[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 128 (Wednesday, September 14, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: September 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF ADM. HENRY H. MAUZ, JR., TO BE PLACED ON THE RETIRED LIST
IN THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL
The Senate continued with the consideration of the nomination.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I rise today during this debate over
the retirement of Admiral Mauz to suggest to my colleagues that they
support the majority and support the Armed Services Committee
recommendation with regard to Admiral Mauz and also to take just a few
minutes to discuss the larger issue of sexual harassment in the U.S.
Navy.
I need tell none of my colleagues that we faced this precise issue of
allegations earlier this year when Admiral Kelso's retirement was
before the Senate. I voted then to give Admiral Kelso retirement at the
four-star grade because I felt it was improper and unfair to have a
trial of Admiral Kelso's conduct on the floor of the U.S. Senate. It
seemed to me that we had a lot of allegations, but we had no certainty,
we had no conviction, no process by which Admiral Kelso could defend
himself from the allegations or where his accusers could have their
side vindicated. It struck me at the time that the floor of the U.S.
Senate is a very poor place to try to come to judgment on contentious
factual issues, and I said so at the time.
Mr. President, I have become something of an expert, if there is such
a thing, on the subject of sexual harassment in the Navy over the last
year, largely due to the experiences of one of my constituents, Lt.
(jg.) Rebecca Hansen. It has now been reported all over the country
that I ended the career of a great admiral, Adm. Stanley Arthur, when I
held up his nomination for the commander of the U.S. Forces in the
Pacific because of a role he did not ask for but accepted in the Hansen
case.
Mr. President, that is not true. The Navy did it to him, with, I
suspect, the unwitting help of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
But, there again, the problem is not me or even Admiral Arthur, but the
absence of a sensible process in the Navy and in the congressional
oversight process to handle allegations of sexual harassment.
In the Hansen case, I asked the Navy, starting on April 7, 1993, in
much the same way that I have asked hundreds of Federal agencies over
16 years in the U.S. Senate, to explain how it made decisions and
arrived at conclusions in a specific matter involving my constituent,
Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen.
What I experienced from April 1993 until June 1994 was, with more
than 1 year of correspondence and meetings, some of which I was
personally involved in, was a system that avoided responsibility,
answered direct questions with indirect answers, and otherwise resisted
any attempt to find out why they treated a constituent of mine the way
they did.
And I must say, without exaggeration--I do not need to do that
anymore, since I am leaving this place, Mr. President--in 16 years, I
have never seen anything like the way the Navy tried to avoid answering
simple, direct questions in the case of Rebecca Hansen.
Finally, in total frustration, on April 28, 1994, more than a year
after this effort on my part began, I took what was an extraordinary
step for me of putting a hold on Admiral Arthur's nomination. I am not
one of the people in this place that does that sort of thing. I say it
was an extraordinary step because with regard to constituent service
matters, I have never been put in the position before where I had to
resort to this particular tactic simply to get straight answers out of
a Federal Government office. But I felt at the time that the Navy would
not evade my questions--I hoped they would not--if I did this, and that
the Navy would not want to put Admiral Arthur at risk.
Mr. President, I was dead wrong. Rather than talk to me, the Navy
called the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, or someone, and
asked how long the nomination could be held up. And for reasons I will
never understand, the Navy decided to withdraw the nomination rather
than hold anyone accountable in the Hansen case. Perhaps someone else
knows the reason why Admiral Arthur's nomination was withdrawn. But it
is remarkable to me, in the context of today's debate, that the Navy
would go to such lengths as withdrawing the nomination of Admiral
Arthur in order to avoid dealing with the reaction of Navy personnel to
the acknowledged sexual harassment in the Hansen case. It is not at all
surprising, based on my experience, that they would lay off on me the
responsibility for their decision.
I want to thank especially my colleague from Virginia, Senator
Warner, who has been a longtime member of the Armed Services Committee
and former Secretary of the Navy, for his particular efforts and for
those of the leadership of the committee in helping us get the real
story of the Hansen case out after the fact.
It is remarkable to me that the U.S. Navy, after having gone through
the identical experience with Admiral Kelso, would now present Admiral
Mauz' retirement without any greater efforts to get to the bottom of
the allegations against him. I read carefully the remarks Monday of my
colleague from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
in which he acknowledged, and I would acknowledge, the terrific efforts
the committee went to to find out the truths of the allegations against
Admiral Mauz.
But with all due respect, getting the Navy's version of disputed
facts, based on the findings of a Navy inspector general, is not a fair
or reasonable process. It is instructive to me that a civilian court of
law in the Paula Coughlin case recently ruled inadmissible the Navy
inspector general's report on the grounds it was unreliable.
I would note that in the Hansen case there was also an inspector
general's report, but I was told, Mr. President, personally, by both
the Navy and the staff of the Armed Services Committee I was not
permitted to see that report. Hence, I was left to my own devices to
get information. And to this day I have no idea if the Hansen inspector
general's report is worth the paper it is written on.
Mr. President, as I said in the beginning, I intend to vote to give
Admiral Mauz his retirement at the four-star rank. And I will do so,
albeit reluctantly, because I think it is unfair to give credence to
mere allegations in a forum where he has no voice, the floor of the
U.S. Senate.
I agree with my colleague from Georgia, Senator Nunn, who said on
Monday, and I will quote:
An allegation is not a fact. An allegation is not proof.
And continuing to quote my colleague:
We need to keep that in mind. There are too many of these
cases now coming before the Senate where allegations are
being taken as tantamount to fact. That is simply not the way
that any deliberative body adjudicates important matters.
I end the quote from my colleague by endorsing his analysis of the
situation, and I agree with him.
All I can say is that blind reliance on the Navy to investigate
itself and report on its findings is not much better. And that is 16
years of experience.
So I have written a letter to my colleagues who have the
responsibility of oversight, which is a near impossible situation given
how fast things change in this place, suggesting to them what I will
now suggest to all of my colleagues and to the Navy, that it is kind of
a sad spectacle to see repeated again and again and again allegations
coming up at a time when a person is ending an otherwise most honorable
career in the Navy.
It is my view that victims of harassment must have confidence that
they have a forum to bring their complaints, a forum where they can get
a fair hearing, where they will not be subverted by what is often
called the old boys network, and where they will not be victimized
further with retribution or retaliation carried out by cronies of their
harassers.
At the same time, those accused of sexual harassment must have a
forum where they can defend themselves from unfair allegations, a place
where they can clear their names and vindicate their decisions and
their behavior, and a forum in which a traditionally and historically
male-dominated service, in which officers retiring today are no more
nor less sensitive than males of the same generation in other walks of
life, can have their behavior put in perspective, so outstanding
careers are not jeopardized by the acknowledged need to eliminate
gender bias. This is not the place to do that.
Finally, I say we in the Senate need a process where we are confident
that whatever we decide in any given case, we are deciding it on the
merits, on the true facts, after a full and fair hearing and
deliberation.
Mr. President, Stanley Arthur will retire from the Navy someday. He
does not deserve to retire with any kind of a cloud over his head. He
deserved to command the Pacific forces, but the Navy decided otherwise.
The Navy, not I, made that decision. The Navy, not I, will cause this
predicament to be repeated if they and the oversight committees cannot
agree on how to deal fairly with constituent concerns and naval
history.
No one will be satisfied with the decision we make today, whichever
way it goes, because there is no factual record upon which to
deliberate, no conclusion, no conviction that we are operating with
full knowledge of the facts.
So I leave here and I leave it to future Congresses and the Navy to
decide how that is to be done. My staff has been briefed by the Navy on
their efforts to establish just such a procedure, and it appears to me
that the Navy is making a good start. But along with that procedure we
need to see the determination of the Navy, from the Secretary on down,
to implement the procedure with fairness and with certainty.
The case of Admiral Mauz does not give evidence of that
determination. I think he deserves what he has asked of us today, and I
support the leadership in their efforts to see that he does get it, and
I will support that effort here today as well. I hope the next case
that comes up will demonstrate we have chosen and are on a different
and a better course.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator answer one question he
raised before he leaves the floor?
We all have a lot of thinking to do about how these nominations are
handled. I think the Navy and the military services are going to have
increasing cases of complaints, some of which are going to be valid.
Inevitably, according to human nature, some of them are not going to be
invalid. Some people are going to deserve punishment for the sexual
harassment, and some people are going to be innocent victims of
allegations of individuals who have not somehow made the kind of
progress in the military they expected to make and therefore are
looking for reasons for that and looking for ways to place blame.
So this is a difficult area. The military has gone through difficult
transitions before. This is going to be a difficult transition that is
going to be with us some time, and I think our committee has urged and
will continue to urge the Department of Defense to come up with
expeditious, fair, and objective ways of judging these cases. And they
are working on that.
But I think we all have to understand that this is a challenge for
the military. We are making positions available for women in the
military which are overdue and which they can perform very well. But
there are significant changes taking place here, and it is going to
require judgment on the part of all.
One point the Senator from Minnesota made that I think needs
correction is he mentioned that this was strictly a Navy investigation.
That is the normal course of events. If the DOD IG is required to
review and supervise every service investigation of one-on-one
misconduct, whether it is sexual or otherwise, there would be hundreds
of thousands of cases of such in the military.
I do not think we in this body sometimes put in perspective the
number of people out there in the military and the number of incidents
that take place, some of them sexual harassment-type cases, some of
them other type cases. For instance, Admiral Mauz had under his command
175,000 people.
Now, Admiral Mauz right now is out there on duty in the Navy, and he
is one of the key players in preparing for whatever may take place in
Haiti, perhaps within the next few days or weeks. If somebody this
morning has a one-on-one offense, whether sexual harassment or not and
the captain of a ship under his command--he has over 200 of them--takes
action, I personally do not want Admiral Mauz involved in that now. He
has things he has to do. He has to supervise the security of the
country and the Navy, the Navy's role. So I do not want the four-star
commander out there to have to be involved and be responsible, and not
for us to start creating the climate on the floor of the Senate that
they are responsible to supervise and make sure that every detail of
every administrative or even court martial proceeding against an
individual is handled properly.
There is a whole chain of command. They are ultimately responsible.
The four-star admirals are responsible for supervising and for creating
a climate, and all of that, and they should be held accountable for
that. But if a captain of a ship makes a misjudgment in how they handle
an administrative matter or a doctor basically--and in this case,
according to the Navy, all the information we have, the doctor who
recommended psychiatric confinement and examination for this particular
complainant did not know that she had ever lodged a sexual harassment
complaint. We have that on the word of the Secretary of the Navy. They
looked into it.
So, if there was a misjudgment about the doctor here, it had nothing
to do, according to the Navy, with the sexual harassment complaint that
this individual had filed. He did not know about it.
I do not think this body wants to hold a four-star admiral
responsible for that kind of detail unless we want to say to them that
we no longer want them to worry about Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, or the
safety of the fleet. They have responsibility for over 200 ships and
over 175,000 people. If we start creating the climate--I know it would
be inadvertent and not intentional--that our top military officials are
responsible to personally supervise and intervene in virtually every
kind of conflict out there, we are asking the impossible. We are about
to set a kind of expectation that can cause the military services and
our overall national security some severe jolts.
The individuals involved in these cases need to be treated properly.
The chain of command needs to set the tone, and needs to set the
climate. They need to make sure that their people are carrying out the
overall policy, and they need to take prompt action when it comes to
their attention that something has gone wrong. They need to discipline
people who do not adhere to the policy of the Navy.
But to hold them responsible--I know the Senator is not in this case,
and I recognize his remarks. I know he is supporting the committee
position on this. But I hope we do not create a climate that is so
unrealistic that it does damage to the top commanders' ability to do
their No. 1 job which is, after all, to protect the security of this
Nation. That is the number one job.
In this case, although I do not think it happens in all cases, there
are not enough people in the DOD IG. We would have to have tens of
thousands of them if we are going to have the DOD IG supervise
everything that happens in the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marine level.
But in this case, because of the significance of it, and because in
this case the victim really was sexually harassed--there is no doubt
about that; there is no dispute it; she was; and the persons who did
that deserve punishment and received punishment --but in this case the
DOD IG did review the Navy IG report in both of these matters, both the
Taylor matter and Simmons matter.
The Senator mentioned no one outside the Navy, but the DOD IG
reviewed both of these cases and concurred with the Navy IG finding. I
wanted to make that clear to the Senator. I submit that to him.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I intend to be brief.
I acknowledge the contribution that my colleague from Georgia has
made to this particular discussion that I raised this morning. Maybe I
will just make three points as he has talked.
First, he believes he is correct. I do not know that there is any
priority that Haiti all of a sudden takes priority over gender bias or
anything else. I think the responsibility--whether it is the Commander
in Chief or a particular admiral in a particular area of
responsibility--the responsibility is to make sure that the goals and
the objectives that are set and the strategy are implemented by
appropriate tactics.
To that extent, I agree with what my colleague said about there needs
to be a system in place. There needs to be a climate that is
encouraged. There needs to be an environment in which people understand
the standards of the U.S. Navy, whether the issue is gender bias or
whether it is any other kind of an issue that involves the people, the
professionals in that institution. That is a responsibility that
creates a climate in order to have a system that everyone understands,
and then to enforce that.
Clearly, an admiral who is responsible for a large command cannot be
responsible for something that is going on directly who said what to
whom on a particular ship at a particular time. But it strikes me that
admiral, he or she, is responsible in the sense that in a particular
case rules are violated, there is a general lack of respect within a
particular command, and that is ignored after someone complains about
it. Of course, the person at the top is responsible whether they were
there or they were not there. I hope that is clear.
Second, I think it is important for people to understand that the
response indicated it was not just the Navy that looked at it. It was
the Department of Defense.
I hope that my colleague from Georgia and the other members of the
Armed Services Committee understand that we are all in this together.
The process of transition from an all-male, basically or a male-
dominated institution to something else is a very difficult transition.
It is more difficult in the Navy than in any other service I would
suggest, although I as an old Army man I have a certain bias with
regard to the subject. But it is more difficult in the services where
people normally carve out a career, and as a tradition--which is
hundreds of years old--it is more difficult there than IBM, or the
company I came from, or this place. It is incredibly difficult.
But I would hope that the Navy, the DOD, and my colleagues on the
Armed Services Committee will acknowledge that because of the nature of
the office that each of us holds, whether we are on the committee or
not, we are all in this together in helping the Navy, or the armed
services in general through this transition period. And in my
particular case, the Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen case, I am not approached
as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am approached in the
traditional fashion which is as her Senator.
So I have my own experience with how the Navy is in transition. It
was not a very pleasant experience. But I do not want to go into the
details of that particular case because I do not want to try that on
the floor of the U.S. Senate, any more than I think we should try the
Admiral Mauz case on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
But I want my colleagues on the committee to understand. I say this
particularly as I leave. There are always going to be 100 people, the
Senators from Washington, Georgia, South Carolina, Minnesota, wherever
it may be, involved at least in this body in this transition. And the
way in which the Navy handled the Hansen case demonstrated clearly to
me that I am not part of this transition--just the way in which they
answered the questions, the way in which they dealt with it, the way in
which they dealt with Stanley Arthur, laying off on me the fact that a
great admiral, according to them, cannot get a command. They lay off on
me because I am doing constituent service. There is no evidence that I
would keep a hold on him forever, or over anything. They just made a
decision to jerk him knowing that, as it turns out, half the people
that have any experience at the Navy thinks it is my fault because I am
a difficult politician and that is the way the politicians operate; and
the other half think it was the Navy's fault, which happens to be right
in this particular case.
But I feel badly for Admiral Arthur as I do for Admiral Mauz or
anyone else, particularly if Admiral Mauz is right in the middle of an
invasion, which most of us are going to object to. That is a pretty
tough line. It is hard to get down to the line when you have all of
that sort of stuff stacked against you.
So I want my colleague from Georgia, for whom everyone in this body
and outside of body has such incredible respect, to understand that my
reason for bringing up my particular experience at this time in this
context and suggesting to my colleagues that no matter what he or they
may think of the Mauz case, that I think the committee deserves to be
supported in their judgment in this case. But the committee also needs
to understand that there will always be 100 of us involved at any given
time in this process of transition, and the Navy has to understand
that, and the oversight process needs to reinforce that so we are not
back here with the next admiral or the next whatever going through this
trial by politician on the floor of the U.S.Senate.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Minnesota. I do understand that. I
understand that our committee is basically the agent of this larger
body and that we report--in effect, to all 100 Senators--and all 100
Senators are the only ones who can make the decisions. The committees
make decisions. But they are all subject to the floor and all
confirmations are subject to the floor. Every Senator has the right to
raise these questions. And we do our very best to respond to every
question that is raised by any Member of Senate in the correspondence
of any nomination. We have done that over and over again. We will
continue to.
What we are going to discuss in just a few minutes--I do not want in
any way to preempt the remarks of my friend and colleague from
Washington--whether the committee should have a formal hearing on this
nomination. I hope that the Senate will agree with the committee that
we do not need a formal hearing.
But we simply cannot do our job and have formal hearings on each
contested nomination or on each nomination where there is an allegation
or even a serious allegation. If we feel that the Navy or the
investigating body has not done the job properly, or if we fell that we
cannot get the information without having hearings, if we feel anyone
is misleading the committee, or there is not good faith, I think
hearings are in order. We have had them frequently, and we will again.
But I hope the Senate will keep in mind our committee jurisdiction. We
have 73 civilians that are appointed to go through our confirmation
process in the Department of Defense. Unfortunately, those rotate. So
73 is not a one 4-year deal; it is many more than 73 when you consider
all of the people that drop out. We now have six nominations out here
that have been pending, civilians, top DOD civilians, that have been
pending for 6 weeks, top people in the Department of Defense, that one
person or another has some problem with. In most cases, we do not even
know what the problem is, and they are being held up. I do not know
what the problem is, and I am chairman of the committee. We cannot get
those passed. These are top people that are supposed to be in place
running the Department of Defense.
In this Congress, we have had 61,112 military people come through our
confirmation process--61,112. Out of that many, we have had 1,085
general or flag officers--1,085. If we are going to have a hearing on,
let us say, even 10 percent, 1 out of 10 of those we may get some
complaint about, then we will do nothing but have hearings on general
and flag officers. We probably will never get to the civilians.
The scope and magnitude of what we are dealing with here is what I
hope our colleagues will put into some context. That does not excuse
anybody from looking into each serious allegation. I emphasize that.
But the procedure by which we do that has to be thought through. We
cannot have a formal hearing on all of those.
While I have had six civilians out here that have been held up for
some 6 weeks now, we have a hearing again this afternoon on two more
top civilians that have not yet had a hearing. We hope to have a
hearing and get them confirmed. But the committee gets a little
discouraged--I do as chairman, and I know the ranking member does--when
we are having a hearing on two more people. And what am I to tell them?
Well, the last six are still pending from 6 weeks ago. They were on the
floor. When the committee recommended them, there were no problems that
we knew of. They are still pending. You are going to take a job in the
Department of Defense--and one individual is coming out of the private
sector. I have known him a long time. He is a very top individual. I do
not know how much he is sacrificing, but I think it is several hundred
thousand dollars a year. It is probably closer to a million, my staff
tells me, having looked at the financial records. He is sacrificing
millions of dollars, and he has already, in all likelihood,
disassociated himself from many of the commercial activities he has.
When he comes before the committee today, I am supposed to say to him--
and I say to my friend from Washington, it has nothing to do with this;
I am talking about civilians now, but I am giving the scope of the
committee activity. I am supposed to say to him or her, well, on the
last group that came through, we do not know what the problem is. Six
of them are on the floor and they have been held up for 6 weeks. We
cannot get them through. And we are not going to be in but 4 more
weeks, so we will be back next January or February, and I hope you have
a good time in the next 3 or 4 months waiting for confirmation.
This process is getting out of hand. Individual holds are getting out
of hand on the floor. People are having holds on nominations for
purposes that have nothing to do with the nominee. That is not the case
here. This case is based on the nominee, and my comments are on my
larger frustration and have nothing to do with the Mauz nomination.
People are holding up nominations time after time for some larger
strategic purpose or, in some cases, for leverage purposes, in terms of
something they want the Department of Defense to do--sometimes
legitimate and sometimes questionable.
I think the process is getting out of hand. It is getting out of
hand. My frustration is not with the Mauz nomination per se. Senator
Murray from Washington, and others who raise questions on this
nomination, as well as the Senator from Minnesota on the Arthur
nomination, those were related to the nominee. Those matters dealt with
the merits of the case on the nominee, whether we agree or disagree.
Where the real abuse is occurring is when the hold on the nomination
has nothing whatsoever to do with the nominee. And if we continue to do
this in this body, then what we are going to do is we are going to end
up lowering the quality of people willing to serve the country, not
just in defense jobs, but other jobs. It may already be happening. But
we have an awesome responsibility under the Constitution of the United
States in confirming people. Our committee takes that very seriously
and will continue to. But this whole body is going to have to take it
seriously, too, collectively and individually.
Somehow the leadership of this body, and all of us involved in it,
are going to have to address this question. Again, I am not speaking on
nominees, where there is a problem with the nomination itself, but
particularly, the frustration is with other cases that we have going on
right now, which have nothing to do with the nominees but simply larger
purposes. The larger picture of what kind of people are going to be
willing to serve this country, I think, is increasingly coming into
play.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I appreciate that. For the benefit of
the Chair and for the benefit of my colleagues, my response to my
colleague's remarks will be brief.
First, I acknowledge that this part of the process does get out of
hand. I think the whole business of holds is way out of hand in this
place. I acknowledge that. It is not just in this case, it is in every
other case. I acknowledge that there are ideologues putting holds on
people because they disagree on ideology. We also know that leverage
has become an important part; leveraging something out of somebody for
something has become another way, as my colleague has pointed out. I
deplore both of those.
I cannot leave the floor and leave the subject that brought me to the
floor without restating the fact that in this particular case--and I
talk not about the Mauz case but about how I come to the floor on the
Mauz case because of the situation with regard to Admiral Arthur and
Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen. All this Senator wanted out of the Navy was a
response, not a specific action, not to reinstate her. And I did not
want to be put in the place of Solomon, to cut the woman in half, or
the Navy in half, or Admiral Arthur in half; I just wanted an answer.
That is my point. I cannot get a direct answer because the Navy is on
the defensive because of Tailhook and sexual harassment and some
changes in command. But that is all this Senator wanted.
That is the only reason I have ever put a hold. I rarely do it. That
is the only reason I have ever done that in this process, to the best
of my understanding.
I met with the new Chief of Naval Operations at one point, and we
went through this issue. He said, ``You should talk to the inspector
general.'' I said, ``Fine,'' and within 2 hours the Navy inspector
general was there and I talked to him. He said, ``Well, obviously,
Senator, you have not read the IG report.'' I said, ``You are
absolutely right, Admiral, I have not. Where is it?'' He said, ``I
cannot give it to you, but they have it in the committee.'' I called
the committee and they said, ``Yes, we got it,'' and I never got to see
it. I do not think I should be the judge in a particular case, but at
some point each of us has to bring some judgment to bear in each of
these constituent cases. It was not, in my case, my constituent, right
or wrong, because I have a responsibility to my country, to the oath I
took, to the Navy, and to my constituents. But I could not get that job
done in that particular context.
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield on that point?
Mr. DURENBERGER. Yes, I am happy to.
Mr. NUNN. I am informed by staff and have been for some time--and the
Senator from Minnesota and I have not had a chance to talk on this; he
raises a very legitimate question--that our practice in the committee
is not to have staff read the IG report but to require Senators to read
the IG report.
The Senator should check with his staff. But my staff advises me that
the Senator's staff was informed, that the Senator could read the
report, but not his staff. I believe that was right before recess. The
Senator was able to get on a plane to go out of town. I think the staff
was not permitted to read the report, but the Senator is always
entitled to read the report.
I want to make sure to clarify that if we have any miscommunication
between our staffs, that needs to be clarified also.
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I acknowledge what my colleague said.
I do not know if that is the case or is not the case.
I merely want to say that I did not have the opportunity to read the
report. But whether I did or I did not, and if I had read the report
and if the Navy had responded, if the Navy had given me the answers to
four questions as quickly as they gave the committee 2 feet of
information within 48 hours when this issue became public, if they had
done that, that would not be any reason to have a hold on this
nomination.
My point here is simple. Whether he has to go through a hearing
process or not, Admiral Mauz will get his four stars. Stanley Arthur is
not going to get his opportunity.
I just want to make the point that it is not my fault, it is not
Rebecca Hansen's fault, that he did not get it. It is the fault of the
U.S. Navy. They made the decision to jerk him from the appointment to
command the Pacific. For whatever reason they did that, that is their
decision.
But right, wrong; appropriate, inappropriate, it simply says, and I
will leave the floor by repeating this, that the Senator from
Washington, the Senator from Minnesota, whoever that will be next year,
as well as the members of the Armed Services Committee, are all in this
process together.
I want my colleagues also to know, particularly my colleague from
Washington, and others, that the chairman is right about the effort
that the committee puts in on hearings. In fact, the unfortunate thing
in the Rebecca Hansen case is, the hearing took place after the fact
but, in fact, the committee and its staff devoted endless hours to
trying to find out what it was that went wrong in the Hansen case.
That is why I particularly complimented my colleague from Virginia,
who read an entire letter, I think, to the full committee that I had
written, and put in a lot of time looking at this matter after the
fact. After the fact is not going to help anybody.
Ahead of the fact, the Senator from Georgia has stated the problem:
How many hours in the day, how many days in the week, how many weeks in
the year do you have to discharge your responsibility as a member of
the Armed Services Committee in its many facets? And, is it the most
appropriate function of the committee to be dealing with sexual
harassment charges, or anything else? Is there any other--or better--
forum in which these matters should be dealt with? I happen to think
there should be a different forum or a different process that is
separate and apart from this.
With that, Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience,
and I particularly thank my colleague from Georgia for his
responsiveness as well.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Washington [Mrs. Murray],
is recognized.
Mrs. MURRAY. I thank the President.
Before the Senator from Minnesota leaves the floor--I do have a
motion I am going to make in just a minute--I did want to comment that
I agree with him. I do not want to be Solomon in the case of Admiral
Mauz. I do not believe anyone here on this floor does.
I believe there ought to be a fair and open process by which the
nominations are brought to us. And I agree with the Senator from
Minnesota that if we could rely on the Navy's responses we would not be
requesting these kinds of hearings. But until all of us have the
confidence of that--I share with the Senator his nonconfidence in that
system at this point--we are going to have to rely on ourselves as a
Senate in our process here in order to make these determinations.
We need a fair, open process and a fair hearing for all sides, and
that is why I am about to make the motion that I am going to make. And
in response to several other comments that were made in the last half
hour or 45 minutes I just feel it is imperative that we do look at the
process. If there is a problem with the process, we should change it.
But we are here today because there is no other process, and it is the
process that we are required as Senators to vote on this nomination.
I believe strongly, and I will again and again, we should not trample
on the rights of an individual in the name of expediency. I believe
that today and I will continue to believe it throughout my career.
To say that Haiti is one of the reasons that we should have
expediency, I have to say I think that not only is a red herring, but
if we start creating a climate that young men and women within the
service cannot count on their chain of command, then how can we count
on them to do their job to protect the security of this Nation?
