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
       g. The vigor with which the command initiated this 
     prosecution is further evidence of the other-than-official 
     interest is seeing MACS Taylor prosecuted. For example, NCIS 
     was called in to investigate and devoted a great deal of 
     resources to this investigation. NCIS jurisdiction, however, 
     is normally over major offenses only. LCDR Cole used his 
     influence as base SJA over other legal matters to affect the 
     investigation in this court-martial. LCDR Cole used the 
     pressure of a barring order to enlist the support of an 
     unwilling witness, Doug Lively. He used his administrative 
     power to order a civilian, Byron Frank, to give, against his 
     will, information to use against MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole also 
     actively participated in interviewing witnesses with the 
     Trial Counsel.
       h. In sum, there is substantial evidence that this 
     prosecution would not have normally been initiated but for 
     the fact that MACS Taylor was the subject. Dislike of a 
     sailor based on his past legal activities (Bermuda) and his 
     personality is not a permissible basis upon which to initiate 
     a prosecution. For the foregoing reasons, all pending charges 
     against MACS Taylor should be dismissed.


                    basis 2: right to remain silent

       i. Ever since initially being accused of dereliction, MACS 
     Taylor has exercised his Constitutional right to remain 
     silent. There is substantial evidence that all forty-eight 
     charges in this court-martial are a result of vindictiveness 
     due to MACS Taylor's invoking this constitutional right. 
     Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all charges.
       j. On 17 March 1994, the Trial Counsel told the Defense 
     Counsel that it was his understanding, based on his 
     discussions with the Convening Authority, that no charges 
     would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's invocation of 
     this right. The Trial Counsel further stated that it was his 
     understanding that the Admiral ``got ticked'' when MACS 
     Taylor invoked this right. The Trial Counsel's statement is 
     clear evidence that the government's decision to prosecute 
     was based on MACS Taylor's decision to remain silent.
       k. In discussing Taylor's court-material charges with Byron 
     Frank, LCDR Cole stated that ``if they had just cooperated 
     with NIS, then it would've been a slap on the wrist'', 
     implying that the charges would not have been brought at all 
     but for MACS Taylor's invocation of his right to remain 
     silent.
       l. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts at pressuring MACS 
     Taylor to give up his right to remain silent, including 
     attempts to persuade LT Brod and * * * appeals to MACS 
     Taylor. LCDR Cole further told MACS Taylor that if he didn't 
     ``open up'' there would be ``twenty more f---ing charges.''
       m. The convening authority has taken several other actions 
     which demonstrate the vigor with which it has attempted to 
     get MACS Taylor to give up his right to remain silent. First, 
     LCDR Cole gave MACS Taylor a direct order to write a new 
     Incident Complaint Report, alleging that the original had 
     been lost. Second, LCDR Cole administratively ordered 
     civilian police lieutenant Byron J. Frank, who participated 
     in the arrest, to give details of the arrest. LT Morean 
     described this administrative order as a ``discovery tool''.
       n. In sum, there is considerable evidence that the 
     convening authority was angered by MACS Taylor's silence, and 
     was in fact motivated to prosecute in retaliation for MACS 
     Taylor's silence. In fact, the convening authority expressly 
     told the Trial Counsel that there would have been a 
     prosecution at all had Taylor not ``clammed up''. It is 
     evident that all forty-eight charges are in direct 
     retaliation for MACS Taylor's exercise of a constitutional 
     right, the right to remain silent.
       o. To allow the government to prosecute as retaliation for 
     exercising the right to remain silent would be to chill the 
     exercise of this important constitutional right. Based on the 
     foregoing, all charges now pending should be dismissed.


                basis 3: right to refuse captain's mast

       p. After MACS Taylor refused Captain's Mast, the charges 
     against him rose from one specification of dereliction of 
     duty to 48 specifications in total at special court-martial. 
     There is substantial evidence that the additional 47 
     specifications were preferred in retaliation for MACS 
     Taylor's refusal to accept Mast. Under this basis, the motion 
     seeks dismissal of all charges added after the refusal of 
     Captain's Mast. The charges sought to be dismissed include 
     all additional specifications related to the 16 November 
     arrest (beyond the one specification from Mast) as well as 
     all specifications related to previous incidents.
       q. LCDR Cole explicitly told MACS Taylor and LT Brod that 
     if Taylor refused Mast ``there would be twenty more charges'' 
     and that he would ``throw the book at him''. These statements 
     demonstrate LCDR Cole's intentions to retaliate if MACS 
     Taylor refused Mast.
       r. Supreme Court and Military decisions support that a 
     large increase in charges after the invocation of a legal 
     right is a strong sign of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Here, 
     the charges jumped from one to forty-eight after MACS Taylor 
     exercised his right to a court-martial. In U.S. v. Davis, the 
     court states that the classic prosecutorial vindictiveness 
     case involves a harsher variation of the same decisions to 
     prosecute. Clearly, if the first decision to prosecute was 
     for only one specification, then a second decision for 48 
     specifications is a harsher variation.
       s. In U.S. v. Martino, 18 M.J. 526 (AFCMR 1984), the 
     government raised the number of charges after the accused 
     refused NJP. The court held such prosecution to be proper. 
     Martino can be distinguished on several bases. First, the 
     court emphasized that the defense counsel asserted 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness with no evidence whatsoever of a 
     vindictive motivation. Further, the government showed 
     evidence of a valid motivation for the difference in number 
     of charges. In the case at bar, however, there is 
     considerable evidence of vindictiveness and there is no 
     evidence of valid government motive for increasing the 
     charges from 1 to 48.
       t. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that 
     in the normal give and take of plea bargaining, a prosecutor 
     has valid discretion to increase and decrease the number of 
     charges in order to secure a guilty plea. Bordenkircher is 
     distinguishable on several grounds. First, in Bordenkircher, 
     the only evident motive on the part of the prosecutor was the 
     non-vindictive motive to receive a guilty plea. In the case 
     at bar, there is considerable evidence of vindictiveness 
     unrelated to the desire to secure a Mast conviction. Second, 
     in Bordenkircher, it was not disputed that the defendant was 
     properly chargeable for the additional charges. In the case 
     at bar, however, there is considerable evidence that there 
     was no valid basis for the additional charges. MACS Taylor's 
     performance evaluation of September 1993 shows the convening 
     authority's acknowledgement that there was no case of 
     dereliction for any prior incidents. Third, the additional 
     charges in the case at bar were not part of the course of 
     normal plea bargaining. MACS Taylor was ordered to attention 
     and threatened with more charges if he did not accept Mast. 
     Further, the military relationship between a Lieutenant 
     Commander and a Senior Chief Petty Officer is one of unequal 
     bargaining power.
       u. In U.S. v. Davis, a claim of prosecutorial 
     vindictiveness was rejected. In Davis, however, there were no 
     additional charges brought in the move from Mast to court-
     martial. In the case at bar, the charges rose from one to 
     forty-eight. Justifying its rejection of the prosecutorial 
     vindictiveness claim, the Davis court stated that the classic 
     case of prosecutional vindictiveness occurs when the number 
     of charges is raised.
       v. U.S. v. Blanchette also involved a rejected 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness claim. That case can be 
     distinguished in that the reason for not charging the accused 
     initially was due to insufficiency of evidence. The court 
     found that the additional charges were justified due to the 
     availability of new evidence. No such evidentiary 
     justifications exist for the government in the case at bar.
       w. In sum, because MACS Taylor refused Mast on one 
     specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority 
     retaliated by preferring forty-seven additional charges 
     against him at a court-martial. The possibility of 
     retaliation is clearly ``realistic'', and the impression made 
     on the accused is clearly one of intimidation. The statements 
     by LCDR Cole are evidence that the convening authority was in 
     fact motivated by vindictiveness. Dismissing the additional 
     charges would be consistent with Supreme Court and Military 
     case law. To allow vindictive charging as occurred here would 
     be to chill the exercise of a sailor's legal right to refuse 
     Captain's Mast. For the foregoing reasons, all charges beyond 
     the initial specification of dereliction of duty should be 
     dismissed.
       5. Evidence.
       a. Witnesses. The defense offers the testimony of the 
     following witnesses in support of this motion: Detective 
     Wunsch, Sergeant Forbes, LCDR Cole, MACS Taylor, Lieutenant 
     Frank, Officer Elgin, Officer Robertson, MACS Kossman, Kari 
     Lee Patterson, DT3 Wright, MS3 Doyle, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Flynt, 
     R.J. Bryan, Petty Officer Bassett, Petty Officer Pringle, 
     Andrew Stewart, LT Morean, Petty Officer Beman Officer 
     Tangonan.
       b. Documents. The following documents will be presented as 
     evidence in support of this motion: Incident Complaint Report 
     (ICR) for Wunsch arrest, ICR for Forbes incident, report of 
     Beman incident, 5 September 1993 Memorandum from LCDR Cole, 
     Bermuda file, MACS Taylor evaluation, Mast charges, Report 
     chit, NJP Refusal Form, Court-martial charges, letter of 
     caution, Bermuda tape, new ICR for 16 November arrest, 
     Barring notice for Doug Lively.
       6. Relief Requested. Pursuant to Basis 1, the defense 
     respectfully requests that all charges be dismissed. Pursuant 
     to Basis 2, the defense respectfully requests that all 
     charges be dismissed. Pursuant to Basis 3, the defense 
     respectfully rests that all charges other than the one 
     specification charged at Mast be dismissed.
       7. Oral Argument. The defense desires to make oral argument 
     of this motion.

                                               Carter F. Brod,

                                                   LT, JAGC, USNR,
                                                  Defense Counsel.
     Date: 23 Mar 94


                         certificate of service

       I, Lieutenant Carter F. Brod, JAGC, USNR, certify that on 
     this 23rd day of March 1944, I personally served upon 
     government trial counsel a true and correct copy of this 
     Motion.
                                  ____

                                           Department of the Navy,


                                      Office of the Secretary,

                                   Washington, DC, August 9, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman, I am responding to your letter of August 
     5, 1994, concerning the retirement confirmation of Admiral 
     Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy.
       The latest GAP letter alleges improper communications 
     between members of Admiral Mauz' staff and persons assigned 
     in the Port Hueneme area who had knowledge of the court-
     martial case involving Senior Chief Taylor. In order to be 
     able to assure the Committee that we were providing all 
     information relevant to this matter, OPNAV staff spoke with 
     the persons concerned and confirmed the accuracy of those 
     parts of the Chief of Naval Operations' 27 July letter to you 
     that addressed this issue (pages 4 and 5).
       Senior Chief Taylor had charges brought against him arising 
     out of actions in November 1993 while serving at the Naval 
     Construction Battalion Center (NCBC), Port Hueneme, 
     California. He had previously requested in writing to be 
     transferred outside the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic 
     Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) chain of command, and the Bureau of Naval 
     Personnel approved that request by assigning him to an 
     appropriate billet in his rating at Port Hueneme. He reported 
     to NCBC Port Hueneme for duty in December 1992.
       After referral to trial of the November 1993 charges, the 
     convening authority (NCBC Port Nueneme) decided it was 
     appropriate to move the case out of the Port Hueneme area to 
     ensure the fair and independent disposition of the case. To 
     this end, the convening authority withdrew the charges on 
     March 26, 1994. My inquiry revealed no communications between 
     Admiral Mauz or anyone on his staff and those involved with 
     bringing the charges, and ultimately withdrawing the charges, 
     against Senior Chief Taylor prior to the withdrawal of 
     charges in March 1994.
       The proceedings in Senior Chief Taylor's case were 
     mentioned in a short Orlando Sentinel article of March 29, 
     1994, which appeared in a Pentagon compilation of news 
     articles on 1 April. In describing the withdrawal of charges 
     relating to Senior Chief Taylor's alleged negligent and 
     improper arrest of a service member, the article stated that 
     his attorneys had filed documents ``contending the misconduct 
     charges were retaliation for Taylor's comments'' in the past 
     regarding Bermuda. Admiral Mauz' Executive Assistant saw the 
     article and asked the senior Staff Judge Advocate to 
     ascertain what, if any, connection there could have been 
     between Senior Chief Taylor's current situation in Port 
     Hueneme and Bermuda. Both officers were confident that 
     CINCLANTFLT had taken no action whatsoever in retaliation 
     against Senior Chief Taylor, and they were understandably 
     concerned that such a suggestion might have been made and 
     believed it important to ascertain the basis, if any, for 
     such an allegation.
       The CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate called the NCBC Staff 
     Judge Advocate, who confirmed the news article was indeed 
     misleading and that there was no suggestion during the 
     proceedings of any involvement by CINCLANTFLT or his 
     subordinates in Senior Chief Taylor's case. The NCBC Staff 
     Judge Advocate explained the charges involved Senior Chief 
     Taylor's law enforcement activities while assigned to NCBC 
     Port Hueneme. The charges included an allegation that Senior 
     Chief Taylor engaged in unauthorized off-base law enforcement 
     activities, including carrying a government-issued firearm 
     off-base. The CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate recounted this 
     information to the Executive Assistant, who then spoke 
     briefly to Admiral Mauz about the matter. The request for 
     clarification of the short news article was appropriate in 
     order for CINCLANTFLT to ascertain whether there were grounds 
     for investigation into any alleged impermissible actions by 
     anyone under the command of CINCLANTFLT.
       Neither Admiral Mauz, nor any other CINCLANTFLT official, 
     was involved with the referral or withdrawal of the charges, 
     which arose solely from events centered in NCBC Port Hueneme 
     nearly a year after Senior Chief Taylor's transfer to that 
     command. On 23 March 1994, Senior Chief Taylor's defense 
     counsel in the pending case filed a ``motion to dismiss for 
     vindictive prosecution,'' alleging the Port Hueneme convening 
     authority had an unlawful decision to prosecute Senior Chief 
     Taylor. The defense motion complained mainly about the vigor 
     with which the Port Hueneme command pursued the charges 
     against Senior Chief Taylor, alleging that members of that 
     command ``had distaste'' for his previous whistleblowing 
     activities and the charges were being pursued because Senior 
     Chief Taylor exercised his rights to remain silent and to 
     refuse nonjudicial punishment for his alleged improper law 
     enforcement activities. The defense pointed to alleged 
     statements by officials in Port Hueneme suggesting that they 
     had focused inordinate attention on his previous, well-
     publicized disclosures relating to Bermuda. The defense 
     motion did not allege ``personal interest'' or any actions or 
     involvement relating to this case by Admiral Mauz or anyone 
     subordinate to him.
       With regard to receipt of a copy of the defense motion by a 
     member of the office of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate, 
     the GAP letter is incorrect in stating that this occurred 
     prior to the call seeking clarification of the news article. 
     I have reconfirmed the office of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge 
     Advocate received the motion more than a week after the 
     charges were withdrawn. This occurred when the Navy judge 
     advocate assigned to an NCBC Port Hueneme tenant command 
     called some of his lawyer colleagues to offer to send them 
     copies of the document, which he found to be unique and very 
     interesting from a professional perspective. One of these 
     officers was an attorney in the office of the CINCLANTFLT 
     Staff Judge Advocate with whom he had worked closely in the 
     past. The two officers had maintained a close professional 
     association and friendship, and spoke with each other and 
     exchanged faxes regularly on professional issues. The 
     CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant accepted the offer, but upon receipt 
     noticed that portions of it were illegible. In order to 
     obtain a better copy, she called the Officer in Charge, Naval 
     Legal Service Office Detachment, Port Hueneme, who was 
     reluctant to provide the document, despite the fact that it 
     was one of the papers in a public court proceeding, to people 
     who were merely curious about the case and had no official 
     reason to have it. The CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant replied that 
     when allegations relating to a command appear in the press, 
     the command has a valid interest in ascertaining the basis, 
     if any, of such allegations. The Officer in Charge agreed 
     that this was a valid reason and, believing that he had 
     received a reasonable request from the CINCLANTFLT staff, he 
     faxed her a copy. Since the Officer in Charge viewed the call 
     as a CINCLANTFLT request, he so informed Senior Chief 
     Taylor's defense counsel.
       The request for the document did not stem from Admiral 
     Mauz. During the further inquiry by OPNAV staff, the Officer 
     in Charge verified the CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant neither 
     demanded a copy of the motion, nor stated that her call was 
     at the personal request of Admiral Mauz. Moreover, the 
     document was not shared outside the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge 
     Advocate's office. Since the document included no allegations 
     of impropriety by Admiral Mauz or anyone in CINCLANTFLT, and 
     had not been requested by Admiral Mauz or anyone else on his 
     staff, there was no reason for the Staff Judge Advocate to 
     provide the document to, or discuss in with, others.
       There is simply no basis whatsoever for any claim that 
     Admiral Mauz took a personal interest in the case involving 
     Senior Chief Taylor. The facts as confirmed by thorough 
     inquiry show the accuracy of Admiral Mauz' public statement 
     categorically denying any such allegation. The communications 
     by members of his staff were permissible and in no way alter 
     this conclusion. There was no attempt or intent in any of 
     these communications to affect the case.
       I have sought to answer the GAP letter's claims candidly, 
     thoroughly and accurately in order to assist the Committee in 
     its deliberations on Admiral Mauz' confirmation to retire in 
     his four-star grade. I believe strongly that there is no 
     basis for the GAP claims and that Admiral Mauz' 
     confirmation--and the assumption of command by his 
     successor--should not be further delayed.
       I am available at any time to discuss this matter further 
     with you or to provide you any further information you 
     desire. Please do not hesitate to call on me. I have sent a 
     similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John H. Dalton,
                                            Secretary of the Navy.
                                  ____

                                                    Camarillo, CA.
     Senator Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn and Members of the Committee: I am 
     writing to address the inaccurate and misleading information 
     provided to the committee concerning my case as it pertains 
     to the retirement status of Admiral Henry Mauz. My primary 
     concerns focus on the involvement of Admiral Mauz and his 
     staff in charges (since dropped) that were brought against me 
     while at Port Hueneme. I believe this involvement, and the 
     Navy's obfuscation of the facts, provide more than enough 
     reason why the committee should hold a full investigation 
     into this matter, before bringing the matter to a vote.
       Below is an outline of the most serious errors in the 
     Navy's communications with the committee. It is by no means 
     comprehensive, and full committee investigation would flush 
     out the full details.


      I. Manner by which Mauz's staff acquired defense proceedings

       Not only do the Navy responses differ from the actual chain 
     of events, the accounts from Admiral Boorda and Secretary 
     Dalton differ from each other concerning the same events.

                     Statement from Boarda letter:

       ``Subsequently, unbeknownst to either the senior Staff 
     Judge Advocate of Admiral Mauz, a junior Staff Judge Advocate 
     obtained a copy of the defense motion that was the basis for 
     withdrawal of the charges, as well as a copy of the charge 
     sheets, from a friend who was then Officer in Charge, Navy 
     Legal Service Office, Port Hueneme. The Officer in Charge 
     believed that in providing that documentation, he was 
     responding to an official request from Admiral Mauz's staff 
     and acting quite properly, he informed Senior Chief Taylor's 
     military counsel of the actions he had taken to comply with 
     the request. While these documents were shared with the 
     senior Staff Judge Advocate he did not speak of them to any 
     other staff member.''

                     Statement from Dalton letter:

       ``With regard to receipt of a copy of the defense motion by 
     a member of the office of the CINCLANFLT Staff Judge 
     Advocate, the GAP letter is incorrect in stating that this 
     occurred prior to the call seeking clarification of the news 
     article. I have reconfirmed the office of the CINCLANFLT 
     Staff Judge Advocate received the motion more than a week 
     after the charges were withdrawn. This occurred when a Navy 
     judge advocate assigned to an NCBC Port Hueneme tenant 
     command called some of his lawyer colleagues to offer to send 
     them copies of the document, which he found to be unique and 
     very interesting from a professional perspective. One of 
     these officers was an attorney in the office of the 
     CINCLANFLT Staff Judge Advocate with whom he had worked 
     closely in the past. The two officers had maintained a close 
     professional association and friendship, and spoke with each 
     other and exchanged faxes regularly on professional issues. 
     The CINCLANFLT Lieutenant accepted the offer, but upon 
     receipt noticed that portions of it were illegible. In order 
     to obtain a better copy, she called the Officer in Charge, 
     Naval Legal Service Office Detachment, Port Hueneme, who was 
     reluctant to provide the document, despite the fact that it 
     was one of the papers in a public court proceeding, to people 
     who were merely curious about the case and had no official 
     reason to have it. The CINCLANFLT Lieutenant replied that 
     when allegations relating to a command appear in the press, 
     the command has a valid interest in ascertaining the basis, 
     if any, of such allegations. The Officer in Charge agreed 
     that this was a valid reason and, believing that he had 
     received a reasonable request, he faxed her a copy.''

            The actual chain of events occurred as follows:

       The junior Staff Judge Advocate contacted a friend of hers 
     at Port Hueneme, a Lieutenant Wilson. Lieutenant Wilson 
     approached Taylor's defense counsel supervisor, Lieutenant 
     Tamboer, and asked for a copy of the defense proceedings. 
     Lieutenant Tamboer refused the request. The junior Staff 
     Judge Advocate contacted Lieutenant Tamboer directly and said 
     it was a direct request from ADM Mauz. Lieutenant Tamboer 
     then complied with the request.


      II. Admiral Mauz's Involvement in the Charges against Taylor

                     Statement from Boorda letter:

       ``There was no influence on the case and, in fact, the 
     charges had already been withdrawn at the time of the call.''

                                 Facts:

       This statement is highly misleading. Although the 
     extraordinarily high number of charges (48 total) were 
     withdrawn at the time of the call, approximately two weeks 
     later, Taylor was sent to an Article 32 hearing where he was 
     re-charged.
       In fact, the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate called the 
     Staff Judge Advocate for the Port Hueneme base, Lt. Cdr. 
     Derrick Cole, to tell him that he was upset that the charges 
     had been withdrawn against Taylor. Lt. Cdr. Cole assured the 
     CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate that Taylor would be re-
     charged. This information is in the record of trial. The Navy 
     withdrew charges, in all likelihood, because they were 
     rightly concerned that if the case was brought before a 
     judge, that judge would promptly dismiss the case.
       Many of the key people involved in my case, who dispute the 
     Navy's account of the chain of events, would be happy to 
     provide the committee with statements or testify. Please 
     contact me if I can be of any assistance. My work phone is: 
     (805) 982-2007. My home phone is (805) 388-3915. My beeper 
     number is: 1-800-482-3366, ext. 10397. I am at your service.
           Very Respectfully,
                                                 George R. Taylor,
                                                    MACS (SW) USN.
                                  ____



                                    Chief Of Naval Operations,

                                                  August 22, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter responds to a recent undated 
     letter from Senior Chief George R. Taylor, USN, to ``Senator 
     Nunn and Members of the Committee.'' Senior Chief Taylor's 
     letter was passed from the Armed Services Committee Staff to 
     the Navy Chief of Legislative Affairs on 19 August asking for 
     ``. . . the Navy's review of the letter and information 
     therein.''
       This is the third in a series of letters concerning Senior 
     Chief Taylor and the pending retirement confirmation of 
     Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy. This most recent letter 
     provides no new allegations or information that have not 
     already been addressed in the prior two letters. 
     Nevertheless, the following paragraphs will address in 
     additional detail each of Senior Chief Taylor's allegations.
       With respect to Part I of his letter, Senior Chief Taylor 
     states that the accounts in my 27 July letter and the 
     Secretary of the Navy's 9 August letter ``. . . differ from 
     each other concerning the same events.'' That is not correct. 
     The Secretary's letter simply provided a more detailed 
     description of the interactions between LT Hagerty-Ford (a 
     junior staff judge advocate at CINCLANTFLT), LT Wilson (a 
     legal officer at a Port Hueneme tenant command), and LT 
     Tamboer (OIC Naval Legal Service Office Detachment, Port 
     Hueneme).
       The actual chain of events as stated in my 27 July letter 
     and amplified in Secretary Dalton's letter is accurate. LT 
     Wilson, a friend of LT Hagerty-Ford and a judge advocate 
     assigned to a tenant command in Port Hueneme, called LT 
     Hagerty-Ford to offer her a copy of the defense motion. When 
     she received the copy with some illegible parts, LT Hagerty-
     Ford asked LT Wilson to send a better copy. LT Wilson asked 
     the OIC, LT Tamboer, for a better copy for this purpose, but 
     LT Tamboer was reluctant to provide it for the reasons stated 
     in Secretary Dalton's 9 August letter. LT Wilson so informed 
     LT Hagerty-Ford, who then phoned LT Tamboer to explain her 
     reason for requesting a copy. As stated in attachments 1 and 
     2, LT Tamboer and LT Hagerty-Ford agree that my previous 
     letter and Secretary Dalton's letter accurately describe 
     their phone conversation. Specifically, LT Hagerty-Ford did 
     not say she was making a direct request from Admiral Mauz. In 
     addition, her statement indicates she never met Admiral Mauz 
     or ever discussed this or any other case with him.
       The foregoing reaffirms that Admiral Mauz played no role in 
     a staff member's request for a copy of the defense motion to 
     dismiss Senior Chief Taylor's case.
       With respect to Part II of Senior Chief Taylor's letter, my 
     27 July letter stating that there was no influence exerted on 
     the case and, in fact, that the charges had already been 
     withdrawn at the time of the call, is absolutely accurate and 
     not misleading. CAPT Baggett (Staff Judge Advocate at 
     CINCLANTFLT) called LCDR Cole after the case had been 
     forwarded to COMNAVBASE San Diego for disposition. At the 
     time of the call, LCDR Cole no longer had any influence on 
     the outcome because of the withdrawal of the charges and the 
     case's transfer to a new convening authority. CAPT Baggett 
     states in Attachment 3 that he never called the new convening 
     authority, who later recharged Senior Chief Taylor.
       On the final page of his letter, under the section entitled 
     ``Facts'', Senior Chief Taylor notes that approximately two 
     weeks after the charges against him were withdrawn, new 
     charges were preferred and sent to an Article 32 hearing. He 
     fails to note, however, that this action was taken by a 
     different convening authority, COMNAVBASE San Diego, after a 
     review of Senior Chief Taylor's alleged misconduct and 
     redrafting of charges against him based on his actions in 
     November 1993 as a member of the Naval Construction Battalion 
     Center, Port Hueneme, Security Force.
       In his next to last paragraph, Senior Chief Taylor says 
     that CAPT Baggett was ``upset'' that the charges had been 
     withdrawn and that LCDR Cole assured CAPT Baggett that Senior 
     Chief Taylor would be recharged. CAPT Baggett rejects this in 
     Attachment 3. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record of 
     the Article 32 investigation that supports Senior Chief 
     Taylor's assertions. Secretary Dalton's letter accurately 
     states that the purpose of Captain Baggett's call to LCDR 
     Cole was to clarify information contained in a newspaper 
     article.
       The foregoing demonstrates again that Admiral Mauz played 
     no role whatever in Senior Chief Taylor's case in California.
       In summary, as stated in the Secretary's and my prior 
     letters, Senior Chief Taylor's accusations are inaccurate and 
     should not be allowed to further delay the confirmation of 
     Admiral Mauz for retirement in the grade of Admiral, which he 
     so deservedly has earned.
       I am sending a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
           Very respectfully,
                                                      J.M. Boorda.
                                  ____



                                             Grand Rapids, MI,

                                                  August 20, 1994.
       To Whom It May Concern: Regarding the call I received from 
     Lieutenant Noreen Hagerty-Ford of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge 
     Advocate office in mid-April, the letters from the Chief of 
     Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy to the Senate 
     Armed Services Committee of July 27, 1994 and August 9, 1994, 
     respectively, fairly and accurately describe my part in 
     responding to her request. In April 1994, I was serving as 
     Officer in Charge, Navy Legal Service Office, Port Huename. I 
     have since left the Navy. My April discussion with Lieutenant 
     Hagerty-Ford was about the purpose of her request for a copy 
     of the notice filed by the defense in the Senior Chief Taylor 
     case. She explained that Admiral Maus was CINCLANTFLT. I knew 
     the motion included allegations about the CINCLANTFLT/Bermuda 
     matter and therefore understood the command (CINCLANTFLT) 
     would want to know about the allegations made in this motion. 
     I recall being very busy when she called and that it did not 
     take long at all for me to make the judgment that it would be 
     appropriate to send her a copy of the motion. I agreed she 
     had provided a valid reason and, believing I had received a 
     reasonable request from the CINCLANTFLT staff, I faxed her a 
     copy and so informed Senior Chief Taylor's defense counsel.
                                                     John Tamboer.
                                  ____



                                                  Norfolk, VA,

                                                  August 22, 1994.
       To Whom It May Concern: The letter of 27 July 1994 and 
     Secretary of the Navy's letter of 9 August 1994 are correct 
     in describing my actions in April 1994 in obtaining a copy of 
     the defense motion in Senior Chief Taylor's case. I was first 
     afforded the document by my friend, LT Wilson, whom I know 
     from a previous duty station. The copy I got had some 
     illegible parts, so I called LT Wilson to ask him to send me 
     a better copy. LT Wilson said he would ask LT Tamboar for 
     one. Later that day LT Wilson called me to say LT Tamboar was 
     reluctant to send out copies of the document unless there was 
     a reason for the person to have it. I told him I would call 
     LT Tamboar and ask him for it myself. Just as Secretary 
     Dalton's letter states, I told LT Tamboar that I was on the 
     CINCLANTFLT staff and explained that when allegations are 
     made about a command, as apparently had been made in this 
     case, the command has a valid reason to know about those 
     allegations. LT Tamboar said he was satisfied I had provided 
     a valid reason and agreed to send me a copy. I did not demand 
     the document. I had no reason to do that and I simply do not 
     work that way. It was a short and business-like conversation. 
     I did not say the request was from Admiral Mauz because it 
     most certainly was not. In fact, I am a relatively junior 
     member on a large fleet staff and have never actually met 
     Admiral Mauz or discussed this or any other case with him. No 
     one else asked me to get it either. I did not provide it to 
     anyone outside my office.
                                                    ------ ------,
                                                   LT. JAGC, USNR.
                                  ____



                                                  Norfolk, VA,

                                                  August 20, 1994.
       To Whom It May Concern: I became the Staff Judge for 
     Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, in mid-February 
     1994. The purpose of my phone conversation on 4 April 1994 
     with the Staff Judge Advocate at Port Hueneme was exactly as 
     stated in Secretary Dalton's letter of 9 August 1994 to the 
     Senate Armed Services Committee. At no time during the 
     conversation did I indicate the LCDR Cole in any way that I 
     was upset that charges against Senior Chief Taylor stemming 
     from occurrences at Port Hueneme had been withdrawn. LCDR 
     Cole explained that, contrary to an Orlando Sentinel 
     newspaper article, the charges had not been dropped because 
     of retaliation for being a whistleblower at Bermuda. He 
     stated that the charges had been withdrawn and the case had 
     been sent to another convening authority solely due to events 
     at Port Hueneme which had prompted Senior Chief Taylor's 
     defense counsel to raise a motion for dismissal based on 
     vindictive prosecution. Upon being told the real reason for 
     the withdrawal of the charges and transfer of materials 
     pertaining to the case, I believed that the processing of the 
     case had no connection with anything that had happened at 
     Bermuda. The disposition of the investigation of Senior Chief 
     Taylor had already been passed to a command in San Diego to 
     determine independently at the time I talked with LCDR Cole. 
     I had no further conversations with LCDR Cole and I never 
     talked to anyone at San Diego about the case.
                                                Joseph E. Baggett,
                                                  Capt. JAGC, USN.

                          Additional Material


                                    The Secretary of the Navy,

                               Washington, DC, September 13, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding at the request of your 
     Committee to additional questions regarding Admiral Henry H. 
     Mauz, Jr. Specific answers to each of the questions forwarded 
     by your staff are attached.
       I believe it significant to note when responding to 
     questions regarding Admiral Mauz's involvement in the case of 
     LT Simmons, that there are three levels of command between 
     Admiral Mauz and the unit to which LT Simmons was assigned, 
     USS CANOPUS (AS-34). Given Admiral Mauz's position as the 
     Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the size of the 
     Fleet--two-hundred-and-twenty-four ships with twelve-thousand 
     officers and one-hundred-and-twenty-five-thousand enlisted 
     personnel--it would have been entirely appropriate for 
     Admiral Mauz to have delegated resolution of LT Simmons's 
     case to an officer, or flag officer, below him in the chain-
     of-command. Admiral Mauz's devotion to duty and extraordinary 
     character are reflected in his personal involvement in 
     ensuring a just and compassionate resolution of LT Simmons's 
     complaint, to include LT Simmons's extension on active duty 
     and assignment to a new command.
       In summary, Admiral Mauz has served the nation for over 
     thirty-five years, including combat and positions of 
     significant importance and responsibility. He is completely 
     deserving of a retirement in his present four star grade and 
     his confirmation should not be further delayed. I hope my 
     response to these additional questions will resolve any 
     lingering concerns.
       A similar letter has been sent to Senator Thurmond.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John H. Dalton.
                                  ____


 Additional Questions Regarding the Activities of Admiral Mauz and His 
                Staff With Regard to Lt. Darlene Simmons

       (1) When did Admiral Mauz learn of Darlene Simmons' case of 
     sexual harassment? How was he made aware of this case?
       Answer: Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons' case of sexual 
     harassment on October 9th or 13th, 1992, by a telephone call 
     from VCNO.
       (2) What actions did Admiral Mauz take to censure the 
     harasser?
       Answer: Admiral Mauz accepted the recommendations by the 
     chain of command (Squadron Commander, Group Commander (Rear 
     Admiral) and Type Commander (Vice Admiral)) on the action by 
     which the harasser was given a non-punitive letter of 
     instruction by his command. The harasser also submitted a 
     request to retire.
       (3) What reasons did Admiral Mauz have for choosing not to 
     take the corrective action that was ultimately taken by the 
     Secretary of the Navy on May 12, 1994--almost two years after 
     the events occurred?
       Answer: Admiral Mauz was informed that corrective action 
     had been taken by the harasser's command as stated in answer 
     to question #2. This level of accountability was upheld by 
     the Navy Inspector General and the DoD Inspector General, 
     Admiral Mauz believed this corrective action was adequate, 
     especially in light of the ship's overall performance. By 
     assigning his Special Assistant, Commander Miller, to 
     participate in the investigation, he further caused the 
     harasser to be transferred from the ship and he personally 
     arranged for LT Simmons to be transferred to another locale 
     in order to get a fresh start. LT Simmons agreed with her 
     transfer. Admiral Mauz also intervened twice to retain LT 
     Simmons on active duty and caused her fitness reports to be 
     reviewed for accuracy.
       (4) What was Navy policy at the time of the Simmons' 
     complaint with regard to removal of the harasser? What is the 
     Navy policy now?
       Answer: At the time of Lieutenant Simmons' complaint, Navy 
     policy did not specifically address removal of a harasser 
     from the workplace. During the process of Admiral Mauz's 
     command inquiry Lieutenant Simmon's harasser was removed from 
     the ship.
       Current Navy policy does not specifically address removal 
     of a harasser from the workplace. Such actions would depend 
     on the circumstances of the incident. Nevertheless, current 
     policy specifically prohibits reprisal and directs commanders 
     to take appropriate action to resolve any incidents of sexual 
     harassment and ensure no reprisal occurs.
       5) What specific steps did Admiral Mauz take to correct the 
     problems in LT Simmons' chain of command that resulted in the 
     loss or destruction of evidence (specifically, the letter 
     from her harasser)?
       Answer: Admiral Mauz expressed his concern to the staff and 
     to Commander Submarine Force Atlantic (a Vice Admiral) 
     regarding the loss of the letter. The Commanding Officer was 
     counselled by the Chief of Staff at SUBLANT for his handling 
     of the case.
       6) Is it the Navy's understanding that Darlene Simmons' 
     confinement for four days in a locked psychiatric facility 
     was voluntary or involuntary? Exactly when did Admiral Mauz 
     and his office learn of LT Simmons' confinement? How did 
     Admiral Mauz learn of her confinement?
       Answer: Doctor Quinones, a psychiatrist on the staff of 
     Naval Hospital Jacksonville, interviewed LT Simmons on 
     October 9, and directed she be admitted to the hospital's 
     psychiatric ward. After 24 hours, she was permitted to leave 
     the ward but remained under observation and had to remain on 
     the hospital grounds. Admiral Mauz learned of the 
     hospitalization during October 1994, after LT Simmons had 
     been released from the hospital, in the course of the 
     investigation to which he had detailed CDR Miller, his 
     Special Assistant for Women's Affairs.
       7) Darlene Simmons maintains that her confinement was 
     involuntary and done in reprisal for her sexual harassment 
     charges. Did Admiral Mauz investigate the issue of how and 
     why she was confined to a locked psychiatric facility for 
     four days?
       Answer: The circumstances of LT Simmons' hospitalization 
     were investigated and it was determined that the allegation 
     that the hospitalization was done in reprisal for her charges 
     of sexual harassment was wrong. Rather, her hospitalization 
     was directed by a Doctor Quinones who had no knowledge of the 
     sexual harassment allegations. Doctor Quinones confirmed by 
     phone on 13 September, that his decision to order her 
     admittance to the psychiatric ward was his alone, based 
     solely on his professional medical judgment.
       8) Commander Miller, Special Advisor to Admiral Mauz for 
     Women's Affairs, has indicated that she has questions about 
     the quality of medical care given to Darlene Simmons at the 
     time of her psychiatric examination. Did Admiral Mauz 
     investigate this issue? Were steps taken to ensure that her 
     treatment was satisfactory?
       Answer: Commander Miller did not express any concerns 
     regarding the quality of care provided to Lieutenant Simmons 
     at the time of her psychiatric examination. The command 
     inquiry, directed by Admiral Mauz, investigated all 
     circumstances of her hospitalization. Commander Miller was 
     satisfied that the command ensured that Lieutenant Simmons 
     received quality treatment.
       9) What is the Navy's position on the veracity of LT 
     Simmons' testimony of March 9, 1994, before the House Armed 
     Services Committee regarding sexual harassment?
       Answer: The Navy does not dispute that Lieutenant Simmons 
     was sexually harassed while she was assigned to USS CANOPUS 
     or that her complaint was initially handled poorly by USS 
     CANOPUS leadership. Nevertheless, the Navy does not agree 
     with several statements raised in her testimony. In 
     particular:
       Lieutenant Simmons states that ``several hours after the XO 
     found out I was talking to a member of Congress, I was 
     ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.''
       The inference of cause and effect of these two incidents is 
     not accurate. The hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons was 
     motivated solely by medical reasons. A referral was initiated 
     by the ship's Medical Officer, despite the Commanding 
     Officer's initial reluctance, and the hospitalization was 
     actually ordered by a physician on the Naval Hospital's 
     staff.
       Lieutenant Simmons states that ``the investigation was 
     never closed.''
       The command inquiry was closed on February 5, 1993.
       Lieutenant Simmons states that ``I believe LCDR Catullo 
     received a medal at his retirement ceremony.''
       LCDR Catullo did not receive a medal upon his retirement.
       10) There were at least two occasions when Commander Miller 
     made recommendations with regard to the Darlene Simmons case 
     that were not followed by Admiral Mauz. Identify the specific 
     instances when recommendations were made by Commander Miller 
     that were not followed by Admiral Mauz, and provide 
     explanation why an alternate course of action was chosen in 
     each situation.
       Answer: Commander Miller is aware of only one occasion 
     where her recommendation with regard to the Lieutenant 
     Simmons case was not agreed to by Admiral Mauz. This 
     recommendation involved Lieutenant Simmons' fitness report 
     upon her detaching from USS CANOPUS. Commander Miller 
     recommended that this fitness report be written by the 
     squadron commander instead of USS CANOPUS Commanding Officer. 
     Several senior officers and flag officers in the chain of 
     command disagreed with Commander Miller's recommendation and 
     advised Admiral Mauz that the Commanding Officer should 
     remain as the reporting authority. It should be noted that 
     after Admiral Mauz directed the Commanding Officer to re-
     evaluate his initial grades on the fitness report, the 
     Commanding Officer upgraded the report.
       11) Why didn't Admiral Mauz complete the report of his own 
     command inquiry on the Darlene Simmons' case?
       Answer: The command inquiry directed by Admiral Mauz was 
     completed on February 5, 1993 and forwarded to Commander, 
     Submarine Group 10 for action. It was subsequently used 
     during the investigation directed by the DOD Inspector 
     General.
                                  ____


Additional Questions Regarding the Activities of ADM Mauz and his Staff 
                   With Regard to Senior Chief Taylor

       1) ADM Mauz took two days leave while in Bermuda. How long 
     was the official business portion of the trip?
       Answer: As stated in the report of the Naval Inspector 
     General, ADM Mauz arrived in Bermuda on a Thursday evening, 
     conducted a full day of business on Friday, took leave over 
     the weekend, and departed on Monday morning. (It is also 
     noted that ADM Mauz, during his leave period (on Sunday), 
     cancelled his recreation plans and did paperwork and wrote 
     speeches instead.)
       2) Following the withdrawal of the charges against Senior 
     Chief Taylor, ADM Mauz's Executive Assistant asked the senior 
     Staff Judge Advocate to call his counterpart at Port Hueneme 
     for additional information. Did ADM Mauz direct his Executive 
     Assistant to take this action? Was ADM Mauz aware of the 
     Executive Assistant's action prior to it occurring?
       Answer: As stated in the letter from the Chief of Naval 
     Operations of July 27, 1994, ADM Mauz did not direct his 
     Executive Assistant to take this action and was not aware of 
     it prior to it occurring.
       3) Before ADM Mauz's Executive Assistant informed him about 
     the withdrawal of the charges against Senior Chief Taylor in 
     March 1994, was ADM Mauz and/or his staff aware of the 
     charges against Taylor or any investigation into alleged 
     activities by Taylor at Port Hueneme?
       Answer: ADM Mauz and his staff were aware from news 
     accounts that disciplinary action was pending against Senior 
     Chief Taylor for alleged activities at Port Hueneme, but were 
     not aware of the specifics of the charges.
       4) A junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT obtained a 
     copy of the defense motion that was the basis for the 
     withdrawal of charges against Senior Chief Taylor. Was the 
     junior Staff Judge Advocate directed to obtain a copy of the 
     defense motion? If so, by whom and when? When did the junior 
     Staff Judge Advocate obtain a copy of the defense motion? Was 
     it before or after the actual withdrawal of the charges? Did 
     the initial request to obtain a copy of the defense motion 
     occur before or after the actual withdrawal of the charges?
       Answer: As discussed in the Secretary's letter of August 9, 
     1994, and the Chief of Naval Operations' letter of August 22, 
     1994, the junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT was 
     offered a copy of the defense motion by a judge advocate 
     assigned to a tenant command in Port Hueneme. She was not 
     directed to obtain a copy of it. It was obtained in mid-April 
     1994. The offer to provide the copy and the receipt of the 
     copy occurred after the withdrawal of the charges at Port 
     Hueneme.
       5) A junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT obtained a 
     copy of the defense motion that was the basis for the 
     withdrawal of the charges from a legal officer at Port 
     Hueneme, but upon receipt noticed that portions of the 
     document were illegible. Was the legal officer's copy 
     illegible or just the copy that was faxed/sent to the junior 
     Staff Judge Advocate? Please provide copies of the following 
     documents: the original defense motion; the Port Hueneme 
     legal officer's copy of the defense motion; and the copy of 
     the defense motion that was faxed/sent to the junior Staff 
     Judge Advocate.
       Answer: The Port Hueneme legal officer's copy of the motion 
     was also illegible. (He is currently on leave, and the Navy 
     has been unable to ascertain whether he retained a copy of 
     the document.) A copy of the defense motion placed into the 
     record at the Article 32 investigation later conducted in San 
     Diego is attached as Tab A. Also, a copy of the legible 
     motion, as faxed to the junior judge advocate at CINCLANTFLT 
     in mid-April, is attached as Tab B. (The CINCLANTFLT Staff 
     Judge Advocate office did not retain the illegible copy first 
     received.)
       6) ADM Boorda's letter of August 22, 1994, tries to explain 
     discrepancies in Secretary Dalton's August 9 and ADM Boorda's 
     July 27 letters. Assuming that ADM Boorda's August 22 letter 
     is accurate, are there not factual discrepancies in ADM 
     Boorda's original letter of July 27 and Secretary Dalton's 
     August 9 letter?
       Answer: There are no factual discrepancies between 
     Secretary Dalton's August 9 and ADM Boorda's July 27 letters. 
     The Secretary's letter responded to additional, more detailed 
     questions from the Armed Services Committee, which the 
     Department of the Navy received after ADM Boorda sent his 
     July 27 response to an earlier inquiry. As ADM Boorda states 
     in his August 22 response to this same question, the 
     Secretary's letter ``simply provided a more detailed 
     description'' of the matters in question.
       7) After the charges against Senior Chief Taylor were 
     withdrawn and referred to San Diego, did ADM Mauz or anyone 
     on his staff have contact with Navy officials in San Diego 
     involved in this case (including any indirect contact through 
     officials at Port Hueneme)?
       Answer: No.
       8) Page 6 of ADM Boorda's 27 July 1994 letter states that, 
     ``In fact, at the time the actions were taken, no one was 
     aware of Senior Chief Taylor's whistle-blowing activity.'' 
     What exactly does this statement mean? What actions were 
     taken and who was unaware?
       Answer: The DoD Inspector General reported in his August 
     16, 1993, report that Senior Chief Taylor's assistant made 
     anonymous phone calls to the Naval Inspector General and 
     Congresswoman Schroeder's office on behalf of Senior Chief 
     Taylor in September 1992. On November 9, 1992, the Security 
     Officer removed Senior Chief Taylor from his duties as 
     Assistant Security Officer because of pending disciplinary 
     action relating to an allegation of disrespect toward the 
     NAS Bermuda Material Division Officer. On November 23, 
     1992, Sam Donaldson revealed to the NAS Bermuda Commanding 
     Officer Senior Chief Taylor's protected disclosures to 
     Congresswoman Schroeder and the Naval Inspector General. 
     This was the first indication to Senior Chief Taylor's 
     chain of command that he had made protected disclosures. 
     The DoD Inspector General later investigated whether 
     unfavorable personnel actions were taken or favorable 
     actions withheld as a result of his protected disclosures. 
     The DoD Inspector General concluded that NAS Bermuda 
     personnel were unaware of the protected disclosures when 
     they took the personnel action. ADM Mauz also was unaware 
     of the protected disclosures at the time of the personnel 
     actions in Senior Chief Taylor's case, and had no role in 
     those actions.
       9) Page 3 of Secretary Dalton's August 9, 1994 letter 
     states that, ``Since the document included no allegations of 
     impropriety by Admiral Mauz or anyone in CINCLANTFLT, and had 
     not been requested by Admiral Mauz or anyone else on his 
     staff. . . .'' Is this statement accurate? Did not ADM Mauz's 
     staff request a copy of the defense motion that was the basis 
     for the withdrawal of the charges against Senior Chief 
     Taylor?
       Answer: The statement is accurate since the document was 
     originally received by LT Hagerty-Ford, a junior judge 
     advocate on the CINCLANTFLT staff, as a result of an 
     unsolicited offer by her friend serving in Port Hueneme. When 
     she found the faxed copy to have illegible parts, she 
     requested and received a better copy. As LT Hagerty-Ford 
     states in her statement attached to ADM Boorda's August 22 
     letter, she sought the better copy because of the possibility 
     the document might contain allegations about her command. 
     When she found the document did not allege involvement by 
     CINCLANTFLT, she and her immediate supervisor concluded there 
     was no reason to provide it to anyone outside the Staff Judge 
     Advocate's office. LT Hagerty-Ford's signed statement, 
     provided to the Armed Services Committee with ADM Boorda's 
     August 22 letter, corroborates these facts, and the fact that 
     Admiral Mauz had no knowledge of, or involvement in, this 
     matter.
                                  ____


  Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Southwest Judicial Circuit, Port 
                              Hueneme, CA

       United States versus Taylor, George R., MACS/E-8, 000-00-
     0000, U.S. Navy.
       Special Court-Martial: Motion to Dismiss for Vindictive 
     Prosecution Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
       Date: 23 March 1994.
       1. Nature of Motion. This is a Motion to Dismiss for 
     Vindictive Prosecution filed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment 
     of the U.S. Constitution. This motion is filed as a direct 
     result of an unlawful decision by Commander, Naval 
     Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, to prosecute 
     MACS George R. Taylor, USN, the accused in this case.
       2. Summary of Facts.


                prior to MACS taylor's reporting at ncbc

       a. In 1992, MACS George R. Taylor, USN, held the position 
     of Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda. 
     While serving at NAS Bermuda, MACS Taylor produced evidence 
     that the air station existed as a resort for top military 
     officials at the expense of taxpayers. MACS Taylor and 
     another ``whistleblower'' were featured on the 10 December 
     1992 episode of ABC's ``Primetime Live'' (tape of which will 
     be hereinafter referred to as ``the Bermuda tape''), which 
     prompted Defense and Inspector General investigations. As a 
     result of MACS Taylor's activities, Congress voted to close 
     the Bermuda base in 1995.
       b. MACS Taylor was transferred to Naval Construction 
     Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, (hereinafter ``NCBC''), in 
     January 1993, under the protection of the Military 
     Whistleblowers Protection Act.
       c. Before MACS Taylor arrived at NCBC, members of the base 
     security department posted an article about MACS Taylor's 
     activities in Bermuda on the security department bulletin 
     board. In addition, members of the security department 
     gathered in a conference room to view the Bermuda tape.
       d. Before MACS Taylor arrived, a file was sent to NCBC from 
     Bermuda which included a non-punitive letter of caution and 
     materials related to MACS Taylor's activities at Bermuda.
       e. Prior to MACS Taylor's arrival at NCBC, RADM David Nash, 
     USN, Commanding Officer of NCBC, requested a copy of the 
     Bermuda tape from Kari Lee Patterson, a civilian employee at 
     NCBC. Ms. Patterson delivered the tape to Mr. W.E. Hudson, 
     NCBC Security Officer, who delivered the tape to RADM Nash.


                        after reporting at ncbc

       f. Upon MACS Taylor's arrival, RADM Nash held a meeting 
     with top base officials to discuss the arrival of MACS 
     Taylor.
       g. Upon reporting on board NCBC, MACS Taylor was taken to 
     Executive Officer's Inquiry for activities in Bermuda. At the 
     XOI, Taylor was awarded the Nonpunitive Letter of Caution 
     sent from Bermuda. The charge was for disrespect to a 
     commissioned officer at Bermuda.
       h. Immediately upon arriving at NCBC, MACS Taylor was 
     directed to meet with LCDR Cole in his office. At that 
     meeting, which was attended by BMCS Kossman, LCDR Cole told 
     MACS Taylor that ``this isn't Bermuda'' and ``You aren't 
     going to get away with that s--t here'', or words to that 
     effect.
       i. In January 1993, LCDR Cole was called by Jeff Ruch, an 
     attorney with the Government Accountability Project, a public 
     interest organization which was involved with the incident in 
     Bermuda. Mr. Ruch called LCDR Cole to discuss the pending 
     Captain's Mast for Disrespect in Bermuda. After the phone 
     conversation, LCDR Cole confronted MACS Taylor, saying he had 
     just gotten a call from his ``liberal lawyers'' and ``this is 
     bulls--t,'' or words to that effect. LCDR Cole told MACS 
     Taylor that ``they're not gonna get you out of this. * * * 
     This package was sent here. We're going to adjudicate this 
     here'', or words to that effect.
       j. Approximately one month after MACS Taylor reported 
     aboard, MACS Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that one of his 
     practices was improper. LCDR Cole had, on several occasions, 
     sent sailors to the Long Beach Brig with full knowledge that 
     there would never be a court-martial. This was typically done 
     on a Friday afternoon, where the magistrate would be unable 
     to release the sailor until the following Monday. When MACS 
     Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that this practice was 
     improper, LCDR Cole became incensed, telling MACS Taylor 
     ``I'm the f---ing lawyer on this base; who made you the base 
     lawyer?'', or words to that effect.
       k. A meeting to discuss Workman's Compensation issues was 
     held in September 1993 and was attended by LCDR Cole, MACS 
     Taylor, NCBC Executive Officer, NCBC Command Master Chief, 
     and other officials. At the meeting, LCDR Cole confronted 
     MACS Taylor due to rumors he had heard about members of the 
     Special Investigations Unit, of which Taylor was a member, 
     being deputized by the federal government. MACS Taylor denied 
     ever spreading the rumor. LCDR Cole responded by admonishing 
     MACS Taylor for not addressing him as ``Sir'' when making a 
     statement.
       l. In a Memorandum dated 5 September 1993, LCDR Cole 
     requested to the Commanding Officer, NCBC, that MACS Taylor 
     be relieved of his duties. RADM Nash, however, declined to 
     carry out LCDR Cole's request.
       m. MACS Taylor has also had numerous personal 
     confrontations with Mr. W.E. Hudson, NCBC Security Officer, 
     since reporting aboard. Mr. Hudson is MACS Taylor's direct 
     superior in the Security Department.
       n. On 30 September 1993, MACS Taylor received a performance 
     evaluation which covered the period since MACS Taylor's 
     arrival on board NCBC and was signed by RADM Nash. Taylor 
     received straight 4.0 evaluations on this evaluation. There 
     was no mention whatsoever of any problems with MACS Taylor's 
     performance. MACS Taylor was described as having ``great 
     depth of professional knowledge'' and a ``keen sense of 
     responsibility''. He was praised for ``drafting and immediate 
     implementation of the department's quality-focused Standard 
     Operating Procedures.'' He was also praised for conducting a 
     special task force to curtail the flow of drugs onto the base 
     and for assisting civilian police in drug operations.


                           16 november arrest

       o. On 16 November 1993, MACS Taylor participated in the 
     arrest of CE3 Richard Miller, USN, a deserter who had escaped 
     from the Long Beach Brig. There were three other NCBC police 
     officers at the scene. The arrest took place in the City of 
     Oxnard with the participation of the Oxnard Police. No 
     complaints were made by any persons involved in the arrest. 
     Officers Ernie Eglin and L.E. Robertson of Oxnard Police 
     executed the arrest and believe that MACS Taylor acted 
     entirely properly.
       p. On 17 November 1993, Mr. Hudson called MACS Taylor into 
     his office and accused him of acting improperly during the 
     previous night's arrest. Mr. Hudson then discussed with MACS 
     Taylor the possibility of an early retirement for MACS 
     Taylor.
       q. On 18 November 1993, Mr. Hudson met with LCDR Cole to 
     discuss this situation. At this meeting, the two men agreed 
     to have Naval Investigative Service investigate MACS Taylor's 
     activities on the night of the arrest.
       r. On 22 November 1993, Mr. Hudson informed MACS Taylor 
     that he planned to have NIS investigate the arrest.
       s. Pursuant to advice from military defense attorneys, MACS 
     Taylor and each of the other three officers consistently 
     invoked his right to remain silent during the investigation.
       t. On 3 January 1994, MACS Taylor was given a Report Chit 
     citing one specification of violation of Article 92 related 
     to the arrest of CE3 Miller. LCDR Cole's signature appears on 
     the Chit for ``person submitting report''. Along with the 
     Report Chit, MACS Taylor received formal notification of 
     contemplated Nonjudicial Punishment.
       u. On numerous occasions after the Report Chit was drafted, 
     LCDR Cole attempted to persuade MACS Taylor and the other 
     three NCBC officers involved to answer questions about the 
     arrest. On or about 3 January 1994, LCDR Cole informed MACS 
     Taylor that the Incident Complaint Report for the incident in 
     question had never been received, and he gave MACS Taylor a 
     direct order to write a report describing what happened on 
     the night in question. MACS Taylor has consistently 
     maintained that he submitted the report immediately after the 
     arrest. Pursuant to advice from LT Carter F. Brod, JAGC, 
     USNR, Defense Counsel, MACS Taylor nevertheless prepared a 
     new report to avoid violating a direct order.
       v. When discussing with MACS Taylor his potential Captain's 
     Mast, LCDR Cole ordered MACS Taylor to sit locked at 
     attention. LCDR Cole told MACS Taylor that he would ``add 
     twenty more f--king charges'' if Taylor refused Captain's 
     Mast.
       w. On or about 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole called LT Brod and 
     asked LT Brod to give MACS Taylor pre-Mast advice. LCDR Cole 
     told LT Brod that MACS Taylor was being really stupid in his 
     attitude and that if he did not accept Mast then they were 
     going to ``throw the book at him.'' LCDR Cole told LT Brod 
     that, if MACS Taylor refused Mast, ``we have lots of other 
     stuff on him to use which we will throw on there'', or words 
     to that effect.
       x. On 10 January 1994, MACS Taylor refused Nonjudicial 
     Punishment.
       y. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts to persuade the 
     other three NCBC officers to discuss the details of the 
     arrest. On 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole told LT Brod in a 
     telephone conversation that ``the command is unlikely to 
     dismiss the charges against Senior Chief Taylor but would 
     probably dismiss on the others if they opened up.''
       z. In a telephone conversation with civilian police 
     lieutenant Byron Frank, which lasted over one hour, LCDR Cole 
     told Lt. Frank that ``if you all had just cooperated with the 
     NIS investigation, then you would have just gotten a slap on 
     the wrist'', or words to that effect. LCDR Cole stated that 
     ``Senior Chief Taylor is manipulating the other three 
     officers. I feel really sorry for them'', or words to that 
     effect. LCDR Cole stated that ``ABC bailed his a-- out in 
     Bermuda. They won't come to his rescue now'', or words to 
     that effect. LCDR Cole asked Lt. Frank, who was also an 
     African-American, ``why won't you just tell me what happened? 
     I'm the smartest black attorney in the JAG Corps. Let's just 
     talk brother to brother'', or words to that effect.
       aa. On 21 January 1994, 48 specifications of UCMJ 
     violations were preferred against MACS Taylor. Many of the 
     specifications related to the 16 November arrest, but 16 of 
     the 47 new specifications related to incidents in April, May 
     and June of 1993.
       bb. Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducted an 
     extensive investigation of the charges against MACS Taylor. 
     Included as part of the NCIS investigation were interviews of 
     over twenty-one witnesses. Many of the witnesses, including 
     Petty Officer Pringle, Detective Wunsch and Lieutenant Frank, 
     were asked questions about MACS Taylor's activities in 
     Bermuda.
       cc. LT Robert P. Morean, JAGC, USNR, Trial Counsel, 
     conducted several witness interviews at NCBC on or about 15 
     February 1994. LCDR Cole was present for many of these 
     interviews and occasionally participated in questioning. In 
     the Interview with BMCS Kossman, USN, LCDR Cole corrected 
     BMCS Kossman for giving an answer LCDR Cole believed was 
     incorrect. When MS3(SS) Doyle was interviewed, LCDR Cole was 
     ``right there, only two feet away from me.'' When MS3 Doyle 
     told LT Morean that he felt MACS Taylor was an excellent cop 
     and excellent leader, LCDR Cole stormed out of the meeting 
     and slammed the door. LCDR Cole also assisted LT Morean in 
     the questioning of Dan Gordon, Security Department Training 
     Officer.
       dd. On 9 February 1994, LCDR Cole approached DT3 Fredia 
     Wright, USN, who had a son living on base who had been barred 
     from the base for juvenile delinquency. LCDR Cole offered DT3 
     Wright that her son could continue to live on the base if he 
     would testify in the court-martial of MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole 
     told her that she could disregard the barring notice if her 
     son would cooperate.
       ee. On or about 18 February 1994, LCDR Cole discussed the 
     16 November arrest while teaching a class to new NCBC 
     security officers. While teaching this class, LCDR Cole 
     referred to the four officers who made the 16 November arrest 
     as ``the four'', and used their arrest as an example of 
     illegal police activities.


                   other similar NCBC security cases

       ff. In the past, there have been several other arrests by 
     NCBC Police with the same characteristics as the 16 November 
     arrest. No prosecution or disciplinary action was taken in 
     any of the other arrests. There have also been egregious 
     cases of clear dereliction of duty by NCBC Military Police 
     where no prosecution was undertaken.
       gg. On 23 September 1992, NCBC Detective A. Carpenter, MA1 
     Woods, USN, and NCBC Detective P. Wunsch arrested EOCN Jason 
     S. Tyree, USN, a deserter from NMCB-40, off-base in the City 
     of Oxnard. The facts of that arrest were effectively 
     identical to those in the case at bar. There was no 
     disciplinary action of any kind taken against any of the 
     officers.
       hh. In December 1993, a complaint was filed alleging that 
     GSM2 E.J. Beman used unlawful force in an arrest of a female 
     suspect. The investigation of the incident was handled 
     internally; NCIS was never asked to investigate. Beman was 
     not court-martialed for his actions.
       ii. In mid-1992, evidence existed that civilian NCBC police 
     officer Carlos Tangonan used unnecessary force by hitting a 
     suspect in the mouth with a baton. No investigation of any 
     kind was undertaken, and no disciplinary action followed.
       jj. On 21 January 1992, F.D. Forbes, a civilian NCBC police 
     officer, arrested a suspect in the City of Port Hueneme by 
     pursuing him on an off-base street, drawing his service 
     revolver and ordering the suspect to freeze. The suspect was 
     unarmed and seen climbing over the base fence from on-base to 
     off-base, which is not an offense under any criminal code. 
     The ``suspect'' was not charged with any crime. Forbes was 
     not disciplined in any way for making this off-base arrest.
       kk. Many members of the NCBC Security Department believe 
     that, based on their knowledge of the facts, the 16 November 
     arrest was entirely legal and consistent with NCBC policy 
     practices.