Motion to Recommit
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I move that the nomination of Adm. Henry
J. Mauz, Jr., to retire in grade be recommitted to the Committee on
Armed Services with instructions to hold a public hearing on the
nomination and not report the nomination back to the Senate until the
committee has held the hearing.
I send that to the desk.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
Does the Senator from Washington seek recognition?
Who seeks recognition?
The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have a very brief response to the Senator
from Washington. Maybe I did not make my point here on Haiti.
I did not say that Haiti was going to supersede this nomination or
any of the issues. What I said was--and I thought I made it clear--that
the four-star admirals in charge of the fleet cannot get involved in
the initial outset of one-on-one type transgressions in the Navy. It
cannot work that way. There are 172,000 people in the Navy.
I would venture in our own offices, usually, when there is a problem
between staff personnel, and usually our office staffs are 40, 50, or
60 people total, depending on the size of the State, sometimes it is
weeks before we know about those personnel problems. It depends on
one's office. Even in our own office we have our administrative
assistants basically to carry that out.
My point was not, as the Senator from Washington just referenced,
that Haiti superseded individual rights. That was not my point. If that
was anyone's understanding of what I said, then I hope it will be
clarified.
My point is the top people in the military who are responsible for
making plans for all sorts of contingencies that involve our national
security, cannot--and I do not think we want them to--be involved in
the beginning stages of conflicts between individuals and even court-
martial offenses. There are thousands and thousands and thousands of
courts-martial in the military every year, and the top people have to
set the climate and the procedures and eventually review in the chain
of command, what is done. And when actions are taken that are unfair to
individuals, they have a command responsibility to correct those.
I know that is the understanding of the Senator, but they do have
other responsibilities. That was my point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). The Senator from Washington
[Mrs. Murray], is recognized.
Mrs. MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. President.
I will speak now to my motion to recommit this. I want to be very
clear about why I am making this motion. In no way do I seek to pass
judgment on any of the allegations that have been made regarding the
nomination of Admiral Mauz. I think that sentence bears repeating: In
no way do I seek to pass judgment on any of the allegations that have
been made regarding the nomination of Admiral Mauz.
I am making this motion because in my review of the allegations
surrounding this nomination, more questions have been raised than
answered. And I believe that the allegations raised against Admiral
Mauz are sufficiently troubling to merit an open and full public
hearing.
Since this nomination was reported out of committee, I have devoted a
great deal of time to reviewing this situation. After meeting with the
Navy and the committee and reviewing what information is available to
the public, I have concluded that the only way to resolve the
conflicting issues is to hold an open public hearing. I know several
other Senators agree with me, including Senators Mikulski, Moseley-
Braun, Boxer, and Feinstein, and I appreciate their support in this
process.
I would hope and I do continue to want to believe, that after such a
hearing, the Senate could vote 100 to 0 to confirm Admiral Mauz in
grade, because there would be no lingering doubts and because the
hearing would provide a place where the record could be clarified once
and for all.
But before I address the specific situation with regard to Admiral
Mauz, let me make an important point for the record with regard to how
the Senate deals with these matters generally. I would rather not be
here today, involved in consideration of this issue. I know this vote
is not convenient, and it is certainly not comfortable for any of us to
be doing this. But I strongly believe we cannot step on individuals'
rights for the sake of expediency, as I said before.
The rules we work by today say that the Senate must vote to confirm
the retirement in grade of any three or four star flag officers.
Typically, the Senate votes on these issues by voice, without debate.
To me, the process of approving this high honor is not something we
should do by rote, and it is not simply a formality. If we want to
change the rules so that the Senate does not have to vote on these
nominations, fine, let us do so. But for now, each Senator must answer
to his or her vote. And there is another issue I need to clarify for
the record. I have never put a hold on this nomination or sought delay.
I have simply sought answers.
As my colleagues know, the committee reported out the nomination on
August 12. Shortly thereafter, I inquired as to how thorough the review
had been of the allegations, and the extent to which members of the
committee had formally deliberated on this nomination through a hearing
process. I was unsatisfied that all questions had been answered.
In good conscience, I informed the committee, I could not allow the
nomination to be voted on by voice, and I requested a rollcall vote. At
that point, the Navy came to me with information in an attempt to
answer my questions. Unfortunately, as I shall clarify later in my
remarks, some of the information provided to me by the Navy was
conflicting and simply inaccurate.
Other members looking at this had growing concerns. Five of us wrote
to ask the committee to hold a hearing before asking the Senate to
consider this nomination last week. The committee continues to
believe a hearing is unnecessary, and that is why we are here today.
But if the Navy had provided straight answers from the beginning, there
is a very good chance we would not be debating this issue this morning,
and I have made the following point in the past, and I shall make it
here again today: The American people deserve to know that when the
U.S. Senate votes to confer high honor on our Nation's military
leadership, we do so with clear justification and solid grounding in
the facts of an individual's career.
It is my firmly held belief that those whom we honor in the U.S.
Senate should serve to a higher standard. They should serve our Nation
beyond reproach. Each Senator should be able to say to the thousands of
young men and women coming behind that he who is honored is in fact a
role model for their own lives as they shape their military careers.
We must be able to tell the American people that those who are
honored by this body have passed the highest test--they are the figures
to whom we as parents can point to with pride and say we want our
children to grow up just like them. With regard to the nomination
before us today, we simply do not have enough information, in my view,
to determine if Admiral Mauz meets this test or not.
As you know, Admiral Mauz is currently serving as the commander in
chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. On May 10, 1994, he was nominated by
President Clinton to retire in grade as a four-star admiral.
Navy Lt. Darlene Simmons alleges inappropriate action by Admiral Mauz
with respect to the investigation and disposition of her sexual
harassment case. In addition, Senior Chief George Taylor alleges that
Admiral Mauz inappropriately used Government assets and retaliated
against him because he was a whistleblower. Both Lieutenant Simmons and
Senior Chief Taylor have written to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, expressing the view that Admiral Mauz should not be retired
at four stars.
Some may ask why a hearing is necessary when the Navy has already
conducted their own investigations into the allegations, and in both
cases, found them to be without merit?
Unfortunately, my answer to that is that at this point in time, the
investigative capabilities of the Navy simply do not have the
confidence of the public. The Senate Armed Services Committee has
rightly assigned a special advisory board to review the investigative
capabilities of the Defense Department generally, so that
recommendations can be made for all the services--and especially the
Navy--to improve their internal investigative processes. This special
advisory board will be issuing its findings later this year. I believe
the report of the advisory board will provide very useful guidance on
this problem and establish a roadmap whereby Congress and the American
people can regain confidence in investigations performed by the U.S.
military.
In the meantime, we are left with an imperfect process in which to
evaluate the cases that are ultimately brought to the Senate for
confirmation. Thus, if there is a case like the one before us, where
serious and troubling concerns have been raised, it seems to me quite
appropriate that a public hearing should be held, so that the views of
all involved--all involved--can be aired.
I want to briefly review the two cases that are relevant to Admiral
Mauz' nomination, because it is important to understand the scope of
the concerns raised. I think it is undisputed by the Navy and by the
committee that in both the Taylor case and the Simmons case, the
individuals involved were greatly wronged.
First, let me review the case of Lt. Darlene Simmons.
The Navy supports and has substantiated the charge by Lt. Darlene
Simmons that she was sexually harassed while stationed abroad the
U.S.S. Canopus. Lt. Simmons served as the legal officer of that ship.
During her service as a lawyer there, she received repeated requests
for dates and comments about her physical appearance from another
officer who was her supervisor and with whom she worked closely. She
filed a complaint to the ship's executive officer on June 1, 1992.
On June 5, 1992, according to the Navy:
The (offending) officer was counseled and administrative
action was taken. He requested retirement from the Navy as
was his prerogative. Unfortunately--and unacceptably--an
atmosphere of harassment and hostility persisted,
particularly as the retirement of the officer involved was
not effective until April 1993, and he remained on duty on
the ship. On October 9, 1992, an anonymous DOD IG hot line
call and a call by Lt. Simmons to [a member of Congress] and
to the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Barbara Pope,
raised the visibility of this case.
Shortly thereafter, the offending officer was removed from the ship.
The Navy maintains that once Admiral Mauz knew of the problem in
October, he took swift and appropriate action.
Lt. Darlene Simmons maintains, however, that Admiral Mauz knew her
claim of sexual harassment had been substantiated by a Navy
investigation, knew she was still being forced to work in a junior
position to her harasser, and did nothing until the case went public to
correct the situation. During the process, she was repeatedly
retaliated against, and no one was ever held accountable. She
repeatedly asked for a report to be issued on her case, but none ever
was.
Lieutenant Simmons testified last spring before the House Armed
Services Committee on the general issue of sexual harassment in the
military. Lieutenant Simmons states:
I was sexually harassed on the Canopus from December 1991
until May 1992. The Navy's zero tolerance policy of sexual
harassment was in place in May 1992 when I made my complaint.
Action directed by those guidelines was not taken and
procedures implemented were not followed. I have attempted to
work within the system for over 2 years and the system has
failed to address the issues or to hold anyone accountable
for the failure.
Despite repeated reports to my chain of command and the
Department of Defense Inspector General's Office there has
never been an independent investigation conducted into the
facts surrounding my complaint of sexual harassment.
During the course of Darlene Simmons' 2-year ordeal to bring an end
to the sexual harassment and to hold the system accountable, she was
retaliated against in a variety of ways. Her harasser was not removed
from his position of authority over her for many months after she filed
her complaint. Ultimately, Lieutenant Simmons was ordered to undergo a
psychiatric evaluation, where she was placed in a locked psychiatric
unit. She was found fit by a Navy doctor after a 24 hour observation
period, but she was nonetheless forced to remain locked up in the
psychiatric unit for 4 days. And then, according to Lieutenant Simmons'
testimony confidential information regarding her psychiatric evaluation
was wrongfully disseminated in retaliation for her reporting of sexual
harassment.
Following these many humiliations, she asked her command to both stop
the malicious gossip, and hold accountable those who were responsible
for the wrongful disclosure. No disciplinary action was taken.
In December 1992, Lieutenant Simmons was transferred from her ship.
On the occasion of her transfer, she received what she viewed to be an
adverse fitness report. Since there was nothing in her record to
substantiate the adverse report, she concluded it was given in
retaliation for her reporting of sexual harassment.
By this time, she had taken her case to the office of Admiral Mauz.
According to her testimony, an aide to Admiral Mauz said that the
admiral was personally involved in her case, and that the ``matter
would be handled.''
Shortly thereafter, she received another unsatisfactory fitness
report. According to her testimony, ``Admiral Mauz' office said they
could do nothing to assist me.''
From this ordeal Darlene Simmons concludes,
I relied on my chain of command to protect me from reprisal
and to take swift and tough action when there was reprisal.
My good faith reliance was not justified; instead my chain of
command used the opportunity to cover up another act of
reprisal.
Eventually, Lieutenant Simmons filed charges against Admiral Mauz for
dereliction of duty.
The Naval inspector general looked into the case and determined the
allegations by Lieutenant Simmons' against Admiral Mauz to be without
merit. According to the Navy, Admiral Mauz responded to the complaints
of Lieutenant Simmons in an appropriate manner and took corrective
action on her behalf.
I now want to speak to the case of Senior Chief George Taylor.
Senior Chief George Taylor is currently stationed at U.S. Naval
Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, CA, and considers himself
a whistleblower.
Senior Chief Taylor maintains that he was retaliated against by
Admiral Mauz because he ``blew the whistle on waste, fraud, and abuse
concerning mismanagement at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Bermuda.''
Taylor maintains that in November 1992, Admiral Mauz abused his power
and authority by traveling to Bermuda along with 12 other military and
civilian personnel for a 5-day vacation. At the time, Taylor was
serving as Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda.
Taylor asserts:
Admiral Mauz was flown to Bermuda at government expense
along with other personnel. During his time on the island his
entire ``official'' visit consisted of playing golf, dining
in the best restaurants, and shopping * * *.
In the months following his public whistleblowing, Taylor was charged
with over 48 offenses of violating the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which the Navy said were ``unrelated to Bermuda.'' Ultimately,
all charges were dismissed, but Taylor maintains they were related to
his whistleblowing against Admiral Mauz, and that Admiral Mauz was a
``key player'' in bringing up the charges.
Chief Officer Taylor maintains that Mauz tried to influence and
pressure the investigation, and to intimidate Taylor's military defense
counsel.
According to the Navy,
Admiral Mauz was not involved in Senior Chief Taylor's case
in California. He played no role in the charges themselves or
in the disposition of the charges * * * Regarding Bermuda * *
* the Naval inspector general conducted a complete and
thorough investigation. The investigation did not disclose
any misuse of government facilities. The IG determined * * *
that the scheduling of the trip created the perception of
impropriety and * * * Admiral Mauz received informal written
counseling.
So what to make of these two serious cases, where clearly two members
of our Nation's armed forces were greatly wronged? Both have asked that
we in the U.S. Senate hold their chain of command accountable--in this
case, Admiral Mauz.
I would like to make it clear that as I have attempted to sort out
the information on these cases, the staff of the Armed Services
Committee has been extremely helpful in attempting to get answers to my
questions, and I commend and thank the committee for their efforts.
In my meetings and exchanges with the Navy, however, I have been left
with more questions than answers. At times the information provided to
me by the Navy has been conflicting and downright inaccurate. Other
times, it has been helpful and clear. But I would not be here today,
requesting this hearing if the responses from the Navy had consistently
been reliable and accurate, and that is truly unfortunate and deeply
troubling.
Thus, without a public hearing on these issues, and without full
confidence in the Navy's investigative capabilities, I can not in good
conscience bestow honor on the leadership, while brushing aside the
concerns of a junior officer and one of our Nation's enlisted
personnel.
Again I find myself down here on this floor talking about leadership
and the chain of command. I respect the chain of command. Frankly, my
colleagues, we are part of that chain of command. The people who elect
us are at the top. They expect us to exert leadership when we see
problems.
Imagine if Darlene Simmons were your daughter. She goes to law
school; she enters the Navy. She finds herself in a situation where her
superior is constantly propositioning her. Her work environment becomes
unbearable so she complains to her chain of command. She gets locked up
in a psychiatric unit. Material evidence on her case is mysteriously
lost. Her medical information is leaked to her colleagues so that her
working environment becomes, once again, unbearable. The Navy issues
what she feels are adverse fitness reports and she is further
discredited.
If she were my daughter--or my son--I would be confused and angry. If
she were yours, so would you.
And we would ask questions and demand answers.
And so I am doing so today, before I case my vote on this nomination.
I urge my colleagues to join me in this motion to instruct, so that a
full public hearing can be held.
As I have said in the beginning of my statement, I am not offering
this motion based on the allegations of these two individuals. I am
simply standing up for the rights of our military personnel to be
heard--and to be taken seriously.
Let us have a hearing. We can clear the air. And then maybe we can
vote 100 to 0 to confirm this nomination.
In the meantime, let this debate serve as yet another plea to the
Navy in particular, and the Defense Department more generally, to do
whatever is required to restore confidence and integrity into the
military's investigative capabilities.
Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays on the motion.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I spoke at length on the nomination of
Admiral Mauz to retire in grade on Monday. That nomination was
submitted on May 10. It has been pending now for over 4 months. It has
been thoroughly reviewed by the Committee on Armed Services. It was
reported favorably to the Senate on August 12, 1994, with the Senate
voting 22 to 0 in favor of the nomination. The nomination has been
pending in the Senate since August 12, 1994.
I would start by saying the Senator from Washington has asked some
legitimate questions. As she observed, we have done everything we can
to facilitate the answer to those questions. I believe as late as last
night we were communicating with her staff about the Navy answers to
those questions. I hope she has gotten the answers, at least to all the
questions that were posed to us. She is certainly entitled to that
information. It is the committee's duty to do everything it can to
facilitate that information. We hope we have performed that duty. I
certainly think these are questions that needed to be answered by the
Navy. I think the Senator was certainly within her rights and duties
and responsibilities to pose those questions. I hope the answer to them
has helped clarify this overall matter for the Senate.
Admiral Mauz has had a long and distinguished career, which I
detailed Monday. Highlights include direct combat experience in
patrolling the rivers of Vietnam, command of the forces which conducted
successful strikes against terrorist related targets in Libya,
establishment of the maritime embargo against Iraq after Iraq invaded
Kuwait, and development of the plans for naval involvement in the
Persian Gulf war. He presently is serving as the commander in chief,
U.S. Atlantic Command, one of the most senior and responsible positions
in the Armed Forces of the United States.
The Committee on Armed Services has thoroughly reviewed this
nomination. We have considered information from the Department of
Defense concerning informal counseling he received related to travel to
the Naval Air Station at Bermuda. We have considered material submitted
by the Government accountability project, a nonprofit private
organization, which alleged: First, that Admiral Mauz retaliated
against senior chief master-at-arms, George R. Taylor, one of the
individuals who has spoken to the news media about travel of senior
officers to Naval Air Station Bermuda; and second, that Admiral Mauz
was aware of sexual harassment against Lt. Darlene Simmons, a female
officer in a subordinate command within the Atlantic Fleet, that he
suppressed findings of his own command's inquiry into the matter, and
that he failed to order any corrective action on behalf of Lieutenant
Simmons.
The committee twice deferred action on the nomination so that the
initial allegations from the Government accountability project, and
subsequent material submitted by that organization, could be reviewed.
The committee obtained detailed, factual, responses from the Department
of the Navy on these issues, which demonstrated that Admiral Mauz had
not retaliated against Senior Chief Taylor, and that he had taken
reasonable actions to address the sexual harassment of Lieutenant
Simmons.
The committee considered this information, and voted 22 to 0 to
recommend confirmation on the nomination. On August 12, I placed in the
Record the communications from the Government accountability project
and the responses from the Navy so that it would be available to all
Senators. On Monday, I included that material in the Record, along with
material that the Government accountability project submitted after the
nomination was reported, and the Navy's responses to that material.
On Monday, I informed Senators that if they had further questions
about this matter, I would endeavor to obtain official responses from
the Navy. Senator Murray provided me with a number of questions on
behalf of herself and a number of other Senators.
I would like to note, Mr. President, that the questions raised by
Senator Murray identified areas in which further clarification was
desirable. Since the nomination was reported, Senator Murray and her
staff have endeavored to keep the committee informed of her concerns.
The issue of sexual harassment is important, and we have had the
opportunity to work closely with Senator Murray, Senator Moseley-Braun,
and others in crafting key reforms in this year's Defense authorization
bill on the issues of investigations and protections against reprisals.
Their initiative, their involvement, and cooperation has been very
helpful in developing legislation to deal with this difficult issue.
We received responses from the Navy last evening to the questions we
received yesterday, and provided the material to Senator Murray and the
other Senators who had participated in drafting the questions. We then
worked with those Senators last evening to develop followup questions,
which were also answered last night. The responses to both sets of
questions confirm the committee's view that Admiral Mauz took
appropriate action with respect to the issue of sexual harassment
against Lieutenant Simmons, and that he had no involvement in the
proceedings against Senior Chief Taylor.
I think one thing that has come to the attention of the committee
since Monday--I do not know whether our colleagues have focused on
this, demonstrates to some degree what we are having to deal with here.
After debate concluded on Monday, the committee received a copy of a
``Dear Senator'' letter from the Government accountability project
which apparently was distributed to all Senators. This letter, dated
September 9, 1994, concerns a new issue, an entirely new issue--I have
not discussed this at all with the Senator from Washington--involving
Admiral Mauz. The letter from the Government accountability project
encloses excerpts from an investigation into inappropriate racial and
ethnic remarks from a naval commander not under Admiral Mauz's direct
supervision--under his overall command but not his direct supervision--
who was the commanding officer of an air antisubmarine squadron, a
subordinate command in the Atlantic Fleet.
The investigation substantiated that the remarks were made. The
officer retired. The individual who submitted the complaint had an
adverse performance evaluation removed from the file.
The letter from the Government accountability project attempts to tie
Admiral Mauz to this matter by asserting,
Admiral Mauz took no action to discipline Commander Brower.
Admiral Mauz allowed Commander Brower to retire honorably,
without any disciplinary action, at full pay and benefits. *
* * Admiral Mauz' turning a blind eye toward racial
harassment is demonstrative of a larger pattern.
This is from the Government accountability project. That sounds
pretty bad. It sounds like Admiral Mauz personally condoned racial
harassment. The facts do not support such a conclusion.
I come back to the fact we have to distinguish between allegations
and facts, and that is always an important distinction. Navy Secretary
Dalton, after we submitted that letter, as we did on others to him,
advised the committee that the matter--this matter, on the racial
improprieties--was handled entirely through inspector general channels
and by a subordinate command. The matter never came to the attention of
Admiral Mauz.
There was no requirement in regulation or practice for it to be
brought to his attention. The Government accountability project asked
us to hold Admiral Mauz accountable for the manner in which a
subordinate unit handled a disciplinary matter, a matter which he never
knew about, never came to his attention.
I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Government
accountability project and the response to these issues from Secretary
Dalton be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
(See exhibit 1.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the fact this incident did not come to
Admiral Mauz' attention should come as no surprise. As Secretary Dalton
notes in his letter, there were three levels of command between him and
the command where the incident took place. These matters are not
handled by the four-star top people, they are handled at a lower level.
As the commander in chief of the Atlantic Command, Admiral Mauz has
under his command 224 ships, 1,480 aircraft, 27 bases, 12,000 military
officers, 125,000 enlisted personnel, 10,000 DOD civilians. How many of
us in our office with 50 or 60 people look into every allegation
against anybody in our office by another person?
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. NUNN. I say zero, until it gets to a level we have to review it
because it has not been able to be solved at a lower level. We are
responsible to set the climate. We are responsible for fairness,
equity, and justice in our office. We are responsible in the final
review when matters are not settled at a lower level. But if we were
responsible for every personnel dispute in an office of 50 or 60 and we
sat there and looked at them all day long, which we would do, we would
never get to the floor of the Senate, probably never get to a committee
meeting.
Admiral Mauz had 125,000 enlisted people and 10,000 DOD civilians
under his command. He also is doing things that some people in this
country might think are significant: Supporting the Haiti embargo, the
war on drugs, Cuban migration operations, providing forces for possible
Haitian contingency, and providing forces for deployment to the
Mediterranean and Central Command areas. I am just saying, Mr.
President, and I will yield to my friend from Arizona----
Mr. McCAIN. Just for a question.
Mr. NUNN. We have to put this in perspective. There are thousands of
personnel actions taken everyday with respect to members of the Armed
Forces. Although our forces are the best trained and best disciplined
in history, there are still many disciplinary problems, and there
always will be and always have been in the history of the military
forces. Military commanders convene over 9,000 courts-martial per year.
They administer over 80,000 nonjudicial punishments. The responsibility
for disciplinary action is exercised primarily by subordinate
commanders, not by fleet commanders-in-chief.
I yield to my friend for a question.
Mr. McCAIN. I would like to ask a question of the Senator from
Georgia. I heard and I believe the Senator from Washington said the
U.S. Senate is in the chain of command. I do not know if the Senator
from Georgia heard that.
Mr. NUNN. I did not hear that. What I interpreted was the Senator was
saying overall responsibility. I do not know whether she used the words
``chain of command.''
Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Washington obviously does not understand
the meaning of ``chain of command.'' The chain of command is clear. I
think she should be provided with what the chain of command is: It
flows from the Commander in Chief, who is the President of the United
States, and the fact is when the Senator from Washington does not even
know what chain of command means, it gives some damage to the
credibility of her argument.
Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
Mr. NUNN. I yield to my colleague, the Senator from Washington, for a
question or brief observation. I want to retain my right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields for a question.
Mrs. MURRAY. First of all, I inform my colleague from Arizona, I am
capable of answering a question.
In response to your question, I am talking about responsibility, and
I believe strongly we are in the chain of command in terms of
responsibility: Responsible to our constituents who we serve and
responsibility to the members of the armed services when they have
legitimate complaints.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my point is, to hold our commanders in chief
in the field responsible for each disciplinary proceeding undertaken by
their subordinate commanders would set an impossible standard. It is
impossible. Anybody looking at it would know it is impossible.
The latest communication from the Government accountability project
is helpful in putting the issues surrounding Admiral Mauz in
perspective. Allegations of misconduct are easily made, but before we
adopt those allegations as fact, we need to think carefully. We must
hold our military officers to a high standard. We must ensure
allegations are investigated. Some are substantiated. Many are not.
Reading the latest letter from the Government accountability project,
one would think Admiral Mauz was involved in the investigation, the
review, and condoning improper racial remarks, but the facts are he was
not.
Likewise, there was no evidence--no evidence--that he was involved in
a reprisal against Senior Chief Taylor. We have to rely on the Navy to
investigate these matters. We cannot become, in our committee, a
factual arbiter trying to determine the facts in each case. If we do,
we will never be able to perform our duties. That is, basically, an
administrative or judicial function. The legislative bodies have
investigating subcommittees. I head one and I know. I know something
about what it takes to investigate in terms of the facts. You have to
put people under oath. You have to swear them in. You have to have
depositions, witnesses, you have to know what is happening in each
case. You have to look at all the data so you can cross-examine.
This is not a normal function for a committee. Every now and then you
get into it. The Judiciary Committee has gotten into it a couple of
times when they, I am sure, would have preferred not to. Sometimes it
happens. When it does, you better recognize and you better get yourself
some investigators and investigative staff. You better put on your
judicial outfits because it is a different kind of hearing.
You are trying to decide who is telling the truth in various
situations. That is something we cannot do on nominations unless the
executive branch has demonstrated they cannot handle it themselves. In
those cases, sometimes we have to do it. But if it becomes the rule
rather than the rare exception, then we are going to change the
fundamental nature of the nomination process.
With respect to Lieutenant Simmons--and that is the focus, I know, of
some very legitimate concern here on the floor--the evidence is that
when the matter was brought to Admiral Mauz' attention, he took
reasonable actions to monitor the investigation and he took reasonable
actions to monitor the actions of subordinate commanders. He did not
simply delegate this matter to subordinate command. He gave it his
personal attention.
The direct involvement of his personal assistant for women's affairs,
Comdr. Cathleen Miller, led to the prompt removal of the offending
officer from Lieutenant Simmons' ship. Admiral Mauz personally
intervened two times with the Chief of Naval Personnel to ensure
Lieutenant Simmons was retained on active duty. She was a Reserve
officer. He took that action twice. Through Commander Miller, his aide,
he ensured that Lieutenant Simmons had an opportunity to communicate
directly with his office throughout the conduct and review of this
investigation.
He implemented a series of specific training and policy actions to
combat sexual harassment. Some may argue he should have done more. Some
may argue that. I do not agree. But it simply cannot be argued with any
factual basis that Admiral Mauz turned a blind eye toward sexual
harassment. The facts do not support that.
Mr. President, turning briefly to the motion. The motion is, as I
understand the motion that has been made that we will vote on, is that
the nomination of Henry J. Mauz, Jr., to retire in grade, be
recommitted to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to
hold a public hearing on the nomination and not report the nomination
back to the Senate until the committee holds the hearing.
The first observation I would make is to ask my colleagues, do we
really want to have public hearings on these kind of matters? Do we
want Admiral Mauz, who has served 35 years in his career, to come up
when the committee by 22 to 0 has already reported that there is not a
factual basis because the Navy has found there is not a factual basis--
and we have relied on the Navy in the factual matters here--do we want
to have a committee have the allegations come up and all be made again
against Admiral Mauz and have him come up, pull him out of the Atlantic
and say, ``Come up and answer these things again. We have gone through
this for 2\1/2\ months. We have your answers and the Navy's answers,
but we want to do this in the public.'' Do we really want to do that?
I do not think we do. With respect to Lieutenant Simmons--she was a
victim in this case, there is no doubt about that. She was a victim.
She was mistreated. The people who mistreated her were dealt with.
Maybe not as severely, maybe not as promptly as should have been done,
but they were dealt with. They were dealt with. Admiral Mauz was not
responsible for her victimization. He did what he could when it came to
his attention to deal with it. Do we want her to come up? Do we want
the doctor to come up who the Navy now tells us--the doctor who
confined her--that he did not know about the sexual harassment charges?
Admiral Mauz did not know about the confinement. The doctor who
confined her did not know she had brought sexual harassment charges. Do
we want to have a public hearing? Do we really want to do that
concerning Lieutenant Simmons and her private medical matters?
The committee made no judgment on any of that. We did not think it
was necessary to make any judgment on her medical condition because she
was an innocent victim. That would come up in terms of a defendant
saying that she had some alleged medical problem. That would be a
defense argument. She was the innocent victim from our point of view.
She does not, in my opinion, deserve to be called up before the Senate.
She testified before the House on the general issue of sexual
harassment. I do not think her medical record was put into play there.
This is a matter of privacy. If she comes up and if the allegation is
that Admiral Mauz was somehow behind the doctor's confinement of her
for 3 or 4 days in some type of psychiatric environment, then her
medical record has to be put in play and the doctor who made that
decision is going to have to be brought up.
We are not talking about a day's hearing. We are talking about weeks.
We are talking about weeks. I do not think we could finish this kind of
hearing in any kind of responsible way in the next 2 or 3 or 4 weeks. I
think the only responsible way to do an investigation the way this
resolution envisions it is to take depositions. We have to know what is
public and what is private. I do not want to be responsible, as the
chairman of the committee, to have a doctor come up and talk about why
he confined a patient without knowing in advance of what exactly he is
going to say.
This means we have to take depositions. That is the only responsible
way to do it. That is the way I run an investigative committee. We do
not bring up witnesses without advance preparation. We do not bring
people in to make allegations that we are not familiar with. We do not
want to become a forum for people to take potshots at anyone else in a
free publicity forum so that, without investigating in advance, we
bring up a witness who can make any kind of charge. Those things have
to be done in advance with affidavits and depositions.
My staff right here, with all the things going on in the world, some
of my key people have spent the last 6 days not doing anything but
working on nominations--not just this one, but this has been one of the
main ones.
Mr. President, there are responsible ways to have hearings. I think
the Senate of the United States learned it is difficult to have a
factual kind of dispute before the Senate of the United States in a
committee. The Judiciary Committee found that out in the Anita Hill
case. You have to know when to go into a private hearing. You have to
know when matters go into the personal reputation of individuals which,
in accordance with the Senate rules, allow closed hearings.
Closed hearings, under the Senate rules, are hearings where the
committee has the authority to make a determination--and I think
responsibility--``when matters will tend to charge an individual with
crime or misconduct or disgrace or injure the professional standing of
an individual or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt
or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an
individual.''
Mr. President, if we have hearings on this matter, I can assure you
that we are going to have to do it correctly. If we have hearings on
the matter, we are not going to go in and just bring up witnesses. You
have to have some idea of where you are going in a hearing and what has
to be closed and what gets into invasion of privacy. The very people
who are basically being addressed here in terms of concern could end up
being the very people who have their own rights of privacy violated.
Mr. President, there is a lot more to this than people might think.
There are all sorts of other reasons why I differ with this motion. I
disagree with the suggestion that the committee did not do everything
we were supposed to do and can do in this case. We have spent 3 months
on it.
The committee adhered to our well-established procedures to ensure
appropriate review of the allegations concerning Admiral Mauz by both
the Department of Defense and the committee. The Navy provided detailed
responses to the allegations concerning Admiral Mauz. With respect to
the allegations concerning Lieutenant Simmons, the Navy concluded:
``Admiral Mauz did not suppress the evidence of any inquiry, did not
fail to take corrective action on behalf of Liuetenant Simmons, nor did
he fail to follow proper procedures in inquiring into allegations.''
With respect to the allegations concerning Senior Chief Taylor, the
Navy concluded: ``There is simply no basis whatsoever for any claim
that Admiral Mauz took a personal interest in the case involving Senior
Chief Taylor.'' The material provided by the Navy cites detailed,
specific facts in support of these conclusions.
The committee in this case relied on the procedures it has used in
the past, both with respect to nominations that have been recommended
for approval and nominations that have been rejected. There has been no
showing that the circumstances of the Mauz nomination require the use
of different procedures.
We have answered or gotten answers to every question that has been
asked. To bring Admiral Mauz back in here now and to put him up on the
witness stand in front of the committee in public and have him
basically again have to go over everything and all these allegations,
when we already have gotten answers to each allegation, just does not
make any sense.
Mr. President, I will not belabor the point. There are other people
who want to speak on this matter. I would just conclude by saying that
I think it would be unfair to Admiral Mauz, as well as others, to have
such a proceeding. He has served his country faithfully and with
distinction for over 35 years, including combat services in Vietnam, as
well as in key operational roles in the Mediterranean and the Persian
Gulf. He continues to serve as Commander in Chief of the Atlantic
Fleet. He has been there when America needed him over the years, and he
is right there now when America needs him.
His service has not been perfect or without fault. I doubt if there
are many officers or many of us who have served without fault. In his
case, his lack of perfection was demonstrated by the counseling he
received in connection with travel to the Bermuda Naval Air Station. In
my judgment, however, that lapse in judgment pales in significance when
compared to his 35 years of outstanding service. His retirement should
be a time to honor his service, while certainly looking at any
allegations against him, which we have done.
A public hearing on this nomination, regardless of the result, I
think would be a very bitter and undeserved end to that career. In my
judgment, a public hearing at this time on allegations which have been
found to be unsubstantiated in accordance with the committee's standard
procedures would be inappropriate.
So I oppose the motion on the nomination. I wish to also include in
the Record Secretary of Defense Bill Perry's letter to the committee
dated September 12. Secretary Perry, speaking for the Clinton
administration, stated:
Admiral Mauz has served his nation for over 35 years. His
proven record of exemplary service has * * * clearly earned
the honor of retirement with four stars.
Secretary Perry added:
Admiral Mauz's relief has been confirmed by the full Senate
and is ready to assume command. The operational demands of
the Atlantic Fleet area of responsibility make it essential
that we proceed with a smooth and timely transition. I
strongly endorse the administration's and the committee's
recommendation that Admiral Mauz be confirmed to retire in
his four star grade and request expeditious Senate action.
Mr. President, this is not simply the Navy supporting Admiral Mauz.
This is also the Secretary of Defense. Now, I am the first one to say,
when the military is wrong, when the Navy is wrong, when the Secretary
of Defense makes errors, this committee has a responsibility to correct
them. We have no information that would lead us to conclude that the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Chief of Naval
Operations have made errors. We have no indication of that. In another
case we do have indications they made errors, the Glosson case. We sent
it back for another whole review with an independent panel. We did not
try to resolve all that factual dispute ourselves. We sent it back over
to the Department of Defense because we did not think they had done an
adequate job and asked them to have an independent panel.
In this case, there is no indication that the Navy or that the
Secretary of Defense or others in the responsible overall command did
not do a thorough job of investigating each of these allegations, and I
hope that our colleagues will agree that this nomination should be
approved and approved today.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: It is my understanding that the
retirement in grade confirmation of Admiral Henry H. Mauz,
Jr. will be debated and voted on by the full Senate some time
this week.
Admiral Mauz has served his nation for over thirty-five
years. His proven record of exemplary service has included
combat and positions of significant responsibility. Notably,
Admiral Mauz commanded River Patrol Boats during the war in
Vietnam, commanded USS AMERICA Battle Group in 1986 during
the air strikes against terrorist related targets in Libya,
served as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command during
Operation Desert Shield, and, as Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, has been responsible for operations ranging
from the Arctic North to South America, including Haiti, Cuba
and the War on Drugs. Admiral Mauz has clearly earned the
honor of retirement with four starts.
This nomination was sent to the Senate four months ago and
was cleared by the Armed Services Committee last month by a
unanimous vote. Recently, a recorded vote on the confirmation
was requested because of the allegations raised by two Navy
servicemembers. These cases were exhaustively addressed by
the Department of the Navy prior to submission of the
confirmation, and the specific subsequent allegations were
investigated in response to several queries from the
Committee. After its own thorough investigation, the
Committee concluded that these allegations were
unsubstantiated.
The Administration believes that the Committee has
conducted a thorough and impartial investigation of this
matter and agrees with the Committee's conclusions that
further inquiry is simply not warranted.
As you know, Admiral Mauz's relief has been confirmed by
the full Senate and is ready to assume command. The
operational demands of the Atlantic Fleet are of
responsibility make it essential that we proceed with a
smooth and timely transition. I strongly endorse the
Administration's and the Committee's recommendation that
Admiral Mauz be confirmed to retire in his four star grade
and request expeditious Senate action.
I have sent a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
Exhibit 1
Government Accountability
Project, National Office,
Washington, DC, September 9, 1994.
Dear Senator: The Government Accountability Project
(G.A.P.) is a non-profit, whistleblower protection
organization. G.A.P. is gravely concerned about the pending
retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz at the four-star level.
Admiral Mauz has repeatedly failed to discipline officers in
his command who have been found guilty of racial, sexual and
whistleblower harassment.
Attached is documentation of Admiral Mauz's failure to hold
an officer in his command accountable for an outrageous
pattern of racial harassment and discrimination. The case
involves Petty Officer Steven Barr, a 17-year veteran of the
U.S. Navy with an unblemished record. Although the Navy did
remove a retaliatory adverse performance evaluation from
Petty Officer Barr's record, the Navy's statement that,
``Appropriate corrective action has been taken'' is
incorrect. Admiral Mauz took no action to discipline
Commander Brower. Admiral Mauz allowed Commander Brower to
retire honorably, without any disciplinary action, at full
pay and benefits.
Please read these excepts from the Navy's investigation
into Commander Brower's record of racial harassment and
decide if Admiral Mauz did the right thing.
Admiral Mauz's turning a blind eye toward racial harassment
is demonstrative of a larger pattern. As G.A.P. has informed
the Senate, Admiral Mauz has a history of failing to hold
officers accountable for their actions of sexual and
whistleblower harassment:
Lieutenant Darlene Simmons was sexually harassed aboard the
U.S.S. Canopus in 1992. Despite her requests for relief that
she filed up the chain of command--all the way to Admiral
Mauz--she was forced to endure a retaliatory psychiatric
lock-up and remained under her harasser's command for weeks.
Although Simmons was ultimately vindicated and received a
letter of apology from the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral
Mauz failed to punish the officers responsible.
Senior Chief George Randell Taylor blew the whistle on the
improper use of Naval Air Station Bermuda as a resort for
high-level Navy officers and specifically implicated Admiral
Mauz. Since his transfer to Port Hueneme, California, Taylor
has been a target for harassment that includes being charged
with forty-eight counts of dereliction of duty. Although
Taylor has been cleared of any wrongdoing, G.A.P. has
evidence that Admiral Mauz has directly and improperly
interfered in Taylor's case.
These cases demonstrate that Admiral Mauz has repeatedly
condoned violations of the law and naval regulations by
officers in his command. Unfortunately, the Senate Armed
Services Committee has never held a hearing concerning
Admiral Mauz's record. His lack of respect for the law--and
sailors who report violations--offers ample justification for
the Senate to deny the high honor of four-star retirement.
Thank you for your consideration. Further documentation of
the cases involving Petty Officer Barr, Lieutenant Darlene
Simmons and Senior Chief Taylor are available upon request.
Please contact Jeff Ruch or Christy Law at G.A.P. if we may
be of further service.
____
Defense/Navy Hotline Completion Report as of 3 August 1992
1. Name of Official Conducting the Investigation;
2. Rank and Grade of Official;
3. Duty Position and Contact Telephone Number of Official;
4. Organization of Official;
5. Hotline Control Number: DOD Hotline 920483
6. Scope of Examination, Conclusions, and Recommendations:
a. An unidentified caller made allegations concerning
racial statements made by Commander Michael R. Brower, USN,
Commanding Officer, Air Anti-Submarine Squadron Two Two (VS-
22). The source alleged that Commander Brower made racial
statements such as the following:
``Black personnel should be concerned about drugs because
all blacks do drugs and sooner or later they will be wiped
off the planet.''
In conjunction with the Dr. Martin Luther King holiday
during which the squadron was in a working status, ``I do not
have any blacks in VS-22, just sailors.''
``I am the White Knight of this squadron.''
``Drugs came to this country from black musicians who
performed overseas and brought drugs back to us.''
While talking to a junior officer who said he may have the
HIV virus, ``I will make you a tall black basketball player,
then you can have AIDS.''
Routinely telling black personnel, ``You are a credit to
your race,'' or if a black service member came to mast, ``You
are a disgrace to your race.''
Used the term ``nigger''.
During a meeting of first class petty officers at which a
report that a black airman had allegedly stolen a car was
mentioned, ``Black petty officers should hold their heads
down because it does not look good on you that a black person
stole.''
``I am now your Great White Father.''
``Blacks are more likely to do drugs than anyone else.''
b. It was alleged that Commander Brower ordered certain
personnel to go to schools to talk about Black History Month
because Commander Brower knew he was in trouble.
c. It was alleged that Commander Brower was unfair towards
* * *
d. AMH1 Steven A. Barr, USN, alleged unfair treatment as a
result of a special adverse evaluation and withdrawal of AMHC
recommendation resulting from his inability to complete
Enlisted Aviation Warfare Specialist (EAWS) qualifications
within Commander Brower's time-frame.
e. An investigation of each allegation was completed. The
investigation consisted of review of available documents as
well as personal interviews with 35 squadron personnel. The
persons interviewed included individuals of all ethnic
backgrounds.
h. Findings as to allegations that racial statements were
made.
(1) A substantial number of the personnel interviewed
indicated they heard Commander Brower say some of the alleged
statements in some form. Additionally, some interviewees
reported hearing Commander Brower make the following
additional statements:
(a) Refer to various squadron members as a ``fat nigger'',
``black nigger'', and ``jew boy.''
(b) ``Catholics are fish-eaters. Non-catholics are
pagans.''
(2) Various motivations were attributed to these
statements. Some personnel believe Commander Brower to be a
racist, others believed he was trying so hard not to be a
racist that he wound up sounding like one.
(3) There was a climate within the command that allowed a
perception that racism existed. Interviewees reported that
other people, particularly * * * used terms like ``nigger''
and ``blue gums'' without any adverse consequences.
i. Findings as to the allegation that AMH1 Barr was given
an unwarranted adverse evaluation.
k. Additional findings:
(1) Commander Brower's Change of Command was 22 April 1992.
He is presently under training for ultimate assignment as the
Air Department Head on board USS CONSTELLATION homeported in
San Diego, California.
(2) * * *A number of enlisted personnel stated that they
were embarrassed during the endless ``dressing down'' of
junior officers that occurred in their presence. Several
enlisted personnel stated he would turn to them and say, ``I
eat officers for breakfast.'' Junior officers were afraid to
bring anything controversial up the chain of command.
Feelings of racial disharmony would not be discussed up the
chain of command. This further alienated enlisted personnel.
(3) Commander Brower has submitted a Letter of Retirement
to be effective June 1993.
____
Department of the Navy,
Naval Inspector General,
Washington, DC, July 30, 1993.
AMH1 Steven Barr, USN,
Jacksonville, FL.
Dear Petty Officer Barr: I am responding to your complaint
of reprisal and inappropriate racial behavior on the part of
Commander Brower, your former Commanding Officer at VS-22.
An investigation conducted at my request by the Commander
in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, found your allegations to be
substantiated. Appropriate corrective action has been taken.
Additionally, I have been informed that the adverse
performance evaluation that was drafted by CDR Brower was
never issued to you. My staff confirmed with BUPERS that the
performance evaluation was not submitted; however, there is
no record of a performance report for that same period of
time (1 Dec 91-3 Apr 92). I would appreciate it if you would
provide my office with a copy of the evaluation you
eventually received for the time in question.
Pursuant to DOD Directive 7050.6, I have enclosed a
redacted copy of the report of investigation for your
information and retention. Be assured that the Navy will not
tolerate such improper behavior on the part of commanding
officers, nor will it allow any type of reprisal against
sailors reporting the improper behavior.
Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.
Sincerely,
D.M. Bennett
____
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, DC,September 13, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding at the request of your
Committee to the Government Accountability project letter of
September 9, 1994 which raises allegations regarding Admiral
Mauz's involvement in the case of Petty Officer Steven Barr.
Petty Officer Barr initiated this case with a call to the
Naval Inspector General on April 10, 1992. Admiral Mauz
assumed command of the Atlantic Fleet on July 13, 1992.
Petty Officer Barr's complaint to the Naval Inspector
General concerned racially insensitive comments made by his
then-Commanding Officer of Air Anti-Submarine Squadron Twenty
Two (VS 22), Commander Brower. The Naval Inspector General
assigned the investigation to the Atlantic Fleet Inspector
General who, in turn, assigned the investigation to
Commander, Strike-fighter Wings, Atlantic
(COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT), the first flag officer in the chain
of command.
The investigation was completed on August 3, 1992 and
forwarded via the chain of command to the Naval IG by
Commander, Strike-Fighter Wings, Atlantic on August 10, 1992.
In enclosure (1), COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT concluded that some of
the statements alleged to have been made by Petty Officer
Barr's commanding officer were substantiated.
COMSTRKFIGHTWINGLANT personally counselled Commander Brower
on August 6, 1992 regarding ``. . . his unacceptable use of
language and his insensitivity to the creation of a command
environment unquestionably supportive of equal opportunity .
. . .''
The results of the investigation were forwarded by
enclosures (2) and (3) to the Naval Inspector General. The
Naval IG approved the results of the investigation involving
the actions taken against Commander Brower, closed the case
and informed Petty Officer Barr of the results. As noted by
the informed Petty Officer Barr of the results. As noted by
the CINCLANTFLT IG in enclosure (3), Commander Brower was no
longer in command and had submitted a Letter of Retirement,
on April 22, 1992, to be effective June 1993. Commander
Brower's change of command was also on April 22, 1992, 12
days after Petty Officer Barr's complaint to the Naval IG.
This case was appropriately addressed by the Naval
Inspector General and the chain of command. There were three
levels of command between CINCLANTFLT and the Commanding
Officer of VS 22. Admiral Mauz had no personal involvement
with this case and acted appropriately in relying on officers
and flag officers within his chain of command to resolve the
matter. It is important to note that the Naval Inspector
General letter of July 30, 1993 (included in the GAP letter)
advised Petty Officer Barr of the results of the
investigation. Petty Officer Barr has never expressed concern
or dissatisfaction of the Naval IG with the results or the
outcome of the investigation.
In sum, after reviewing the allegations raised by the
Government Accountability Project and the Navy's actions, I
am satisfied that Admiral Mauz had no personal involvement
with this case and that it was handled by the Naval Inspector
General and the chain of command.
I have sent a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
Sincerely,
John H. Dalton.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that correspondence
concerning the Mauz nomination be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 12, 1994]
Government Accountability Project,
Washington, DC, July 11, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Russell Senate
Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: On behalf of the Government
Accountability Project (GAP) I am writing to bring
information to the attention of your committee bearing on the
merits of the retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz at the ``four
star'' level.
GAP is a non-partisan, non-profit whistleblower protection
organization. GAP provides legal representation and other
support services to workers both within and outside federal
service. Two of our clients, Senior Chief Master-at-Arms
George R. Taylor and Lt. Darlene S. Simmons, JAGC, USNR, have
had direct, recent experiences with Admiral Mauz and their
letters are attached for your consideration [Attachments 1
and 2].
As Senior Chief Taylor's letter indicates, Admiral Mauz
misused government facilities and property at the Bermuda
Naval Air Station for his and his family's personal use. When
these actions were brought to public attention, Admiral Mauz
and his staff retaliated against Taylor, stripping him of his
duties and attempting to prosecute him for insubordination.
Following his transfer to the base at Port Hueneme,
California, Taylor was faced with a 48-count court martial on
a supposedly unrelated matter. This incident was closely
monitored by Admiral Mauz's legal staff for the Atlantic
Fleet. All charges against Taylor were subsequently
dismissed.
As Lt. Simmons's letter indicates, Admiral Mauz was aware
of sexual harassment against Lt. Simmons and the failure of
her command to take proper action. Admiral Mauz suppressed
the findings of his own command's inquiry into the issue.
Despite his personal involvement and knowledge of the
situation, Admiral Mauz failed to order any corrective action
to be taken on behalf of Lt. Simmons. Finally, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral S.R. Arthur, refused to accept a
formal complaint from Lt. Simmons alleging dereliction of
duty in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
against Admiral Mauz.
While the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Dalton, recently
ordered corrective action on behalf of Lt. Simmons (an
apology, clearing her record, a new duty station and letters
of censure for three officers in her former chain of command
[see Attachment 3]), no action was taken against any flag
commander who was responsible for the ongoing development of
this situation over several months.
Besides reprisal for the reporting of wrongdoing, there is
one additional common element in these two cases--the role
played by the Inspector General of the Atlantic Fleet to
cover up the nature and extent of the underlying problems and
prevent any further remedial actions.
These two cases, in our minds, bear directly on the merits
of the decision before your committee with respect to the
appropriate level of retirement grade for Admiral Mauz.
Regardless of how this particular question is resolved, it
is clear that the system of accountability within the
military and the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, in
particular, are broken and in dire need of repair. GAP
strongly urges that a comprehensive review of these issues be
undertaken by the Armed Services Committee as soon as it is
practicable.
Cordially,
Jeffrey P. Ruch,
Policy Director.
____
Ponte Vedra, FL,
July 8, 1994.
Senator Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, Russell Senate Office
Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: I am writing this letter to express my
concern that Admiral Henry Mauz may retire at the Four Star
Level, a distinction indicative of extraordinary service. I
request that during the deliberation process of this issue
the information regarding Admiral Mauz's involvement in the
handling of my sexual harassment case be considered. I
believe Admiral Mauz was (1) Derelict in his Duty through his
culpable inefficient and negligent handling of my case of
sexual harassment. (2) Admiral Mauz failed to act on my
report of sexual harassment, retaliation and reprisal. I
specifically report to you that Admiral Mauz failed to follow
those procedures directed by the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Navy. (3) Admiral Mauz in his position
as Commander In Chief of the Atlantic Fleet Mauz
intentionally allowed sexual harassment, retaliation and
reprisal by senior officers in my chain of command to go
unchecked. Admiral Mauz used his official position to protect
those guilty of sexual harassment and then to cover up his
inefficient handling of the matter.
Admiral Mauz had knowledge in October 1992 that I was
sexually harassed. This harassment was substantiated by a
member of his staff, Commander Cathleen Miller. Admiral Mauz
was also aware of the failure of my chain of command to
handle the matter from May 1992 until October 1992. A command
inquiry was conducted in October 1992. This command inquiry
substantiated the sexual harassment which I had reported in
May 1992. The command inquiry also substantiated the
existence of a hostile environment in which I worked from May
1992 until October 1992. Admiral Mauz was familiar with those
substantiated facts and took no action.
On December 28, 1992 I suffered reprisal for my report of
sexual harassment when I received an adverse fitness report.
I reported this retaliation and reprisal directly to the aide
of Admiral Mauz. I was assured on that same day that Admiral
Mauz was personally involved and that proper corrective
action would follow. I relied in good faith on these
assurances. My good faith reliance was not justified. Instead
of taking corrective action the reprisal was covered up.
Admiral Mauz was personally involved in this negligent
handling of my report of reprisal. Admiral Mauz was the
highest level of leadership in my chain of command.
I then reported the failure by my entire chain of command
to properly handle my report of sexual harassment and
reprisal to the Department of Defense, Inspector General's
office. This report was then referred to the Navy Inspector
General. I believe that Admiral Mauz used his position to
influence the report from the Navy Inspector General's office
in order to protect himself because he knew that he and the
chain of command had failed to take appropriate action in my
case of sexual harassment.
I actually swore to these facts on a charge sheet for
violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 92
by Admiral Mauz. This charge sheet and supporting memorandum
was returned to me without any investigation whatsoever. This
too was inappropriate and not in accordance with applicable
instructions and orders.
I believe Admiral Mauz has perpetuated the discrimination
against women in the U.S. Navy with his failure to take swift
and tough action against sexual harassment. I believe his
failure to hold anyone accountable in my case of sexual
harassment was Dereliction of his duties. One who is derelict
in the performance of duty should not be rewarded for
extraordinary service.
Sincerely,
Darlene S. Simmons.
____
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, DC, May 12, 1994.
Lt. Darlene S. Simmons, JAGC, USNR,
Naval Legal Service Office, Naval Station, Mayport, FL.
Dear Lieutenant Simmons: I am writing to discuss your
future in the U.S. Navy. Before doing so, however, I wish to
express my profound regret over the harassment that you
unfortunately experienced. No one in our Navy or Marine Corps
should be treated as you were. My goal is to send the message
to every Sailor, Marine, and civilian in our Department that
we are to treat others with the same respect and dignity we
expect ourselves.
I believe we have made significant progress during the past
18 months to implement a comprehensive program aimed at
eliminating sexual harassment from the workforce. As you
know, we issued our revised policy guidance in January 1993
and also established an Advice and Counseling Line and an
Informal Resolution System. Our Department-wide Reporting and
Tracking System will provide us with information on formal
complaints, results of investigations and administrative and
judicial actions taken to resolve complaints. In March, we
released the ``Commander's Handbook,'' a single reference for
commanders that addresses investigation, resolution, and
prevention of sexual harassment. I thank you for your lessons
learned, which were integrated into the first edition. While
we have done much, I realize we still have far to go.
After you testified, I directed my staff to thoroughly
review the circumstances of your case. Our review leads me to
conclude that: you were sexually harassed by a fellow officer
aboard USS CANOPUS; he retaliated against you by fostering a
hostile work environment and polarizing the wardroom against
you; the shipboard chain of command did not correct this
environment; and your fitness report for the period 9
February 1992 to 28 December 1992 was improperly handled by
the command.
As a result of my review of your case, I am issuing a
Secretarial letter of censure to the officer who committed
the harassment. The Chief of Naval Operations is also taking
action with regard to two other officers in your former chain
of command who did not measure up to our standards.
With regard to your specific situation, I recognize that
your harassment, and the energy required on your part to
address issues springing from it, impaired your ability to
demonstrate fully what you can contribute to the Navy.
Therefore, I have directed that the Navy make available to
you the option to transfer to a new duty station with orders
that you be retained on active duty until 1 September 1996.