                              recent facts

       ll. On 11 February 1994, LCDR Cole offered LT Brod that 
     MACS Taylor could still go to Captain's Mast if he wanted. 
     LCDR Cole told LT Brod that, if MACS Taylor accepted Mast, 
     the charges would include only two specifications of 
     dereliction of duty.
       mm. On 9 March 1994, LCDR Cole ordered an administrative 
     questioning of Byron Frank regarding the arrest of 16 
     November 1993. LT Morean told LT Caroline Goldner, JAGC, 
     USNR, that this was done as a ``discovery tool'' for the 
     court-martial of MACS Taylor.
       nn. On 17 March 1994, LT Morean told LT Brod in a telephone 
     conversation, that ``it is my understanding that if everyone 
     had been forthcoming, there would have been no charges. The 
     Admiral just got ticked when everyone clammed up.''
       3. Statement of Law.
       a. R.C.M. 907, MCM 1984. Motions to Dismiss.
       b. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. ``No person 
     shall be * * * compelled in any case to be a witness against 
     himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
     without due process of law.''
       c. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). ``To punish 
     a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him 
     to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.''
       d. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). For an agent 
     of the state to pursue a course of action whose object is to 
     penalize a person's reliance on his constitutional rights is 
     ``patently unconstitutional.''
       e. U.S. v. Davis, 18 M.J. 820 (AFCMR 1984). For a claim of 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness to succeed, it must be 
     established that the decision to prosecute was based on 
     impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the 
     desire to prevent the exercise of a legal right. ``In the 
     classic prosecutorial vindictiveness case the subsequent 
     charges are harsher variations of the same decision to 
     prosecute.'' See Also U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 
     1983), Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
       f. U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 1983). ``To help 
     simplify prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, the Supreme 
     Court developed a `presumption of vindictiveness'.'' 719 F.2d 
     at 361. ``Courts in this circuit construing post-Blackledge 
     decisions have held that whenever a prosecutor brings more 
     serious charges following the exercise of procedural rights, 
     `vindictiveness' is presumed, provided that the circumstances 
     demonstrate either actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear 
     of vindictiveness.'' 719 F.2d at 361.
       g. U.S. v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1983). If the 
     defendant challenges as vindictive a prosecutorial decision 
     to increase the number or severity of charges following the 
     exercise of a legal right, the court must examine the 
     prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire 
     proceedings. If ``the course of events provides no objective 
     indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the 
     defendant that the more serious charge was vindictive, i.e. 
     inspired by a determination to `punish a pesky defendant for 
     exercising his legal rights,' a presumption of vindictiveness 
     applies which cannot be overcome unless the government proves 
     by a preponderance of the evidence occurring since the time 
     of the original charge decision altered that initial exercise 
     of the prosecutor's discretion.'' 718 F.2d at 1365.
       h. U.S. v. Blanchette, 17 M.J. 512 (AFCMR 1983). ``The test 
     for prosecutorial vindictiveness is whether, in a particular 
     factual situation, there is a realistic likelihood of 
     vindictiveness for the preferral of charges against the 
     accused.'' 17 M.J. at 514.
       i. U.S. v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (CMA 1987). Once a prima facie 
     case of vindictiveness is made out, the burden shifts to the 
     prosecution to disprove the misconduct. See Also U.S. v. 
     Garwood, 20 M.J. at 154 (CMA 1985).
       j. U.S. v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973). If a 
     defendant alleges intentional or purposeful discrimination 
     and presents facts to raise a reasonable doubt about the 
     prosecutor's purpose, then the prosecutor can be called to 
     the stand to testify.
       k. U.S. v. Green, 37 M.J. at 384 (CMA 1993). ``This Court 
     has previously stated that `in referring a case to trial, a 
     convening authority is functioning in a prosecutorial 
     role'''. See Also U.S. v.  Fernandez, 24 M.J. at 78 (CMA 
     1987), Cooke v. Orser, 12 MJ 335 (CMA 1982), U.S. v. Hardin, 
     6 M.J. at 404 (CMA 1979).
       l. In assessing a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness, 
     the Supreme Court focusses on practices which tend to chill 
     the assertion of defendant's rights. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 
     U.S. 21 (1974), NC v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), 
     Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
       4. Discussion.
       a. There are essentially three independent bases upon which 
     the prosecution of MACS Taylor is vindictive. The first basis 
     is due to retaliation for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing in 
     Bermuda and his personal relationship with the convening 
     authority's attorney, LCDR Cole. These two issues have been 
     grouped together because they support the premise that MACS 
     Taylor is being prosecuted for who he is, not what he has 
     done. Second, MACS Taylor is being prosecuted for exercising 
     his Constitutional right to remain silent. Third, MACS Taylor 
     is being prosecuted for exercising his right to refuse 
     Captain's Mast.
       b. In light of the nature of these charges, the fact that 
     forty-eight total specifications were preferred in this case, 
     in itself, is strong evidence of the government's 
     vindictiveness. An inference can be drawn that by charging 
     MACS Taylor with such a large number of charges, the 
     government intended to intimidate him, ``show'' him, or 
     otherwise ``retaliate'' against him for any one of the three 
     bases supporting this motion. The context of these charges, 
     including the content and tone of statements made by the 
     convening authority's attorney, further clarifies that this 
     prosecution was undertaken with a vindictive purpose.


               BASIS 1: BERMUDA AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

       c. Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all 
     charges pending against MACS Taylor. None of these charges 
     would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing 
     in Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole. 
     Pursuant to U.S. v. Davis and Blackledge v. Perry, these are 
     both impermissible bases for undertaking a prosecution.
       d. There is substantial evidence that the convening 
     authority knew about MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda and 
     had distaste for those activities. RADM Nash requested a copy 
     of the Bermuda tape before MACS Taylor arrived. Articles were 
     posted and the tape was watched at the security department 
     prior to MACS Taylor's arrival. LCDR Cole's statements to 
     MACS Taylor when he arrived at NCBC shows his distaste for 
     MACS Taylor's prior whistleblowing. MACS Taylor was taken to 
     XOI by the convening authority for activities in Bermuda. The 
     convening authority awarded him a letter of caution at this 
     XOI for activities in Bermuda. NCIS, in conducting the 
     investigation of these charges for the convening authority, 
     asked numerous witnesses if they knew anything about the 
     Bermuda incident. Furthermore, LCDR Cole's statement that 
     ``ABC bailed him out of Bermuda, they won't come to his 
     rescue here'', shows the vindictive tone of LCDR Cole based 
     on MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda.
       e. There is also substantial evidence that LCDR Cole had a 
     personal animosity for MACS Taylor. The statements by LCDR 
     Cole at the meeting upon MACS Taylor's arrival is evidence of 
     that animosity. MACS Taylor questioned LCDR Cole's 
     professionalism by challenging his practice with regard to 
     pretrial confinees. LCDR Cole was incensed at MACS Taylor's 
     complaint. The 5 September 1993 memorandum shows that prior 
     to this arrest, LCDR Cole sought to have MACS Taylor fired 
     from his job. Ever since the first meeting when MACS Taylor 
     reported at NCBC, there have been continual confrontations 
     between the two men.
       f. In addition to the evidence of vindictiveness, there is 
     considerable evidence of fact situations similar to those in 
     the case at bar that were not prosecuted. The off-base 
     arrests involving detectives Forbes and Wunsch were very 
     similar to this arrest, and no disciplinary action followed. 
     There was evidence of dereliction by GSM2 Beman, but no 
     disciplinary action was initiated. There was evidence of 
     dereliction by Officer Tangonan, and no investigation was 
     initiated. An examination of these other situations 
     demonstrates that the government would not have ordinarily 
     prosecuted this case but for MACS Taylor's activities in 
     Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
       g. The vigor with which the command initiated this 
     prosecution is further evidence of the other-than-official 
     interest is seeing MACS Taylor prosecuted. For example, NCIS 
     was called in to investigate and devoted a great deal of 
     resources to this investigation. NCIS jurisdiction, however, 
     is normally over major offenses only. LCDR Cole used his 
     influence as base SJA over other legal matters to affect the 
     investigation in this court-martial. LCDR Cole used the 
     pressure of a barring order to enlist the support of an 
     unwilling witness, Doug Lively. He used his administrative 
     power to order a civilian, Byron Frank, to give, against his 
     will, information to use against MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole also 
     actively participated in interviewing witnesses with the 
     Trial Counsel.
       h. In sum, there is substantial evidence that this 
     prosecution would not have normally been initiated but for 
     the fact that MACS Taylor was the subject. Dislike of a 
     sailor based on his past legal activities (Bermuda) and his 
     personality is not a permissible basis upon which to initiate 
     a prosecution. For the foregoing reasons, all pending charges 
     against MACS Taylor should be dismissed.


                    basis 2: right to remain silent

       i. Ever since initially being accused of dereliction, MACS 
     Taylor has exercised his Constitutional right to remain 
     silent. There is substantial evidence that all forty-eight 
     charges in this court-martial are a result of vindictiveness 
     due to MACS Taylor's invoking this constitutional right. 
     Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all charges.
       j. On 17 March 1994, the Trial Counsel told the Defense 
     Counsel that it was his understanding, based on his 
     discussions with the Convening Authority, that no charges 
     would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's invocation of 
     this right. The Trial Counsel further stated that it was his 
     understanding that the Admiral ``got ticked'' when MACS 
     Taylor invoked this right. The Trial Counsel's statement is 
     clear evidence that the government's decision to prosecute 
     was based on MACS Taylor's decision to remain silent.
       k. In discussing Taylor's court-material charges with Byron 
     Frank, LCDR Cole stated that ``if they had just cooperated 
     with NIS, then it would've been a slap on the wrist'', 
     implying that the charges would not have been brought at all 
     but for MACS Taylor's invocation of his right to remain 
     silent.
       l. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts at pressuring MACS 
     Taylor to give up his right to remain silent, including 
     attempts to persuade LT Brod and * * * appeals to MACS 
     Taylor. LCDR Cole further told MACS Taylor that if he didn't 
     ``open up'' there would be ``twenty more f---ing charges.''
       m. The convening authority has taken several other actions 
     which demonstrate the vigor with which it has attempted to 
     get MACS Taylor to give up his right to remain silent. First, 
     LCDR Cole gave MACS Taylor a direct order to write a new 
     Incident Complaint Report, alleging that the original had 
     been lost. Second, LCDR Cole administratively ordered 
     civilian police lieutenant Byron J. Frank, who participated 
     in the arrest, to give details of the arrest. LT Morean 
     described this administrative order as a ``discovery tool''.
       n. In sum, there is considerable evidence that the 
     convening authority was angered by MACS Taylor's silence, and 
     was in fact motivated to prosecute in retaliation for MACS 
     Taylor's silence. In fact, the convening authority expressly 
     told the Trial Counsel that there would have been a 
     prosecution at all had Taylor not ``clammed up''. It is 
     evident that all forty-eight charges are in direct 
     retaliation for MACS Taylor's exercise of a constitutional 
     right, the right to remain silent.
       o. To allow the government to prosecute as retaliation for 
     exercising the right to remain silent would be to chill the 
     exercise of this important constitutional right. Based on the 
     foregoing, all charges now pending should be dismissed.


                basis 3: right to refuse captain's mast

       p. After MACS Taylor refused Captain's Mast, the charges 
     against him rose from one specification of dereliction of 
     duty to 48 specifications in total at special court-martial. 
     There is substantial evidence that the additional 47 
     specifications were preferred in retaliation for MACS 
     Taylor's refusal to accept Mast. Under this basis, the motion 
     seeks dismissal of all charges added after the refusal of 
     Captain's Mast. The charges sought to be dismissed include 
     all additional specifications related to the 16 November 
     arrest (beyond the one specification from Mast) as well as 
     all specifications related to previous incidents.
       q. LCDR Cole explicitly told MACS Taylor and LT Brod that 
     if Taylor refused Mast ``there would be twenty more charges'' 
     and that he would ``throw the book at him''. These statements 
     demonstrate LCDR Cole's intentions to retaliate if MACS 
     Taylor refused Mast.
       r. Supreme Court and Military decisions support that a 
     large increase in charges after the invocation of a legal 
     right is a strong sign of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Here, 
     the charges jumped from one to forty-eight after MACS Taylor 
     exercised his right to a court-martial. In U.S. v. Davis, the 
     court states that the classic prosecutorial vindictiveness 
     case involves a harsher variation of the same decisions to 
     prosecute. Clearly, if the first decision to prosecute was 
     for only one specification, then a second decision for 48 
     specifications is a harsher variation.
       s. In U.S. v. Martino, 18 M.J. 526 (AFCMR 1984), the 
     government raised the number of charges after the accused 
     refused NJP. The court held such prosecution to be proper. 
     Martino can be distinguished on several bases. First, the 
     court emphasized that the defense counsel asserted 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness with no evidence whatsoever of a 
     vindictive motivation. Further, the government showed 
     evidence of a valid motivation for the difference in number 
     of charges. In the case at bar, however, there is 
     considerable evidence of vindictiveness and there is no 
     evidence of valid government motive for increasing the 
     charges from 1 to 48.
       t. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that 
     in the normal give and take of plea bargaining, a prosecutor 
     has valid discretion to increase and decrease the number of 
     charges in order to secure a guilty plea. Bordenkircher is 
     distinguishable on several grounds. First, in Bordenkircher, 
     the only evident motive on the part of the prosecutor was the 
     non-vindictive motive to receive a guilty plea. In the case 
     at bar, there is considerable evidence of vindictiveness 
     unrelated to the desire to secure a Mast conviction. Second, 
     in Bordenkircher, it was not disputed that the defendant was 
     properly chargeable for the additional charges. In the case 
     at bar, however, there is considerable evidence that there 
     was no valid basis for the additional charges. MACS Taylor's 
     performance evaluation of September 1993 shows the convening 
     authority's acknowledgement that there was no case of 
     dereliction for any prior incidents. Third, the additional 
     charges in the case at bar were not part of the course of 
     normal plea bargaining. MACS Taylor was ordered to attention 
     and threatened with more charges if he did not accept Mast. 
     Further, the military relationship between a Lieutenant 
     Commander and a Senior Chief Petty Officer is one of unequal 
     bargaining power.
       u. In U.S. v. Davis, a claim of prosecutorial 
     vindictiveness was rejected. In Davis, however, there were no 
     additional charges brought in the move from Mast to court-
     martial. In the case at bar, the charges rose from one to 
     forty-eight. Justifying its rejection of the prosecutorial 
     vindictiveness claim, the Davis court stated that the classic 
     case of prosecutional vindictiveness occurs when the number 
     of charges is raised.
       v. U.S. v. Blanchette also involved a rejected 
     prosecutorial vindictiveness claim. That case can be 
     distinguished in that the reason for not charging the accused 
     initially was due to insufficiency of evidence. The court 
     found that the additional charges were justified due to the 
     availability of new evidence. No such evidentiary 
     justifications exist for the government in the case at bar.
       w. In sum, because MACS Taylor refused Mast on one 
     specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority 
     retaliated by preferring forty-seven additional charges 
     against him at a court-martial. The possibility of 
     retaliation is clearly ``realistic'', and the impression made 
     on the accused is clearly one of intimidation. The statements 
     by LCDR Cole are evidence that the convening authority was in 
     fact motivated by vindictiveness. Dismissing the additional 
     charges would be consistent with Supreme Court and Military 
     case law. To allow vindictive charging as occurred here would 
     be to chill the exercise of a sailor's legal right to refuse 
     Captain's Mast. For the foregoing reasons, all charges beyond 
     the initial specification of dereliction of duty should be 
     dismissed.
       5. Evidence.
       a. Witnesses. The defense offers the testimony of the 
     following witnesses in support of this motion: Detective 
     Wunsch, Sergeant Forbes, LCDR Cole, MACS Taylor, Lieutenant 
     Frank, Officer Elgin, Officer Robertson, MACS Kossman, Kari 
     Lee Patterson, DT3 Wright, MS3 Doyle, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Flynt, 
     R.J. Bryan, Petty Officer Bassett, Petty Officer Pringle, 
     Andrew Stewart, LT Morean, Petty Officer Beman Officer 
     Tangonan.
       b. Documents. The following documents will be presented as 
     evidence in support of this motion: Incident Complaint Report 
     (ICR) for Wunsch arrest, ICR for Forbes incident, report of 
     Beman incident, 5 September 1993 Memorandum from LCDR Cole, 
     Bermuda file, MACS Taylor evaluation, Mast charges, Report 
     chit, NJP Refusal Form, Court-martial charges, letter of 
     caution, Bermuda tape, new ICR for 16 November arrest, 
     Barring notice for Doug Lively.
       6. Relief Requested. Pursuant to Basis 1, the defense 
     respectfully requests that all charges be dismissed. Pursuant 
     to Basis 2, the defense respectfully requests that all 
     charges be dismissed. Pursuant to Basis 3, the defense 
     respectfully rests that all charges other than the one 
     specification charged at Mast be dismissed.
       7. Oral Argument. The defense desires to make oral argument 
     of this motion.

                                               Carter F. Brod,

                                                   LT, JAGC, USNR,
                                                  Defense Counsel.
     Date: 23 Mar 94


                         certificate of service

       I, Lieutenant Carter F. Brod, JAGC, USNR, certify that on 
     this 23rd day of March 1944, I personally served upon 
     government trial counsel a true and correct copy of this 
     Motion.
                                  ____



                                    The Secretary of the Navy,

                               Washington, DC, September 13, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Attached are responses to five 
     additional questions forwarded from your Committee regarding 
     the pending confirmation of Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr.
       Again, I hope that my response to these additional 
     questions is helpful and will finally resolve any pending 
     issues.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John H. Dalton.
       Enclosure.
                                  ____

       1. When was Admiral Mauz first informed of the Lieutenant 
     Simmons case? What was he told and by whom?
       Answer. On either 9 or 13 October, Admiral Mauz's Executive 
     Assistant received a call from the Executive Assistant to the 
     Vice Chief of Naval Operations asking whether he had any 
     knowledge of a sexual harassment case on USS CANOPUS 
     concerning Lieutenant Darlene Simmons. Neither Executive 
     Assistant can, today, two years after the fact, recall 
     whether the call occurred on Friday, 9 October or Tuesday, 13 
     October. Both agreed that the call occurred during a normal 
     workday around the Columbus Day weekend, with Monday being a 
     holiday. Both Executive Assistants confirm that this phone 
     call did not include any mention of Lieutenant Simmons' 
     hospitalization. Because this was the first time he had 
     received any indication of a sexual harassment case on USS 
     CANOPUS, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant called Admiral 
     Mauz's Special Assistant for Women's Policy. This was her 
     first notification of a sexual harassment case on USS CANOPUS 
     and she also confirms that this initial notification did not 
     include any mention of hospitalization. Admiral Mauz's 
     Executive Assistant then called the Chief of Staff at 
     COMSUBLANT to inquire. The Chief of Staff was not aware of 
     the case, but indicated that he would look into the matter. 
     One of two working days later, the Chief of Staff called to 
     advise that they had verified that there was a sexual 
     harassment case on the USS CANOPUS, but COMSUBLANT did not 
     have all the details and would inquire further. Admiral 
     Mauz's Executive Assistant advised Admiral Mauz of all these 
     telephone calls.
       2. When did Admiral Mauz find out about Lieutenant 
     Simmons's referral to the psychiatric ward?
       Answer. Lieutenant Simmons was admitted to the hospital on 
     Friday, 9 October and released on Tuesday, 13 October. On 
     Tuesday, October 13, 1992, Admiral Mauz's Special Assistant 
     for Women's Policy began to inquire into the sexual 
     harassment case regarding Lieutenant Simmons. Sometime on 
     October 13 or 14, the Special Assistant for Women's Policy 
     learned that Lieutenant Simmons was hospitalized over the 
     weekend. She verified this hospitalization with medical 
     documentation on October 15. Sometime on October 14 or 15, 
     she advised Admiral Mauz of Lieutenant Simmons's 
     hospitalization. In sum, Admiral Mauz was first advised of 
     Lieutenant Simmons' hospitalization after she was released 
     from the hospital.
       3. Did Admiral Mauz or anyone on his staff know of 
     Lieutenant Simmons's hospitalization or referral for 
     hospitalization at the time of her hospitalization?
       Answer. No.
       4. Was the admitting psychiatrist informed by Navy 
     officials of Lieutenant Simmons' sexual harassment complaint 
     at the tome of admission?
       Answer. The admitting physician, Dr. Quinones, had no 
     knowledge of the sexual harassment allegations at the time of 
     admission.
       5. Did Admiral Mauz investigate the order by the Bermuda 
     commanding officer that Senior Chief Taylor undergo a forced 
     psychiatric examination?
       Answer. No, because the responsibility for the 
     investigation was assigned by the Vice Chief of Naval 
     Operations to the Naval Inspector General, except the 
     reprisal and psychiatric referral, which were assumed by the 
     DoD Inspector General. The allegation of reprisal including a 
     psychiatric referral became first known to the Department of 
     the Navy on December 9, 1992. On December 11, 1992, the Vice 
     Chief of Naval Operations directed the Naval Inspector 
     General to investigate all Senior Chief Taylor's allegations, 
     except the reprisal and psychiatric referral, which were 
     assumed by the DoD Inspector General. On August 16, 1993, the 
     DOD Inspector General concluded in his report that Senior 
     Chief Taylor's ``referral for psychiatric evaluation was 
     justified and was not reprisal.''

  Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, in response to the statements of my 
colleague from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
with respect to the availability of Navy inspector general reports 
through the Armed Services Committee, I want to make sure that the 
record clearly reflects my understanding of the facts in the case of 
Rebecca Hansen.
  I was told by the Navy inspector general that I needed to get a copy 
of his report from the Senate Armed Services Committee. On that same 
day, May 27, 1994, my staff made a request of the Armed Services 
Committee staff for the report. They were told that the reports were 
made available only to the members of that committee. When pressed, the 
Armed Services Committee staff told my staff that they would talk with 
the chairman and see if an exception could be made in the Hansen case.
  After the June recess my staff called again and asked about progress 
on the request. They were told that there had been no progress, but 
that they would expedite getting a response.
  By June 24, 1994, the decision was made to discharge Lieutenant 
(junior grade) Hansen and the Arthur nomination was withdrawn. These 
events removed, to some extent, the urgency of receiving the report.
  But at no time was my staff informed that I could review the report. 
In fact, they were given to believe that the committee staff was 
working to make the report available, but that it was not available to 
me at that time.
  Whether the report would have been made available to me eventually 
was never determined, as events overtook that question and rendered it 
moot.
  Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer] is 
recognized.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  I rise with great respect for the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee. He and I have always been very open with our views when we 
have disagreed, as we do in this case. I understand that he is 
frustrated at the prospect of looking into this matter further.
  I had the honor of serving on the Armed Services Committee in the 
House for several years, and there is a tremendous workload there, 
particularly at a time when there are so many problems in the world 
that may require action.
  So in that context, I say to my friend respectfully, that 
notwithstanding all of those responsibilities, we must always honor our 
responsibility to individuals. It is sometimes a very cumbersome thing. 
We go long distances to protect single individuals, whether it is in 
the courtroom, whether it is in the workplace, in any circumstance, and 
certainly I hope in the U.S. Senate.
  I want to say to my friend and colleague, Senator Murray from 
Washington, that I always have an enormous amount of respect for her. 
To bring this matter forward is not pleasant. As you can see from the 
tenor of the debate so far, it is not pleasant. It is not pleasant to 
stand up and say we are not going to do business as usual. It is not 
pleasant to stop a four-star train from going down the track.
  We faced the same issues in another case--the case of Admiral Kelso. 
Particularly for me, opposing this nomination certainly is not pleasant 
because in California we have an enormous number of retired Navy 
personnel for whom I have great respect.
  But, I want to say to my colleagues, it is because of that great 
respect that I have for the Navy, for the military, and for their 
commitment to this country, that I think we owe it to them that this 
kind of debate is not perfunctory. I wish in many ways we were not 
involved in this issue. I discussed that with the chairman. But the 
fact is article 2, section 2 of the Constitution says we must provide 
our advice and consent on Presidential nominees.
  Therefore, when we put our yes, or no, behind a vote, we need to feel 
good about it. I am sure that my friend from Georgia feels perfectly 
comfortable with this. I assume that my friend from Arizona feels 
extremely comfortable with this nomination. Senator Durenberger, 
although he said he had some reservations, feels that he could vote on 
this nomination. I respect that. That is fine. But if there are some of 
us who believe that there ought to be a little more looking at this 
nomination to see whether the four-star level is deserved, I would hope 
that they would not be subjected to such comments suggesting that we 
don't know anything about the military. It reminds me of an appointee 
of the Reagan administration who said women did not understand the 
concept of throw weight. I remember that. So I hope that we can keep 
this debate on a higher level than that.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, my name was used. Will the gentlelady 
yield?
  Mrs. BOXER. Certainly. I am happy to yield.
  Mr. McCAIN. I am trying to point out to the gentlelady that the chain 
of command is a specific set of words that means a certain thing, and 
that is that it flows to the Commander in Chief.
  Yes, the U.S. Senate has responsibility. In fact, I do not hear the 
Commander in Chief being mentioned in this issue of who is responsible 
and who is in the chain of command. Facts are facts. The Senate has 
responsibilities. The chain of command is very clear. It flows to the 
Commander in Chief who is the President of the United States.
  The Senate has its responsibilities. I do not dispute that. But facts 
are facts, I say to the Senator from California, and the fact is that 
the chain of command is a specific set of responsibilities. I thank the 
gentlelady from California for yielding.
  Mrs. BOXER. I say to the Senator that when we speak on the floor of 
the U.S. Senate, we do take poetic license once in a while, and we will 
use terms to make a point.
  What the Senator from Washington was simply stating in her way was, 
she was not commenting on every single rule and regulation in the 
military. She was basically stating that in her mind the Senate has a 
responsibility here entrusted to us under article 2, section 2 of the 
Constitution.
  The issue at hand is not whether Admiral Mauz deserves four stars. 
The question is, Should we do it today, or should we have a hearing to 
give us a better and deeper look at some of the issues before us?
  I think we should recommit this nomination to the committee. I think 
the Senator from Washington is making a very conservative motion here. 
We should be careful. We should be cautious. It is important. It is 
important to the Navy.
  I believe that we cannot provide our advice and consent on this 
nomination at this time. It is very clear to me that there are 
allegations that have been raised. There are parts of the record that 
are disturbing. There are conflicts in the record, and they involve 
whistleblowers. I go back a long way in the defense of whistleblowers. 
For years on the House side I was involved not only in general 
legislation involving whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act 
and others, but the specific issue of committing military personnel to 
the psychiatric ward in retaliation for whistleblowing. So it is a very 
important issue to me and I have a long history with it.
  In each of the instances of Darlene Simmons and Master Chief George 
Taylor, both were committed for psychiatric evaluations, and it seems a 
little suspicious to me both were working in a chain of command with 
Admiral Mauz at the top.
  I will not restate the facts of the cases, but I will allude to them 
briefly. The one disgraceful similarity, as I have said, is that the 
whistleblowers were ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluation shortly 
after reporting their experiences of sexual harassment in the case of 
Lieutenant Simmons and wasteful military spending in the case of Chief 
Taylor.
  You may say that is just a coincidence, but I think we ought to look 
at it a little bit. It was my amendment offered to the DOD bill in 1990 
that made it illegal to retaliate against whistleblowers by ordering 
them to undergo mental fitness evaluations. That amendment became the 
law of the land.
  We saw psychiatric evaluations being used regularly. As a matter of 
fact, at my request there was an open hearing about those psychiatric 
evaluations. The whistleblowers wanted to come forward and tell their 
story because they were put in the psychiatric ward for no reason other 
than they had blown the whistle against their superiors. They wanted to 
tell their story.
  I want to be very fair here today. The inspector general in fact did 
look at the law and found that the hospitalizations were not 
retaliatory. But I must say, I am still suspicious. And I think all 
Senators should be suspicious. And I think Patty Murray's motion before 
us will help us resolve our suspicions.
  It may very well be that when that hearing is held, we will find out 
that there is no problem, that it is just a coincidence--just a 
coincidence--that two whistleblowers were sent to the psychiatric 
ward--one of them for 4 days.
  Admiral Mauz has been accused by military personnel of improper 
conduct in handling the cases of Lieutenant Simmons and Senior Chief 
Taylor. Now the Senator from Georgia says there is another charge from 
the Government accountability project--by the way a very, very well-
respected nonprofit organization. But I am not going to get into that 
charge. I know nothing about that. I do not even know why the Senator 
from Georgia raised it here. I guess it is just to point out that there 
could be many accusations made against an individual. But I am not 
talking about that new situation.
  In the case of Lieutenant Simmons, Admiral Mauz is accused of being 
derelict in his duty to protect her and to oversee the vigorous 
prosecution of her harasser. In Chief Taylor's case, he is accused of 
attempting to influence a military prosecution not under his 
jurisdiction as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. Those are the 
accusations.
  Let me talk about the case of Lt. Darlene Simmons. This case 
demonstrates that many key issues remain unresolved. It shows why we 
need a full investigative hearing before we can act responsibly on this 
nomination. I would like to lay out my concerns, and I hope that 
Senators are listening. I hope they will vote for the Murray motion so 
that we can investigate these questions. I know that if this issue does 
get remanded to his committee, the Senator from Georgia will do a 
vigorous job of pursuing the truth.
  In the Simmons case, the key question is simple: What did Admiral 
Mauz know and when did he know it? When did he learn about the sexual 
harassment and involuntary hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons? 
Although this nomination has been on the Executive Calendar for more 
than a month, we still do not know the answer. Some Senators may wonder 
why we care so much about this question. But I think we must care. 
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution says we must provide our 
advice and consent on this nomination. Just as we want to know the 
facts about a Supreme Court nominee that comes before us--and we take 
that very seriously--we need to know the facts about this nomination.
  Let me briefly review what we do know about this case. From December 
1991 until May 1992, Lieutenant Simmons was sexually harassed. She 
reported this harassment up the chain of command in accordance with 
Navy procedures, but her complaint seemed to go nowhere. Finally, as 
many of our constituents do, Lieutenant Simmons asked one of her 
State's Senators to intervene on her behalf. On October 9, 1992, the 
Friday preceding the Columbus Day holiday weekend, Lieutenant Simmons 
was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. When a whistleblower 
is ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation--or, frankly, when 
anybody is--on a Friday of a holiday weekend, it automatically arouses 
suspicion. This is because you cannot be released until the next 
business day, the following Tuesday, even if you are quickly found fit 
for duty, which she was. She was found entirely fit for duty; yet, she 
was stuck in a psych ward.
  How would you feel, I say to my colleagues, if that happened to your 
wife or your daughter, or your mother, or your sister, or your aunt? 
You are stuck in a psych ward, and you are perfectly fine, and you 
cannot get out because you were sent there on a Friday, and the rule is 
you cannot get out until the next business day. It is a long holiday 
weekend, and you are perfectly fine, and you are sitting in a psych 
ward.
  This is the United States of America; this is not the former Soviet 
Union. That is why we passed the law that prohibits that kind of 
treatment. But here is a whistleblower who happens to be sent for a 
psych evaluation and happens to be sent on a Friday, and happens not to 
be released until Tuesday. All we are asking is let us take a look at 
this, Armed Services Committee; we need your help. We want to 
understand this better.
  Lieutenant Simmons was a virtual prisoner in a military hospital for 
4 days. Here is the interesting thing: Before Lieutenant Simmons 
reported to the hospital that Friday, she made an important telephone 
call. She telephoned the Under Secretary of the Navy to report that she 
believed that this order was issued in retaliation for her complaints 
of sexual harassment. What happened with that telephone call is the 
subject of my concern about this case.
  We know that the Navy undersecretary gave this information to the 
Vice Chief of Naval Operations and that the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations then gave the information to Admiral Mauz. That is on the 
record. Admiral Mauz was told.
  Here is the key question: When did he know? We tried to get the 
answer. We tried to get the answer from Admiral Mauz, Senator Murray 
and I, and other women Senators, who have been interested and concerned 
about this. We asked the question. Do you know what we got back? 
Different answers.
  Let me tell you what those answers were. The first question was:

       When did Admiral Mauz learn of the Darlene Simmons case of 
     sexual harassment? How was he made aware of this case?

  Answer:

       Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons case of sexual 
     harassment on October 9 or October 13, 1992, by a telephone 
     call * * *.

  I explained who made that call. It was the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations. It is either October 9 or 13. Well, there is a big 
difference between the two. If it was October 9 then perhaps he knew 
Lieutenant Simmons was hospitalized, and perhaps he could have 
intervened. If it was the 13th, that was the end of her confinement.
  Answer:

       Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons case on October 9 or 
     October 13.

  I am troubled by that.
  We asked another question:

       Exactly when did Admiral Mauz and his office learn of 
     Lieutenant Simmons' confinement?

  Answer:

       Admiral Mauz learned of the hospitalization during October 
     1992, after Lieutenant Simmons had been released from the 
     hospital.

  Those answers may be inconsistent. We cannot get what I consider to 
be a straight answer. It is either October 9 or 13, and then it is in 
October after the confinement.
  So it seems to me that we need to look at this. And in addition, we 
need to look at the other issue, the other issue posed by Chief Taylor 
when he reported the fact that Admiral Mauz was using Government 
drivers and cars on a vacation in Bermuda when he was there on 
``official business.'' This story was reported on a TV show. I am not 
one to believe TV shows. As a matter of fact, I discount a lot of what 
I see. But is it not amazing that shortly after this, we have 
harassment of this gentleman, Chief Taylor, and a psychiatric 
evaluation? So you have Chief Taylor blowing the whistle. And, by the 
way, the IG did put a letter into the file of Admiral Mauz saying that 
it was an improper use of this material.
  Let me tell you exactly what was said. The Navy concluded that the 
scheduling of the trip created the perception of impropriety because he 
mixed business and pleasure. Furthermore, it found that Admiral Mauz 
had misused Government property because he requisitioned a military 
vehicle and driver while on personal leave, and he received an official 
letter critical of his action. And then we have a situation where the 
guy who blows the whistle on this activity gets what? He gets a 
psychiatric evaluation. Then we also have on the record a very high-
level staff of Admiral Mauz calling the military prosecutor's office, 
which was looking into a case involving Chief Taylor. By the way, there 
were 48 counts lodged against Chief Taylor, none of which ever came to 
anything. Here you have a guy who blows the whistle, gets sent for a 
psych evaluation, and they bring a case against him in which he is 
ultimately not found guilty of anything.
  All I can say to my colleagues is that we have a responsibility here. 
I do not have enough information to know whether it is just a 
coincidence that these people happen to be sent for a psych evaluation 
because they blew the whistle. I do not have enough information, 
because it is conflicting as to whether or not Admiral Mauz, in fact, 
knew that Darlene Simmons was sent in on a Friday before a long 
holiday. We do not know that.
  So how can we, in good conscience, vote on this today? Senator Murray 
is giving us a way out, a good solid, conservative motion to take a 
hard look at these issues, entrusting it to our Armed Services 
Committee. I think that is a very sensible course.
  I hope our colleagues will go along with the Murray amendment. I am 
proud to be associated with it.
  Again, this is not easy. This is not easy. But once in a while you 
have to slow down the four-star train and take a hard look at what we 
are doing.
  I think at this point we ought to take that hard look and then come 
back and vote on this fourth star.
  I at this time thank the President and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 2582

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole and myself, I 
send an amendment in the first degree to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself and Mr. 
     Dole, proposes an amendment numbered 2582.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the instructions add the following:
       The Senate finds that:
       The President has proposed to use the United States Armed 
     Forces to intervene militarily in the situation in Haiti;
       The stated purpose of the proposed United States military 
     intervention in Haiti is the restoration by force of Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide to the Office of President of Haiti;
       The President has not presented a comprehensive case for 
     United States military intervention in Haiti to either the 
     American people or their representatives in Congress;
       The support of the American people is critically important 
     to the success of any offensive military action;
       All national public opinion surveys taken to date establish 
     that a substantial majority of Americans oppose United States 
     military intervention in Haiti;
       The State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 
     Practices for 1991 characterized President Aristide's regime 
     as ``unwilling or unable to restrain popular justice through 
     mob violence'';
       Allegations connecting President Aristide to several 
     incidents of human rights abuses, including allegations of 
     his involvement in the assassination of a political opponent, 
     remain unresolved;
       United States vital national security interests are not 
     threatened by the situation in Haiti;
       It is the sense of the Senate that the Armed Services 
     Committee also consider the fact that it is the sense of the 
     Senate:
       That the lives of United States Armed Forces personnel 
     should not be risked in combat for the purpose of restoring 
     Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the office of President of Haiti.

  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, will the 
Senator explain the first-degree amendment? There is so much buzz on 
the floor I did not hear it.
  Mr. McCAIN. I am glad to explain to the Senator from Maryland.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Moseley-Braun). The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, this amendment expresses the sense of 
the Senate that the lives of the United States armed service forces 
personnel should not be risked in combat for the purpose of restoring 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the office of President of Haiti.
  The fact is that it is well known that the President of the United 
States intends to invade Haiti, probably this weekend, and 73 percent 
of the American people are opposed to that invasion.
  The President of the United States has had the time to consult with 
various countries, including the United Nations Security Council. He 
has had time to consult with and get the agreement from Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Britain, Dominica, Guyana, Israel, Jamaica, the Netherlands, 
Panama, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago.
  The President has been unable or unwilling to come to the Congress of 
the United States and seek our approval for this invasion.
  Madam President, I want to make it perfectly clear I do not believe 
that the United States is constitutionally bound to seek the approval 
of the Congress of the United States, although in the case of the 
Persian Gulf and several other occasions the Congress of the United 
States has acted in an affirmative fashion.
  The fact is 73 percent of the American people, according to a poll 
yesterday, are opposed to this invasion. The President of the United 
States has refused to come to receive our approval.
  The Secretary of State over the weekend and the United Nations 
representative have both stated that the President will not.
  So, Madam President, in this rather unusual fashion, I intend to 
force a vote on this issue before this weekend because that is the time 
of this invasion as we all know, perhaps the most publicized invasion 
in the history of warfare.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH and Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is advised I 
had heard and seen the Senator from Maryland on her feet previously.
  Mr. SMITH. She was not even on the floor, as I recall, at the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I rise to----
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Address the original topic of debate of the Senator 
from the State of Washington.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. I believe I have the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Maryland yield?
  Ms. MIKULSKI. No, I do not yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator does not yield.
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I rise today to explain why I support 
the motion to recommit the retirement of Adm. Henry Mauz to the Armed 
Services Committee with instructions to hold a hearing on Admiral Mauz' 
retirement at four stars.
  Today, we debate the retirement of Adm. Henry Mauz. Let me say first 
that I do not prejudge any of the allegations made against Admiral 
Mauz. There is no doubt that he has had a distinguished career.
  But, Madam President, I also acknowledge the right of those within 
this Chamber who wish to debate Haiti, but I would wish out of respect 
for the admiral and the process that we complete the debate on the 
motion to recommit of the Senator from the State of Washington. I 
believe we conclude that debate in a crisp and civil fashion and then 
upon the conclusion of that debate, I understand it is the intention 
that was agreed upon by both the Republican leader and the Democratic 
leader to have full and ample debate on the Haiti issue.
  I now understand there is a first-degree amendment pending. I am not 
going to go through the parliamentary quagmire or the parliamentary 
thicket.
  But I do ask my colleagues to then let us move forward on the debate 
on the Mauz nomination and whether or not we should return it to 
committee.
  Good people with good intentions can have civil debate on this topic, 
and we can conclude it. Then we can move on to the 7 hours to talk 
about Haiti. We can listen to the President tomorrow night, and we can 
debate Haiti all of next week. But let us, out of respect for the 
admiral, move ahead and at least have a vote on this issue. I believe 
we can conclude it.
  That is why I wish to say about the Mauz issue, I do not prejudge any 
of the allegations made against him. I acknowledge the validity of 
recommending him for four stars.
  What I have questions about is the process. I have more questions 
about the process than in some ways I have about the admiral.
  The questions about the admiral are how he handled charges of sexual 
harassment by Lt. Darlene Simmons, and charges of retaliation against a 
whistleblower, Senior Chief George Taylor, and allegations made about 
the admiral by even those within this body.
  There are many unanswered questions. Earlier this month, my 
colleagues, Senators Murray, Moseley-Braun, Boxer, and Feinstein, and I 
wrote to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee to urge the 
committee to hold a hearing on the unanswered questions.
  I ask unanimous consent that our letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, September 9, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On August 12, the Committee on Armed 
     Services reported out the nomination of Admiral Henry Mauz, 
     Jr., US Navy, to retire in grade. Because important questions 
     have been raised about this nomination, we are writing to 
     request that a public hearing be held by your Committee prior 
     to Senate consideration of Admiral Mauz's retirement status.
       As you know, Lt. Darlene Simmons alleges inappropriate 
     action by Admiral Mauz with respect to the investigation and 
     disposition of her sexual harassment case. In addition, 
     Senior Chief George Taylor alleges that Admiral Mauz 
     inappropriately used government assets and retaliated against 
     a whistleblower. Both Lt. Simmons and Senior Chief Taylor 
     have written to the Committee expressing the view that 
     Admiral Mauz should not be retired at four stars.
       We are concerned that the allegations raised against 
     Admiral Mauz are sufficiently troubling to merit an open and 
     full public hearing. While we in no way seek to pass 
     judgement on any of the allegations involved, we do believe 
     that a public hearing would serve to answer the important 
     questions that have been raised.
       Thank you for your consideration of our request.
           Sincerely,
     Patty Murray,
     Carol Moseley-Braun,
     Barbara Mikulski,
     Barbara Boxer,
     Dianne Feinstein.

  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, the letter talks about how we are 
concerned that the allegations raise questions that we should have a 
hearing. While we in no way seek to pass judgment, we do believe that 
there are questions related to how certain allegations that were made 
were handled.
  There is conflicting and contradictory information about how the Navy 
and Admiral Mauz handled the Simmons sexual harassment case. There is 
conflicting information regarding what steps were taken and when they 
were taken to address the harassment issue. There is conflicting 
information regarding whether Admiral Mauz allowed an adverse fitness 
report by senior officers in Lieutenant Simmons' chain of command to go 
unchecked.
  Now, the Senator from California has gone into this in great detail 
and, therefore, I will not need to go into those issues, but they are 
the questions that we have submitted to the committee.
  The admiral has been accused of retaliating against a whistleblower. 
Senior Chief George Taylor, raised those questions about the propriety 
of a trip that the admiral took to the Naval Air Station in Bermuda.
  Now all of us know what that is like. You take a trip, you try to do 
business, and then you could be accused of any number of things. We all 
understand that.
  So all we want to do is get to the facts; get to the facts.
  There was contradictory information about whether Senior Chief Taylor 
was transferred to another assignment and charged with insubordination 
and retribution for reporting the admiral's alleged misconduct in 
Bermuda. And I keep saying ``alleged.'' I want to underline--a-l-l-e-g-
e-d--alleged. We just want to clear it up. We want to clarify the 
controversy.
  There is contradictory information regarding whether or not Admiral 
Mauz used the Navy resources for his personal benefit.
  These are serious allegations and discrepancies which should fully be 
aired. I do not accuse the Navy of mishandling either this case or the 
disciplinary action against Senior Chief Taylor.
  But I do believe, because of the serious nature of these various 
charges, a full and open hearing should be held before the Senate votes 
on Admiral Mauz's retirement at the rank of four stars.
  I believe that a hearing will get all involved--the Navy, the 
admiral, the lieutenant, the chief--the chance to present their story.
  Now Senator Murray has submitted a 3-page list of questions to the 
Armed Services Committee. A hearing will give the Navy the chance to 
answer those questions and any others. A hearing will give Senators the 
chance to make their own determination as to whether these incidents 
were handled appropriately.
  We have a very able chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, whose 
career within this body is distinguished. I believe that he has tried 
to handle many of these nominations in the most expeditious way. But 
the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee raises the 
question about how he cannot hold investigative hearings on each and 
every situation. And we understand that.
  But what we are saying to the members of the Armed Services 
Committee, what we are saying to the Armed Services Committee is we 
need to anticipate those situations that are high profile and highly 
controversial, anticipate the type of questions that we would have on 
those issues, and then anticipate what we need to answer in order to 
move on the fitness or whether we should proceed with the 
recommendations. That is what we are saying.
  But, do you know what? There was talk about the Commander in Chief; 
there was talk about the Navy. I would like to raise a question with 
the Secretaries of the armed services personnel, whether it is the 
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the 
Air Force, which is when a nomination or a recommendation is coming 
forward, anticipate the controversy; anticipate the questions; work 
with the committee.
  This committee has had a wonderful reputation for bipartisanship. The 
relationship between Senator Nunn of Georgia and Senator John Warner of 
Virginia, I believe, is a model of cooperation and civility that should 
be a hallmark of this entire institution. We need less partisanship, 
less bickering, and they have done that in the Armed Services 
Committee.
  Now when they look to the executive branch to send over those 
nominations or recommendations on rank for retirement, they should 
anticipate that and answer those questions. And that is what we are now 
faced with here. Somehow or another, we did not close the loop on this.
  It is not with joy that the women of the U.S. Senate keep raising 
these issues. It is not with joy that we keep doing that. We respect 
our U.S. military. And, on the brink of a possible military action, we 
want to show our enthusiastic support for the U.S. military. We do not 
want to be jackpotted. But we are continually jackpotted by the 
bungling processes that come before us.
  We honor and respect the men and women who make heroic sacrifices, 
and some are on this floor and some have spoken earlier today who have 
made incredible sacrifices. We are not hear to fussbudget. We are not 
fussbudget Senators. We have to take these things seriously.
  We thought when we raised the Kelso issue that we had changed the 
culture. We did not change the culture because they very shortly 
followed with this.
  Now, once again, an admiral with a distinguished history of 35 years 
of service is now here while we raise three pages of questions. The 
questions that the gentlelady from the State of Washington has raised 
are the questions that the Secretary of Navy should have raised and 
gotten the answers; should have anticipated that when he came to the 
distinguished chairman and the ranking Republican on that committee, 
that they would have those questions. And that is what we are saying. 
Anticipate the needs, anticipate the questions that would be raised in 
high-profile cases.
  Nominations have been held up or other recommendations have been held 
up in the Foreign Relations Committee for Ambassadors, and so on. So we 
should not be accused of holding something up. And we should not be 
accused of being the problem.
  Now this takes me to something else.
  And I would like to compliment the gentlelady from the State of 
Washington for the outstanding job that she has done to raise these 
issues. As she said, she felt that she had the responsibility to raise 
the questions--that is all we are doing--raise the questions and let us 
get the answers and let us get on with it.
  But what disturbed me is not only where the Secretaries of the U.S. 
military continue not to anticipate what we would be raising on some of 
these high-profile issues, but when we raise the issues, we become the 
issue. And that is what has happened to the junior Senator from the 
State of Washington. When she raised the issue, suddenly she became the 
problem.
  When we raise the issue, it looks like the Democratic women are the 
problem. Madam President, we are not the gender cops of the U.S. 
Senate. We do not see ourselves as the gender cops of the U.S. Senate.
  But we do believe we need to stand sentry over making sure that 
questions raised are questions answered. That is all we are saying.
  I believe that what has happened to the junior Senator from the State 
of Washington is not a very nice thing. She has been made the issue. 
She has been hounded into letting this nomination go. Tart things were 
said about her behind her back, to her face, and even on this floor. 
This Senator knows the chain of command. She spoke about it in terms of 
responsibility.
  We are getting all jacked up and juiced up about being self-
righteous. All we are saying is, the reason we want this to be referred 
to the committee is for questions to be answered.
  But I come back to, yes, the Secretary of Defense and his 
Secretaries, where there are high-profile cases with controversy there, 
raise those questions and so on. And then when the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee says this is more than they 
can handle, I believe we could handle them if they were handled first 
at the executive branch and then, second, we need to anticipate them in 
the committee.
  Now we have just had an unfortunate thing occur on this floor about 
the recognition. I would like to say to the distinguished Senator from 
New Hampshire, who is one of the most active members of the Ethics 
Committee and who I have been with and in circumstances requiring 
integrity and judgment and so on, I can only attest to his, to his; and 
also to his own deep commitment to the U.S. military. I regret that 
there seems to be some confusion over recognition. I understand that 
the Senator from Illinois took the chair in anticipation of my speaking 
in support of this motion, and that I was to speak at this time.
  But, Madam President, I do believe that it would be in the interest 
of all concerned if we could conclude the debate on the pending request 
of the junior Senator from Washington, that we vote on this, that it be 
one way or the other; that one way or the other the Senate exercises 
its will. And that we then conclude that and then move on to what needs 
to be a robust, amplified, and extensive debate on the Haiti question.

  So, Madam President, we are on the eve of Yom Kippur when all people 
reflect on their souls, and I hope we will take this time over the next 
few days to reflect on our own role in public policy, where we do our 
best and where we serve. We ask, then, that we really cooperate in 
terms of bringing certain issues to closure, being able to move forward 
on this, having the debate.
  And I note that on the floor is the distinguished chairman of the 
committee. I would like to say to that Senator, we thank you for your 
cooperation. I think you know what we have raised. We have discussed it 
one other time, where the executive branch needs to beef up its 
investigation on complaints. But we really do believe the Secretaries 
of the various armed services should anticipate these concerns. I just 
want to say to you: We do not want to be fussbudgets. As I said, we do 
not see ourselves as gender cops.
  Also, whether we are on the brink of a military action or whether we 
are not, I can say as the dean of the Democratic women, we respect the 
U.S. military. We so want to work with them. And one of the finest 
opportunities I have had is being on the board of visitors of the U.S. 
Naval Academy to help produce naval officers for the 21st century and 
working with the Senator from Arizona on accomplishing that. And of 
course we look forward to working with you on that.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Maryland, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maryland. I can 
assure her that our committee and I personally will continue to work 
very diligently with the military services because I think they 
recognize that they are going through a difficult transition. I think 
they know that this transition is going to be several years in process. 
I think they understand that they are going to have to act on sexual 
harassment or sexual assault cases in a very timely, expeditious manner 
and a thorough manner in fairness to all the parties, both the alleged 
victims and the people who are accused and to our top ranking 
officials.
  That is a continuing process. It is far from perfect now. There are a 
lot of improvements that have to be made, and I will certainly pledge 
to continue to work with the Senator from Maryland along that line.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been noted. The 
clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. When a Senator is 
seeking recognition on the floor on a debate, why are we going into a 
quorum call?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum call is in progress.
  Mr. SMITH. What is going on? Madam President, may the Senator from 
New Hampshire call the quorum off so he can speak on the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has a right to 
request the quorum call. The quorum call is in progress.
  Mr. SMITH. I ask unanimous consent the quorum call be dispensed with, 
Madam President.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I object but I will not object for long. I 
object for a moment. I have to confer for a moment, and then I will 
withdraw my objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The bill clerk resumed the call of the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it so 
ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I know the Senator from New Hampshire has 
been on the floor for quite awhile and desires to be recognized. I know 
he is on the floor seeking recognition. I hope the Chair will recognize 
him. I know he has remarks on this nomination. I also know the Senator 
from South Carolina has not made his remarks on the Mauz nomination. So 
I hope that both of them will present their views.
  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader, the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, my understanding now is that the 
Senator from New Hampshire, followed by the distinguished Senator from 
South Carolina, and then followed by the Senator from Texas, all are to 
address the Senate on the subject of the Mauz nomination.
  Following the remarks of the Senator from Texas, a quorum call will 
be called by either the chairman or whoever is acting in his behalf on 
this side. We discussed this here. There is no time limitation on the 
Senators. They are free to discuss it as long as they wish.
  My request is that first Senator Smith be recognized to address the 
Senate with respect to the Mauz nomination; that upon the completion of 
his remarks, Senator Thurmond be recognized for the same purpose; and 
that upon the completion of Senator Thurmond's remarks, Senator 
Hutchison be recognized for the same purpose; that upon the 
completion--perhaps I should inquire on the length of time. If he could 
just give some idea.
  Mr. SMITH. Approximately 15 minutes.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Fifteen minutes?
  Mr. SMITH. Approximately.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Why do we not say the Senator be recognized for up to 
20 minutes? That will give him plenty of time on that subject.
  Mr. SMITH. That should be sufficient.
  Mr. MITCHELL. And the Senator from South Carolina to be recognized 
for 5 minutes. Then the Senator from Texas for up to 15 minutes, 
following which there will be a quorum call, and I will then be 
recognized following the quorum call.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  To the Senator from New Hampshire, the Senator is over 6 feet by, I 
imagine, about 4 inches, and the Senator from Maryland is probably less 
than 5 feet no inches. But the fact is, the Chair saw and heard the 
Senator from Maryland prior to the Senator from New Hampshire, and that 
is why the priority of recognition pursuant to our rules was given.
  It is the Chair's hope that the Senator from New Hampshire takes no 
personal affront or offense from the priority of recognition being 
given under the rules based on the fact of the Chair having seen and 
heard the Senator from Maryland previously.
  The Senator from New Hampshire is now recognized for up to 15 
minutes.
  Mr. SMITH. Up to 20 minutes, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Up to 20 minutes.


                         privilege of the floor

  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent 
that a fellow in the office of Senator Hutchison, Colonel Dave Davis, 
be allowed the privilege of the floor during this debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, since you brought this up, the Record and 
the recording will make very clear what happened. I do not wish to 
pursue this in an argumentative manner, nor do I take it personally--I 
do not think it is a personal matter--but I think the Record will very 
clearly show that the Senator from Maryland was not seeking recognition 
at the time that the Senator from New Hampshire was seeking 
recognition.
  The Record will also show during the time when two of your 
predecessors were in the chair, the Senator from New Hampshire was on 
the floor for approximately 2 hours seeking recognition while the 
chairman, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator 
Murray, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator 
Boxer, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator Nunn, 
again was recognized on your side of the aisle; then Senator Mikulski 
was recognized, and all of the time, all during that debate, I sought 
recognition after each one of those individuals. So that is the Record. 
The Record will also show that I called at least three times asking for 
recognition from the Chair, and the Chair did not recognize me.
  That is the Record. I do not wish to pursue it anymore on my time. 
The Record speaks for itself, Madam President. I do not question 
anybody's motives.
  Madam President, with all of the hoopla here, I was simply trying to 
get the floor to support my chairman in your party, by the way, Senator 
Nunn, and to support the ranking member of this committee, on behalf of 
the nomination of Admiral Mauz to retire in grade. That is all I have 
been trying to do. I regret that it has taken so much time to get here 
to do it. I think we ought to be a little bit more fair in terms of 
recognition in the debate. There will be other opportunities at some 
point in the future, maybe it might be January, it may be later--I hope 
it is January--when this party will have the majority in the Senate.
  I wish to caution my colleagues on what is becoming what I believe to 
be a very unfair and increasingly damaging perversion of this whole 
confirmation process. It is simply impossible for the Senate to look 
over the shoulders of the UCMJ or all the decisions that are made 
throughout the military and do our job, the very extensive job that we 
have to do, from nominations to the budget and other things that we do 
in the Armed Services Committee.
  I wish to reaffirm my absolute support for the Senate's 
constitutional prerogatives to advise and consent on this nomination or 
any other nomination. The Senator from Washington has the perfect right 
to recommit this. It is certainly within her prerogatives. I do not 
question that. The advise and consent process is a fundamental element 
of our system of checks and balances and each of us should take it very 
seriously.
  But, unfortunately, there has been a growing trend among Members of 
this body to exploit the military nomination process in a manner that 
runs very contrary to how the framers intended it. There seems to be 
this lofty theory of accountability, accountability for some and not 
accountability for others. And it has become standard fare for a select 
few to slander and denigrate the service of our distinguished military 
leaders, leaving their reputations tarnished and their career history 
distorted in the Senate. We saw it with Admiral Kelso. We saw it with 
Admiral Arthur. We are seeing it again today with Admiral Mauz, where a 
very small minority is seeking--maybe not seeking, but in fact 
accomplishing--the tarnishing of the 35-year career of an outstanding 
military leader based on allegations which are, frankly, 
unsubstantiated, and this cannot be allowed to occur.
  That is why Chairman Nunn is out here today and why Senator Thurmond 
is out here today, and others, speaking so strongly and forcefully, 
because 22 members of the Armed Services Committee, of both political 
parties, from the liberal to the conservative side, said that this 
nomination should go forward--22 to zero. That is a fact. We do not 
take this lightly. We do our job. And we did do our job. We did it. And 
we did it well under the leadership of this chairman. Numerous meetings 
were held and numerous investigations were held, and we looked into it. 
I happened to look into it personally every step of the way.
  Admiral Mauz has been nominated by the President of the United States 
to retire in grade as a four-star admiral. The President made this 
decision. The Secretary of Defense made this decision. The Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs made this decision. The Secretary of the Navy made 
this decision. And the CNO made this decision.
  Madam President, 22 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
in a vote of 22 to nothing, made this decision. But that is not good 
enough. We have to come out in the Chamber now and tarnish this 
brilliant military leader, who had a brilliant military career, who 
served his country well. Now he has to go out with this on his record, 
because this will be part of the debate.
  It is a textbook story. He has a long list of awards. And I will not 
go through them all, but to begin with: Four Distinguished Service 
Medals, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the 
Bronze Star with a Combat ``V,'' the Meritorious Service Medal, three 
Navy Achievement Medals, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Navy Unit 
Commendation Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation Medal, Japanese Order 
of the Rising Sun, and on and on and on, including eight relating to 
service in Vietnam.
  This is an impressive record. And, yes, if he was even remotely 
guilty of some of the things that have been said about him in looking 
the other way at harassment and this nonsense, he should be held 
accountable, but that is not the case. The President knows it. The 
Secretary of Defense knows it. The Secretary of the Navy knows it. That 
is why his nomination is being recommended to retire in the four-star 
grade. His reputation should not be destroyed in the Senate. It is 
outrageous.
  To those very few Members who are seeking to prevent Admiral Mauz 
from retiring in grade, I say the burden of proof lies with you, not 
with him. It lies with you. He has served his Nation for 35 years. His 
career is an open book. His cards are on the table. He put them there. 
On the contrary, those who are alleging this improper conduct and are 
alleging that we did not do our job in the Armed Services Committee do 
not have any substance for these allegations.
  They are allegations. That is all they are. This is a critical point. 
Those who are opposing the nomination are also criticizing this 
committee, maybe not openly, but blatantly underlying that is the 
message: We did not do our job. And I resent it, frankly. I resent it, 
because I know how hard Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond and other 
members of this committee worked to try to review it.
  We have had nomination after nomination. Every single time any member 
of that committee, any Member of the Senate, for that matter, has ever 
raised an objection to anybody, I do not care if it is a lieutenant, 
this chairman has given us the opportunity to be heard--every time, 
every single time. Sometimes they are frivolous, too, but we are heard. 
Never has he pushed a nomination through. From the most junior member 
of the committee to the most senior member of the committee, they are 
treated equally under this chairman.
  The truth is that the committee thoroughly and methodically 
investigated every single one of these allegations against Admiral 
Mauz. Now, maybe some do not like the result, but the truth is they 
were investigated and there is nothing there--nothing there, period.
  The criticism being lodged against Admiral Mauz centers on his 
alleged mishandling of a sexual harassment case. It has been debated he 
is not involved in sexual harassment, lest some think he may be. He did 
not condone it. He is a four-star admiral. He is trying to do his job 
in the fleet to conduct the operations that a four-star admiral has to 
do, and something happened down in his command. It was bad, no question 
about it, and disciplinary action was taken.
  If someone in one of our offices commits a crime tonight, is that our 
fault? Is that our fault? Should we be held responsible? Maybe we 
should resign because of it. That is the logic being used here. We are 
totally accountable for everybody else's actions. Nobody is accountable 
for their own actions.
  The Senator from Washington is alleging that Admiral Mauz used his 
position to protect those guilty of sexual harassment and to cover up 
alleged improper handling. It could not be further from the truth. 
These are very serious allegations. They are not supported by the 
facts.
  The truth is that an individual was harassed. We went through all of 
that. I am not going to mention names. Admiral Mauz did not learn of it 
until October 1992. We cannot micromanage every single decision in the 
command of an admiral or a general or anybody else. It is impossible. 
Anybody who even remotely understands the military would understand 
that; even if you remotely understand it. When he learned of what 
happened, he investigated it immediately, and even assigned a member of 
his personal staff, his Special Assistant for Women's Affairs, to 
assist with the investigation to ensure that the victim had direct 
contact to Admiral Mauz at all times.
  That did not end Admiral Mauz' involvement in this case. In fact, 
upon reviewing the proposed inspector general's report, Admiral Mauz 
was dissatisfied and he returned the report for more specific 
accountability. He personally intervened at the flag level twice in an 
effort to retain the victim in the Navy. He directed corrective action 
to ensure that there was no repeat of the harassment in the Atlantic 
Fleet or the Navy. I can say with all personnel in the Navy from the 
highest levels--CNO on down--since I have been on this committee, and 
since I have been in the Congress, there have been cases of sexual 
harassment, and they have tried to look into them and to deal with them 
fairly and appropriately. This admiral did the same. This is not 
dereliction of duty.
  And to bring Admiral Mauz back up before another hearing, the damage 
will be done. It is being done now as we debate it on the floor of the 
Senate. It should not be here being debated frankly on the floor of the 
Senate. It can be. It has a right to be. But there is no reason, none, 
for it to be here. It is just that somebody does not accept the 
investigation.
  So here is an opportunity to be macho here to show we are not going 
to let anybody get away with sexual harassment. Nobody got away with 
sexual harassment. Nobody got away with it. Admiral Mauz did not 
tolerate it, and he ought to be commended instead of being challenged 
on his integrity.
  The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda, thoroughly reviewed 
this case and Admiral Mauz' involvement and determined that Admiral 
Mauz did not suppress the evidence of any inquiry, did not fail to take 
corrective action on behalf of the victim, nor did he fail to follow 
proper procedures on inquiries into allegations; and, further, the CNO 
determined the Atlantic Fleet did not cover up the nature and the 
extent of these actions.
  I do not profess to say that Admiral Mauz and 35 years of military 
service made flawless judgments. Does anyone in the Senate consider 
themselves flawless in their judgments in every decision that you have 
ever made? He surely has not. I surely have not. I am speaking for 
myself. But who among us could hold up such a standard? No one.
  The issue before the Senate is whether his 35 years of service to our 
Nation warrant retirement in a grade of a four-star admiral. That is 
the issue. It is not a gift. He earned it. He earned the fourth star--
earned, not gift. Understand what the military means. Do you realize 
what is happening out there today in this military situation? We have 
people in some cases that have been home 3 or 4 weeks in the last year 
while they have been in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cuba, and where else? 
How much more do we ask of these people? They give their service to 
their country.
  They come to retire in the fourth star, in this case an admiral, and 
what do we do? We beat him up on the floor of the Senate and try to get 
a hearing to beat him up again. So he has to have that stigma with him 
for the rest of his life. It is disgraceful. It has to stop. We are 
losing good people in the U.S. Navy and all across the board in the 
military because of this stuff--good people; people that fought these 
wars and won these wars for us, who won the cold war for us.
  I have several cases right now before me as a Senator, good people 
being basically harassed out of the service. You talk about harassment, 
being harassed out of the service because they are fed up with it, they 
cannot take it anymore. He served 35 years, and to just be treated like 
this. This is an honorable man.
  My colleague from Washington and those who are joining her are saying 
in effect if you are fortunate enough to survive the reductions in 
force, serve your Nation with distinction, reach the pinnacle of 
success in your field, Senators still may decide that politics is more 
important than your reputation, and torpedo your retirement. It is 
bullying. What can the man do? He has to answer. He has to come up 
here, and he did answer. He answered through the proper channels--throw 
out our constitutional obligations, throw them out the window----
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SMITH. I will not yield.
  Mrs. BOXER. I want to make a----
  Mr. SMITH. to be politically correct--Madam President, I would 
appreciate order. We should accommodate our responsibilities fairly and 
objectively. This is an outrage. It reflects very poorly on this 
institution, and it must not be permitted to prevail. I am extremely 
sensitive again to the underlying charges that somehow this committee 
was derelict. One or two, you might make that charge, but 22 to 0, 
including the chairman and the ranking member.
  Let me conclude on the limited remarks that I agreed to, even though 
there is no limit to this debate and I finally was recognized, by 
urging my colleagues to reject this motion to recommit, reject this 
motion to recommit and accept the fact that Chairman Sam Nunn and 
Senator Strom Thurmond and 20 other members of this committee 
thoroughly investigated these charges and found them wanting. They are 
not worthy of the debate on the floor. He did nothing wrong. On the 
contrary, he did everything right. He checked it out as he should. He 
is a good admiral. He is a good soldier. He deserves to retire in that 
fourth star without any negative stigma being thrown his way as he 
leaves the military. Have the decency at least to allow this great 
soldier the opportunity to do that.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  [Applause in the galleries.]
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be no disturbance in the gallery or 
the people will be removed by the Sergeant at Arms.
  The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I previously have spoken on this 
matter so I shall make very brief remarks.
  I just want to say that I oppose the motion to recommit Admiral Mauz' 
nomination. The Armed Services Committee has thoroughly reviewed each 
allegation and voted 22 to nothing in favor of the nomination. There 
are three issues:
  Admiral Mauz' trip to Bermuda. This was investigated by the Navy, and 
Admiral Mauz was censured by the Navy.
  Next, Lieutenant Simmons was verbally harassed, which was wrong. 
Admiral Mauz was three levels of command above Lieutenant Simmons.
  The next is the Navy and the DOD investigated the allegations of 
reprisal and found no wrongdoing on the part of Admiral Mauz. That was 
proper. He was three levels above her.
  Now, if she wanted to bring allegations against her commanding 
officer, that is one thing. But to go above that and above that and 
above that, and the admiral probably did not even know about the matter 
because her commander should have handled that.
  The next is, Master Chief Taylor says that Admiral Mauz influenced 
the court-martial charges against him and reprisal for whistle blowing. 
Again, the Navy and the DOD investigated and found no connection to 
Admiral Mauz. He did not even know about this.
  This nomination has been pending since May 10. This great man, 
admiral in the Navy--the nomination was sent to us May 10. We spent 4 
months on it. It is an injustice to a man like that to hold it up when 
there is no real reason. He deserves to retire in grade.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against the motion to recommit and to 
vote in favor of Admiral Mauz' nomination to retire as an admiral. I 
just want to say that he has had 35 years' service, valuable service, 
during some of the most critical time in our Nation's history. He has 
commanded riverboats in Vietnam, big ships of war, the U.S. 7th Fleet, 
and is currently serving as commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet involving about 140,000 people.
  I just cannot imagine after these things have been investigated by 
the Navy, and then further by the Defense Department, that it would 
continue to go on and haunt this man. He deserves better. He is a great 
patriot. We are proud of him. And I hope this nomination will go 
through and not be recommitted.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I am rising to speak against the 
motion to recommit the nomination of Admiral Mauz. But let me say that 
I do commend Senator Murray for having the courage to raise the 
questions. I raised many of the same questions in committee. I have 
worked with Admiral Boorda. I have had the questions answered to my 
satisfaction, which is why I wanted to speak here today.
  But Senator Murray did call me to raise concerns, to ask questions, 
which I appreciate very much. I think she has handled this very 
professionally, and I certainly know that sometimes it is difficult 
when you are raising an issue, where there are competing and very valid 
views. So I do want to commend her. But I have come to a different 
conclusion from Senator Murray, such that I am satisfied that we do not 
have to go back to the committee. I am on the committee and, as you 
know, I have raised questions before and have gotten the answers that I 
asked for. I have worked with the chairman of the committee, Senator 
Nunn. He has been very forthcoming. I want to say that the committee 
has, in every instance where there is a question about a nomination, 
been very careful to inform members of the committee that there is a 
question on the nomination. The committee has gone overboard to get 
information. I have asked for information and I have received 
information. I do commend the chairman of the committee, who has had a 
tough time dealing with so many questions about so many nominations. I 
know that in a future time we are going to talk about how we can 
satisfy everyone in the nomination process and also protect the people 
who are involved in questionable situations. So it is difficult, and I 
commend the chairman and the ranking Member, and I also commend Senator 
Murray.
  Let me say that I have come to a different conclusion, because when I 
asked the questions, I felt that Admiral Mauz really has done an 
exemplary job of handling a very delicate situation. So let me speak on 
a couple of the questions and then go forward.
  We do know that Admiral Mauz has had a distinguished career, with 
over 35 years of service to our Nation. When allegations are made 
against a senior officer in Admiral Mauz's situation, the Armed 
Services Committee must investigate the charges to determine if the 
officer in question deserves the benefit of retirement at a higher 
grade. In this case, my colleagues and I on the committee, after 
reviewing the evidence and documentation and reexamining certain 
aspects of it over a period of weeks and months, voted unanimously to 
approve the nomination of Admiral Mauz to retire in grade. Clearly, 
this was a poll and not a vote of the committee as a whole, but that 
was because of the constraint of time and the difficulty of getting a 
committee meeting when we were in, I believe, the health care debate at 
the time.
  I want to talk about a couple of the issues that have been mentioned. 
First, there was one allegation about an official trip to Bermuda in 
November 1992. Believing there was impropriety in the Admiral's 
actions, CPO George R. Taylor registered an initially anonymous 
complaint through the Navy's complaint hotline. Chief Taylor also 
alerted ABC-TV news, which did produce an account of the event in the 
news story. In this case, Admiral Mauz clearly made a mistake. Anyone 
with a long and distinguished career certainly makes mistakes, and I 
think that we have been able to weigh that lapse, and I think he has 
paid for any indiscretion that was made.
  The issue that concerns me here is the sexual harassment complaint 
that was brought by Lt. Darlene Simmons, who was the victim of verbal 
harassment of a superior officer while serving on the U.S.S. Canopus. 
Admiral Mauz had an important and affirmative responsibility as 
commander of the Atlantic Fleet. To have fallen short of the discharge 
of his duties--to ensure a swift, thorough, and impartial 
investigation, appropriate disciplinary action and effective followup--
would have been, in my view, a serious breach of his command 
responsibilities. But the record reflects that Admiral Mauz's actions 
were a model for effective leadership. Although he was fleet commander, 
separated from Lieutenant Simmons by several levels of command, he 
personally became involved to ensure that Lieutenant Simmons was 
treated fairly.
  When the harassment complaint reached his desk, Admiral Mauz assigned 
a member of his staff, his Special Assistant for Women's Affairs, 
Comdr. Cathy Miller, to investigate the incident. The investigation led 
to the removal of the offending officer from the ship and his 
subsequent retirement from the Navy.
  In the wake of the disciplinary actions against the offending 
individual, Admiral Mauz ordered additional instruction in handling 
sexual harassment matters for the captain and officers of the Canopus. 
He also took it upon himself to initiate two official messages to the 
Atlantic Fleet. First, in April 1993, he directed that steps be taken 
to eliminate sexual harassment. Subsequently, in September 1993, he 
ordered that official inspections would henceforth include a review of 
the effectiveness of efforts to combat sexual harassment. So it was 
clearly not just the investigation itself, but a followup to make sure 
that everyone knew of the seriousness of sexual harassment in the Navy, 
and especially in the Atlantic Fleet, which was under the charge of 
Admiral Mauz.
  Finally, then, Admiral Mauz took steps to ensure that Lieutenant 
Simmons would be protected against reprisal. After Lieutenant Simmons 
took issue with a subsequent unfavorable fitness report that she 
received, Admiral Mauz intervened with the Chief of Naval Personnel in 
order to extend Lieutenant Simmons' tour of duty, provide for her 
reassignment, and assure that she would have a full opportunity to 
appeal the adverse findings. I think we must make clear that Lieutenant 
Simmons remains on active duty today as a judge advocate general 
officer. She is an attorney in the judge advocate general's office. So 
the person that has made the charges is still in the Navy, while the 
person accused of harassing her is no longer in the Navy.
  There is an issue that has been brought up that is of great concern 
to me, and that is the hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons and 
perhaps the allegation that she was hospitalized because of a sexual 
harassment complaint. This is an issue which has concerned me in every 
instance where I have read of it. I am concerned that on an allegation 
that a service member makes, he or she is then referred for psychiatric 
evaluation based on the fact that they have a problem that needs to be 
looked at, as opposed to the fact that they have made an allegation. 
But the facts in this case, which I have carefully reviewed, showed 
that the hospitalization was motivated solely by medical reasons. A 
referral was initiated by the ship's medical officer, a woman doctor, 
despite the commanding officer's initial objections, and the 
hospitalization was actually ordered by a physician on the hospital's 
staff. Most important, Admiral Mauz was not aware of the 
hospitalization until after Lieutenant Simmons was released from the 
hospital.