This represents an additional two years beyond the date
currently established for your departure from active duty,
and will afford you the opportunity to compete again for
augmentation to the Regular Navy.
I have been informed that you have applied to the Board for
Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) in accordance with 10
U.S.C. 1552 to correct any injustice in your performance
records. I have final authority to review the BCNR's
recommendation and will direct action to correct your
military record as necessary.
While my actions can never wipe the slate clean, they
reflect my genuine desire that you have the opportunity to
continue to serve, if you wish. Should you nevertheless
decide to leave active duty on 1 September 1994, however, I
want you to know that you have my respect and gratitude for
your Navy service.
I have directed Rear Admiral H.E. Grant, the Judge Advocate
General of the Navy, to meet personally with you to discuss
your decision.
John H. Dalton,
Secretary of the Navy.
____
July 8, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: I would like to introduce myself. My
name is George R. Taylor. I am a Senior Chief Petty Officer
(E-8) currently on active duty with the U.S. Navy stationed
at the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port
Hueneme, California. Additionally, I am a whistleblower.
Sir, In December 1992, I blew the whistle on fraud, waste,
and abuse concerning mismanagement at the U.S. Naval Air
Station Bermuda. I would like to give you a very brief
rundown on some of the events that transpired and are
continuing to unfold in regards to Admiral Henry Mauz Jr.,
USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
In November 1992, Admiral Mauz abused his power and
authority as CINCLANTFLT by traveling to NAS Bermuda along
with 12 other military and civilian personnel for a five day
vacation.
Admiral Mauz was flown to Bermuda at government expense
along with the other personnel. During his time on the
island, his entire ``official'' visit consisted of playing
golf, dining in the best restaurants, and shopping. This was
in fact exposed on national television on ABC New's
``Primetime Live'' program. I appeared on the show and
commented on the behavior of not only Admiral Mauz but
numerous flag officers within the Armed Forces who had
visited the beautiful island at taxpayer's expense.
Additionally, Senator McCain had visited the island with a
large group of family members and the nanny for his
grandchildren all at taxpayer's expense or at a reduced rate.
As you know, this was not a popular thing for me to do. I
was not politically correct. Needless to say, numerous high
ranking officers within the Department of Defense were
offended. Representative Schroder made arrangements for me to
be transferred to NCBC Port Hueneme, CA. I was very naive, I
believed in the system. However, I have very little faith
left at this time. During the past 18 months numerous things
have occurred that in my opinion and the opinion of my
attorney have been nothing short of criminal.
Admiral Mauz in my opinion has not only abused his power
but is a disgrace to the uniform of the Naval Service. He was
a key player in me being charged with over 48 offenses of
violating the Uniform Code of Military Justice in a supposed
``unrelated to Bermuda situation''. His attorney requested
and received all legal documents and a brief in regards to my
status. All charges were dismissed by Admiral Kelley,
CINCPACFLT, 8 months later. Admiral Mauz took a personal
interest in the prosecution of a case where nothing had been
done wrong.
Senator, there is no doubt that if you or I committed some
of the things that Admiral Mauz has, we would have been ran
out of town.
As you know, the Navy has gone through a lot. However, I do
believe with the current leadership in the Navy things will
improve, but in order to correct wrongs and to ensure that
senior, military officers do not continue to abuse their
power and authority, you should take the lead in retiring
Admiral Mauz at a two-star level.
You sir, are in the position to send a message to the
entire Armed Forces announcing that misconduct at any level
will not be tolerated, also that everyone in the Armed Forces
from E1 to O-10 will be held accountable for their actions.
Sir, if you or your staff needs additional information feel
free to call me at (805) 388-3915 or my attorney, Jeff Ruch
at (202) 408-0034.
Very Respectfully,
George R. Taylor,
MACS(SW) USN.
____
Chief of Naval Operations,
July 27, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding to your letter of July
21, 1994 to the Secretary of the Navy which enclosed a letter
from the Government Accountability Project, concerning the
retirement confirmation of Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S.
Navy. I have reviewed the letter as well as the letters from
Lieutenant Darlene Simmons and Senior Chief George Taylor
that were included. It is my judgment that the allegations in
these letters are not correct. Admiral Mauz has served
faithfully and well in every assignment including this final
one as a four star officer and deserves to retire in grade.
Before turning to these allegations, I want to state that
Admiral Mauz is completing a career that exceeds thirty-five
years of dedicated service to our Nation. He is scheduled to
retire and desires to do so. His relief has been confirmed
and is ready to assume the duties of Commander in Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Mauz's plans to enter the next phase
of his personal and professional life are being delayed as is
the assumption of command by the relieving officer. Admiral
Mauz's performance has been outstanding throughout his career
including, especially including, this final tour as Commander
in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
With regard to LT Simmons, Admiral Mauz did not suppress
the evidence of any inquiry, did not fail to take corrective
action on behalf of LT Simmons, nor did he fail to follow
proper procedures in inquiring into allegations. Further, the
Inspector General of the Atlantic Fleet did not cover-up the
nature and extent of underlying problems nor prevent
appropriate remedial action in the case.
The case of LT Simmons is an involved one with several
complaints, overlapping in time, and inquiries that took
place over nearly two years. It is clear that in 1992 LT
Simmons was sexually harassed while stationed aboard USS
CANOPUS (AS-34). While serving as Legal Officer in that ship
she received repeated requests for dates and comments about
her physical appearance from another officer who was one rank
senior to her and with whom she worked closely in the
performance of her duties.
The case was initiated at the shipboard level on 1 June
1992, when LT Simmons reported to the ship's Executive
Officer that she was being sexually harassed by another
officer. The allegations involved repeated requests for dates
and comments about her physical appearance. On 5 June 1992,
the officer was counseled and administrative action was
taken. He requested retirement from the Navy as was his
prerogative.
Unfortunately--and unacceptably--an atmosphere of
harassment and hostility persisted, particularly as the
retirement of the officer involved was not effective until
April 1993, and he remained on duty on the ship. On 9 October
1992, an anonymous DOD IG hot line call and a call by LT
Simmons to Congresswoman Schroeder and to the then Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Barbara Pope, raised the visibility of
this case.
Admiral Mauz responded promptly when informed of the matter
as a result of these calls. To assure fairness and high-level
attention, he directed his Special Assistant for Women's
Affairs, CDR Miller, to join an investigation by COMSUBGRU
10. Following a briefing by Commander Miller, the offending
officer was moved off the ship by the Commanding Officer in
October 1992. The CO assembled all officers and told them
that LT Simmons had been sexually harassed, condemned this
behavior, and emphasized that any harassment would not be
tolerated.
LT Simmons states in her letter that Commander Miller
substantiated the sexual harassment. That is true. There is
no question that LT Simmons was sexually harassed. As the
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Mauz acted
promptly and appropriately. He directed the necessary actions
to ensure a thorough and timely response to LT Simmons's
allegations. The expeditious assignment of Commander Miller
to examine the case and ensure that LT Simmons had a direct
conduit to his clearly substantiates his personal concern and
direct involvement in investigating LT Simmons's allegations.
Nor was this the end of Admiral Mauz's concern. In December
1992, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter. He personally
intervened with the Chief of Naval Personnel to extend LT
Simmons on active duty and assure her assignment to another
command.
At this time also, LT Simmons complained that her transfer
fitness report was issued in reprisal. The Inspector General
investigation, completed in the spring of 1993, substantiated
LT Simmons's original allegations of sexual harassment and
also concluded the Commanding Officer of CANOPUS failed to
recognize the development of a hostile command climate.
Accordingly, the Commanding Officer was counseled by his
immediate superior. While the Inspector General concluded the
fitness report was not reprisal, the Secretary of the Navy
later concluded that he would review, through the Board for
Correction of Naval Records, any alleged injustice in her
military record and that LT Simmons would be given the option
of a new duty station with orders retaining her on active
duty until September 1996. The Secretary stated that his
decision was based on his recognition that ``* * * your [LT
Simmons] harassment, and the energy required on your part to
address issues springing from it, impaired your ability to
demonstrate fully what you can contribute to the Navy.'' The
Secretary's action in correcting the fitness report, intended
to provide LT Simmons with an opportunity to continue her
naval career, was a decision that only the Secretary is
empowered to make.
On his own initiative, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter
for a third time in 1993. In a series of actions he
manifested his concern that improvements should be made in
handling cases of this kind. To effect change in this regard,
Admiral Mauz, in April of 1993, issued a policy statement for
the ``Prevention of Sexual Harassment'' to all Atlantic Fleet
activities. It addressed Department of the Navy policy and
the need for training in place. It tasked every manager,
supervisor, and employee, military and civilian, within
Admiral Mauz's command with the responsibility for carrying
out the DON policy on prevention of sexual harassment.
In June 1993, Admiral Mauz signed a combined LANT/
PACFLTINST 5354.1 (Equal Opportunity) that revised the
Command Managed Equal Opportunity program and incorporated
sexual harassment requirements from a new SECNAVINST.
In September 1993, Admiral Mauz issued a PERSONAL FOR to
ensure each commander was cognizant of the contents of the
combined LANT/PAC Equal Opportunity instruction. He directed
each commander to review the implementation of the program,
including sexual harassment, in his command to ensure
compliance. ISIC's were directed to include this as a special
interest item for command inspections, and were directed to
utilize Equal Opportunity Program Specialists in their
inspections to the maximum extent possible.
Going well beyond normal bureaucratic requirements, in
April 1994, Admiral Mauz returned to this matter again. To
assure that fleet priorities and procedures would be as good
as they could be, he personally conducted a training session
for all flag officers assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. The
subject was a case study in sexual harassment, and on
addressing it, Admiral Mauz used both information obtained
from the inquiry about LT Simmons case and information
provided by LT Simmons herself. Finally, Admiral Mauz
recognized that additional training was needed beyond what
the initial curriculum in sexual harassment provided.
Accordingly, he directed the development and distribution of
a kit to assist commanders with the investigation and
disposition of sexual harassment complaints. This kit formed
the nucleus for the newly published Navy Sexual Harassment
Handbook.
In January 1994, LT Simmons forwarded allegations of
criminal dereliction by Admiral Mauz in the handling of her
case. As the facts of the case did not, in fact, justify
criminal charges, they were determined to be more appropriate
for resolution under the provisions of Article 1150, U.S.
Navy Regulations, Redress of Wrong Committed by a Senior,
than under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The
allegations were accordingly returned to LT Simmons by the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, on advice of counsel, for
forwarding as a matter under Article 1150. In response, LT
Simmons indicated she did not desire to pursue an Article
1150 complaint. Nevertheless, LT Simmon's allegations were
referred to the Naval Inspector General. The Inspector
General found the allegations against Admiral Mauz to be
without merit. Admiral Mauz did not influence or attempt to
influence, the Inspector General's decision in this matter.
With regard to Senior Chief Taylor, the allegation that
Admiral Mauz influenced the charges against Senior Chief
Taylor after Senior Chief Taylor arrived at Port Hueneme,
California, is without basis.
By way of background, there were charges brought against
Senior Chief Taylor after he began his tour of duty in
California. These charges addressed irregularities in the
manner in which Senior Chief Taylor performed his duties.
Senior Chief Taylor declined to have his case heard under
Article 15 of the UCMJ, as was his right. As a result,
charges were referred to a special court-martial. After
charges were referred, Senior Chief Taylor's chain of command
in the Pacific decided it was appropriate to move the case
out of the Port Hueneme area to ensure an independent review
of the case. Accordingly, the charges were considered by a
Flag Officer in command in the San Diego area.
Following a newspaper account which stated that the charges
against Senior Chief Taylor had been withdrawn in response to
allegations of retaliation for his whistle-blowing activity
in Bermuda, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant asked the
senior Staff Judge Advocate to call his counterpart at Port
Hueneme for additional information. A call was made and the
situation was clarified. The senior Staff Judge Advocate
verbally reported his findings to the Executive Assistant who
then back briefed Admiral Mauz as to the action he had taken.
There was no influence on the case and, in fact, the charged
has already been withdrawn at the time of the call.
Subsequently, unbeknownst to either the senior Staff Judge
Advocate or Admiral Mauz, a junior Staff Judge Advocate
obtained a copy of the defense motion that was the basis for
withdrawal of the charges, as well as a copy of the charge
sheets, from a friend who was then Officer in Charge, Navy
Legal Service Office, Port Hueneme. The Officer in Charge
believed that in providing that documentation, he was
responding to an official request from Admiral Mauz's staff
and acting quite properly he informed Senior Chief Taylor's
military counsel of the actions he had taken to comply with
that request. While these documents were shared with the
senior Staff Judge Advocate, he did not speak of them to any
other staff member. Clearly, the junior staff Judge
Advocate's inquiry and receipt of documents did not stem from
Admiral Mauz. In fact, Admiral Mauz did not become aware of
the documents until their existence was revealed during my
inquiry into Senior Chief Taylor's allegation preparatory to
making this letter response. In this vein, Admiral Mauz's
statement to Navy Times on July 21, 1994, that ``I don't
really recall this, but I think I said ok,'' to an inquiry
regarding the newspaper account was not an accurate
recollection. In fact, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant
states that he, independently and without Admiral Mauz's
knowledge, instituted that lawyer's inquiry into the
newspaper article. These matters taking place after the
withdrawal of charges at Fort Hueneme, could not have had any
impact in any event.
The San Diego commander convened an Investigation under
Article 32 of the UCMJ to inquire into the matter and make
recommendations as to the appropriate disposition. The senior
Judge Advocate assigned to conduct the Article 32
Investigation concluded there were reasonable grounds to
believe that four offenses should be charged, with a total of
seven specifications thereunder. The senior Judge Advocate
recommended that the charges be adjudicated under Article 15
of the UCMJ, but noted that should Senior Chief Taylor
decline Article 15, referral of the charges to special court-
martial would be appropriate. The Commander in Chief of U.S.
Pacific Fleet, however, determined that the nature of charges
did not warrant referral to court-martial and directed
counseling as the appropriate remedy, thereby closing the
case.
In summary, Admiral Mauz was not involved in Senior Chief
Taylor's case in California. He played no role in the charges
themselves or in the disposition of the charges.
Senior Chief Taylor had accused Admiral Mauz of misconduct
with regard to Admiral Mauz's travel to Bermuda. As a result
of Senior Chief Taylor's allegations regarding Admiral Mauz's
travel to Bermuda, the Naval Inspector General conducted a
complete and thorough investigation. The investigation did
not disclose any misuse of government facilities. The
Inspector General determined that Admiral Mauz conducted
significant official business while in Bermuda, including an
inspection of the air station's facilities, addressing base
personnel at an ``All Hands'' meeting and making calls on the
U.S. Consul General and the Governor of Bermuda. Admiral Mauz
took two days of leave while in Bermuda, in compliance with
Navy guidelines for combining leave and official travel. The
Inspector General determined that the scheduling of the trip
created the perception of impropriety and that there was a
violation in the use of government drivers during the period
of time that Admiral Mauz was on leave, as a result of which
Admiral Mauz received informal written counseling.
Admiral Mauz did not remove Senior Chief Taylor from his
duties or attempt to prosecute Senior Chief Taylor for
insubordination as a result of Senior Chief Taylor having
publicly accused Admiral Mauz of misconduct, as alleged by
Mr. Ruch of the Government Accountability Project. Senior
Chief Taylor originally alleged that his Commanding Officer
in Bermuda had taken those actions as reprisals for his
whistle-blowing activity in Bermuda. After a thorough
investigation of the facts surrounding those actions,
however, the DoD IG concluded that the actions were warranted
under the circumstances and did not constitute reprisal. In
fact, at the time the actions were taken, no one was aware of
Senior Chief Taylor's whistle-blowing activity. The
difficulties Senior Chief Taylor was experiencing in Bermuda
preceded any knowledge by naval personnel, including his
Commanding Officer and Admiral Mauz regarding his complaints.
Admiral Mauz has served his Navy and Nation for over
thirty-five years. He has served in positions of great
responsibility and he has served his Nation well.
I have discussed this letter with the Secretary of the Navy
and he and I are in complete agreement that Admiral Mauz
should be confirmed to retire in his four star grade and that
he should be permitted to depart his command in a timely
manner.
I am, of course, prepared to provide you any additional
information that you or the other members of the Committee
may require. Thank you for your consideration. I have sent an
identical letter to Senator Thurmond.
Very respectfully,
J.M. Boorda,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.
____
Attachment 3
Government Accountability Project,
August 3, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: Last month my client, Senior Chief
Master-at-Arms George R. Taylor (USN) wrote to you concerning
the pending four-star retirement of Admiral Henry Mauz. In
his letter, Senior Chief Taylor wrote that Admiral Mauz had
taken ``a personal interest'' in the prosecution, that was
later dismissed, against Senior Chief Taylor and the members
of his security detachment. This personal interest raised
questions concerning retaliatory motive since the attempted
prosecution took place within the Pacific Command at a time
when Admiral Mauz served as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet.
In the August 1, 1994 edition of Navy Times, Admiral Mauz
told reporter Patrick Pexton that Taylor's allegation was
``without foundation'' and ``nonsense.'' Mauz told the
reporter that his staff contacted Port Hueneme authorities
only once and then only for the purposes of learning the
status of the case. In fact, Captain Joseph Baggett, the
legal advisor to Admiral Mauz, did contact the legal advisor
for the base at Port Hueneme after the withdrawal of the 48-
count court martial against Taylor and his detachment on
April 9, 1994.
Prior to Captain Baggett's call to Port Hueneme, however,
Lt. Noreen Hagerty-Ford, a JAG attorney on Admiral Mauz's
staff, contacted Lt. John Tamboer, the supervisor of Taylor's
military defense counsel, Lt. Carter Brod. Lt. Hagerty-Ford
asked Lt. Tamboer to provide her with a copy of a motion
filed by Lt. Brod seeking dismissal of all charges against
Taylor on the grounds of ``vindictive prosecution''
[attached]. Lt. Tamboer refused her request, on the grounds
that the Atlantic Fleet had no legitimate reason to obtain
defense filings. Lt. Hagerty-Ford called Lt. Tamboer later
that same day and demanded a copy of the motion stating that
her call was at the personal request of Admiral Mauz. Lt.
Tamboer acceded to this direct request from a flag officer
and provided a copy of the motion to Lt. Hagerty-Ford.
Admiral Mauz's public statements with respect to his role
and the role of his personal staff in the Taylor prosecution
do not square with the facts. The lack of candor displayed
here is consistent with the ``damage control'' approach to
high profile personnel cases Admiral Mauz has exhibited. More
disturbingly, these repeated contacts represent an attempt to
influence the prosecution of Taylor and to intimidate his
military defense counsel.
As always, if you or your staff desire any further
information from my clients, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey P. Ruch,
Policy Director.
____
Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Southwest Judicial Circuit, Port
Hueneme, CA
United States versus Taylor, George R., MACS/E-8, 000-00-
0000, U.S. Navy.
Special Court-Martial: Motion to Dismiss for Vindictive
Prosecution Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
Date: 23 March 1994.
1. Nature of Motion. This is a Motion to Dismiss for
Vindictive Prosecution filed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. This motion is filed as a direct
result of an unlawful decision by Commander, Naval
Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, to prosecute
MACS George R. Taylor, USN, the accused in this case.
2. Summary of Facts.
prior to MACS taylor's reporting at ncbc
a. In 1992, MACS George R. Taylor, USN, held the position
of Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda.
While serving at NAS Bermuda, MACS Taylor produced evidence
that the air station existed as a resort for top military
officials at the expense of taxpayers. MACS Taylor and
another ``whistleblower'' were featured on the 10 December
1992 episode of ABC's ``Primetime Live'' (tape of which will
be hereinafter referred to as ``the Bermuda tape''), which
prompted Defense and Inspector General investigations. As a
result of MACS Taylor's activities, Congress voted to close
the Bermuda base in 1995.
b. MACS Taylor was transferred to Naval Construction
Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, (hereinafter ``NCBC''), in
January 1993, under the protection of the Military
Whistleblowers Protection Act.
c. Before MACS Taylor arrived at NCBC, members of the base
security department posted an article about MACS Taylor's
activities in Bermuda on the security department bulletin
board. In addition, members of the security department
gathered in a conference room to view the Bermuda Tape.
d. Before MACS Taylor arrived, a file was sent to NCBC from
Bermuda which included a non-punitive letter of caution and
materials related to MACS Taylor's activities at Bermuda.
e. Prior to MACS Taylor's arrival at NCBC, RADM David Nash,
USN, Commanding Officer of NCBC, requested a copy of the
Bermuda tape from Kari Lee Patterson, a civilian employee at
NCBC. Ms. Patterson delivered the tape to Mr. W.E. Hudson,
NCBC Security Officer, who delivered the tape to RADM Nash.
after reporting at ncbc
f. Upon MACS Taylor's arrival, RADM Nash held a meeting
with top base officials to discuss the arrival of MACS
Taylor.
g. Upon reporting on board NCBC, MACS Taylor was taken to
Executive Officer's Inquiry for activities in Bermuda. At the
XOI, Taylor was awarded the Nonpunitive Letter of Caution
sent from Bermuda. The charge was for disrespect to a
commissioned officer at Bermuda.
h. Immediately upon arriving at NCBC, MACS Taylor was
directed to meet with LCDR Cole in his office. At that
meeting, which was attended by BMCS Kossman, LCDR Cole told
MACS Taylor that ``this isn't Bermuda'' and ``You aren't
going to get away with that s--t here'', or words to that
effect.
i. In January 1993, LCDR Cole was called by Jeff Ruch, an
attorney with the Government Accountability Project, a public
interest organization which was involved with the incident in
Bermuda. Mr. Ruch called LCDR Cole to discuss the pending
Captain's Mast for Disrespect in Bermuda. After the phone
conversation, LCDR Cole confronted MACS Taylor, saying he had
just gotten a call from his ``liberal lawyers'' and ``this is
bulls--t,'' or words to that effect. LCDR Cole told MACS
Taylor that ``they're not gonna get you out of this. * * *
This package was sent here. We're going to adjudicate this
here'', or words to that effect.
j. Approximately one month after MACS Taylor reported
aboard, MACS Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that one of his
practices was improper. LCDR Cole had, on several occasions,
sent sailors to the Long Beach Brig with full knowledge that
there would never be a court-martial. This was typically done
on a Friday afternoon, where the magistrate would be unable
to release the sailor until the following Monday. When MACS
Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that this practice was
improper, LCDR Cole became incensed, telling MACS Taylor
``I'm the f---ing lawyer on this base; who made you the base
lawyer?'', or words to that effect.
k. A meeting to discuss Workman's Compensation issues was
held in September 1993 and was attended by LCDR Cole, MACS
Taylor, NCBC Executive Officer, NCBC Command Master Chief,
and other officials. At the meeting, LCDR Cole confronted
MACS Taylor due to rumors he had heard about members of the
Special Investigations Unit, of which Taylor was a member,
being deputized by the federal government. MACS Taylor denied
ever spreading the rumor. LCDR Cole responded by admonishing
MACS Taylor for not addressing him as ``Sir'' when making a
statement.
l. In a Memorandum dated 5 September 1993, LCDR Cole
requested to the Commanding Officer, NCBC, that MACS Taylor
be relieved of his duties. RADM Nash, however, declined to
carry out LCDR Cole's request.
m. MACS Taylor has also had numerous personal
confrontations with Mr. W.E. Hudson, NCBC Security Officer,
since reporting aboard. Mr. Hudson is MACS Taylor's direct
superior in the Security Department.
n. On 30 September 1993, MACS Taylor received a performance
evaluation which covered the period since MACS Taylor's
arrival on board NCBC and was signed by RADM Nash. Taylor
received straight 4.0 evaluations on this evaluation. There
was no mention whatsoever of any problems with MACS Taylor's
performance. MACS Taylor was described as having ``great
depth of professional knowledge'' and a ``keen sense of
responsibility''. He was praised for ``drafting and immediate
implementation of the department's quality-focused Standard
Operating Procedures.'' He was also praised for conducting a
special task force to curtail the flow of drugs onto the base
and for assisting civilian police in drug operations.
16 november arrest
o. On 16 November 1993, MACS Taylor participated in the
arrest of CE3 Richard Miller, USN, a deserter who had escaped
from the Long Beach Brig. There were three other NCBC police
officers at the scene. The arrest took place in the City of
Oxnard with the participation of the Oxnard Police. No
complaints were made by any persons involved in the arrest.
Officers Ernie Eglin and L.E. Robertson of Oxnard Police
executed the arrest and believe that MACS Taylor acted
entirely properly.
p. On 17 November 1993, Mr. Hudson called MACS Taylor into
his office and accused him of acting improperly during the
previous night's arrest. Mr. Hudson then discussed with MACS
Taylor the possibility of an early retirement for MACS
Taylor.
q. On 18 November 1993, Mr. Hudson met with LCDR Cole to
discuss this situation. At this meeting, the two men agreed
to have Naval Investigative Service investigate MACS Taylor's
activities on the night of the arrest.
r. On 22 November 1993, Mr. Hudson informed MACS Taylor
that he planned to have NIS investigate the arrest.
s. Pursuant to advice from military defense attorneys, MACS
Taylor and each of the other three officers consistently
invoked his right to remain silent during the investigation.
t. On 3 January 1994, MACS Taylor was given a Report Chit
citing one specification of violation of Article 92 related
to the arrest of CE3 Miller. LCDR Cole's signature appears on
the Chit for ``person submitting report''. Along with the
Report Chit, MACS Taylor received formal notification of
contemplated Nonjudicial Punishment.
u. On numerous occasions after the Report Chit was drafted,
LCDR Cole attempted to persuade MACS Taylor and the other
three NCBC officers involved to answer questions about the
arrest. On or about 3 January 1994, LCDR Cole informed MACS
Taylor that the Incident Complaint Report for the incident in
question had never been received, and he gave MACS Taylor a
direct order to write a report describing what happened on
the night in question. MACS Taylor has consistently
maintained that he submitted the report immediately after the
arrest. Pursuant to advice from LT Carter F. Brod, JAGC,
USNR, Defense Counsel, MACS Taylor nevertheless prepared a
new report to avoid violating a direct order.
v. When discussing with MACS Taylor his potential Captain's
Mast, LCDR Cole ordered MACS Taylor to sit locked at
attention. LCDR Cole told MACS Taylor that he would ``add
twenty more f--king charges'' if Taylor refused Captain's
Mast.
w. On or about 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole called LT Brod and
asked LT Brod to give MACS Taylor pre-Mast advice. LCDR Cole
told LT Brod that MACS Taylor was being really stupid in his
attitude and that if he did not accept Mast then they were
going to ``throw the book at him.'' LCDR Cole told LT Brod
that, if MACS Taylor refused Mast, ``we have lots of other
stuff on him to use which we will throw on there'', or words
to that effect.
x. On 10 January 1994, MACS Taylor refused Nonjudicial
Punishment.
y. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts to persuade the
other three NCBC officers to discuss the details of the
arrest. On 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole told LT Brod in a
telephone conversation that ``the command is unlikely to
dismiss the charges against Senior Chief Taylor but would
probably dismiss on the others if they opened up.''
z. In a telephone conversation with civilian police
lieutenant Byron Frank, which lasted over one hour, LCDR Cole
told Lt. Frank that ``if you all had just cooperated with the
NIS investigation, then you would have just gotten a slap on
the wrist'', or words to that effect. LCDR Cole stated that
``Senior Chief Taylor is manipulating the other three
officers. I feel really sorry for them'', or words to that
effect. LCDR Cole stated that ``ABC bailed his a-- out in
Bermuda. They won't come to his rescue now'', or words to
that effect. LCDR Cole asked Lt. Frank, who was also an
African-American, ``why won't you just tell me what happened?
I'm the smartest black attorney in the JAG Corps. Let's just
talk brother to brother'', or words to that effect.
aa. On 21 January 1994, 48 specifications of UCMJ
violations were preferred against MACS Taylor. Many of the
specifications related to the 16 November arrest, but 16 of
the 47 new specifications related to incidents in April, May
and June of 1993.
bb. Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducted an
extensive investigation of the charges against MACS Taylor.
Included as part of the NCIS investigation were interviews of
over twenty-one witnesses. Many of the witnesses, including
Petty Officer Pringle, Detective Wunsch and Lieutenant Frank,
were asked questions about MACS Taylor's activities in
Bermuda.
cc. LT Robert P. Morean, JAGC, USNR, Trial Counsel,
conducted several witness interviews at NCBC on or about 15
February 1994. LCDR Cole was present for many of these
interviews and occasionally participated in questioning. In
the Interview with BMCS Kossman, USN, LCDR Cole corrected
BMCS Kossman for giving an answer LCDR Cole believed was
incorrect. When MS3(SS) Doyle was interviewed, LCDR Cole was
``right there, only two feet away from me.'' When MS3 Doyle
told LT Morean that he felt MACS Taylor was an excellent cop
and excellent leader, LCDR Cole stormed out of the meeting
and slammed the door. LCDR Cole also assisted LT Morean in
the questioning of Dan Gordon, Security Department Training
Officer.
dd. On 9 February 1994, LCDR Cole approached DT3 Fredia
Wright, USN, who had a son living on base who had been barred
from the base for juvenile delinquency. LCDR Cole offered DT3
Wright that her son could continue to live on the base if he
would testify in the court-martial of MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole
told her that she could disregard the barring notice if her
son would cooperate.
ee. On or about 18 February 1994, LCDR Cole discussed the
16 November arrest while teaching a class to new NCBC
security officers. While teaching this class, LCDR Cole
referred to the four officers who made the 16 November arrest
as ``the four'', and used their arrest as an example of
illegal police activities.
other similar NCBC security cases
ff. In the past, there have been several other arrests by
NCBC Police with the same characteristics as the 16 November
arrest. No prosecution or disciplinary action was taken in
any of the other arrests. There have also been egregious
cases of clear dereliction of duty by NCBC Military Police
where no prosecution was undertaken.
gg. On 23 September 1992, NCBC Detective A. Carpenter, MA1
Woods, USN, and NCBC Detective P. Wunsch arrested EOCN Jason
S. Tyree, USN, a deserter from NMCB-40, off-base in the City
of Oxnard. The facts of that arrest were effectively
identical to those in the case at bar. There was no
disciplinary action of any kind taken against any of the
officers.
hh. In December 1993, a complaint was filed alleging that
GSM2 E.J. Beman used unlawful force in an arrest of a female
suspect. The investigation of the incident was handled
internally; NCIS was never asked to investigate. Beman was
not court-martialed for his actions.
ii. In mid-1992, evidence existed that civilian NCBC police
officer Carlos Tangonan used unnecessary force by hitting a
suspect in the mouth with a baton. No investigation of any
kind was undertaken, and no disciplinary action followed.
jj. On 21 January 1992, F.D. Forbes, a civilian NCBC police
officer, arrested a suspect in the City of Port Hueneme by
pursuing him on an off-base street, drawing his service
revolver and ordering the suspect to freeze. The suspect was
unarmed and seen climbing over the base fence from on-base to
off-base, which is not an offense under any criminal code.
The ``suspect'' was not charged with any crime. Forbes was
not disciplined in any way for making this off-base arrest.
kk. Many members of the NCBC Security Department believe
that, based on their knowledge of the facts, the 16 November
arrest was entirely legal and consistent with NCBC policy
practices.
recent facts
ll. On 11 February 1994, LCDR Cole offered LT Brod that
MACS Taylor could still go to Captain's Mast if he wanted.
LCDR Cole told LT Brod that, if MACS Taylor accepted Mast,
the charges would include only two specifications of
dereliction of duty.
mm. On 9 March 1994, LCDR Cole ordered an administrative
questioning of Byron Frank regarding the arrest of 16
November 1993. LT Morean told LT Caroline Goldner, JAGC,
USNR, that this was done as a ``discovery tool'' for the
court-martial of MACS Taylor.
nn. On 17 March 1994, LT Morean told LT Brod in a telephone
conversation, that ``it is my understanding that if everyone
had been forthcoming, there would have been no charges. The
Admiral just got ticked when everyone clammed up.''
3. Statement of Law.
a. R.C.M. 907, MCM 1984. Motions to Dismiss.
b. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. ``No person
shall be * * * compelled in any case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.''
c. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). ``To punish
a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him
to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.''
d. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). For an agent
of the state to pursue a course of action whose object is to
penalize a person's reliance on his constitutional rights is
``patently unconstitutional.''
e. U.S. v. Davis, 18 M.J. 820 (AFCMR 1984). For a claim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness to succeed, it must be
established that the decision to prosecute was based on
impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the
desire to prevent the exercise of a legal right. ``In the
classic prosecutorial vindictiveness case the subsequent
charges are harsher variations of the same decision to
prosecute.'' See Also U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir.
1983), Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
f. U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 1983). ``To help
simplify prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, the Supreme
Court developed a `presumption of vindictiveness'.'' 719 F.2d
at 361. ``Courts in this circuit construing post-Blackledge
decisions have held that whenever a prosecutor brings more
serious charges following the exercise of procedural rights,
`vindictiveness' is presumed, provided that the circumstances
demonstrate either actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear
of vindictiveness.'' 719 F.2d at 361.
g. U.S. v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1983). If the
defendant challenges as vindictive a prosecutorial decision
to increase the number or severity of charges following the
exercise of a legal right, the court must examine the
prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire
proceedings. If ``the course of events provides no objective
indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the
defendant that the more serious charge was vindictive, i.e.
inspired by a determination to `punish a pesky defendant for
exercising his legal rights,' a presumption of vindictiveness
applies which cannot be overcome unless the government proves
by a preponderance of the evidence occurring since the time
of the original charge decision altered that initial exercise
of the prosecutor's discretion.'' 718 F.2d at 1365.
h. U.S. v. Blanchette, 17 M.J. 512 (AFCMR 1983). ``The test
for prosecutorial vindictiveness is whether, in a particular
factual situation, there is a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness for the preferral of charges against the
accused.'' 17 M.J. at 514.
i. U.S. v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (CMA 1987). Once a prima facie
case of vindictiveness is made out, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to disprove the misconduct. See Also U.S. v.
Garwood, 20 M.J. at 154 (CMA 1985).
j. U.S. v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973). If a
defendant alleges intentional or purposeful discrimination
and presents facts to raise a reasonable doubt about the
prosecutor's purpose, then the prosecutor can be called to
the stand to testify.
k. U.S. v. Green, 37 M.J. at 384 (CMA 1993). ``This Court
has previously stated that `in referring a case to trial, a
convening authority is functioning in a prosecutorial
role'''. See Also U.S. v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. at 78 (CMA
1987), Cooke v. Orser, 12 MJ 335 (CMA 1982), U.S. v. Hardin,
6 M.J. at 404 (CMA 1979).
l. In assessing a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness,
the Supreme Court focusses on practices which tend to chill
the assertion of defendant's rights. Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), NC v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
4. Discussion.
a. There are essentially three independent bases upon which
the prosecution of MACS Taylor is vindictive. The first basis
is due to retaliation for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing in
Bermuda and his personal relationship with the convening
authority's attorney, LCDR Cole. These two issues have been
grouped together because they support the premise that MACS
Taylor is being prosecuted for who he is, not what he has
done. Second, MACS Taylor is being prosecuted for exercising
his Constitutional right to remain silent. Third, MACS Taylor
is being prosecuted for exercising his right to refuse
Captain's Mast.
b. In light of the nature of these charges, the fact that
forty-eight total specifications were preferred in this case,
in itself, is strong evidence of the government's
vindictiveness. An inference can be drawn that by charging
MACS Taylor with such a large number of charges, the
government intended to intimidate him, ``show'' him, or
otherwise ``retaliate'' against him for any one of the three
bases supporting this motion. The context of these charges,
including the content and tone of statements made by the
convening authority's attorney, further clarifies that this
prosecution was undertaken with a vindictive purpose.
BASIS 1: BERMUDA AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
c. Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all
charges pending against MACS Taylor. None of these charges
would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing
in Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
Pursuant to U.S. v. Davis and Blackledge v. Perry, these are
both impermissible bases for undertaking a prosecution.
d. There is substantial evidence that the convening
authority knew about MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda and
had distaste for those activities. RADM Nash requested a copy
of the Bermuda tape before MACS Taylor arrived. Articles were
posted and the tape was watched at the security department
prior to MACS Taylor's arrival. LCDR Cole's statements to
MACS Taylor when he arrived at NCBC shows his distaste for
MACS Taylor's prior whistleblowing. MACS Taylor was taken to
XOI by the convening authority for activities in Bermuda. The
convening authority awarded him a letter of caution at this
XOI for activities in Bermuda. NCIS, in conducting the
investigation of these charges for the convening authority,
asked numerous witnesses if they knew anything about the
Bermuda incident. Furthermore, LCDR Cole's statement that
``ABC bailed him out of Bermuda, they won't come to his
rescue here'', shows the vindictive tone of LCDR Cole based
on MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda.
e. There is also substantial evidence that LCDR Cole had a
personal animosity for MACS Taylor. The statements by LCDR
Cole at the meeting upon MACS Taylor's arrival is evidence of
that animosity. MACS Taylor questioned LCDR Cole's
professionalism by challenging his practice with regard to
pretrial confinees. LCDR Cole was incensed at MACS Taylor's
complaint. The 5 September 1993 memorandum shows that prior
to this arrest, LCDR Cole sought to have MACS Taylor fired
from his job. Ever since the first meeting when MACS Taylor
reported at NCBC, there have been continual confrontations
between the two men.
f. In addition to the evidence of vindictiveness, there is
considerable evidence of fact situations similar to those in
the case at bar that were not prosecuted. The off-base
arrests involving detectives Forbes and Wunsch were very
similar to this arrest, and no disciplinary action followed.
There was evidence of dereliction by GSM2 Beman, but no
disciplinary action was initiated. There was evidence of
dereliction by Officer Tangonan, and no investigation was
initiated. An examination of these other situations
demonstrates that the government would not have ordinarily
prosecuted this case but for MACS Taylor's activities in
Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
g. The vigor with which the command initiated this
prosecution is further evidence of the other-than-official
interest is seeing MACS Taylor prosecuted. For example, NCIS
was called in to investigate and devoted a great deal of
resources to this investigation. NCIS jurisdiction, however,
is normally over major offenses only. LCDR Cole used his
influence as base SJA over other legal matters to affect the
investigation in this court-martial. LCDR Cole used the
pressure of a barring order to enlist the support of an
unwilling witness, Doug Lively. He used his administrative
power to order a civilian, Byron Frank, to give, against his
will, information to use against MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole also
actively participated in interviewing witnesses with the
Trial Counsel.
h. In sum, there is substantial evidence that this
prosecution would not have normally been initiated but for
the fact that MACS Taylor was the subject. Dislike of a
sailor based on his past legal activities (Bermuda) and his
personality is not a permissible basis upon which to initiate
a prosecution. For the foregoing reasons, all pending charges
against MACS Taylor should be dismissed.
basis 2: right to remain silent
i. Ever since initially being accused of dereliction, MACS
Taylor has exercised his Constitutional right to remain
silent. There is substantial evidence that all forty-eight
charges in this court-martial are a result of vindictiveness
due to MACS Taylor's invoking this constitutional right.
Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all charges.
j. On 17 March 1994, the Trial Counsel told the Defense
Counsel that it was his understanding, based on his
discussions with the Convening Authority, that no charges
would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's invocation of
this right. The Trial Counsel further stated that it was his
understanding that the Admiral ``got ticked'' when MACS
Taylor invoked this right. The Trial Counsel's statement is
clear evidence that the government's decision to prosecute
was based on MACS Taylor's decision to remain silent.
k. In discussing Taylor's court-material charges with Byron
Frank, LCDR Cole stated that ``if they had just cooperated
with NIS, then it would've been a slap on the wrist'',
implying that the charges would not have been brought at all
but for MACS Taylor's invocation of his right to remain
silent.
l. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts at pressuring MACS
Taylor to give up his right to remain silent, including
attempts to persuade LT Brod and * * * appeals to MACS
Taylor. LCDR Cole further told MACS Taylor that if he didn't
``open up'' there would be ``twenty more f---ing charges.''
m. The convening authority has taken several other actions
which demonstrate the vigor with which it has attempted to
get MACS Taylor to give up his right to remain silent. First,
LCDR Cole gave MACS Taylor a direct order to write a new
Incident Complaint Report, alleging that the original had
been lost. Second, LCDR Cole administratively ordered
civilian police lieutenant Byron J. Frank, who participated
in the arrest, to give details of the arrest. LT Morean
described this administrative order as a ``discovery tool''.
n. In sum, there is considerable evidence that the
convening authority was angered by MACS Taylor's silence, and
was in fact motivated to prosecute in retaliation for MACS
Taylor's silence. In fact, the convening authority expressly
told the Trial Counsel that there would have been a
prosecution at all had Taylor not ``clammed up''. It is
evident that all forty-eight charges are in direct
retaliation for MACS Taylor's exercise of a constitutional
right, the right to remain silent.
o. To allow the government to prosecute as retaliation for
exercising the right to remain silent would be to chill the
exercise of this important constitutional right. Based on the
foregoing, all charges now pending should be dismissed.
basis 3: right to refuse captain's mast
p. After MACS Taylor refused Captain's Mast, the charges
against him rose from one specification of dereliction of
duty to 48 specifications in total at special court-martial.
There is substantial evidence that the additional 47
specifications were preferred in retaliation for MACS
Taylor's refusal to accept Mast. Under this basis, the motion
seeks dismissal of all charges added after the refusal of
Captain's Mast. The charges sought to be dismissed include
all additional specifications related to the 16 November
arrest (beyond the one specification from Mast) as well as
all specifications related to previous incidents.
q. LCDR Cole explicitly told MACS Taylor and LT Brod that
if Taylor refused Mast ``there would be twenty more charges''
and that he would ``throw the book at him''. These statements
demonstrate LCDR Cole's intentions to retaliate if MACS
Taylor refused Mast.
r. Supreme Court and Military decisions support that a
large increase in charges after the invocation of a legal
right is a strong sign of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Here,
the charges jumped from one to forty-eight after MACS Taylor
exercised his right to a court-martial. In U.S. v. Davis, the
court states that the classic prosecutorial vindictiveness
case involves a harsher variation of the same decisions to
prosecute. Clearly, if the first decision to prosecute was
for only one specification, then a second decision for 48
specifications is a harsher variation.
s. In U.S. v. Martino, 18 M.J. 526 (AFCMR 1984), the
government raised the number of charges after the accused
refused NJP. The court held such prosecution to be proper.
Martino can be distinguished on several bases. First, the
court emphasized that the defense counsel asserted
prosecutorial vindictiveness with no evidence whatsoever of a
vindictive motivation. Further, the government showed
evidence of a valid motivation for the difference in number
of charges. In the case at bar, however, there is
considerable evidence of vindictiveness and there is no
evidence of valid government motive for increasing the
charges from 1 to 48.
t. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that
in the normal give and take of plea bargaining, a prosecutor
has valid discretion to increase and decrease the number of
charges in order to secure a guilty plea. Bordenkircher is
distinguishable on several grounds. First, in Bordenkircher,
the only evident motive on the part of the prosecutor was the
non-vindictive motive to receive a guilty plea. In the case
at bar, there is considerable evidence of vindictiveness
unrelated to the desire to secure a Mast conviction. Second,
in Bordenkircher, it was not disputed that the defendant was
properly chargeable for the additional charges. In the case
at bar, however, there is considerable evidence that there
was no valid basis for the additional charges. MACS Taylor's
performance evaluation of September 1993 shows the convening
authority's acknowledgement that there was no case of
dereliction for any prior incidents. Third, the additional
charges in the case at bar were not part of the course of
normal plea bargaining. MACS Taylor was ordered to attention
and threatened with more charges if he did not accept Mast.
Further, the military relationship between a Lieutenant
Commander and a Senior Chief Petty Officer is one of unequal
bargaining power.
u. In U.S. v. Davis, a claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness was rejected. In Davis, however, there were no
additional charges brought in the move from Mast to court-
martial. In the case at bar, the charges rose from one to
forty-eight. Justifying its rejection of the prosecutorial
vindictiveness claim, the Davis court stated that the classic
case of prosecutional vindictiveness occurs when the number
of charges is raised.
v. U.S. v. Blanchette also involved a rejected
prosecutorial vindictiveness claim. That case can be
distinguished in that the reason for not charging the accused
initially was due to insufficiency of evidence. The court
found that the additional charges were justified due to the
availability of new evidence. No such evidentiary
justifications exist for the government in the case at bar.
w. In sum, because MACS Taylor refused Mast on one
specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority
retaliated by preferring forty-seven additional charges
against him at a court-martial. The possibility of
retaliation is clearly ``realistic'', and the impression made
on the accused is clearly one of intimidation. The statements
by LCDR Cole are evidence that the convening authority was in
fact motivated by vindictiveness. Dismissing the additional
charges would be consistent with Supreme Court and Military
case law. To allow vindictive charging as occurred here would
be to chill the exercise of a sailor's legal right to refuse
Captain's Mast. For the foregoing reasons, all charges beyond
the initial specification of dereliction of duty should be
dismissed.
5. Evidence.
a. Witnesses. The defense offers the testimony of the
following witnesses in support of this motion: Detective
Wunsch, Sergeant Forbes, LCDR Cole, MACS Taylor, Lieutenant
Frank, Officer Elgin, Officer Robertson, MACS Kossman, Kari
Lee Patterson, DT3 Wright, MS3 Doyle, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Flynt,
R.J. Bryan, Petty Officer Bassett, Petty Officer Pringle,
Andrew Stewart, LT Morean, Petty Officer Beman Officer
Tangonan.
b. Documents. The following documents will be presented as
evidence in support of this motion: Incident Complaint Report
(ICR) for Wunsch arrest, ICR for Forbes incident, report of
Beman incident, 5 September 1993 Memorandum from LCDR Cole,
Bermuda file, MACS Taylor evaluation, Mast charges, Report
chit, NJP Refusal Form, Court-martial charges, letter of
caution, Bermuda tape, new ICR for 16 November arrest,
Barring notice for Doug Lively.
6. Relief Requested. Pursuant to Basis 1, the defense
respectfully requests that all charges be dismissed. Pursuant
to Basis 2, the defense respectfully requests that all
charges be dismissed. Pursuant to Basis 3, the defense
respectfully rests that all charges other than the one
specification charged at Mast be dismissed.
7. Oral Argument. The defense desires to make oral argument
of this motion.
Carter F. Brod,
LT, JAGC, USNR,
Defense Counsel.
Date: 23 Mar 94
certificate of service
I, Lieutenant Carter F. Brod, JAGC, USNR, certify that on
this 23rd day of March 1944, I personally served upon
government trial counsel a true and correct copy of this
Motion.
____
Department of the Navy,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, DC, August 9, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman, I am responding to your letter of August
5, 1994, concerning the retirement confirmation of Admiral
Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy.
The latest GAP letter alleges improper communications
between members of Admiral Mauz' staff and persons assigned
in the Port Hueneme area who had knowledge of the court-
martial case involving Senior Chief Taylor. In order to be
able to assure the Committee that we were providing all
information relevant to this matter, OPNAV staff spoke with
the persons concerned and confirmed the accuracy of those
parts of the Chief of Naval Operations' 27 July letter to you
that addressed this issue (pages 4 and 5).
Senior Chief Taylor had charges brought against him arising
out of actions in November 1993 while serving at the Naval
Construction Battalion Center (NCBC), Port Hueneme,
California. He had previously requested in writing to be
transferred outside the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) chain of command, and the Bureau of Naval
Personnel approved that request by assigning him to an
appropriate billet in his rating at Port Hueneme. He reported
to NCBC Port Hueneme for duty in December 1992.
After referral to trial of the November 1993 charges, the
convening authority (NCBC Port Nueneme) decided it was
appropriate to move the case out of the Port Hueneme area to
ensure the fair and independent disposition of the case. To
this end, the convening authority withdrew the charges on
March 26, 1994. My inquiry revealed no communications between
Admiral Mauz or anyone on his staff and those involved with
bringing the charges, and ultimately withdrawing the charges,
against Senior Chief Taylor prior to the withdrawal of
charges in March 1994.
The proceedings in Senior Chief Taylor's case were
mentioned in a short Orlando Sentinel article of March 29,
1994, which appeared in a Pentagon compilation of news
articles on 1 April. In describing the withdrawal of charges
relating to Senior Chief Taylor's alleged negligent and
improper arrest of a service member, the article stated that
his attorneys had filed documents ``contending the misconduct
charges were retaliation for Taylor's comments'' in the past
regarding Bermuda. Admiral Mauz' Executive Assistant saw the
article and asked the senior Staff Judge Advocate to
ascertain what, if any, connection there could have been
between Senior Chief Taylor's current situation in Port
Hueneme and Bermuda. Both officers were confident that
CINCLANTFLT had taken no action whatsoever in retaliation
against Senior Chief Taylor, and they were understandably
concerned that such a suggestion might have been made and
believed it important to ascertain the basis, if any, for
such an allegation.
The CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate called the NCBC Staff
Judge Advocate, who confirmed the news article was indeed
misleading and that there was no suggestion during the
proceedings of any involvement by CINCLANTFLT or his
subordinates in Senior Chief Taylor's case. The NCBC Staff
Judge Advocate explained the charges involved Senior Chief
Taylor's law enforcement activities while assigned to NCBC
Port Hueneme. The charges included an allegation that Senior
Chief Taylor engaged in unauthorized off-base law enforcement
activities, including carrying a government-issued firearm
off-base. The CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate recounted this
information to the Executive Assistant, who then spoke
briefly to Admiral Mauz about the matter. The request for
clarification of the short news article was appropriate in
order for CINCLANTFLT to ascertain whether there were grounds
for investigation into any alleged impermissible actions by
anyone under the command of CINCLANTFLT.
Neither Admiral Mauz, nor any other CINCLANTFLT official,
was involved with the referral or withdrawal of the charges,
which arose solely from events centered in NCBC Port Hueneme
nearly a year after Senior Chief Taylor's transfer to that
command. On 23 March 1994, Senior Chief Taylor's defense
counsel in the pending case filed a ``motion to dismiss for
vindictive prosecution,'' alleging the Port Hueneme convening
authority had an unlawful decision to prosecute Senior Chief
Taylor. The defense motion complained mainly about the vigor
with which the Port Hueneme command pursued the charges
against Senior Chief Taylor, alleging that members of that
command ``had distaste'' for his previous whistleblowing
activities and the charges were being pursued because Senior
Chief Taylor exercised his rights to remain silent and to
refuse nonjudicial punishment for his alleged improper law
enforcement activities. The defense pointed to alleged
statements by officials in Port Hueneme suggesting that they
had focused inordinate attention on his previous, well-
publicized disclosures relating to Bermuda. The defense
motion did not allege ``personal interest'' or any actions or
involvement relating to this case by Admiral Mauz or anyone
subordinate to him.
With regard to receipt of a copy of the defense motion by a
member of the office of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate,
the GAP letter is incorrect in stating that this occurred
prior to the call seeking clarification of the news article.
I have reconfirmed the office of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge
Advocate received the motion more than a week after the
charges were withdrawn. This occurred when the Navy judge
advocate assigned to an NCBC Port Hueneme tenant command
called some of his lawyer colleagues to offer to send them
copies of the document, which he found to be unique and very
interesting from a professional perspective. One of these
officers was an attorney in the office of the CINCLANTFLT
Staff Judge Advocate with whom he had worked closely in the
past. The two officers had maintained a close professional
association and friendship, and spoke with each other and
exchanged faxes regularly on professional issues. The
CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant accepted the offer, but upon receipt
noticed that portions of it were illegible. In order to
obtain a better copy, she called the Officer in Charge, Naval
Legal Service Office Detachment, Port Hueneme, who was
reluctant to provide the document, despite the fact that it
was one of the papers in a public court proceeding, to people
who were merely curious about the case and had no official
reason to have it. The CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant replied that
when allegations relating to a command appear in the press,
the command has a valid interest in ascertaining the basis,
if any, of such allegations. The Officer in Charge agreed
that this was a valid reason and, believing that he had
received a reasonable request from the CINCLANTFLT staff, he
faxed her a copy. Since the Officer in Charge viewed the call
as a CINCLANTFLT request, he so informed Senior Chief
Taylor's defense counsel.
The request for the document did not stem from Admiral
Mauz. During the further inquiry by OPNAV staff, the Officer
in Charge verified the CINCLANTFLT Lieutenant neither
demanded a copy of the motion, nor stated that her call was
at the personal request of Admiral Mauz. Moreover, the
document was not shared outside the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge
Advocate's office. Since the document included no allegations
of impropriety by Admiral Mauz or anyone in CINCLANTFLT, and
had not been requested by Admiral Mauz or anyone else on his
staff, there was no reason for the Staff Judge Advocate to
provide the document to, or discuss in with, others.
There is simply no basis whatsoever for any claim that
Admiral Mauz took a personal interest in the case involving
Senior Chief Taylor. The facts as confirmed by thorough
inquiry show the accuracy of Admiral Mauz' public statement
categorically denying any such allegation. The communications
by members of his staff were permissible and in no way alter
this conclusion. There was no attempt or intent in any of
these communications to affect the case.
I have sought to answer the GAP letter's claims candidly,
thoroughly and accurately in order to assist the Committee in
its deliberations on Admiral Mauz' confirmation to retire in
his four-star grade. I believe strongly that there is no
basis for the GAP claims and that Admiral Mauz'
confirmation--and the assumption of command by his
successor--should not be further delayed.
I am available at any time to discuss this matter further
with you or to provide you any further information you
desire. Please do not hesitate to call on me. I have sent a
similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
Sincerely,
John H. Dalton,
Secretary of the Navy.
____
Camarillo, CA.
Senator Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn and Members of the Committee: I am
writing to address the inaccurate and misleading information
provided to the committee concerning my case as it pertains
to the retirement status of Admiral Henry Mauz. My primary
concerns focus on the involvement of Admiral Mauz and his
staff in charges (since dropped) that were brought against me
while at Port Hueneme. I believe this involvement, and the
Navy's obfuscation of the facts, provide more than enough
reason why the committee should hold a full investigation
into this matter, before bringing the matter to a vote.
Below is an outline of the most serious errors in the
Navy's communications with the committee. It is by no means
comprehensive, and full committee investigation would flush
out the full details.