  (Mr. MATHEWS assumed the chair.)
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to say that because of my 
concern for this type of possibility I specifically have asked Admiral 
Boorda what is the policy now with regard to psychiatric examinations 
after a sexual harassment charge. He has told me that it is not allowed 
anymore, that in the past they tried to be careful to make sure that it 
was not looked upon as any type of retaliation, but because of the 
questions and because it is such a difficult situation, they now just 
have a flat rule that there cannot be a psychiatric evaluation after a 
sexual harassment charge.
  I hope that we can have the ability for someone who wants counseling 
after an occurrence like this to be able to have it, but I also think 
we must make sure that no one is ever, against their will, put into a 
psychiatric referral because of a charge. I think we have to walk a 
very fine line here, and I believe that Admiral Boorda agrees with that 
and is taking the steps that are necessary to make sure there is not 
any kind of abuse of this possibility.
  The facts as they bear on Admiral Mauz' performance are unequivocal: 
He responded correctly and positively at every turn, and set an example 
for others in command positions to follow. He discharged his duties in 
this case in exactly the manner in which we would expect him to act and 
I would want to encourage other commanders to look at what he did to 
make sure that we follow every avenue that is necessary to look into 
sexual harassment charges without in any way hurting the person who is 
making the charges but also, of course, trying to make sure there is 
integrity and equality in the process.

  The matters we are discussing here today are serious ones, and the 
committee took them very seriously. This nomination has been pending 
for months. Whenever questions are raised about abuse of command 
authority and administering justice within our military services, they 
do deserve our full attention. The committee undertook a review of all 
of the relevant information and a critical appraisal of Admiral Mauz' 
performance. At the conclusion of the committee's work, it was our 
recommendation that he merit the retirement in grade. And I am going to 
support that nomination.
  I do want to say that I think on the issue of investigation, here is 
the key for a commanding officer, for a person that is not in the 
direct line when a charge is made like this: I think the judgment that 
we must make is the judgment of how the commanding officer handled the 
chain of command to make sure that there was fairness in the process 
and particularly that the person who is making the charge is handled 
with complete fairness. I believe Admiral Mauz met our standard.
  But I also want to say that I have talked to Admiral Boorda and other 
commanding officers of our military services. They know that all of us, 
including the chairman of our committee, the ranking member of our 
committee, every member of the Armed Services Committee, know that it 
is very important that we have integrity in our process. It is 
difficult for members of the committee to come in and judge on a record 
after the fact. But nevertheless, we have taken great pains to do that.
  But I think we also must take as great pains to protect the officer, 
such as Admiral Mauz, as we are trying to protect Lieutenant Simmons 
here. I think he deserves the promotion into retirement, and I think 
Admiral Boorda, as the Chief of Naval Operations, is doing everything 
he can to try to make sure that occurrences of this kind do not happen, 
but, if they do, that there is an investigation. I have said in the 
past that I think one of the failures in the Navy has been the 
investigation, but I am convinced that Admiral Boorda is taking steps 
to assure that there will not be lapses in investigation.
  I also commend Secretary Dalton for having these types of interests 
uppermost in his mind for the U.S. Navy as well.
  So I wanted to make my views known because I think there are a lot of 
lives that we are affecting here today. I do hope that we can have a 
vote quickly so that this can be handled today if at all possible so 
that we will not have to go back over a week and come back and refresh 
everyone's memories.
  I think Senators should give the fairness of their judgment weight on 
behalf of the Navy, and I think Admiral Mauz deserves this promotion 
into retirement.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, my understanding is that there is an 
agreement that we have a quorum call as soon as the Senator from Texas 
has finished speaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk continued to call the roll.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise to give a brief statement and ask 
unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk continued to call the roll.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The clerk continued to call the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Chair advises that a quorum 
is not present in the Senate.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to instruct the Sergeant at Arms 
to request the presence of absent Senators, and I ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion to instruct.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell], 
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], and the Senator from Minnesota 
[Mr. Wellstone] are necessarily absent.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from New York [Mr. D'Amato], 
the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm], 
and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] are necessarily absent.
  The result was announced--yeas 74, nays 19, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 299 Ex.]

                                YEAS--74

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Thurmond
     Wofford

                                NAYS--19

     Bond
     Boren
     Breaux
     Brown
     Craig
     Faircloth
     Grassley
     Helms
     Lott
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Wallop
     Warner

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Campbell
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Gramm
     Hatfield
     Inouye
     Wellstone
  So the motion was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. With the addition of Senators voting who did 
not answer the quorum call, a quorum is now present.
  The Chair recognizes the Senate majority leader. The Senate will be 
in order.


                amendment no. 2583 to amendment no. 2582

  (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate with respect to Haiti)

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
it be read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment must be read first. The clerk 
will read.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Mitchell], for himself and Mr. 
     Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2583 to amendment No. 
     2582.

  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike all after the first colon and insert the following:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED 
                   STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI.

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that the Armed Services Committee also consider the fact that 
     it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) all parties should honor their obligations under the 
     Governor's Island Accord of July 3, 1993, and the New York 
     Pact of July 16, 1993;
       (2) the United States has a national interest in preventing 
     uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
       (3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to 
     support national reconciliation and further its interest in 
     preventing uncontrolled emigration.
       (b) Limitation.--It is the sense of the Senate that funds 
     should not be obligated or expended in Haiti unless--
       (1) authorized in advance by the Congress;
       (2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed Forces 
     into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or evacuate 
     United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger 
     and the President reports as soon as practicable to Congress 
     after the initiation of the temporary deployment;
       (3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti 
     is vital to the national security interests of the United 
     States, including but not limited to the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports, as soon as is practicable to Congress 
     after the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later 
     than 48 hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       (4) the President transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       (c) Report.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the 
     President reports in advance to Congress that the intended 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
       (1) if justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure that safety and security of United States 
     Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States 
     Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of 
     their rules of engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than 
     civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
       (B) the United States Armed Forces proposed for deployment 
     are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of 
     the proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued 
     deployment, introduction, or reintroduction of United States 
     Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, irrespective 
     of whether those Armed Forces are under United States or 
     United Nations command, but does not include activities for 
     the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly 
     related to the operations of United States diplomatic or 
     other United States Government facilities, or operations to 
     counter emigration from Haiti.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the amendment just read is identical in 
substance to an amendment which the Senate approved on June 29, by a 
vote of 93 to 4. The only changes are technical in nature and they 
appear in the statement of the policy and in the sentence on 
limitation. That is to make them conform to the procedural status in 
which this amendment exists as opposed to the procedural status of the 
amendment of June 29.
  The Senate overwhelmingly approved this amendment, as I noted. Mr. 
President, 53 Democrats and 40 Republicans voted for it; 1 Democrat and 
3 Republicans voted against it; 3 Senators were absent.
  It is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment and by its terms it expresses 
the interest in the United States that all parties honor their 
obligations under the Governor's Island accord of July 3 of last year 
and the New York Pact of July 16.
  All Senators will recall that under those agreements the military 
dictators who illegally seized power in Haiti expressed a willingness 
to relinquish power and to permit the democratically elected government 
of that country to return. Subsequently, the military dictators reneged 
on the agreement and that has led to the current situation in that 
unfortunate country.
  The amendment further expresses the interest of the United States in 
preventing uncontrolled emigration from Haiti, which earlier this year 
reached levels that created serious problems in some parts of our 
country. The amendment then includes a limitation which provides that 
funds should not be obligated or expended in Haiti unless first 
authorized in advance by Congress. And the temporary deployment of 
United States forces into Haiti is deemed necessary to protect or 
evacuate United States citizens. And the deployment of the U.S. Armed 
Forces is vital to the national security interests of the United 
States.
  In the alternative, the President can submit a report to Congress, 
pursuant to a subsequent section and the subsequent section details the 
provisions of such report.
  Mr. President and Members of the Senate, we are in a unusual 
parliamentary situation. We are in executive session under which we are 
considering a nomination. The underlying amendment to the motion to 
recommit that nomination and the amendment which I have just offered of 
course represent legislative business. Not in my knowledge has this 
ever occurred in the Senate; that is, an attempt to conduct legislative 
business when the Senate is in executive session considering a 
nomination.
  We have asked the Parliamentarian to review the matter to determine 
whether or not such a procedure is in order, and we will await a final 
determination before attempting to proceed in that regard.
  I think all Senators should be aware that if this process proceeds, 
then the distinction between legislative and executive sessions will 
have been obliterated and all matters regarding nominations and other 
matters in executive session would then be open to some form of 
legislative action. Wholly apart from the subject matter of the 
discussion, which is a very serious and important one and which 
deserves full and thorough debate by this Senate--that is the subject 
of Haiti--from the standpoint of the integrity of this institution and 
the procedures under which we operate, this is also a very serious 
matter. And it is important that all Senators understand that, and, at 
the appropriate time, I will have more to say on that subject.
  For now the question, of course, is the situation that is set forth 
in the underlying amendment and in the amendment which I have just set 
forth.
  Clearly, this is a serious matter. Clearly, it requires thorough 
debate and consideration by the Senate. As we all know, in this 
Congress, the Senate has already debated and voted seven times on the 
subject of United States policy to Haiti. We are now doing so for the 
eighth time, and I expect that there will be many more occasions, and 
that is appropriate given the importance of the subject matter.
  But I think the first point to be made is that everyone should 
understand that there has been extensive debate and discussion in the 
Senate, although it is correct that not every issue has been squarely 
confronted and voted on until now in the Senate.
  Second, of course, under the rules of the Senate, any Senator has the 
opportunity to speak at any time on any subject, and many Senators have 
availed themselves of that opportunity. So we have not only had seven 
debates and seven votes on specific amendments, we have had very 
extensive debate, outside of that context, as a large number of 
Senators of both parties have expressed themselves on this important 
matter.
  Mr. President, I offered this amendment in behalf of myself and 
Senator Nunn because I believe this is an appropriate expression of 
what the Senate should do. I believe it is appropriate that the Senate 
go on record, as it has previously, in urging all parties to honor the 
obligations under the prior agreements that are set forth, in 
describing our national interest with respect to emigration and in 
expressing our view that funds should not be obligated in Haiti unless 
the terms and conditions set forth in this amendment are met.
  All Senators have had a chance to review this matter. As I said 
earlier, 93 out of 97 Senators voted for it. My hope and expectation is 
that there will be another substantial, indeed overwhelming, vote for 
the amendment at this time because I think the reasons which led 
Senators to vote for it in June exist today in a form that has not 
abated.
  And so I think it is appropriate that we deal with this subject as 
expressed in this sense-of-the-Senate resolution at the appropriate 
time.
  Mr. President, I say to Members of the Senate, we are in an unusual 
situation in another respect. Several weeks ago, I consulted with the 
distinguished Republican leader and with many other Senators on the 
Senate schedule. As we are all aware, a high holiday for persons of the 
Jewish faith commences at sundown this evening and continues until 
sundown tomorrow evening. It has been a longstanding practice of the 
Senate, a custom honored in at least the 15 years since I have been in 
the Senate and no doubt longer than that, that the Senate not conduct 
business during that time.
  Therefore, at the request of many Senators, and in accordance with 
the practice that has been followed for many years, I announced several 
weeks ago that the Senate would not have any rollcall votes or conduct 
any business after 2 p.m. today, and also at the request of many 
Senators, Republicans and Democrats--and from this there was no 
dissent--that since the holiday ends on Thursday evening, I was 
strenuously urged not to have a session on Friday because that would 
require Senators to return for just that 1 day. And so the schedule was 
set forth weeks ago, and there has not been any protest or disagreement 
with that, to my knowledge, to this very moment. No Senator has come to 
me and said, ``I disagree with the schedule. I think we should be in 
session.'' Every single Senator who spoke to me--and there was a very 
large number, both Democrats and Republicans--urged that I do what I 
eventually did, and that is to say there would be no session on 
Thursday or Friday and no business would be transacted after 2 p.m. 
today. That is to say, no rollcall votes or other matters that would 
require the presence of a Senator occur. That would not preclude debate 
in the Senate after 2 p.m. today.
  Yesterday, I met with the distinguished Republican leader to prepare 
the schedule for today and for the remainder of the session. In the 
discussion that we had, the subject of Haiti and how to handle it in 
the Senate arose. I had requested that the Senate proceed to a vote on 
the Department of Defense authorization bill, which was then the 
pending matter, yesterday afternoon. The response I received from the 
distinguished Republican leader was that a Republican colleague had 
agreed to permit such a vote to occur yesterday afternoon provided I 
agreed in exchange to have 6 hours of debate on the subject of Haiti 
today after all of the votes, if any, which were to occur today had 
occurred. The 6 hours was later amended by a request of our Republican 
colleagues to 7 hours, and I agreed to that, and that order was 
entered.
  It was my understanding that pursuant to that agreement, we would 
take up the subject of Haiti today and have the 7 hours for debate, and 
that there would be no further action with respect to that matter or 
any other matter today. Pursuant to a separate order entered last 
evening, the Senate agreed to take up the nomination of Admiral Mauz of 
the U.S. Navy. During the course of debate on that nomination, Senator 
Murray made a motion to recommit the nomination to the Armed Services 
Committee for purposes of holding a hearing, and subsequently Senator 
McCain offered the now pending underlying amendment to include the 
subject of Haiti.
  The second-degree amendment which I have just offered, and which has 
been stated, deals also with that subject. As I stated earlier, both of 
those amendments--the underlying McCain amendment and the amendment 
which I have offered--appear to be an attempt to legislate in executive 
session on a nomination, something which at least to my knowledge has 
not ever occurred and something which I have asked the Parliamentarian 
to review.
  So we now are in a situation where we will, of course, be prepared 
and are prepared to debate this matter, as we had agreed yesterday, for 
a period of time under an agreement which would have divided the time 
equally between the parties in morning business.
  The effect of this matter arising so late, and given the importance 
of the matter, and given the 2 o'clock deadline which had been 
established several weeks ago, made it, of course, a practical 
impossibility that any vote would occur today on this subject.
  I repeat, the request for, first, 6 hours of debate, and then 7 hours 
of debate, was made initially by our Republican colleagues, and I 
agreed to that. I think it is clear that on a subject of this 
importance there ought to be at least that much debate, and possibly 
more, before there is a vote. But the presentation of an amendment 
dealing with the subject--obviously it was done late because that is 
the only opportunity that was created when the motion to recommit was 
made, but nonetheless it created a situation where there simply is no 
feasible way to have a vote on this matter without the kind of debate 
that is necessary and appropriate prior to 2 p.m. today. I do not know 
the exact time that the McCain amendment was offered, but it was a 
couple of hours ago, I estimate. It was sometime, I think, between 11 
and 12--between 11 and 12 this morning--following the motion to 
recommit by the Senator from Washington.
  So, Mr. President, my belief now is that we should proceed to have 
the debate on which we agreed yesterday, and which is the subject of an 
order, and that it be conducted in a way that the time is equally 
divided so that every Senator will have some opportunity to get his or 
her view across. And the time can be allocated as between the two 
parties in what I hope will be a fair and responsible way.
  I note the presence of the acting Republican leader in the Chamber at 
this time and wish to inquire of him as to whether it would not be 
agreeable to proceed to a vote, to proceed to a debate under the terms 
that we had agreed upon yesterday, that is to say, 7 hours would be 
equally divided between the two parties under the control of the 
majority leader and the acting Republican leader or their designees.
  I so inquire, without losing my right to the floor.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, the witching hour is now past--2 
o'clock--and I think we all understand we will continue to debate this 
issue. After all, it is certainly a debatable motion. I am assuming it 
is considered as a second-degree amendment to the first-degree 
amendment of Senator McCain.
  Obviously, the Republican leader is not present. I am not privy to 
the full communications that took place with regard to what would 
transpire today, but I think there may have been something in the way 
of miscommunication rather than any intent to mislead the majority 
leader.
  The 7 hours of debate was constructed so that we could debate Haiti. 
Since the issue was so volatile and would cause great delay with the 
consideration of the Department of Defense legislation, it was 
determined to process that properly; we could then debate the 7 hours' 
worth on Haiti so as not to obstruct the DOD report.
  The 2 o'clock hour, indeed, was adhered to, and we do adhere to it, 
and the rest of the week's activity. We understand that. I would say 
only that whatever miscommunication may have come from the 7 hours, and 
that that would be the only issue, there was a similar miscommunication 
with many on our side thinking that this would be an up and down vote 
on Admiral Mauz. And then that changed and was altered by the motion to 
recommit. There were some on our side who felt, perhaps, as I say, with 
miscommunication, that, indeed, then opened it up again for discussion 
of Haiti. And on that entry I would yield in a moment to the Senator 
from Arizona.
  But in any case, that up-and-down vote was not available, as the 
floor managers had wished, and that was altered by the motion to 
recommit. And then, of course, that made it open to an amendment.
  But let me just conclude to the leader that many things have changed 
since June when we adopted this exact language by a vote of 94 to 3. 
Many things have changed. It is very important we have this national 
debate. We have been trying to get that national debate because there 
is not one of us here on either side of the aisle who does not know 
that this invasion is imminent.
  The President of the United States seems to wish to go forward with 
it, without congressional participation, and many on our side of the 
aisle have compiled the record of the debate during the gulf war and 
just flipped it over, and now those same things are being said by those 
on the other side of the aisle and the other side of the issue, just 
flipping it over as to the necessity for congressional response before 
the body bags are flown here to Dover Air Base, and I will not go into 
that. That is something that is heavy on all of us.
  But I think if we are going to go forward, and this was the Senator's 
question, with regard to the 7 hours, it be appropriately divided and 
alternated so that it does not just stack up with 2 hours and then--if 
we can alternate that, that would be very important.
  Then it was very difficult--and I am not going to get into the 
unfortunate activity, but it was very difficult for those of us on our 
side of the aisle and caused some of the anguish here when the occupant 
of the chair earlier in the day refused to recognize one of our Members 
who was here seeking recognition for many minutes. The Chair refused to 
recognize that Member from our side of the aisle, who was intending to 
participate in the debate, perhaps intending to offer a second-degree 
amendment.
  I do hope that that is not a portent of anything to come as we get 
down into the crush of these next few weeks where tempers will be short 
and it would be very difficult, but the rules are the rules, and no one 
adheres to that more than our fine majority leader. But that was very 
unfortunate, and that must not be, it cannot be, if we are to have the 
comity and the coordination and cooperation we must have in what is 
going to be a very fractious national session until we then recess for 
the year sine die.
  So we will be pleased to work with the leader with regard to the 
allocation of time as long as it is done in an alternate fashion, back 
and forth.
  I did want the Record to be clear as to how we got here. I did not 
know, nor did the leader know, exactly what would take place with 
regard to this amendment. Certainly, this Senator was not aware until a 
moment before I came to the floor. Therefore, I wanted that to be very 
clear. I think the sponsor of the amendment would like to address that 
issue. But I hope that is a response to the question, which was rather 
lengthy.
  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader has the floor.


                      UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments. He 
indicated that he and his colleagues are prepared for some comments 
contrasting the current situation with the Persian Gulf situation, that 
there has been a flip. I understand that, because we have also, on our 
side. Many comments were made by Republican Senators at the time of 
Panama and Grenada. And there was a flip there as well. If there is to 
be one, in any case, I expect that will all be part of the debate that 
is forthcoming.
  What I propose now, Mr. President--and before presenting the request 
formally I will describe it to the distinguished acting Republican 
leader--what I suggest is that we agree to 7 hours equally divided, 
under the control of the majority leader and the acting Republican 
leader, or their designees; that the statements alternate beginning 
with a Democratic Senator, then a Republican Senator, and then back and 
forth, but that no statement exceed 30 minutes in length, so that you 
do not get a situation where one person or one side talks for 2 hours 
or 2\1/2\ hours, effectively foreclosing the other side until later in 
the day.
  I inquire of my colleague and my other colleagues whether that 
appears to be an agreeable proposal.
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I ask the 
majority leader if I will be able to make a few remarks prior to that, 
since my name was liberally mentioned concerning what has transpired 
today. I do not object at all to the equal division. I would like to 
make some additional comments to those made by the distinguished whip 
before we go into that.
  If the majority leader does not find that acceptable, that is fine 
with me. My name was used liberally about the parliamentary procedures 
that were employed by the majority leader. I would like to be able to 
respond to that.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, may I suggest that the Senator would 
have, under this proposal, a full 30 minutes to do so, following 
remarks by one Democratic Senator.
  Mr. McCAIN. The distinguished majority leader just said the first 
speaker would be a Democrat. I would like to respond to the comments 
made concerning what transpired here today since about 10 o'clock, when 
I came on the floor, I say to the majority leader. I think I should 
have the right to do that since words like unprecedented and things 
like that were stated concerning procedures that took place today, 
which this Senator initiated.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I inquire if there is leader time 
allocated today.
  Mr. MITCHELL. That will not be necessary. Mr. President, why do I not 
make the request that the Senator from Arizona be recognized for 10 
minutes, and that following his remarks, there be 7 hours of debate 
equally divided, with the time under the control of the majority leader 
or the minority leader or their designees; that the speakers alternate, 
the Democratic Senators speaking first, a Republican Senator second, 
and then alternating back and forth; but that in that sequence, no 
Senator be permitted to speak for more than 30 minutes so as to ensure 
fairness in allocation of time on each side.
  Mr. NICKLES. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not, I ask 
the majority leader, when will we have a chance to vote on either his 
second-degree amendment or the underlying amendment?
  Mr. MITCHELL. Next week.
  Mr. NICKLES. Monday or Tuesday?
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I have not made a decision on that. For 
one thing, we do not know how long the debate will be. There are many 
Senators who have left or are leaving who may well want to speak on 
this subject. Of course, that is exactly what happened to us on the DOD 
authorization bill on Monday. We took it up on Monday. We had a few 
hours of debate. We were told there were several Republican Senators 
who were not here on Monday. They wanted to speak on it. We had to wait 
until Tuesday.
  So we do not know what Senators will be able to speak today, or how 
many will want to speak for how long, and therefore we will have a vote 
when all Senators have an opportunity to speak who wish to speak.
  Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate the majority leader's answer, Mr. 
President. So to further clarify, the 7 hours is not all inclusive. 
Further debate could transpire on Monday or Tuesday, and this will be 
the pending business when we return on Monday.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Absent some agreement to the contrary, it will be the 
pending business.
  Mr. NICKLES. I thank the majority leader. This does not limit it to 7 
hours. We can speak on this issue on Monday or Tuesday. We will not be 
capping the total debate time.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I did not intend the proposal to be the only time; we 
will debate it today, and then when we get back into session, if any 
other Senator wants to speak, he or she will be able to speak, absent 
some agreement to the contrary.
  Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate that.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I will not 
object, but I would like 2 minutes simply to address the underlying 
issue, which is the Mauz nomination, prior to beginning --about 2 
minutes. I do not want to delay the Senator from Arizona, but I do 
think we ought not to leave this simply hanging without some 
explanation.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I reserve my right for 5 minutes, as well.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not intend to debate.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, we have a situation where, in order to 
accommodate several Senators earlier on the Mauz nomination, we 
concluded that debate with statements by three Republican Senators. 
Senator Murray had requested the opportunity to address the Mauz 
nomination, as well. She was not able to do so because of the agreement 
that we reached.
  Why do I not ask at this time that Senator Nunn be recognized for 5 
minutes on the Mauz nomination; that following his remarks, Senator 
Murray be recognized for 5 minutes on the Mauz nomination; and then 
Senator McCain be recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. I object. I ask that Senator Nunn's words come after 
mine.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will not object. The majority leader is 
trying to get an agreement. I really just wanted to make the point that 
the Mauz nomination is the underlying business, and he is an individual 
who may very well be involved in the debate we are talking about; that 
is, the Haiti situation, if we intervene there. His nomination has been 
pending 2\1/2\ months now. And the fact that the Haiti resolution has 
been put on top of his nomination, which is the Senator's right, has 
basically prevented this from being considered. I hope we can get to it 
next week, either with or without Haiti.
  But that is the underlying matter, and I think it is an important 
matter. It has to do with the whole chain of people who will be 
replacing him, and those who are replacing those who are replacing him.
  So there are a lot of people in the Navy chain that are not present. 
That was the only point I wanted to make. I did not want to debate it.
  So I withdraw any objection or any request for time.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I renew my request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I say to the majority leader, before he leaves the floor, that I 
always admire his skill; I always admire his capabilities, especially 
in the area of manipulating the process here on the floor, the 
parliamentary process. I have not seen anyone in the short time I have 
been here as skillful as he is in successfully shepherding the 
legislative agenda through this body. And there are several technical 
statements that the majority leader made which I will reserve for 
another time because I want to make the major thrust of my remarks in 
saying to the majority leader that I am deeply, deeply, deeply 
disappointed. He has used legislative procedures in which he is so 
adept and efficient and skillful to prevent the Senate of the United 
States to speak on the issue of the risk of the lives of young 
Americans who are going to go into combat, and some of them are going 
to die sooner or later.

  The majority leader of the Senate by delaying, by keeping us in a 
quorum call, by proposing to second-degree an amendment that was passed 
last June that says in it ``There is not sufficient time to seek and 
receive congressional authorization'' has successfully--and I 
congratulate him--prevented the United States Senate from speaking on 
this issue before an invasion takes place of Haiti and American lives 
are lost.
  I am not going to spend a lot of time quoting from the debate on the 
Persian Gulf conflict. I am not going to waste this body's time talking 
about this, but the majority leader said:

       * * * the Founders knew that a legislative body could not 
     direct the day-to-day operations of a war.
       But they also knew that the decision to commit the Nation 
     to war should not be left in the hands of one man. The clear 
     intent was to limit the authority of the President to 
     initiate war.
       But yesterday the President said that, in his opinion, he 
     needs no such authorization from Congress. I believe the 
     correct approach was the one taken by the President 2 days 
     ago when he requested authorization. His request clearly 
     acknowledged the need for congressional approval.

  Continuing to quote from the majority leader:

       The Constitution of the United States is not and cannot be 
     subordinated to a U.N. resolution.
       It is universal. If there is to be war in the Persian Gulf, 
     it should not be a war in which Americans do the fighting and 
     dying while those who benefit from our efforts provide token 
     help and urge us on. Yet, as things stand, that is how it 
     should be.
       But in the event of war, why should it be an American war, 
     made up largely of American troops, American casualties, and 
     deaths? We hope there is no war, but if there is, we hope and 
     pray it will not be prolonged and with many casualties.

  The majority leader of the Senate, on January 10, 1991, made a 
compelling case, one of the most compelling cases I have ever seen. 
Before our young men and women sail into harm's way, the Congress of 
the United States speaks. The Congress of the United States, by the 
Constitution--about which I happen to have some disagreement--but 
clearly, on January 10, 1991, the majority leader sincerely and 
strongly believed that.
  Now, Mr. President, we all know that there is going to be an 
invasion--estimates range from a matter of days--and it is perhaps the 
most publicized invasion since the first Battle of Bull Run, where 
residents proceeded south in their buggies to observe the conflict. We 
know that there is going to be an invasion, and this body will be 
silent. This body will be silent--an abrogation of our obligations 
under the Constitution of the United States and to the people that sent 
us here.
  Mr. President, I can only express my deep disappointment and hope 
that in the future, before this happens again, on both sides of the 
aisle we recognize that we have our obligations. If we find ourselves 
in a position, I say to the distinguished majority leader, where the 
American people oppose that involvement, we should think very long and 
very carefully, because there are some of us, including the present 
occupant of the chair, that know that without the support of the 
American people, military enterprises do not succeed. And 73 percent of 
the American people, as of yesterday, oppose our involvement in Haiti.
  When that invasion starts, Mr. President, I will hope and pray that 
it succeeds, that not a single American life is sacrificed, and I will 
not speak out. But prior to that invasion, I feel it is my obligation 
to do so.
  Finally, I express my deep and profound regret that the majority 
leader of the Senate, exercising his authority, rightfully, without 
abuse, has prevented this body from speaking on an issue of grave, 
grave, grave national importance to this country and to the mothers and 
fathers and husbands and wives of the men and women who will now sail 
into harm's way without the approval of Congress.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, let me express my deep disappointment 
that a Senator, knowing in advance that no vote could occur after 2 
p.m., comes in here a couple of hours before the deadline and offers an 
amendment which no other Senator has seen, which there has not been any 
opportunity to scrutinize or analyze, and then suggest somehow that 
there was a design to prevent that vote from occurring.
  Every Senator knows this is a serious matter. Every Senator knows 
that it deserves full and thorough debate, and every Senator knew that 
there could not be any votes after 2 p.m. So when an amendment is 
offered just a couple of hours before the deadline, with no advance 
notice to anyone, there was a certain knowledge on the part of all 
concerned that no vote would occur, that there would have to be the 
opportunity for Senators to debate the matter. Therefore, the amendment 
is not intended to get a vote. The amendment is intended to be able to 
make a political argument. That is the situation we are in. Since this 
amendment is offered in a procedure that is without precedent, it could 
have been offered earlier in a procedure that is without precedent.
  The fact of the matter is that the Senate is in session this week 
only because I insisted that it be in session this week. The Republican 
leader requested that the Senate not be in session this week. That 
request was made to me repeatedly up to and through last week. And if I 
had the plan, and if my intention was as stated by the Senator from 
Arizona, I would simply have accepted the request of the Republican 
leader and had no session. Not only would there then not have been a 
vote, there would not even have been an opportunity for debate. There 
would not have been opportunity for a single speech to be made on the 
Senate floor criticizing others. That is all it would have taken.
  I repeat: The Republican leader asked me not to have the Senate in 
session this week. If I had the plan or design attributed to me by the 
Senator from Arizona, all I had to do was accept the suggestion of the 
Republican leader. And then the Senator from Arizona would not have had 
this forum to make the speech he just made, or to offer the amendment 
he has offered. So the facts of the matter directly contradict the 
assertion made. The Senate is in session this week only at my 
insistence, only because I would not accept the request of the 
Republican leader to have the Senate out of session this week.
  We can debate the issue, as we will now for the next several hours, 
and as we should, but I hope we will keep the debate on the issues. I 
repeat that this amendment is offered in a situation that is without 
legislative precedent. It could have been offered in a situation 
without legislative precedent yesterday, or the day before, when people 
would have a chance to debate it and not wait until just prior to the 
deadline at a time in which everybody knows it would be possible to 
have the kind of debate and vote this issue warrants.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining of my 10 
minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that there has 
been no option this week to offer an amendment. The fact of the matter 
is there would not have been any option to offer the amendment if it 
had not been for the Senator from Washington proposing a motion to 
recommit, which came as a surprise, I believe, on both sides of the 
aisle.
  There was no option this week to propose any amendment on the pending 
invasion of Haiti. If there was, I will be pleased to hear about that 
from the majority leader. If there was, I am sorry I missed it because 
there was a number of us seeking that opportunity to try to get a vote 
on the part of the Senate of the United States.
  But laying that aside, I say to the distinguished majority leader and 
my colleagues what we have ended up with, after all the discussion 
about procedures or not procedures or who had what opportunity or who 
did not have what opportunity, is the fact that there will be an 
invasion without the endorsement of the Senate of the United States.
  I suggest, in all due respect, that if the majority leader of the 
Senate had wanted us to have a vote approving or disapproving the 
invasion of Haiti, it would have happened.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I will just conclude by saying it seems 
to me almost certain that the amendment offered is not in order. It is 
in a situation for which there is no precedent and which I think will 
be held out of order.
  If an amendment is offered out of order today, it could have been 
offered out of order yesterday; it could have been offered out of order 
the day before. Being more or less out of order is insignificant.
  I yield the floor and designate the Senator from Connecticut to 
control the debate and allocate the time on the Democratic side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today I would like to begin this debate by 
doing something that our colleagues who have spoken over the last few 
days, weeks, and months have not done, and that is I would like to 
spend a little time talking about Haiti, if I may, and what has 
happened there about the murders and the rapes, the kidnappings, the 
disappearances, about deep, deep fear, Mr. President, deep fear and 
despair, and about democracy, democracy stolen, I might point out, in a 
poor, impoverished, predominantly black nation some 125 or 150 miles to 
the south of the borders of this country.
  It has been almost 3 years now since the Aristide government was 
overthrown by a military coup. Shortly after the coup occurred in 1991, 
Secretary of State James Baker, articulating U.S. policy, stated and I 
quote him: ``This coup must not and will not succeed.''
  Since that time, Mr. President, U.S. policy has been driven by one 
overriding objective, that is, one overriding objective initiated and 
commenced under the Bush administration and by and large sustained and 
supported during the Clinton administration. And that objective, as 
stated by the Secretary of State in 1991 and continued up to now in 
1994, was to restore democracy to Haiti by returning President Aristide 
to power. This has been the objective, the stated objective of two 
administrations, ironically a Republican and a Democratic 
administration.
  On December 16, 1990, Haitians went to the polls in their country and 
chose as their President a priest by the name of Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide. The election of President Aristide, in the most free and fair 
elections in that nation's history, I would tell you, Mr. President, 
because I know this country, gave great hope, great hope to a watching 
world and to the people of that nation that possibly they had seemed 
finally to overcome a bitter, bitter legacy of repression and military 
rule.
  Sadly, Haiti's brief encounter with democracy would end almost as 
soon as it had begun. In September of 1991, just 10 months later, 
military and security forces overthrew the Aristide government and 
resumed their iron grip on the people of Haiti.
  For those who have followed the sad fortunes of Haiti over recent 
years, Mr. President, the events of 1991 had a very familiar and 
unsettling ring to them. Time and time again since the fall of Jean-
Claude Duvalier in 1986, the military has taken the reins of power in 
Haiti. Time and time again the military has promised the international 
community that reform and democratic rule were just around the corner. 
Time and time again, Mr. President, the military has gone back on its 
word.
  First there was Gen. Henri Namphy, who assumed power in 1986 and was 
rewarded, I might point out, with U.S. military aid after promising to 
hold free and fair elections. Those elections, for those who may recall 
this--I realize, Mr. President, the danger in talking about history 
because we all think the world began yesterday. It is not what happened 
now over the last 7 or 8 years here but what happened in the last week 
or last 10 days, because that is all our collected attention can 
encounter and hold at any one time. There is a little danger to go 
back, but I want to remind some people that there is some history here.
  Those elections, as I pointed out, that General Namphy allowed to 
happen and quickly were canceled turned into a bloodbath in the 
country.
  Then there was a civilian in charge, Leslie Manigat, who was 
handpicked by the military to lead the country in 1988. The Raegan 
administration decided against imposing sanctions on Haiti in the hopes 
that the military would allow the new President a measure of autonomy. 
Those hopes were soon dashed by a military coup that was led by none 
other than General Namphy himself, the very guy who said ``Give me the 
military and support and we will allow for free and fair elections.''
  Then there was Prosper Avril, who overthrew Namphy in yet another 
coup 3 months later. General Avril also promised to hold elections and 
even managed to convince the Bush administration to publicly defend his 
record on human rights. He, too, went back on his word.
  Then there was Herard Abraham, who took over from General Avril. 
Abraham sat on his hands while opponents of democracy tried 
unsuccessfully to disrupt the 1990 elections. After permitting the 
supporters of Duvalier to plot the assassination of then President-
elect Aristide, he too was forced to step aside as commander of the 
Haitian Armed Forces and allow then Col. Raoul Cedras--now people start 
to register--to take his place. But like his predecessors, Raoul 
Cedras' commitment to democracy was no more than his predecessors had 
been and was short-term as commander in chief and solely self-serving 
in his capacity as general of the Army.
  So it should have come as no surprise when, about this time last 
year--as General Cedras and others were to have stepped aside; that was 
the commitment--the military reneged on yet another agreement to 
restore democratic rule in Haiti. The Governors Island Accord called on 
the military to take a number of steps toward democratic reform, 
culminating with the return of President Aristide by October 30. But no 
sooner was the ink dry on the accord, and no sooner had sanctions on 
Haiti been lifted, than the military signaled its disdain for the 
agreement and the commitments it had made. Most notably, the military 
prevented the arrival of U.N.-sanctioned military personnel and engaged 
in a number of serious human rights abuses including, I might point 
out, the high-profile murders of several of President Aristide's close 
associates and cabinet members.
  While I know voices have been raised in opposition to the prospect 
that the President may decide to use force, I would take serious issue 
with anyone who would suggest that the President and his predecessor 
had not tried all other options available to him short of force. Ever 
since the overthrow of President Aristide in September 1991, this 
administration and its predecessor has given the military regime in 
Haiti every opportunity to seek a peaceful way out.
  When the leaders of the Haitian military agreed to go to the 
conference table last summer, the administration met with them in New 
York City and helped to negotiate the Governors Island Accord--an 
accord that would be violated by the Haitian military almost as soon as 
it was signed.
  When multilateral sanctions against Haiti failed to dislodge the 
regime--let me point out, those sanctions began under the Bush 
administration, not as complete as eventually imposed by the Clinton 
administration, but the path was commenced by the previous 
administration to impose sanctions as a result of the coup in that 
country.
  As a result of more tightening of those sanctions, a fuel and arms 
embargo at the United Nations was supplemented by a worldwide embargo 
on trade and a ban on noncommercial flights to Haiti.
  When these sanctions also failed to change the course of events in 
Haiti, the administration tightened the noose even further, adding a 
ban on commercial flights and financial transactions between the United 
States and Haiti and a freeze on the United States assets of all 
wealthy Haitians. These sanctions also failed to convince the military 
regime to step aside.
  It has been an incremental approach, beginning in September 1991, 
slowly ratcheting up, trying to find a way to resolve this problem. We 
did not act precipitously. We did not seek a military solution to the 
problem at the very outset.
  Ambassador Albright, our Ambassador to the United Nations, summed up 
the situation very succinctly, July 31, when explaining to the U.N. 
Security Council, why it should in her words, ``authorize the use of 
all necessary means'' to restore democracy to Haiti. She said in part:

       This Council has pursued patiently a peaceful and just end 
     to the Haitian crisis. The Organization of American States 
     has pursued a parallel effort. Member states, including my 
     own, [speaking of the United States] have taken steps 
     independently to encourage the illegitimate leaders to leave. 
     Together, we--in the international community--have tried 
     condemnation, persuasion, isolation and negotiation. At 
     Governors Island we helped broker an agreement that the 
     military's leader signed but refused to implement. We have 
     imposed sanctions, suspended them, re-imposed them and 
     strengthened them. We have provided every opportunity for the 
     de facto leaders in Haiti to meet their obligations.

  She concluded as follows:

       The status quo in Haiti is neither tenable nor acceptable. 
     Choices must be made. And although the situation in Haiti is 
     complex, this choice is as simple as the choice between right 
     and wrong. Today, the Council has made the right choice--in 
     favor of democracy, law, dignity and relief for suffering 
     long endured and never deserved.

  One need only watch the nightly news or read the newspapers to know 
that the situation in Haiti has only gotten worse in recent months. 
Before the U.N./OAS civilian mission was expelled in July, it tracked 
and reported on a daily basis the unspeakable--the unspeakable and 
sick--atrocities committed by the de facto regime and its supporters 
earlier this year--nearly 400 murders, over 100 kidnapings--including 
children, I might point out--and at least several hundred arrests and 
beatings during the 6-month period in 1994 this operation was permitted 
to operate in Haiti.
  Now, I might add, there was a new element discovered recently, and 
that is taking orphan children and using them as target practice. You 
are talking about some of the worst elements in the world. This is 125 
to 130 miles off our shores. This is not China. This is not Rwanda. 
This is not some distant land. It is one that is almost in shouting 
distance of this country that we have these problems, serious problems, 
and some of the worst human rights violations going on anywhere in the 
world.
  These individuals are so vile and so shameless that they have 
mutilated bodies, removed faces and left the corpses lying in full view 
as further intimidation of an already frightened and demoralized 
people. Nothing--absolutely nothing--is apparently sacred to them. Last 
year, they went into church while services were ongoing and dragged a 
prominent Aristide supporter outside and shot him in full view of the 
congregation. And, just a few weeks ago they murdered another supporter 
of President Aristide, this time a Catholic priest, Rev. Jean-Marie 
Vincent.
  It is not surprising that thousands of refugees have left Haiti in 
search of our shores, desperate to escape the deteriorating political 
conditions in their country--or that hundreds of thousands more live in 
hiding within Haiti. At this moment there are more than 15,000 
displaced Haitians in our custody at Guantanamo, Cuba. This is clearly 
a temporary solution--a holding pattern. Ultimately, the only permanent 
solution is a political solution in Haiti that is responsive to the 
Haitian people. That is what President Aristide represents and that is 
why I happen to believe it is so important that we make every effort to 
try and seek his return.
  Yet all of the efforts taken to date by Presidents Bush and President 
Clinton have so far failed to restore democracy to Haiti. As my 
colleagues know, it has been my judgment that sanctions, effectively 
applied, coupled with a credible threat of force can be successful in 
achieving our objectives. But at some point we will be left with two 
choices if over time sanctions prove ineffective. We can do nothing, 
and let the military continue its reign of terror in Haiti. Or we can 
exercise the military option and seek to remove the dictators and the 
tyrants, and give the people of Haiti a chance to build a nation once 
again.
  Each one of us debating here today has the luxury of expressing his 
or her personal view without having the heavy burden of knowing that 
any one of us individually affects the course of our Nation. The 
President does not have that luxury. He and he alone has the heavy 
burden of deciding the course the United States will take. And I am 
convinced that whatever choice he makes with respect to the use of 
force, it will only be made after he believes that he has exhausted all 
other possibilities.
  Mr. President, I am deeply offended at the suggestion some have made 
that this President is considering, after all of these months, all of 
these weeks, through two administrations to resolve this problem, that 
the consideration of the use of force is political motivated.
  What were the numbers today? Seventy-three, eighty percent? You would 
have to be out of your mind to consider this a great political 
advantage, given the public reaction to the situation, to engage in a 
military operation, if he decides to do so. Quite the contrary; quite 
the contrary.
  But I happen to believe, and I think most of my colleagues here 
understand, that being President is different than being a Senator or 
being a Congressman. We can debate, discuss, and get on our planes and 
go on home for a few days. This individual ultimately bears the 
responsibility of making touch, tough decisions.
  And we have exhausted a lot of options here. I would tell you, Mr. 
President, I am not enthusiastic about the use of force at all. I hope 
sanctions, well applied, would produce the desired results in time.
  But I also understand that after a while, when you run out that 
string and it does not produce the kind of results, that you may not be 
left with any other options.
  And to talk about this in terms of just how the polls are moving back 
and forth--in fact, throughout history, on many occasions, what has 
been terribly unpopular in foreign policy happened to have been right; 
happened to have been right.
  The Marshall plan, I do not think, had 30 percent support among the 
American public when Harry Truman advocated it.
  As I recall going back--some of my colleagues may provide some 
additional statistical information on this--but at most times when the 
threat of a foreign involvement was upon us, Americans historically and 
for good cause and reason have been resistant to becoming involved and 
engaged in so-called foreign entanglements.
  Even foreign aid--if you stand up and vote for 5 cents in foreign aid 
you run the risk of political reprisal at home because of how our 
people feel about involvement in foreign nations. So it does not come 
as any great surprise here that there is a great deal of resistance and 
concern about whether or not we ought to go forward in Haiti with the 
use of force.
  But I think it is important that the American people understand that 
there is a history to this fact situation. This just did not happen in 
the last 6 weeks. I happen to believe there are some interests here 
that are important. They are not as clear as a canal or a missile 
pointed at us. There, there is no doubt or question about the dangers 
to our country. But I believe--maybe I am in the minority, maybe a 
minority of one--that democracy within our neighborhood is important. 
It is a very important issue. We are seeing democracy emerge throughout 
the hemisphere, fragile democracies struggling to be free. The people 
of Haiti proved it: 70 percent of their people chose a leader. That 
should not be taken lightly.
  I know that goes on in other places around the world and that every 
time there is a democracy threatened you cannot start talking about the 
United States becoming militarily involved. But in this hemisphere, as 
close as it is to us, with the threat of a wave of humanity coming to 
our shores for good reason, that changes the equation. For Rwanda and 
the People's Republic of China and other nations, that risk is not 
there. They cannot get to our shores too easily. But a wave of humanity 
from Haiti can come here.
  So democracy stolen, democracy hijacked should have value. The 
concern about the refugees coming to our shores should be a matter of 
deep concern to all of us--not as immediate as the threat would be if 
there were some hostility or some military aggression that we were 
facing.
  I might also point out, it has not been mentioned too often, Haiti is 
a major transit point in drugs--a major transit point. These generals 
down there live like potentates, not just because of what they are 
stealing from their own people, but they are directly and deeply 
involved in the drug trafficking that plagues our society. That, in and 
of itself, Mr. President, I would not suggest is a justification. But 
when I hear people say there is no justification here whatsoever--none 
whatsoever--I disagree with that. I think there is a justification for 
our involvement. That is why President Bush and Jim Baker made the 
statements they did in 1991. They talked about it as being in our 
interest to be concerned and care about what goes on in Haiti. And they 
stated so repeatedly. This administration carried on basically the same 
commitment in foreign policy.
  The irony is this administration ends up having run out the string on 
the diplomatic, political, and economic front and is left in this ugly 
choice. I suspect, had the Presidential elections in 1992 turned out 
differently and that George Bush was still the President of this 
country, and we had no change in Haiti on the political front, we might 
very well be standing here today debating whether or not President 
Bush, in seeking possibly to use military force, deserved support if 
that option were exercised. That is how longstanding this problem is 
and how it has run out.
  So again, I want to be very clear here. I am not--and I have stated 
this--I am not enthusiastic about this option being exercised. But let 
us not give comfort to the thugs in Haiti today in our debate. Let us 
remember why this problem arose, who created this situation, and what 
is happening to 6 million people as we stand here on the floor of this 
body today. Do not give the comfort, do not give the kind of protection 
to those who engage in the brutal human rights violations of these 
desperate, poor, and helpless people. We may disagree about tactics. 
But do not let these people leave convinced that we do not care, that 
we are not going to do anything about this, that we are just going to 
walk away from it, as some have suggested we ought to. ``It is just too 
messy. It is just too complicated. It is just too unpopular. The 
election is around the corner.''
  All of these arguments do not go to the heart, the central question 
of whether or not this country, our country, the United States of 
America--we are not any other nation. We are the leader in the world 
today, the unchallenged leader in the world. If we were just any other 
country then maybe we could just wash our hands of it as many do in 
Europe when it comes to Bosnia or problems in Africa--that many of them 
helped create, I might add, in their colonial efforts over the years. 
We are not those nations. We are special because we care about problems 
like this.
  It ought not to be something we are ashamed of or walk away from. Try 
to effectuate the result, maybe through some different means, but let 
us not forget our heritage as a people. Let us not forget our history. 
Let us not forget we have stood up in the past when others have faced 
hardship and difficulty.
  There were those in 1941, while Europe was aflame, who felt there was 
no validity in being involved in a foreign conflict. It took an attack 
on Pearl Harbor to energize the opinion in this country to think 
differently. But when we did, we made a significant and profound 
difference in the world.
  So I hope in this debate, while one can argue about the use of force 
or not, do not let these thugs look to your words as some source of 
comfort as they continue to thumb their noses at us and the rest of the 
world in perpetuating the dreadful, frightening situation just a few 
miles from our shores.
  Mr. President, we are going to have a long afternoon here. I probably 
have exceeded my time already. But I feel very strongly this issue is 
one that deserves our careful consideration. I would just say I wish we 
had voted on this as well. Others have raised the point. But I quickly 
point out to my colleagues, I suspect every Congress since 1789 has 
wanted Presidents to come before them and seek their approval for 
foreign engagements. With the exception of George Bush and the Persian 
Gulf, where he voluntarily asked the Congress to act, every other 
President since Franklin Roosevelt after the declaration of war in 
December 1941, have found reasons not to come up here.
  I suspect that is going to be the situation here. We can decry that, 
and I think there is a lot of legitimacy to that point. But the fact of 
the matter is, at the end of the day, this action may be taken. If it 
is, then I hope at least we will offer the kind of support and backing 
to the American forces that they deserve in a difficult situation, and 
hope and pray that it succeeds without the loss of any life. And that 
if it is exercised, that is the military option, that it not only 
succeeds without the kind of harm and difficulty that our military 
people can face, but that democracy can be restored and that this 
little, poor, country to the south of us will have a chance to 
recapture the hopes it thought it had achieved with the first free 
election ever in its history, of its first democratically chosen 
President. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I would designate--as 
acting leader of our party, I would designate Senator Helms as my 
designee with regard to controlling the debate on our side of the 
aisle, a fine ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
And Ms. Ann Sauer and Mike Tongour, my chief of staff, will be here to 
assist in the allocation of time in accordance with the unanimous-
consent agreement. I now yield to Senator Roth for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to 
send a succinct message to President Clinton concerning the projected 
invasion of Haiti: ``Don't do it.''
  The Commander in Chief of this Nation has every right to consider 
placing the U.S. Armed Forces in harms way in order to protect the 
security or economic interests of this Nation. In considering this 
course of action, the President must also consider the crucial 
importance of winning support in the Congress and explaining the case 
for military action to the American people.
  The invasion of Haiti fails on all counts. The situation in Haiti 
poses no threat to the national security of the United States. I am 
aware that some members of the Clinton administration have contended, 
somewhat tortuously, that further floods of Haitian refugees constitute 
a threat to our national security. But if this is true they know that 
they can obviate the threat immediately by returning to the Bush policy 
of turning back Haitian boats on the high seas, a policy to which 
President Clinton wisely adhered until he gave in to pressure from 
within his own party and abandoned it.
  Nor does the Haitian situation constitute an economic threat to this 
Nation. Indeed, so wrecked is the Haitian economy that it can barely be 
said to exist, as such.
  So far as congressional support is concerned, the White House has 
apparently concluded that it has no chance of winning congressional 
approval for military action against Haiti so it has decided to ignore 
its constitutional responsibility to obtain an affirmative vote in 
favor of military action. I draw the attention of my colleagues to the 
fact that when President Reagan and George Bush initiated surprise 
military action against Grenada and Panama, they did so on the basis 
that United States lives were in danger.
  Under these circumstances, they were acting within their legitimate 
emergency powers in initiating that military action.
  Opponments of the Grenada and Panama operations have objected to this 
legitimization of military action. But the fact remains that the 
legitimization was made and both the Reagan and Bush administration 
were able to produce evidence to support their assertions. But no one 
has attempted to suggest that United States lives are in danger in 
Haiti, or that an element of surprise is called for in order to save 
those lives.
  Under these circumstances, President Clinton has no choice but to 
adhere to his constitutional duty, as President Bush did prior to 
launching Operation Desert Storm. He must formally seek the support of 
the Congress in favor of a United States military intervention in Haiti 
and if that support is not forthcoming, that action may not take place.
  Quite frankly, I am amazed that we are here today discussing a 
nonbinding sense-of-the-Senate resolution while the Clinton 
administration prepares for war. The question should be: Does this body 
approve an invasion of Haiti--Yes or no? And that vote should be fully 
binding. I still hope that President Clinton will grasp this truth and 
seek the approval of this body before undertaking any military action 
against Haiti.
  I have heard it asserted that all of this is justified because of 
President Clinton's overriding need to maintain his international 
credibility. We are told that, having threatened to invade Haiti so 
often, President Clinton must now proceed or his international 
credibility will be damaged beyond repair.
  Mr. President, the credibility of this great Nation cannot, and must 
not, be equated with the credibility of one man, even if he is the 
President. President Clinton has, in my opinion, made some unwise 
statements. It is not the duty of U.S. service men and women to lay 
down their lives in order to protect him from the political 
consequences of his statements.
  I grant that abandonment of the Haiti operation at this time will, no 
doubt, once again call President Clinton's credibility into question. 
But these are problems which, I regret, he has brought upon himself. I 
for one, have no doubt that the Saddam Hussein's of this world will 
still know that, while the executive branch of the U.S. Government may 
not have a firm grip on foreign policy, the American people still stand 
ready and willing to defend their true interests--with force if 
necessary--whenever they are threatened.
  Moreover, once the military operation is completed, what then? Are we 
going to imprison the active Haitian military and police force? Are we 
to become an army of occupation until the scheduled Haitian elections 
in 1996? Will we try to interpose our forces if Haiti's downtrodden 
masses seek bloody revenge on their traditional persecutors? How is a 
Haitian occupation force to be financed out of a military budget 
severely stretched by budget cuts and multiplying international 
commitments?
  I fear that the Clinton administration has no convincing answers for 
these all important questions. Under these circumstances, President 
Clinton should not initiate a military invasion of Haiti, especially 
without congressional approval and with little public support.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Leahy). Who yields time?
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield as much as 10 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico is 
recognized for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for 
yielding time to me on this important issue.
  I rise to urge the President to rethink his policy toward Haiti; in 
particular, to rethink the idea of invasion that it is widely rumored 
could take place as early as next week.
  I see no rationale for taking this action, which will put at risk the 
lives of thousands of young Americans. In my view, there is no 
compelling national interest at stake that requires military action. As 
the Washington Post editorial states this morning:

       The national security/national interest case for the 
     evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhere 
     between exceedingly thin and preposterous.