I. Manner by which Mauz's staff acquired defense proceedings
Not only do the Navy responses differ from the actual chain
of events, the accounts from Admiral Boorda and Secretary
Dalton differ from each other concerning the same events.
Statement from Boarda letter:
``Subsequently, unbeknownst to either the senior Staff
Judge Advocate of Admiral Mauz, a junior Staff Judge Advocate
obtained a copy of the defense motion that was the basis for
withdrawal of the charges, as well as a copy of the charge
sheets, from a friend who was then Officer in Charge, Navy
Legal Service Office, Port Hueneme. The Officer in Charge
believed that in providing that documentation, he was
responding to an official request from Admiral Mauz's staff
and acting quite properly, he informed Senior Chief Taylor's
military counsel of the actions he had taken to comply with
the request. While these documents were shared with the
senior Staff Judge Advocate he did not speak of them to any
other staff member.''
Statement from Dalton letter:
``With regard to receipt of a copy of the defense motion by
a member of the office of the CINCLANFLT Staff Judge
Advocate, the GAP letter is incorrect in stating that this
occurred prior to the call seeking clarification of the news
article. I have reconfirmed the office of the CINCLANFLT
Staff Judge Advocate received the motion more than a week
after the charges were withdrawn. This occurred when a Navy
judge advocate assigned to an NCBC Port Hueneme tenant
command called some of his lawyer colleagues to offer to send
them copies of the document, which he found to be unique and
very interesting from a professional perspective. One of
these officers was an attorney in the office of the
CINCLANFLT Staff Judge Advocate with whom he had worked
closely in the past. The two officers had maintained a close
professional association and friendship, and spoke with each
other and exchanged faxes regularly on professional issues.
The CINCLANFLT Lieutenant accepted the offer, but upon
receipt noticed that portions of it were illegible. In order
to obtain a better copy, she called the Officer in Charge,
Naval Legal Service Office Detachment, Port Hueneme, who was
reluctant to provide the document, despite the fact that it
was one of the papers in a public court proceeding, to people
who were merely curious about the case and had no official
reason to have it. The CINCLANFLT Lieutenant replied that
when allegations relating to a command appear in the press,
the command has a valid interest in ascertaining the basis,
if any, of such allegations. The Officer in Charge agreed
that this was a valid reason and, believing that he had
received a reasonable request, he faxed her a copy.''
The actual chain of events occurred as follows:
The junior Staff Judge Advocate contacted a friend of hers
at Port Hueneme, a Lieutenant Wilson. Lieutenant Wilson
approached Taylor's defense counsel supervisor, Lieutenant
Tamboer, and asked for a copy of the defense proceedings.
Lieutenant Tamboer refused the request. The junior Staff
Judge Advocate contacted Lieutenant Tamboer directly and said
it was a direct request from ADM Mauz. Lieutenant Tamboer
then complied with the request.
II. Admiral Mauz's Involvement in the Charges against Taylor
Statement from Boorda letter:
``There was no influence on the case and, in fact, the
charges had already been withdrawn at the time of the call.''
Facts:
This statement is highly misleading. Although the
extraordinarily high number of charges (48 total) were
withdrawn at the time of the call, approximately two weeks
later, Taylor was sent to an Article 32 hearing where he was
re-charged.
In fact, the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate called the
Staff Judge Advocate for the Port Hueneme base, Lt. Cdr.
Derrick Cole, to tell him that he was upset that the charges
had been withdrawn against Taylor. Lt. Cdr. Cole assured the
CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge Advocate that Taylor would be re-
charged. This information is in the record of trial. The Navy
withdrew charges, in all likelihood, because they were
rightly concerned that if the case was brought before a
judge, that judge would promptly dismiss the case.
Many of the key people involved in my case, who dispute the
Navy's account of the chain of events, would be happy to
provide the committee with statements or testify. Please
contact me if I can be of any assistance. My work phone is:
(805) 982-2007. My home phone is (805) 388-3915. My beeper
number is: 1-800-482-3366, ext. 10397. I am at your service.
Very Respectfully,
George R. Taylor,
MACS (SW) USN.
____
Chief Of Naval Operations,
August 22, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter responds to a recent undated
letter from Senior Chief George R. Taylor, USN, to ``Senator
Nunn and Members of the Committee.'' Senior Chief Taylor's
letter was passed from the Armed Services Committee Staff to
the Navy Chief of Legislative Affairs on 19 August asking for
``. . . the Navy's review of the letter and information
therein.''
This is the third in a series of letters concerning Senior
Chief Taylor and the pending retirement confirmation of
Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy. This most recent letter
provides no new allegations or information that have not
already been addressed in the prior two letters.
Nevertheless, the following paragraphs will address in
additional detail each of Senior Chief Taylor's allegations.
With respect to Part I of his letter, Senior Chief Taylor
states that the accounts in my 27 July letter and the
Secretary of the Navy's 9 August letter ``. . . differ from
each other concerning the same events.'' That is not correct.
The Secretary's letter simply provided a more detailed
description of the interactions between LT Hagerty-Ford (a
junior staff judge advocate at CINCLANTFLT), LT Wilson (a
legal officer at a Port Hueneme tenant command), and LT
Tamboer (OIC Naval Legal Service Office Detachment, Port
Hueneme).
The actual chain of events as stated in my 27 July letter
and amplified in Secretary Dalton's letter is accurate. LT
Wilson, a friend of LT Hagerty-Ford and a judge advocate
assigned to a tenant command in Port Hueneme, called LT
Hagerty-Ford to offer her a copy of the defense motion. When
she received the copy with some illegible parts, LT Hagerty-
Ford asked LT Wilson to send a better copy. LT Wilson asked
the OIC, LT Tamboer, for a better copy for this purpose, but
LT Tamboer was reluctant to provide it for the reasons stated
in Secretary Dalton's 9 August letter. LT Wilson so informed
LT Hagerty-Ford, who then phoned LT Tamboer to explain her
reason for requesting a copy. As stated in attachments 1 and
2, LT Tamboer and LT Hagerty-Ford agree that my previous
letter and Secretary Dalton's letter accurately describe
their phone conversation. Specifically, LT Hagerty-Ford did
not say she was making a direct request from Admiral Mauz. In
addition, her statement indicates she never met Admiral Mauz
or ever discussed this or any other case with him.
The foregoing reaffirms that Admiral Mauz played no role in
a staff member's request for a copy of the defense motion to
dismiss Senior Chief Taylor's case.
With respect to Part II of Senior Chief Taylor's letter, my
27 July letter stating that there was no influence exerted on
the case and, in fact, that the charges had already been
withdrawn at the time of the call, is absolutely accurate and
not misleading. CAPT Baggett (Staff Judge Advocate at
CINCLANTFLT) called LCDR Cole after the case had been
forwarded to COMNAVBASE San Diego for disposition. At the
time of the call, LCDR Cole no longer had any influence on
the outcome because of the withdrawal of the charges and the
case's transfer to a new convening authority. CAPT Baggett
states in Attachment 3 that he never called the new convening
authority, who later recharged Senior Chief Taylor.
On the final page of his letter, under the section entitled
``Facts'', Senior Chief Taylor notes that approximately two
weeks after the charges against him were withdrawn, new
charges were preferred and sent to an Article 32 hearing. He
fails to note, however, that this action was taken by a
different convening authority, COMNAVBASE San Diego, after a
review of Senior Chief Taylor's alleged misconduct and
redrafting of charges against him based on his actions in
November 1993 as a member of the Naval Construction Battalion
Center, Port Hueneme, Security Force.
In his next to last paragraph, Senior Chief Taylor says
that CAPT Baggett was ``upset'' that the charges had been
withdrawn and that LCDR Cole assured CAPT Baggett that Senior
Chief Taylor would be recharged. CAPT Baggett rejects this in
Attachment 3. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record of
the Article 32 investigation that supports Senior Chief
Taylor's assertions. Secretary Dalton's letter accurately
states that the purpose of Captain Baggett's call to LCDR
Cole was to clarify information contained in a newspaper
article.
The foregoing demonstrates again that Admiral Mauz played
no role whatever in Senior Chief Taylor's case in California.
In summary, as stated in the Secretary's and my prior
letters, Senior Chief Taylor's accusations are inaccurate and
should not be allowed to further delay the confirmation of
Admiral Mauz for retirement in the grade of Admiral, which he
so deservedly has earned.
I am sending a similar letter to Senator Thurmond.
Very respectfully,
J.M. Boorda.
____
Grand Rapids, MI,
August 20, 1994.
To Whom It May Concern: Regarding the call I received from
Lieutenant Noreen Hagerty-Ford of the CINCLANTFLT Staff Judge
Advocate office in mid-April, the letters from the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy to the Senate
Armed Services Committee of July 27, 1994 and August 9, 1994,
respectively, fairly and accurately describe my part in
responding to her request. In April 1994, I was serving as
Officer in Charge, Navy Legal Service Office, Port Huename. I
have since left the Navy. My April discussion with Lieutenant
Hagerty-Ford was about the purpose of her request for a copy
of the notice filed by the defense in the Senior Chief Taylor
case. She explained that Admiral Maus was CINCLANTFLT. I knew
the motion included allegations about the CINCLANTFLT/Bermuda
matter and therefore understood the command (CINCLANTFLT)
would want to know about the allegations made in this motion.
I recall being very busy when she called and that it did not
take long at all for me to make the judgment that it would be
appropriate to send her a copy of the motion. I agreed she
had provided a valid reason and, believing I had received a
reasonable request from the CINCLANTFLT staff, I faxed her a
copy and so informed Senior Chief Taylor's defense counsel.
John Tamboer.
____
Norfolk, VA,
August 22, 1994.
To Whom It May Concern: The letter of 27 July 1994 and
Secretary of the Navy's letter of 9 August 1994 are correct
in describing my actions in April 1994 in obtaining a copy of
the defense motion in Senior Chief Taylor's case. I was first
afforded the document by my friend, LT Wilson, whom I know
from a previous duty station. The copy I got had some
illegible parts, so I called LT Wilson to ask him to send me
a better copy. LT Wilson said he would ask LT Tamboar for
one. Later that day LT Wilson called me to say LT Tamboar was
reluctant to send out copies of the document unless there was
a reason for the person to have it. I told him I would call
LT Tamboar and ask him for it myself. Just as Secretary
Dalton's letter states, I told LT Tamboar that I was on the
CINCLANTFLT staff and explained that when allegations are
made about a command, as apparently had been made in this
case, the command has a valid reason to know about those
allegations. LT Tamboar said he was satisfied I had provided
a valid reason and agreed to send me a copy. I did not demand
the document. I had no reason to do that and I simply do not
work that way. It was a short and business-like conversation.
I did not say the request was from Admiral Mauz because it
most certainly was not. In fact, I am a relatively junior
member on a large fleet staff and have never actually met
Admiral Mauz or discussed this or any other case with him. No
one else asked me to get it either. I did not provide it to
anyone outside my office.
------ ------,
LT. JAGC, USNR.
____
Norfolk, VA,
August 20, 1994.
To Whom It May Concern: I became the Staff Judge for
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, in mid-February
1994. The purpose of my phone conversation on 4 April 1994
with the Staff Judge Advocate at Port Hueneme was exactly as
stated in Secretary Dalton's letter of 9 August 1994 to the
Senate Armed Services Committee. At no time during the
conversation did I indicate the LCDR Cole in any way that I
was upset that charges against Senior Chief Taylor stemming
from occurrences at Port Hueneme had been withdrawn. LCDR
Cole explained that, contrary to an Orlando Sentinel
newspaper article, the charges had not been dropped because
of retaliation for being a whistleblower at Bermuda. He
stated that the charges had been withdrawn and the case had
been sent to another convening authority solely due to events
at Port Hueneme which had prompted Senior Chief Taylor's
defense counsel to raise a motion for dismissal based on
vindictive prosecution. Upon being told the real reason for
the withdrawal of the charges and transfer of materials
pertaining to the case, I believed that the processing of the
case had no connection with anything that had happened at
Bermuda. The disposition of the investigation of Senior Chief
Taylor had already been passed to a command in San Diego to
determine independently at the time I talked with LCDR Cole.
I had no further conversations with LCDR Cole and I never
talked to anyone at San Diego about the case.
Joseph E. Baggett,
Capt. JAGC, USN.
Additional Material
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, DC, September 13, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding at the request of your
Committee to additional questions regarding Admiral Henry H.
Mauz, Jr. Specific answers to each of the questions forwarded
by your staff are attached.
I believe it significant to note when responding to
questions regarding Admiral Mauz's involvement in the case of
LT Simmons, that there are three levels of command between
Admiral Mauz and the unit to which LT Simmons was assigned,
USS CANOPUS (AS-34). Given Admiral Mauz's position as the
Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet and the size of the
Fleet--two-hundred-and-twenty-four ships with twelve-thousand
officers and one-hundred-and-twenty-five-thousand enlisted
personnel--it would have been entirely appropriate for
Admiral Mauz to have delegated resolution of LT Simmons's
case to an officer, or flag officer, below him in the chain-
of-command. Admiral Mauz's devotion to duty and extraordinary
character are reflected in his personal involvement in
ensuring a just and compassionate resolution of LT Simmons's
complaint, to include LT Simmons's extension on active duty
and assignment to a new command.
In summary, Admiral Mauz has served the nation for over
thirty-five years, including combat and positions of
significant importance and responsibility. He is completely
deserving of a retirement in his present four star grade and
his confirmation should not be further delayed. I hope my
response to these additional questions will resolve any
lingering concerns.
A similar letter has been sent to Senator Thurmond.
Sincerely,
John H. Dalton.
____
Additional Questions Regarding the Activities of Admiral Mauz and His
Staff With Regard to Lt. Darlene Simmons
(1) When did Admiral Mauz learn of Darlene Simmons' case of
sexual harassment? How was he made aware of this case?
Answer: Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons' case of sexual
harassment on October 9th or 13th, 1992, by a telephone call
from VCNO.
(2) What actions did Admiral Mauz take to censure the
harasser?
Answer: Admiral Mauz accepted the recommendations by the
chain of command (Squadron Commander, Group Commander (Rear
Admiral) and Type Commander (Vice Admiral)) on the action by
which the harasser was given a non-punitive letter of
instruction by his command. The harasser also submitted a
request to retire.
(3) What reasons did Admiral Mauz have for choosing not to
take the corrective action that was ultimately taken by the
Secretary of the Navy on May 12, 1994--almost two years after
the events occurred?
Answer: Admiral Mauz was informed that corrective action
had been taken by the harasser's command as stated in answer
to question #2. This level of accountability was upheld by
the Navy Inspector General and the DoD Inspector General,
Admiral Mauz believed this corrective action was adequate,
especially in light of the ship's overall performance. By
assigning his Special Assistant, Commander Miller, to
participate in the investigation, he further caused the
harasser to be transferred from the ship and he personally
arranged for LT Simmons to be transferred to another locale
in order to get a fresh start. LT Simmons agreed with her
transfer. Admiral Mauz also intervened twice to retain LT
Simmons on active duty and caused her fitness reports to be
reviewed for accuracy.
(4) What was Navy policy at the time of the Simmons'
complaint with regard to removal of the harasser? What is the
Navy policy now?
Answer: At the time of Lieutenant Simmons' complaint, Navy
policy did not specifically address removal of a harasser
from the workplace. During the process of Admiral Mauz's
command inquiry Lieutenant Simmon's harasser was removed from
the ship.
Current Navy policy does not specifically address removal
of a harasser from the workplace. Such actions would depend
on the circumstances of the incident. Nevertheless, current
policy specifically prohibits reprisal and directs commanders
to take appropriate action to resolve any incidents of sexual
harassment and ensure no reprisal occurs.
5) What specific steps did Admiral Mauz take to correct the
problems in LT Simmons' chain of command that resulted in the
loss or destruction of evidence (specifically, the letter
from her harasser)?
Answer: Admiral Mauz expressed his concern to the staff and
to Commander Submarine Force Atlantic (a Vice Admiral)
regarding the loss of the letter. The Commanding Officer was
counselled by the Chief of Staff at SUBLANT for his handling
of the case.
6) Is it the Navy's understanding that Darlene Simmons'
confinement for four days in a locked psychiatric facility
was voluntary or involuntary? Exactly when did Admiral Mauz
and his office learn of LT Simmons' confinement? How did
Admiral Mauz learn of her confinement?
Answer: Doctor Quinones, a psychiatrist on the staff of
Naval Hospital Jacksonville, interviewed LT Simmons on
October 9, and directed she be admitted to the hospital's
psychiatric ward. After 24 hours, she was permitted to leave
the ward but remained under observation and had to remain on
the hospital grounds. Admiral Mauz learned of the
hospitalization during October 1994, after LT Simmons had
been released from the hospital, in the course of the
investigation to which he had detailed CDR Miller, his
Special Assistant for Women's Affairs.
7) Darlene Simmons maintains that her confinement was
involuntary and done in reprisal for her sexual harassment
charges. Did Admiral Mauz investigate the issue of how and
why she was confined to a locked psychiatric facility for
four days?
Answer: The circumstances of LT Simmons' hospitalization
were investigated and it was determined that the allegation
that the hospitalization was done in reprisal for her charges
of sexual harassment was wrong. Rather, her hospitalization
was directed by a Doctor Quinones who had no knowledge of the
sexual harassment allegations. Doctor Quinones confirmed by
phone on 13 September, that his decision to order her
admittance to the psychiatric ward was his alone, based
solely on his professional medical judgment.
8) Commander Miller, Special Advisor to Admiral Mauz for
Women's Affairs, has indicated that she has questions about
the quality of medical care given to Darlene Simmons at the
time of her psychiatric examination. Did Admiral Mauz
investigate this issue? Were steps taken to ensure that her
treatment was satisfactory?
Answer: Commander Miller did not express any concerns
regarding the quality of care provided to Lieutenant Simmons
at the time of her psychiatric examination. The command
inquiry, directed by Admiral Mauz, investigated all
circumstances of her hospitalization. Commander Miller was
satisfied that the command ensured that Lieutenant Simmons
received quality treatment.
9) What is the Navy's position on the veracity of LT
Simmons' testimony of March 9, 1994, before the House Armed
Services Committee regarding sexual harassment?
Answer: The Navy does not dispute that Lieutenant Simmons
was sexually harassed while she was assigned to USS CANOPUS
or that her complaint was initially handled poorly by USS
CANOPUS leadership. Nevertheless, the Navy does not agree
with several statements raised in her testimony. In
particular:
Lieutenant Simmons states that ``several hours after the XO
found out I was talking to a member of Congress, I was
ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.''
The inference of cause and effect of these two incidents is
not accurate. The hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons was
motivated solely by medical reasons. A referral was initiated
by the ship's Medical Officer, despite the Commanding
Officer's initial reluctance, and the hospitalization was
actually ordered by a physician on the Naval Hospital's
staff.
Lieutenant Simmons states that ``the investigation was
never closed.''
The command inquiry was closed on February 5, 1993.
Lieutenant Simmons states that ``I believe LCDR Catullo
received a medal at his retirement ceremony.''
LCDR Catullo did not receive a medal upon his retirement.
10) There were at least two occasions when Commander Miller
made recommendations with regard to the Darlene Simmons case
that were not followed by Admiral Mauz. Identify the specific
instances when recommendations were made by Commander Miller
that were not followed by Admiral Mauz, and provide
explanation why an alternate course of action was chosen in
each situation.
Answer: Commander Miller is aware of only one occasion
where her recommendation with regard to the Lieutenant
Simmons case was not agreed to by Admiral Mauz. This
recommendation involved Lieutenant Simmons' fitness report
upon her detaching from USS CANOPUS. Commander Miller
recommended that this fitness report be written by the
squadron commander instead of USS CANOPUS Commanding Officer.
Several senior officers and flag officers in the chain of
command disagreed with Commander Miller's recommendation and
advised Admiral Mauz that the Commanding Officer should
remain as the reporting authority. It should be noted that
after Admiral Mauz directed the Commanding Officer to re-
evaluate his initial grades on the fitness report, the
Commanding Officer upgraded the report.
11) Why didn't Admiral Mauz complete the report of his own
command inquiry on the Darlene Simmons' case?
Answer: The command inquiry directed by Admiral Mauz was
completed on February 5, 1993 and forwarded to Commander,
Submarine Group 10 for action. It was subsequently used
during the investigation directed by the DOD Inspector
General.
____
Additional Questions Regarding the Activities of ADM Mauz and his Staff
With Regard to Senior Chief Taylor
1) ADM Mauz took two days leave while in Bermuda. How long
was the official business portion of the trip?
Answer: As stated in the report of the Naval Inspector
General, ADM Mauz arrived in Bermuda on a Thursday evening,
conducted a full day of business on Friday, took leave over
the weekend, and departed on Monday morning. (It is also
noted that ADM Mauz, during his leave period (on Sunday),
cancelled his recreation plans and did paperwork and wrote
speeches instead.)
2) Following the withdrawal of the charges against Senior
Chief Taylor, ADM Mauz's Executive Assistant asked the senior
Staff Judge Advocate to call his counterpart at Port Hueneme
for additional information. Did ADM Mauz direct his Executive
Assistant to take this action? Was ADM Mauz aware of the
Executive Assistant's action prior to it occurring?
Answer: As stated in the letter from the Chief of Naval
Operations of July 27, 1994, ADM Mauz did not direct his
Executive Assistant to take this action and was not aware of
it prior to it occurring.
3) Before ADM Mauz's Executive Assistant informed him about
the withdrawal of the charges against Senior Chief Taylor in
March 1994, was ADM Mauz and/or his staff aware of the
charges against Taylor or any investigation into alleged
activities by Taylor at Port Hueneme?
Answer: ADM Mauz and his staff were aware from news
accounts that disciplinary action was pending against Senior
Chief Taylor for alleged activities at Port Hueneme, but were
not aware of the specifics of the charges.
4) A junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT obtained a
copy of the defense motion that was the basis for the
withdrawal of charges against Senior Chief Taylor. Was the
junior Staff Judge Advocate directed to obtain a copy of the
defense motion? If so, by whom and when? When did the junior
Staff Judge Advocate obtain a copy of the defense motion? Was
it before or after the actual withdrawal of the charges? Did
the initial request to obtain a copy of the defense motion
occur before or after the actual withdrawal of the charges?
Answer: As discussed in the Secretary's letter of August 9,
1994, and the Chief of Naval Operations' letter of August 22,
1994, the junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT was
offered a copy of the defense motion by a judge advocate
assigned to a tenant command in Port Hueneme. She was not
directed to obtain a copy of it. It was obtained in mid-April
1994. The offer to provide the copy and the receipt of the
copy occurred after the withdrawal of the charges at Port
Hueneme.
5) A junior Staff Judge Advocate at CINCLANTFLT obtained a
copy of the defense motion that was the basis for the
withdrawal of the charges from a legal officer at Port
Hueneme, but upon receipt noticed that portions of the
document were illegible. Was the legal officer's copy
illegible or just the copy that was faxed/sent to the junior
Staff Judge Advocate? Please provide copies of the following
documents: the original defense motion; the Port Hueneme
legal officer's copy of the defense motion; and the copy of
the defense motion that was faxed/sent to the junior Staff
Judge Advocate.
Answer: The Port Hueneme legal officer's copy of the motion
was also illegible. (He is currently on leave, and the Navy
has been unable to ascertain whether he retained a copy of
the document.) A copy of the defense motion placed into the
record at the Article 32 investigation later conducted in San
Diego is attached as Tab A. Also, a copy of the legible
motion, as faxed to the junior judge advocate at CINCLANTFLT
in mid-April, is attached as Tab B. (The CINCLANTFLT Staff
Judge Advocate office did not retain the illegible copy first
received.)
6) ADM Boorda's letter of August 22, 1994, tries to explain
discrepancies in Secretary Dalton's August 9 and ADM Boorda's
July 27 letters. Assuming that ADM Boorda's August 22 letter
is accurate, are there not factual discrepancies in ADM
Boorda's original letter of July 27 and Secretary Dalton's
August 9 letter?
Answer: There are no factual discrepancies between
Secretary Dalton's August 9 and ADM Boorda's July 27 letters.
The Secretary's letter responded to additional, more detailed
questions from the Armed Services Committee, which the
Department of the Navy received after ADM Boorda sent his
July 27 response to an earlier inquiry. As ADM Boorda states
in his August 22 response to this same question, the
Secretary's letter ``simply provided a more detailed
description'' of the matters in question.
7) After the charges against Senior Chief Taylor were
withdrawn and referred to San Diego, did ADM Mauz or anyone
on his staff have contact with Navy officials in San Diego
involved in this case (including any indirect contact through
officials at Port Hueneme)?
Answer: No.
8) Page 6 of ADM Boorda's 27 July 1994 letter states that,
``In fact, at the time the actions were taken, no one was
aware of Senior Chief Taylor's whistle-blowing activity.''
What exactly does this statement mean? What actions were
taken and who was unaware?
Answer: The DoD Inspector General reported in his August
16, 1993, report that Senior Chief Taylor's assistant made
anonymous phone calls to the Naval Inspector General and
Congresswoman Schroeder's office on behalf of Senior Chief
Taylor in September 1992. On November 9, 1992, the Security
Officer removed Senior Chief Taylor from his duties as
Assistant Security Officer because of pending disciplinary
action relating to an allegation of disrespect toward the
NAS Bermuda Material Division Officer. On November 23,
1992, Sam Donaldson revealed to the NAS Bermuda Commanding
Officer Senior Chief Taylor's protected disclosures to
Congresswoman Schroeder and the Naval Inspector General.
This was the first indication to Senior Chief Taylor's
chain of command that he had made protected disclosures.
The DoD Inspector General later investigated whether
unfavorable personnel actions were taken or favorable
actions withheld as a result of his protected disclosures.
The DoD Inspector General concluded that NAS Bermuda
personnel were unaware of the protected disclosures when
they took the personnel action. ADM Mauz also was unaware
of the protected disclosures at the time of the personnel
actions in Senior Chief Taylor's case, and had no role in
those actions.
9) Page 3 of Secretary Dalton's August 9, 1994 letter
states that, ``Since the document included no allegations of
impropriety by Admiral Mauz or anyone in CINCLANTFLT, and had
not been requested by Admiral Mauz or anyone else on his
staff. . . .'' Is this statement accurate? Did not ADM Mauz's
staff request a copy of the defense motion that was the basis
for the withdrawal of the charges against Senior Chief
Taylor?
Answer: The statement is accurate since the document was
originally received by LT Hagerty-Ford, a junior judge
advocate on the CINCLANTFLT staff, as a result of an
unsolicited offer by her friend serving in Port Hueneme. When
she found the faxed copy to have illegible parts, she
requested and received a better copy. As LT Hagerty-Ford
states in her statement attached to ADM Boorda's August 22
letter, she sought the better copy because of the possibility
the document might contain allegations about her command.
When she found the document did not allege involvement by
CINCLANTFLT, she and her immediate supervisor concluded there
was no reason to provide it to anyone outside the Staff Judge
Advocate's office. LT Hagerty-Ford's signed statement,
provided to the Armed Services Committee with ADM Boorda's
August 22 letter, corroborates these facts, and the fact that
Admiral Mauz had no knowledge of, or involvement in, this
matter.