  The President and his national security team have simply not 
convinced the public and they have not convinced their representatives 
in the Congress that we should undertake an invasion of Haiti at this 
time. They have boxed themselves into a corner by making a series of 
threats to the thugs presently in control of Haiti, and evidently the 
administration now feels compelled to carry out those threats to 
preserve their credibility. This is a sorry reason to put American 
lives at risk.
  The main rationale that we hear for the invasion from administration 
officials is that we cannot allow the ouster of President Aristide by 
the thugs in the Haitian military to stand, and that having exhausted 
various diplomatic and economic sanctions, the only course now is to 
remove those thugs by force. In other words, the generation that grew 
up criticizing Lyndon Johnson for his attempt to ``make the world safe 
for democracy'' in Vietnam is now undertaking a new effort 30 years 
later to bring democracy to Haiti.
  Haiti clearly is not going to be Vietnam in terms of the cost of 
American lives. By all reports, the military expects very few 
casualties in this invasion. This seems to be one of the main 
rationales for undertaking the invasion. But I would note that when 
President Bush decided, in consultation with President-elect Clinton, 
to undertake the humanitarian effort to feed the starving in Somalia, 
it was also supposed to be without casualties. And instead, we found 
ourselves drawn into the civil war and into the misguided efforts at 
nation-building, which were only abandoned after a military 
catastrophe.
  If the President is undertaking this invasion to restore democracy, 
when will we know that we have succeeded? It is easy to be drawn into 
one of these so-called easy military actions; it is very hard to get 
out.
  We may well be no more successful at nation-building in Haiti this 
time than we were the last time we sent marines 80 years ago.
  After two decades of American military occupation, the country soon 
sank once again to the depths of the Duvalier era. We may well be no 
more successful in Haiti now than they were in Somalia last year or in 
Vietnam three decades ago.
  Mr. President, we cannot get into the practice in the post-cold-war 
world of trying to remove dictators and install democracy by force of 
arms. The very democrats that we install will be tainted from the first 
day they take office, and we will be doing them no favors.
  Mr. President, the tide of history is on our side. Democracy is on 
the rise across the world. There is no competing successful model. 
Patience will in the end be rewarded. We have to have the courage to 
exercise restraint, to resist the easy victory that will bring up the 
question of why we do not undertake the hard ones. If Haiti, why not 
Cuba? If Haiti, why not Libya? If Haiti, why not Zaire or why not 
Bosnia? The only answer is that Haiti, like Grenada before it, is easy 
and close by and the others are hard or farther away.
  I urge the President to change course and to stand down preparations 
for the pending invasion. I urge the President to seek congressional 
approval for his actions before he undertakes those actions. I believe 
that a resolution of approval would be defeated if it were brought to a 
vote. And I do not expect that the President's speech to the Nation 
tomorrow evening will change the outcome of that vote.
  The Congress and the American public already understand what the 
President proposes to do in Haiti, and a majority of the Congress and 
the public oppose the action. It is a very dangerous course for the 
President to embark on military action with so little support. It is an 
unwise course to risk American lives for so tenuous a national 
interest. I hope that Congress will be given the opportunity to express 
its will on this invasion before it occurs, and I hope the President 
and his national security team will have the courage to change course.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Under the previous agreement, it would be customary now to go to the 
Republican side of the aisle.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. I would yield so much time as he may need to the 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Pell, of 
Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no one on the Republican side of the aisle 
is seeking recognition, the Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
  Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague from Connecticut.
  Mr. President, for the last 3 years the international community has 
wrestled with how to restore democracy in Haiti. There are no easy 
solutions there and I, like many of my colleagues, have grappled over 
the question of what is the best policy. I am deeply disturbed by the 
horrendous human rights abuses in that small country and by the 
military regime's blatant rejection of democracy and the commitments it 
made under the Governors Island accord.
  However, in my view there are not sufficient United States interests 
to justify an invasion of Haiti and, in fact, I so advised the 
President in a letter of July 22.
  I believe President Clinton would be in a stronger position, too, if 
he sought a formal authorization from Congress. I recognize, though, 
that more often than not, Presidents have taken military action without 
the prior authorization of Congress. I would point out, furthermore, 
that although the President is not seeking prior authorization, the 
administration has made every effort to consult with me and with the 
Members of Congress, appearing at more than 75 hearings, briefings, and 
meetings on this issue.
  I commend the President for his success in marshaling the support of 
the world community via the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of 
force to restore democracy in Haiti and for putting together a 
multinational force. If the President feels compelled to take this 
step, it is best to do it in a multilateral forum with the support of 
the international community.
  While President Clinton and I may differ on the wisdom of using force 
in Haiti, I know the President has the best interests of the United 
States at heart.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today to state my grave concerns for 
the imminent invasion of Haiti. I appreciate having this chance to 
share my concerns, and I hope that President Clinton will give us a 
chance by asking Congress before he commits our troops to an invasion 
of Haiti.
  President Clinton has been flip-flopping on our policy on Haiti ever 
since he took office. But over time the threat of military intervention 
has moved to the forefront. And now we are on the verge of sending 
American troops to Haiti.
  I am not alone in sounding alarm bells for this haphazard decision.
  Montanans want to know why we are rushing into this situation. Why 
are we putting American lives on the line? The administration has 
failed to give sound reasons for why we have to get involved.
  Where is our national interest in sending an invasion force of 20,000 
troops? Seventeen other countries only think it is important enough to 
send 1,500 troops. And that is just the first stage. And then the 
second stage will be to restore order. What are our plans to disengage? 
The last time we went in to take care of Haiti, we stayed for 19 years.
  At the second stage, the United Nations are likely to replace the 
invasion force and take over the operation. Remember, they were the 
ones who came in while we were in Somalia. That mission ended in more 
chaos than order before we were able to withdraw.
  Another question: How much is this going to cost? Our defense budget 
has been slashed and money for a Haitian invasion is not there. We have 
already spent nearly $200 million to rescue Haitians. Polls show that 
Americans are not in support of this invasion and they sure do not want 
their tax money to go for paying for it. Montanans are absolutely 
against this, and they have been.
  While we are at it, let us look at another stated administration 
goal; the need to restore democracy in Haiti. President Clinton has 
made it a key goal to restore Aristide as President of Haiti. Aristide 
was hardly the perfect picture of democracy during his time as 
president. In fact, he ruled with a strong fist and often resorted to 
violence against his people. That is not democracy and that is not what 
Americans should fight to defend.
  Let us not rush into a foolhardy invasion. We still have not 
exhausted all of our policy options. And most of all, we should take 
the time to reexamine the policies that are already in effect. 
Something is obviously not working. For one thing, it is time to lift 
the sanctions. Let us help the innocent victims of the tough economic 
sanctions. They are the ones who are risking their lives by attempting 
to cross the ocean in rickety boats. And they are the ones who have 
been caught in the Clinton administration's ever-changing policy web.
  I do not see any need for an invasion at this time. And the President 
Clinton has not given good, hard reasons for this invasion that 
convince me that this is the best, and only, course of policy.


                   united states policy toward haiti

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition to 
the current slide toward American military intervention in Haiti.
  The White House is playing a dangerous game and American foreign 
policy is starting to look a lot like the Waco of the Caribbean. Once 
again, the administration is clearly exasperated and frustrated by a 
standoff. And once again, the White House apparently believes that the 
only way out of this box is through the use of force. This is an act of 
sheer desperation on the part of the White House and it is a foreign 
policy prescription for disaster.
  The administration has always lacked a fundamental appreciation of 
how to conduct foreign policy, and under what circumstances military 
force should be used to achieve foreign policy goals. Military force is 
not a good vehicle to help reform a political system or culture, 
particularly one lacking any history of democracy and ranking among the 
poorest countries in the world.
  I challenge this administration to outline its specific goals in 
Haiti and to explain how we plan to achieve them through the use of 
force.
  The simple fact is that we do not have a vital national security 
interest at stake in Haiti. We are not fighting Soviet or Cuban 
surrogates as we did in Grenada. We are not using force to defend vital 
interests as we did against Noriega in Panama. We had a legitimate 
stake in Panama's internal developments because of our interest in the 
Panama Canal and our need for information about Noriega's involvement 
in drug trafficking. The situation in Haiti is vastly different from 
either Grenada or Panama, but the White House has been unable to 
discern these important distinctions.
  Secretary of State Christopher, in a Tuesday afternoon press 
conference, stated that our general objectives in Haiti include the 
restoration of civil law and the establishment of a free government. 
However, he also insisted that the United States will not be involved 
in nation-building. Secretary Christopher said that:

       Now the aim of the multinational coalition, the aim of the 
     United States here, is not to be involved in nation building, 
     but to give the people of Haiti an opportunity to build their 
     institutions, to reclaim their country and have that 
     opportunity with respect to the building of their own 
     institutions.

  I have some news for the administration: restoring civil order and 
replacing a government is nation-building--pure and simple.
  The administration has asserted that it does not have to come to 
Congress prior to the introduction of troops because the President has 
the authority to do so on his own. That is a constitutional debate that 
has continued for over two centuries.
  Mr. President, Congress is not obligated to sit by idly when an 
administration embarks on a potentially dangerous and inappropriate use 
of American military power. The use of force is the most important 
decision a President can make because it places the lives of American 
troops at risk.
  While I believe that the President has the prerogative to use 
military force in matters of national security, Congress also has a 
role to play, and both are accountable to the American people. Members 
of this Chamber have an obligation and a right to respond to the 
inappropriate use of this executive branch prerogative. And in this 
context, I am completely opposed to sending troops into Haiti.
  Mr. President, the Clinton administration has some explaining to do. 
We have heard bits and pieces from the administration about its 
intentions in Haiti. Many of these statements have been contradictory, 
including Sunday's confusion between Secretary Christopher and U.N. 
Ambassador Madeline Albright concerning whether Lieutenant General 
Cedras must leave the Caribbean island republic, in addition to 
surrendering power.
  It is clear that this administration lacks a coherent policy toward 
Haiti. Holding an occasional State Department press conference to talk 
briefly about Haiti--when it suits the needs of the administration--is 
not a substitute for a rational formulation of American foreign policy. 
And it is certainly no substitute for congressional support for this 
action.
  We are about to place American troops in harm's way and Congress has 
neither seriously discussed the possible costs of an invasion nor 
explored the possible consequences of this action. I would pose several 
questions to the administration concerning United States intervention 
in Haiti:
  First, do we have an approximate timetable for how long a military 
operation would last? The administration has given us no reason to 
believe that there is any such estimate.
  Second, what are the short- and long-term goals of the intervention 
force in Haiti? There has been no clear explanation of the specific 
political and military objectives.
  Third, do we have any idea how long we plan to stay in Haiti and who 
will oversee the political, economic, and military transition? The 
administration has not provided us with clear answers.
  Fourth, who will bear the financial costs of this so-called 
multinational effort? We have not even begun to consider the financial 
costs of an invasion, or the financial implications of maintaining a 
large occupying force in Haiti.
  Finally, is it actually worth the life of one American soldier to put 
Aristide back into political power? Serious questions still exist about 
Aristide's commitment to human rights, pluralism, and democracy.
  Mr. President, let us face the facts. This administration has sought 
to avoid discussing these issues in depth because it does not have any 
answers at this time. Yet these critical questions deserve a response 
before the President decides to intervene with American forces.
  I would argue that it is time for the administration to review the 
current policy options and available alternatives. I do not believe 
that we have exhausted all diplomatic efforts. The administration 
should reconsider a plan that calls for an immediate lifting of the 
economic embargo if the current military leadership steps down and 
allows free and fair elections to be monitored by international 
observers. We should redouble our efforts to seek a compromise 
agreement among all of the parties involved.
  Mr. President, there is simply no way that the administration will be 
able to establish a viable, functioning, and effective democracy in a 
few short weeks after an invasion. Once we are in Haiti, we will be 
there for a long time. We have attempted nation-building in Haiti 
before, and after 19 years and major infrastructure projects, the 
country slipped back into a state of civil disorder. We should have 
learned what happens when you attempt to perform nation-building after 
the debacle in Somalia.
  The administration is playing a high stakes game that commits the 
United States to an invasion of a sovereign nation and that opens up 
the prospect of an indefinite stay for American forces on that island. 
There is no consensus in Congress or among the American people for 
intervening in Haiti, or for a prolonged occupation of that country. 
Before we place our troops in imminent danger, the American people 
deserve a clear and concise explanation of what we hope to achieve in 
that country.
  I urge the administration to reexamine its current policy on Haiti 
and to come to Congress prior to an introduction of forces into Haiti.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, once again the Senate is addressing the 
issue of United States foreign policy toward Haiti.
  Once again, talk of invasion has risen.
  The level of rhetoric coming out of the administration leads to one 
conclusion: The inconsistent foreign policy of this administration will 
result in the use of U.S. forces.
  I do not support the administration's proposed invasion of Haiti. I 
have demonstrated that opposition through several votes expressing 
concern and opposition to the use of military action.
  I do not enjoy finding myself in a position opposing the Commander in 
Chief, but will do so.
  If President Clinton insists on ignoring public and congressional 
dissent and chooses to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, I 
will stand firmly in support of our troops.
  Mr. President, this is not the first time the issue of the use of 
force has been debated during my short tenure in the Senate.
  As a Member of Congress and a U.S. Senator representing the people of 
Idaho, I established a set of conditions that I look for in making a 
decision to either support or oppose the use of our military. On the 
top of that list is the opinion or sentiments of my fellow Idahoans.
  In making my determination, I also look at what economic, security, 
or national interests are at stake. I also review our policy or 
strategy: When are we going in; why are we going in; what are our 
objectives and goals and how will they be carried out?
  These important questions have not been answered to my satisfaction.
  In addition, as part of my decisionmaking process, I ask if all other 
policy options have been exhausted. It is my position that there are 
unexplored options that should be considered.
  Through the auspices of a bipartisan commission, a range of viable 
options could be considered and a sound and consistent policy 
established that would lead us toward a welcome solution.
  As I just mentioned, the implementation of a sound and consistent 
policy is very important.
  Mr. President, as the situation in Haiti has evolved, there have been 
a number of efforts to restrict the President's use of force. I have 
been gravely concerned about setting a precedent that would restrict 
the authority of the Commander in Chief.
  However, the continual lack of a clear U.S. foreign policy in trouble 
spots around the world has led me to the conclusion that without clear 
leadership, the Congress is left to micromanage foreign policy in order 
to protect U.S. interests and security. This has not been a direction 
that I have happily embraced, rather it has been a reluctant necessity.
  Mr. President, this administration has repeatedly changed the 
direction of its policy, often in the middle of implementing the 
policy. In dealing with the refugee issue, candidate Clinton opposed 
the Bush policy of direct repatriation of Haitian migrants. Then, 
President-elect Clinton expressed support for that policy.

  Finally, earlier this year, the President changed his position once 
again in an effort to counter criticism from different groups that he 
had not kept his promise to change the policy on dealing with Haitian 
refugees.
  While doing this flip-flop on the refugee problem, the administration 
was also tightening sanctions on this very poor nation. As a result, 
the administration's policy has encouraged more people to flee because 
of severe economic depression.
  There is no question that if you use sanctions to block the fragile 
economy of that small island nation, people will attempt to flee its 
shores--and that is exactly what has happened. Sanctions aimed at the 
rich supporters and members of the junta government have fallen on the 
backs of Haiti's poorest citizens.
  In short, Mr. President, the administration's efforts to tighten 
sanctions on Haiti seem unlikely to force out the military chief, Lt. 
Gen. Raoul Cedras and his allies.
  So where does that leave us?
  I do not believe that we are left with only the option to invade. As 
I mentioned before, it may require a bipartisan committee to review the 
situation and alternative policy options so that we are resolved to 
carry out a consistent policy.
  In an effort to respond to growing concerns in the Congress and 
concerns in the general population about a possible invasion of Haiti, 
Senator Dole sponsored an amendment recently that would create a 
bipartisan commission on the situation in Haiti.
  I supported that amendment. However, it unfortunately did not pass.
  The amendment was offered during debate on the 1995 foreign 
operations appropriations bill and would have deterred, for now, the 
imminent invasion.
  The amendment would have established a bipartisan commission, 
assigned to assess diplomatic and political conditions in Haiti. The 
commission would have been required to report on its findings within 45 
days after enactment. This amendment could have slowed the progression 
toward invasion.
  Prior to this, there were a number of earlier efforts to require the 
President to consult the Congress before ordering an invasion of Haiti. 
Three such attempts occurred this summer in the form of amendments to 
bills moving through the Senate.
  There was also a vote last fall on an amendment offered by Senator 
Helms and dealing with the Haiti situation. Regrettably that amendment 
also failed.
  Mr. President, in addition to the concerns I have expressed here, I 
am troubled that in the name of democracy, this administration is 
planning to return to power a man who certainly does not hold 
democratic principles in esteem.
  Rather, this is a man who uses such practices as necklacing as a tool 
of leadership. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's commitment to human 
rights and democratic principles is questionable at best. Judging by 
reports I have reviewed, a number of incidents that occurred following 
Aristide's election in December 1990, can only be described as gross 
violations of human rights. A specific example of this violence was the 
attack on the Papal Nuncio in January 1991.
  If Aristide is restored to power, we will likely see the kind of 
repression he imposed when he was initially elected and attempted to 
wipe out those who dared to dissent from his opinions. Instability and 
unrest are inevitable if he seeks to destroy those who supported his 
ousting and the implementation of the junta government.
  In light of this, I am very concerned about the aftermath of an 
invasion.
  If we are to occupy Haiti, will our service people be asked to serve 
as domestic police? What authority will they be granted to maintain 
order? Will that include the authority to quell domestic unrest?
  Mr. President, many questions remain unanswered in the 
administration's pursuit of an invasion of Haiti. Once our military has 
prevailed in ousting the junta government, where do we go from there?
  Mr. President, how is order established and how is it maintained? 
And, finally, when and how do we leave? These are all very important 
questions that have not been answered--they are questions, Mr. 
President, that must be answered.
  I do not relish the position I am in, opposing the actions of our 
Commander in Chief. However, I cannot support the use of our Armed 
Forces in a situation that does not meet any reasonable test for 
military involvement.
  Let me reiterate, Mr. President, I will fully support our troops in 
Haiti if the President chooses to exercise the military option. I have 
no doubt in the ability of our forces to prevail in an invasion. We 
have a fine group of men and women who have dedicated their lives to 
serving the United States.
  Mr. President, there is a final point that I would like to make. The 
United States is the remaining superpower in the community of sovereign 
nations. How we use our military in this instance may affect our 
ability to exercise policy options in other areas of concern that are 
far more critical to U.S. national interests and security.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that this debate will serve to deter our 
present course and set us on the course of a consistent policy that 
will allow us to be a leader and continue to pursue a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign policy, which is to support democracy.


             aristide undeserving of u.s. military support

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the administration obviously is hopeful 
that Jean-Bertrand Aristide will become a small ``d'' democrat sometime 
before the President orders American troops to invade Haiti. The 
problem is, neither Mr. Aristide's philosophy nor his background 
indicates that he is motivated by democratic values or principles.
  Consider whom the man looks to as models for his philosophy. In his 
autobiography, Aristide identifies his role models as being Che 
Guevara, the Cuban Communist revolutionary; Salvador Allende, the 
Marxist President of Chile; and Robespierre, the 18th century French 
revolutionary who was an architect of the bloody reign of terror in 
France.
  Sure, Mr. President, Aristide speaks of ``beauty, dignity, respect, 
and love,'' but his heroes are history's synonyms of brutality and 
violent revolution. No doubt, Robespierre, who so effectively used the 
guillotine to silence his adversaries, would approve of executions by 
necklacing--that cruel, bloodthirsty ultimate in horror in which 
gasoline-filled tires are hung around the necks of victims and ignited.
  Aristide has no relationship whatsoever with democracy; he is neither 
a peacelover nor a peacemaker. He is a mean-spirited revolutionary and 
an anti-American demagog. Just as his heroes endeavored to create 
totalitarian governments, they like Aristide had no commitment to 
democracy nor respect for human rights. Aristide's philosophy and 
record cannot and should not be overlooked as a factor in any decision 
involving calling on United States troops to invade Haiti.
  Mr. President, the distinguished and courageous newspaper, Human 
Events, has stripped Aristide of his phony piety. Human Events has 
spelled out Aristide's record for all to see. The very able editor of 
Human Events, Allan Ryskind, understands that militants, Aristide being 
no exception, see nothing wrong with resorting to violence to attain 
power. Mr. Ryskind went to Aristide's own writings to determine exactly 
what Mr. Aristide supports. I am astounded that the President of the 
United States is said to be willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops to 
restore Aristide to power.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that portions of Allan 
Ryskind's article, ``Has Aristide Changed His Extremist Stripes?'' 
published in the July 29 issue of Human Events, be printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Has Aristide Changed His Extremist Stripes--Aristide's Revealing 
                             Autobiography

       Indeed, in his autobiography, published just two years ago, 
     Aristide comes across as a full-blown leftist revolutionary. 
     In the English-language edition, published by the Maryknoll 
     Order's Orbis Books in 1993, Aristide says (page 125) that 
     his foes would like to label him ``a follower of Fidel 
     Castro, an admirer of the Sandinistas * * * an imitator of 
     Salvador Allende [the late Marxist-Leninist leader of Chile] 
     or of the Shining Path [Peru's Maoist revolutionaries].''
       Astonishingly, Aristide then refuses to flatly deny the 
     charges of his enemies. ``Rather than searching for models,'' 
     he explains (page 126), ``I prefer to welcome those ideas 
     that rest on the values of beauty, dignity, respect and love. 
     Che Guevara * * * certainly incorporated some of those 
     values, as did Allende. They were sincere men, like so many 
     others * * * I feel more affection and sympathy for them than 
     I do for many others.''
       Che Guevara, of course, was the Marxist-Leninist 
     revolutionary who helped Fidel Castro impose communism in 
     Cuba and got killed in Bolivia attempting to spread Marxist 
     revolutions throughout the hemisphere. Salvador Allende was 
     the late Marxist-Leninist ruler of Chile, deposed in a 
     military coup in 1973.
       In his autobiography, Aristide also makes it clear he 
     favors ``liberation theology,'' the violent, Marxist 
     philosophy that has gripped so many revolutionaries in Latin 
     America and the Caribbean, that he rejects ``western 
     democracies'' and that he worships historical figures such as 
     Robespierre.
       In chapter 15, titled ``Convictions,'' Aristide is asked in 
     a question and answer format--it is unclear who's doing the 
     questioning--if he sees himself as resembling the notorious 
     revolutionary leader who unleashed a reign of terror in 
     France in the late 1700s.
       Aristide replied (page 184): ``There is no question that 
     there are common denominators between us and the makers of 
     the French Revolution: 1789 is an essential reference point 
     as is 1793 [the beginning of Robespierre's rule]. The memory 
     of the heroes of the rights of humanity should always be in 
     our minds, as their texts are in our hands. Robespierre 
     himself denounced the `patripockets.' From Saint-Just to Abbe 
     Gregoire, how much I owe to the makers of the Revolution!''
       Aristide's fanaticism was underscored last week in a 
     revealing Washington Post profile of the man the Clinton 
     Administration hopes to restore to power in Haiti. Written by 
     Daniel Williams, the piece does not suggest any reason to 
     believe that Aristide is a ``changed man,'' as some of his 
     supporters have been saying.
       Williams, who interviewed Aristide in his Washington, D.C. 
     apartment, allows that Aristide ``is a very untypical 
     beneficiary of American muscle not to mention blood. He is 
     more the kind of leader U.S. governments frequently opposed 
     during the Cold War; he certainly would have been labeled 
     anti-American. * * *
       ``He is a populist who used mob power to intimidate 
     political critics. During his brief stay in office, he spoke 
     glowingly of the `necklace,' the burning tire ignited around 
     the neck of victims of street execution. * * *
       ``Aristide, ordained in 1982 as a Catholic priest, is a 
     disciple of liberation theology, an interpretation of the 
     Bible as a revolutionary document. `The Gospel in its raw 
     form,' he once said, `could act like a stick of dynamite.'''
       Though in his effort to get U.S. support he has proposed a 
     moderate program for Haiti. Williams noted that Aristide 
     won't apologize for his past remarks or try to explain them 
     away, insisting they are irrelevant.
       Nor does he reveal any inclination to compromise with his 
     political opponents.
       ``From his exile,'' said Williams, ``Aristide has resisted 
     naming a new prime minister and shelved his own plans to form 
     a `government of concord.'
       ``Last winter, U.S. officials tried to persuade Aristide to 
     build a broad cabinet to include political opponents. 
     Aristide refused, claiming such a move would effectively 
     marginalize him.''

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to any 
United States invasion of Haiti. I have just returned from Idaho and 
while I was home I did not meet one person advocating a United States 
invasion of Haiti. Instead, I met a number of Idahoans who expressed 
concern and opposition to an American invasion of Haiti. I could not 
agree more with my constituents.
  If this administration thinks the American people want to put our 
troops at risk in order to restore President Aristide to power, then I 
urge these policymakers to get out of Washington and meet with the 
American people. The American people have considered this question and 
an overwhelming number of Americans oppose a United States invasion of 
Haiti. And they do so because there is absolutely no United States 
national interest that requires the use of American military power in 
Haiti.
  I hope President Clinton will listen to our warnings and turn back 
from the policy of preparing to invade Haiti. I believe it will be a 
mistake for United States forces to invade Haiti because there is no 
objective in Haiti that is worth the cost of one American life. If the 
United States invades Haiti what will the President tell the American 
men, women, and children who lose a loved one in Haiti? What goal will 
the administration cite to justify this loss? I do not want to see 
grieving parents asking us if their child died in vain.
  There is no doubt that United States military forces can successfully 
invade and conquer Haiti. The real questions facing us are: What do we 
do once we have conquered Haiti and how do we get out? Once we have 
taken over Haiti we will be faced with an enormous nationbuilding task. 
In Haiti, we will find a poverty stricken people. Analysts have looked 
at this enormous nationbuilding task and they estimate that the United 
States might be required to stay in Haiti for months or even years. In 
addition, we do not know how Haitian people will view our presence. In 
short, we will be faced with a potentially dangerous, international 
welfare case with no hope that we can get out anytime soon.
  As my colleagues know, I have been actively involved in bringing an 
end to the United States military and diplomatic presence in Somalia. 
This exercise demonstrated that the U.S. has a very difficult time 
leaving once we send our troops into a country. The last time the 
United States invaded Haiti, it took us 19 years to withdraw. We must 
not make that mistake again.
  Before a President considers putting the lives of U.S. military 
personnel at risk, we need to determine that our national interests are 
involved. When President Reagan invaded Grenada there was a clear and 
imminent threat to United States citizens. When President Bush toppled 
Manuel Noriega in Panama, there had been attacks on American citizens 
in Panama. When President Bush liberated Kuwait, he stopped Saddam 
Hussein from seizing the Persian Gulf and a large percent of the 
world's oil reserves. In each of these cases, there was a compelling 
reason for the President's action. Today, however, there is no such 
compelling reason to invade Haiti.
  I am not adverse to the United States using force when it's 
warranted. There was a time during the Reagan era when nations of the 
world knew they couldn't mess with the United States. If you did, you 
might be the recipient of a smart bomb or a Tomahawk missile. I think 
that's healthy. We should use our military forces sparingly, but if 
some other country has done something to merit the use of force, it 
should be done rapidly and effectively. It should not be done simply to 
prove that we have the strength to do it, and certainly not because the 
administration wants to prove it's finished bluffing.
  Mr. President, I urge President Clinton to step back from this abyss. 
Time is on our side. We must not put our troops at risk in order to 
restore the reliability of this administration. It is a travesty that 
our reliability now seems in such disrepair that it now requires 
rebuilding. This is no way to conduct foreign policy. We can do better 
than this.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to address the troubling issue of 
a possible impending invasion of Haiti by United States military 
forces.
  It is unfortunate, Mr. President, that those of us on this side of 
the debate must feel compelled to preface our remarks by making certain 
disclaimers and caveats. But such has been the nature of the criticism 
against the position that many in my party have taken regarding such an 
invasion, so some clarifications and reassurances to the President and 
to the public seem necessary.
  Let it be firmly understood that this Senator at least, as well as my 
Republican colleagues, do not challenge the President's authority, if 
national security requires it, to invade Haiti or indeed to take any 
other appropriate action involving the United States military. That is 
his charge and his right, to act with full authority in the interest of 
national security as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. military 
forces.
  That should be clearly understood, and I would remind my colleagues 
that previous resolutions offered on this side of the aisle, even as 
they would have required consultation with Congress before deploying 
United States forces in Haiti, would have made appropriate exemptions 
for the event that the President deemed our vital ``national security'' 
interests to be at stake.
  So let that be understood. President Clinton enjoys full support from 
this side of the aisle, just as previous Republican Presidents have, 
for his authority to use his powers as the Commander in Chief to act on 
behalf of vital U.S. interests.
  But that is the rub, isn't it? The singular lack of an assault on our 
national security. I do not believe that there would be this kind of 
showdown between the President and congressional leaders if we faced an 
Iran-style hostage situation, or if we faced, as we did in Iraq, an 
international aggressor straddling a large fraction of the world's 
precious energy reserves. But instead we are not facing any of those 
obvious challenges to our national security, nor to the security of our 
private citizens.
  Furthermore, we do not face a military situation in which surprise 
and secrecy seems to be deemed by the administration as essential to 
preserving the lives of American soldiers. We are not facing a 
situation where we have the necessity of remaining silent on this issue 
so as to preserve the ignorance of the Haitian junta. In other words, 
we do not have a situation where the President is seeking to use the 
most extensive powers he has a Commander in Chief to launch a sudden 
and secret assault, the war-making powers of Congress notwithstanding.
  No, Mr. President. Indeed we see quite the contrary. we have seen 
every manner of verbal hint and threat from the administration that an 
invasion will come if the Haitian military does not abdicate. The 
administration clearly intends to force the Haitian military out of its 
position of power, if not by invasion, then by the threat of it. The 
military action envisioned here clearly has the character of a willful 
entrance into warmmaking, quite distinct from an urgent and time-
sensitive military rescue mission or urgent national security action.
  We well recall when President Bush laid out for Saddam Hussein the 
consequences of his action in invading Kuwait. ``This will not stand'' 
it was an ultimatum much like today's that seems to be coming from the 
Clinton administration. And President Bush was told by Congress that he 
must come before us and make his case for the use of force. Which, he 
did. And his arguments carried the day, because he was able to 
demonstrate a clear and demonstrable threat to the international order, 
and was able to generate the requisite support from the American people 
and their elected representatives.
  If President Bush was so obliged, certainly President Clinton is as 
well. Indeed I cannot see any reason for the President to claim an 
exemption from this necessity, that was not available to President Bush 
when he faced the aggression of Saddam Hussein. The only credible 
argument I can see advanced within the administration against 
congressional authorization is based on the apparent fact that he does 
not, indeed, have the support either of the American people or of the 
Congress for this action.
  Having said that, let me reiterate: I have an open mind. If the 
President can make a convincing case that this action is worth American 
blood, I am listening. But it seems bizarre to me that we would even be 
contemplating such an action when no such case has been made.
  We hear that democracy has been ``hijacked'' in Haiti, which indeed 
it has, by military thugs. And this is certainly ample reason to apply 
sanctions and economic pressure against the Haitian military junta. But 
what is it, Mr. President, that distinguishes Haiti from the many other 
nondemocratic governments around the world? Of course we support and 
argue for democratic processes everywhere, and we support the rights of 
people for self-determination. We do not always, however, shed American 
blood in that cause. We are not contemplating an invasion of Burma. We 
are not, to my knowledge, contemplating an invasion of Cuba. Haiti is 
not the only country--not even the only Caribbean country--where 
democracy has been hijacked. Why Haiti?
  Is it the case that there is so clear a choice between the virtue of 
the Aristide Presidency and the evil of the existing military junta? 
Mr. President, I respect to overwhelming electoral victory won by 
President Aristide. But is President Clinton, and the Government of the 
United States, so confident that his return will mean a respect for 
democratic norms, and a respect for individual human rights, that we 
are willing to stamp the ``made in USA'' label on the Aristide 
government from this day forward? Because, make no mistake--once 
Aristide is installed at American gunpoint, he will be considered our 
``client'' in the eyes of Haitians, Americans, and in the eyes of the 
world. Let no one mistake that inevitable result.
  I therefore cannot support the use of American military force in 
Haiti, at least--at the very least--until a compelling, not contrived, 
case is made that the situation in Haiti poses a direct threat to our 
national security, in a way that Cuba or Burma or any other ``outlaw 
regime'' does not. The President ought to know, as well as any American 
citizen does, how inappropriate, how unworkable it is to ask Americans 
to fight and die for confused and uncertain objectives.
  And finally, let me make absolutely clear: No one is suggesting that 
the President decide against an invasion solely because of popular 
opposition to the idea. Foreign policy, and military policy, cannot be 
made by pollsters. But leadership requires more than acting in defiance 
in popular opinion. In matters of war, the Nation must be led, it must 
be rallied, if our aims are to be met. We have not seen that kind of 
leadership from this administration on this issue, and until we do, 
this Senator has no choice but to oppose the use of United States 
military force in Haiti.
  I would like now to address this subject of making the specific case 
for war in Haiti. I assume that one of the reasons offered in 
justification of an invasion of Haiti will be the need to stop illegal 
immigration from Haiti. I have an abiding interest in this issue, 
arising from my position as ranking member on the Immigration 
Subcommittee.
  I want to specifically address Haitian illegal immigration, and that 
problem--and it is a problem--as a justification for an invasion of 
that tiny country.
  Illegal immigration from Haiti is indeed a problem, but it is a small 
problem compared to illegal immigration to this country from Cuba, from 
China, from Mexico, and from other Central American countries including 
the Dominican Republic which shares with Haiti the island of 
Hispaniola.
  No one is suggesting that we invade any of those countries to stop 
illegal immigration, and in my view, it is pretty difficult to justify 
an invasion of Haiti on that basis.
  Justification for an invasion aside, we do not need to invade Haiti 
to deter illegal immigration from that country.
  We have had a number of Caribbean nations offer their territory for 
``holding centers'' for Haitian illegal immigrants--places where 
persons leaving Haiti could stay until they felt it was safe to return 
to their country.
  I assume those offers of locations for holding centers are still 
open, and establishing holding centers to provide temporary safe haven 
to the Haitians outside the United States, is the solution to illegal 
immigration from Haiti. We do not need an invasion.
  Experience has shown us rather clearly that if we do not allow 
illegal boat people, whether they be from Haiti, or from Cuba, to enter 
the United States, no matter what their claim to safe haven may be, the 
boat flow will dry up.
  All we need to do is by our words, and by our actions, clearly 
establish the policy that attempting to enter the United States without 
proper authority will not give boat people an opportunity to live in 
the United States until his or her claim for asylum is determined.
  However, if potential illegal immigrants do not believe we mean it 
when we say they cannot come, and the Clinton administration's 
remarkable confusion on the issue has given them good reason not to 
believe us, they will continue to try to come.
  The answer to illegal immigration from Haiti is not an invasion, but 
a clear, firm, consistent, and persevering policy which does not permit 
the entry into the United States of persons attempting to come on 
vessels without proper immigration documents.
  I would close, therefore, by reiterating the point that a convincing 
case for invasion has not yet been made, and certainly not with respect 
to resolving problems of illegal immigration. Until and unless other 
convincing justifications arise, this Senator must continue to oppose 
risking American lives in a military invasion of Haiti.
  I ask that an article by Charles Krauthammer, ``To Die for 
Aristide?'', be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, July 22, 1994]

                          To Die for Aristide?

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       Unless Haiti's military rulers panic and flee in the face 
     of Bill Clinton's threats--it would be a first--we will have 
     to invade to get them out. The administration has neatly 
     maneuvered itself into a corner from which there is no other 
     escape. It could, of course, declare its entire Haiti policy 
     misbegotten from Day One. It could admit that the restoration 
     of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, hardly a vital American interest, 
     is not worth the bones of a single American grenadier. But 
     there is no chance of such an admission.
       The invasion will have to go forth. Before it does, before 
     the first American dies, it is worth asking why. What 
     national interest do we have in Haiti?
       Among the welter of interests offered by Clinton, the only 
     one with any real resonance is refugees. A tidal wave of 
     refugees washing up on Florida shores is something the United 
     States cannot tolerate.
       This would be a perfectly reasonable rationale--if the 
     refugee exodus were not the direct consequence of Clinton's 
     own policies. The refugee flow shows a striking mathematical 
     relationship between Clinton's ever-changing asylum policies 
     and the numbers of Haitians taking to their boats.
       In May, responding to the pressure of Randall Robinson's 
     hunger strike, Clinton declared a new U.S. policy on Haitian 
     refugees. It offered the possibility of asylum hearings to 
     any Haitian who could make it by boat to a U.S. ship. On June 
     16, it took effect. Surprise: Within two weeks, refugees were 
     arriving at the rate of more than 1,000 a day. On July 4 
     alone, 3,247 were picked up.
       On July 5, overwhelmed, Clinton reversed course. Henceforth 
     refugees who took to sea would no longer be considered for 
     asylum in the United States but sent instead to third 
     countries. Surprise: A week later, the number of refugees 
     fell almost 90 percent.
       Clearly, these wild fluctuations in refugee flow are not a 
     function of Haiti's military repression--the repression 
     continues unabated--but of the prospect of admission to the 
     Promised Land. People genuinely in fear of their lives are 
     not terribly fastidious about where they are granted safe 
     haven. Yet large numbers of Haitians--once they realized that 
     they would end up not in Florida but in Grenada or Antigua or 
     even, God forbid, Benin--have apparently decided that Haiti 
     is the better place for them.
       Our interest in preventing a flood of refugees is 
     incontrovertible. But the refugee crisis is Clinton's own 
     creation. It is exacerbated by sanctions that have done 
     nothing but further impoverish the most impoverished nation 
     in the hemisphere. And it is inflamed by an administration 
     that periodically, as between June 16 and July 5, makes the 
     possibility of asylum far easier for Haitians than for, say, 
     Chinese boat people who, when intercepted at sea, are almost 
     automatically turned away.
       The other reason offered for invading Haiti is that we 
     stand for democracy. Coming from Democrats, this is a 
     touching concern. They spent the better part of the 1980s 
     vilifying the Nicaraguan contras, who were trying to restore 
     democracy to their country too. (In the end, they did.) In 
     that case, moreover, all that was being asked as military 
     aid. Today it is American blood.
       But apart from hypocrisy, there is illogic. Democracy alone 
     cannot be reason enough for American intervention--or we 
     should be intervening in half the world. There must also be 
     some strategic rationale. The strategic threat in Nicaragua 
     was that it might be turned into a forward base for a hostile 
     superpower. (That was during the Cold War--a time, Clinton 
     now laments, of unusual moral clarity.) What possible 
     strategic threat emanates from Haiti?
       Moreover, intervening to install Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 
     the name of democracy is quite a stretch. Yes, he was elected 
     president of his country. But many dictators and psychopaths 
     have been elected as well. Juan Peron won election (twice!). 
     So did Hitler.
       Aristide is no Hitler, but he quite admires Robespierre, 
     who ranks high among history's bloodthirsty executioners. ``I 
     am inclined to see in you a certain resemblance to 
     Robespierre,'' he writes in a self-interview in his 
     autobiography. ``Robespierre was called `the incorruptible.' 
     That is a rare quality in politics, and it doesn't always 
     make for a long term in office.'' The parallel is meant to be 
     both obvious and flattering.
       Accordingly, Aristide incited mobs to intimidate judges and 
     (democratically elected) legislators. He spoke rhapsodically 
     in praise of the ``necklace,'' the burning tire used to 
     murder political opponents, the modern revolutionary's 
     improvement of the guillotine: ``It is beautiful, it looks 
     sharp. It is fashionable, it smells good,'' he, as president, 
     told a crowd in September 1991.
       And then there is the matter of his anti-Americanism. The 
     United States, he writes in the chapter ``My Convictions,'' 
     is one of the ``gang of four'' ``enemies of Haitian people.'' 
     His affection for Che Guevara, his references to American 
     imperialism, have been muted of late, for good reason. He now 
     lives in Washington and will ride the backs of U.S. Marines 
     into Port-au-Prince. But it is a curious American policy that 
     seeks to advance American interests at the risk of American 
     lives by installing an anti-American demagogue.
       American Marines patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince 
     to keep Robespierre in power--this, after Somalia and Bosnia 
     and Korea, will be Clinton's great demonstration of 
     muscularity. Makes you pine for flabbiness.


                     A U.N. LICENSE TO INVADE HAITI

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the U.N. Charter is not a social science 
experiment. It is a treaty about the use of force. Chapter VII of the 
charter prescribes the authority of the Security Council to deal with 
``threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression.'' It is not about nation-building.
  Let me be clear: I do not support an invasion of Haiti. I do believe 
that the United States has an interest in promoting democracy and 
stability in Haiti. We have done more than any other country to restore 
the legally elected Government of Haiti. I support those efforts. They 
should continue.
  But Haiti is not--simply put--a threat to the peace or to the United 
States sufficient to justify a chapter VII invasion. In the words of 
the New York Times, ``Washington recklessly stretched the boundaries of 
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security'' in 
order to obtain Security Council authorization for an invasion.
  An invasion would endanger the lives of American service men and 
women in the cause of a most uncertain mission--nation-building. Not a 
theoretical concern.
  It also jeopardizes one of the finest achievements of American 
statecraft--the U.N. Charter. To cite again the New York Times:

       Having taken its lumps trying to be a world police force, 
     the U.N. has now fallen into the unhealthy habit of licensing 
     great-power spheres of influence. In recent weeks the 
     Security Council has commissioned France to send troops to 
     Rwanda and endorsed Russia's ``peacekeepers'' in Georgia. Now 
     the U.S. is authorized to lead an invasion of Haiti. Such 
     crude power politics damages the U.N.'s standing as an 
     organization valuing the sovereignty of all its member 
     states.

  This is no small issue. Hard cases make bad law. Haiti is indeed a 
hard case. The human rights abuses there are extraordinary. We are 
trying to help. But what law do we create by invading under the 
authority of chapter VII? What will we say 6 months from now if Russia 
engages in a police action to protect Russian nationals in the Baltics 
or Ukraine?
  The people of Haiti need and should receive our continued support in 
their struggle to restore their elected government. But Haiti is no 
more a threat to the United States and has no less a democratic 
government than numerous other regimes. Is the military dictatorship in 
Haiti less democratic and more dangerous to the United States than 
Colonel Qadhafi's regime in Libya, a terrorist state which blew Pan Am 
103 out of the sky and murdered score upon score of Americans? Is it 
less democratic and more threatening to the United States than other 
terrorist states such as Syria, Sudan, and Iran? The military 
dictatorship in Burma threw those chosen in its last election in prison 
and murdered thousands of others. Burma is probably the source of most 
of the heroin which reaches the United States. Is it more democratic 
and less a threat to the United States than Haiti?
  Frankly, while the situation in Haiti is deplorable, Haitian refugees 
are a problem for the United States, not a threat to our national 
security. Indeed. Haiti is not even a threat to the Dominican Republic 
with which it shares the island of Hispaniola, much less the sole 
remaining superpower in the world.
  I have served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and have 
represented the United States as President of the Security Council. 
Save on the sternest instructions of the President himself, I would 
never have countenanced a Security Council resolution authorizing the 
invasion of Haiti under chapter VII of the charter.
  In closing, I must make clear that if troops are sent into the field 
by the Commander in Chief that they must be fully supported. In asking 
them to put their lives at stake we must ensure that they are given the 
means to adequately perform the task at hand and are protected from 
undue risk.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire New York Times 
editorial of August 2, 1994 be printed in the Record and I yield the 
floor.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Aug. 2, 1994]

                     A U.N. License to Invade Haiti

       If it persuades Haiti's military leaders to leave on their 
     own, then Sunday`s U.N. Security Council resolution 
     authorizing a U.S.-led invasion will have done some good. The 
     resolution contains no deadline, and the Clinton 
     Administration has no plans for an imminent military strike.
       Perhaps only the threat of force will convince Haiti's top 
     soldiers they should depart. They viscerally oppose the 
     social and economic changes they believe President Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide would make if he returns. And they are 
     reportedly profiting handsomely from the status quo.
       But the threat to use force implies a willingness actually 
     to use it if the military leaders hold fast, and an invasion 
     of Haiti under present circumstances would be a big mistake. 
     Meanwhile, the Administration's strained interpretation of 
     the U.N. Charter to classify the Haitian situation as a 
     threat to regional peace and security damages the U.N.'s 
     legitimacy and invites trouble.
       The resolution, orchestrated by Washington envisions 
     several countries taking part in any invasion, but the 
     operation would remain under direct U.S. military and 
     political control. Presumably, the Clinton Administration 
     will heed its constitutional duty and seek previous 
     Congressional approval, which it may not get. But even a 
     properly authorized invasion would add to the long string of 
     dubious U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean basin 
     during the past century, including a 19-year occupation of 
     Haiti itself.
       Some of these actions had nobler ends than others. But very 
     few did any lasting good and each poisoned U.S. relations 
     with the rest of the hemisphere. Significantly, one of the 
     two Latin American members of the Security Council, Brazil, 
     abstained Sunday, while the non-members Mexico, Uruguay, 
     Venezuela and Cuba all spoke out against an invasion. The 
     other Latin member, Argentina, voted yes.
       Even though President Aristide implicitly endorsed the 
     resolution, an invasion could weaken his domestic legitimacy 
     while diminishing Haiti's sovereignty. And despite plans to 
     quickly hand off peacekeeping authority to a more broadly 
     based U.N. force, an invasion would saddle the U.S. with 
     political responsibility for controlling the violent 
     vendettas that might erupt once the present repressive 
     structure is disarmed.
       To justify the use of U.N. force, Washington recklessly 
     stretched the boundaries of what constitutes a threat to 
     international peace and security under Chapter Seven of the 
     U.N. Charter. Gen. Raoul Cedras's violation of the pledges he 
     made in the Governors Island agreements last year is 
     legitimately an international issue. So is the tide of 
     refugees and systematic violation of human rights. But none 
     of these issues now rise to the threshold necessary to 
     justify invasion. On many of the same grounds, Cuban emigres 
     might well lobby the Clinton Administration to seek U.N. 
     authorization for invading Cuba.
       Having taken its lumps trying to be a world police force, 
     the U.N. has now fallen into the unhealthy habit of licensing 
     great-power spheres of influence. In recent weeks the 
     Security Council has commissioned France to send troops to 
     Rwanda and endorsed Russia's ``peacekeepers'' in Georgia. Now 
     the U.S. is authorized to lead an invasion of Haiti. Such 
     crude power politics damages the U.N.'s standing as an 
     organization valuing the sovereignty of all its member 
     states.
       Licensing big-power armies was justified in cases like the 
     Persian Gulf war and the Korean War where the necessary level 
     of force could only be supplied by major military powers. But 
     it is surely not justified in Haiti, with a 7,000-man regular 
     army and a comparable number of lightly armed paramilitary 
     troops.
       The Clinton Administration, under attack from critics on 
     the left and right for alleged timidity in deploying U.S. 
     military power, now reveals a dangerously low threshold for 
     using force in Haiti.

  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, in the strongest terms, I oppose 
President Clinton's apparently unstoppable course of preparing for a 
United States invasion of Haiti.
  The test for military action against another country must be the 
national interest of the United States. No American interest would be 
served by invading Haiti. While the regime of General Cedras is 
deplorable, the troubles of Haiti are internal to itself. As a matter 
of foreign policy, it is appropriate for the United States to encourage 
democracy elsewhere in the world. But encouraging democracy does not 
give our country license to send in American troops wherever democracy 
does not exist. The test of military force must be national interest, 
not a general interest in improving the governments of other countries.
  The Clinton administration points to Haitians fleeing that country by 
boat in an attempt to reach the United States. In large part, they are 
fleeing terrible economic conditions which have been worsened by the 
Clinton administration's tightened economic embargo. The stated purpose 
of the administration is to tighten the embargo, cause Haitians to flee 
their country, arrest them on the high seas and transmit them to 
detention camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This does not constitute the 
kind of national interest necessary to justify the use of military 
force.
  After many weeks of bluster, the Clinton administration claims that 
the United States would lose its credibility if it did not follow 
through with an invasion of Haiti. But loss of credibility is the fault 
of the administration's incompetence in the first place. The loud 
speaking diplomacy of President Clinton should not propel the United 
States toward the inexorable use of our military.
  The best policy for our country to follow would be to abandon the 
planned invasion, lift the embargo--which is hurting poor Haitians and 
sending them to their boats--and terminate recognition of Cedras's 
regime.
  I have often spoken and written of the importance of establishing a 
bipartisan foreign policy. In dealing with the world, Americans should 
speak with one voice. Members of Congress of both parties should be 
quick to support Presidents in the conduct of foreign policy and 
reluctant to substitute our own views for those of the executive 
branch.
  However, the ground beneath a bipartisan foreign policy is undercut 
when the basis for proposed action is the political needs of a 
President in an election year rather than the requirements of the 
country as a whole.
  When the invasion occurs, there will be predictable efforts to appeal 
to the pride of Americans in a successful mission by our military. Yet 
there would be little source of pride when the strongest country in the 
world invades one of the weakest. And any short-term pride, however, 
misplaced, will soon be supplanted by what will become America's long-
term stake in the internal affairs of Haiti and in the conduct of the 
Aristide regime.
  Finally, and most importantly, an invasion of Haiti without a 
declaration of war by Congress violates Congress's responsibility in 
declaring war. There is no possible basis for argument that the use of 
military force against Haiti is simply a police action, for it is not. 
This is not a matter of saving American lives that are endangered, as 
was the case in Grenada, or bringing to justice a person perpetrating 
crimes against America as was the case in Panama. This is the use of 
military force for the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs 
of another country. It will not be a police action, it will be a war. 
It will be a war which cannot be justified by any standard of national 
interest and which will be clear violation of the constitutional powers 
of Congress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 30 
minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, just a short time ago, the Senator from 
Connecticut [Mr. Dodd]--I believe I am correctly quoting him--indicated 
the President, and he alone, has a very heavy burden. I would like to 
respectfully submit that I object to the notion that the President 
alone carries a heavy burden. That really is at the heart of the debate 
that is taking place this afternoon and, I am sure, will continue in 
the days ahead. Congress also has a heavy burden to bear, and what we 
are suggesting is that Congress is not either being asked or required 
to bear that heavy burden of responsibility.
  Mr. President, when our parents and we as parents send off our sons 
and daughters to the military, we expect a number of things. We expect 
them to be well trained. We expect them to be well disciplined. We 
expect them to be well led. We expect them to be well cared for. We 
expect that they will be used prudently and wisely, with careful 
consideration given before they are ever sent off to face the dangers 
of war.
  I will recall during the debate on the Persian Gulf war a really 
poignant moment in my office. I was absolutely deluged with thousands 
of letters and thousands of phone calls and people coming into my 
office demanding that they have an opportunity to speak to me before I 
voted on whether to send their sons or daughters off to war. I will 
never forget a session where a delegation from Mothers Against War met 
with me in my office for some time. It was very emotional. And they 
said:

       You cannot send our sons and daughters off to fight this 
     war. It is not in our national security interests. You, 
     Senator Cohen, will have the blood of our sons on your hands 
     if you vote in this fashion.

  So it was a pretty heavy responsibility we had at that time. Some of 
us voted to authorize the President to go to war and some voted against 
it.
  Mr. President, as the United States military forces poise themselves 
to invade Haiti, it seems to me there are two questions facing the 
Congress and the President. One is whether military intervention in 
Haiti would be a wise policy, and the second is the constitutional 
issue of who answers the first question. Who determines whether it is 
wise or not. Perhaps President Clinton could persuade me and Congress 
and the American people that his plan to intervene is wise. Perhaps he 
will be as persuasive as the Senator from Connecticut is passionate. 
But he has not yet persuaded us. Indeed, I do not think he has even 
seriously attempted to persuade us, to make his case. Apparently, he 
intends to do so tomorrow evening. But it appears also that he does not 
intend to attempt to persuade us out of fear that he might fail and 
then be faced with launching an invasion against the expressed will of 
Congress. Given the most recent polls showing--I think the Senator from 
Connecticut indicated--some three-fourths of the American people are 
opposed to military intervention into Haiti, it is clear the President 
will have a very heavy burden to bear if he is going to persuade the 
American people and Congress that there should be an invasion.

  There are only two ways for the President to respond to the gulf 
between his plans and congressional and public opinion. He can either 
engage Congress, and thus indirectly the public, in a meaningful dialog 
followed by a vote. Or he can roll the dice, proceed with military 
intervention without congressional authorization and hope that it is 
successful enough that the public and congressional critics will then 
lend their support.
  The President, it seems to me, is pursuing the latter option. I think 
it is regrettable because in my opinion it is both politically unwise 
and inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution. It is 
unwise because the President will have assumed complete responsibility 
for the outcome. If the operation is successful, then he will receive 
the credit whether the Congress gave its approval or not. But if it is 
unsuccessful, if things go awry, if U.S. forces get bogged down in a 
long-term engagement in Haiti, the President will not have had the 
benefit of sharing the burden of responsibility with a Congress that 
had voted its prior approval of the operation. Instead, Members of 
Congress, including those of his own party I might add, will quickly 
turn on him. They will recount the many analyses that have been done 
that warned an invasion will make a very bad situation worse, and 
bemoan the administration's naivete, perhaps even its arrogance.
  Such second guessing would not be possible for Members of Congress 
who, forced to vote, had cast their lot with the President.
  Beside being bad politics, invading without congressional 
authorization is also contrary to the Constitution. While the President 
is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Constitution 
reserves unto Congress the power to declare war.
  I wanted to take the floor this afternoon to make these points 
because I made the same arguments to President Bush when he was 
contemplating the very initial stages of conducting warfare in the 
Persian Gulf, Operation Desert Storm. I, along with a number of my 
colleagues, went to the White House on several occasions with many 
Members, and I stood up and expressed my opinion. I said:

       Mr. President, you must come to Congress to get authority. 
     If you disagree that the Constitution requires you to do so, 
     set that aside for a moment. I think it is clear that the 
     Constitution requires you to, but set that aside. If you do 
     not have us on record before the bullets start flying, the 
     blood starts flowing, the bodies start dropping, and the body 
     bags come home and are received at Andrews or Dover, if you 
     do not have us on record before that happens, then surely you 
     can count on one thing: We will be in full flight chasing 
     public opinion which will be racing in the complete opposite 
     direction of your policy. You must put us on record. You must 
     have us as your advocates. You must force us to share the 
     responsibility. Otherwise, you are out there all alone with 
     little support, and we guarantee you even that support will 
     evaporate if things go awry.

  Mr. President, at that time there were some very important Members of 
Congress in the Senate and in the House who stated that President Bush 
had an absolute obligation to come before the Senate and the House. My 
colleague from Maine, my good friend, the majority leader, said the 
following:

       Mr. President, for two centuries Americans have debated the 
     relative powers of the President and Congress. Often this has 
     been an abstract argument. But today the debate is real.
       The men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose 
     the prevention of tyranny in America. They had lived under a 
     British king. They did not want there ever to be an American 
     king. They were brilliantly successful. In our history there 
     have been 41 Presidents and no kings.

  Well, now there are 42 Presidents, and hopefully no kings. My 
colleague from Maine said:

       President Bush was not required to seek the approval of 
     Congress to order (the deployment of forces to the Persian 
     Gulf area), and he did not do so. But if he now decides to 
     use those forces in what would plainly be war, he is legally 
     obligated to seek the prior approval of Congress.

  I think Senator Mitchell was absolutely correct at that time. The 
same arguments obtain to President Clinton.
  Senator Biden is also someone I have a great deal of confidence in as 
a leading voice on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee. He said the following:

       Yet President Bush has claimed that his power as Commander 
     in Chief gives him the authority, acting alone, to start a 
     war. His Secretary of Defense has said, ``We do not believe 
     the President requires any additional authorization from the 
     Congress for committing U.S. forces to achieve our objective 
     in the gulf.'' His Secretary of State has said, ``The 
     President has the right, as a matter of practice and 
     principle, to initiate military action.'' To put it simply, 
     these views are at odds with the Constitution. They may 
     accurately describe the power of leaders of other countries, 
     but they do not describe the power of the President of the 
     United States.

  Senator Biden went on to say:

       Finally, we have been told that the congressional debate on 
     war could tie the President's hands or limit his discretion. 
     To this charge, I have one simple response--exactly right. 
     Americans once lived under a system where one man had 
     unfettered choice to decide by himself whether we could go to 
     war or not go to war, and we launched a revolution to free 
     ourselves from the tyranny of such a system.

  Senator Kennedy also spoke passionately and vigorously on the Persian 
Gulf war. He said:

       What is clear is that President Bush has not the right to 
     go to war on his own. Article II of the Constitution makes 
     the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, but 
     Article I gives Congress, and only Congress, the power to 
     declare war.

  During that debate, Senator Kennedy offered a letter that was signed 
by 241 of the Nation's most distinguished law professors. And, in sum, 
they said, ``The Constitution thus requires the President meaningfully 
to consult with Congress and receive its affirmative authorization 
before engaging in acts of war.''
  I could at some length quote other more extensive statements by these 
individuals and many of our colleagues. But I think it is unnecessary 
to do so at this time.
  Some are going to argue that the impending invasion of Haiti is 
something other than war and therefore this provision of the 
Constitution really does not apply. Our Ambassador to the United 
Nations argues that this would be a ``police action,'' not a war. I 
wonder whether those young men who are now poised to go into Haiti 
think that is simply a police action with two aircraft carriers sailing 
off the coast.
  Officials of the Justice Department argue that it would not be ``a 
major military action,'' and therefore Congress has no right or duty to 
demand a say. That is our Justice Department. It is not a major 
military act of war, only a minor one, therefore Congress has no role.
  Mr. President, this really raises the question of who is to determine 
whether a premeditated offensive military intervention is a war or 
something else--a war, police action, conflict? The clear implication 
of Ambassador Albright's and the Justice Department's argument is that 
only the President can make such a determination; only the President 
can decide what is a war, what is a conflict, what is a police action, 
or what is a minor war.
  Well, that is an interesting argument. I would refer my colleagues to 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's 1990 decision, 
Dellums versus Bush, a lawsuit filed by our House colleagues. I believe 
there were some 53 of them who joined in that particular court action. 
But let me just repeat a part of what the court had to say:

       If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any 
     particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, 
     does not constitute warmaking but only an offensive military 
     attack, the Congressional power to declare war will be at the 
     mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an 
     ``interpretation'' would evade the plain language of the 
     Constitution, and it cannot stand.

  So no matter what euphemisms are employed, the simple fact is that we 
are about to wage war. We are about to engage in an act of war.
  The Senator from Connecticut has made a passionate plea that it is 
justified under concerns about the rape, pillage, torture, and the 
horrendous abuses of human rights not too far from our shores, and that 
is one argument to be made. But I do not think it is a controlling one, 
because if you apply that logic, we can apply it also to Cuba, where we 
also have outrageous abuses of human rights and torture, a country also 
flooding our shores with people trying to flee that dictatorship.
  We are also going to hear from the Justice Department and others the 
argument that this is no different than interventions in Grenada or 
Panama, which were not authorized in advance by Congress. And the 
implication is that if you ignore the Constitution on one occasion, or 
two, that gives you license to ignore it on each and every following 
occasion.
  I think we can draw some distinctions between the case of Haiti and 
that of Panama and Grenada. There was a sense of urgency, an emergency, 
certainly, with respect to Grenada, prompted by the killing of Maurice 
Bishop and the resulting unstable situation. I think prompt action was 
required, and obtaining congressional authorization would have been 
impractical under those situations, especially without raising the 
already high risk to the Americans who were in Grenada. In contrast, 
the Clinton administration has been publicly threatening to invade 
Haiti for months. There is no great urgency that would preclude a 
congressional debate and a congressional vote.
  In both Grenada and Panama, the primary objective was to protect the 
American citizens in those countries. In Grenada, the Americans were 
believed to be endangered by an unstable situation, while in Panama, 
Americans were already the target of assault and murder. In contrast, 
the executive branch's own assessments do not indicate any untoward 
threats to American citizens. The greater danger to Americans in Haiti 
may be in the form of an American invasion in Haiti.
  The United States also had some strong national security interests 
that justified our military intervention there, quite unlike the case 
of Haiti. I think having such strong interests does not waive the 
requirement for congressional approval for military intervention, but 
it helps to explain better the context and the rationale behind 
President Bush's decision.
  Finally, Grenada and Panama were quick operations, which few analysts 
believe will be the case in Haiti. The fighting in Grenada lasted only 
about 8 days, and all of the troops were withdrawn after 7 weeks. The 
fighting in Panama lasted about 4 days, with all of the forces 
withdrawn after 8 weeks. In contrast, most analysts estimate that after 
a few days of fighting to overcome whatever organized resistance there 
might be in Haiti, the United States troops would be required to remain 
for well over a year, possibly as long as a decade.
  Based on these factors, the invasion of Haiti more closely resembles 
the gulf war against Iraq than the invasions of Grenada and Panama. It 
is not an emergency. It is being pursued for foreign policy objectives, 
not to rescue Americans whose lives are in danger. After a quick period 
of hostilities, there will be a years-long deployment in order to 
maintain order and support for the local people we might favor. Like in 
the war against Iraq, congressional authorization is clearly required.
  None of the credible or even usual arguments for unilateral 
Presidential employment of military force exists in the case of Haiti--
not one. It is not an emergency. It is being pursued for foreign policy 
objectives, not to rescue Americans. And we can expect a short period 
of hostilities followed by a long commitment on our part. It requires 
congressional authorization.
  Another argument we hear is that the United Nations has given its 
approval to an invasion, so congressional authorization is not 
required. I saw that in today's Washington Post by one of the leading 
political scientists/constitutional authorities. Well, the Senate has 
rendered its view on that question. Last month, by a vote of 100 to 0, 
the Senate categorically rejected the notion that the United Nations 
resolution satisfies the requirements of the Constitution or the War 
Powers Act. So I hope we will not hear any of that argument made in 
this Chamber, that now that the United Nations has acted, Congress no 
longer is required to act.
  I want to bring to my colleagues' attention an article by the 
syndicated columnist, Samuel Francis in which he asks:

       What is wrong with the following sentence: ``The Security 
     Council authorized the United States today to lead a 
     multinational invasion to drive out the military rulers of 
     Haiti and restore exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to 
     power''?

  Then he goes on to answer his own question:

       If you don't know what's wrong with that, the lead sentence 
     of the Washington Post's lead story (on August 1), maybe 
     another sentence will give you a clue: ``The Congress shall 
     have power * * * to declare war, grant letters of marque and 
     reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and 
     water * * *.''
       Sentence number two, as it happens, comes not from the 
     Washington Post morning edition, but out of something the 
     people once thought was a rather more enduring document--the 
     Constitution of the United States. And now, thanks in part to 
     the Clinton administration, we know it was not so enduring 
     after all.
       Of all the powers that characterize the sovereignty of a 
     nation, the power to make war is the most basic.

  Let me paraphrase the remainder because some of this is acerbic: But 
those in the administration seem to have spent much of their weekend 
making certain it was the United Nations and not the U.S. Congress that 
exercised this power.
  Mr. President, the reason the Framers put the power to decide whether 
to go to war in the hands of Congress was to ensure that one person 
could not put American lives and treasure at risk for spurious reasons. 
The case of Haiti, in my judgment, highlights the wisdom of the 
Constitution's allocation of power.
  The administration's argument for intervening, when you strip off all 
the varnish, comes down to this: Our credibility is now on the line. 
Our credibility is on the line. There are abuses taking place down 
there that is a subversion of democracy. They are close to our shores, 
and our credibility is now on the line. We have been beating the drum 
so loudly, if we do not act now, nobody will ever take us seriously.
  That seems to be the driving force behind this impetus now to go to 
war. There is something to be said for the argument about taking us 
seriously, that credibility is something that we should treasure. 
Unfortunately, the administration has painted itself into a corner by 
its own action. Let me respectfully suggest that the administration's 
credibility will be little enhanced by sending the most powerful 
military in the world to invade the most impoverished country in the 
Western Hemisphere.
  In my view, if the administration feels the need to demonstrate its 
credibility and its willingness to use force, perhaps it should do so 
in a venue in which American national interest are genuinely at stake, 
such as in North Korea. There we have real national security interests.
  Putting the Congress at the center of the decision to go to war was 
intended precisely to ensure that we would go to war only when the 
representatives of the people were persuaded that our interests 
justified the costs and the chances of success were sufficient to 
justify the risks. That is what Senator Biden was saying during the 
debate before the Persian Gulf war, and he was right. We do not want 
this President, or any other President, to have a totally free hand to 
send our sons and daughters into war without consultations and without 
authorization. On an emergency, yes; to protect American lives, on an 
emergency basis, yes. To rescue another country's democratically 
elected president--not without authorization from us.
  Mr. President, the events of the past year have demonstrated the 
practical wisdom of not leaving such assessments to the President and 
his advisers. It was just 11 months ago that President Clinton ordered 
the U.S.S. Harlan County to set sail toward Haiti with 200 lightly 
armed troops. And he did so even though the Departments of Defense and 
State could not agree on the mission they would perform or how they 
would respond to resistance. He did so even though the intelligence 
community warned that there would be resistance. The President's 
principal advisor on Haiti at that time dismissed the concerns 
expressed by Members of Congress by declaring:

       Suddenly Chicken Little says the sky is falling, but there 
     is no problem of major proportion. Somebody's making it sound 
     very dramatic. These are all minor issues. We're moving on 
     course.

  Mr. President, indeed, they moved on course until the Harlan County 
reached the docks of Port-au-Prince and found a rock-throwing rabble on 
the docks, and the President of the United States ordered our troops to 
turn around and return to the United States.
  Now, as we approach the first anniversary of this event, the 
President once again is about to order troops to go to Haiti.
  The administration seems to be saying that if the Congress would only 
remain silent and play along, the military leadership in Haiti will be 
intimidated enough to flee on its own and our invasion force will face 
no opposition.
  Mr. President, that may be one of the calculations involved. The 
calculation may be that the administration decided that if they put two 
aircraft carriers off the coast of Haiti, threaten to put in 20,000 or 
25,000 troops, heavily armed tanks, sophisticated weaponry, those thugs 
who now govern and control that small, tortured country will simply 
take flight.
  I hope that is the case. I hope that is the case. But if that is part 
of the game plan, it has never been conveyed to us. To my knowledge, 
there has been no consultation of what the administration intends, not 
even with a select group of leaders. I am not even suggesting that they 
have to talk to the entire Congress. But to my knowledge, genuine 
consultations have been held with not even the big eight, not the 
Senate majority and minority leaders, not the House leaders, not the 
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee leaders, not the Armed 
Services Committees leaders, not the Intelligence Committee leaders.
  To my knowledge, there has been no such consultation, no conveyance 
of what are the original intent or plans or options they might have in 
mind.
  Mr. President, a decade ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
set forth a list of criteria to help us decide when military force can 
be used effectively and when it cannot. In his speech, he said:

       Some theorists argue that military force can be brought to 
     bear at any crisis. Some of these proponents of force are 
     eager to advocate its use in even limited amounts simply 
     because they believe if there are American forces of any size 
     present they will somehow solve the problem.