____
Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary, Southwest Judicial Circuit, Port
Hueneme, CA
United States versus Taylor, George R., MACS/E-8, 000-00-
0000, U.S. Navy.
Special Court-Martial: Motion to Dismiss for Vindictive
Prosecution Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
Date: 23 March 1994.
1. Nature of Motion. This is a Motion to Dismiss for
Vindictive Prosecution filed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. This motion is filed as a direct
result of an unlawful decision by Commander, Naval
Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, to prosecute
MACS George R. Taylor, USN, the accused in this case.
2. Summary of Facts.
prior to MACS taylor's reporting at ncbc
a. In 1992, MACS George R. Taylor, USN, held the position
of Chief of Military Police at Naval Air Station Bermuda.
While serving at NAS Bermuda, MACS Taylor produced evidence
that the air station existed as a resort for top military
officials at the expense of taxpayers. MACS Taylor and
another ``whistleblower'' were featured on the 10 December
1992 episode of ABC's ``Primetime Live'' (tape of which will
be hereinafter referred to as ``the Bermuda tape''), which
prompted Defense and Inspector General investigations. As a
result of MACS Taylor's activities, Congress voted to close
the Bermuda base in 1995.
b. MACS Taylor was transferred to Naval Construction
Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, (hereinafter ``NCBC''), in
January 1993, under the protection of the Military
Whistleblowers Protection Act.
c. Before MACS Taylor arrived at NCBC, members of the base
security department posted an article about MACS Taylor's
activities in Bermuda on the security department bulletin
board. In addition, members of the security department
gathered in a conference room to view the Bermuda tape.
d. Before MACS Taylor arrived, a file was sent to NCBC from
Bermuda which included a non-punitive letter of caution and
materials related to MACS Taylor's activities at Bermuda.
e. Prior to MACS Taylor's arrival at NCBC, RADM David Nash,
USN, Commanding Officer of NCBC, requested a copy of the
Bermuda tape from Kari Lee Patterson, a civilian employee at
NCBC. Ms. Patterson delivered the tape to Mr. W.E. Hudson,
NCBC Security Officer, who delivered the tape to RADM Nash.
after reporting at ncbc
f. Upon MACS Taylor's arrival, RADM Nash held a meeting
with top base officials to discuss the arrival of MACS
Taylor.
g. Upon reporting on board NCBC, MACS Taylor was taken to
Executive Officer's Inquiry for activities in Bermuda. At the
XOI, Taylor was awarded the Nonpunitive Letter of Caution
sent from Bermuda. The charge was for disrespect to a
commissioned officer at Bermuda.
h. Immediately upon arriving at NCBC, MACS Taylor was
directed to meet with LCDR Cole in his office. At that
meeting, which was attended by BMCS Kossman, LCDR Cole told
MACS Taylor that ``this isn't Bermuda'' and ``You aren't
going to get away with that s--t here'', or words to that
effect.
i. In January 1993, LCDR Cole was called by Jeff Ruch, an
attorney with the Government Accountability Project, a public
interest organization which was involved with the incident in
Bermuda. Mr. Ruch called LCDR Cole to discuss the pending
Captain's Mast for Disrespect in Bermuda. After the phone
conversation, LCDR Cole confronted MACS Taylor, saying he had
just gotten a call from his ``liberal lawyers'' and ``this is
bulls--t,'' or words to that effect. LCDR Cole told MACS
Taylor that ``they're not gonna get you out of this. * * *
This package was sent here. We're going to adjudicate this
here'', or words to that effect.
j. Approximately one month after MACS Taylor reported
aboard, MACS Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that one of his
practices was improper. LCDR Cole had, on several occasions,
sent sailors to the Long Beach Brig with full knowledge that
there would never be a court-martial. This was typically done
on a Friday afternoon, where the magistrate would be unable
to release the sailor until the following Monday. When MACS
Taylor suggested to LCDR Cole that this practice was
improper, LCDR Cole became incensed, telling MACS Taylor
``I'm the f---ing lawyer on this base; who made you the base
lawyer?'', or words to that effect.
k. A meeting to discuss Workman's Compensation issues was
held in September 1993 and was attended by LCDR Cole, MACS
Taylor, NCBC Executive Officer, NCBC Command Master Chief,
and other officials. At the meeting, LCDR Cole confronted
MACS Taylor due to rumors he had heard about members of the
Special Investigations Unit, of which Taylor was a member,
being deputized by the federal government. MACS Taylor denied
ever spreading the rumor. LCDR Cole responded by admonishing
MACS Taylor for not addressing him as ``Sir'' when making a
statement.
l. In a Memorandum dated 5 September 1993, LCDR Cole
requested to the Commanding Officer, NCBC, that MACS Taylor
be relieved of his duties. RADM Nash, however, declined to
carry out LCDR Cole's request.
m. MACS Taylor has also had numerous personal
confrontations with Mr. W.E. Hudson, NCBC Security Officer,
since reporting aboard. Mr. Hudson is MACS Taylor's direct
superior in the Security Department.
n. On 30 September 1993, MACS Taylor received a performance
evaluation which covered the period since MACS Taylor's
arrival on board NCBC and was signed by RADM Nash. Taylor
received straight 4.0 evaluations on this evaluation. There
was no mention whatsoever of any problems with MACS Taylor's
performance. MACS Taylor was described as having ``great
depth of professional knowledge'' and a ``keen sense of
responsibility''. He was praised for ``drafting and immediate
implementation of the department's quality-focused Standard
Operating Procedures.'' He was also praised for conducting a
special task force to curtail the flow of drugs onto the base
and for assisting civilian police in drug operations.
16 november arrest
o. On 16 November 1993, MACS Taylor participated in the
arrest of CE3 Richard Miller, USN, a deserter who had escaped
from the Long Beach Brig. There were three other NCBC police
officers at the scene. The arrest took place in the City of
Oxnard with the participation of the Oxnard Police. No
complaints were made by any persons involved in the arrest.
Officers Ernie Eglin and L.E. Robertson of Oxnard Police
executed the arrest and believe that MACS Taylor acted
entirely properly.
p. On 17 November 1993, Mr. Hudson called MACS Taylor into
his office and accused him of acting improperly during the
previous night's arrest. Mr. Hudson then discussed with MACS
Taylor the possibility of an early retirement for MACS
Taylor.
q. On 18 November 1993, Mr. Hudson met with LCDR Cole to
discuss this situation. At this meeting, the two men agreed
to have Naval Investigative Service investigate MACS Taylor's
activities on the night of the arrest.
r. On 22 November 1993, Mr. Hudson informed MACS Taylor
that he planned to have NIS investigate the arrest.
s. Pursuant to advice from military defense attorneys, MACS
Taylor and each of the other three officers consistently
invoked his right to remain silent during the investigation.
t. On 3 January 1994, MACS Taylor was given a Report Chit
citing one specification of violation of Article 92 related
to the arrest of CE3 Miller. LCDR Cole's signature appears on
the Chit for ``person submitting report''. Along with the
Report Chit, MACS Taylor received formal notification of
contemplated Nonjudicial Punishment.
u. On numerous occasions after the Report Chit was drafted,
LCDR Cole attempted to persuade MACS Taylor and the other
three NCBC officers involved to answer questions about the
arrest. On or about 3 January 1994, LCDR Cole informed MACS
Taylor that the Incident Complaint Report for the incident in
question had never been received, and he gave MACS Taylor a
direct order to write a report describing what happened on
the night in question. MACS Taylor has consistently
maintained that he submitted the report immediately after the
arrest. Pursuant to advice from LT Carter F. Brod, JAGC,
USNR, Defense Counsel, MACS Taylor nevertheless prepared a
new report to avoid violating a direct order.
v. When discussing with MACS Taylor his potential Captain's
Mast, LCDR Cole ordered MACS Taylor to sit locked at
attention. LCDR Cole told MACS Taylor that he would ``add
twenty more f--king charges'' if Taylor refused Captain's
Mast.
w. On or about 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole called LT Brod and
asked LT Brod to give MACS Taylor pre-Mast advice. LCDR Cole
told LT Brod that MACS Taylor was being really stupid in his
attitude and that if he did not accept Mast then they were
going to ``throw the book at him.'' LCDR Cole told LT Brod
that, if MACS Taylor refused Mast, ``we have lots of other
stuff on him to use which we will throw on there'', or words
to that effect.
x. On 10 January 1994, MACS Taylor refused Nonjudicial
Punishment.
y. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts to persuade the
other three NCBC officers to discuss the details of the
arrest. On 6 January 1994, LCDR Cole told LT Brod in a
telephone conversation that ``the command is unlikely to
dismiss the charges against Senior Chief Taylor but would
probably dismiss on the others if they opened up.''
z. In a telephone conversation with civilian police
lieutenant Byron Frank, which lasted over one hour, LCDR Cole
told Lt. Frank that ``if you all had just cooperated with the
NIS investigation, then you would have just gotten a slap on
the wrist'', or words to that effect. LCDR Cole stated that
``Senior Chief Taylor is manipulating the other three
officers. I feel really sorry for them'', or words to that
effect. LCDR Cole stated that ``ABC bailed his a-- out in
Bermuda. They won't come to his rescue now'', or words to
that effect. LCDR Cole asked Lt. Frank, who was also an
African-American, ``why won't you just tell me what happened?
I'm the smartest black attorney in the JAG Corps. Let's just
talk brother to brother'', or words to that effect.
aa. On 21 January 1994, 48 specifications of UCMJ
violations were preferred against MACS Taylor. Many of the
specifications related to the 16 November arrest, but 16 of
the 47 new specifications related to incidents in April, May
and June of 1993.
bb. Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducted an
extensive investigation of the charges against MACS Taylor.
Included as part of the NCIS investigation were interviews of
over twenty-one witnesses. Many of the witnesses, including
Petty Officer Pringle, Detective Wunsch and Lieutenant Frank,
were asked questions about MACS Taylor's activities in
Bermuda.
cc. LT Robert P. Morean, JAGC, USNR, Trial Counsel,
conducted several witness interviews at NCBC on or about 15
February 1994. LCDR Cole was present for many of these
interviews and occasionally participated in questioning. In
the Interview with BMCS Kossman, USN, LCDR Cole corrected
BMCS Kossman for giving an answer LCDR Cole believed was
incorrect. When MS3(SS) Doyle was interviewed, LCDR Cole was
``right there, only two feet away from me.'' When MS3 Doyle
told LT Morean that he felt MACS Taylor was an excellent cop
and excellent leader, LCDR Cole stormed out of the meeting
and slammed the door. LCDR Cole also assisted LT Morean in
the questioning of Dan Gordon, Security Department Training
Officer.
dd. On 9 February 1994, LCDR Cole approached DT3 Fredia
Wright, USN, who had a son living on base who had been barred
from the base for juvenile delinquency. LCDR Cole offered DT3
Wright that her son could continue to live on the base if he
would testify in the court-martial of MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole
told her that she could disregard the barring notice if her
son would cooperate.
ee. On or about 18 February 1994, LCDR Cole discussed the
16 November arrest while teaching a class to new NCBC
security officers. While teaching this class, LCDR Cole
referred to the four officers who made the 16 November arrest
as ``the four'', and used their arrest as an example of
illegal police activities.
other similar NCBC security cases
ff. In the past, there have been several other arrests by
NCBC Police with the same characteristics as the 16 November
arrest. No prosecution or disciplinary action was taken in
any of the other arrests. There have also been egregious
cases of clear dereliction of duty by NCBC Military Police
where no prosecution was undertaken.
gg. On 23 September 1992, NCBC Detective A. Carpenter, MA1
Woods, USN, and NCBC Detective P. Wunsch arrested EOCN Jason
S. Tyree, USN, a deserter from NMCB-40, off-base in the City
of Oxnard. The facts of that arrest were effectively
identical to those in the case at bar. There was no
disciplinary action of any kind taken against any of the
officers.
hh. In December 1993, a complaint was filed alleging that
GSM2 E.J. Beman used unlawful force in an arrest of a female
suspect. The investigation of the incident was handled
internally; NCIS was never asked to investigate. Beman was
not court-martialed for his actions.
ii. In mid-1992, evidence existed that civilian NCBC police
officer Carlos Tangonan used unnecessary force by hitting a
suspect in the mouth with a baton. No investigation of any
kind was undertaken, and no disciplinary action followed.
jj. On 21 January 1992, F.D. Forbes, a civilian NCBC police
officer, arrested a suspect in the City of Port Hueneme by
pursuing him on an off-base street, drawing his service
revolver and ordering the suspect to freeze. The suspect was
unarmed and seen climbing over the base fence from on-base to
off-base, which is not an offense under any criminal code.
The ``suspect'' was not charged with any crime. Forbes was
not disciplined in any way for making this off-base arrest.
kk. Many members of the NCBC Security Department believe
that, based on their knowledge of the facts, the 16 November
arrest was entirely legal and consistent with NCBC policy
practices.
recent facts
ll. On 11 February 1994, LCDR Cole offered LT Brod that
MACS Taylor could still go to Captain's Mast if he wanted.
LCDR Cole told LT Brod that, if MACS Taylor accepted Mast,
the charges would include only two specifications of
dereliction of duty.
mm. On 9 March 1994, LCDR Cole ordered an administrative
questioning of Byron Frank regarding the arrest of 16
November 1993. LT Morean told LT Caroline Goldner, JAGC,
USNR, that this was done as a ``discovery tool'' for the
court-martial of MACS Taylor.
nn. On 17 March 1994, LT Morean told LT Brod in a telephone
conversation, that ``it is my understanding that if everyone
had been forthcoming, there would have been no charges. The
Admiral just got ticked when everyone clammed up.''
3. Statement of Law.
a. R.C.M. 907, MCM 1984. Motions to Dismiss.
b. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution. ``No person
shall be * * * compelled in any case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.''
c. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). ``To punish
a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him
to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.''
d. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). For an agent
of the state to pursue a course of action whose object is to
penalize a person's reliance on his constitutional rights is
``patently unconstitutional.''
e. U.S. v. Davis, 18 M.J. 820 (AFCMR 1984). For a claim of
prosecutorial vindictiveness to succeed, it must be
established that the decision to prosecute was based on
impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the
desire to prevent the exercise of a legal right. ``In the
classic prosecutorial vindictiveness case the subsequent
charges are harsher variations of the same decision to
prosecute.'' See Also U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir.
1983), Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977).
f. U.S. v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 1983). ``To help
simplify prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, the Supreme
Court developed a `presumption of vindictiveness'.'' 719 F.2d
at 361. ``Courts in this circuit construing post-Blackledge
decisions have held that whenever a prosecutor brings more
serious charges following the exercise of procedural rights,
`vindictiveness' is presumed, provided that the circumstances
demonstrate either actual vindictiveness or a realistic fear
of vindictiveness.'' 719 F.2d at 361.
g. U.S. v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1983). If the
defendant challenges as vindictive a prosecutorial decision
to increase the number or severity of charges following the
exercise of a legal right, the court must examine the
prosecutor's actions in the context of the entire
proceedings. If ``the course of events provides no objective
indication that would allay a reasonable apprehension by the
defendant that the more serious charge was vindictive, i.e.
inspired by a determination to `punish a pesky defendant for
exercising his legal rights,' a presumption of vindictiveness
applies which cannot be overcome unless the government proves
by a preponderance of the evidence occurring since the time
of the original charge decision altered that initial exercise
of the prosecutor's discretion.'' 718 F.2d at 1365.
h. U.S. v. Blanchette, 17 M.J. 512 (AFCMR 1983). ``The test
for prosecutorial vindictiveness is whether, in a particular
factual situation, there is a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness for the preferral of charges against the
accused.'' 17 M.J. at 514.
i. U.S. v. Hagen, 25 M.J. 78 (CMA 1987). Once a prima facie
case of vindictiveness is made out, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to disprove the misconduct. See Also U.S. v.
Garwood, 20 M.J. at 154 (CMA 1985).
j. U.S. v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973). If a
defendant alleges intentional or purposeful discrimination
and presents facts to raise a reasonable doubt about the
prosecutor's purpose, then the prosecutor can be called to
the stand to testify.
k. U.S. v. Green, 37 M.J. at 384 (CMA 1993). ``This Court
has previously stated that `in referring a case to trial, a
convening authority is functioning in a prosecutorial
role'''. See Also U.S. v. Fernandez, 24 M.J. at 78 (CMA
1987), Cooke v. Orser, 12 MJ 335 (CMA 1982), U.S. v. Hardin,
6 M.J. at 404 (CMA 1979).
l. In assessing a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness,
the Supreme Court focusses on practices which tend to chill
the assertion of defendant's rights. Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), NC v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
4. Discussion.
a. There are essentially three independent bases upon which
the prosecution of MACS Taylor is vindictive. The first basis
is due to retaliation for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing in
Bermuda and his personal relationship with the convening
authority's attorney, LCDR Cole. These two issues have been
grouped together because they support the premise that MACS
Taylor is being prosecuted for who he is, not what he has
done. Second, MACS Taylor is being prosecuted for exercising
his Constitutional right to remain silent. Third, MACS Taylor
is being prosecuted for exercising his right to refuse
Captain's Mast.
b. In light of the nature of these charges, the fact that
forty-eight total specifications were preferred in this case,
in itself, is strong evidence of the government's
vindictiveness. An inference can be drawn that by charging
MACS Taylor with such a large number of charges, the
government intended to intimidate him, ``show'' him, or
otherwise ``retaliate'' against him for any one of the three
bases supporting this motion. The context of these charges,
including the content and tone of statements made by the
convening authority's attorney, further clarifies that this
prosecution was undertaken with a vindictive purpose.
BASIS 1: BERMUDA AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP
c. Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all
charges pending against MACS Taylor. None of these charges
would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's whistleblowing
in Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
Pursuant to U.S. v. Davis and Blackledge v. Perry, these are
both impermissible bases for undertaking a prosecution.
d. There is substantial evidence that the convening
authority knew about MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda and
had distaste for those activities. RADM Nash requested a copy
of the Bermuda tape before MACS Taylor arrived. Articles were
posted and the tape was watched at the security department
prior to MACS Taylor's arrival. LCDR Cole's statements to
MACS Taylor when he arrived at NCBC shows his distaste for
MACS Taylor's prior whistleblowing. MACS Taylor was taken to
XOI by the convening authority for activities in Bermuda. The
convening authority awarded him a letter of caution at this
XOI for activities in Bermuda. NCIS, in conducting the
investigation of these charges for the convening authority,
asked numerous witnesses if they knew anything about the
Bermuda incident. Furthermore, LCDR Cole's statement that
``ABC bailed him out of Bermuda, they won't come to his
rescue here'', shows the vindictive tone of LCDR Cole based
on MACS Taylor's activities in Bermuda.
e. There is also substantial evidence that LCDR Cole had a
personal animosity for MACS Taylor. The statements by LCDR
Cole at the meeting upon MACS Taylor's arrival is evidence of
that animosity. MACS Taylor questioned LCDR Cole's
professionalism by challenging his practice with regard to
pretrial confinees. LCDR Cole was incensed at MACS Taylor's
complaint. The 5 September 1993 memorandum shows that prior
to this arrest, LCDR Cole sought to have MACS Taylor fired
from his job. Ever since the first meeting when MACS Taylor
reported at NCBC, there have been continual confrontations
between the two men.
f. In addition to the evidence of vindictiveness, there is
considerable evidence of fact situations similar to those in
the case at bar that were not prosecuted. The off-base
arrests involving detectives Forbes and Wunsch were very
similar to this arrest, and no disciplinary action followed.
There was evidence of dereliction by GSM2 Beman, but no
disciplinary action was initiated. There was evidence of
dereliction by Officer Tangonan, and no investigation was
initiated. An examination of these other situations
demonstrates that the government would not have ordinarily
prosecuted this case but for MACS Taylor's activities in
Bermuda and his personal relationship with LCDR Cole.
g. The vigor with which the command initiated this
prosecution is further evidence of the other-than-official
interest is seeing MACS Taylor prosecuted. For example, NCIS
was called in to investigate and devoted a great deal of
resources to this investigation. NCIS jurisdiction, however,
is normally over major offenses only. LCDR Cole used his
influence as base SJA over other legal matters to affect the
investigation in this court-martial. LCDR Cole used the
pressure of a barring order to enlist the support of an
unwilling witness, Doug Lively. He used his administrative
power to order a civilian, Byron Frank, to give, against his
will, information to use against MACS Taylor. LCDR Cole also
actively participated in interviewing witnesses with the
Trial Counsel.
h. In sum, there is substantial evidence that this
prosecution would not have normally been initiated but for
the fact that MACS Taylor was the subject. Dislike of a
sailor based on his past legal activities (Bermuda) and his
personality is not a permissible basis upon which to initiate
a prosecution. For the foregoing reasons, all pending charges
against MACS Taylor should be dismissed.
basis 2: right to remain silent
i. Ever since initially being accused of dereliction, MACS
Taylor has exercised his Constitutional right to remain
silent. There is substantial evidence that all forty-eight
charges in this court-martial are a result of vindictiveness
due to MACS Taylor's invoking this constitutional right.
Under this basis, this motion seeks dismissal of all charges.
j. On 17 March 1994, the Trial Counsel told the Defense
Counsel that it was his understanding, based on his
discussions with the Convening Authority, that no charges
would have been brought but for MACS Taylor's invocation of
this right. The Trial Counsel further stated that it was his
understanding that the Admiral ``got ticked'' when MACS
Taylor invoked this right. The Trial Counsel's statement is
clear evidence that the government's decision to prosecute
was based on MACS Taylor's decision to remain silent.
k. In discussing Taylor's court-material charges with Byron
Frank, LCDR Cole stated that ``if they had just cooperated
with NIS, then it would've been a slap on the wrist'',
implying that the charges would not have been brought at all
but for MACS Taylor's invocation of his right to remain
silent.
l. LCDR Cole has made numerous attempts at pressuring MACS
Taylor to give up his right to remain silent, including
attempts to persuade LT Brod and * * * appeals to MACS
Taylor. LCDR Cole further told MACS Taylor that if he didn't
``open up'' there would be ``twenty more f---ing charges.''
m. The convening authority has taken several other actions
which demonstrate the vigor with which it has attempted to
get MACS Taylor to give up his right to remain silent. First,
LCDR Cole gave MACS Taylor a direct order to write a new
Incident Complaint Report, alleging that the original had
been lost. Second, LCDR Cole administratively ordered
civilian police lieutenant Byron J. Frank, who participated
in the arrest, to give details of the arrest. LT Morean
described this administrative order as a ``discovery tool''.
n. In sum, there is considerable evidence that the
convening authority was angered by MACS Taylor's silence, and
was in fact motivated to prosecute in retaliation for MACS
Taylor's silence. In fact, the convening authority expressly
told the Trial Counsel that there would have been a
prosecution at all had Taylor not ``clammed up''. It is
evident that all forty-eight charges are in direct
retaliation for MACS Taylor's exercise of a constitutional
right, the right to remain silent.
o. To allow the government to prosecute as retaliation for
exercising the right to remain silent would be to chill the
exercise of this important constitutional right. Based on the
foregoing, all charges now pending should be dismissed.
basis 3: right to refuse captain's mast
p. After MACS Taylor refused Captain's Mast, the charges
against him rose from one specification of dereliction of
duty to 48 specifications in total at special court-martial.
There is substantial evidence that the additional 47
specifications were preferred in retaliation for MACS
Taylor's refusal to accept Mast. Under this basis, the motion
seeks dismissal of all charges added after the refusal of
Captain's Mast. The charges sought to be dismissed include
all additional specifications related to the 16 November
arrest (beyond the one specification from Mast) as well as
all specifications related to previous incidents.
q. LCDR Cole explicitly told MACS Taylor and LT Brod that
if Taylor refused Mast ``there would be twenty more charges''
and that he would ``throw the book at him''. These statements
demonstrate LCDR Cole's intentions to retaliate if MACS
Taylor refused Mast.
r. Supreme Court and Military decisions support that a
large increase in charges after the invocation of a legal
right is a strong sign of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Here,
the charges jumped from one to forty-eight after MACS Taylor
exercised his right to a court-martial. In U.S. v. Davis, the
court states that the classic prosecutorial vindictiveness
case involves a harsher variation of the same decisions to
prosecute. Clearly, if the first decision to prosecute was
for only one specification, then a second decision for 48
specifications is a harsher variation.
s. In U.S. v. Martino, 18 M.J. 526 (AFCMR 1984), the
government raised the number of charges after the accused
refused NJP. The court held such prosecution to be proper.
Martino can be distinguished on several bases. First, the
court emphasized that the defense counsel asserted
prosecutorial vindictiveness with no evidence whatsoever of a
vindictive motivation. Further, the government showed
evidence of a valid motivation for the difference in number
of charges. In the case at bar, however, there is
considerable evidence of vindictiveness and there is no
evidence of valid government motive for increasing the
charges from 1 to 48.
t. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that
in the normal give and take of plea bargaining, a prosecutor
has valid discretion to increase and decrease the number of
charges in order to secure a guilty plea. Bordenkircher is
distinguishable on several grounds. First, in Bordenkircher,
the only evident motive on the part of the prosecutor was the
non-vindictive motive to receive a guilty plea. In the case
at bar, there is considerable evidence of vindictiveness
unrelated to the desire to secure a Mast conviction. Second,
in Bordenkircher, it was not disputed that the defendant was
properly chargeable for the additional charges. In the case
at bar, however, there is considerable evidence that there
was no valid basis for the additional charges. MACS Taylor's
performance evaluation of September 1993 shows the convening
authority's acknowledgement that there was no case of
dereliction for any prior incidents. Third, the additional
charges in the case at bar were not part of the course of
normal plea bargaining. MACS Taylor was ordered to attention
and threatened with more charges if he did not accept Mast.
Further, the military relationship between a Lieutenant
Commander and a Senior Chief Petty Officer is one of unequal
bargaining power.
u. In U.S. v. Davis, a claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness was rejected. In Davis, however, there were no
additional charges brought in the move from Mast to court-
martial. In the case at bar, the charges rose from one to
forty-eight. Justifying its rejection of the prosecutorial
vindictiveness claim, the Davis court stated that the classic
case of prosecutional vindictiveness occurs when the number
of charges is raised.
v. U.S. v. Blanchette also involved a rejected
prosecutorial vindictiveness claim. That case can be
distinguished in that the reason for not charging the accused
initially was due to insufficiency of evidence. The court
found that the additional charges were justified due to the
availability of new evidence. No such evidentiary
justifications exist for the government in the case at bar.
w. In sum, because MACS Taylor refused Mast on one
specification of dereliction of duty, the convening authority
retaliated by preferring forty-seven additional charges
against him at a court-martial. The possibility of
retaliation is clearly ``realistic'', and the impression made
on the accused is clearly one of intimidation. The statements
by LCDR Cole are evidence that the convening authority was in
fact motivated by vindictiveness. Dismissing the additional
charges would be consistent with Supreme Court and Military
case law. To allow vindictive charging as occurred here would
be to chill the exercise of a sailor's legal right to refuse
Captain's Mast. For the foregoing reasons, all charges beyond
the initial specification of dereliction of duty should be
dismissed.