  Somehow, U.S. military forces will ``restore democracy'' to a country 
that, while it has had a free election, has never known democracy.
  I doubt it, Mr. President, I seriously doubt it.
  Mr. President, I inquire how much time I have remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has 5 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, last year, Air Force magazine warned about 
the administration's attitude toward the use of military force--and I 
am quoting:

       These people are not dealing in abstract concepts. They are 
     tinkering with deadly force. If their notions become policy, 
     we may learn all over again that it is much easier to get 
     into a fight than it is to get out of one.

  I think it is worth remembering that we slid into the Vietnam 
quagmire not because of a lack of intelligence but an excess of 
arrogance--arrogance regarding America's ability to impose its will, 
even where our interests were limited; and arrogance regarding the 
Executive's primacy over the Congress.
  Arrogance and power is a dangerous brew. We must resist the 
temptation to drink this hemlock masquerading as the nectar of the 
gods.
  Mr. President, let me associate myself with something that the 
Senator from Connecticut has said. I agree with him completely that 
suggestions that President Clinton has some ulterior motive, that 
somehow he is seeking to gain a bounce in popularity, is cynical beyond 
words. I do not think it is true.
  I think the President of the United States is convinced that he has 
to go to war to restore democracy in Haiti. He believes it is in our 
national security interests to do so.
  I disagree with that assessment, but I believe he is sincere in that 
conviction of his own.
  But what I am respectfully suggesting is whether one challenges the 
motives of the President, which I think is uncalled for, whether one is 
convinced he is acting out of the most sincere motivations, ultimately 
the debate that has to take place must occur right in this Chamber and 
in the House of Representatives.
  This President, I believe, will make a mistake in going forward 
without our expressed endorsement. As I indicated before, he may get a 
temporary success out of this invasion. We, I think, could be expected 
to overcome any significant force within a matter of a few days at 
most. But that is only the beginning of the problem.
  Then it is maintaining order until stability is restored. Then it is 
maintaining a presence until the institutions of democracy are built 
and sustained. Then it is part of another peacekeeping operation for 
months and perhaps longer, maybe years.
  Mr. President, this President and no President can engage our forces 
for that kind of a long-term commitment without us playing a coequal 
role.
  That is the key part of this debate. We can differ as the Senator 
from Connecticut and I may differ on the wisdom of it. But, 
nonetheless, the only recourse that the President should have in this 
circumstance is to turn to us.
  If we reject the President, so be it. We have expressed the will of 
the American people not to put our sons' and daughters' lives on the 
line, put them in jeopardy, however few they may be.
  But you can also anticipate that any kind of a military operation is 
going to involve risk, that some people will die, some people will die. 
We ordinarily would then be called upon to justify to their parents why 
it was important, why it was imperative that we spilled their sons' and 
daughters' blood in order to save the lives and a standard of well-
being for another nation.
  That burden the President has to carry, not just over a public 
address over television one night, he has the burden to come here and 
persuade us. I believe if he can make the case, he may be able to 
change people's minds on this matter.
  Perhaps he will be able to be as persuasive as the Senator from 
Connecticut has been passionate. But if he cannot persuade us, then 
there is no reason he should go in. And if he ignores what we are 
saying and suffers a great foreign policy misadventure, I believe it 
will inflict mortal damage to his Presidency. That is something I do 
not want to see. I do not want to see the President embarrassed by a 
resolution. I do not want to see him embarrassed by a failure, and I do 
not want to see his Presidency undermined by his going forward without 
congressional approval and then facing the consequences standing by 
himself.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, we have no one prepared to speak at this 
point on this side. I will be glad to yield from the other side's time 
a half hour, or whatever time the Senator from Indiana wishes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. What amount of time does the Senator from 
Indiana seek?
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized for 15 
minutes.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I sat through what I thought was the 
unfortunate procedural debate that took place just a couple hours ago 
in this Chamber.
  It is clear that there are a number of us who believe the press 
reports and the administration's own comments that an invasion of Haiti 
is imminent. Spokesmen for the administration have said that there are 
no other options, all other recourses to solve the problem in Haiti, 
all those recourses have been tried and failed, and, therefore, the 
only option left is an invasion.
  Many of us do not accept that argument, do not believe that argument, 
do not think that is true. And we have been pressing for a debate on 
the issue with an expression of the Senate's will before such an 
invasion takes place.
  This is, in a last desperate hope of sending a signal to the 
President and to the administration that they are following a misguided 
and wrong course of action, an attempt to send a signal that the 
Senate, in a bipartisan way, does not believe that an invasion should 
take place, in hopes that the administration would change its mind, 
would step back and try to come to a different conclusion, and would 
perhaps be willing to once again examine some other options.
  The reason we are concerned about an invasion is that we do not 
believe a case has been made to the American people nor a case made to 
their elected representatives, either the U.S. Senate or the House of 
Representatives, by the President or this administration, for an 
invasion, an imposition of a so-called democratic regime under Mr. 
Aristide; an imposition that can only be made by force--gunboat 
liberalism, in a sense, of building a new democracy where no democracy 
exists or has existed for a long, long time.
  It is clear that the leadership was not anxious to move to a vote on 
this matter, probably because they did not have the votes to prevail 
and it would be difficult for the administration to accept, perhaps at 
a time when the invasion is imminent; an expression of disapproval, not 
only from Republicans in the Senate but probably from a number of 
Democrats, judging from statements that have been made on this floor in 
just the last few days and other statements that have been made public 
by a number of Democrats and Democrat leaders.
  Senator McCain has all week been looking for an opportunity to offer 
an amendment or a sense-of-the-Senate resolution or some vehicle by 
which this Senate could express its will on this matter, for several 
reasons.
  One, because we have a constitutional obligation to advise the 
President of the United States, provide consent to his actions, because 
we believe the Constitution requires a congressional authorization 
before the United States sends its young men and women into war. We 
understand that there is a decades-long dispute over whether or not the 
President has authority to do this as Commander in Chief without the 
consent of or the authorization of the Congress. Constitutional 
scholars have argued this for some time. Clearly, in cases of 
emergency; clearly, in cases where the national security of the United 
States is in peril and time does not warrant or allow for congressional 
deliberation and debate; clearly, in situations like that, the 
President, as Commander in Chief, has not only the right but the 
obligation to commit U.S. forces.
  But that is clearly not the case in the situation that we face today. 
We have been discussing this for months. The administration has been 
engaged in a public relations campaign to lay the groundwork for an 
invasion. We read about it in the papers every day and watch it on 
television, and we have been talking about it now for weeks. We watch 
as the forces are being assembled and the ships sailing.
  So there was plenty of time to consult with the Congress, had the 
administration wanted to consult with the Congress. It clearly does not 
want to consult with the Congress. And they do not want to consult with 
the Congress because they are certain that Congress is not going to 
accept their position on this issue, and they do not want an 
embarrassing defeat.
  They have had time to consult with the United Nations. They have had 
time to consult with the leaders of the countries that some Americans 
have never even heard of that are now joining us, or supposedly joining 
us, in this effort with this invasion. But they have not had time to 
consult with the Congress.
  I serve on the Armed Services Committee. We have not been briefed by 
any member of this administration on what the plans are or 
justification for this invasion. My understanding is that, just 
yesterday, the chairman and ranking member met with the Secretary of 
Defense. I do not know what was discussed. I do not know if you could 
classify that as consultation or not. But it is, I believe, an 
objective, fair statement to say that most Members of the U.S. Senate 
have not been consulted at all.
  With the actions taken by the Senate leadership and Senator Mitchell 
today, a vote on this matter has been precluded until, at earliest, 
next week. If an invasion takes place before that time, the 
administration will then have acted without congressional 
authorization. And perhaps that is the intent. I do not know when the 
invasion is supposed to occur.
  But it is clear that the administration and the Democrat leadership 
in this Senate did not want a debate and vote on this matter this week. 
They did not want that to precede the President addressing the Nation 
tomorrow, and perhaps an invasion shortly thereafter.
  Procedurally, they have placed us in a position where we will not 
have that vote. We are able to debate it here to an empty Chamber, 
virtually, at a time when the Senate will be shortly in adjournment, 
with no opportunity tomorrow or Friday to come back and seek a vote on 
this matter.
  And so Senator McCain has been procedurally boxed out. He saw an 
opportunity, he seized the opportunity, and we thought for a moment 
there might be an opportunity for the Senate to express its will and 
the will of the people, as we represent those people and best 
understand what their wishes are.
  The polls show 73 percent oppose this invasion. I think it is much 
higher than that. The expressions that I have received from the people 
I represent in Indiana certainly are higher than 73 percent. I cannot 
find the 27 percent that support an invasion of Haiti.
  So the case has not been made. And we know from history, we know from 
experience, that unless the American people support an action involving 
sending our young men and women into combat and putting their lives at 
risk, that that is ultimately not going to succeed.
  The President, for, I believe, constitutional reasons, but also for 
policy reasons and political reasons, ought to be seeking the support 
of the American people and the Congress first before he reaches a 
conclusion on whether or not to invade Haiti. Or he at least ought to 
make a strong case. And that has not been done, either.
  It is only in just the last few days that any attempt at defining a 
justification for an invasion of Haiti has been made.
  Today's New York Times, September 14, has this headline: ``Democrats 
Hope to Avoid an Embarrassing Vote on Haiti.''

       A spokesman for the Democrat leadership said a vote in the 
     House probably could not be escaped early next week. What the 
     White House and Democratic leaders want to avoid is a clear 
     vote on whether to authorize the President to order an 
     invasion. As matters stand now, Mr. Clinton would lose such a 
     vote by a wide margin.

  That is a report from the New York Times.
  So it is no secret as to why the majority leader went to such 
extraordinary lengths to preclude the Senate from coming to a vote. 
They did not want to lose that vote and now procedurally we are 
precluded from coming to that vote.
  Mr. President, I have a friend I have known for a long time. 
Obviously, you do not base conclusions on foreign policy on the basis 
of one individual's opinions. But this is a friend who has lived in 
Haiti for 35 years. He is not a businessman. And, as he states in his 
letter, he has nothing to gain financially either way on this decision 
by the United States.

  But I would like to quote from a letter he wrote me recently, because 
I think he makes the case as to why an invasion is not in the best 
interests of the United States and why it is a false conclusion to 
authorize an invasion.
  He writes:

       Dear Dan: Thank you for lending your support to a non-
     invasion of Haiti. I recall you speaking on the floor and 
     saying, ``why are we doing this?'' Indeed, why? I believe 
     that question is at the core of everything. No one seems to 
     know the justifiable cause behind the invasion ehetoric. I am 
     very much aware of the surface reasons as supplied by the 
     White House, Aristide's lawyers and lobbyists, Madeleine 
     Albright, liberal senators and the media. But they all wither 
     away under close scrutiny as having no substance.
       The emerging middle class, once identified by small 
     industrial ventures, and providing jobs for tens of 
     thousands, is finished. This was to have been the foundation 
     upon which democracy would be built in time, as a process, 
     not legislated by Washington, the lobbyists and the 
     international community. These were young Haitian 
     businessmen, Haiti's new blood, the majority of whom studied 
     in the States and returned with democratic ideals. Their 
     dreams were shattered when Aristide exercised his dictatorial 
     powers and promoted a non-democratic environment. Knowing 
     Aristide's intentions was one thing. Clinton pursuing and 
     supporting this same policy and insisting on a return to 
     ``democratic'' rule is quite another thing.

  He goes on to say that--it is not ironic that someone who knows Haiti 
far better than I concludes that it was Mr. Aristide's policies that 
denied and suppressed the democratic movement in Haiti and now we are 
attempting through force to insert Mr. Aristide back into power, the 
very person who by many Haitians is perceived to be the one who is 
denying the democratic process.
  My friend goes on to say:

       These young businessmen, many of whom are my friends, are 
     the first ones to say there was no democracy under Aristide. 
     They don't blame the military, General Cedras in particular, 
     for the present chaotic situation, they rightfully put the 
     blame at the feet of President Clinton and Aristide.
       An invasion of Haiti by Clinton led forces would be a 
     disaster. Haiti, a peaceful country, is at war with no one. 
     There is no civil war. Haiti is not a threat to this 
     hemisphere in general, and to the United States in 
     particular. The U.S. interests in Haiti are the refugees. The 
     solution is quite simple. The embargo and sanctions must be 
     lifted. Air travel must be restored. People are not fleeing 
     military and political repression, rape and violations of 
     human rights. They are fleeing a devastating economic 
     situation created by the embargo. It's a self-perpetuating 
     thing. Clinton's policy is fomenting the very thing he wants 
     to avoid.
       An invasion is no substitute for a policy that's broken or 
     as a face saving measure. Thanks for listening.

  I doubt that 1 American in 100 if not 1 in 1,000 can explain what the 
justification is for an invasion of Haiti. Mr. Aristide is not the kind 
of individual the United States should be putting its credibility 
behind and installing by force into a nation which does not want him 
back and which does not believe he can lead that country to democracy. 
We are committing 20,000 or more young American men and women in 
uniform. We are putting them at risk of life and limb. And we are doing 
so for at most a dubious purpose.
  Those of us who were here during the Persian Gulf war participated in 
the process of understanding the basis and justification for U.S. use 
of force in the Persian Gulf. That was authorized by this Congress, it 
was to the President's benefit to have that authorization. This has not 
been authorized by the Congress nor understood by the American people. 
And I think it is a tragic mistake that the President is about to 
embark on.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). The Senator has yielded himself 15 
minutes. Does he yield himself further time?
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, it is my understanding I was next on our 
side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from 
Oklahoma that the agreement is to alternate from side to side. But the 
Chair notes there is no Democrat seeking recognition and it has been 
the procedure this afternoon that, if one side does not have somebody 
seeking recognition, the other side just takes another turn. How much 
time did the Senator from Oklahoma wish to yield himself?
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 15 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from Indiana 
for an outstanding speech. I hope my colleagues, and I hope the 
American people, had a chance to listen to it. I also wish to 
compliment our colleague, Senator McCain, from Arizona, for his sense-
of-the-Senate resolution and for his ability to get it at least entered 
into the debate.
  I noted earlier in the debate today that Senator Mitchell said this 
could have been offered earlier. Frankly, the bill that we had before 
us earlier was the Department of Defense conference report, which was 
not amendable; it could not have been amended. So I just mention that.
  Many of us have stated time and time again we wanted to debate this 
issue. It has been reported--I know Senator Mitchell mentioned, we 
voted on seven resolutions dealing with Haiti. I would call those to 
the attention of this body. Four of those resolutions passed 
overwhelmingly. All of those were sense-of-the-Senate or sense-of-the-
Congress resolutions basically telling the President of the United 
States, ``Do not invade Haiti.'' Granted they had some caveats and they 
had some exceptions. I know this one which Senator Mitchell has 
introduced as a second-degree amendment to Senator McCain's amendment 
gives the President an out. He said it is a sense of the Senate that 
limitation in this amendment should not apply if the President reports 
in advance to Congress that the intended deployment of United States 
forces into Haiti is justified by United States national security 
interests.
  Evidently, this President feels that he can define that very broadly. 
As a matter of fact, in a news conference with the Indian Prime 
Minister on May 19, he gave six instances where our national interests 
are involved--six justifications for invasion of Haiti; five are: Haiti 
is in our backyard, the United States has a million Haitian Americans, 
there are several thousand Americans in Haiti, drugs are coming through 
Haiti to the United States, and the United States faces continuous 
possibility of a massive flow of Haitian migrants to the United States.
  Mr. President, all five of those are not justifications. Not one of 
those is justification to risk thousands and thousands of American 
lives on invading Haiti--not one. You can go through the list:
  It is in our backyard. There are other countries in our backyard. 
That does not mean it poses a national security threat to the United 
States.
  The United States has a million Haitian Americans. Well, we have 
millions of Mexican-Americans. There is no reason or justification of 
an invasion for that reason.
  Several thousand Americans are in Haiti. Their lives are not in 
jeopardy. This invasion or potential invasion jeopardizes their lives. 
Certainly, the administration's action jeopardizes their lives more 
than anything from the past.
  Drugs are coming through Haiti to the United States. It just so 
happens that happens in Bermuda, it happens in the Bahamas, it happens 
in Mexico. Are we going to invade those countries as well? Actually, I 
think the amount of drugs coming through Haiti is less than from most 
of those countries. Again, this is no justification whatsoever for 
invading.
  The United States faces the possibility of a massive flow of Haitian 
migrants to the United States--only because of this administration's 
policies where they have been clamping down the economic vice that is 
really not hurting the military in Haiti. It is hurting the Haitian 
people.
  And then this administration's vacillating policy of how they will 
handle the migrants. Are we going to accept them in? Are we going to 
handle their cases on ships? Are we going to allow them to stay in the 
country? Are we going to return them? Where is the safe harbor going to 
be? The administration's statements during the campaign; their change 
of those statements and change in policy because Randall Robinson went 
on a hunger strike--all of this vacillation has greatly increased the 
desire of a lot of people in Haiti to come to the United States. But 
those are by the administration's own actions and none of which would 
justify military invasion of Haiti.
  The real point is, I hear time and time again, the sixth 
justification is we want to restore democracy to Haiti. I just 
will read a comment from a Wall Street Journal article dated June 16, 
entitled ``From Port-au-Prince to Gucci Gulch.'' I will just read the 
first couple of paragraphs of this article by Christopher Caldwell.

       President Clinton appears to be seriously considering using 
     U.S. troops to return exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide to power. Taken on their face, the stated reasons 
     for his pro-Aristide policy--stemming the flow of refugees 
     and drugs and improving human rights--are absurd. The refugee 
     flow is due to U.S. economic sanctions; Haiti's role in drug 
     shipments is dwarfed by its neighbors; and Mr. Aristide 
     flagrantly violated human rights during his brief reign.
       The administration policy amounts to blind subservience to 
     Mr. Aristide's agenda. It's a warning of what can happen when 
     virtually the entire budget of a sovereign nation is funneled 
     into a massive Washington lobbying and public relations 
     campaign.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this entire article be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1994]

                   From Port-au-Prince to Gucci Gulch

                       (By Christopher Caldwell)

       President Clinton appears to be seriously considering using 
     U.S. troops to return exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide to power. Taken on their face, the stated reasons 
     for his pro-Aristide policy--stemming the flow of refugees 
     and drugs and improving human rights--are absurd. The refugee 
     flow is due to U.S. economic sanctions; Haiti's role in drug 
     shipments is dwarfed by its neighbors; and Mr. Aristide 
     flagrantly violated human rights during his brief reign.
       The administration policy amounts to blind subservience to 
     Mr. Aristide's agenda. It's a warning of what can happen when 
     virtually the entire budget of a sovereign nation is funneled 
     into a massive Washington lobbying and public relations 
     campaign.
       After the September 1991 coup that ousted Mr. Aristide, 
     President Bush issued an executive order that Haitian 
     government funds frozen in the U.S. be delivered to Mr. 
     Aristide. While the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have 
     imposed no oversight requirements, the rough amounts of the 
     money Mr. Aristide can tap are known. According to State and 
     Treasury sources, the funds contain upwards of $50 million, 
     and Mr. Aristide's forces have spent more than $30 million so 
     far. Disbursals from the U.S. Treasury started at $500,000 a 
     month and have risen steadily, to their current point of $5.6 
     million to $5.9 million per quarter.
       What is happening to all that money is unclear: During the 
     brief premiership of Robert Malval last autumn, the U.S.-
     based newspaper Haiti Observateur was leaked a copy of the 
     Aristide government's fourth-quarter budget for 1993, which 
     showed $740,000 per month budgeted for Mr. Malval's 
     ministerial cabinet. The scrupulous Mr. Malval, who was a 
     major Aristide supporter, claims he never received a penny. 
     That $2.2 million has never been accounted for.
       The democratically elected Haitian Chamber of Deputies in 
     April asked Secretary of State Warren Christopher for a 
     thorough accounting of Mr. Aristide's expenditures. The 
     request has not even been acknowledged. While it's true that 
     Mr. Aristide is spending Haitian, not U.S. funds, his 
     finances should be of concern to U.S. taxpayers. The handover 
     of Haitian assets to Mr. Aristide violates the Haitian 
     constitution and possibly international law. ``When this is 
     all over,'' says one American consultant to Haitian 
     interests, ``the Haitians are going to sue us for the money 
     Aristide has spent, and we're going to have to pay it all 
     back.''
       Since his arrival in the U.S., Mr. Aristide has used those 
     funds for a public relations blitz. Miami attorney Ira 
     Kurzban gets a six-figure salary as Mr. Aristide's lawyer. 
     Another lawyer, Haitian-American Mildred Trouillot, is paid 
     $6,000 a month, plus rent, expenses and office space. Mr. 
     Aristide also engaged the services of Rabinowitz, Boudin, 
     Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman to defend him against a $10 
     million suit filed in Brooklyn by the widow of Roger 
     Lafontant, a Haitian coup leader slain in prison in 1991, 
     allegedly by Aristide supporters. The law firm was paid tens 
     of thousands of dollars out of the Haitian treasury before 
     the suit was finally thrown out.
       Mr. Aristide's PR is coordinated by the firm of McKinney & 
     McDowell, which charges $175-per-hour for its services. 
     However, the Aristide budget printed by the Haiti Observateur 
     has no money earmarked for public relations. That led the 
     newspaper's editor, Raymond Joseph, to speculate that the 
     Aristide government has been fabricating its outlays to dupe 
     the U.S. into releasing frozen funds.
       But Mr. Aristide's most effective representative in the 
     U.S. has been former Rep. Michael Barnes (D., Md.). As 
     chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee in the 
     1980s, Mr. Barnes was among the most outspoken leaders of the 
     congressional effort to thwart supply of the Nicaraguan 
     Contras. Today, Mr. Barnes is all for U.S. intervention--in 
     Haiti.
       Mr. Barnes has used his connections to give the Aristide 
     government a beachhead inside U.S. foreign policy, and earn 
     his current firm, Hogan & Hartson, compensation that started 
     at $55,000 a month. (In March, perhaps reacting to the 
     Aristide government's straitened circumstances, the firm cut 
     its retainer in half.) Mr. Barnes has claimed to charge Mr. 
     Aristide half his going rate, but that still adds up to big 
     money: $303,237.60 for billings between Sept. 29 and Dec. 7, 
     1993, to take the last period for which records are 
     available. (Mr. Barnes did not return repeated calls seeking 
     comment.)
       According to an Aristide source, when associates of the 
     exiled president expressed unhappiness with Mr. Barnes' work 
     in late 1992, Mr. Barnes was able to play his trump card--his 
     access to the incoming administration. He had run the Clinton 
     campaign in Maryland. What's more, deputy national security 
     adviser Samuel R. ``Sandy'' Berger, who is in charge of Haiti 
     policy at the National Security Council, is by all 
     accounts a close friend of Mr. Barnes. Just four months 
     after Mr. Berger left his partnership at Hogan & Hartson 
     to take up his administration post, Mr. Barnes pulled up 
     stakes at Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn and took his 
     account to Hogan & Hartson. This potentially brings 
     millions into a firm that Mr. Berger will have every right 
     to rejoin after his White House stint.
       Dealing with Haiti at all may have become a serious ethical 
     violation on Mr. Berger's part. The issue was first broached 
     by Rep. Frank Wolf (R., Va.), after an article in the 
     National Journal raised questions about Mr Berger's 
     negotiating most-favored-nation status for China after having 
     lobbied for Payless Shoes, a major Chinese trading partner. 
     Then-White House counsel Bernard Nussbaum found no conflict. 
     Nonetheless, he said in a May 12, 1993, letter, Mr. Berger 
     ``has a `covered relationship' with Hogan & Hartson for a 
     year after severing his relationship with that firm, and [we] 
     would be required to undertake the same inquiry if Hogan & 
     Hartson represented a party in a particular matter.''
       Five days after the letter was written, Michael Barnes 
     brought the Haiti account to Hogan & Hartson. Since Mr. 
     Berger's ``covered'' status with Hogan & Hartson didn't 
     expire until Jan. 19, 1994, an inquiry should have been 
     opened into his Haiti role, and Mr. Berger should have 
     recused himself from Haiti policy until his covered period 
     expired. It is unlikely that any such inquiry was ever 
     launched, for by Nov. 14, 1994, the Washington Post was 
     describing Mr. Berger as the ``principal driver of the U.S. 
     policy of supporting Aristide's return.''
       According to Justice Department records, Hogan & Hartson 
     had direct phone contact with Mr. Berger during this period 
     to discuss the ``restoration of democratically elected 
     government in Haiti.'' (White House counsel Lloyd Cutler 
     later wrote me that Mr. Berger did consult both the White 
     House counsel and the NSC's legal adviser, and that both 
     approved his participation.)
       All of these questionable dealings should, at the very 
     least, give Americans pause as President Clinton continues 
     his campaign to return Mr. Aristide to power.
  Mr. NICKLES. But, Mr. President, there are another couple of 
paragraphs that talk about a former Member of the House, Mr. Barnes, 
Michael Barnes, and his public relations firm Hogan & Hartson, was 
given compensation which started at $55,000 a month. They received over 
$303,000 for billings between September 29 and December 7, 1993.
  Mr. President, that is hundreds of thousands of dollars of PR money 
that Mr. Aristide's group is paying for Mr. Barnes and, I guess, his 
access to this administration. And now this administration is taking 
the total case of restoring Mr. Aristide to power.
  I think we have to look at why are we doing that, and why Mr. 
Aristide gets all this money from funds that were locked up for Haiti, 
how in the world can they afford to pay that kind of money, and then 
why would we be following that kind of agenda--and who is Mr. 
Aristide--for all the purported reasons that the President mentioned on 
May 19, our reasons for going into Haiti, none of which justify an 
invasion.
  Our national security interests are not at stake, are not in 
jeopardy. Lives are not threatened. Yet we are going to be threatening 
the lives of countless U.S. soldiers, and I say U.S. soldiers. It is 
not a U.N. force, it is a U.S. force. Those are United States men and 
women who will be on the ships, who will be invading Haiti, who will be 
risking their lives. For what? To restore Mr. Aristide to power. Is he 
an Abraham Lincoln, a George Washington of Haiti? Is this the real 
democrat, the savior? I do not think so.
  I am looking at a Washington Post article dated January 24, 1993. It 
says:

       Haiti Suspect Savior: Why President Aristide's Return From 
     Exile May Not Be Good News.

  I do not think it is good news, but yet this administration has made 
their entire foreign policy on Haiti the restoration of Mr. Aristide as 
President of Haiti. We hear some people say, ``Well, he was elected.'' 
Well, so was his predecessor. His predecessor, ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier, 
was elected; we did not have our foreign policy to keep him in power at 
all costs, but he was elected. Mr. Milosevic of Serbia was elected. He 
is a tyrant, but is it our foreign policy to put him back into power--
he is already in power--but to keep him there? No, that should not be 
our policy. Hitler was elected. Mistakes happen in elections, and if 
you look at some of the statements Mr. Aristide has made, I think you 
would agree that maybe some mistakes were made there.
  I do not find him as a true democrat in the legends of Washington or 
Lincoln or Jefferson. As a matter of fact, I see some of the statements 
that he has made, and it bothers me. I also note that when he was a 
priest, he was expelled from the order. He was expelled. He was 
defrocked because ``He is protagonist of destabilization.'' That was 
back in December 1988. The church kicked him out. They did not want him 
as a church leader because he was a ``protagonist of destabilization.'' 
I have that article, as well.
  I want to allude to a couple of the statements made in this 
Washington Post article. I read the Washington Post on occasion. I do 
not always agree with it. I notice they made some comments on Mr. 
Aristide. This is the individual we are going to be risking American 
lives to reinstate in power. But he is no real democrat, as I can see:

       In speeches, Aristide called on his followers to attack 
     freely anyone who dared disagree with him. This included even 
     organizations such as the labor union CATH, which had 
     supported Aristide's election but later criticized some of 
     his actions.
       Aristide actually urged his followers to engage in the 
     hideous practice of ``necklacing''--slapping a petrol-soaked 
     tire around the neck of a political opponent and igniting it, 
     thus burning the victim alive. On September 27, 1991, shortly 
     before he was overthrown by the military, the former Haitian 
     President--

  Mr. Aristide.

     told a mass rally that if they could see ``a faker who 
     pretends to be one of our supporters * * * just grab him. 
     Make sure he gets what he deserves * * * with the tool you 
     have now in your hands [the burning tire] * * *. You have the 
     right tool in your hands * * * the right instrument * * *. 
     What a beautiful tool we have. What a nice instrument. It is 
     nice, it is chic, it is classy, elegant and snappy. It smells 
     good, and wherever you go, you want to smell it.

  Mr. President, this is a statement not made 10 years ago, this is a 
statement not made 20 years ago, this is a statement made in 1991, and 
we are talking about trying to reinstate this person as the President 
of Haiti?
  I also happened to sit in on the classified briefing where many of us 
heard this. I am just reading from the Washington Post right now. I 
cannot believe that this administration would risk American lives to 
reinstate Mr. Aristide to power. I do not know why they would do it. 
But I think it is a serious mistake.
  Congress has spoken seven times and, basically, has said, ``Mr. 
President, don't do this.'' You can look at every one of these Senate 
resolutions. We had a few that said, ``Mr. President, you can't do it; 
no funds would be allowed.'' It was law, and those were not passed 
because a lot of people do not want to tie the President's hands that 
tightly.
  Every sense-of-the-Senate resolution that says, ``Let's not invade 
until you get congressional authorization''--and, granted, some of them 
had caveats, unless it was an emergency or national security interest--
those passed overwhelmingly. But the President has ignored those, 
totally ignored them.
  So the Senator from Arizona comes up with a resolution that says, 
``Wait a minute. Let's not risk the lives of any American soldiers to 
reinstate Mr. Aristide.'' Senator Mitchell offers a second-degree 
amendment, in other words, to wipe out the McCain amendment because he 
does not want us to vote on the McCain amendment, and for good reason, 
because if we have an up-or-down vote on the McCain amendment--and some 
of us are going to work very diligently to see that we do--but if we 
have an up-or-down vote on the McCain amendment, it is going to be 
adopted. It is going to be adopted. That is the reason we are not going 
to have a vote.
  I know this holiday was scheduled, and I heard Senator Mitchell say, 
``Well, this came up a couple of hours before.'' But it would not take 
our colleagues very long--the McCain resolution is one page--it would 
not take us long to determine how to vote on that. I certainly wish we 
would stay here, even on this religious holiday, and vote on Friday, if 
necessary, but I wish we would vote on it before we make this mistake.
  I think we have to look at what we are doing. Let us say we reinstate 
Mr. Aristide. What is going to happen then? He has a lot of opponents. 
Not just the generals, but a lot of people have opposed him. In the 
past, when he was in power, he had a lot of his opponents locked up. 
Some were killed.
  In the same article, I will just mention a couple more:

       Aristide supporters may claim reliance on mob violence was 
     needed to counteract the military, but Aristide's mob also 
     killed other antimilitary politicians, such as Sylvio Claude, 
     the founder of the Democratic Christian Haitian Party--a man 
     who had been jailed and tortured by Duvalier but was a 
     political opponent of Aristide. Although Claude sought 
     shelter in a police station, he was turned over to the mob 
     and burned to death.
       The Catholic Church was a central target of Aristide's more 
     violent supporters. Monsignor William Murphy wrote a graphic 
     account of events in January 1991 when, according to Murphy, 
     ``* * * a group of thugs, supporters of newly elected 
     President Aristide, went on a rampage. They destroyed the old 
     cathedral, gutted the archbishop's house * * * and then went 
     on to the nunciature, the home of the Pope's representative. 
     There, they completely destroyed the building, attacked the 
     nuncio and his priest-secretary, broke both legs of the 
     priest and roughed up and stripped the nuncio * * * who was 
     saved only by the intervention of a neighbor.

  And I could go on. In the same article it says:

       U.S. Government officials cite extensive evidence showing 
     that Aristide personally gave the order to kill Roger 
     Lafontant, the Duvalierist who was incarcerated in the 
     National Penitentiary after his conviction for leading a coup 
     attempt in January 1991.
       * * * Lafontant was killed by his jailers on the night 
     Aristide was overthrown.

  Mr. President, this concerns me. How in the world could we risk U.S. 
lives to put Mr. Aristide back in power? This is his proven track 
record. And if we put him back in power, what is going to happen when 
we have these types of conflicts in the future? Are we going to have to 
maintain U.S. forces and police personnel to be in some type of a 
policing action for not only months but years? What are we going to do 
when the mobs reignite and start killing somebody? What are we going to 
do if somebody tries--we are going to be engaged in a policing action 
possibly for years and years.
  How much will it cost? I have not heard anybody talk about the cost, 
but I happen to be concerned about that, too. I know the Senator from 
Arkansas hopefully is.
  According to the New York Times, we already invested about $200 
million in this operation to rescue Haitians fleeing the country by 
boat, and it is estimated we will spend another $400-some million if we 
invade. That is about $600-some million. So this is expensive.
  Who is going to pay for that? Are we going to ask other Caribbean 
nations to pay for that? I doubt that.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the 
Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I hope I have laid out a case that this 
is a serious, serious mistake. I do not believe that the reinstatement 
of Mr. Aristide into Haiti is worth the life of one --one--American 
soldier. Yet, this President is willing to risk the lives of a lot of 
American soldiers. And it seems to be a foregone conclusion, if you 
listen to statements now by the Secretary of State and by our U.N. 
representative, that this is going to happen. I heard my colleague from 
Maine, Senator Cohen, say he hopes maybe they will leave under this 
ominous force that is now presented before them. I hope and think that 
a rightful thinking person might do that.
  But I hate to think that we might lose any lives to reinstate 
somebody like Mr. Aristide. I think that is a serious mistake. I do not 
want to see us obligated for years again with the risk of loss of life, 
with the tying up of military forces and personnel.
  It is embarrassing to me to think that we have to do this, and then 
also find out we even have to call up reserves, or at least it was 
reported that reserves may be called up to help make this action 
happen. For the invasion of Haiti?
  Mr. President, I have not even touched on the constitutional 
questions, but the Constitution clearly says Congress has the right and 
the power and the authority to declare war, not the President of the 
United States.
  This is not a national security interest. This is not Panama, this is 
not Grenada, and this is not the Persian Gulf.
  Frankly, this is clearly a war action, when you are talking about a 
couple of aircraft carriers, several combat ships, 20,000 troops, all 
the U.S. troops. This is not a multinational police-keeping force. This 
is the invasion of another country. This does require congressional 
authorization. The President does not have it.
  Not to let us even have a vote on this resolution, and a real 
resolution that says that we do not favor this action, I think is a 
serious mistake. Senator Mitchell says we can return to it on Monday. I 
have a little sneaky suspicion that Monday is going to be too late. I 
hope we do not lose lives in the process. Mr. President, I hope and 
pray that we do not lose lives in the process, and that if this action 
is commenced, I hope and pray every single American soldier will be 
able to return healthy and we do not have the body bags coming back, 
especially for what we are gaining, because I do not see a national 
interest. I do not see national support. The support is not there for 
good reason. It is not in the national interest to make this action 
happen, and it is certainly not in the national interest to restore Mr. 
Aristide.
  Mr. President, I will just conclude with the fact that we are going 
to spend, are spending hundreds of millions of dollars. We are risking 
and jeopardizing United States leadership and prestige.
  More importantly, we are risking thousands of U.S. lives. For what? 
Maybe for political gains, maybe to fulfill the desires of a lobbying 
firm and ``Gucci Gulch'' makes hundreds of thousands of dollars, maybe 
to make Randall Robinson happy or the Black Caucus happy. But it is not 
in the United States' interest. The case has not been made for an 
invasion of Haiti. I believe it is a serious mistake, and I hope 
Congress would have a chance to express itself.
  The United Nations got to vote. The United Nations had a vote on 
authorizing this. I think the Congress should vote as well, and I hope 
that we will have a vote before the invasion will occur. And I hope the 
vote will occur on Monday and no later than Monday.
  I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record the article I quoted 
from the Washington Post.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1993]

Haiti's Suspect Savior; Why President Aristide's Return From Exile May 
                            Not Be Good News

                          (By Lally Weymouth)

       Before his inauguration, well aware that thousands of 
     Haitians were planning to set sail for America in direct 
     response to his perceived campaign promises, Bill Clinton 
     reversed course and adopted the Bush administration policy he 
     had bashed resoundingly--ostensibly on humanitarian grounds--
     during the campaign. The president-elect announced that 
     Haitians trying to reach U.S. shores would be forcibly 
     returned to Haiti.
       Human rights groups have attacked Clinton for the reversal. 
     Their chief hope now with regard to Haiti is that the 
     incoming administration will restore disposed President Jean-
     Bertrand Aristide to power. A leftist priest, Aristide was 
     chosen president of Haiti in a free election in December 
     1990. Seven months later, he was ousted from office in a 
     military coup.
       After the coup, the Bush administration, in coordination 
     with the Organization of American States, slapped a harsh 
     embargo on Haiti. A senior Bush foreign policy official 
     explains that the action was meant to remind the militaries 
     of other Carribean and Latin American countries that coups 
     don't pay.
       Not surprisingly, however, the Haitian people became the 
     primary victims of the embargo. While Aristide lived nicely 
     in Washington--enjoying access to thousands of dollars in 
     frozen Haitian assets made available to him by the U.S. 
     government--Haiti, already the poorest country in this 
     hemisphere, saw the loss of thousands of jobs as companies in 
     electronic assembly, clothing manufacture and other light 
     industry sold out to Haitian businessmen or moved operations 
     elsewhere.
       Before the Clinton administration sets out to restore 
     Aristide to power, newly appointed officials would be wise to 
     study carefully the true character of Aristide's short, but 
     brutal, tenure in office. Not only did he abuse democratic 
     practices but Aristide condoned and even encouraged violence.
       The State Department 1991 human rights report said that 
     under Aristide there were fewer instances of abuse by the 
     military but ``the government proved to be unwilling or 
     unable to restrain popular justice through mob violence. . . 
     .''
       In his speeches Aristide called upon his followers to 
     attack freely anyone who dared disagree with him. This 
     included even organizations such as the labor union CATH, 
     which had supported Aristide's election but later 
     criticized some of his actions.
       Aristide actually urged his followers to engage in the 
     hideous practice of ``necklacing''--slapping a petrol-soaked 
     tire around the neck of a political opponent and igniting it, 
     thus burning the victim alive. On Sept. 27, 1991, shortly 
     before he was overthrown by the military, the former Haitian 
     president told a mass rally that if they should see ``a faker 
     who pretends to be one of our supporters . . . just grab him. 
     Make sure he gets what he deserves . . . with the tool you 
     have now in your hands [the burning tire] . . . You have the 
     right tool in your hands . . . the right instrument . . . 
     What a beautiful tool we have. What a nice instrument. It is 
     nice, it is chic, it is classy, elegant and snappy. It smells 
     good and wherever you go, you want to smell it.''
       A few days later an Aristide-inspired mob attacked Sylvio 
     Claude, the founder of the Democratic Christian Haitian Party 
     (PDCH)--a man who had been jailed and tortured by Duvalier 
     but was a political opponent of Aristide. Although Claude 
     sought shelter in a police station, he was turned over to the 
     mob and burned to death.
       The Catholic Church was a central target of Aristide's more 
     violent supporters. Monsignor William Murphy wrote a graphic 
     account of events in January 1991 when, according to Murphy, 
     `` . . . a group of thugs, supporters of newly-elected 
     President Aristide, went on a rampage. They destroyed the old 
     cathedral, gutted the archbishop's house . . . and then went 
     on to the nunciature, the home of the pope's representative. 
     There, they completely destroyed the building, attacked the 
     nuncio and his priest-secretary, broke both legs of the 
     priest and roughed up and stripped the nuncio . . . who was 
     saved only by the intervention of a neighbor.''
       According to senior U.S. government officials, Aristide 
     also participated in a cover-up of the killing of five 
     teenagers on July 26, 1991. Members of an anti-gang unit 
     claimed the killings occurred when they became involved in a 
     struggle with the youths as they tried to escape. 
     Photographs, however, showed that the young men were severely 
     beaten and shot at point blank range by several weapons. The 
     Haitian armed forces--in particular Interim Commander-in-
     Chief Raoul Cedras--demanded that the incident be 
     investigated. But Aristide, who had been building his own 
     security forces outside the military chain of command, tried 
     to block the investigation and sided publicly with one of the 
     officers involved in the slaying.
       U.S. government officials cite extensive evidence showing 
     that Aristide personally gave the order to kill Roger 
     Lafontant, the Duvalierist, who was incarcerated in the 
     National Penitentiary after his conviction for leading a coup 
     attempt in January 1991.
       When Lafontant was tried in July 1991, a mob of Aristide 
     supporters assembled outside the courtroom carrying tires and 
     gasoline cans and threatening to kill the judge in the case 
     if Lafontant were not given a life sentence. As a result, 
     Lafontant received a life sentence although the Haitian 
     constitution sets the maximum penalty for his alleged crime 
     at 15 years. Aristide praised his followers for their 
     efforts, asking whether, without the threat of necklacing, 
     ``don't you think that the sentence handed down would have 
     been 15 years?'' Lafontant was killed by his jailers on the 
     night that Aristide was overthrown.
       After the coup, Cedras became chief of staff. He is, 
     nevertheless, credited by U.S. officials with saving 
     Aristide's life the night of the coup. In a December 
     interview, Cedras said he also has information that Aristide 
     intended to have other political prisoners killed, not just 
     Lafontant: ``He [Aristide] gave the orders to kill around 20 
     people, but they had the courage to execute only 
     Lafontant.''.
       During Aristide's short rule, says Canadian journalism 
     professor Gerard Etienne, a Haitian-born staunch opponent of 
     Duvalier who conducted a detailed study of Aristide's rule, 
     soldiers were regularly assassinated and several military 
     posts were burned. Aristide, according to Etienne, not only 
     failed to denounce these brutal slayings, but ``backed them 
     up by his silence and his demagogic tirades. . . .''
       In August 1991, Haitian legislators met to deal with the 
     government's abuses. They planned to question Prime Minister 
     Rene Preval--who, according to the State Department human 
     rights report, had personally interrogated political 
     prisoners and denied them recourse to legal counsel--and then 
     to consider censuring him. Before parliament met, shots were 
     fired outside the headquarters of the National Front for 
     Change and Democracy (FNCD)--a political party that had 
     originally supported Aristide but had begun to criticize some 
     of his actions. The home of an FNCD legislator was also 
     stoned.
       When the parliament met, its members found themselves 
     surrounded by about 2,000 demonstrators, many carrying 
     burning tires. Under the threat of the mob, the legislators 
     decided to recess.
       Cedras says he did his best to keep order in Haiti during 
     the 1990 elections that brought Aristide to power. Moreover, 
     he recalls trying subsequently to cooperate with Aristide. 
     ``But we could never really find out why he behaved the way 
     he did,'' said Cedras. ``He spent seven months violating the 
     constitution of this country which he was there to 
     guarantee.''
       After Aristide was overthrown by the military on Sept. 30, 
     1991, the army soon appointed a civilian government, headed 
     by Prime Minister Marc Bazin. Since then, efforts have been 
     made--with U.S. assistance--to arrive at a negotiated 
     settlement between Aristide, the army and Bazin.
       The closest the two sides came to an agreement was the 
     Washington Accord reached 11 months ago. But the accord 
     reached a stumbling block after Aristide changed his mind on 
     a central element--amnesty for the armed forces leadership. 
     Negotiations dragged on, and Aristide proved to be in no 
     hurry to make a deal.
       During the transition, the threat that thousands of Haitian 
     boat people might descend on Florida quickened the 
     negotiating pace. The two sides appear to have approached a 
     solution--amnesty would be granted to the army in return for 
     a recognition of Aristide's right to return to power. In 
     theory, both sides have agreed to accept a large team of 
     international monitors that would hopefully reduce the 
     widespread human rights violations currently being committed 
     by the army and prevent future abuses by Aristide's 
     supporters should he return.
       The challenge for Haiti and its U.S. friends is to turn to 
     building institutions that can sustain a measure of 
     democracy. Helping Aristide regain power may make sense as a 
     way of stemming the flow of Haitian immigrants to Florida. 
     But it is foolish to assume that he represents a return to 
     human rights and democratic rule for that impoverished 
     island.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am anticipating the arrival of a couple of 
our colleagues on this side who wish to be heard on the issue. Pending 
their arrival, let me just take a minute or so if I can. Let me 
reiterate what I said a while ago, Mr. President.
  If I had my druthers here, I prefer that the President come to the 
Congress, and we have a chance to vote on these matters, not because I 
necessarily believe that a vote is required for the President to act, 
but because I think there is value in having a debate and even perhaps 
a resolution.
  I must say, Mr. President, having said that, to listen to some of the 
comments being made today by some of our colleagues about their deep 
concern and commitment to having resolutions every time there is a 
matter like this, the history and the record show a quite different 
reaction when confronted with different fact situations involving the 
use of U.S. military forces.
  Now, the way I read the history of these issues is as follows: If 
someone agrees with a certain action to be taken, then the necessity, 
as he or she perceives it, for the Congress to vote is probably less. 
If one disagrees with a potential action, then the demand for 
congressional involvement seems to increase. What is lacking is 
consistency in the comments on these issues over time, when you go back 
and review the history of congressional reaction to recent involvements 
by various Chief Executive officers of our country.
  Now, one can start to split hairs about Grenada and Panama. In 
Panama, Mr. President, we knew for months that Panama would likely 
involve a military involvement. That was not any overnight decision by 
President Bush. We were pursuing General Noriega for months and 
insisting over and over again that we were going to take action if 
necessary in order to protect our interests.
  Now, I recall that I received a call about 1 o'clock in the morning 
from then Secretary of State Jim Baker informing me that the planes 
were basically on their way, or had landed. I supported the action in 
Panama. Yet I do not recall any similar outcry about the failure of 
Congress to act even though we were more than aware that there was a 
strong possibility our Armed Forces would be used in achieving our 
desired goals in Panama.
  Now, you can go back, and I have looked back, to 1975, 20 years, and 
there are some 31 different examples where Presidents, Republicans and 
Democrats alike, have committed U.S. forces, some in situations I could 
make a strong case that the President had no other choice but to act 
immediately because the emergency demanded it. But many, Mr. President, 
many were ones where we were involved for some time in the issue 
leading up to a decision to take military action.
  Let me just cite that we had President Bush--and I happened to agree 
with him on this--in August 1990 committing thousands of U.S. forces to 
the Persian Gulf. Now, we voted in January 1991 as to whether or not 
the President ought to have authority to use force. But with the 
decision to send hundreds of thousands of people to the Persian Gulf to 
defend Saudi Arabia from further expansion by the Iraqis into that 
area, certainly placed United States forces in harm's way without any 
question--the Scud missiles proved that later on. I seem to recall--
maybe I am wrong--some of these same noises that I hear from this side 
today insisting that we vote on Haiti were just awfully silent during 
those days.
  Now, again, I am not suggesting that we ought not to vote. I happen 
to think we should. I think it is important to do so. But I have to say 
it just does not strike me as being terribly consistent.
  Let me quote some of the comments that were made during that time.

       Politics does stop at the water's edge. If I were Saddam 
     Hussein, I would be doing handsprings of joy with things that 
     are being published and said about it.

  Here were people being critical. That is our minority leader Bob 
Dole.

       I do not believe the President requires any additional 
     authorization from Congress.

  Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, December 1990.

       No doubt about it, the President's policy is working. The 
     last thing we need are more timid signals from Congress.

  Bob Dole, our minority leader, on the Persian Gulf.
  Again, it depends where you come out on some of these issues, that 
all of a sudden people find the necessity of congressional involvement.
  I recall, Mr. President, having been involved in Central American 
issues in the mid-1980's, that any time I offered a resolution or 
various other proposals, I would be very significantly criticized by 
some of my colleagues because I was tinkering with the President's 
authority to conduct foreign policy.
  Now, I may have taken objection to the notion that I was tinkering. I 
certainly thought it my right as a Member of this body to express my 
views on whether or not I thought American tax dollars ought to be 
expended in various involvements in which we were engaged.
  All I am suggesting here is that as people listen to this debate, it 
might be worthwhile to reflect, refresh their memories about some of 
the same people making entirely different statements when it came to 
the question of whether or not Congress ought to give prior approval to 
a President's decision to commit U.S. forces. All Presidents, it 
seems--I have gone back 20 years, but other than Thomas Jefferson, who 
requested the Congress to give him approval before committing our 
forces to take on the Barbary pirates in about 1804, I do not recall 
too many other Presidents other than Franklin Roosevelt, in 1941, 
requesting a declaration of war from Congress. Since him, we had police 
actions in North Korea; 50,000 people died there--more.
  Vietnam, police action--you can go down the long list. All of our 
Presidents have been reluctant to come up here and to seek approval 
from Congress in the conduct of foreign policy. Some have suggested 
over the last several weeks that we probably ought to revisit this war 
powers debate. I agree with that because there are some very 
significant rules. Clearly, the power to declare war rests with the 
legislative branch. Clearly, the powers of Commander in Chief rest with 
the President of the United States. There is a huge gap between 
declarations of war and performing your functions as Commander in 
Chief.
  It is our obligation, it seems to me, with all of these examples that 
we are all painfully familiar with over at least the last 20 years 
where Presidents of different parties have exercised their authority as 
Commander in Chief without first coming to Congress for authorization. 
Now we all of a sudden decide this President in this fact situation 
which some may happen to disagree with, that this is an outrage. I did 
not hear that same sense of outrage, as I say, even a few short years 
ago when other Presidents have sought to commit forces.
  Ronald Reagan, I remember, in 1982 sent the Marines to Lebanon. 
Tragically that ended in ultimate disaster. We had to hightail it out 
of there. There was no doubt about it. This was a longstanding 
conflict. It was not a surprise decision. It was debated between March 
and the summer of 1982, and ultimately he sent them in. I do not recall 
anybody standing around, with all due respect, on this side of the 
aisle, Mr. President, saying President Reagan ought to come up here and 
get the approval of this body before subjecting those marines to the 
dangers of Lebanon. Tragically, it was a great misfortune.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to my colleague.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I am enjoying this. My friend from 
Connecticut is being articulate and appropriate as always. I am 
wondering if he is indeed waiting for another speaker to come to the 
floor and the other speaker is delayed.
  My question is answered by the arrival of the other speaker. I thank 
the Senator.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I will finish my remarks. And then I think 
my colleague from Massachusetts will be finished shortly. I appreciate 
that.
  Mr. BENNETT. I was asking, if the other speaker was not coming, if I 
could proceed. Since the Senator from Massachusetts has arrived and it 
is the Democrats' turn, I will appropriately listen to my friend from 
Massachusetts with great interest.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Utah very much.
  I do not want to dwell on this point. But I do think it needs to be, 
for the purpose of the record, stated clearly. I have heard, again it 
is bipartisan, objection to the idea that we commit forces to Haiti. 
But I cannot sit here silently in the face of some of the statements 
that are being made about prior congressional approval when previous 
Presidents, not in the distant past, Mr. President, but only a few 
short years ago, were up here denying that they needed to have 
authority from this body in order to commit U.S. forces. I will not 
mention Panama.
  Grenada again was a bit more spontaneous because of the kidnaping and 
assassination of Maurice Bishop. We had medical students there in 
Grenada. I would argue that, one, the proximity of time was one where 
President Reagan probably did not have to meet the obligation that is 
being insisted upon here. But clearly Panama was. There is no question 
about it. There were months involved in debating Panama before we sent 
the troops, as I say, between the summer of 1990 and the actual 
decision in January 1991. And the Persian Gulf, clearly months. Yet I 
do not recall the kind of demand for prior congressional approval.
  Last, I want to make one additional point and then I will yield to my 
colleagues.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record at 
this juncture the remarks made on October 2, 1991, before the 
Organization of American States by our then-Secretary of State, James 
Baker. I will just read them and ask unanimous consent they be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                      Attack on Democracy in Haiti

                          (By Secretary Baker)

[Address before the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington, 
                           DC, Oct. 2, 1991]

       Today, the international community and this Organization of 
     American States are being tested. A small group of willful, 
     violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation; 
     they have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government 
     elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just 9 
     months ago.
       Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere 
     in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle 
     and sacrifice and the support of the international community, 
     they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy 
     under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
       The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand 
     united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the 
     assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no 
     legitimacy and will not succeed. I commend the Secretary 
     General for the speed with which he has acted, first to 
     convene the Permanent Council, then to convene this meeting. 
     The elections is Haiti were held with unprecedented 
     international support. The OAS, the United Nations, and the 
     democratic community helped oversee and verify that this 
     electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He 
     and his government have and deserve our support.
       This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate 
     claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer 
     mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the 
     elections; the OAS mission was a strong symbol of this 
     hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development 
     the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this 
     hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to 
     establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this 
     table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in 
     Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This 
     hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
       Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of 
     guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any 
     ``sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic order in 
     any member state.'' Today, that mechanism faces its first 
     test, and it is imperative that we agree--for the sake of 
     Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the 
     hemisphere--to act collectively to defend the legitimate 
     government of President Aristide. Words alone will not 
     suffice.
       This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt 
     where the United States stands as a member of this proud 
     organization. The United States condemns this assault on 
     Haiti's democratically elected government and the violence 
     committed against innocent Haitians. We demand the immediate 
     restoration of President Aristide's constititional rule. We 
     have suspended all foreign assistance to Haiti. We do not and 
     we will not recognize this outlaw regime.
       My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in 
     uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political 
     persuasion--to desist from all violent actions. Surely this 
     week's events show that violence only begets more violence, 
     and the way to justice lies in the rule of law, not in 
     recourse to violence.
       Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft 
     resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to 
     take the best elements in each to produce the strongest 
     possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common 
     denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti. 
     By sending a mission from this body to Haiti, led by the 
     Secretary General, we will send an important message to those 
     who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people: This 
     junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the democratic 
     community. Until President Aristide's government is restored, 
     this junta will be treated as a parish throughout this 
     hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without 
     a future.
       Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce 
     the message already sent by the United States, Canada, 
     Venezuela, France, and the European Community. And this 
     meeting must remain open in order to show that this 
     hemisphere will not lose interest or forget the suffering of 
     Haiti's people.
       If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional 
     steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The 
     path they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is 
     restored, Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation 
     of the international community in promoting development and 
     alleviating poverty.
       My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the 
     rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our 
     interests do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that 
     stands poised to achieve what the world has never seen 
     before; the fulfillment of democratic rights across two 
     continents. This is the hemisphere that is building a future 
     of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. This is the 
     hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate weapons 
     of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the New 
     World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, ``to offer to man a land 
     of liberty.'' That is the future we are defending, and the 
     people of Haiti are and must continue to be part of that 
     community. This is a moment of darkness, but this coup must 
     not and will not succeed. I believe the people of Haiti will 
     regain their liberty. I believe this hemisphere will meet its 
     test.
       This Organization of American States must not and will not 
     rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.

  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me for my colleagues read a couple of 
poignant paragraphs about this Haiti policy and how it just did not all 
of a sudden occur on January 20, 1993, the day President Clinton was 
inaugurated. This goes back to the previous administration. Here is 
President Bush's Secretary of State Jim Baker speaking about Haiti.

       Today the international community and this Organization of 
     American States are being tested. A small group of willful, 
     violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation. 
     They have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government 
     elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just nine 
     months ago.

  He goes on down to excoriate what these thugs did and talks about 
ripping out of Haiti their duly elected President. To listen to some of 
my colleagues talk it was as if they were Haitian. I do not know 
whether I would have voted for President Aristide or not were he a 
candidate and I was a Haitian. It is not our business to decide whether 
or not we like people other nations elect as their heads of state. But 
no one has contradicted the fact that 70 percent of the people of that 
country in the freest and fairest election ever held in the nation of 
Haiti chose this man to be their President. That is their business, not 
ours.
  To be sitting here and suggesting somehow that because we do not like 
this guy or we do not particularly care for his speeches--Mr. 
President, I should tell you, and I will state this in the way for 
someone to challenge me. I spent more time than any other person I know 
in this body reviewing the record on President Aristide through our 
intelligence community and the various files; hours going over it. I 
must tell you, Mr. President, putting aside whether one likes Mr. 
Aristide's policies or not, I have rarely seen such an assassination on 
a person's character done to the extent it was done on this man.
  I would invite my colleagues to do what I did and read the record, 
and to go back and listen to the people who knew this individual. Read 
the transcripts and the files. Read the memos. Read the cables coming 
out of Haiti from Ambassador Adams, President Bush's Ambassador in 
Haiti from the time Aristide was elected to the time of the coup. The 
remarks that are being attributed to President Aristide and the 
character assassination just do not hold up under the scrutiny of an 
examination of that file.
  But going back to the point here, whether or not we like President 
Aristide is not the issue. He was elected by an overwhelming majority 
of that people and then summarily thrown out by the very people now who 
want to sustain power, the very ones involved in the drug trafficking 
and the ones engaged in the blatant, violent human rights violations.
  Let me also go further in my quotation of James Baker's speech that 
day because I think there are some important paragraphs.

       This hemisphere is united to defend democracy.

  I would point out that the Organization of American States has taken 
a strong position with regard to Haiti, as has the United Nations. That 
is not committing us to use force but it is worthy of note that the 
entire world unanimously have indicted the Haitian Government for what 
they have done.
  Jim Baker goes on further in his remarks and he talks about the 
various sanctions. I will not take up the time to read all of this. But 
I goes down and lists the various things that we are going to be 
doing--cutting off assistance, suspending various things--to show that 
we mean business.
  Then President Bush's Secretary of State says the following:

       If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional 
     steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know the path 
     they have chosen leads nowhere.

  He further says that once democracy is restored, we would be willing 
to provide some help.
  Jim Baker did not say that day that if this fails other additional 
steps will be taken including the use of military force. He did not say 
that. He would have been terribly unwise to do so. I do not think those 
words were chosen idly. When the then Secretary of State under the 
previous administration is talking about what happened in Haiti, he 
says that, if these steps do not succeed, the economic sanctions, we 
must consider additional steps. I do not recall people expressing any 
great outcry at the time when the Bush administration properly indicted 
the military leadership of Haiti that stripped that nation of its 
democratically elected Government. In fact, most of us applauded the 
Bush administration. When they started with the sanctions--all of us, 
in my view, will remember it as I remember it--we agreed with that.
  As I said earlier today, when you start that process and run that 
string out, you get to what Jim Baker talked about--additional steps. I 
would suggest to you today that, if President Bush had been reelected 
in November 1992 and the diplomatic and political efforts had not 
succeeded, instead of President Clinton considering the use of military 
force, I suspect that President Bush in 1994 would be considering the 
use of force because that is what Jim Baker committed that 
administration to, in my view, if all of those other steps had failed.
  We do not know that for certain. Obviously, a lot of other things 
could have happened along the way. But I think in describing this 
situation, where we are today, to go back and review that history is 
important. There has been a longstanding effort through two 
administrations to try and resolve this problem.
  I will conclude by saying this to you, Mr. President: I sincerely 
hope that the de facto military leadership of Haiti will decide in the 
next few days to live up to the commitments they made in Governors 
Island, that they made to the Bush administration, to this 
administration, and to the United Nations, and to the OAS, and pack 
their bags and give us a chance to restore this democracy and get this 
country back on its feet again.
  I hope my colleagues, in talking about Haiti, will not offer any 
comfort to these guys. They do not deserve it. Disagree about the use 
of force; disagree, if you will, about sanctions and so forth, but do 
not let these leaders and others pretend we do not care about what they 
are doing. It is an outrage what they are doing to the people of their 
nation. Their violent, vile assassinations and mutilations of people 
ought to offend everybody in this Chamber, regardless of our 
differences over what tactics ought to be used.
  As the most important deliberative body in this great Nation, it is 
important that we send a message--and they watch and listen, by the 
way, to what we say and do--that we do not support what they are doing 
and are adamantly opposed to it, and that we are determined 
collectively to find a way to change that situation.
  I hope we do not have to use force. That has been my position all 
along, that using force ought to be the last thing considered. But do 
not deny this President entirely the ability to exercise his office as 
President of the United States and Commander in Chief. Let us come back 
and debate this question of war powers and declarations of war and the 
role of a Commander in Chief. But let us not apply such a rigid 
standard here.
  This issue is not all black and white. It falls into a gray area. It 
is a difficult one. I agree with the statements made earlier by Senator 
Cohen of Maine. Yes, the burden falls here as well on all of us as to 
how we vote on matters that commit young men and women to war in this 
Nation. I will repeat what I said earlier. It certainly falls to a 
severe and profound degree on the President of the United States--any 
President--and whatever else one may think about this President, 
whether you like him or not, to suggest somehow that he is pondering 
the use of military force and committing young men and women in a 
potentially life-threatening situation because of some desire to do 
better on the local elections in November is a cynical, cynical, 
cynical comment and statement to make.
  I do not believe any American President has ever engaged in that kind 
of a tactic. To attribute it to this one, in my view, is unfair and 
undermines our democratic process. Debate, argue, fight, disagree, but 
let us also understand what is at stake here. I hope in the coming days 
we might have a chance to vote on this. I really believe that. That has 
been my position consistently throughout the years here, and I will not 
change it for this fact situation.
  But, again, I find it somewhat disingenuous that the people who stood 
here and berated some of us who suggested we have votes earlier on 
other issues and are now demanding that we have one here, fail to look 
at their own record and the history that goes back when other 
Presidents have committed troops--or threatened to--because they found 
it to be in the interest of this Nation.
  With that, I will yield the floor. I yield to my colleague from 
Massachusetts whatever time he may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized 
for up to 30 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, there is not one of us in the Senate who 
does not approach a subject such as this with enormous concern for 
country, for those who might go into harm's way, for the principles 
that are at stake. And I think it is fair to say that the Senator from 
Connecticut and I have no illusions about where this debate begins at 
this point in time in this country.
  It is sad. It is probably regrettable that there has not been more 
debate, that there really has not been a more intense focus on the 
connection of Haiti to the United States, to the hemisphere, and to our 
interests. It is regrettable that at the moment, when Americans are 
beginning to focus most on Haiti, there is perhaps the least 
understanding. I regret that there has not been a greater effort to try 
to explain our interests so that the American people can understand 
them. I do not think that this is the best of situations in the waning 
moments of confrontation of one kind or another.
  I also think that it is absolutely vital that we try to maintain a 
base of reality in this discussion so that we assist the American 
people in really discerning the facts. I have heard a lot of talk about 
war, a lot of revisionist history here about Panama and Grenada, and I 
think it is very important for us to understand what we are really 
talking about. Under both legal and, frankly, commonsense definitions 
if we were to engage in military action in Haiti, it would not be war.
  I think many of us still remain hopeful that we will not have to 
engage in military action. I know I share with the Senator from 
Connecticut a deep aversion to military action by the United States in 
this hemisphere. We all know the history, and we all understand the 
difficulties. But we also ought to recognize that this is not a case, 
as it was in most of history, of the United States acting alone. This 
is not some freewheeling, trigger-happy, potential involvement of U.S. 
forces to protect a business. This is not an effort to protect United 
Fruit. This is an internationally sanctioned effort by the friends of 
Haiti, by the United Nations, by the OAS, and others, all of whom have 
been deeply involved over a period of almost 3 years in focusing on a 
renegade group of thugs who have stolen a democracy.
  My colleagues have used the word ``war.'' Under any technical 
definition, war is a state of open armed hostilities between political 
units or states, or nations. And a state of war cannot, by definition, 
exist between countries, unless they both have their own government and 
the governments are involved.
  We all know that the Government of Haiti was duly elected by its 
people with 68 percent of the vote. The Government of Haiti is 
President Aristide, and the Government of Haiti is asking the United 
States of America for help.
  The group of people against whom we might conceivably proceed with 
our Armed Forces are a small group of thugs who have stolen a 
government and who have no standing in the international community to 
fit under any ``declarations of war'' or otherwise.
  I have heard allusions to Vietnam in the course of this debate. But 
we ought to remember that there were maybe 3, almost 4 years of 
involvement of American troops in Southeast Asia before we even got to 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
  I would be the last person in the United States to suggest that that 
is good or that that ought to be replicated. But there is not one iota 
of a breathe of a plan here that suggests that we are somehow going to 
be involved for a long period of time. There is, in fact, every 
indication to the contrary that the United Nations is going to be 
involved, that international peacekeepers would be involved, that if 
U.S. forces were involved, they would be withdrawn as rapidly as 
possible, and that an exit strategy is as central to this question as 
an entry strategy.
  I have also heard arguments being made about no consultation. Again, 
we ought to have honesty and candor on the floor of the U.S. Senate. 
There has been no end of consultation with the U.S. Senate and the 
Congress.
  I have a list here of hearings and briefings on Haiti just to this 
Congress. The list is not exhaustive, but it reflects State Department 
organized consultations, I will run down the list.
  As recently as this month, Defense Secretary Perry was meeting with 
House and Senate Republican leadership. The day before that senior 
administration officials were meeting with the House and Senate 
Democratic leadership. A few days before that, State Department 
officials were briefing the House Appropriations Committee. National 
Security Adviser Lake and Special Adviser Gray briefed the House 
Intelligence Committee in August. And so the line of consultation goes, 
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador 
Albright, and others.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full list of consultations be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             Hearings and Briefings on Haiti, 103d Congress

       This list is not exhaustive but primarily reflects State 
     Department organized consultations. In addition, senior 
     Administration officials have made numerous phone contacts 
     with various Members of Congress over the past year.
       13 September 1994 Meeting. Defense Secretary Perry met with 
     House and Senate Republican leadership to discuss recent 
     developments on Haiti policy.
       12 September 1994 Meeting. Senior Administration officials 
     met with House and Senate Democratic Leadership to discuss 
     recent developments on Haiti policy.
       30 August 1994 Briefing. State Department officials briefed 
     staff of the House Appropriations Committee on Migrant and 
     Refugee Assistance funding.
       18 August 1994 Briefing. National Security Advisor Lake and 
     Special Advisor Gray briefed the House Intelligence Committee 
     on Administration Haiti policy.
       16 August 1994 Briefing. ARA DAS Patterson briefed House 
     Foreign Affairs Committee staff on sanctions enforcement in 
     the Dominican Republic.
       12 August 1994 Briefing. State Department officials briefed 
     House and Senate appropriations staff on Haiti refugee 
     funding.
       11 August 1994 Briefing. OAS Ambassador Colin Granderson 
     met with Senate staff to discuss the current human rights 
     situation in Haiti.
       5 August 1994 Meeting. Special Advisor Gray met with House 
     and Senate members of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
     Caucus to discuss Haiti.
       4 August 1994 Hearing. Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs of 
     staff Chairman Shalikashvilli testified before the House 
     Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
       4 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher, Ambassador 
     Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, and AID 
     Administrator Atwood met with members of the Congressional 
     Black Caucus on Haiti and other foreign policy issues.
       3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with 
     Senator Byrd to discuss Haiti and other foreign policy 
     issues.
       3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with 
     Minority Leader Michel and Minority Whip Gingrich to discuss 
     Haiti and other foreign policy issues.
       3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with 
     Majority Leader Gephardt to discuss Haiti and other foreign 
     policy issues.
       2 August 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed 
     Republican members: Goss; Chris Smith; Livingston; Fowler, 
     Ros-Lehtinen; Hobson; Shaw; Mica; Boehlert; Houghton; Coble; 
     Hunter; Bateman; Hutchinson; and buyers.
       2 August 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed 
     Majority Leader Gephardt.
       2 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary of State met with Rep. 
     Berman on Haiti and other issues.
       29 July 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Issues. State and 
     Justice briefed HFAC and House Judiciary Committee staff.
       28 July 1994 Briefing. State DAS George Ward briefed SFRC 
     and CJS on the UN Security Council Resolution on Haiti.
       27-28 July 1994 Briefings. Haiti Resolution; 5 Day Advance 
     Notice. State DAS Chapman briefed HFAC, CJS, HASC, SFRC, 
     SFRC, House and Senate Appropriations, and Sen. Dole's staff.
       21 July 1994 Briefing. Deputy Secretary Talbott briefed 
     Sen. Nunn.
       21 July 1994 Meeting. Deputy Secretary Talbott spoke with 
     Rep. Richardson regarding his trip to Haiti.
       21 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senator 
     Wellstone.
       21 July 1994 Meeting. Special Advisor Gray met with the 
     Senate Democratic Policy Committee.
       21 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Rep. 
     Major Owens.
       20 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Rep. 
     Porter Goss.
       19 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor on Haiti William 
     Gray briefed HFAC members in a closed session.
       14 July 1994 Briefing. Assistant Secretary of State Gati 
     and officials from CIA and Justice brief Senate Select 
     Intelligence Committee on Haiti and Iran.
       13 July 1994 Briefing. Secs. Christopher, Perry, Ambassador 
     Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, and General 
     Shalikashvili briefed the Senate and House Leadership 
     ``Consultative Group'' (leadership, chairs and ranking of 
     HFAC/SFRC; HASC/SASC; Intelligence; Appropriations--full 
     committee/DoD/Foreign Operations/Commerce, State, Justice) 
     separately.
       13 July 1994 Hearing. OAS Ambassador Babbitt and State DAS 
     Skol testified on Dominican Republic elections and Haiti 
     before the HFAC subcommittee on Western Hemisphere.
       13 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly State official 
     Bob Loftis briefed SASC staff.
       13 July 1994 Briefing. Coast Guard officials briefed House 
     Merchant Marine committee members and staff.
       13 July 1994 Briefing. State officials briefed House 
     Appropriations staff on Emergency Refugee and Migrant 
     Assistant.
       12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, State DAS Ward 
     briefed HFAC staff.
       12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, Ambassador 
     Dobbins briefed senior House staff.
       12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, State DAS 
     George Ward briefed SFRC staff.
       7 July 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed majority 
     and minority SFRC staff.
       7 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed HFAC 
     chairman Lee Hamilton.
       5 July 1994 Phone Calls. State officials made phone calls 
     to Congressional staff of SFRC and HFAC, and Judiciary on 
     ``safehaven'' policy.
       28 June 1994 Hearing. U.S. Policy Towards Haiti Special 
     Advisor Gray, Assistant Secretary of State Shattuck, State 
     DAS McKinley testified before SFRC Subcommittee on Western 
     Hemisphere Affairs.
       28 June 1994 Meeting. Secretary of State met with Speaker 
     Foley on Haiti and other issues.
       20 June 1994. State and DoD officials briefed HFAC staff on 
     Dominican Republic elections and the Administration's 
     sanctions-monitoring efforts.
       16 June 1994 Briefing. State, DoD, and CIA officials 
     briefed SSCI staff on drug trafficking in Haiti.
       15 June 1994 Hearing. Haitian Asylum-seekers; State DAS 
     Brunson McKinley testified before the House Judiciary 
     Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees 
     on legislation on Haiti introduced by Reps. Meek and Dellums.
       8 June 1994 Hearing. Special Advisor Gray testified before 
     House Foreign Affairs Committee.
       8 June 1994 Briefing. Assistant Secretary of State Watson 
     briefed Senator Bob Graham on Haiti and other regional 
     issues.
       1 June 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Processing; State and 
     Justice staff brief HFAC staff.
       26 May 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed Reps. 
     Dixon, Richardson, and Reed prior to their trip to Haiti.
       26 May 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed Rep. 
     Rangel.
       25 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Intelligence Community Briefing 
     (closed) HPSIC Members and Staff. Briefers: CIA/NIO Lattrel, 
     INR, others.
       24 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Pre-trip Intelligence Community 
     Briefing, Rep. Dixon and HPSCI staff. Briefers: CIA, INR, 
     DIA, DEA, NSA, JCS/J-2.
       18 May 1994 Briefing. State and INS officials briefed 
     Senate Judiciary committee staff on Haitian refugee 
     processing.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed House 
     Democratic Leadership.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senate 
     Democratic Leadership.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed 
     Congressional Black Caucus.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senate 
     Republican Leadership.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed House 
     Republican Leadership.
       17 May 1994 Briefing. Acting Refugee Policy Director Oakley 
     and INS Commissioner Meissner briefed Reps. Mazzoli, Canady, 
     and Lamar Smith on Haiti refugee processing.
       12 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Policy. House Judiciary 
     Subcommittee on Immigration; RP & INS.
       3 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Issues: HFAC Staff with 
     RP, ARA, and INS.
       3 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti. Senator Dodd and other SFRC 
     Members. Briefers: Acting Secretary Talbott and NSC Sandy 
     Berger.
       24 March 1994 Meeting. Assistant Secretary of State 
     Shattuck met with Rep. Joe Kennedy regarding Haiti.
       8 March 1994 Hearing. Haiti. SFRC Subcommittee on Western 
     Hemisphere. Witness: Ambassador Pezzullo.
       2 March 1994 Meeting. Ambassador Swing met with Rep. 
     Torricelli on recent events in Haiti.
       9 February 1994 Hearing. Ambassador Pezzullo and AID 
     Assistant Administrator Schneider met with HFAC members in a 
     closed session to brief Members on humanitarian relief.
       14 January 1994 Meeting. Assistant Secretary of State 
     Watson met with Sen. Dodd to discuss recent developments in 
     Haiti.
       9 November 1993 Briefing. Haiti: HFAC Western Hemisphere 
     Members Briefing; (Amb. Pezzullo).
       3 November 1993 Briefing. Haiti (closed); HPSCI Members & 
     Staff. Briefers: State/CIA/DIA/DOD.
       27 October 1993 Briefing. Haiti-Intelligence; House 
     Republican Policy Committee Members. Briefers: CIA, DIA.
       20 October 1993 Hearing. Roundtable on Haiti; HFAC.
       20 October 1993 Briefing. Recent Events in Haiti: House 
     Intelligence Committee. Included State Department witnesses.
       21 July 1993 Hearing. Recent Developments in Haiti; HFAC W. 
     Hemisphere Subcommittee.
       21 July 1993 Hearing. Governor's Island Implementation; 
     HFAC.
       18 June 1993 Briefing. Haiti; Reps. Torricelli and HFAC 
     staff. Briefer: Amb. Pezzullo.
       26 May 1993 Briefing. Assistance from Haiti; Sen. Leahy. 
     Briefers: ARA Pezzulo & Watson.
       18 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; SACFO Minority Staff. 
     Briefers: ARA-Pezullo, AID.
       13 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; SACFO Minority Staff. 
     Briefers: ARA--Pezullo, AID.
       13 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; HAC Foreign OPS Subcommittee 
     and Associate Staff. ARA/Pezzullo, AID, and DOD.
       3 May 1993 Briefing. Situation in Haiti/Request for 
     Contingency Fund; SACFO Majority and Minority Staff Briefers: 
     ARA-Pezzullo, AID-Williams.
       10 March 1993 Briefing. Haiti; for HAC Foreign OPS Minority 
     Staff w/ Majority Staff.
       9 March 1993 Briefing. Haiti; for HAC Foreign OPS Minority 
     and Majority Staff. Briefer: ARA/?
       27 January 1993 Vote. Haiti; HAC Foreign Ops Subcommittee 
     Staff. ARA/ Gelbard.
       12 January 1993 Briefing. Update on Haiti; Senate Judiciary 
     Committee Staff Briefers: ARA/RP/INS.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in addition to that, we have heard 
arguments a moment ago from the Senator from Arizona that somehow there 
is some setup here to avoid a vote.
  Let us be fair. The majority leader has said this and I think most 
Senators know it is fact. The 2 o'clock deadline on voting was set long 
before we even left for our recess a month ago or 3 weeks ago. Every 
Senator knew that as of 2 o'clock today we would not be able to vote. 
And it was only by agreement with the Republicans that we were allowed 
to have two votes last night that cleared some business, and the 
agreement was it was an exchange for 7 hours of debate on Haiti at 
their request.
  So the entire parliamentary situation in which we find ourselves was 
frankly dictated to us by the Republicans who would not let us vote 
unless there was the commitment to 7 hours of debate.
  By happenstance, a motion was made in the course of that debate that 
opened up the possibility for an amendment. The Senator from Arizona 
seized that opportunity and offered an amendment. Now that Senator and 
others are complaining that the second-degree amendment offered by the 
majority leader has precluded any opportunity for the Senate to vote 
today on their amendment. But that is not true, because the majority 
leader's amendment was not even offered until we had reached the 
previously scheduled hour beyond which votes would not occur.
  So to somehow play politics with this issue, always politics, and to 
suggest to the American people that there is some conspiracy to prevent 
a vote does a disservice to the quality of debate and the obligations 
of all of us in the U.S. Senate. That is not what has happened here.
  I would prefer to have a vote. It is consistent with everything I 
have ever said since I fought in Vietnam. I know this country is 
stronger if it sends people into combat when the Congress agrees. I 
know that the American staying power will last longer if we have had a 
healthy debate and we have come to a resolution and the American people 
are part of it. I have personally suggested historically that I do not 
like American troops going off into harm's way unless there is that 
consent. But we do not always get our druthers in the course of human 
events.
  For whatever reasons, Mr. President, it sometimes falls to the 
President of the United States to make a judgment under the Commander 
in Chief power that the fathers of this country, in their wisdom, gave 
to the President in the Constitution. We have a War Powers Act and 
still hold the President accountable if in fact the President exercises 
that authority, and we have checks and balances by which we gain 
control over whatever judgments the President might make with respect 
to that use of power.
  But no one in the U.S. Senate can legitimately make the argument that 
the President does not have that power, and that is why again and again 
when the issue of curtailing the power has come before the Senate with 
respect to Haiti and elsewhere we, as Senators, have upheld that power 
of the President.
  And that is the lonely decision that my friend from Connecticut 
referred to earlier, I am not suggesting disrespectfully that Congress 
does not have a role--of course, it does--but I am simply suggesting 
the reality: that there are times when the buck stops at the desk of 
the President of the United States who has to make a decision.
  What is the quality of that decision that the President has to make 
and in what context is the President making it?
  I would ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to search 
their consistency compass and perhaps their conscience when they come 
to the floor to debate Haiti because this policy was not begun by Bill 
Clinton. This policy was set in place by a person whose stewardship as 
Secretary of State I respect enormously, one of the better players on 
the international scene, and that is Jim Baker. And it was set in place 
by a President of the United States who had a string of successes in 
foreign policy and whom this Nation came to respect for his acumen in 
foreign policy and his accomplishments.
  Lest anybody question to what degree President Bush and Jim Baker put 
this policy in place, I want to remind them with Jim Baker's words, and 
I read.

       Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere 
     in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle 
     and sacrifice and the support of the international community, 
     they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy 
     under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
       The test we face is clear: To defend democracy; to stand 
     united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the 
     assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no 
     legitimacy and will not succeed. . . . The elections in Haiti 
     were held with unprecedented international support. The OAS, 
     the United Nations, and the democratic community helped 
     oversee and verify that this electoral process was open, 
     free, and fair.

  I quote Jim Baker.

       Jean-Bertrand Aristide is the democratically elected 
     President of Haiti. He and his government have and deserve 
     our support.

  That was the Republican policy when they held the Presidency and when 
they believed that they would be reelected and continue to conduct the 
foreign policy of this country. It is only with the defeat of that 
President and the ascendancy of a Democratic President that suddenly 
our Republican friends have found new routes of policy and new reasons 
to doubt Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the democratic election.
  Let me continue on with Jim Baker's words spoken October 2, 1991, 
before the Organization of American States. He said:

       This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate 
     claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer 
     mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the 
     elections; the OAS mission was a strong symbol of this 
     hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development 
     the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this 
     hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to 
     establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this 
     table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in 
     Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This 
     hemisphere is united to defend democracy.

  Mr. President, I am skipping through some of this, but I want to read 
another important paragraph of Secretary Baker's statement.

       Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft 
     resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to 
     take the best elements in each to produce the strongest 
     possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common 
     denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti. 
     By sending a mission of this body to Haiti, led by the 
     Secretary General, we will send an important message to those 
     who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people.

  And here are the most important words of all.

       This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the 
     democratic community. Until President Aristide's government 
     is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah 
     throughout this hemisphere--without assistance, without 
     friends, and without a future.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full statement of 
Secretary Baker before the Organization of American States be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       [From the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Oct. 1, 1991]

                      Attack on Democracy in Haiti

                          (By Secretary Baker)

       Today, the international community and this Organization of 
     American States are being tested. A small group of willful, 
     violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation; 
     they have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government 
     elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just 9 
     months ago.
       Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere 
     in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle 
     and sacrifice and the support of the international community, 
     they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy 
     under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
       The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand 
     united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the 
     assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no 
     legitimacy and will not succeed. I commend the Secretary 
     General for the speed with which he has acted, first to 
     convene the Permanent Council, then to convene this meeting. 
     The elections in Haiti were held with unprecedented 
     international support. The OAS, the United Nations, and the 
     democratic community helped oversee and verify that this 
     electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He 
     and his government have and deserve our support.
       This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate 
     claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer 
     mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the 
     elections; the OAB mission was a strong symbol of this 
     hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development 
     the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this 
     hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to 
     establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this 
     table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in 
     Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This 
     hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
       Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of 
     guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any 
     ``sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic order in 
     any member state.'' Today, that mechanism faces its first 
     test, and it is imperative that we agree--for the sake of 
     Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the 
     hemisphere--to act collectively to defend the legitimate 
     government of President Aristide. Words alone will not 
     suffice.
       This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt 
     where the United States stands as a member of this proud 
     organization. The United States condemns this assault on 
     Haiti's democratically elected government and the violence 
     committed against innocent Haitians. We demand the immediate 
     restoration of President Aristide's constitutional rule. We 
     have suspended all foreign assistance to Haiti. We do not and 
     we will not recognize this outlaw regime.
       My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in 
     uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political 
     persuasion--to desist from all violent actions. Surely this 
     week's events show that violence only begets more violence, 
     and the way to justice lies in the rule of law, not in 
     recourse to violence.
       Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft 
     resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to 
     take the best elements in each to produce the strongest 
     possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common 
     denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti. 
     By sending a mission from this body to Haiti, led by the 
     Secretary General, we will send an important message to those 
     who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people: This 
     junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the democratic 
     community. Until President Aristide's government is restored, 
     this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this 
     hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without 
     a future.
       Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce 
     the message already sent by the United States, Canada, 
     Venezuela, France, and the European Community. And this 
     meeting must remain open in order to show that this 
     hemisphere will not lose interest or forget the suffering of 
     Haiti's people.
       If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional 
     steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The 
     path they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is 
     restored, Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation 
     of the international community in promoting development and 
     alleviating poverty.
       My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the 
     rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our 
     interests do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that 
     stands poised to achieve what the world has never seen 
     before: the fulfillment of democratic rights across two 
     continents. This is the hemisphere that is building a future 
     of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. This is the 
     hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate weapons 
     of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the New 
     World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, ``to offer to man a land 
     of liberty.'' That is the future we are defending, and the 
     people of Haiti are and must continue to be part of that 
     community. This is a moment of darkness, but this coup must 
     not and will not succeed. I believe the people of Haiti will 
     regain their liberty. I believe this hemisphere will meet its 
     test.
       This Organization of American States must not and will not 
     rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is sad to see so many of our colleagues 
now coming to the floor with a totally different policy than the policy 
they supported under President Bush and suggesting to the American 
people that now we ought to have a whole different set of standards 
applied to Haiti.
  It is even more incredible to listen to the new policy. We heard it 
from the Senator from Indiana, who came to the floor quoting somebody 
from Haiti, and saying that we ought to lift the embargo, not worry 
about the democratic issue, not worry about the military junta that has 
taken over because no American lives are being threatened.
  That is so contrary to what President Bush and Jim Baker established 
as policy and to what they supported.
  It takes us right back to the crime bill, Mr. President, where they 
voted for a crime bill that had a certain amount of money in it, more 
than the crime bill that came back, and then they voted against a crime 
bill that has less money than the crime bill they voted for with more 
money, and argue against the amount of money in the crime bill that 
they are voting. If ever George Orwell was going to be alive and well 
and happy with doublespeak, it is in what comes out of Washington.
  Mr. President, I repeat again, I hope we do not have to go into 
Haiti. But people ought to think about what the policy is that follows 
through with what George Bush and Jim Baker said. If you lift the 
embargo and simply do not pay any attention and do not worry about 
their democratic election, what is the message to any country that 
aspires to a democratic election? And, more importantly, what is the 
message to the despots and thugs willing to challenge those elections? 
That our words are only words? That nothing means anything? That you 
can risk lives? That you can listen to the United States talk tough 
about human rights and about the rights of people to have a democratic 
process, but when push comes to shove we are willing to be shoved?
  I am not advocating that you ought to run around the world and 
intervene everywhere. I am not advocating that even in this hemisphere 
the circumstances in every situation are the same.
  We have heard comparisons with Panama and comparisons with Grenada, 
and we will hear them. Frankly, we should make a judgment solely on the 
issue of Haiti. Because each and every country will not present us with 
the exact same set of circumstances.
  But I would ask my colleagues to measure whether or not the 
circumstances in Grenada in their totality cannot be compared with the 
totality of the circumstances in Haiti? I would not point to one 
particular concern in Haiti as sufficient to demand that we hold out 
military force as a legitimate threat. But when you take the 
conglomerate of what has happened in Haiti, I believe you have a very 
different situation.
  Mr. President, since ousting Haiti's first democratically elected 
leader in September, we have been engaged in a test of wills between 
the thugs who threw out President Aristide and stole the democracy and 
the international community.
  If my colleagues want to be fair about analyzing our options here, 
they should make a judgment about all of the efforts that we have made 
to try to get them to step down. For over 3 years now, we have been 
engaged in a dialog. They even acknowledged their illegitimacy by 
agreeing in New York at Governor's Island that they ought to step down, 
and then they went back on that agreement. Notwithstanding that, we 
have continued to be patient and give them an opportunity to come to 
their senses. But they have not. They have, in fact, dug in deeper and 
consolidated their power.
  Mr. President, I ask how much time is remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). The Senator has 9 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. KERRY. Am I entitled, under the rules, to ask for or to be 
yielded additional time?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. I advise the Senator that it would take a 
unanimous-consent request to extend your time.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to extend my 
time by 10 minutes, if possible.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. It is my 
understanding that the procedure that we are following is that, at the 
conclusion of the statement by the Senator from Massachusetts, another 
Democrat would then be recognized, and I am told it would probably be 
the Senator from Florida, Mr. Graham, after which, the time would then 
come back to this side and I would be recognized.
  Is that the correct procedure?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from Utah 
that the next speaker will be from your side.
  Mr. BENNETT. It will not be from the Democratic side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It will be from your side. And it will 
probably be Senator Bennett.
  Mr. BENNETT. I understand.
  Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not object.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I am reminded of the debate that we had over Iraq, 
during which time we were consistently told by Republicans that any 
kind of dissent somehow strengthened the hand of Saddam Hussein and 
weakened the ability of the President of the United States to be able 
to work his will.
  There are countless quotes from that debate on the floor. Among them, 
I remember Dick Cheney telling us he did not believe the President 
required any additional authorization from Congress. Jim Baker said to 
us, in December 1990, ``If we are to have any chance of success, I must 
go to Baghdad with the full support of the Congress and the American 
people behind the message of the international community.''
  The minority leader said that, ``The success of Saddam's agreeing to 
release all foreign hostages came despite attempts by many in Congress 
to `tie the President's hand behind his back.'''
  He also said, ``No doubt about it. The President's policy is working. 
The last thing we need are more timid signals from Congress.''
  So we all understand there is a relationship between our debates and 
the message we send.
  Regrettably lacking from our colleagues on the other side in this 
debate on Haiti is a condemnation of the military junta. Regrettably 
lacking is a condemnation of the human rights abuses. Regrettably 
lacking is the condemnation of the usurpation of democracy.
  So the message that goes to Gen. Raoul Cedras and company is that 
they can find a sense of safety because Americans are not somehow 
committed to their removal.
  Now, Americans are rightfully, absolutely, appropriately asking: What 
are our interests in Haiti? Why should we be concerned about this? What 
is it we have to do? What interests does the United States have in 
risking anybody in any kind of operation in Haiti? And I think it is 
essential that those questions be answered, not only for the public but 
obviously for those involved in this operation on the ground.
  You have to review a small amount of what happened in Haiti through 
the years to understand why there is an interest, Mr. President. Haiti, 
in many respects, is the orphan of this hemisphere. Unlike a lot of 
other nations in the region, it is not Hispanic in origin. Its people 
are predominantly poor, largely uneducated, and they are of African 
origin. Throughout the history of Haiti, they have been brutally 
repressed by a small, wealthy ruling elite. There are deep-seated 
hatreds between that ruling elite and the masses. And those hatreds 
have given birth to a whole culture of violence and a politics of 
instability. Indeed, their history is filled with coups and civil wars 
and with brutal dictators like the Duvaliers who have used people like 
the Ton-Ton Macoutes, their thugs in arms, to keep people in check. And 
now you have the so-called ``attaches,'' who serve the same function in 
the present regime--to repress Haiti's people.

  The fact is, despite this incredible oppression, the Haitian people 
said that they were willing to take the risk to have an election. And 4 
years ago, in December 1990, they did so and for the first time since 
independence in 1804 they were allowed to participate in a free and 
fair election. For the first time in the history of Haiti the power of 
the people really did prevail.
  We all know the outcome of that and we know where we find ourselves 
today. But we cannot turn our back on the fact that what happened, 
happened under the watchful eye and with the participation of, the 
international community. The United Nations, the Organization of 
American States, and individual nations, including ours, all provided 
observers. And that experiment came to a sudden halt only when the 
promise of reform became too real for some of the military thugs to 
tolerate. So they took power.
  Since then, those who sought democracy have been murdered and beaten, 
arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured. Many have disappeared 
without a trace. Women have been raped as a matter of intimidation and 
policy. Children have been kidnapped from their homes and impressed 
into forced labor. In recent months the campaign of intimidation has 
taken on new levels, astonishing even by Haitian standards.
  Murder and mutilation have become commonplace. Bodies without heads 
or faces have been left in the street to rot, and sometimes those who 
have gone out into the street to try to retrieve them have been killed, 
cut down in broad daylight to lie there and become another rotting 
corpse for people to see and be intimidated by.
  We know the litany of the high profile assassinations calculated to 
intimidate: Reverend Jean-Marie Vincent shot most recently, last month; 
Antoine Izmery, a pro-Aristide activist, killed during a church service 
last year; respected lawyer and Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, 
assassinated in broad daylight just before Haitian thugs rioted against 
the docking of the U.S.S. Harlan County last October.
  Mr. President, despite each of these instances, I wonder if my 
colleagues really understand the full measure of suffering of our 
neighbors, the Haitians. International human rights monitors and the 
State Department have documented dozens upon dozens of cases of 
politically motivated rape. Last October the U.N.-OAS human rights 
monitoring mission documented the rape of a 13-year-old girl in June by 
military personnel, the rape of the wife of a City Soleil activist by 
uniformed men in July, and the rape of a 16-year-old girl by a soldier. 
According to Human Rights Watch, a woman north of Port-au-Prince bled 
to death after being raped by soldiers in late December.
  Human Rights Watch has also documented a case that took place on 
February 7 of this year, when two of Haiti's paramilitary thugs invaded 
the home of a family that had been denounced as Aristide supporters by 
an unidentified detractor. The husband was tied up and forced to watch 
as his wife was raped on the front porch.
  A recent Washington Post article quoted a young Haitian woman named 
Florence who was raped by 3 thugs seeking her boyfriend. She said: They 
looked for him everywhere, under the bed, the table, then they beat my 
mother and father and told me to lie on the floor, and then they raped 
me.
  That is only one of the tools of these tyrants.
  The most helpless members of Haitian society, orphan children, are 
targets of the military's heinous campaign of repression. Children have 
been forced to sleep in the weeds because there is no shelter, and they 
are afraid to stay on the streets. A recent New York Times article 
quoted a Haitian who runs an orphanage saying that children disappear 
and their bodies are found later, often with their hands bound, in the 
streets. In the words of one young Haitian boy quoted in the same 
article, ``They do not know that if they kill us they help us. I do not 
care if the Macoutes kill me because it only brings an end to my 
suffering.''
  Perhaps the best example of the disregard that this regime has for 
human life is the story of a gentleman--if you can call him that--
called Norelus Mandelus, a military commander who has dubbed himself 
the Saddam Hussein of Haiti. Among the many atrocities he has committed 
was the cutting off of a victim's ear during a vicious beating and 
forcing the victim to eat his own ear, and then carving his initials in 
the victim's flesh. Mandelus received a mere reprimand when later it 
was learned, through priests, that the person victimized, or one of the 
people victimized, was related to an officer who was senior to him.
  In this atmosphere of terror, it is little wonder that thousands of 
Haitians have taken to the seas. And if we do nothing, then thousands 
of other Haitians will take to the boats and continue to flood the 
shores of this country, providing the international community with the 
spectacle of desperation on the high seas.
  After fits and starts we finally adopted a policy for safe haven. But 
that does not offer them a future, Mr. President.
  For the poor masses, political retribution is the most frightening, 
but it is not the only problem. Economic mismanagement and sanctions 
have ground the economy to a halt. Businesses are closed. Unemployment 
stands at 80 percent. And inflation is out of sight. We understand what 
this embargo is doing and we understand that there are limits to how 
long that should go on.
  While the majority of Haitians have been struggling to survive, the 
military strongmen have been making money selling fuel, smuggled in, in 
defiance of the embargo, and running the drug trade in Haiti for the 
Colombian kingpins. As chairman of the Narcotics and Terrorism 
Subcommittee, I can say to my colleagues in the Senate without any 
doubt that the linkages of the Haitian kingpins to the Cali cartel and 
to drug running are beyond dispute, provable beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In fact, they kicked out a DEA agent last year because he was getting 
too close to information, and they threatened his family. Is that not a 
threat to an American citizen? Is this not a threat to American 
interests, that drug kingpins are permitted to continue to help and 
assist in the flow of narcotics into the streets of America? No, the 
drug trade through Haiti is not as big as Mexico. No, it is not as big 
as Colombia. But it is one of the links in a long network, and the 
question ought to be legitimately asked whether we ought to turn 
around, lift the embargo, congratulate them for their ability to avoid 
all international sanction, and allow them to continue to fill the 
streets of America with these illegal substances?
  When do we come to our common senses? One of the reasons we removed 
Noriega was drugs. One of the reasons we went to Somalia was 
starvation. One of the reasons we went to Grenada was chaos. And in 
Haiti you have all of them. But, suddenly the principles are different. 
Suddenly the standards are different. And one has to be left asking if 
it is not because the cultural ties to Haiti are not perceived by so 
many Americans as being as strong.
  Mr. President, I am not going to dwell on the issue of drugs or each 
of these individual interests because my time is going to run out. That 
Haiti's leaders are involved in the drug trade is beyond question. We 
estimate that there is a sum of approximately $100 million a year they 
put away into bank accounts as a consequence of the fruits of their 
illicit traffic in this country.
  Drugs are an important source of income for their leaders--although 
cut back now, obviously, because of the situation. But I assure you if 
we follow the advice of some of our colleagues who just want to lift 
the embargo and not worry about democracy, they will be empowered to do 
a lot more.
  Many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have argued that 
United States interests in Haiti simply do not warrant the use of 
force. I say to them: You have a choice. You have a fundamental choice 
here.
  You can give meaning to the words of Secretary Baker and President 
Bush, to all of our efforts to encourage democracy and to try to 
encourage the Haitians to be able to make it on their own. Or you can 
abandon them. Because that is the alternative policy. And in abandoning 
them we will abandon a host of other interests that we have in the 
world.
  Mr. President, believe me I understand it is not easy to ever ask any 
young American to put his or her life at risk in any circumstance. But 
we are duty-bound to ask ourselves whether or not our interests in 
Haiti are not equal to or greater than the interests we have in a host 
of other places where young American military personnel are at risk 
today? We have Americans risking their life and limbs to protect the 
Iraqi Kurds.
  We have Americans who risked their lives to prevent a coup against 
President Aquino in the Philippines. We have Americans who have risked 
their lives, and are continuing to do so, in Rwanda for humanitarian 
purposes. We have Americans who are risking their lives in order to 
enforce safe zones in Bosnia. Yet, here we have Haiti, this tiny 
country close to our own Nation, affecting our own Nation with would-be 
refugees coming to our shores seeking asylum, running away from a tiny 
group of dictators whose illegitimate rulers are empowered by the 
unwillingness of some in this Nation to assume our responsibility to 
lead and confront them.
  I respectfully suggest to my colleagues that there are times when 
withholding the threat of force because of the possibility that you may 
have to use that force, causes you to lose the capacity to achieve the 
goals that you have set out for yourself as a nation.
  Earlier, I heard my colleague from Connecticut talk about the 
tradition of this country. We have an extraordinary tradition. We are, 
indeed, every bit the great Nation that we talk about. And many people 
over the course of history have given their lives in an effort to try 
to bring to other people what some people lost their lives in bringing 
to us. We should not forget that our own country did not just emerge 
completely on its own without help from other people who were willing 
to assist us, and that was in a revolution. That is not what we are 
even talking about in this situation.
  Mr. President, I believe that we have an obligation under the United 
Nations, under the Organization of American States, under our own 
history, to try to keep faith with what we have set out to do in 
Haiti--to restore democracy. While I do not advocate that we run around 
the world doing this, that we engage in this enterprise helter-skelter 
and willy-nilly in parts of Central America, Latin America, or 
elsewhere, I believe that the circumstances arising in Haiti are 
sufficiently exigent to permit us to hold out this potential use of 
force at this moment in time with the hope, obviously, that in the 
final analysis we will not be called on to use it.
  Mr. President, I will have more to say at some later time on this 
subject. My colleague has graciously allowed me a little extra time. I 
know I have not used it all. I want to express my gratitude to him for 
allowing me to do so.
  I reserve the balance of whatever time I do have.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. COHEN. I yield 15 minutes to Senator Bennett.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I understand we have come back to the 
order that was previously there. I was willing to accommodate, but I am 
told I probably should not, so I apologize to my colleague from 
Florida, given these instructions and procedures.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Utah for 
15 minutes.
  Mr. BENNETT. Thank you. Mr. President, I do not want to multiply all 
of the arguments that have been made here as to the wisdom or ill 
wisdom of the invasion. But I do have some points that I think are 
valid and that we may be losing sight of here.
  I will confine those quotations that I make to sources that are not 
considered Republican sources because we have had a lot of quotation 
back and forth. I want to quote from people who normally are expected 
to side with the President and with the Democrats.
  I start, if you will, with the New York Times. The New York Times is 
not known as a particularly friendly journal, as far as the Republicans 
are concerned. The New York Times ran this editorial this week which 
was headed: ``Congress Must Vote on Haiti,'' and began with this 
paragraph:

       To invade Haiti without prior congressional approval would 
     short circuit the United States Constitution. It would also 
     leave the President with sole political responsibility if the 
     operation turns sour. Yet that is just what the Clinton 
     administration now suggests it might do.

  It goes on to say later in the editorial:

       In 1991, Democrats in both Houses insisted that President 
     Bush get prior congressional approval for Operation Desert 
     Storm. Now, misplaced fealty drives many of those same 
     Democrats to relieve President Clinton of the same 
     responsibility. That is poor Government and poor 
     partisanship, too. Democrats would do better to protect Mr. 
     Clinton from enmeshing himself in a military action where 
     most Americans see no compelling national interest at stake 
     and in which the first casualties are likely to bring bitter 
     recrimination.

  This, again, I remind you, Mr. President, is from the New York Times.
  There has been much made on the floor here today about the fact that 
as Commander in Chief, President Bush put our troops in harm's way in 
Saudi Arabia without any objection from this body, long prior to the 
time when we debated and voted.
  I would like to comment my reaction to that. I was not a Member of 
the body at the time that happened, but like all citizens, I watched 
very closely. I think the Commander in Chief, when invited by a 
friendly power, as Saudi Arabia is, to place our troops on their soil, 
has the constitutional power to respond to that invitation without 
coming to Congress for any formal declaration.
  But to take those troops, once they are in place in that friendly 
power, and then order them to cross an international border in an 
invasion against a hostile power does, in my view, require clear 
constitutional authority from the Congress. I know there were some in 
the Republican Party who said in support of their President, ``No, the 
Congress is not required to vote in this fashion.'' I know there were 
some in the Bush administration who argued thus. And we have had them 
all quoted on the floor today. I do not agree, and I did not prior to 
coming to the Senate.
  If I may be personal for just a moment, my opponent in the 1992 race 
was then a Member of Congress. He filed a suit against the President 
saying the President could not proceed in Iraq without getting 
congressional approval first. And many of my supporters in Utah said, 
``This is a great political issue. You can attack him for having 
attacked Bush on this very popular war.''
  I said, ``I will not raise it in the campaign, because I think he was 
right.'' President Bush had no right, in my view, to invade Iraq 
without congressional authority, and I was delighted that President 
Bush took the step to seek that authority before proceeding.
  On that comment, I would turn to another source, not usually thought 
of as a Republican journal, the Washington Post, in their editorial 
today. They make this comment about the wisdom of going into Haiti. 
They are not involved politically or in a partisan fashion, the comment 
that I wish I had written myself, one of those lines that I could not 
do better than. They say:

       The national security/national interest case for the 
     evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhere 
     between exceedingly thin and preposterous. If there is a 
     better case than that, the administration should be willing 
     to make it to the public and to Congress. It should be 
     willing to seek consensus and consent for spending the money 
     and taking the chances with American lives no matter how 
     pitiable the Haitian's military resources or how good the 
     odds of succeeding may seem to the planners. A Government 
     that calls up reserves for military action has an obligation 
     to do these things.

  Mr. President, I will not pursue the question of whether or not going 
into Haiti is a good or a bad idea. I do want to come down hard on the 
issue of whether or not the President of the United States has the 
right to invade a sovereign country that has not attacked us, that has 
not put any of our forces under any military threat, and where there is 
no emergency circumstance of American citizens at danger--as was, in my 
view, the case in Grenada--cold-bloodedly, after careful calculation, 
without coming to the Congress for approval.
  In my view, the Constitution is clear and the President of the United 
States, be he a Republican or a Democrat, does not have that 
constitutional authority. I think it very, very clear.

  Going back to the Washington Post on that issue, the same editorial, 
I quote:

       President Clinton insists he won't ask Congress for 
     authorization to invade Haiti. The shortcut spares him the 
     possibility of repudiation for a venture that appears more 
     dubious and unpopular by the day. But it cheats on the 
     separation of powers as defined in the Constitution. It 
     threatens to undercut not just the quick operation planned 
     against the thugs in Port-au-Prince but the prolonged 
     occupation meant to follow on its promises to bring a 
     political disaster upon the administration for misreading the 
     popular mood on the process as well as the substance of its 
     policy.

  The New York Times, quoting the Constitution, saying the President 
should not proceed without getting congressional approval.
  The Washington Post, quoting the Constitution, saying the President 
should not proceed without getting authority. As I say, I agree with 
them, and I would agree with them if the President were a Republican, 
and I did agree with them when the President was a Republican even 
though I did not have this forum in which to make that point.
  Now we have heard from the Senator from Connecticut about Jim Baker, 
the Senator from Massachusetts has repeated that quote, and I am 
perfectly willing to grant them that Secretary Baker made statements 
which would logically lead to the conclusion of military action at some 
point if he were not satisfied with what eventually happened. But I do 
not believe that Secretary Baker made statements that ruled out coming 
to Congress for constitutional authority if invasion was the final 
decision. And, indeed, if President Bush had been elected and Secretary 
Baker were now saying it is time to invade Haiti but we do not need to 
get congressional approval for that, I would be standing on this floor, 
I believe, complaining that the Secretary of State and the President 
were ignoring the Constitution.
  As I say, I have the record of having taken that position with 
respect to President Bush and the debate that occurred during my 
campaign. I feel very strongly about this issue. I think the 
Constitution is very clear. And I ask the rhetorical question, what is 
the hurry? We are being told, well, we will not have time because the 
invasion is coming, the invasion is probably going to take place this 
weekend and the Senate will not have a chance to vote prior to the time 
that the troops are in Haiti.
  I do not know that there is any more urgency to invade Haiti this 
weekend than next weekend. I think the President has the clear 
constitutional obligation to come here, and I call on him to say to the 
ships at sea, say to the people who are in motion, the Constitution is 
clear, if we are going to invade a sovereign country in a cold, 
calculated, deliberate fashion, not in the heat of reacting to bullets 
that are flying, not in the emergency, but after a careful, calculated 
buildup that has been going on for months, if we are now going to 
invade another sovereign nation for whatever reason, however valuable, 
under the Constitution we need to get congressional authority, just as 
we did prior to the invasion of Iraq.
  In my opinion--having not been here I can say this--I think we should 
have done it prior to the action that was taking place in Panama. I 
think this is a very clear constitutional issue that we cannot ignore.
  Finally, Mr. President, I make this comment. We have consulted with 
the United Nations and achieved a formal resolution endorsing this kind 
of action. We are being told that. We have consulted, we being the 
administration, with the OAS and gotten their approval. If the 
President of the United States can find the time to get formal approval 
and resolution from the United Nations, if he can find the time to get 
formal approval and resolution from the Organization of American 
States, why can he not find the time to get formal approval from the 
Congress of the United States, as, in my opinion, he has the clear 
constitutional obligation to do?
  So I conclude, Mr. President, as I began. In my opinion, the 
Washington Post described this circumstance as well as anybody can when 
they say the arguments in favor of it, and I quote again, ``hover 
somewhere between exceedingly thin and preposterous.''
  But even if the arguments are stronger than that, indeed, more 
particularly if the arguments are stronger than that, the President has 
the obligation to make those arguments in the constitutionally 
established forum, and the people of the United States, as the Founding 
Fathers set up, have the check and balance to respond to those 
arguments through congressional action as we did in the case of going 
beyond the defensive action in Saudi Arabia to the formal invasion in 
Iraq. We have the obligation to do the same thing in this circumstance, 
and I urge the President to delay the invasion in Haiti for at least 1 
week until he takes advantage of that opportunity that the delay would 
give him and complies with what is to me a very clear requirement in 
the Constitution of the United States.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Simon). The Senator from Connecticut is 
recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield such time, I guess within the 30-
minute time frame, as the distinguished Senator from West Virginia so 
desires.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized 
for up to 30 minutes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for his courtesy in yielding me this time.
  Mr. President, the Senate is in executive session, is it not?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. And pending before the Senate is the nomination of Adm. 
Henry H. Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy, to be admiral, with the pending question 
immediately before the Senate an amendment in the second degree to an 
amendment in the first degree, both of which amendments deal with the 
Haitian situation?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. As I understand it, both of these amendments are sense-of-
the-Senate amendments. Is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me direct my comments initially to the 
parliamentary situation.
  I am concerned very much that we may be about to go down a very 
slippery slope because of the procedure that is being utilized here to 
attach, or to attempt to attach a legislative amendment, namely, an 
amendment dealing with a possible invasion of Haiti--both amendments 
being sense-of-the-Senate amendments--the attempt to attach legislative 
amendments to an executive matter, the matter in this case being a 
nomination.
  Mr. President, from the beginning of the Republic, as far as I can 
recall, there has never been a legislative amendment added to a 
nomination. From the very beginning, the Senate rules have kept 
legislation, on the one hand, and executive business--in other words, 
treaties and/or nominations--on the other hand, separate. There has 
always been that wall between the two.
  Mr. President, the Senate rules were adopted in April of 1789. There 
were 19 rules adopted in April 1789, and the next day or the day after, 
there was a 20th rule adopted. But before the Senate rules were 
adopted--and even they were taken in great measure from the rules under 
which the First and Second Continental Congresses acted, and the 
Congress of the Confederation as well.
  Before the Senate rules were adopted by which we operate today, the 
Constitution of the United States was adopted. The Constitution of the 
United States preceded the U.S. Senate, of course, preceded the 
Presidency, the executive branch, and preceded the judiciary.
  The Constitution itself established this wall between legislative 
business on the one hand and executive business on the other. Senators 
only need to read the Constitution to understand that. If Senators will 
examine section 5 of article I of the Constitution, in the first 
paragraph, they will read as follows:

       Each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and 
     Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each 
     shall constitute a Quorum to do Business;

  The Constitution is saying there that a majority of each House shall 
constitute a quorum to do business. It is thereby saying that a 
majority of each House may pass legislation, because to do business is, 
in large measure, as far as these two bodies are concerned, to pass 
legislation--to debate, to amend, and to pass or to reject legislation.
  So the Constitution, article I, section 5, states clearly that a 
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. 
Therefore, a majority of each House can enact legislation.
  Now, I urge Senators to look at section 2 of article II of the 
Constitution. I read therefrom:

       He--

  Meaning the President of the United States.

       He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
     the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
     Senators present concur; and he--

  Meaning the President.

     shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
     Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
     Consuls, judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers 
     of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
     otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
     Law.

  On the one hand the Constitution is saying legislation can be enacted 
by a majority vote, but approval of the resolution of ratification of 
treaties will require two-thirds.
  Also, the language that I have read, article II, section 2, confines 
the advice and consent powers with respect to treaties and nominations 
to the Senate. The other body is not given a voice in either the 
approval of the resolution of ratification of treaties or the 
confirmation of nominations.
  So, this Constitution of the United States--created before this 
Senate existed, and by which the Senate came into being--established 
the wall between legislation on the one hand and executive business on 
the other. The wall is created by the Constitution. And the Senate, 
from time immemorial, has recognized and respected that constitutional 
wall of separation between executive business and legislative business.
  The Senate prints a ``Calendar of Business.'' On that Calendar of 
Business are legislative matters. On a separate calendar is found the 
title ``Executive Calendar.'' And in that calendar are to be found 
treaties and nominations. For example, there are two treaties to be 
found on page 2 of the Executive Calendar for today. Then beginning on 
page 3, there are nominations. So treaties and nominations are kept 
separate.
  Mr. President, I hope that Senators who are listening will pay 
careful attention to what I am saying. I hope that those who are not 
listening will perchance read the Record before we have any vote with 
regard to any point of order that may be made in respect to the pending 
amendments.
  This is a slippery slope that we are on. Prometheus stole fire from 
the heavens and gave it to the sons of men. Zeus punished Prometheus, 
and gave to Pandora, the wife of Epimetheus the brother of Prometheus, 
a box in which all of the evils of mankind were enclosed and warned 
that the box not be opened. Pandora opened the box out of curiosity, 
and all of the evils escaped. Only hope remained.
  We are opening up Pandora's box if we go down this slippery slope.
  Let us say for a moment that a point of order is made against these 
legislative amendments because it is not in order to offer them to a 
motion to recommit, with instructions, an executive nomination. And the 
Chair, let us say, rules that the point of order is well taken. The 
Senate by a simple majority vote can appeal and overrule the Chair. 
Where are we then? Pandora's box will have been opened. If we ever set 
that precedent here, we will rue the day. If the Senate decides that a 
legislative matter may be attached to a nomination--the Constitution 
provides that only the Senate will act to confirm nominees--where does 
that leave the House? The House is given no part, under the 
Constitution, in the confirmation of the nominees. But if legislation 
is attached in the Senate, where does that leave the House? The House 
expects to be a party, under the Constitution, to the enactment of 
legislation.
  Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BYRD. No, not yet, thanks. But I will yield.
  The House is not a party to the confirmation of nominees.
  Suppose the Senate decides that a legislative matter may be attached 
to a treaty. So let us attach the health bill or the crime bill, or 
whatever. A treaty requires a two-thirds vote for passage. Amendments 
to a treaty only require a majority vote. So we could attach the crime 
bill. The Senate could attach campaign finance reform. Where does that 
leave the House? It has a voice, according to the Constitution, in the 
enactment of legislation. But it has no voice in the approval of the 
resolutions of ratification of treaties, which require a two-thirds 
vote. So we open all kinds of constitutional Pandora's boxes.
  Let us say that the Senate decides that we can attach a legislative 
amendment. If the Senate so decides, what is to keep a Senate committee 
from doing the same thing? We will have taken a step in that direction, 
and the next step will be for a legislative committee that has 
jurisdiction over a nomination to do the same thing. Various and sundry 
committees have jurisdiction over nominees, depending upon what 
committee has jurisdiction over the legislation creating the office to 
which an individual is being appointed. If the Senate adopts such a 
procedure, who can say that the next step will not be that the 
Committee on Armed Services, or the Committee on Commerce, or the 
Committee on the Judiciary will decide that on the next nomination that 
the committee reports out, a piece of legislation will be attached that 
the leader has had difficulty in bringing up in the Senate. If the 
majority on that committee has the votes and can attach that 
legislation to that nomination, the nomination will be reported to the 
Senate and the nomination will go on the Executive Calendar.
  I do not know whether Senators are aware of it--I assume most of them 
are--but a motion to go to the Executive Calendar is not debatable. 
Many Senators may not be aware of the fact that I was a Senate leader 
when the precedent was established that a motion could be made to go to 
any specific item on the Executive Calendar. Therefore, Mr. President, 
I could stand on my feet and say: Mr. President, I move that the Senate 
go into executive session to consider the nomination of John Doe on the 
Executive Calendar, No. 123, or whatever it is, and that would not be 
nondebatable. I established that precedent, that a motion was in order 
to go to any particular item on the calendar. Before I established that 
precedent, when the Senate went into executive session, it had to go to 
the top item on the calendar and work itself down, unless unanimous 
consent were given to do otherwise. But the precedent has long been 
set, and a nondebatable motion is in order to go to any item on that 
executive calendar.
  Should the wall of separation be breached, if a committee having 
jurisdiction over a nomination wishes to attach legislation to the 
nomination and has the votes to do it, then that nomination will be 
reported to the Senate, and put on the calendar. When that nomination 
is called up--and it can be called up without debate--that piece of 
legislation will be before the Senate. The majority leader has been 
fussing and fuming, with some justification, about the need to be able 
to take up a matter in the Senate without debate or with only a brief 
time for debate, 1 or 2 hours, whatever.
  At the present time, a motion to proceed to legislative business is 
debatable and subject to a filibuster. But, if the Senate approves a 
precedent here of allowing legislative matters to be attached to 
executive business, then, of course, vice versa, the converse will 
ultimately also become the rule. Nominations and treaties will be 
attached to legislation. One would expect that development to flow in 
time's due course.
  Let us take this step down that slippery slope now and the stage will 
have been set for the next step for committees to start reporting out 
nominations and attaching legislation. The majority leader will then 
have his nondebatable motion to proceed to take up legislation. He will 
only need to make the nondebatable motion to go to that particular item 
on the Executive Calendar and he will have his legislation as a part of 
that nondebatable motion.
  Our friends on the other side in the minority surely do not want 
that. Senators already have great flexibility in the Senate in offering 
amendments. There is no rule of germaneness in the Senate. You can call 
up any amendment you want to. It does not have to be germane. There is 
a little reference to germaneness in Rule XVI dealing with 
appropriations bills, but it is only a majority point of order, and 
nobody pays much attention to it. Otherwise, there is no rule of 
germaneness in the Senate. Senators already have all kinds of leeway to 
offer amendments to bills. Surely we do not want to take down that wall 
of separation between executive business and legislative business in 
order to offer an amendment. We ought not do it. That will create very 
difficult far reaching problems.
  So let us not breach this wall of separation. I hope that if a vote 
comes on such point of order, Senators will uphold the Chair if it 
comes to that, because the Chair will surely rule that the pending 
legislative amendments are not in order. And in the interest of the 
Senate as an institution, and in support of the Constitution, Mr. 
President, I hope that Senators will at least weigh what I have said 
and, hopefully, they will agree that this is not the thing to do. We 
would be cutting off our nose to spite our face.
  Briefly, as to the resolutions themselves, I believe that Members 
will agree that I am very zealous in my defense of the prerogatives of 
this institution.
  I believe most of them will agree that I also try to be just as 
zealous in upholding the Constitution.
  In this situation, I think that the President should have the 
approval of this body before he launches an invasion of Haiti under the 
current circumstances. I think he has the inherent authority to take 
such action in an emergency. He has to have that authority, because if 
Congress is not in town and this country is invaded or the lives of 
Americans or American fighting men and women are put in jeopardy, the 
President would have to act. He has the implied constitutional 
authority to take action without prior congressional approval and to 
use the military forces of this country in an imminent emergency, but 
after such action is taken, there will come a time when the Congress 
will have a voice. It can by its actions authorize, explicitly or 
implicitly, his use of the military. It can cut off funds.
  I hope that Senators will remember that it was I who took the lead in 
dealing with Somalia by legislation that set a deadline--I believe it 
was March 31--and required that, if the President felt he needed an 
extension beyond that time, he had to come back and make his case here, 
and that, regardless of any other act, no funds would be available in 
that operation after that deadline, set as March 31, no funds.
  There is the real bite, the money, the power of the purse. I have 
stood on my feet scores of times in this Senate and defended the 
legislative control over the purse.
  That is what means business. Money is what talks, and the Congress 
can cut off the funds. Then all of the President's lawyers can argue 
all they wish. He has to have money to keep a war going, to keep the 
police action going. He has to have money, and only the Congress can 
appropriate, in accordance with the Constitution. I have argued that 
time and time again. So I do not need to go over it again here today.
  But let nobody kid themselves that either of these sense-of-the-
Senate amendments is going to stop the President. Sense-of-the-Senate 
amendments just express the sense of the Senate. That is it, period. 
They have no teeth. They do not cut off any money. They do not have the 
effect of law. Let us not kid ourselves that either of these amendments 
is going to stop the President if, in his judgment, he decides that it 
is in the best interests of this country--no matter how much I may 
disagree with him--that he has to take action to invade, he will 
invade.
  There will come a time, however, when Congress will have its bite at 
the apple, and it can lay down the limit, as we did in the legislation 
on Somalia--go this far, but no farther. If you want to go farther, 
come back to the Congress for further authorization and funds. And no 
funds may be spent after that date regardless of any other act.
  Congress has, in the final analysis, the hammer. Do not kid yourself. 
That is why I have stood on my feet many times and opposed efforts to 
shift power of the purse to the executive branch. I will always defend 
Congress' control over the power of the purse. It is a mighty power. I 
will not cede it to any Executive by line-item veto or enhanced 
rescissions or anything else. There is where the buck counts and there 
is where it stops. Congress can draw that line and say no more money. 
That is the end of it.
  Senators, do not kid yourselves that either of these amendments is 
going to stop the President if he decides to invade Haiti. By the way, 
on previous occasions I have voted against the same amendment that Mr. 
Mitchell and Mr. Nunn offered today. I voted against it on June 29, 
1994. As Mr. Mitchell stated earlier today there were four votes 
against it. I was the only Democrat. There were three Republicans and 
one Democrat, and mine was the Democratic vote, who voted against it.
  And on June 29, 1994, when that vote occurred, Mr. Mitchell said that 
that amendment was identical ``in form and substance to an amendment 
adopted by the Senate by a vote of 98 to 2 a few months ago.''
  I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. The vote of 98 to 2 to which the majority leader referred 
occurred on October 21, 1993. And of the two votes cast against that 
amendment at that time, mine was one of the votes.
  Those were sense-of-the-Senate amendments. They will not amount to 
anything. I voted against both of them, partly because they would not 
amount to anything. And there were other reasons which I explained at 
the time. I will vote against the pending Mitchell amendment, and I 
will vote against the amendment by Mr. McCain if it comes to a vote. 
They do not amount to anything. When we pass something, let us pass 
something that means something. Neither of these Senate amendments is 
binding.
  This debate, as I have listened to it, has not been altogether 
constructive. A lot of it amounts to second guessing. I do not know 
that we are going to invade Haiti. I do not know that the President 
intends to invade this week or next week or the next one. I do not 
know.
  But there may be some very delicate negotiations going on. I do not 
know that they are not going on. I have every right to assume that 
negotiations are going on or that they will perhaps be going on, who 
knows, maybe even now, perhaps tomorrow, perhaps Friday, perhaps 
Saturday. I hope we are not giving aid and comfort to Cedras and his 
thugs by what we are saying here today.
  When Senators want to say that the President should have approval, 
under the present circumstances, before he invades Haiti, count me in. 
I, too, say he requires congressional approval. But these sense-of-the-
Senate amendments are not going to stop him. If the President of the 
United States, in his judgment, feels we should invade, he will do it, 
and a sense-of-the-Senate amendment will not stop him.
  I think there is the larger issue. I hope the American people who are 
listening do not believe that the pending amendments are going to be a 
real effort to stay the President's hand. I have never thought much of 
sense-of-the-Senate amendments. They usually serve no purpose with 
regard to reality except a political purpose but only to put people on 
the record. They will look good on 30-second TV spots.

  They are not worth a hill of beans when it comes to reality.
  I think the President should get the approval of Congress before 
acting to invade in the current situation. I certainly do not blame any 
Senator for standing up here and expressing his opposition to any 
invasion of Haiti without congressional approval. But, the larger 
issue, as I see it, is the ability of this President, or any President, 
to use the threat of an invasion.
  By the way, I think there has been entirely too much of that already. 
I think we have threatened and threatened to the point that the 
argument is now being used that we have to go into Haiti, or else the 
credibility of our country will suffer.
  But I think the President has to have the use of a threat of an 
invasion as a tool of foreign policy and as a tool of negotiation. If 
he is trying to negotiate, he may want to hold over the heads of the 
other side the likelihood of an invasion. It is a legitimate tool in 
his negotiation arsenal.
  Do we want to pull the rug out from under an effort to remove the 
offensive Haitian regime through any other means but an invasion? That 
may be the result of what we are unwittingly doing here today.
  The President will speak to the Nation Thursday night. Let us hear 
him out. Let us hear him out and see what he has to say. And he can get 
a clear understanding from reading this Record that if an invasion is 
ordered, nothing precludes this body--nothing will preclude this 
Senator, if I am living and able to stand on my feet, nothing will 
prevent me or any other Senator from offering legislation to draw a 
line in the sand. I did it in the case of Somalia. Who did it then? 
Most everybody else was silent. I did it. What is going to keep me from 
doing it again? I am going to protect the prerogatives of this 
institution under the Constitution.
  If an invasion is ordered, then nothing precludes this body from 
passing binding legislation to curtail the length of such an invasion 
and to define its mission and to cut off the funds after a certain 
date. Let the lawyers in the executive branch contemplate that this 
Congress will have a voice, and I will probably be one who will be 
lending my voice to whatever action appears to be appropriate at that 
time.
  But let us hear the President out. Let us see what he has to say. Do 
not tie his hands here with this kind of a debate on amendments that 
are meaningless, except for political purposes to put somebody on 
record. This is not to question the integrity or the good faith of any 
Member. I can understand why Members want to stand up here and go on 
record. But let us exercise a little caution. We may be hurting our own 
cause by engaging in so much debate on meaningless amendments at this 
point. Let us first hear what the President has to say to the people of 
the Nation tomorrow.
  Mr. President, I had offered to yield to my friend from Maine and I 
am out of time, but if he wishes me to yield.
  Mr. COHEN. I think at a later time. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank all Senators.
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
  Mr. COHEN. I now yield to the Senator from Georgia such time as he 
may consume, up to 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for up 
to 30 minutes.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. President.
  The Senate has not resolved this constitutional question as posed by 
the eloquent Senator from West Virginia.
  I will proceed to discuss the procedures and amendments that are 
before us.
  Before I begin my discussion, though, I would like to clarify very 
strongly the suggestions that were made a little earlier on the floor 
by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry], who was suggesting that 
there was linkage between the former administration and the former 
President in the conduct of the affairs of an invasion.
  Former Secretary Baker and former President Bush, I did not hear all 
the quotations, were cited as somehow being the beginning of this 
process. And this simply is not accurate.
  I have in my possession a personal letter from the former President. 
I will read only one paragraph of it, but I want to make it absolutely 
clear that the former President is not in support of the policy of an 
invasion of Haiti. You cannot make linkage from the timeframe in which 
the former President and his Cabinet were engaged with Mr. Aristide and 
others to this moment. I will read this and then I will set this aside.

       I remain unalterably opposed to the use of U.S. force in 
     Haiti. It would be disastrous for our relations with the rest 
     of this hemisphere and there is no guarantee at all that 
     military intervention will bring peace and stability to Haiti 
     for long.

  That is a direct quote from former President George Bush, dated July 
28, 1994. And so I hope that whatever is trying to be characterized as 
an extension of the policy of that administration to be in support of 
the concept of an invasion be put aside and be made clear for all 
people and this Senate.
  Mr. President, throughout the course of the debate, we have heard, 
almost without precedent, linkage of precedents: What about Grenada? 
What about Panama? What about the Persian Gulf?
  I do not choose to engage in the constitutional arguments related to 
that, nor to the relation of one to the other. I am not sure that can 
be accomplished.
  But, because of the unique nature of this crisis in our hemisphere, 
this problem in our hemisphere, the issue of whether or not we should 
use force in Haiti is one of broad public knowledge now. This is not 
something that occurred over the weekend or in the middle of the night; 
something that was not expected. All America has been engaged in this 
debate. It is a subject, due to our modern communications, for which 
most Americans are reasonably knowledgeable.
  There is an understanding of the dilemma: The problems that are being 
suffered by the people of Haiti; the fact that this is a country in our 
own hemisphere; that refugees are impacting the United States.
  They are really not very many secrets about this issue. It is one of 
those issues for which a broad population has a reasoned and 
knowledgeable feel for the subject. We have been debating it for 
months. And somewhere between 6 to 8 out of 10 Americans have come to a 
conclusion that the circumstances in Haiti are not reason enough to put 
an American son or daughter in harm's way.
  And I am puzzled. I am puzzled in light of the overwhelming view of 
our people that we would each day inch closer to an invasion --inch 
closer to putting Americans in harm's way even in the face of 
overwhelming public, not just opinion, but knowledge.

  Here is a question. I have not heard much said about the fact that we 
have 3,000 Americans in Haiti right now. Over half of this population 
are under 18 years of age. Here is the question. Are they safer if we 
begin hostilities in Haiti and land thousands of troops and engage in a 
firefight? Or are they less safe? If you were going to engage in a 
firefight in this situation, should they have been left there or 
removed, ordered to be removed?
  I contend that no rational person could conclude that the 
inauguration of hostile activities, military activities, could do 
anything but put those lives in more jeopardy than they are today. 
Nothing could make you rationally believe they will be safer.
  Another question. What is this Clinton doctrine that we are 
establishing by this act, if it were to be carried out? What is the 
message that we are sending to the hemisphere? These kinds of 
activities establish precedents. We are in a new era. We are in a 
defining era. We are defining our relations around the world. So what 
are we saying? Are we saying to the hemisphere--and maybe even the 
world--that every time there is a domestic crisis, that a democracy 
falls because of a military action confined to a given country, that 
the U.S. Marines will be sent in to reestablish democracy? Is that what 
we are going to do?
  You do not have to reflect long that over the last 25 years this 
circumstance has happened almost 10 different times. If you were just 
visiting this country and you read the criteria that were being 
enumerated as the rationale for this invasion and you had been subject 
to no other facts and you were asked what is it we are about to do, the 
probable answer would be you are about to invade Cuba--where there is a 
dictatorship, where human rights violations have occurred for decades, 
where there is oppression, where there is destabilization in the 
hemisphere and even of our own policy. What doctrine do we establish by 
the enumeration of the criteria we have been given to date? Maybe there 
will be a revelation that we see Thursday evening, but the criteria 
that we have been given to date would suggest that a domestic crisis in 
our hemisphere is grounds for military intervention.
  In one of the discussions that I had with a very distinguished member 
of this administration I was assured that if intervention ever did 
occur, it would be comforted by broad hemispheric support; that it 
would be an international force. America simply cannot accept the fact 
that you have 12,000 to 20,000 U.S. armed personnel and 266 police 
officers from Belize or the Bahamas as justification of the 
accumulation of an international force. It would almost be better if 
that were left aside--alone.
  It is reported that this invasion would cost in the range of one-half 
billion. I do not know what happened to the America first concept, but 
we would be spending in the range of one-half billion dollars to 
accomplish the initial phases of this activity. Who is to know what the 
costs would be of nation building? These things have real effects. I 
read a little-noted column that appeared in one of my periodicals as to 
the effect on Fort Benning: The budget cuts to meet the Department of 
Defense mandate could delay repairs of the air-conditioning system in 
the infantry hall; force layoffs of some of the post's 113 temporary 
employees--a hiring freeze; will cut off locally funded training of 
civilians, in many cases halt paying soldiers to go elsewhere on 
temporary active duty assignments.
  These things have consequences right here at home, in my State, in 
all of your States. These are enormous sums of money. They have to come 
from somewhere. This is where they come from. Employees lose their 
jobs. People do not get hired. Construction does not take place. 
Training does not take place.
  These are the consequences, the costs of pursuing an activity that 
the Nation says, ``Don't do, Mr. President.'' This is probably the 
reason they do not want him to do it, because they know we have been 
paying an inordinate burden and they know that costs us here at home.
  I am not going to be long. There has been so much said about this. 
But I will say that the idea that has been alluded to--I am going to 
say it briefly--the idea that we would go to the United Nations in 
search of confirmation for what we are doing and not come to the 
Congress I do not believe is a rational process nor do I believe the 
American people will find that comforting.
  So I am anxious, as the Senator from West Virginia said, to hear the 
President tell us. But I just hope and pray we do not have to pay the 
price of the loss of any American son or daughter over the crisis as it 
exists today. I do not believe you can substantiate a national risk. I 
do not believe there are American citizens at risk. I do not believe 
this meets longstanding criteria for the use of military force.
  Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am about to yield to my colleague from 
Alabama. I just point out briefly, if I can, the statements being 
made--and I certainly do not disagree at all, I have said as much--
about the congressional approval before the prior use of force except 
in absolute emergency situations. I remind my colleagues--you can go 
back through the Record. Unfortunately, you find here a great deal of 
inconsistency in terms of some of these remarks and positions people 
have taken regarding what action Congress should have taken before the 
President of the United States should use force. Again, I do not 
disagree here. I think, frankly--we voted twice here almost 
unanimously. I agree with Senator Byrd the sense-of-the-Senate 
resolutions lack the kind of teeth that an appropriation decision can 
have regarding any President's ability to act. But nonetheless I think 
it is pretty much universally held here that we would like the 
opportunity to vote on these matters.
  But if you go back through the Record, and there are some 30 
different examples in the last 20 years, you are going to find Members 
running into their own remarks about when they thought it was 
appropriate to have prior congressional approval and when it was not. 
It is usually based on whether or not you thought the particular fact 
situation was an appropriate one or not.
  Having said that, Mr. President, let me yield whatever time the 
distinguished Senator from Alabama wishes, within the confines of the 
30 minutes.
  May I inquire, by the way, Mr. President, how much time remains on 
this side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 1 hour and 13 
minutes.
  Mr. DODD. And on the other side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One hour and fifty minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Fifty?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. 5-0.
  Mr. DODD. How much time does my colleague desire?
  Mr. HEFLIN. Ten minutes.
  Mr. DODD. I yield up to 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Alabama.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ford). The Senator from Alabama.
  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, the ongoing debate over the threatened 
military invasion of Haiti has come down largely to an either-or 
proposition. Those who support military intervention emphasize 
political and humanitarian concerns, and believe that economic 
sanctions will not work and will continue to place unacceptable burdens 
on Haiti's poverty-stricken population.
  They stress the need for the United States to maintain--or regain--
international and regional leadership as a trustworthy supporter of 
democracy, which they equate with the return of President Aristide. 
They note that the Haitian military is small, poorly trained and 
equipped, and unable to oppose American forces. Their view is of a 
short-term military operation, with a longer nation-building period to 
establish a new government infrastructure.
  Most proponents recommend that the United States seek international 
participation in any military actions, and act with the authority of 
the United States or the Organization of American States, or the United 
Nations.
  Those who oppose a military invasion of Haiti at this time have grave 
concerns about proposals for direct military action. They cite the 
reluctance of our allies to participate; stretched resources; and the 
possibility of a nation-building project with no foreseeable end. Our 
experience in Somalia has no doubt contributed to this cautious 
approach. Indeed, our previous involvement in Haiti from 1915 through 
1934 showed the futility of establishing a lasting, stable, and 
democratic government there.
  The arguments against an invasion of Haiti are persuasive and I am 
opposed to a military land invasion. When we hear talk of restoring 
democracy in Haiti, we are really hearing an oxymoron: This poor island 
nation has never had any democracy to be restored. It is important to 
distinguish between the democratic methods by which officials like 
President Aristide come to power from an actual democratic form of 
government. One is a process, an election method; the other is a way of 
life. Haiti did finally enjoy the process, but certainly not the way of 
life, and it is questionable if it ever would have, even if President 
Aristide had remained in power.
  Additionally, whenever we contemplate military action, we must take 
into account each and every member of the Armed Forces who would be 
required to put their lives on the line. American casualties must be 
anticipated, whether through hostile action or by accident. While 
significant casualties through actual combat during a landing would 
likely be minimal, the characteristics of such an invasion would, 
nevertheless, make them almost inevitable. This would be a particular 
threat if the Haitian military were to blend into the general 
population and continue sporadic attacks on American Forces. U.S. 
Forces might also have to contend with terrorists still loyal to ``Baby 
Doc'' Duvalier, who have recently enjoyed a resurgence. While at odds 
with the present Haitian military, his terrorist organization has a 
strong dislike for President Aristide.

  Haitian casualties would also increase if President Aristide's 
supporters began to exact retribution upon supporters of the current 
regime, placing Americans squarely in the middle. Although the 
possibility of extended and substantial Haitian resistance is 
considered slim, sporadic harassment, sniping, and sabotage would 
require a significant commitment of forces to quell and would 
necessarily delay the establishment of a fully democratic civil regime.
  In my judgment, many of the concerns on both sides of the argument 
are valid. I do not believe, however, that an either-or debate 
addresses the real issues in Haiti nor the real reasons used to justify 
an invasion. Instead, there are concrete steps that we can take which 
will ultimately garner the desired results--the removal of Haiti's 
illegitimate military dictators and a resolution to the refugee 
problem. While they may take longer to accomplish than with a military 
land invasion, these steps would be acceptable to the American people. 
Conversely, no one in this Chamber would argue that an invasion--land 
invasion--has the support of the public at this time, since it is not 
clear, beyond the immigration issue, what our national interests there 
are.
  First, we must make the current economic embargo more enforceable. An 
effective naval blockade and a multinational military force along the 
border with the Dominican Republic would virtually cut off what little 
imports are getting through to Haiti now. The Dominican Republic has 
made efforts to cooperate with such efforts. This needs to be 
substantially beefed up.
  There are not a great number of roads that go from the Dominican 
Republic into Haiti. They are limited. These can be substantially 
blocked. You look also at the fact that you have to transport supplies 
through vehicles and other things to make some substantial impact, and 
I believe that a much-beefed-up Border Patrol there, using troops from 
many nations, can substantially enforce the embargo.
  A naval blockade which operates near the shore can effectively stop 
small boat traffic between Haiti and the Dominican Republic with little 
danger to the lives of American service members. Frigates and the 
modern versions of PT boats can be effectively used. Our aircraft 
carriers and their support forces are uniquely well qualified to help 
in such an operation. Air fields that could be used in the Dominican 
Republic and other surrounding islands could be effectively used for an 
airport in regard to patrolling. The embargo should be given time to 
work effectively. No arbitrary timetable should force us to invade and 
abandon the measures we already have in place.
  Second, we must institute immediate and comprehensive immigration 
reform. The United States cannot take into its borders each and every 
refugee and immigrant, even if they are from within our hemisphere. 
Immigration reform is long overdue.
  Third, we can work with our allies in Latin American countries to 
help resolve the refugee problem, which is largely driving our Haiti 
policy. Latin America benefits tremendously from our Caribbean Basin 
initiative, these nations should accept a certain number of these 
refugees, and when you divide it out among all of the more than 20 
Caribbean Basin initiative countries, you can find that they could take 
a large number of these refugees. Countries who refuse to cooperate 
could see certain trade incentives granted through the Caribbean Basin 
initiative withdrawn. We have provided great incentives for Latin 
American nations to cooperate with the United States. I think, however, 
they should be reminded of these incentives rather than being 
threatened with their withdrawal.
  This three-pronged strategy would make the current regime in Haiti 
understand that we are serious about their departure, while at the same 
time safeguarding the lives of our young men and women in uniform. 
These are all credible alternatives to a military invasion, which if 
pursued in conjunction with each other would ultimately succeed, in my 
judgment. For those calling for an immediate invasion, I ask, what is 
the urgency? Can we not effect a change in Haiti without hastily 
risking American lives?
  I want to take a moment to remind my colleagues of an amendment to 
the Foreign Operations appropriations bill for 1995 that passed this 
body by a vote of 93 to 5. It expresses the sense of the Senate that no 
funds appropriated under the act or any other act should be expended in 
Haiti unless: First, authorized by Congress; second, is necessary to 
protect or evacuate United States citizens from a situation of imminent 
danger; or third, the deployment is vital to United States national 
security interests.

  This sense of the Senate amendment sets forth more conditions under 
which military action may be taken, but based only on these three 
provisions, it is clear that a military invasion of Haiti should not 
occur.
  It has been said over and over again, but bears repeating: The United 
States cannot and should not serve as the world's police force. 
Certainly, we should be a supporter, encourager, and, where possible, 
promoter or democracy around the world. But we should not and cannot be 
its enforcer throughout the world, even if the place in question is in 
our back yard.
  The fundamental bottom line of the use of American military land 
forces, any where in the world, must be in our own national interest. 
Again, what is our national interest in Haiti beyond solving the 
refugee problem--a problem that can be addressed through immigration 
reform and the cooperation of our Latin American allies? Let us give a 
100-percent effort toward enforcing the embargo rather than risking 
American lives. At the minimum, we should fully debate the issue in 
Congress, and every supporter of an invasion be put on record as 
explaining why an invasion of Haiti is in our interests, or why, on the 
other hand, they oppose such an invasion.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky as 
much time as he may consume up to 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ford). The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. President, the reason the public is so strongly opposed to an 
invasion is there are far more questions than answers about the step 
that the administration is planning to take.
  Like other members, I have been informed of the President's decision 
to carry out a military invasion of Haiti. When this mistake will be 
made remains somewhat unclear, but the fact that it is a mistake to 
invade without answering some very basic questions is absolutely clear.
  In the past, I have been a stalwart supporter of Presidential 
prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs, in fact have repeatedly 
voted to guarantee the President maximum flexibility in Somalia, 
Bosnia, as well as Haiti.
  But I was so troubled by the administration's inability to answer 
some fundamental questions about this imminent action that I cannot in 
good conscience support the President's determination to move forward.

  Let me review the questions that I believe must be resolved prior to 
any serious consideration of an invasion.
  First, why are we going in?
  Deputy Secretary Talbott tells me there are five reasons: democracy, 
human rights, refugees, the post-cold-war order, and American 
credibility.
  Given those criteria, I asked him why we were not invading Cuba. He 
had two answers. First, in Haiti we were protecting the outcome of an 
election--there was a principle at stake. Well, I believe democracy is 
as important as every Member of this Chamber, but we start down a 
slippery slope if we are engaging in military action to defend the 
outcome of elections rather than our national security interests. It is 
a very short step from defending Mr. Aristide's right to office, to 
intervening if we feel a nation's elections have not been free and 
fair. Do we really want to change this Nation's image from that of 
election monitors to election mercenaries?
  Mr. Talbott's second reason why Haiti and Cuba differed involved a 
so-called risk-benefit analysis. He pointed out Cuba had a standing 
army of 170,000 men--Haiti has only 7,000. I am not sure about the 
accuracy of his Cuban Army figure, but I find it shocking that we only 
consider invading weaker nations. This is a dangerous mind set sending 
a signal around the world which compromises the credibility of the 
threat of force and our ability to secure vital national interests.
  As to the legitimacy of the remaining arguments about the need to 
establish guidelines for conduct in the post-cold-war world and 
demonstrating American leadership, I am not sure Haiti should serve as 
a proving ground. If there are doubts about American credibility, they 
are certainly of the Administration's making. Who can forget the tragic 
events surrounding the arrival of the U.S.S. Harlan? The image of an 
American ship turned back by a small band of thugs armed with sticks 
was truly a low point in American history.

  I do not think we should risk lives in a misguided effort to recover 
from the Administration's self-inflicted wounds and sagging 
international reputation.
  I find myself not only questioning the five reasons offered as the 
very premise for this invasion, I am deeply worried about the plans and 
tactics as they have been briefed to me. Let me turn to other questions 
that remain unanswered on the eve of invasion.
  What are our immediate invasion objectives? Ambassador Albright has 
said the military junta must leave office and the island. She is 
publicly contradicted by Secretary Christopher who has said this past 
weekend that they only need to leave office.
  There is an obvious follow-on question: after we figure out what we 
do with Army Commander General Cedras, his Chief of Staff, General 
Biamby, and police commander, Colonel Francois, are there other members 
of the military who we are interested in ousting? In our conversation, 
Deputy Secretary Talbott often referred to the ``bad guys''--I guess I 
am still unclear who all the bad guys are. Here again, I think this is 
a question that should be answered before, not after, an invasion.
  Not only can the administration not agree on the limited initial 
objectives, it is unclear who will be in charge of executing 
the invasion.

  We know that the President went to the United Nations to approve 
using all necessary means to facilitate the departure of the military 
junta in keeping with the Governor's Island accords. I was told that 
this was indeed a United Nations operation for which the United States 
will provide the overwhelming element of force. But I am haunted by the 
shadow of Somalia and Bosnia where fuzzy command and control lines 
between United States troops and U.N. commanders complicated the task 
and cost American lives. When the Secretary welcomes the participation 
of 17 nations, without defining their roles or missions, I see the 
potential for chaos. I find myself questioning whether this is a 
political coalition or a serious military force.
  The basic question of who is in charge should be answered before we 
go into Haiti, not after. Our soldiers should not be the sorry victims 
of another on-the-job U.N. learning experience.
  So, proceeding along the time-line of invasion, let us assume 20,000 
Americans have now landed in Haiti. As soon as the situation 
stabilizes, I have been told we will turn over security to a local 
police force supervised by 500 international observers or monitors. 
Well, we all know from Somalia that stabilizing a situation sometimes 
takes longer than a day or two.
  Questions bearing on the security of our soldiers must be addressed 
before we go into Haiti, not after. It is likely that 20,000 young men 
and women will be asked to restore and maintain security in a hostile 
environment. While I do not overestimate the military threat posed by 
the Haitian military, I am troubled by the prospect of Americans 
patrolling the violent slums of Port-au-Prince. Who is the enemy? When 
can they open fire? What are the rules of engagement?
  Our Nation was shocked to learn American marines were unarmed in 
Beirut. We could not believe the U.S.S. Harlan had to withdraw because 
our soldiers were not armed or equipped to handle any kind of security 
crisis. Families and friends deserve to know before we send in soldiers 
that they are well equipped, well prepared and fully capable of 
protecting themselves from hostile fire. Again, we need to know the 
terms of engagement in advance, not once the invasion is underway.
  I hope we will quickly reach the point where we can turn over 
security to a local police force supervised by international monitors. 
So, the obvious question needing an answer is who will make up both the 
local and international contingents.
  The first answer I got was horrifying. The administration intends to 
draw some police from the ranks of the refugees at Guantanamo. If 
indeed these refugees are the legitimate victims of political 
persecution and possible torture, they strike me as precisely the wrong 
people to be recruiting. At a minimum, they are justifiably angry about 
the circumstances which forced them to flee Haiti, and I would not be 
the least surprised if revenge was very much on their collective mind.
  Turning Haitians from Guantanamo into a professional constabulary is 
like arming the Crips and the Bloods to patrol the streets of Los 
Angeles.
  As to the international police monitors, I have heard that the 
Israelis may contribute 30 men, but otherwise no one has specifically 
offered to accept these responsibilities. We know we need 500 police 
monitors; the administration just does not know who is willing to 
perform those duties.
  I hope we are not anticipating an extended, risky peacemaking role 
for American men and women. But if the administration cannot answer who 
will volunteer to become peace enforcement officers, I fear the burden 
will fall to the United States. As with all my other questions, I think 
the administration should answer this question before we invade, not 
after.
  Mr. President, I would like to tell my constituents that the 
administration has exhausted every policy option and it is in America's 
interests to join forces with an international coalition to restore 
democracy in our back yard.
  I want to offer that assurance to a confused and deeply divided 
public. But I cannot.
  As we anticipate a major invasion and use of American military force, 
too many vital questions remain unanswered: Who will command and 
control the lives of American soldiers in this U.N. operation? Once we 
land in Haiti, who is the enemy and what are the terms of engagement? 
Will we end up in yet another misguided nation building, peace 
enforcement mission in the name of restoring Aristide to office?
  In January 1991, President Bush asked Congress for approval to use 
force to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. By any measure it was 
one of the most illuminating and remarkable debates I have experienced 
in my years in the U.S. Senate--a difficult decision for all of us.
  I would like to call my colleagues' attention to some of the concerns 
raised at that time by Members on the other side of the aisle. Some of 
my colleagues understandably questioned the strength and stability of 
the coalition when it actually came under fire.
  Senator Biden declared,

       The truth is that the alleged coalition consists, at least 
     at this point, of little more than a few self interested . . 
     . governments who are all too ready to see American forces 
     committed to battle for reasons which have absolutely nothing 
     to do with the new world order about which we hear so much.

  His comments were echoed by Senator Kennedy, who commented,

       We have arrayed an impressive military coalition . . . but 
     when the bullets start flying, 90 percent of the casualties 
     will be American. It is hardly a surprise that so many other 
     nations are willing to fight to the last American to achieve 
     the goals of the United Nations. It is not their sons and 
     daughters that will do the dying.

  Fortunately, casualties were low. With clear U.S. leadership, the 
coalition worked together effectively. This time, as the invasion date 
looms, who is participating, the actual number of troops they will 
commit, their mandate and mission all remain unresolved? Perhaps, we 
should heed the early warnings of Senators Kennedy and Biden.
  In addition to the strength of the coalition, there appeared to be 
near unanimous concern about the wisdom of taking a nation to war when 
the country was divided.
  Senator Harkin noted, ``If the country is divided on this issue, it 
is because the President has not made his case to the American 
people.''
  Senator Bradley said, ``I can tell you the country is deeply divided. 
When a country is not totally united, it is not a good time to go to 
war.''
  My colleague, Senator Leahy, chairman of the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee warned us that, ``Politically, morally, and even 
militarily, we must not go to war if it is not supported by the 
American people. Vietnam proved that truth.''
  Senator Kennedy agreed telling us that President Bush had missed the 
tragic lesson of Vietnam and ``that it is a grave mistake to take a 
divided America to war. Unless and until the American people support a 
war the Congress has no business authorizing war.''
  Many Members have already pointed out that recent polls reflect that 
73 percent of Americans oppose this invasion, and virtually everyone is 
confused as to the President's purpose. We all hope he will clarify his 
agenda and unite this Nation in his address to the Nation.
  But whether he is able to or not, I believe it is in the interests of 
this President and the Presidency to seek and support a full debate in 
the Congress of his intention to use force to reinstate President 
Aristide and restore democracy to Haiti. I deeply respect the 
Constitution and Presidential prerogative and do not wish to encroach 
on the constitutional powers of the Executive Office.
  I share the frustration of a majority of my colleagues who believe we 
are being denied an opportunity to debate and vote on a matter 
affecting the lives of 20,000 American men and women.
  Let me close with an eloquent statement made by a colleague during 
the debate over the Persian Gulf:

       The issue of the President's willingness to comply not just 
     with what Congress decides but with the Constitution itself 
     has been the source of serious and unnecessary confusion and 
     has complicated the country's ability to come to grips with 
     this crisis. The plain sense of our Constitution, supported 
     by the full weight of history and jurisprudence, says that 
     the President was never meant to have the power to order this 
     Nation to war: that this power was vested in Congress after 
     the most careful deliberation by our Founders for reasons 
     that are absolutely as valid now as they were then.

  This was advice offered in 1991 by then-Senator Gore.
  Whether one agrees with this constitutional division of power, 
President Bush understood that it was important to secure the support 
of the public and their representatives in Congress prior to engaging 
in war in the gulf.
  President Bush drew a distinction between the events precipitating 
intervention in Grenada and Panama and those surrounding the decision 
to deploy force in the Persian Gulf. In Grenada and Panama crises 
erupted and military action was in response to urgent threats to 
American citizens and interests. In Grenada, 53 days elapsed from the 
time we launched Operation Urgent Fury to the withdrawal of troops. In 
Panama, Just Cause troops were in and out in 58 days.
  Haiti has been in crisis for decades, the most recent cycle beginning 
in September 1991. After working this problem for 18 months, the 
current administration plans will leave several thousand troops in 
Haiti through 1996. In Haiti, there has not been and there is not now 
an immediate emergency that could arguably stand in the way of the 
Senate's careful and serious consideration of this issue.
  I think it would be tragic if we were denied the opportunity to vote 
prior to the President committing Americans to another U.S. operation.
  Whether we are denied the chance to express our views and judgment 
with a vote, we still have an obligation to the 20,000 Americans who 
will be deployed in harm's way--we have a responsibility to their 
friends and families--to make sure questions are asked and answered, we 
must challenge the administration's plans, and guarantee that they are 
thinking as clearly about the security of American soldiers as they are 
about their perception of American political leadership and 
credibility.
  Mr. President, in summary there are basic questions which must be 
answered before an invasion of Haiti would seem to make any sense 
whatsoever. I, like many of us, have had a conversation with Secretary 
Talbot in the last 24 hours. Actually, it was a conversation at some 
length. We went over the questions that seem to this Senator--and I 
think to most Senators--to be appropriate for discussion. The questions 
which the administration has not answered it seems to me, at the very 
least are the following:
  First, why are we invading? Mr. Talbot says democracy, human rights, 
refugees, the post-cold-war world, and U.S. credibility. Democracy, 
human rights, refugees, the post-cold-war world and U.S. credibility. 
That is why, Secretary Talbott says, we are invading.
  Now, these are far too generic criteria, far too generic. Actually, 
they apply to Cuba, which raises the obvious: Why are we not invading 
Cuba? The same criteria apply to that other Caribbean nation nearby.
  We also need to know what are our immediate invasion objectives? 
Ambassador Albright says the junta must leave office and the island--
and the island. Secretary Christopher says that they just have to leave 
office.
  Now, once we decide the immediate objectives, we need to have a 
better understanding of who is in charge. This is a U.N. operation, Mr. 
President. We all know the price of committing U.S. soldiers to U.N. 
command. The administration has not yet established clear lines of 
command and control.
  Now, of course, they would say 17 nations have signed up to 
participate, but we obviously need to know before we invade what their 
roles and missions are. If the 17 nations are going to have troops 
there, what are they going to do? Well, we are told that once the 
situation is stabilized, we will turn over security to a local police 
force monitored by 500 international observers. We need to know before 
we invade what are the rules of engagement for American troops as they 
try to establish a stable situation. We need to be sure that we are not 
once again engaging in peace enforcing without a full understanding of 
the consequences.
  We need to know whether anyone has committed to monitor the police. 
Has anyone agreed to serve in the police force?
  Well, the questions could go on and on. A number of them have 
obviously been asked here today. What is particularly troubling, Mr. 
President, is that we are on the eve of an invasion and we have few 
answers, very few answers. And so it is not surprising that the public 
is so confused.
  In the wake of this absence of explanation, I suppose it is not 
surprising that 73 percent of the American public oppose the invasion. 
I do not want to make the argument, Mr. President, I will not make the 
argument, that just because the public at the outset is opposed to the 
invasion it still might not be in America's best interest. That 
argument was made by some with regard to the Persian Gulf war to 
justify their opposition to that war. But certainly, when 73 percent 
are opposed, at the very least the President should give us and give 
the American public--and hopefully he will do that tomorrow night--some 
clear indication of how our national security interests are involved in 
invading Haiti.
  I, for one, am willing to listen, but I must tell you, Mr. President 
and my colleagues, it seems to me, as others have probably said, it is 
not worth a single life, not worth a single life of any American 
soldier unless the President can make a national security argument.
  It is too bad we are not having this debate in the context of some 
kind of resolution of approval. In my view--and I think any careful 
student of this would reach the same conclusion--the fact situation 
does not fit the pattern in Grenada. It does not fit the pattern in 
Panama, where there was an urgent crisis that involved the use of 
American troops.
  We have been discussing this for 18 months, Mr. President. This is a 
thoroughly premeditated invasion. There is apparently an absence of any 
Americans in Haiti in distress. There is no rational basis upon which 
the President could not conclude that this premeditated invasion, 
discussed for over 18 months, should not be submitted to the Congress 
for some kind of approval resolution.
  Where is the emergency? Where is the national security interest of 
the United States? In the absence of an emergency, in the absence of a 
security interest, or a national security interest on the part of the 
United States, why are we sending American troops into harm's way? A 
very, very important question.
  I, for one, would be open to listening to the President make a 
national security interest argument. I asked Secretary Talbot for that 
argument yesterday. It is clear the administration cannot make such an 
argument because it is perfectly obvious to any, even most casual 
observer of international affairs that our national security interests 
do not lie in Haiti.
  I wonder about the propriety of establishing the principle that we 
should go about the world restoring deposed regimes as a matter of 
American foreign policy.
  My goodness. If our goal is to restore deposed regimes, I suspect 
there will be a long list. Who is going to be in charge of the 
Government in Haiti, it seems to me, is a question for the Haitians, 
which is not an endorsement of deposing any particular regime. But the 
question clearly remains, is it in America's national security interest 
to restore deposed regimes in countries that have no bearing on 
America's national security interest? That is what is before us.
  So, Mr. President, even though President Clinton believes, I suppose, 
that this will be a largely successful adventure, hopefully involving 
no loss of life on our side, you still have to ask the question: At 
what expense do we engage in this kind of activity? I do not have 
before me the cost of this to date. But it is substantial already. 
There seems to be no constituency for it in the United States outside 
of possibly a very narrow constituency with a rather provincial concern 
in this particular country; no broad American interest in this.
  So, Mr. President, I think it is particularly ill advised. I think 
the American public will resent that the American Congress, elected by 
them, has not been asked for approval of this deployment of American 
troops.
  So it is too bad that we have come to this point. I wish the 
President had chosen to do the otherwise. But this is where we are.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham].
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I at this late hour will limit myself to 
discussing two questions in this debate expecting that we will have 
opportunities in the next few days or weeks to discuss the other 
aspects of our relationship to the circumstances in Haiti.
  But I would like to talk first about what are the United States 
national interests in Haiti which justify our participation in an 
international use of force; second, is this in fact a political 
military adventure which is related to the special circumstances of the 
current administration?
  Before I discuss the first question, I would like to try to put this 
in some context. For the last almost half century, the United States 
has had a foreign policy which was driven by the nature of our 
enemies--during World War II, the Axis Powers; and since the end of 
World War II, the Soviet Union. Our foreign policy essentially was a 
policy of asking the question: Who are our friends and who are our 
enemies? We supported our friends and we opposed our enemies. We also 
had a policy that was based on the concept of containment of the Soviet 
Union, to avoid the Soviet Union extending its reach beyond the borders 
that were established at the end of World War II.
  The Soviet Union now has collapsed. America no longer has the easy 
touchstone to determine what its foreign policy objectives are going to 
be--questions such as: Does this nation support our enemy; does this 
nation have hostile military capabilities and intentions directed 
towards the United States? These no longer can be the sole criteria by 
which the United States judges what its foreign policy objectives in 
this new era should be.
  Let me suggest what I think should be at least two of our guiding 
principles. One of those principles is that we have a very significant 
national interest in the deepening, nurturing, and maturing of 
democratic institutions. We know that democratic institutions, states 
which are elected and given legitimacy by their people, are very 
unlikely to enter into hostile combat with other democratic states that 
have a similar legitimacy. We also know that states that have 
democratic governments tend to be stable and predictable, and that they 
are the governments that are most likely to respect the rights of their 
own people and provide political and economic systems that will give to 
their people the greatest breadth of opportunity. Those are the kinds 
of nations that the United States has a very strong national interest 
in promoting and protecting.
  Second, in this new cold-war era, I believe in the principle that 
there will be an assumption of special responsibility based on 
geographic proximity. One of the reasons that I have been reticent for 
the United States to become overly involved in Bosnia is because I 
think Bosnia is primarily a European issue. I believe that European 
democracies should shoulder the first line of responsibility as it 
relates to the world's concern about the conditions and incidents that 
are occurring in that beleaguered country.
  Just as I believe that it is appropriate that we look to countries 
such as England and France to have the primary responsibility in 
Bosnia, I believe that it is to the United States that the world 
appropriately looks for leadership within the Western hemisphere. This 
has historically been an area of special concern to the United States. 
The Monroe Doctrine was one of the first principles of American foreign 
policy. It is an area in which we have a special knowledge, affinity, 
and a mutuality of future interests.
  We spent much of last year debating the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. In my judgment, that agreement is but a harbinger of what is 
likely to follow, and that is a closer economic integration among the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. For that goal to be realized, it is 
in our interest that we have democratic countries within the Western 
Hemisphere with which we can deal.
  So those two principles--the United States has a fundamental national 
interest in the protection and advancement of the concept of democracy, 
and that we have a special role and responsibility in terms of the 
democracies of the Western Hemisphere--form the backdrop for the 
discussion as to what are the particular United States interests in 
Haiti. I would suggest, Mr. President, that those interests, interests 
which in my judgment equate to a sufficient U.S. national interest to 
justify our participation in an international force to restore 
democracy to Haiti, include the following:
  The protection of a democratic government. Haiti has had a very sad, 
stressful 200-year history. It was not until 1990 that there was an 
internationally recognized free and fair election held in that country. 
That election took place after some three decades of despotic rule. 
That newly elected government, which received the international stamp 
of legitimacy, resulted in one candidate receiving over two-thirds of 
the vote. That candidate, President Aristide, assumed his elected 
office in February 1991. He served for less than 8 months. It was this 
month of September in 1991 when he was deposed by an old-style military 
coup d'etat.
  I believe that Haiti stands for more than just an individual, elected 
President Aristide, and it stands for more than just the democracy of 
that one nation. It stands for our commitment to the protection of 
democracies within this hemisphere.
  The United States is a member of the Organization of American States 
which, just a few weeks before this military coup, had adopted a 
resolution in which all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, all 
of the democracies of the Western Hemisphere, had jointly committed 
themselves to the protection of the concept of democracy among the 
member States.
  I believe that there is a very serious message to be sent if the 
United States abandons that commitment. That message is that other 
democracies are likely to find little beyond rhetorical support if they 
become threatened. We have in this hemisphere many democracies which 
are relatively new and fragile. In fact, 25 years ago, if you had 
counted the number of democracies in the Western Hemisphere, you could 
have done so on the fingers of your hand.
  Today, all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere are democracies, 
with the exception of two--Cuba and Haiti. But in those new 
democracies, there are many sons and grandsons of the former military 
dictators who are waiting in the barracks for their opportunity to 
assume what they often consider to be their rightful national 
leadership. Haiti will be a test of whether there is a resolve to 
protect these fragile democracies against a potential domino of efforts 
and military coups.
  It is significant, Mr. President, that since Haiti, there have been 
three attempts to depose democracies within the Western Hemisphere. 
Fortunately, two of those failed, and a third is being reborn. Those 
are just indicators of what would happen if Haiti were to be allowed to 
become permanently under the rule of a military dictator.
  A second issue which I believe makes this important to the United 
States is the tremendous rise in human rights abuses in Haiti. Haiti is 
a country which, unfortunately, has had a history of human rights 
abuses. But never in that long two centuries history have the abuses 
reached the level that they have in the last 3 years.
  The United States State Department has, this week, released a report 
on human rights abuses in Haiti. It is significant that the report was 
issued by the United States State Department and not by the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission, which had been the agency that had been observing 
and reporting on human rights abuses in Haiti. The reason that the 
United Nations is no longer issuing the reports is because this 
dictatorial regime has kicked out U.N. human rights observers. They 
have denied to the world the opportunity to personally see, understand, 
and report on what is happening to the people of Haiti.
  The report issued by the State Department gives some of the following 
information that illustrates what is occurring in that country: Over 
3,000 Haitian civilians, including many who were political supporters 
of President Aristide, have been killed during this 3-year reign of 
terror; over 300,000 persons have been driven into hiding; military and 
paramilitary forces have used politically motivated rape, aimed at 
terrorizing opponents of the regime as well as of the general 
population.
  Though the democratically approved constitution of 1987 calls for the 
establishment of a police force separate from and independent of the 
military, the armed forces have retained control of the police 
function. They have effectively turned a security institution into an 
institution of terror.
  The consequences of the loss of democracy, the consequences of human 
rights abuses in Haiti are not restricted to that island. We in the 
United States, Mr. President, are feeling some of the resonance of 
those evil deeds. We have seen a surge in refugees from Haiti. We have, 
today, at our naval station in Guantanamo, Cuba, over 14,000 Haitians 
who have left their country and have sought safe haven at our naval 
base. We are opening bases throughout the Caribbean for the refugees 
who have left the tyrannies of Cuba and Haiti. This immigration crisis 
has had a direct impact on the United States, and as long as this 
regime stays in power, it will constitute a continuing threat to the 
United States.
  A second area of consequence to the United States is the fact that 
Haiti has become a significant transshipment point for drugs. 
Essentially, the military dictators have sold the sovereignty of Haiti 
to the drug cartels of Latin America, so that that country can be used 
for the purposes of refueling, storage, and other important steps that 
facilitate the transport of drugs into the United States.
  Mr. President, American credibility is on the line in terms of our 
actions in Haiti. We have tried for the better part of 3 years through 
negotiations, through diplomacy, through international intervention, 
through economic sanctions and embargoes to create a condition in which 
the military coup leaders would voluntarily cede power to President 
Aristide. After almost 36 months, none of those have worked, and none 
of them show any reasonable prospect of working in the future.
  In my judgment, that brings us to a fork in our national credibility 
road. One of those forks leads to acquiescence, to accommodation, 
essentially to capitulation and surrender to the coup in Port-au-
Prince. The other is to put behind our words the strength of the 
international community with a credible threat and a willingness to use 
force. By not following through on our commitments to restore democracy 
to Haiti, the United States would be abandoning its efforts to oust the 
illegitimate, sadist regime and would be capitulating on its commitment 
to the restoration of democracy.
  The consequences of this policy of inaction are a continued and 
tragic escalation in human rights abuses, renewed immigration crises, 
the expansion of the renegade regime's use of state powers, drug 
trafficking, and other illegal activities.
  Mr. President, I recognize that it is a matter of judgment, 
particularly when we are without the kind of easy standards to direct 
our international behavior that we had prior to the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It is a matter of judgment as to whether those factors equal a 
sufficient United States national interest to warrant the use of the 
United States military force in a multinational effort to restore 
democracy to Haiti. My judgment tells me that that test has been met.
  Mr. President, let me turn to the second question, and that is, is 
this national interest being manipulated by the current administration 
for its own purposes?
  The fact is that many in Congress have attempted to paint America's 
foreign policy toward Haiti as the Clinton policy, initiated and 
developed solely by the current administration.
  Mr. President, history will not support that characterization. The 
American policy toward Haiti was not born with the Clinton 
administration. It is a bipartisan response to a September 1991 coup 
developed during the Bush administration and continued by the Clinton 
administration. President Bush made clear from the outset that the 
restoration of the Aristide government is an important goal of United 
States foreign policy.
  In the month after the coup, President Bush made the following 
statement:

       Grave events in Haiti that are continuing to disrupt the 
     legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected 
     government * * * continue to constitute an unusual and 
     extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
     policy, and economy of the United States.

  Those are not the words of Bill Clinton. Those are the words of 
George Bush.
  The President, however, was not alone in stating the United States 
interests in Haiti.
  On October 2, 1991, the then Secretary of State James Baker addressed 
the Organization of American States. Our colleague, Senator Kerry of 
Massachusetts, has placed in the Record the full statement by the 
Secretary of State on that occasion. Therefore, I will not repeat but a 
portion of that statement. The Secretary of State stated:

       This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the 
     democratic community. Until President Aristide's government 
     is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah 
     throughout this hemisphere--without assistance, without 
     friends, and without a future.

  The Secretary of State continued:

       If these steps--

  The steps that the Organization of American States was committed to 
take--

     do not succeed, we must consider additional steps. Those who 
     pretend to govern Haiti should know: The path they have 
     chosen leads nowhere.

  Mr. President, this is a policy which has had strong support, both 
with a Republican administration, which presided over the Haitian 
crisis for the better part of 16 months, and now a Democratic 
administration, which has presided over this for an additional 20 
months.
  Mr. President, there is only one group that will take heart by a 
vacillation in the United States resolve to restore democracy to Haiti, 
and that one group are the people who stole democracy in Haiti.
  I submit to the Senate what I consider to be some words of wisdom 
that were uttered on January 12, 1991, at another time when American 
resolve was being tested, and this was the question of whether the 
United States would authorize the President to use force in repelling 
the invasion of Kuwait and occupation of that country by Iraq. One of 
our colleagues made the following statement:

       Mr. President, I am prayerfully hopeful that, if we act 
     affirmatively today in supporting the President, we can yet 
     have a peaceful solution in the Middle East. I believe there 
     is only one thing that we can do that might bring Saddam 
     Hussein to his senses, and that is to use our vote today to 
     affirm the leadership of our President, to assure that 
     America speaks with one clear voice for peace. * * * Now is 
     not the time at this late hour, at this critical moment, to 
     change the position of the United States of America. Now, 
     more than ever, we must speak with one clear voice, and 
     ultimately, that is the voice of the President.

  I commend my colleague, the senior Senator from Texas, for his wisdom 
on January 12, 1991, and I submit that wisdom is valid today.
  If we have any hope of resolving this crisis without the use of 
force, it is to convince the military leaders in Haiti that we are 
prepared to use force. If they believe that their choices are limited 
to a voluntary exit from Haiti or an involuntary exit from Haiti, I 
believe there is some chance that we might be able to end this crisis 
without the use of force.
  That was the theory that was advanced by the Senator from Texas as it 
related to Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, the theory did not work in 
Iraq. I believe that it might work in Haiti but only if we show that 
resolve.
  So, Mr. President, I believe that this is not a Clinton initiative. 
It is not a Bush initiative. It is not a Republican or Democratic 
initiative. It is an American commitment to some principles that are 
going to be critically important in this country in the post-cold-war 
era. How this crisis is resolved will set the stage for how many other 
crises are resolved. How this crisis is resolved will underscore how 
America's credibility will be seen in the years ahead, whether we will 
have the opportunity to live in the world and particularly in a 
hemisphere of democracies, peace, economic growth, and prosperity. A 
sense of common purpose will in significant part be determined by the 
actions that we are taking on this issue in that small, distressed 
nation of Haiti.
  I urge that we show a resolve and a recognition of the significance 
of the decision that we are making, and that we support the President 
in the actions that he has taken; that we support this Nation in terms 
of the defense of our national interest represented in Haiti, and the 
symbol that it will be for the future of democracy in the Western 
Hemisphere.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
Senator from Virginia, not to exceed 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized for up 
to 30 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my 
distinguished colleague from Maine.
  Mr. President, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from 
Florida. Senator Graham and I have worked together and collaborated on 
many issues. We serve together on the Intelligence Committee.
  Just yesterday, the Senate adopted a resolution with respect to the 
former Yugoslavia, primarily relating to the situation in the conflict 
between the Moslems and the Serbs, and we worked hand in hand together 
on that.
  It is interesting how I will now speak to a goal which is quite 
opposite from that of my good friend from Florida, but I wish to say to 
him I respect his position, as I hope he will respect the one that I 
take.
  I think the fact that the two of us have worked together and our work 
product was adopted yesterday exemplifies the fact that this Chamber is 
divided on this issue. It is not along partisan lines, as my colleague 
said. It is along the lines of each individual drawing on the 
respective experiences we have had.
  Mr. President, I just want to pick up on a line from my distinguished 
colleague from Florida about the future and how this action, should it 
be undertaken in the form of a military invasion using primarily U.S. 
forces, will have very long-range implications for our country.
  My colleague from Florida says it establishes U.S. credibility. That 
is a point on which I respectfully differ. I think the United States 
has credibility second to none in the world as of this very moment.
  My concern is that it establishes a precedent--and I see my 
distinguished friend from Connecticut here--a precedent in that 
hemisphere of which he has extensive knowledge. We have traveled 
together in that hemisphere of Central America, the Caribbean, South 
America. Are we saying to those countries we, the United States, must 
make the judgments in relation to their governments?
  I have listened carefully to my distinguished friend from Connecticut 
on this very subject many times, and I am deeply concerned that this 
will have negative long-range implications, rather than positive, to 
our diplomacy and relationships to those countries.
  Mr. President, I have supported the President on a number of his 
foreign policy decisions, and I support what he is undertaking right 
this minute in terms of resolving this problem as it relates to 
diplomacy and other means. I acknowledge and I express my respect for 
the President and his principal advisers for the manner in which they 
have kept this Senator fully informed on a daily basis.
  The Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am privileged to serve 
as vice chairman, is at this very moment conducting a lengthy hearing 
on the implications of a military force from the United States being 
utilized to solve the problems in Haiti and what the ramifications 
would be.
  Fortunately, there were several Senators present and, indeed, I think 
the knowledge of the consequences of this are now becoming widespread 
within the Senate. I urge all Senators to try to avail themselves of 
this information.
  Therefore, I conclude by saying I express appreciation to the 
administration for keeping me fully informed in my capacity as vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
  Nevertheless, I have at each opportunity expressed my nonconcurrence 
in the use of United States military forces at this point in time, 
given the facts of the situation, to try to remove the three principal 
persons down there, Cedras and two others, who are the ostensible 
leaders at this time in Haiti. I think it is unwise, and I give the 
following reasons.
  All of us are moved by the tragedies in Haiti. Indeed, the President, 
as reported on this evening's news, was given pictures of the tragedies 
that are taking place. We recognize that. We have compassion for the 
people in that tragic land. But, nevertheless, there are many places in 
the world where similar human rights violations are taking place and, 
indeed, in a more widespread manner. So that is not sufficient reason 
of itself.
  We must have, as a nation, a clear and convincing national security 
interest. And how many times have we heard that statement here in the 
past months and years in this Chamber? It has become the very 
foundation of the policy that this Chamber has tried to explain to our 
constituents.
  I feel that the administration has made an effort but, thus far, they 
have not succeeded in establishing, to my satisfaction and to many of 
my constituents, a case where U.S. national interest is in jeopardy--in 
jeopardy to the extent that we should utilize our military forces.
  During briefings to the Congress, administration officials have said 
that the United States has an interest in restoring democracy in Haiti. 
Why, of course, we have that interest. We would like to see democracy 
spread through many places on our globe. But that alone, or in 
conjunction with the human rights violations, is not sufficient 
justification for the use of United States military force at this time.
  The administration has also stated that we must have an interest in 
the stability in the Caribbean. We concur in that. But this Senator 
fails to see how that situation in Haiti is contributing to a degree of 
instability that would justify the use of our military forces at this 
time.
  I draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the contiguous 
nation, the Dominican Republic, just this spring had a free and open 
election at the same time that much of the insurrection and human 
rights violations were taking place in Haiti. So far as we know, that 
election was not contested in the sense that it was fraudulent or 
affected by what was taking place in Haiti. And, therefore, that is an 
example of how in this region, in my judgment, there has not been that 
degree of instability that would justify the use of military force at 
this time.
  I have always believed in and I strongly defend a President's 
constitutional right to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as 
he sees fit in pursuing the security interests of this country. That is 
clearly laid down in the Constitution. I have participated, with many 
others, through the years in the debates on the War Powers Act and many 
other debates. So in no way do I interpret the resolution by the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, Senator Cohen and 
others as in any way infringing on the President's power and right.
  It is, rather, an effort to say, ``Mr. President, given the facts as 
they exist at this moment, there is every reason to involve the 
Congress of the United States and most particularly the U.S. Senate, 
given our own special constitutional powers, in trying to assess along 
with you, Mr. President, whether or not we should have at this time a 
justification to utilize our military forces.''
  Indeed, the leaders of this Chamber, the distinguished Senator from 
Maine and the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Senator Dole, the 
minority leader, have each said that it is in the interest of this 
country that the Congress be given an opportunity. And I regret that 
this was not more fully made available to the Senate today to reach 
some point where we could have had a vote on this question.
  I clearly hope that any President, absent situations where timing is 
so critical and consultation cannot precede execution of military 
operations, would seek prior congressional expression on the use of 
military force. It may not have to be specific authorization, but at 
least the opportunity for a congressional expression. Certainly in this 
case, at this point in time, at this very moment, there is not the 
urgency that requires the President to act without an expression by the 
Congress.
  Pollings should not conduct our foreign policy. Nevertheless, those 
of us privileged to serve our constituents must take into account their 
viewpoints. The polls indicate very strongly that the American people 
do not support at this time, given the facts, any use of United States 
military force in the form of an invasion of Haiti. It is essential, 
therefore, that an informed debate continue. And we have had debate. 
But we must continue that debate in the Congress, most particularly in 
the Senate, to indicate the position that we should take as a body, 
given the facts as they exist at this time. I personally do not agree 
with the goals to be achieved through the use of military action at 
this point in time.
  Mr. President, we should not forget the history of United States 
military involvement in Haiti as we contemplate a possible use of our 
forces.
  In 1915, the United States became involved in Haiti when the 
President of Haiti executed 167 political prisoners, provoking citizen 
outrage in that island nation. Angry Haitians attacked their President, 
dismembered him, and paraded parts of his body through the streets--
again, the long history of the Haitian people inflicting incredible 
violence on one another. The United States intervened to restore 
justice within 6 weeks, and we were literally running the country in 
1915.
  The United States occupied and indeed ran the country for 19 years. 
In 1934, a commission President Hoover appointed to look into the 
situation found that after the 19 years, and I quote from that 
commission report, ``The social forces that created instability still 
remain--poverty, ignorance, and the lack of tradition and desire for 
orderly, free government.''
  Mr. President, history has a way of repeating itself. It is still 
that situation today.
  Mr. President, I have worked with the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee and other members in assessing the situation 
that took place in Somalia. Indeed, I accompanied the Senator from 
Michigan [Mr. Levin], to Somalia as a part of the responsibilities of 
the committee to write a report, which report will soon be completed.
  But I bring to the attention of the Senate that last year, on October 
3, United States Army Rangers found themselves fighting for their lives 
in the dusty streets of Mogadishu--in an operation that had begun 
months earlier, with the best of intentions, primarily to feed those 
impoverished people. That operation initially had the support of the 
American people and the Congress. But, over time--and we will spell 
this out in the Armed Services Committee report--United States policies 
became less and less clear, and suddenly we ended up with 18 U.S. Army 
Rangers killed and 83 wounded in a battle that raged on for 2 days, 
October 3 and 4. How well all of us remember that.
  Congress, almost immediately, insisted that our troops be withdrawn. 
Congress questioned the right of our President to exercise his 
constitutional authority with respect to the deployment of our troops 
in that country.
  And only by the narrowest of margins--and I was with the majority in 
supporting the President, the right of the President to make the 
determination and to set the timetable for withdrawal, which was March 
1994, that is this year, rather than an earlier date sought by many of 
our colleagues, which was December of 1993. I felt that would be an 
abrogation of the President's constitutional authority, and I supported 
our President in his right to set the timetable in that situation to 
withdraw our troops.
  Mr. President, I hope we have not already forgotten those lessons in 
Somalia. Certainly this Senator has not. Last May, specifically May 12, 
the Armed Services Committee held hearings on the raid of October 3 and 
4. The father of one of the young rangers who gave his life in that 
battle in open testimony to our committee made a very moving statement 
which I shall never forget. I would like to quote directly from the 
record of the statements made by that father, Lt. Col. Larry Joyce, 
U.S. Army, retired, a man who had been a careerist himself. He was the 
father of Sgt. James Casey Joyce. Colonel Joyce said as follows, and I 
quote him:

       Our purpose here should be to tell every American who and 
     what contributed to this tragic episode. No matter how much 
     the President and his advisers would like us to forget it, 
     along with the heroes who gave their lives in Mogadishu last 
     October, we should also let everyone, especially the 
     policymakers, know the consequences of foreign policy that is 
     developed haphazardly and implemented by amateurs. Too 
     frequently, policymakers are insulated from the misery they 
     create. If they could be with the chaplain who rings a 
     doorbell at 6:20 in the morning to tell a 20-year-old woman 
     she is now a widow, they would develop their policies more 
     carefully.

  Other parents testified that day about the loss of their loved ones. 
It was not testimony given in acrimony. It was testimony given by 
parents who, for generations, have sent their sons and daughters 
forward in the uniform of our country in the cause of peace. They 
simply ask, Mr. President, of the Congress, their elected leaders, of 
their President, and of the policymakers, to think very, very carefully 
each time before we send from our shores the men and women in the Armed 
Forces to assume risks which could well involve loss of life or serious 
injury.
  That is precisely why we are gathered here in this Chamber tonight. 
That is why earlier today it was hoped that the Senate could make some 
formal expression on this issue, but that, for reasons that have been 
explained, was denied us.
  We must not forget the lessons of Somalia. Before we commit our young 
men and women to battle, we must assure the objectives are vital to our 
national security interests, that they are attainable with military 
force, and that we know how we will get our forces out. That is all 
important. Just remember, 1915 to 1934, the last time we endeavored 
this mission.
  Perhaps there are reasons which the administration has which might 
make the invasion of Haiti acceptable to the Congress and the American 
people. We will learn, hopefully, tomorrow night perhaps facts that are 
not known to us in this Chamber as of this time. But thus far, I say 
most respectfully to our President of the United States, that the 
administration has not made their case on this point.
  I recall, as I am sure all of us do, the debate we had before the 
utilization in a combat status of our forces in the Persian Gulf. The 
distinguished Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, and I led that debate on our respective sides. I supported 
the President, drafted the resolution which was eventually adopted by 
only five votes in this Chamber, and my good friend from Georgia, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, opposed very vigorously, and 
for credible reasons, the use of force in the gulf.
  But this Chamber reverberated for those several days in a very fine 
debate, perhaps one of the finest that we have had in recent memory, 
and we spoke as a body. We supported our President and, as we know, 
that military action in the minds of most Americans was justified and 
was successful.
  I only hope that we would proceed along much the same lines in this 
case.
  I listened this morning, almost painfully, as the President's Chief 
of Staff tried to draw a parallel--distinction first and then a 
parallel and then a distinction--between what took place in the Persian 
Gulf operation and what might take place in Haiti.
  I most respectfully disagree with the Chief of Staff when he said you 
cannot use the procedure followed in the gulf as a precedent for this, 
and he tried to justify it on the basis of the relative small military 
force under the control of the three principals that the whole world 
wants out of Haiti.
  We have covered in great detail that military force in the 
Intelligence Committee in the past hour. It is well known to all of us. 
It is not highly classified. It is relatively small. And their weaponry 
is somewhat archaic, their training in the past few years has been 
sporadic. But we cannot justify this military action simply because we 
may only experience several casualties. One casualty--one casualty--is 
vital to one family, it is vital to this Senator, it is vital to all of 
us. We cannot justify this military action simply because the poorly 
trained force and the poorly equipped force in Haiti might not inflict 
the casualties we experienced in the gulf operation. That is no basis 
whatsoever for rationalizing a justification for this invasion.
  I hope the Chief of Staff reconsiders the statements that he made 
publicly earlier today on that.
  So I conclude, Mr. President, that this is a very troubled world that 
we are in today. Several months ago, I spoke on the floor and showed a 
chart where today there are 64 areas in which there are very 
substantial human rights violations, in which there is conflict, in 
which Armed Forces are involved in this world, that 64 as compared to 
perhaps half that number a mere 5 to 6 years ago. But the United States 
cannot, nor should it, assume the responsibility we can resolve all 
those problems.
  The simple fact that this nation, Haiti, so troubled, so tragically 
suffering at this moment, is nearer to our shores than Rwanda, than 
parts of the former Yugoslavia, some of the troubled areas in Southeast 
Asia, that alone is not justification. The fact that it is in this 
hemisphere--we have been suffering since the adoption of the Monroe 
Doctrine of the Big Brother attitude toward the smaller countries in 
this hemisphere. We cannot do that.
  So, therefore, there are many reasons--many reasons--why we should 
not undertake the use of military force at this time. And until the 
President of the United States can put forth a clear and convincing 
case that it is in our national security interest, not just to save 
democracy, not just to stem the flow of a tragic immigration to our 
shores, but in the security interests, then and only then can we 
undertake the responsibility that we have to look our constituents 
squarely in the eye, and particularly those who may suffer a loss 
occasioned by a casualty, then and only then can our forces be 
deployed.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SASSER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Moseley-Braun). The Senator from 
Tennessee.
  Mr. SASSER. Madam President, tomorrow evening the President of the 
United States goes before the American people to present his case for 
the military invasion of Haiti. And perhaps, given the President's 
considerable persuasive powers, he can justify a very grave action for 
which, frankly, there is no present consensus among the American 
people. It is not going to be an easy case to make. The American people 
justly demand an unambiguous statement of our policy before risking the 
lives of American troops, and I demand that statement also. I believe 
strongly that we must bring to this potential military action the same 
standards of national security interest, constitutional conformity, and 
public support that we have demanded on prior occasions.
  Like most Americans, I will listen tomorrow night to the President 
with an open mind. But I feel compelled to state that at this time I 
vigorously oppose this invasion of Haiti. Like most Americans, I am 
deeply skeptical about the need to put our troops in harm's way in 
Haiti or the wisdom of forcibly imposing democracy on a complex culture 
that has little or no history of democratic principle.
  Before we invade, there must be a clear statement from the President 
on our reasons for going in and, most importantly, our plan for getting 
out. Without a unified sense of national purpose, we get the ambiguity 
that leads to disasters like those we experienced in Beirut. Without a 
strong sense of purpose and a plan for extricating ourselves, we have 
muddles like what occurred in Somalia. Without clear guidelines before 
us, we are on the verge of committing our Nation's blood and treasure, 
and I do not think that is a wise policy to follow.
  Now, since the early 1980's, we have tried to design rules of thumb 
that could be used to determine whether the use of military force is 
justified and whether it is in our national interest. There is general 
agreement on four of these rules.
  First, military force should only be used as a last resort. And 
diplomatic and economic solutions should be fully exhausted before we 
ask our men and women to risk their lives.
  Second, military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut 
military objective. We should not send military forces to achieve vague 
political goals. We learned our lesson on that, I hope, in the late 
1960's and early 1970's.
  Third, military force should be used only when we can determine the 
point at which our military objective has been achieved. In other 
words, we need to know when we can bring our troops home.
  Fourth, military force should be used only in an overwhelming 
fashion. We should get it done quickly with as little loss of life as 
possible.
  And, finally and perhaps as important as all of the rest, there must 
be popular support behind the military operation.
  Now, based on these criteria, it appears that the operation in Haiti 
as currently planned by the administration only meets one of these five 
tests, and that is No. 4, the use of overwhelming force.
  At present, the administration has failed to muster, in my view, a 
cogent case on the other four.
  First, it is far from clear that we have exhausted all of our 
diplomatic and economic options, and the question comes: Has patience, 
strength, and the international isolation of the thugs in Port-au-
Prince truly failed, or have we simply grown weary of waiting for 
pressure and diplomacy to achieve its desired end?
  Second, I think, most importantly, the administration's objective, at 
least to this Senator at this point, for this use of force is, to say 
the least, fuzzy.
  Are we sending troops simply to oust General Cedras, or are we 
sending troops to restore democracy in Haiti? Is this a vital interest, 
or merely an important concern?
  Do we truly believe that the military dictatorship in Haiti presents 
a threat to this country's security? I think not.
  Third, achieving any goal larger than capturing General Cedras or 
forcing Cedras and all of his hooligan comrades out, we must 
understand, is going to take years.
  Do we really have full confidence in President Aristide's ability to 
lay the foundation for democratic institutions and to build on that? I 
do not think we do. Or are we in fact writing a blank check for 
perpetual military occupation by American troops in Haiti? It appears 
to me it would be difficult to decide when, if ever, our forces will 
have accomplished their objective, if, indeed, their objective is to 
establish democracy.
  I remind my colleagues, as they have been reminded before--most 
recently by my friend and colleague, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia--the last time we intervened, in 1915, it took 19 years to 
extricate the marines from Haiti.
  Now, the world has changed a lot since those days of musketry and 
campfires. That was 80 years ago. But the cultural cross-currents in 
Haiti--bred from years of dictatorship and poverty--are maybe more 
pronounced and more perplexing today than they were in 1915.
  On September 13, the New York Times wrote an editorial which I think 
summed up the other side of the problem. The editorial said this:

       A century of Latin intervention should have taught 
     Washington you cannot enforce democracy at gunpoint.

  Continuing, the editorial said:

       Haitians elected Father Aristide and still support him, but 
     even his legitimacy may not survive being installed by 
     foreign troops.

  In other words, a military effort to impose democracy might actually 
strengthen the forces of chaos and tyranny. We have seen it happen 
before.
  Now, Madam President, I come from a State where patriotism runs deep. 
It is called the Volunteer State because of the great number of young 
men who volunteered in service to their country, beginning first in the 
early 19th century and continuing to today. I come from a State where 
love of country is a value that is treasured from the barracks of the 
Army base of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell to a 
schoolhouse in the mountains of east Tennessee.
  Our young men and women have answered their country's call without 
reservation. They are not complainers. And our military cemeteries bear 
witness to their loyalties to our Nation. But I do not think they see 
the reason for this particular action.
  According to reports, there are plans for invasion with about 20,000 
U.S. military personnel to be involved along with 260 personnel from 
the Caribbean nations. They say, according to the administration, that 
Belgium, the Dutch, France, Britain, and Israel have all indicated a 
willingness to play a part in the postinvasion policing. But here 
again, I think in the final analysis this appears to be solely an 
operation by the U.S. Government.
  President Eisenhower once said at a press conference, so the syntax 
is not totally perfect:

       If we ever come to a place that I feel that a step of war 
     is necessary, it is going to be brought about not by any 
     impulsive individualistic act of my own. But I am going 
     before the Congress in the constitutional method set up in 
     this country and lay the problem before them, with my 
     recommendation as to whatever it may be.

  I think President Eisenhower was quite right in that statement. The 
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution are clear when it comes to 
consulting Congress before introducing American Armed Forces into 
hostilities or imminent hostilities.
  Many of us stood on this floor and debated that President Bush do the 
same before he put American forces in harm's way in the Persian Gulf 
region. I think we can ask no less of President Clinton in this 
instance.
  We cannot abdicate our responsibility to the American people. They 
are trusting in our leadership and our ability to exercise good 
governance here. They are praying that we will watch over their sons 
and daughters and their husbands and wives who might be called upon to 
put their lives on the line.
  So, Madam President, I would sum up my statement simply by saying 
this: I oppose this invasion. The burden of proof, a very heavy burden 
of proof indeed, will be on the President next evening to convince the 
American people and this Senator that it is in our national interest to 
do so at this time.
  Second, I urge the President to bring this matter before the Congress 
of the United States and let the elected representatives of the people 
here in the Senate have some input before putting our troops in harm's 
way and launching what I think is an ill-advised military expedition.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, it has been a very long day, as the Chair 
knows better than anyone. I remember this morning, when we were 
debating another subject, the current Presiding Officer was then in the 
chair and is winding up there tonight after a long day. But there are 
important matters that I think must be discussed tonight.
  The Senator from Tennessee noted that the President would be making a 
very important speech tomorrow night. The President will have a 
considerable burden in terms of expressing clearly to the American 
people what our national interest and our national goals are in Haiti. 
And he particularly has the obligation to explain this to the military 
people and the families that are directly involved, or soon may be 
involved.
  Madam President, as significant American preparations are under way 
for an invasion of Haiti, and as the wisdom of the administration's 
policy is the subject of heated debate here in the Senate and 
elsewhere, I think we need to step back and consider carefully the 
implications of the present course.
  Although I do not expect the administration to change that course 
now--and I think the people in Haiti, leaders in Haiti, need to 
understand that--I also suggest it is not too late to consider whether 
there exists a reasonable and viable alternative that could bring 
relief to the people of Haiti without launching a military invasion.
  While it is still possible that Haiti's military leaders will depart 
the country--and I hope that will happen--thereby obviating the 
necessity or the perceived necessity for an invasion on the part of the 
administration, the likelihood of an invasion grows with each passing 
day, and leaders in Haiti need to understand that. This invasion would 
mark the first time in many years that we have utilized large numbers 
of American troops at considerable cost and some risk to restore 
democracy in a failed state.
  This invasion also would raise again an important issue of democracy 
here at home; that is, the relationship between the constitutional 
power of the President as Commander in Chief and the constitutional 
power of the Congress to declare war. That clash has been taking place 
for all of our history and is likely to continue for a long time to 
come.
  But these two issues--restoring democracy in Haiti, which is the 
announced goal, and the way we go about deciding whether to use U.S. 
forces for that goal--are intertwined in my own mind. Building 
democracy in Haiti is going to be a lengthy, expensive proposition. It 
clearly will cost hundreds of millions of dollars, if not several 
billion dollars. It will take years, if not decades, to develop a 
soundly rooted democracy in Haiti. The process will be tenuous long 
after our invasion force has been withdrawn.
  Of course, we will prevail militarily if we invade. We will prevail 
quickly and at relatively low risk. While we do not have strategic 
surprise--there has been entirely too much conversation about intent 
for that to still be a possibility--there are reasons for such 
conversation, which relate to the hope of getting the illegitimate 
Haitian military leaders out of there without invading. I know that is 
the administration's hope. So we do not have strategic surprise, but we 
have not lost tactical surprise, which is enormously important. And we 
must do all we can to ensure that we achieve that tactical advantage 
which can save American lives.
  Madam President, I have complete confidence in our military leaders, 
their planning, and the skills of our superb troops. There is no doubt 
about the military outcome. It would be quick; it would be decisive; it 
would be overwhelming.
  However if, as the administration states, establishing democracy in 
Haiti is its principal goal, this will require the long-term support of 
the American people, as well as the United States Congress. The 
American people must clearly understand in advance our national 
interest and our national goals regarding Haiti. The President, before 
he takes military action, clearly must establish our national interest. 
He must clearly explain our goals. He must clearly explain what we 
would define as success, and thereby explain our exit strategy, when we 
are going to get out. But not by date; I think trying to predict when 
we will leave a military engagement by date is always a mistake. But at 
least by a definition of what we would consider success. These 
ingredients are necessary.
  Madam President, while our risk militarily is low--the Haitian 
military is not very capable, and in my view it is not likely there 
would be any organized resistance for any long period of time. I say 
``organized''--there certainly could be sporadic resistance, and 
certainly no one can assure there will not be casualties. Casualties in 
any kind of operation of this size are almost inevitable. Certainly, I 
hope and pray that if an invasion occurs, it would bring minimal harm 
to our own military personnel.
  But the bottom line is that the President, as the Commander in Chief, 
must explain clearly to the Nation, and particularly to our military 
personnel and their families, what our national stake is, what our 
national interests are, and clearly what our goal is. I have long felt 
and have said publicly on numerous occasions that the administration's 
goals in Haiti and my goals differ somewhat. In fact, my goals differ 
in rather important ways from the goals that have been articulated by 
the Clinton administration.
  I believe that our goals should be, first, to alleviate the suffering 
of the Haitian people, which is considerable and growing; second, to 
prevent uncontrolled Haitian immigration to the United States; and, 
third, to shift our near-term policy focus away from restoring 
democracy solely through President Aristide's return, to building 
democracy by vitalizing political and economic structures in Haiti, 
with President Aristide's return deferred until that process takes 
hold.
  If our national goal is to build democracy in Haiti, our focus should 
be on the establishment of a democratic process as specified in the 
Haitian Constitution. They have a constitution. It was adopted in 1987. 
It specifies the way their own people envision their democracy. That 
Constitution is important. Certainly, it is important if what we are 
restoring is real democracy.
  I have felt that our options to achieve these goals--these are my 
goals, the ones I have stated on many occasions publicly and 
privately--came down to three various options in broad terms: First, to 
return President Aristide on the shoulders of United States military 
power, which appears to be the administration's present course of 
action or present intent; second, to continue the status quo by 
tightening sanctions and increasing pressure on General Cedras and his 
colleagues, which until just a few weeks ago was the administration's 
policy; and third, to defer President Aristide's return pending 
development of a political consensus in Haiti, which we would help 
foster with the help of the international community, that could begin 
to build democracy and allow President Aristide to return without 
United States military intervention and without long-term United States 
military protection.
  Obviously, Madam President, from what I have already said, the third 
course of action is my preference, but that would require more patience 
on the part of the Aristide supporters in this country, more patience 
on the part of Aristide and his supporters in Haiti, and more patience 
than has been displayed in the last week or so by the Clinton 
administration.
  Given the administration's current position, which is clearly moving 
toward military intervention, the issue of the role of Congress--which 
has been debated today--in approving an invasion must be addressed.
  In terms of the President's power under the Constitution, I regard an 
invasion of Haiti as somewhere between the Persian Gulf war, for which 
congressional approval was sought, and the military operations in 
Grenada and Panama, for which congressional approval was not sought.
  A Haitian invasion will not require major war, which was the case 
when we attacked Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf in 1991. So that is 
the difference between this anticipated action and the Persian Gulf 
war. This is not going to be a major war. It may be a major challenge 
after the initial stage, but the initial military action, even though 
it certainly has some risk and unfortunately is likely to entail some 
casualties, it is not what I think anyone would define as a ``major'' 
war. Yet, it resembles the Persian Gulf situation in that a threat 
requiring immediate action is not involved. It also resembles the 
Persian Gulf in that the initiative is in our hands, as far as military 
action is concerned, and there is ample time for planning, for a 
debate, and for congressional action. That is where the similarity is 
with the Persian Gulf war, in my mind. The situations in Grenada in 
1983, and in Panama in 1989, did involve threats which the 
administration at that time clearly felt and stated to the American 
people were emergencies that required quick responses. Grenada and 
Panama were similar to the current situation in Haiti, in that these 
operations entailed relatively low-risk military operations and could 
not be defined properly, in my view, as full-scale war, although 
certainly casualties were likely to and indeed did occur.
  Madam President, should the President seek the approval of Congress 
for United States military force in Haiti? My answer is yes. Legal 
scholars can debate the constitutional issue, and like other military 
interventions that have not had congressional approval, the matter 
probably will be debated, if it occurs, without clear result for a long 
period of time.
  As a practical matter, however, I believe the President should obtain 
the support of Congress for a United States-led invasion of Haiti. The 
problems in Haiti defy short-term solutions. They will not be resolved 
in days or even in months. The invasion will set an important precedent 
regarding the use of United States military force to instill democracy 
in a failed state. At least it will be a modern-day precedent.
  Haiti has virtually no democratic tradition. President Aristide is 
only the second popularly elected Haitian chief of state. The first 
elected chief of state was ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The Haitian economy 
is in ruins, and the basic welfare of its people is in peril. Without 
Congressional support for building democracy for an extended time, 
certainly long after our invasion force has been withdrawn, without 
that continued support by the Congress and the American people, this 
goal of restoring democracy is unlikely to be achieved. A short-term 
American response will increase the likelihood of Haitian domestic 
violence, political turmoil, and the return of uncontrolled Haitian 
emigration to the United States. A short-term approach and a goal to 
restore democracy, in my view, are incompatible.
  I do not, however, believe Congress should attempt to prohibit by law 
an invasion of Haiti. I have supported a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
which said that the President should come forward for congressional 
approval. I will continue to support that next week--the pending 
resolution that the majority leader put down, the one we have already 
passed, which had some 94 votes. But clearly the Senator from Arizona 
[Mr. McCain], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], and others, voted 
for that resolution, and I believe Senator McCain, who has been on the 
floor today giving his, I am sure, heartfelt views on this situation, 
made the statement very emphatically, and I think correctly, that to 
bar in law a President from invading Haiti is a very bad precedent and 
should not be done. He argued against that, as did I. The majority of 
the Senate on two occasions, I believe, agreed we should not bar in law 
that activity from occurring.
  There are a couple of reasons for that, Madam President. First, as a 
practical matter, if Congress were to pass prohibitive legislation by 
law, as opposed to a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, the President 
could always veto such legislation, and he would probably do so. 
Second, a law prohibiting an invasion of Haiti--and if one is proposed 
next week, I will not support it--by singling out one country would 
treat Haiti differently from every other country in the world and would 
badly undermine whatever remaining credibility there is in the War 
Powers Resolution. Such action would certainly undermine the Clinton 
administration for the remainder of its term in office. It would badly 
undermine U.S. foreign policy.
  This would establish a dangerous precedent, and it would have 
repercussions far beyond Haiti. It could have perceptions in places far 
more dangerous to our security and to military personnel, like North 
Korea. I will not favor barring by law this kind of action, in spite of 
my words of caution and my words of reservation here this evening--and 
indeed my specific words that the President should seek approval before 
he undertakes this activity, if he does.
  Madam President, in effect, if we tried to bar by law an invasion of 
Haiti at this point in time, what we would be saying is that the 
President can invade any other country in the world. He could invade 
Russia, China, Iran, or Mexico, and he could do them simultaneously, 
and there would be no bar to that, as long as he complied, of course, 
with the War Powers Resolution. But that resolution does not bar 
initial deployments. We would be saying that there is one country in 
the world in which the President cannot take military action. It would 
be a sign of weakness on our part that would haunt us in many areas of 
the globe and could very well cost far more American lives than would 
be at stake in an invasion of Haiti. So I do not choose that course, 
and I hope we will not favor that course when we start voting next 
week.
  If an invasion occurs, we still must face the reality--and I hope the 
administration will think carefully about this, as I do not believe 
that enough attention has been given to this aspect of the situation--
we must face the reality that the return of President Aristide, while 
desirable in itself, is not synonymous with the establishment of 
democracy. A democracy is more than one individual, even an individual 
elected by a majority of the people. Democracy rests on institutions, 
not on an individual office holder.

  The Haitian Constitution, overwhelmingly approved by the Haitian 
people in 1987, requires that all of the Chamber of Deputies and one-
third of the Senate in Haiti be elected not later than December of 
1994. That is this year. There is a mandated election in the Haitian 
Constitution for no later than December of this year.
  That is an important point. The Congress of the United States and 
other parliamentary bodies are not very popular. We know that. But what 
kind of democracy can we have with no Congress? Would anyone in this 
country, despite the low esteem in which the polls show Congress is 
held, want to turn all the Government of the United States and its 
powers over to the President, any President, whether it is President 
Clinton, President Reagan, President Bush, President Carter, President 
Ford, or Presidents further back in history?
  Madam President, you cannot have a democracy without a parliament. 
That is the key. That is the key, much more than one individual. The 
parliament is a much more permanent body. Something can happen to one 
individual, either health, tragedy, assassination. It can happen 
overnight. There has been too much focus on one Haitian official, 
President Aristide, as important as his return is. And I do think his 
return is important at the appropriate point, and I will speak a little 
more to that in a moment.
  Madam President, if the administration proceeds with military 
intervention, it must first obtain a clear, firm commitment from 
President Aristide, prior to any invasion, that he will abide fully by 
the Haitian Constitution and in particular will facilitate free and 
fair parliamentary elections by the end of 1994, as required by the 
Haitian Constitution itself.
  The Haitian Constitution specifies that Parliament is an essential 
branch of the Haitian Government, and it prohibits the President from 
ruling by decree without parliamentary review.
  This is the essence of democracy. If we are going there to restore 
democracy, this should be, in my view, the major, not secondary, but 
the major point of emphasis--the elections that are required by the 
Haitian Constitution.
  Madam President, we also, I believe, must obtain before any kind of 
invasion occurs President Aristide's firm commitment regarding fair and 
equitable access to the Haitian news media for those participating in 
the parliamentary elections; appointment of a broadly acceptable 
government that is duly approved by parliament as specified by the 
Haitian Constitution; prevention of illegal reprisals against 
Aristide's political opponents and enemies, except under due course and 
due rule of law, under a justice system as called for in the Haitian 
Constitution; establishment of an independent judicial system as well 
as a professional police force.
  These are the institutions that will tell whether Haiti has a 
democracy.
  Madam President, I recognize that this approach may not satisfy 
President Aristide's supporters in the United States, including his 
supporters in the U.S. Congress. Let me assure them that I share their 
desire to restore President Aristide to his proper place in Haiti. He 
was elected. I believe, however, it is in everyone's best interests, 
including those of President Aristide, that he succeed as a democratic 
leader. It is in everyone's best interests that President Aristide work 
cooperatively with a freely elected, representative parliament, as a 
President who observes fully the letter and the spirit of the 
Constitution of his own country, which legitimizes his own rule.
  Madam President, there is a strategy that to me would have been 
preferable to an all-out invasion, and even at this late date still 
would be preferable to invasion, in my view. Under this strategy, the 
United States would present the illegitimate military leaders in 
Haiti--Cedras, Francois and Biamby--with a final ultimatum requiring 
their agreement within a specific deadline.
  The proposal would have three time-linked elements.
  First, Cedras and associates would have to leave Haiti voluntarily.
  Second, the United States and the international community would 
undertake to ensure that free, fair parliamentary elections take place 
in accord with the legitimate Constitution of Haiti.
  Third, President Aristide would return to Haiti, but he would return 
after the parliamentary elections, not later than the end of this year.
  This is not perfect solution. Anyone looking for a perfect solution 
in Haiti I think is looking for something that does not exist. But 
neither is a full-scale, U.S.-led military invasion.
  There are all sorts of problems with that option which we seem to be 
heading toward, not military problems, not problems in the very 
beginning, but problems the longer we are there, problems of Haitian-
on-Haitian violence, problems that may involve the people who are not 
for Aristide if he is returned immediately on the backs of the U.S. 
military, feeling that they should become refugees so that they are not 
in danger of their lives. If we are not very careful, we may simply 
swap one set of people who are trying to escape Haiti with another set 
of refugees.
  The step I am suggesting would not foreclose the option of President 
Clinton and the administration to undertake an invasion if the Haitian 
military leaders refuse to go along with this overall plan and if they 
refuse to leave, which they must. Based on the present, clear intent of 
the Clinton administration to invade, this proposal would be considered 
by Cedras and company against the certainty of military intervention if 
they refuse to agree. And if they do not believe an invasion is certain 
if they remain in Haiti, they certainly should. They must have begun by 
now to realize the consequences that are coming.
  I believe that this step has important advantages as compared to a 
kick-the-door-down, invade-now approach.
  First, this overall approach would recognize that democracy is a 
popularly approved process, based on a legitimate Constitution. That 
would be the first principle that we would make absolutely clear. 
Democracy, as I have said, involves more than one election of one 
President. This is the wisdom embodied in our own Constitution, framed 
to prevent domination by one man or one institution. This wisdom is 
also embodied in the Haitian Constitution of 1987 under which President 
Aristide was elected.
  Second, this approach would facilitate the repatriation of the 
thousands of Haitian refugees currently detained, and increasingly 
restive, at our Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on Cuba, which I think could 
become a ticking time bomb if it has not already. It would also help 
avoid a new wave of Haitian refugees which would probably be made up of 
President Aristide's opponents, which could follow even a successful 
U.S. invasion. It might not happen in a week or a month, but if 
retribution starts being dished out to those who opposed Aristide, 
inevitably it will happen.
  Third, it would enable President Aristide to rule democratically, in 
full accord with the Haitian Constitution. And it would provide before 
he started asserting his rule, which is clearly his right under the 
election that was held before he was removed from office--that there 
would be another election and the people would be able to speak. There 
would be assurance to both pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide groups there 
that they would have a full voice in who was going to exercise 
authority over them from the parliament. It would establish a check and 
balance mechanism. If you do not have that check and balance device, 
there are very few examples in world history of any kind of successful 
democracy. This also would make clear to the Haitian people that the 
United States stands for broad democratic institutions and processes 
and not one-man rule.
  Fourth, this approach would offer Cedras and his colleagues--if they 
chose to agree to this option, which I still hope they will--something 
they do not have now. It would offer them a departure scenario in which 
they could assert with accuracy that their supporters and those who 
fear and oppose Aristide, whether or not such attitudes are legitimate, 
will have an immediate chance to participate fully in Haiti's political 
and economic recovery.
  Finally, in my view, this step could reduce the risk of loss of 
American and Haitian lives that an invasion inevitably will put at 
risk.
  Madam President, in concluding, if we invade Haiti--and I do believe 
that an invasion is a virtual certainty, unless Haiti's present 
military rulers wake up to reality--I want to make it abundantly clear 
that in spite of my reservations, in spite of the fact that I have 
serious questions about whether we are on the right course, I will 
fully support our American military personnel who are at risk.
  Those who are tonight preparing for possible military action should 
understand that at least this Senator will support them fully once they 
are committed. Once they are committed, the debate, as far as I am 
concerned, about the appropriate course of action is concluded, because 
our men and women will then be at risk.
  I think it is up to all of us to support them, and up to the American 
people to support them. We do not have to support the policy to support 
the troops. But supporting the troops is absolutely essential, I think, 
for not only this contingency but for the broader interests America has 
in the world. And we do have broader interests, we do have much more 
important interests, including, as we all know, the situation in Korea 
and the situation in other dangerous parts of the world.
  Madam President, I am confident my colleagues in Congress and the 
American people will also support our troops, whatever they are called 
on to do, in the due course of their responsibilities.
  If an invasion takes place, we must define democracy in Haiti in 
terms of the constitutional processes there. We must assure--and I 
think this has to be done before an invasion occurs, if it is going 
to--that President Aristide both agrees with and abides by the lawful 
processes set forth in the Haitian constitution.
  Finally, we should convey to the Haitian people that the United 
States and the other friends of Haiti cannot by themselves resolve 
Haiti's domestic problems. In the final analysis, Madam President, 
whether there is democracy and prosperity in Haiti will depend on the 
Haitian people.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor
  Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
  Madam President, we have now begun a debate on a matter of great 
import. There are really two questions. One is the substance of the 
policy and the other is the process by which the policy decision will 
be made. It is important to consider not only the substance of policy 
but to recognize that the process you follow can give you a greater or 
lesser opportunity to explore the substance of a policy.
  On Haiti, I do not think the case has been made for the substance of 
administration policy and I think that is the belief across the 
country. If the public support does not exist for the course of action 
which the President appears to be set upon.
  There has not been a clear definition of what the rationale and 
strategy are: The reasons and conditions under which we are prepared to 
use force; the specific objectives that military action would be 
designed to accomplish; an evaluation of the potential costs of an 
invasion in both human and economic terms; the national interests that 
are at stake; the reasons why such a course of action is preferable 
over other alternatives; and the larger question of how we would 
declare that the mission has been accomplished and be able to disengage 
our forces. I point out that the last time the United States went into 
Haiti, we stayed there for 19 years.
  Let me turn to the question whether the President should seek and 
receive congressional authorization; in other words, the question of 
whether the President--any President--acting alone, can commit 20,000, 
25,000 or 30,000 American troops to the invasion of a country without 
coming to the Congress, to the elected representatives of the American 
people, and obtaining their judgment on that question.
  This is not a matter of protocol. This is a basic matter of how 
decisions are to be made under our Constitution and in our democracy. 
It is also a matter of what is the best and wisest way to arrive at 
decisions and judgments? The checks and balances system so integral to 
our system of government was premised on the proposition that from the 
interaction required by checks and balances would come better policy.
  If policy is made by only one individual, where is the independent 
questioning that may well be necessary in order to identify pitfalls or 
oversights in the policy? Our democracy has proceeded over the 
centuries on the premise that out of the interaction between 
independent branches of government better policy would emerge and 
errors would be avoided.
  Only yesterday, the New York Times, in a powerful editorial, and 
again this morning, the Washington Post in another strong editorial 
addressed this issue. I ask unanimous consent that both of those 
editorials be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SARBANES. The Times, in the opening sentence of its editorial, 
said, ``To invade Haiti without prior congressional approval would 
short-circuit the United States Constitution.'' It then went on to say, 
``Neither of the situations usually cited as justifying independent 
action by the Commander in Chief--military crisis or unexpected threat 
to national security--exists in this case. To the contrary, 
congressional deliberation is both practical and desirable, and there 
is plenty of time for it.''
  The Washington Post just this morning, commenting on the President 
saying that he will not ask Congress for authorization to invade Haiti 
went on to say that this shortcut ``cheats on the separation of powers 
as defined in the Constitution.''
  The Constitution, of course, vests in the Congress the power to 
declare war. Yet the President, under the Constitution, is the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. From these two provisions and 
the overlap in responsibilities has come controversy of long duration 
as to their respective rules of the President and the Congress.
  I encourage Members to ponder the question of whether the President, 
acting alone, should, in effect, be able to commit the Nation to 
hostilities?
  I know efforts are made to draw a distinction between police actions 
and an all-out war, and there may be some merit to those distinctions. 
But where does the line lie along that scale? It seems to me that, the 
wiser course--and I have been consistent in arguing for this position 
previously on the floor--is that the Executive needs to come to the 
Congress and seek its authority in order to engage in these military 
operations.
  A range of very probing, critical questions have been raised about 
the substance of the administration's policy. I share the concern which 
is expressed in that questioning, some of which were very articulately 
put just previously here on the floor by my colleagues, Senator Sasser 
from Tennessee and Senator Nunn from Georgia. Those questions have not 
been answered. The consultation with the Congress has not, thus far, 
brought about a clear and comprehensive statement of policy and the 
rationale for it.
  The administration has, unfortunately, created self-imposed deadlines 
which enhance the pressure to move forward, even though such a course 
may well be ill-advised. We are told that they must go ahead and do 
this because they have asserted they will do it and if they fail to do 
so, it will reflect badly upon them. Well, of course, that sequence 
should have been carefully considered before the initial assertion was 
made.
  A debate on the Haiti issue would be difficult, there is no question 
about it. But the issue is difficult and it is important. Many believe 
that we must continue to pursue a course of action that will enhance 
the international ostracism of the regime there. The U.N. monitors that 
are to be on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in 
order to see that the embargo is being thoroughly enforced are not yet 
fully in place. Other possibilities for resolution short of military 
action have not been fully explored, as the Senator from Georgia 
indicated in the course of his statement to this body only a few 
moments ago.
  There is a history of intervention in Latin America. It is not as 
though we are facing this issue for the first time. That intervention 
does not give you promising lessons in terms of the ability to bring 
about democracy at gunpoint. Obviously, we all have very strong 
reactions to the brutal conduct of Haiti's generals--the torture, 
killings and gross abuse they impose upon their own people. But the 
question of whether that should result in an American military 
intervention is of a different order of magnitude, and particularly 
when the question is whether it should be done by the Chief Executive 
acting alone, acting solely.
  It is interesting that the administration went to the Security 
Council to seek its approval but has not come to the Congress to seek 
the Congress' approval. The case must be made by the administration to 
the Congress and to the American people. Otherwise, we are transforming 
the nature of our constitutional democracy.
  Obviously, there is the inclination to be supportive of the 
President. Obviously, if American troops in the end are involved, the 
American people will support our forces. But the questions need to be 
asked now ahead of any such involvement. After it takes place, one will 
rally in support of our men and women who have been placed in harm's 
way. So the questions need to be raised and they need to be debated now 
which, of course, the Senate is now in the course of doing.
  So, Madam President, it is clearly in the best interest, in my view, 
of the President himself to come to the Congress to seek its 
authorization, and then to have a full debate here. Maybe in a clear 
comprehensive presentation, the administration can lay out a justifying 
rationale. As I have indicated, I have not seen that rationale to date. 
I do not think the consultations which have taken place have provided 
it. I think the assertions that have been made for the sweep of 
executive power are excessive and I, therefore, hope that the President 
and his advisers will take heed of the responses coming from the 
elected representatives of the American people in the Congress and from 
the people themselves with respect to this very grave and serious 
matter.
  We have been through this before. We had an extended debate on Iraq. 
There was the insistence on the part of many of us that the President 
had to come to Congress for authority. Presidents--all Presidents 
apparently--constantly assert that this is not necessary; that they 
have a broad, sweeping power to commit forces as they choose. But in 
that instance, the President did come to the Congress and an extended 
debate took place here on the substance of the policy, the rationale 
was thoroughly debated and a vote was taken. And by a narrow margin, 
authorization was given for that action.
  But that is how the constitutional system is supposed to work. That 
is what the checks and balances are all about. We did not establish a 
system of a single executive leader who would make all of these 
judgments solely of his own accord without interacting with the 
legislative body in order to obtain a broader judgment. This was, of 
course, debated at great length at our Constitutional Convention.
  The fact that over the years Presidents have taken such solo actions 
does not invalidate the argument made here that this is not the 
arrangement that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution.
  So I strongly urge the President to come to the Congress to seek its 
judgment on the policy he is proposing, to lay out his rationale. As I 
have indicated, it is my view that the rationale that has been put 
forth does not justify the actions he is proposing to take. That is a 
matter that ought to be decided in an interaction between the executive 
and the legislative branches of our government after a full debate in 
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
  Clearly, there is not congressional agreement at this time or broad 
public support for the action that the President is proposing, and 
that, in and of itself, is a matter of serious and grave proportions.
  Let me also make the observation that the projected operation is 
essentially an American one. Caribbean nations have committed 266 
troops to join in the operation. They now are going through some quick 
training. The number of American troops that is being talked about now 
is 20,000, but the number changes from time to time. Obviously, we can 
overwhelm Haiti militarily, although as in all such actions, there are 
risks to our fighting men and women.
  The next question becomes, then what? Will they continue to remain 
exposed in a dangerous situation?
  Will the United States remain entangled and how, after having gone 
through all of this, will we ever be able to extricate our forces? 
Secondly, what precedent does it establish for similar actions 
elsewhere? What is the rationale that warrants going into Haiti that 
would not warrant going into a number of other countries that are 
experiencing similar abysmal and, indeed, terrorist conduct on the part 
of illegal holders of authority?
  We understand situations in which it can be asserted that the 
national security interests of the United States are endangered or 
threatened, and obviously in those situations we have to respond with 
force if it is necessary in order to protect those interests. But no 
one is making that case here. Therefore, the question becomes how do 
you separate this action as a precedent from other similar actions 
which people could easily call upon us to make? What role is it that we 
will be assuming in the worldwide context on the basis of assuming this 
role in Haiti?
  I close by quoting again from the editorials cited earlier in my 
statement and set out in full below. From the New York Times:

       To invade Haiti without prior Congressional approval would 
     short-circuit the United States Constitution.

  And from the Washington Post:

       It cheats on the separation of powers as defined in the 
     Constitution.

                               Exhibit 1

               [From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1994]

                      Congress Must Vote on Haiti

       To invade Haiti without prior Congressional approval would 
     short-circuit the United States Constitution. It would also 
     leave the President with sole political responsibility if the 
     operation turns sour. Yet that is just what the Clinton 
     Administration now suggests it might do.
       Neither of the situations usually cited as justifying 
     independent action by the Commander in Chief--military crisis 
     or unexpected threat to national security--exists in this 
     case. To the contrary, Congressional deliberation is both 
     practical and desirable, and there is plenty of time for it.
       The Constitution vests the power to declare war in Congress 
     while giving the President command of the armed forces. Those 
     overlapping responsibilities have fueled generations of 
     controversy.
       Beyond indulging a natural tendency to press against a 
     vaguely defined constitutional boundary, recent Presidents 
     have invoked practical arguments for bypassing Congress, like 
     the need for speedy response or tactical surprise. Under the 
     threat of a missile-launched nuclear Armageddon on 20 
     minutes' warning, the idea of protracted Congressional 
     deliberation could be made to look like an absurd 18th-
     century anachronism.
       Cold-war Presidents also argued that military actions taken 
     under the authority of treaty commitments or U.N. resolutions 
     are not really wars, but ``police actions'' or ``troop 
     redeployments,'' and thereby exempt from constitutional 
     requirements.
       For years Congress was happy to avoid responsibility. But 
     Presidential excesses in Vietnam drove Congress to reclaim 
     some of its authority in the War Powers Resolution of 1973. 
     This required Presidents to get timely Congressional approval 
     whenever they placed U.S. troops at risk. Since then, 
     Presidents have disputed the resolution's authority but 
     sometimes fulfilled its provisions.
       In 1991, Democrats in both houses insisted that President 
     Bush get prior Congressional approval for Operation Desert 
     Storm. Now, misplaced fealty drives many of those same 
     Democrats to relieve President Clinton of the same 
     responsibility.
       That is poor governance and poor partisanship too. 
     Democrats would do better to protect Mr. Clinton from 
     enmeshing himself in a military action where most Americans 
     see no compelling national interests at stake and in which 
     the first casualties are likely to bring better 
     recrimination.
       President Jean-Bertrand Aristide still represents Haiti's 
     legitimate government. But sending the Marines to restore him 
     to power makes no sense even if, as some military experts 
     predict, that turns out to be an afternoon's work.
       A century of Latin interventions should have taught 
     Washington that it cannot enforce democracy at gunpoint. 
     Haitians elected Father Aristide and still support him, but 
     even his legitimacy may not survive being installed by 
     foreign troops.
       It is frustrating to watch Haiti's generals sneer at 
     sanctions, play games with U.N. and systematically shoot down 
     democratic leaders in cold blood. Their conduct warrants 
     international ostracism and economic sanctions until they 
     yield power, then generous and muscular support for the 
     elected government that replaces them.
       But the conditions that warrant an American invasion--
     conditions that include broad public support and 
     Congressional agreement--are not in place at this time. Mr. 
     Clinton should not abuse his powers and risk damage to his 
     Presidency by plunging ahead.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1994]

                      Haiti: Consensus and Consent

       President Clinton insists he won't ask Congress for 
     authorization to invade Haiti. The shortcut spares him the 
     possibility of repudiation for a venture that appears more 
     dubious and unpopular by the day. But it cheats on the 
     separation of powers as defined in the Constitution. It 
     threatens to undercut not just the quick operation planned 
     against the thugs in Port-au-Prince but the prolonged 
     occupation meant to follow. And it promises to bring a 
     political disaster upon the administration for misreading the 
     popular mood on the process as well as the substance of its 
     policy.
       Administration spokesmen trot out justifications of 
     presidential prerogative familiar--and stale--from decades of 
     political usage. The constitutional scholars shred these 
     claims. The basic point of law remains that the Founding 
     Fathers plainly meant the legislature to have a meaningful 
     say in military action beyond the immediately defensive. A 
     succession of wary presidents has resisted imposition of 
     rigid consultation under the Vietnam-era War Powers 
     Resolution, and there is reason for this. But a succession of 
     wise presidents has understood the advantage to the country--
     and to presidents--of voluntarily bringing Congress in on 
     decisions entailing a recourse to force and an exposure of 
     Americans to battlefield peril.
       In this instance, the administration conveys the impression 
     that it has adequately ``consulted'' Congress and informed 
     the public by assorted briefings and statements. Our 
     impression is that the presentation as well as the reception 
     of administration policy has been piecemeal and cluttered. No 
     single clear and comprehensive conception of policy exists of 
     the sort you would expect in a formal presidential 
     presentation. As a result, the administration heads toward an 
     early self-imposed deadline in a public fog. It actually 
     seems to be believe that its request for an enabling 
     resolution in the U.N. Security Council moots the obligation 
     or reason to seek the political company of the U.S. Congress, 
     let alone the understanding and consent of a properly 
     informed public. Imprudently, especially for a commander in 
     chief short on military credentials or standing, it counts on 
     the public to rally around if bullets begin to fly and the 
     usual accidents of war occur.
       The right precedent lies in President Bush's request of 
     Congress to authorize force, by a majority vote in both 
     houses, in the Persian Gulf in 1991. The issue was difficult 
     and hot, and Mr. Bush--having resisted but been pushed into 
     seeking that authority--took a real chance. It paid off in 
     the impetus the vote gave his policy and standing and in the 
     cover it offered if the operation had failed. Had Congress 
     rebuffed him, meanwhile--and President Clinton cannot ignore 
     this possibility--he could have laid off responsibility for 
     the consequences. With a Democrat in the White House. 
     Republicans are notably more eager, and Democrats less, to 
     bring the legislation into the act. But the principle of 
     shared accountability remains the same, and of course, the 
     concept of a commander in chief's needing to be able to 
     respond to military danger too speedily to countenance the 
     delay has no relevance whatever in this instance.
       The national security/national interest case for the 
     evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhat 
     between exceedingly thin and preposterous. If there is a 
     better case than that, the administration should be willing 
     to make it to the public and to Congress. It should be 
     willing to seek consensus and consent for spending the money 
     and taking the chances with American lives, no matter how 
     pitiable the Haitians' military resources or how good the 
     odds of succeeding may seem to the planners. A government 
     that calls up reserves for military action has an obligation 
     to do these things.

  Mr. SARBANES. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarbanes). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Illinois.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I thank the Chair.
  At the outset, I would like to thank the Senator for taking the Chair 
to give me a moment to speak on the issue of Haiti, one that has 
greatly concerned me and certainly the people of Illinois over the last 
year or so and one that certainly has been the subject of much debate 
in this Chamber today.
  A lot of the debate, Mr. President, has been confusing because there 
is a lot of conversation from every possible aspect. The issue of where 
we are and what we should do has been considered by the Members of this 
body. But I think the issue we are facing now boils down to essentially 
two things: What, if anything, should we do and how to do it.
  At the outset, I would note that in spite of all the conversation, 
our present policy is still one of negotiation. Our present policy is 
still one of diplomatic intervention. The President of the United 
States has not yet announced a change of that policy. The President of 
the United States has not yet ordered an invasion or military action.
  In fact, Mr. President, we are in this debate assuming--and rightly 
so--that there will be such an announcement and that announcement will 
take place tomorrow, Thursday, but the fact is at this moment in time 
the policy has not been changed. An invasion may be imminent but it 
certainly has not been articulated by the President.
  And so, taking for a moment the notion that we are looking at and 
expecting the President tomorrow night to announce his plan, or his 
proposal, to launch a military action against the dictatorship in 
Haiti, the question then becomes the propriety of that decision, what, 
if anything, should we do.
  I have heard conversation today from a number of our colleagues 
suggesting that we do nothing. I am reminded of that old saw that the 
only thing necessary for evil to succeed is for good men, and I would 
add women, to fail to oppose it.
  It seems to me, Mr. President, that there is little question that we 
are facing evil in the activities of the coup leaders in Haiti, evil in 
regard to human rights abuses that have occurred there, and the tragedy 
of what has happened to the Haitian people, and what we have seen, the 
spectacle of people at Guantanamo, coming across to escape persecution 
and the kind of issues, which I will speak to at length, discussed in 
the recently published human rights in Haiti publication by the U.S. 
State Department, in which they at great length talk about the actual 
situation on the ground, if you will, in Haiti. And again, I will get 
to that more specifically later on in my discussion this evening.
  But there is no question in my mind, or, frankly, I suspect, in 
anyone else's, that what we are talking about is not a nice group of 
people who have taken over the leadership of Haiti.
  No one on this floor today has been willing to stand up for the 
present dictator in Haiti. No one has spoken fondly of Mr. Cedras or 
his efforts on behalf of the Haitian people of his commitment to the 
blessings of liberty, of what a democrat he is. No one wants to say 
anything nice because there is nothing nice to say.
  Our Members have not, frankly, ducked and have not wanted to talk 
about the dirty little secret in all of this--that our uncertainty and 
the uncertainty of the trumpet that is being blown here, if you will, 
gives no small amount of comfort and succor and protection to Cedras, 
Francois, and others. It seems to me, Mr. President, that we have an 
obligation to admit, to call it like we see it, and to face up to the 
fact that we really are facing a tragedy in Haiti and a tragedy that 
has been brought about by the actions of the military dictatorship 
there.
  The major objection that I have heard on the floor in all of the 
conversations today has been that the United States does not have a 
defined national interest in Haiti. Where are our interests? We have 
heard time and time again the President has not adequately explained 
it. I will point out in the first instance that the President has not 
yet spoken on this issue. Frankly, part of the value of this debate is 
hopefully we will get a chance to hear all sides and to get the 
information and the American people will get a chance to evaluate and 
weigh the facts themselves. The American people, in my opinion, rightly 
do not want war. I mean none of us want war. Frankly, in Illinois, the 
invasion of Haiti is not a popular matter.
  But, it seems to me, the issue before us is not what is popular as 
much as it is what is right. What is the right thing to do? What can we 
be proud of? What gives this great country honor? Those are the kinds 
of concerns that I think we need to face as we go forward in this 
debate.
  I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that from my perspective I 
can see at least four very direct and specific interests of the United 
States in getting rid of this military dictatorship in Haiti, four 
specific interests that are identifiable to me. Those four interests 
are, just very briefly, the drug trade, immigration, democracy, and 
human rights. I would like to speak about each of those things.
  In the first instance, with regard to the drug trade, there is a joke 
almost--I do not know if it is a joke to call it the right thing. But 
the kids on the street, the ``boys in the hood,'' if you will, say 
things like ``you cannot buy a Cuban cigar on the streets but you can 
buy cocaine.''
  The fact of the matter is that the Haitian dictatorship is making 
money, lots of it, from being a transshipment point for the drug trade. 
It was estimated that they have made in excess of $100 million in the 
last year alone pouring drugs into our communities that are killing our 
kids; that is, killing our kids, destroying our communities, and 
wrecking the very fiber of this Nation. It seems to me that threat, the 
threat of a continued drug trade, the deterioration of our communities 
that comes from that gives us a direct national interest in Haiti, and 
what happens there and the leadership there. Certainly, that was our 
interest, and that was the stated interest when we decided to go into 
Panama back in 1990. The whole idea was Manuel Noriega was directly 
involved in the drug trade, and that involvement was seen as a direct 
threat to the United States.
  Here we have a situation that is no less obscure. In fact, it is 
probably more advisable than even Mr. Noriega's involvement. And the 
yet the whole issue of the drug trade has not really been talked about 
a whole lot on this floor. I think it has to be. I think it should be 
because we have a vital national interest in protecting our community 
from people profiteering over shipping poison across the shores into 
the United States.
  The second has to do with immigration. Certainly, while there has 
been a temporary lull in the boat people, and certainly, if anything, 
we all saw people coming across and dying in droves trying to flee the 
repression and the human rights abuses and the economic deprivation in 
Haiti at the present time. The fact of the matter is that Guantanamo 
has become, if you will, a holding ground for the Haitians that have 
tried to escape and have not been able to.
  We have not made a decision, quite frankly, as to whether to let 
those people in the country, making them immigrants fleeing from 
political persecution or encourage them to go back home. They certainly 
cannot go back home in the present circumstance.
  So the question comes, what do we do? Are we going to let the 
dictators that have destroyed democracy in Haiti control our 
immigration policy and violate altogether our borders and set up a 
situation that puts us in an impossible situation that we cannot 
control, making American taxpayers, if you will, responsible for 
warehousing people for whom there is no obvious answer in terms of 
immigration policy?
  That, it seems to me, is the second direct national interest that I 
would rather see the Attorney General of the United States control U.S. 
immigration policy than Mr. Cedras and Mr. Francois.
  The third has to do with restoring Haitian democracy. The 
consideration has been accurate here about the fact that Haiti does not 
have the 200-year or 300-year experience with democracy as does this 
country. They are trying. They tried with the election of President 
Aristide to begin to develop a brandnew baby democracy, if you will, a 
fragile democracy, that democracy that was just getting itself off the 
ground.
  President Aristide won the election in Haiti with better than 70 
percent of the vote--and I would add parenthetically that the Presiding 
Officer did a little better than that last night in the Maryland 
primaries. But the fact is that 70 percent of the vote is considered a 
very healthy vote, indeed. The people of his country elected him 
president. He was kicked out by people by the end of a gun wielded by 
this military coup.
  So the question becomes, do we have a direct interest in restoring 
democracy as high flown as that might sound? When it happens, to begin 
with, then-Secretary of State Jim Baker, and I quote, said:

       This coup must not and will not succeed.

  Here we are almost 2 years later, more than 2 years later, debating 
the coup that must not and would not succeed. It apparently has 
succeeded at least long enough, too long in my opinion, and it seems to 
me that if we are serious about protecting democracy, restoring 
democracy, giving democracy a chance in that tiny country right off our 
borders, we have an obligation to go in and to let the dictators know 
that they just cannot get away with having taken democracy hostage and 
having it shut down in Haiti.
  Certainly, the Clinton administration shares the Bush 
administration's commitment to restore democracy in Haiti because the 
President knows that if the Haitian military coup is allowed to stand, 
the stability of other fledgling democracies in the region will be 
threatened.
  So again, that is a third national interest that I think should be 
fairly clear to all involved.
  Fourth, Mr. President, I believe that our country has a real interest 
in promoting human rights and in responding to the terrible rights 
abuses that have occurred so close to our shores.
  I would like really to share with the Members of this body the report 
on human rights abuses in Haiti. It makes for terrible reading. But I 
really would like to have it introduced as part of the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Human Rights in Haiti, United States Department of State, September 13, 
                                  1994

       This is the third interim report on the condition of human 
     rights in Haiti to be prepared by the Department of State in 
     1994. Since publication of the annual ``Country Reports on 
     Human Rights Practices in 1993'' in February 1994, the 
     Department prepared and released two reports on Haiti, in 
     April and July of 1994. This third report is more detailed 
     and comprehensive than its predecessors. It attempts to fill 
     the void created by the compulsion in July of this year of 
     the UN/OAS's jointly sponsored International Civilian Mission 
     (ICM), which monitored human rights conditions throughout 
     Haiti.


                                summary

       The human rights situation in Haiti under the illegal 
     Cedras regime is comparable to the notorious regime of 
     Francois ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The military and the de facto 
     government promote repression and terror, sanctioning 
     widespread assassination, killing, torture, beating, 
     mutilation and rape. The regime's actions openly defy the 
     international community, which has repeatedly condemned these 
     gross human rights violations.
       The increasing repression and terrorism in Haiti is 
     perpetrated at various levels by military, police and 
     civilian groups reporting to the Cedras regime. The military 
     controls the de facto government, the police, the police 
     attaches, the Chefs de Section, and the nominally independent 
     FRAPH, known variously as the Revolutionary Front for 
     Advancement and Progress in Haiti, or the Armed Revolutionary 
     Front of the Haitian People.
       Though the democratically approved constitution of 1987 
     calls for the establishment of a police force separate from 
     the military, the armed forces have retained control of 
     policing functions. The police attaches are quasi-official 
     agents of the security apparatus, who conduct low level 
     surveillance of the populace, enforce repression, and 
     organize vigilante action. The Chefs de Section constitute 
     the rural branch of the military structure, and answer to the 
     army's departmental commanders. The regime directs, 
     encourages or permits these organizations and individuals to 
     violate human rights with impunity.
       The central authorities set the tone and provide general 
     direction for official terrorism, but do not necessarily 
     oversee each violent act. Repression is, in effect, 
     decentralized with the result that the lower ranks of the 
     security apparatus commonly regard their positions as private 
     sinecures. They regularly exploit their authority to extort 
     from the local populace, enhance their own social standing, 
     and settle scores for themselves or their friends. This 
     particular brand of Haitian terror, much used by Francois 
     Duvalier in his time, gave rise to his creation of the 
     notorious Tonton Macoutes. As the case of military commander 
     Norelus Mandelus (see below) illustrates, the military is 
     capable of controlling the violence, but encourages or 
     permits it because it suits their purposes.
       To monitor the human rights performance of the de facto 
     government, the UN and the OAS co-sponsored the International 
     Civilian Mission (ICM), which was first deployed in Haiti in 
     1993, and again in 1994. The ICM found considerable evidence 
     of rampant human rights abuse in Haiti from the time of its 
     arrival to July 1994, when the de facto government asserted 
     that the ICM's presence in Haiti had not been legally 
     authorized, and expelled it.


                     recent human rights reporting

       Although the U.S. embassy has not been able to replicate 
     the outstanding work of the nearly 90 full time ICM monitors 
     who were resident throughout the country until July, it has 
     significantly stepped up its human rights monitoring efforts 
     since the ICM's departure. In addition to spot reporting, the 
     embassy's interagency team reports weekly on the 
     deteriorating human rights situation.


                 since the ouster of president aristide

       The Cedras regime came to power in September 1991 when it 
     staged a violent coup against the eight-month-old, 
     democratically-elected government of President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide. In the immediate aftermath of the coup the new 
     regime killed at least 300 to 500 people, targeting Aristide 
     supporters specifically. As we approach the third anniversary 
     of the coup against the Aristide government, the human rights 
     situation has worsened. To maintain its rule, the regime has 
     instilled a pervasive climate of fear through widespread 
     assassination and other killings, torture, mutilation, rape, 
     and steady harassment. According to the February 7, 1994 
     report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Haiti, as many as 
     3000 Haitian civilians, including many Aristide supporters, 
     have been killed under the Cedras regime. Other reports 
     indicate that at least several hundred more have been killed 
     since then. Indeed, the present situation reflects a degree 
     of terror comparable to that of the Duvalier regimes.


                   the most recent high profile cases

       The August 28 assassination of President Aristide's 
     colleague, the Rev. Jean-Marie Vincent, is the most recent 
     demonstration of the de facto regime's determination to 
     silence its opponents. The priest was shot to death by 
     unidentified gunmen as he drove up to the gates of his 
     order's compound in the Turgeau area of Port-au-Price.
       Several other political assassination attempts have failed 
     in recent months. Former Senator Reynold Charles was wounded 
     when shot by unidentified gunmen but escaped death. Gunmen 
     attacked the home of Senator Clarck Parent and his sister 
     (the Mayor of Petionville) but fled when the blind senator 
     fired his pistol into the air. Rather than launch credible 
     investigations into these events, the de facto government 
     dismissed them as the acts of parties interested in 
     discrediting the regime.
       These assassinations and attempted assassinations are but 
     the latest in a lengthy series of killings of high level 
     opposition figures. In September of 1993 prominent pro-
     Aristide activist Antoine Izmery was killed when a band of 
     armed men attacked him during a church service; on October 
     14, 1993, the respected Haitian lawyer and Minister of 
     Justice Guy Malary was assassinated in downtown Port-au-
     Prince. The Cedras regime has shown scant interest in 
     investigating these deaths.
       On September 9, 1994, the New York Times reported specific 
     instances of political terror being directed at orphans, many 
     of whose parents were themselves victims of the de facto 
     regime. These killings have reportedly been accompanied by 
     persecution of the orphanage staffs, resulting in the closure 
     of many orphanages.


                           the rule of terror

       The regime's human rights record demonstrates its intention 
     not only to eliminate its opponents, but to subjugate the 
     general populace and suppress and intimidate any potential 
     opposition as well. A recent Human Rights Watch report 
     estimates that as many as 300,000 persons have been driven 
     into hiding. Widespread torture, rape, beatings, and the 
     extortion of money from people arrested for no reason, serve 
     to cow and demoralize the public.
       The evidence of mass intimidation is ample and widely 
     corroborated. A delegation from the Inter-American Commission 
     for Human Rights (IACHR) that visited Haiti from May 16 to 
     May 20, 1994 found that the human rights situation in Haiti 
     had ``deteriorated seriously'' since their last visit in 
     August 1993. The delegation was able to document 133 cases of 
     extrajudicial killings between February and May of 1994 
     alone, and there is reason to believe there were many more 
     beyond the scope of their investigations. It also found that 
     the regime was leaving severely mutilated corpses on the 
     street simply to terrorize the populace.
       The IACHR delegation uncovered evidence that the wives and 
     relatives of the regime's opponents were being raped and 
     otherwise sexually abused. It identified numerous cases of 
     arbitrary detention, disappearances, and torture. The 
     delegation attributed full responsibility for the 
     deteriorating situation to the de facto authorities.
       In its press release of July 27, 1994, the IACHR 
     characterized human rights abuse in Haiti as ``flagrant and 
     systematic'' and attributed it to ``the continuing unlawful 
     exercise of power by the Haitian military and its 
     appointees.'' It further pointed out the collapse of 
     responsible governmental institutions, referring to ``the 
     total ineffectuality of the judiciary or other mechanisms to 
     prevent or punish human rights violations,'' and noted that 
     violators ``act with outright impunity.''
       In July 1994, Human Rights Watch issued a report 
     documenting dozens of cases of rape aimed at terrorizing not 
     only the opponents of the regime, but the general populace as 
     well. And the ICM, for its part, documented sixty-six cases 
     of politically motivated rape by the military and para-
     military forces in the first five months of 1994 (before the 
     ICM's expulsion from Haiti by the military).


                    a litany of human rights abuses

       A sampling of the mounting incidence of rape, torture, and 
     mutilation illustrates the serious deterioration of the human 
     rights situation over the past year:
       On August 6, 1993, uniformed soldiers and police invaded 
     the home of a suspected Aristide supporter, raping the wife 
     and arresting the husband, whom they tortured and released.
       On August 14, 1993, police, military, and attaches invaded 
     the home of another suspected Aristide supporter. They killed 
     a two-year-old child, molested two young women, and stole 
     valuables.
       In October 1993 the ICM report on human rights documented 
     the rape of a 13-year-old girl by military personnel in 
     Bayeux (near Cap Haitien in the north) in June; the wife of a 
     Cite Soleil activist by uniformed men in July; and a 16-year-
     old girl by a soldier in Derec (near Ft. Liberte in the 
     northeast).
       On December 27, 1993, a fire in the Cite Soleil 
     neighborhood of Port-au-Prince destroyed some 200 dwellings, 
     killed four people and injured 61. There is evidence that 
     FRAPH set the fire in retaliation for the killing of one of 
     its members.
       According to Human Rights Watch, on January 9, 1994 a woman 
     from Cabaret (a coastal town north of Port-au-Prince) bled to 
     death as a result of having been raped by soldiers in late 
     December.
       Amnesty International reports that on January 15, a 17-
     year-old boy was shot by the FRAPH because he was suspected 
     of being connected to a children's home established by 
     Aristide.
       Human Rights Watch reports that on January 29 a pro-
     Aristide student activist was raped by two FAD'H attaches as 
     she walked home.
       On February 3, the military surrounded a house occupied by 
     pro-Aristide activist youth and opened fire, killing eight or 
     nine youths.
       On the same day, the military fabricated an attack by 
     Aristide supporters to justify terrorizing and beating 
     residents near Les Cayes on the southern peninsula. One 
     elderly man was beaten to death, and the military 
     subsequently attacked those who attended his funeral.
       Human Rights Watch reports that on the evening of February 
     7, 1994, two attaches invaded the home of a family that had 
     been denounced by an unidentified detractor. They tied up the 
     husband and raped his wife on the front porch.
       On March 23, plainclothes military and FRAPH members 
     harassed and physically abused five ICM monitors in the 
     central plateau town of Hinche. The ICM reported increased 
     lawlessness in the region, with FRAPH members and soldiers 
     shooting up neighborhoods and committing burglary and 
     extortion with impunity.
       In late March, international monitors reported FRAPH 
     members and soldiers shooting up neighborhoods and committing 
     burglary and extortion with impunity. The U.S. embassy 
     reported a general increase in violence, including rape, 
     against the families of the regime's critics.
       On April 18, soldiers opened fire on slum-dwellers in the 
     pro-Aristide area of Raboteaux in Gonaives, killing roughly 
     30 people.
       On May 23, a dozen right-wing gunmen--probably members of 
     FRAPH-- hunted down and brutally killed four Aristide 
     supporters in Cite Soleil.
       On June 14, soldiers and armed civilians raided a church 
     office in Laborde, arresting and severely beating the 
     director of the College of Notre Dame and his parents.
       On June 21, an employee of the Petionville mayor's office 
     was severely beaten and another imprisoned for unwittingly 
     violating a new decree that the Haitian flag not be lowered 
     until the ``international oppression'' of Haiti ends.
       On June 24, an explosion in the house of a local 
     representative of a labor organization killed two girls.
       On June 30, the bodies of five men appeared on the streets 
     of Port-au-Prince. All had been shot with their hands tied 
     behind their backs. As with many killings, the exact 
     motivation is unknown; the absence of effort by the military 
     or police to prevent or investigate such killings lead us to 
     assume that they and others took place with the approval or 
     outright participation of the military and their allies.
       The embassy also confirms that on August 18 the FAD'H 
     arrested up to 40 people in the southern peninsula town of 
     Cavaillon over an incident involving the lowering of the 
     Haitian flag. As of August 23, as many as 30 remained 
     incarcerated.
       Several prisoners are reported to have died in police 
     custody in Les Cayes, and beatings and torture are common.


      REPORTING FROM THE EMBASSY HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM SINCE JULY 1994

       After the expulsion of the UN/OAS human rights monitors, 
     the U.S. embassy stepped-up its own human rights reporting. 
     Extensive coverage of the countryside by embassy reporting 
     teams since July 1994 has found a dramatic increase in human 
     rights violations.
       The Central Province (near Hinche) had long been the home 
     of popular movements until they were silenced by the brutal 
     repression of the regime's local authority, Col. Gideon. 
     After the Colonel was reassigned to the Southwest Province 
     (around Les Cayes) repression in that area immediately 
     increased. Indiscriminate searches and arbitrary arrests were 
     commonplace. There have been reports that several people in 
     the Les Cayes region have been arrested simply for listening 
     to Voice of America broadcasts.
       In Les Cayes, the summer saw the appearance in a southern 
     coastal town of Norelus Mandelus, a military commander who 
     characterized himself as the Saddam Hussein of Haiti. Among 
     other atrocities, Norelus cut off a victim's ear during a 
     vicious beating and forced him to eat it, and then carved his 
     initials in the victim's flesh. Military authorities 
     tolerated this behavior until a priest and seminarian who 
     were among the victims of Norelus' indiscriminate beatings 
     turned out to be relatives of a higher ranking officer. 
     Norelus apparently received a minor reprimand before being 
     reassigned.
       In a flagrant example of an arbitrary arrest, authorities 
     in Miragoane imprisoned Lavalas activist Gardy Leblanc, 
     reportedly for ridiculing the new para-military civilian 
     guard during their drills. The officer in command of the 
     Miragoane police office refused embassy personnel access to 
     Mr. Leblanc. The officer said that he was under orders not to 
     talk to the embassy representatives and that Leblanc was 
     being held pending orders from his commander. After repeated 
     inquiries from the embassy, Leblanc was reportedly released.
       Last month, the embassy reporting team found that low-level 
     repression and terror is common in coastal Aquin, just east 
     of Les Cayes. Many people were incarcerated and all were 
     subject to harassment by the authorities. A local nun 
     described to the embassy some of the injuries she had treated 
     for prisoners tortured by their captors.
       In the town of Gressiers, a short distance west of Port-au-
     Prince, several bodies of murder victims were found in a 
     shallow grave. The bodies were partially exposed and were 
     easily discovered.
       On the morning of August 1, 1994, the police beat several 
     persons who were awaiting the opening of the U.S. refugee 
     processing center in Port-au-Prince. No evidence was found 
     that the victims provoked the action.


                     flouting international concern

       Ever since the time of the coup, the international 
     community has repeatedly condemned Haiti's de facto regime. 
     The de facto government's response has been to increasingly 
     isolate itself from the international community. The regime 
     reneged on the terms of the Governor's Island Agreement, and 
     has subsequently rejected all efforts by the international 
     community to bring about a peaceful resolution of this 
     crisis. Just this month, the regime refused to meet the 
     special representative of UN Secretary General Boutros 
     Boutrous-Ghali. It has long been clear that they are the 
     cause of the horrendous human rights situation in Haiti, and 
     it is now becoming clearer that they have no intention of 
     working with the international community to resolve this 
     crisis.
       The escalating human rights crisis in Haiti has received 
     intense attention in the OAS, the UN, and other international 
     fora. Most recently, the UN Security Council, recognizing 
     that appropriate diplomatic channels had not resolved the 
     crisis, approved Resolution 940 which authorizes the removal 
     of the de facto government by all necessary means. From this 
     authorization, the United States has worked to form an 
     international coalition to implement Resolution 940.

  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I would like to just read a little 
bit of the summary from the report. This report came about--it was a 
function of the International Civilian Mission as well as of the United 
Nations and the OAS sponsorship. This is a report by the State 
Department. They said:

       The human rights situation in Haiti under the illegal 
     Cedras regime is comparable to the notorious regime of 
     Francois ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The military and the de facto 
     government promote repression and terror, sanctioning 
     widespread assassination, killing, torture, beating, 
     mutilation and rape. The regime's actions openly defy the 
     international community, which has repeatedly condemned these 
     gross human rights violations.
       The increasing repression and terrorism in Haiti is 
     perpetrated at various levels by military, police and 
     civilian groups reporting to the Cedras regime. The military 
     controls the de facto government, the police, the police 
     attaches, the Chefs de Section, and the nominally independent 
     FRAPH, known variously as the Revolutionary Front for 
     Advancement and Progress in Haiti, or the Armed Revolutionary 
     Front of the Haitian People.

      And then it goes on to talk about something else. I want to 
read a little bit here:

       The Cedras regime came to power in September 1991 when it 
     staged a violent coup against the eight-month old 
     democratically-elected government of President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the new 
     regime --

  Meaning Cedras' group.

     killed at least 300 to 500 people, targeting Aristide 
     supporters specifically.

  This is the third anniversary of the coup.
  Then they go on to talk about some of the high-profile cases of the 
killings and tortures.

       The August 28 assassination of President Aristide's 
     colleague, the Reverend Jean-Marie Vincent, is the most 
     recent demonstration of the de facto regime's determination 
     to silence its opponents. The priest was shot to death by 
     unidentified gunmen as he drove up to the gates of his 
     order's compound in the Turgeau area of Port-au-Prince.

  They are killing priests, Mr. President. It seems to me that you have 
to go a long way to want to stand by and be associated in any way with 
that kind of action.
  In addition to killing priests, there was a litany of human rights 
abuses.

       A sampling of the mounting incidence of rape, torture and 
     mutilation illustrates the serious deterioration of the human 
     rights situation over the past year:
       On August 6, 1993, uniformed soldiers and police invaded 
     the home of a suspected Aristide supporter, raping the wife 
     and arresting the husband, whom they tortured and released.
       On August 14, 1993, police, military, and attaches invaded 
     the home of another Aristide supporter. They killed a 2-year-
     old child, molested two young women, and stole valuables.
       In October 1993, the ICM report on human rights documented 
     the rape of, one, a 13-year-old girl by military personnel in 
     Bayeaux; two, the wife of a Cite Soleil activist by uniformed 
     men in July; and three, a 16-year-old girl by a soldier in 
     the Northeast.

  On December 27, 1993, a fire destroyed some 200 dwellings. It was 
determined that the fire was set.

       Amnesty International reports on January 15, a 17-year-old 
     boy was shot to death by the FRAPH because he was suspected 
     of being connected to a children's home established by 
     Aristide.

  Mr. President, this report goes on and on and on and gets just more 
and more gruesome as you go forward. I will not belabor the point, 
except to say that it seems to me that we have identifiable, specific 
national interests in seeing to it that these kinds of human rights 
abuses are not allowed to be continued under the leadership of this 
military dictatorship.
  The question becomes what should we do about it, and the process. 
Certainly, I think you know I care a lot about process. I talk about it 
a lot. It is critically important because process, after all, is the 
foundation on which we maintain democratic institutions.
  I want to talk for a moment about the fact that this administration--
the President--has given peace a chance. The fact of the matter is, 
with the Governor's Island accord, with the appointment of former 
Congressman Gray, with Madeleine Albright's efforts, with the 
international efforts, with the conversations and constant 
deliberations with the United Nations, OAS, the Caribbean community, 
they have tried peace. Two resolutions have been passed by the U.N. 
Security Council of late. Resolution No. 917 authorized the use of 
sanctions. Resolution No. 940 authorized the use of force.
  With regard to the sanctions specifically, Mr. President, I am making 
this speech now having all along said, ``let us use sanctions, let us 
not use military intervention, let us resort to weapons as an absolute 
final, last-ditch thing we can do. Try every possible diplomatic means 
and economic means at our disposal.''
  The sanctions have been tried, and they have been put on, and they 
have been squeezed tight and enforced. Unfortunately, Mr. President, 
the reality is--and it is the decision that the President is having to 
face--the sanctions really are cutting to the core of the social and 
economic fabric in Haiti. Poor people, people who cannot make it 
otherwise, are feeling the impact of the sanctions, while the very 
wealthy, the military elite, the dictators and their wives and their 
families, have been able to withstand the sanctions in large part 
because they can transfer money internationally, and they can fly to 
Miami to shop, and they can live their lives in their villas and 
compounds without real concerns. So the sanctions have not been as 
effective as they were, for example, in South Africa. I was very proud 
to have been part of the sanctions effort in South Africa, because I 
thought it would make a difference, and it did.
  Here the sanctions really have had limited utility, because it is 
such a blunt instrument and unfortunate under the circumstances, since 
the military leadership feels they can wait us out, that we will blink 
first, and the effect has been, if you will, arguably 
counterproductive.
  So, Mr. President, the President of the United States may well 
conclude that direct intervention is the course that we need to take. 
He has not said that yet, but it is likely that he will. And so the 
question becomes for all of us as Senators: What about the War Powers 
Act and what is our appropriate role in all of that?
  Well, of course, Mr. President, I think it is altogether appropriate 
that, as Senators, we certainly want to protect our prerogatives under 
the Constitution. We certainly want to make certain that the law gets 
followed in this regard, that we do the right thing in terms of the 
constitutional separation of powers and the checks and balances.
  But I would like at this point to associate myself with the remarks 
of the Senator from Georgia, when he pointed out we are not talking 
about a war. We are not talking about a war; we are talking about an 
action that is more like the action in Panama or Grenada than it is 
even the Persian Gulf.
  So, in that regard, I believe that while the debate over the War 
Powers Act has continued for years, and will no doubt continue--and 
Congress is rightly concerned about our appropriate role under the 
Constitution--the fact is that this struggle in this debate, which is a 
very important one, should not be used to hamstring this President any 
more than it was allowed to hamstring previous Presidents who were 
faced with making very difficult decisions in equally difficult 
circumstances.
  The reality of it is that none of us was elected President of the 
United States. We do not have the entire picture. We have the picture 
as we read it in the newspapers and as we get briefed by the State 
Department. And we, of course, have the benefit of our own logic and 
common sense and judgment. I do not in any way mean to suggest that 
this debate should not happen and the debate around our prerogatives 
and rightful role should not happen. I think it is an important and 
healthy debate.
  Mr. President, I say at this time that until the President of the 
United States decides what to do, the most important thing that we can 
do in this body is to say very clearly that our foreign policy will 
follow our values, that we will act as a Nation when human lives are at 
stake, as surely as we will act when oil or our economic interests are 
at stake; that the most important thing we can do is to sound a sure 
trumpet, to be very clear, to let the military dictators know--who, 
hopefully, are watching C-SPAN or CNN and hearing some parts of this--
that we will not let them pull the chain of the greatest country on the 
Earth on behalf of something that is so clearly wrong; that we will not 
allow them to set an example for Korea or any other place on this 
planet where dictatorship will overwhelm democracy, where the few will 
make life miserable and take advantage of and commit human rights 
abuses against the many; where the dictators and their ilk will rape a 
country, will take the lifeblood out of a country in order to further 
their own personal pecuniary financial gain. That is what we have here.

  So I think, Mr. President, it is important that the Congress not send 
the signal--and those are so important--that we not send the signal out 
there, whether it is to our domestic media or to the military in Haiti, 
or frankly anywhere else in the world, that we are confused about what 
our values are, that we are confused about what our national interest 
is, or that we are confused in our support for this President doing the 
best job he can to conduct our foreign policy, because that is the job 
that under the Constitution he is charged with doing.
  So, Mr. President, again, in conclusion, I would say that I am 
looking forward, as we all are, to the President's speech tomorrow 
night. This is a very tough, tough issue. No one likes to be involved 
in this. I mean, of all the issues that we get to deal with here in the 
U.S. Senate, I daresay these kinds of issues having to do with war and 
peace are the toughest. I have a 17-year-old son. I am not at all 
anxious ever to want to commit American forces to do something that 
will require being around things that will kill people.
  These are very grave and serious matters. But at the same time, it 
seems to me that if our Nation is to stand for anything and if my 17-
year-old son's life and my life and our lives as Americans are to have 
meaning, they have to have meaning with honor. We have to stand for 
something, and we have to let the world know that when we say 
something, we give our word, when we make speeches and make 
pronouncements about the lofty principles that we hold dear, that they 
are not just conversation, that those principles have real meaning to 
us; that we really do believe that democracy has a value; we really do 
believe that human rights have a value; we really do want to make 
certain that the drug trade is stopped; we really do want to see to it 
that people can stay in their own homes.
  We have values in this country, and those values form the bedrock 
foundation of our policy both domestic and foreign.
  So, Mr. President, in conclusion, I yield the floor, and I suggest 
the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum having been suggested, 
the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________