5. Evidence.
a. Witnesses. The defense offers the testimony of the
following witnesses in support of this motion: Detective
Wunsch, Sergeant Forbes, LCDR Cole, MACS Taylor, Lieutenant
Frank, Officer Elgin, Officer Robertson, MACS Kossman, Kari
Lee Patterson, DT3 Wright, MS3 Doyle, Mr. Hudson, Mr. Flynt,
R.J. Bryan, Petty Officer Bassett, Petty Officer Pringle,
Andrew Stewart, LT Morean, Petty Officer Beman Officer
Tangonan.
b. Documents. The following documents will be presented as
evidence in support of this motion: Incident Complaint Report
(ICR) for Wunsch arrest, ICR for Forbes incident, report of
Beman incident, 5 September 1993 Memorandum from LCDR Cole,
Bermuda file, MACS Taylor evaluation, Mast charges, Report
chit, NJP Refusal Form, Court-martial charges, letter of
caution, Bermuda tape, new ICR for 16 November arrest,
Barring notice for Doug Lively.
6. Relief Requested. Pursuant to Basis 1, the defense
respectfully requests that all charges be dismissed. Pursuant
to Basis 2, the defense respectfully requests that all
charges be dismissed. Pursuant to Basis 3, the defense
respectfully rests that all charges other than the one
specification charged at Mast be dismissed.
7. Oral Argument. The defense desires to make oral argument
of this motion.
Carter F. Brod,
LT, JAGC, USNR,
Defense Counsel.
Date: 23 Mar 94
certificate of service
I, Lieutenant Carter F. Brod, JAGC, USNR, certify that on
this 23rd day of March 1944, I personally served upon
government trial counsel a true and correct copy of this
Motion.
____
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, DC, September 13, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Attached are responses to five
additional questions forwarded from your Committee regarding
the pending confirmation of Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr.
Again, I hope that my response to these additional
questions is helpful and will finally resolve any pending
issues.
Sincerely,
John H. Dalton.
Enclosure.
____
1. When was Admiral Mauz first informed of the Lieutenant
Simmons case? What was he told and by whom?
Answer. On either 9 or 13 October, Admiral Mauz's Executive
Assistant received a call from the Executive Assistant to the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations asking whether he had any
knowledge of a sexual harassment case on USS CANOPUS
concerning Lieutenant Darlene Simmons. Neither Executive
Assistant can, today, two years after the fact, recall
whether the call occurred on Friday, 9 October or Tuesday, 13
October. Both agreed that the call occurred during a normal
workday around the Columbus Day weekend, with Monday being a
holiday. Both Executive Assistants confirm that this phone
call did not include any mention of Lieutenant Simmons'
hospitalization. Because this was the first time he had
received any indication of a sexual harassment case on USS
CANOPUS, Admiral Mauz's Executive Assistant called Admiral
Mauz's Special Assistant for Women's Policy. This was her
first notification of a sexual harassment case on USS CANOPUS
and she also confirms that this initial notification did not
include any mention of hospitalization. Admiral Mauz's
Executive Assistant then called the Chief of Staff at
COMSUBLANT to inquire. The Chief of Staff was not aware of
the case, but indicated that he would look into the matter.
One of two working days later, the Chief of Staff called to
advise that they had verified that there was a sexual
harassment case on the USS CANOPUS, but COMSUBLANT did not
have all the details and would inquire further. Admiral
Mauz's Executive Assistant advised Admiral Mauz of all these
telephone calls.
2. When did Admiral Mauz find out about Lieutenant
Simmons's referral to the psychiatric ward?
Answer. Lieutenant Simmons was admitted to the hospital on
Friday, 9 October and released on Tuesday, 13 October. On
Tuesday, October 13, 1992, Admiral Mauz's Special Assistant
for Women's Policy began to inquire into the sexual
harassment case regarding Lieutenant Simmons. Sometime on
October 13 or 14, the Special Assistant for Women's Policy
learned that Lieutenant Simmons was hospitalized over the
weekend. She verified this hospitalization with medical
documentation on October 15. Sometime on October 14 or 15,
she advised Admiral Mauz of Lieutenant Simmons's
hospitalization. In sum, Admiral Mauz was first advised of
Lieutenant Simmons' hospitalization after she was released
from the hospital.
3. Did Admiral Mauz or anyone on his staff know of
Lieutenant Simmons's hospitalization or referral for
hospitalization at the time of her hospitalization?
Answer. No.
4. Was the admitting psychiatrist informed by Navy
officials of Lieutenant Simmons' sexual harassment complaint
at the tome of admission?
Answer. The admitting physician, Dr. Quinones, had no
knowledge of the sexual harassment allegations at the time of
admission.
5. Did Admiral Mauz investigate the order by the Bermuda
commanding officer that Senior Chief Taylor undergo a forced
psychiatric examination?
Answer. No, because the responsibility for the
investigation was assigned by the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations to the Naval Inspector General, except the
reprisal and psychiatric referral, which were assumed by the
DoD Inspector General. The allegation of reprisal including a
psychiatric referral became first known to the Department of
the Navy on December 9, 1992. On December 11, 1992, the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations directed the Naval Inspector
General to investigate all Senior Chief Taylor's allegations,
except the reprisal and psychiatric referral, which were
assumed by the DoD Inspector General. On August 16, 1993, the
DOD Inspector General concluded in his report that Senior
Chief Taylor's ``referral for psychiatric evaluation was
justified and was not reprisal.''
Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, in response to the statements of my
colleague from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
with respect to the availability of Navy inspector general reports
through the Armed Services Committee, I want to make sure that the
record clearly reflects my understanding of the facts in the case of
Rebecca Hansen.
I was told by the Navy inspector general that I needed to get a copy
of his report from the Senate Armed Services Committee. On that same
day, May 27, 1994, my staff made a request of the Armed Services
Committee staff for the report. They were told that the reports were
made available only to the members of that committee. When pressed, the
Armed Services Committee staff told my staff that they would talk with
the chairman and see if an exception could be made in the Hansen case.
After the June recess my staff called again and asked about progress
on the request. They were told that there had been no progress, but
that they would expedite getting a response.
By June 24, 1994, the decision was made to discharge Lieutenant
(junior grade) Hansen and the Arthur nomination was withdrawn. These
events removed, to some extent, the urgency of receiving the report.
But at no time was my staff informed that I could review the report.
In fact, they were given to believe that the committee staff was
working to make the report available, but that it was not available to
me at that time.
Whether the report would have been made available to me eventually
was never determined, as events overtook that question and rendered it
moot.
Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer] is
recognized.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
I rise with great respect for the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee. He and I have always been very open with our views when we
have disagreed, as we do in this case. I understand that he is
frustrated at the prospect of looking into this matter further.
I had the honor of serving on the Armed Services Committee in the
House for several years, and there is a tremendous workload there,
particularly at a time when there are so many problems in the world
that may require action.
So in that context, I say to my friend respectfully, that
notwithstanding all of those responsibilities, we must always honor our
responsibility to individuals. It is sometimes a very cumbersome thing.
We go long distances to protect single individuals, whether it is in
the courtroom, whether it is in the workplace, in any circumstance, and
certainly I hope in the U.S. Senate.
I want to say to my friend and colleague, Senator Murray from
Washington, that I always have an enormous amount of respect for her.
To bring this matter forward is not pleasant. As you can see from the
tenor of the debate so far, it is not pleasant. It is not pleasant to
stand up and say we are not going to do business as usual. It is not
pleasant to stop a four-star train from going down the track.
We faced the same issues in another case--the case of Admiral Kelso.
Particularly for me, opposing this nomination certainly is not pleasant
because in California we have an enormous number of retired Navy
personnel for whom I have great respect.
But, I want to say to my colleagues, it is because of that great
respect that I have for the Navy, for the military, and for their
commitment to this country, that I think we owe it to them that this
kind of debate is not perfunctory. I wish in many ways we were not
involved in this issue. I discussed that with the chairman. But the
fact is article 2, section 2 of the Constitution says we must provide
our advice and consent on Presidential nominees.
Therefore, when we put our yes, or no, behind a vote, we need to feel
good about it. I am sure that my friend from Georgia feels perfectly
comfortable with this. I assume that my friend from Arizona feels
extremely comfortable with this nomination. Senator Durenberger,
although he said he had some reservations, feels that he could vote on
this nomination. I respect that. That is fine. But if there are some of
us who believe that there ought to be a little more looking at this
nomination to see whether the four-star level is deserved, I would hope
that they would not be subjected to such comments suggesting that we
don't know anything about the military. It reminds me of an appointee
of the Reagan administration who said women did not understand the
concept of throw weight. I remember that. So I hope that we can keep
this debate on a higher level than that.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, my name was used. Will the gentlelady
yield?
Mrs. BOXER. Certainly. I am happy to yield.
Mr. McCAIN. I am trying to point out to the gentlelady that the chain
of command is a specific set of words that means a certain thing, and
that is that it flows to the Commander in Chief.
Yes, the U.S. Senate has responsibility. In fact, I do not hear the
Commander in Chief being mentioned in this issue of who is responsible
and who is in the chain of command. Facts are facts. The Senate has
responsibilities. The chain of command is very clear. It flows to the
Commander in Chief who is the President of the United States.
The Senate has its responsibilities. I do not dispute that. But facts
are facts, I say to the Senator from California, and the fact is that
the chain of command is a specific set of responsibilities. I thank the
gentlelady from California for yielding.
Mrs. BOXER. I say to the Senator that when we speak on the floor of
the U.S. Senate, we do take poetic license once in a while, and we will
use terms to make a point.
What the Senator from Washington was simply stating in her way was,
she was not commenting on every single rule and regulation in the
military. She was basically stating that in her mind the Senate has a
responsibility here entrusted to us under article 2, section 2 of the
Constitution.
The issue at hand is not whether Admiral Mauz deserves four stars.
The question is, Should we do it today, or should we have a hearing to
give us a better and deeper look at some of the issues before us?
I think we should recommit this nomination to the committee. I think
the Senator from Washington is making a very conservative motion here.
We should be careful. We should be cautious. It is important. It is
important to the Navy.
I believe that we cannot provide our advice and consent on this
nomination at this time. It is very clear to me that there are
allegations that have been raised. There are parts of the record that
are disturbing. There are conflicts in the record, and they involve
whistleblowers. I go back a long way in the defense of whistleblowers.
For years on the House side I was involved not only in general
legislation involving whistleblowers, the Whistleblower Protection Act
and others, but the specific issue of committing military personnel to
the psychiatric ward in retaliation for whistleblowing. So it is a very
important issue to me and I have a long history with it.
In each of the instances of Darlene Simmons and Master Chief George
Taylor, both were committed for psychiatric evaluations, and it seems a
little suspicious to me both were working in a chain of command with
Admiral Mauz at the top.
I will not restate the facts of the cases, but I will allude to them
briefly. The one disgraceful similarity, as I have said, is that the
whistleblowers were ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluation shortly
after reporting their experiences of sexual harassment in the case of
Lieutenant Simmons and wasteful military spending in the case of Chief
Taylor.
You may say that is just a coincidence, but I think we ought to look
at it a little bit. It was my amendment offered to the DOD bill in 1990
that made it illegal to retaliate against whistleblowers by ordering
them to undergo mental fitness evaluations. That amendment became the
law of the land.
We saw psychiatric evaluations being used regularly. As a matter of
fact, at my request there was an open hearing about those psychiatric
evaluations. The whistleblowers wanted to come forward and tell their
story because they were put in the psychiatric ward for no reason other
than they had blown the whistle against their superiors. They wanted to
tell their story.
I want to be very fair here today. The inspector general in fact did
look at the law and found that the hospitalizations were not
retaliatory. But I must say, I am still suspicious. And I think all
Senators should be suspicious. And I think Patty Murray's motion before
us will help us resolve our suspicions.
It may very well be that when that hearing is held, we will find out
that there is no problem, that it is just a coincidence--just a
coincidence--that two whistleblowers were sent to the psychiatric
ward--one of them for 4 days.
Admiral Mauz has been accused by military personnel of improper
conduct in handling the cases of Lieutenant Simmons and Senior Chief
Taylor. Now the Senator from Georgia says there is another charge from
the Government accountability project--by the way a very, very well-
respected nonprofit organization. But I am not going to get into that
charge. I know nothing about that. I do not even know why the Senator
from Georgia raised it here. I guess it is just to point out that there
could be many accusations made against an individual. But I am not
talking about that new situation.
In the case of Lieutenant Simmons, Admiral Mauz is accused of being
derelict in his duty to protect her and to oversee the vigorous
prosecution of her harasser. In Chief Taylor's case, he is accused of
attempting to influence a military prosecution not under his
jurisdiction as Commander of the Atlantic Fleet. Those are the
accusations.
Let me talk about the case of Lt. Darlene Simmons. This case
demonstrates that many key issues remain unresolved. It shows why we
need a full investigative hearing before we can act responsibly on this
nomination. I would like to lay out my concerns, and I hope that
Senators are listening. I hope they will vote for the Murray motion so
that we can investigate these questions. I know that if this issue does
get remanded to his committee, the Senator from Georgia will do a
vigorous job of pursuing the truth.
In the Simmons case, the key question is simple: What did Admiral
Mauz know and when did he know it? When did he learn about the sexual
harassment and involuntary hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons?
Although this nomination has been on the Executive Calendar for more
than a month, we still do not know the answer. Some Senators may wonder
why we care so much about this question. But I think we must care.
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution says we must provide our
advice and consent on this nomination. Just as we want to know the
facts about a Supreme Court nominee that comes before us--and we take
that very seriously--we need to know the facts about this nomination.
Let me briefly review what we do know about this case. From December
1991 until May 1992, Lieutenant Simmons was sexually harassed. She
reported this harassment up the chain of command in accordance with
Navy procedures, but her complaint seemed to go nowhere. Finally, as
many of our constituents do, Lieutenant Simmons asked one of her
State's Senators to intervene on her behalf. On October 9, 1992, the
Friday preceding the Columbus Day holiday weekend, Lieutenant Simmons
was ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. When a whistleblower
is ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation--or, frankly, when
anybody is--on a Friday of a holiday weekend, it automatically arouses
suspicion. This is because you cannot be released until the next
business day, the following Tuesday, even if you are quickly found fit
for duty, which she was. She was found entirely fit for duty; yet, she
was stuck in a psych ward.
How would you feel, I say to my colleagues, if that happened to your
wife or your daughter, or your mother, or your sister, or your aunt?
You are stuck in a psych ward, and you are perfectly fine, and you
cannot get out because you were sent there on a Friday, and the rule is
you cannot get out until the next business day. It is a long holiday
weekend, and you are perfectly fine, and you are sitting in a psych
ward.
This is the United States of America; this is not the former Soviet
Union. That is why we passed the law that prohibits that kind of
treatment. But here is a whistleblower who happens to be sent for a
psych evaluation and happens to be sent on a Friday, and happens not to
be released until Tuesday. All we are asking is let us take a look at
this, Armed Services Committee; we need your help. We want to
understand this better.
Lieutenant Simmons was a virtual prisoner in a military hospital for
4 days. Here is the interesting thing: Before Lieutenant Simmons
reported to the hospital that Friday, she made an important telephone
call. She telephoned the Under Secretary of the Navy to report that she
believed that this order was issued in retaliation for her complaints
of sexual harassment. What happened with that telephone call is the
subject of my concern about this case.
We know that the Navy undersecretary gave this information to the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations and that the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations then gave the information to Admiral Mauz. That is on the
record. Admiral Mauz was told.
Here is the key question: When did he know? We tried to get the
answer. We tried to get the answer from Admiral Mauz, Senator Murray
and I, and other women Senators, who have been interested and concerned
about this. We asked the question. Do you know what we got back?
Different answers.
Let me tell you what those answers were. The first question was:
When did Admiral Mauz learn of the Darlene Simmons case of
sexual harassment? How was he made aware of this case?
Answer:
Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons case of sexual
harassment on October 9 or October 13, 1992, by a telephone
call * * *.
I explained who made that call. It was the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations. It is either October 9 or 13. Well, there is a big
difference between the two. If it was October 9 then perhaps he knew
Lieutenant Simmons was hospitalized, and perhaps he could have
intervened. If it was the 13th, that was the end of her confinement.
Answer:
Admiral Mauz learned of the Simmons case on October 9 or
October 13.
I am troubled by that.
We asked another question:
Exactly when did Admiral Mauz and his office learn of
Lieutenant Simmons' confinement?
Answer:
Admiral Mauz learned of the hospitalization during October
1992, after Lieutenant Simmons had been released from the
hospital.
Those answers may be inconsistent. We cannot get what I consider to
be a straight answer. It is either October 9 or 13, and then it is in
October after the confinement.
So it seems to me that we need to look at this. And in addition, we
need to look at the other issue, the other issue posed by Chief Taylor
when he reported the fact that Admiral Mauz was using Government
drivers and cars on a vacation in Bermuda when he was there on
``official business.'' This story was reported on a TV show. I am not
one to believe TV shows. As a matter of fact, I discount a lot of what
I see. But is it not amazing that shortly after this, we have
harassment of this gentleman, Chief Taylor, and a psychiatric
evaluation? So you have Chief Taylor blowing the whistle. And, by the
way, the IG did put a letter into the file of Admiral Mauz saying that
it was an improper use of this material.
Let me tell you exactly what was said. The Navy concluded that the
scheduling of the trip created the perception of impropriety because he
mixed business and pleasure. Furthermore, it found that Admiral Mauz
had misused Government property because he requisitioned a military
vehicle and driver while on personal leave, and he received an official
letter critical of his action. And then we have a situation where the
guy who blows the whistle on this activity gets what? He gets a
psychiatric evaluation. Then we also have on the record a very high-
level staff of Admiral Mauz calling the military prosecutor's office,
which was looking into a case involving Chief Taylor. By the way, there
were 48 counts lodged against Chief Taylor, none of which ever came to
anything. Here you have a guy who blows the whistle, gets sent for a
psych evaluation, and they bring a case against him in which he is
ultimately not found guilty of anything.
All I can say to my colleagues is that we have a responsibility here.
I do not have enough information to know whether it is just a
coincidence that these people happen to be sent for a psych evaluation
because they blew the whistle. I do not have enough information,
because it is conflicting as to whether or not Admiral Mauz, in fact,
knew that Darlene Simmons was sent in on a Friday before a long
holiday. We do not know that.
So how can we, in good conscience, vote on this today? Senator Murray
is giving us a way out, a good solid, conservative motion to take a
hard look at these issues, entrusting it to our Armed Services
Committee. I think that is a very sensible course.
I hope our colleagues will go along with the Murray amendment. I am
proud to be associated with it.
Again, this is not easy. This is not easy. But once in a while you
have to slow down the four-star train and take a hard look at what we
are doing.
I think at this point we ought to take that hard look and then come
back and vote on this fourth star.
I at this time thank the President and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Amendment No. 2582
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole and myself, I
send an amendment in the first degree to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself and Mr.
Dole, proposes an amendment numbered 2582.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the instructions add the following:
The Senate finds that:
The President has proposed to use the United States Armed
Forces to intervene militarily in the situation in Haiti;
The stated purpose of the proposed United States military
intervention in Haiti is the restoration by force of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide to the Office of President of Haiti;
The President has not presented a comprehensive case for
United States military intervention in Haiti to either the
American people or their representatives in Congress;
The support of the American people is critically important
to the success of any offensive military action;
All national public opinion surveys taken to date establish
that a substantial majority of Americans oppose United States
military intervention in Haiti;
The State Department Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1991 characterized President Aristide's regime
as ``unwilling or unable to restrain popular justice through
mob violence'';
Allegations connecting President Aristide to several
incidents of human rights abuses, including allegations of
his involvement in the assassination of a political opponent,
remain unresolved;
United States vital national security interests are not
threatened by the situation in Haiti;
It is the sense of the Senate that the Armed Services
Committee also consider the fact that it is the sense of the
Senate:
That the lives of United States Armed Forces personnel
should not be risked in combat for the purpose of restoring
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the office of President of Haiti.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, will the
Senator explain the first-degree amendment? There is so much buzz on
the floor I did not hear it.
Mr. McCAIN. I am glad to explain to the Senator from Maryland.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Moseley-Braun). The Senator is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, this amendment expresses the sense of
the Senate that the lives of the United States armed service forces
personnel should not be risked in combat for the purpose of restoring
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the office of President of Haiti.
The fact is that it is well known that the President of the United
States intends to invade Haiti, probably this weekend, and 73 percent
of the American people are opposed to that invasion.
The President of the United States has had the time to consult with
various countries, including the United Nations Security Council. He
has had time to consult with and get the agreement from Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Belgium,
Bolivia, Britain, Dominica, Guyana, Israel, Jamaica, the Netherlands,
Panama, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The President has been unable or unwilling to come to the Congress of
the United States and seek our approval for this invasion.
Madam President, I want to make it perfectly clear I do not believe
that the United States is constitutionally bound to seek the approval
of the Congress of the United States, although in the case of the
Persian Gulf and several other occasions the Congress of the United
States has acted in an affirmative fashion.
The fact is 73 percent of the American people, according to a poll
yesterday, are opposed to this invasion. The President of the United
States has refused to come to receive our approval.
The Secretary of State over the weekend and the United Nations
representative have both stated that the President will not.
So, Madam President, in this rather unusual fashion, I intend to
force a vote on this issue before this weekend because that is the time
of this invasion as we all know, perhaps the most publicized invasion
in the history of warfare.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SMITH and Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is advised I
had heard and seen the Senator from Maryland on her feet previously.
Mr. SMITH. She was not even on the floor, as I recall, at the time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I rise to----
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Address the original topic of debate of the Senator
from the State of Washington.
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, a parliamentary inquiry.
Ms. MIKULSKI. I believe I have the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Maryland yield?
Ms. MIKULSKI. No, I do not yield.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator does not yield.
The Senator from Maryland.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I rise today to explain why I support
the motion to recommit the retirement of Adm. Henry Mauz to the Armed
Services Committee with instructions to hold a hearing on Admiral Mauz'
retirement at four stars.
Today, we debate the retirement of Adm. Henry Mauz. Let me say first
that I do not prejudge any of the allegations made against Admiral
Mauz. There is no doubt that he has had a distinguished career.
But, Madam President, I also acknowledge the right of those within
this Chamber who wish to debate Haiti, but I would wish out of respect
for the admiral and the process that we complete the debate on the
motion to recommit of the Senator from the State of Washington. I
believe we conclude that debate in a crisp and civil fashion and then
upon the conclusion of that debate, I understand it is the intention
that was agreed upon by both the Republican leader and the Democratic
leader to have full and ample debate on the Haiti issue.
I now understand there is a first-degree amendment pending. I am not
going to go through the parliamentary quagmire or the parliamentary
thicket.
But I do ask my colleagues to then let us move forward on the debate
on the Mauz nomination and whether or not we should return it to
committee.
Good people with good intentions can have civil debate on this topic,
and we can conclude it. Then we can move on to the 7 hours to talk
about Haiti. We can listen to the President tomorrow night, and we can
debate Haiti all of next week. But let us, out of respect for the
admiral, move ahead and at least have a vote on this issue. I believe
we can conclude it.
That is why I wish to say about the Mauz issue, I do not prejudge any
of the allegations made against him. I acknowledge the validity of
recommending him for four stars.
What I have questions about is the process. I have more questions
about the process than in some ways I have about the admiral.
The questions about the admiral are how he handled charges of sexual
harassment by Lt. Darlene Simmons, and charges of retaliation against a
whistleblower, Senior Chief George Taylor, and allegations made about
the admiral by even those within this body.
There are many unanswered questions. Earlier this month, my
colleagues, Senators Murray, Moseley-Braun, Boxer, and Feinstein, and I
wrote to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee to urge the
committee to hold a hearing on the unanswered questions.
I ask unanimous consent that our letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 9, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On August 12, the Committee on Armed
Services reported out the nomination of Admiral Henry Mauz,
Jr., US Navy, to retire in grade. Because important questions
have been raised about this nomination, we are writing to
request that a public hearing be held by your Committee prior
to Senate consideration of Admiral Mauz's retirement status.
As you know, Lt. Darlene Simmons alleges inappropriate
action by Admiral Mauz with respect to the investigation and
disposition of her sexual harassment case. In addition,
Senior Chief George Taylor alleges that Admiral Mauz
inappropriately used government assets and retaliated against
a whistleblower. Both Lt. Simmons and Senior Chief Taylor
have written to the Committee expressing the view that
Admiral Mauz should not be retired at four stars.
We are concerned that the allegations raised against
Admiral Mauz are sufficiently troubling to merit an open and
full public hearing. While we in no way seek to pass
judgement on any of the allegations involved, we do believe
that a public hearing would serve to answer the important
questions that have been raised.
Thank you for your consideration of our request.
Sincerely,
Patty Murray,
Carol Moseley-Braun,
Barbara Mikulski,
Barbara Boxer,
Dianne Feinstein.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, the letter talks about how we are
concerned that the allegations raise questions that we should have a
hearing. While we in no way seek to pass judgment, we do believe that
there are questions related to how certain allegations that were made
were handled.
There is conflicting and contradictory information about how the Navy
and Admiral Mauz handled the Simmons sexual harassment case. There is
conflicting information regarding what steps were taken and when they
were taken to address the harassment issue. There is conflicting
information regarding whether Admiral Mauz allowed an adverse fitness
report by senior officers in Lieutenant Simmons' chain of command to go
unchecked.
Now, the Senator from California has gone into this in great detail
and, therefore, I will not need to go into those issues, but they are
the questions that we have submitted to the committee.
The admiral has been accused of retaliating against a whistleblower.
Senior Chief George Taylor, raised those questions about the propriety
of a trip that the admiral took to the Naval Air Station in Bermuda.
Now all of us know what that is like. You take a trip, you try to do
business, and then you could be accused of any number of things. We all
understand that.
So all we want to do is get to the facts; get to the facts.
There was contradictory information about whether Senior Chief Taylor
was transferred to another assignment and charged with insubordination
and retribution for reporting the admiral's alleged misconduct in
Bermuda. And I keep saying ``alleged.'' I want to underline--a-l-l-e-g-
e-d--alleged. We just want to clear it up. We want to clarify the
controversy.
There is contradictory information regarding whether or not Admiral
Mauz used the Navy resources for his personal benefit.
These are serious allegations and discrepancies which should fully be
aired. I do not accuse the Navy of mishandling either this case or the
disciplinary action against Senior Chief Taylor.
But I do believe, because of the serious nature of these various
charges, a full and open hearing should be held before the Senate votes
on Admiral Mauz's retirement at the rank of four stars.
I believe that a hearing will get all involved--the Navy, the
admiral, the lieutenant, the chief--the chance to present their story.
Now Senator Murray has submitted a 3-page list of questions to the
Armed Services Committee. A hearing will give the Navy the chance to
answer those questions and any others. A hearing will give Senators the
chance to make their own determination as to whether these incidents
were handled appropriately.
We have a very able chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, whose
career within this body is distinguished. I believe that he has tried
to handle many of these nominations in the most expeditious way. But
the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee raises the
question about how he cannot hold investigative hearings on each and
every situation. And we understand that.
But what we are saying to the members of the Armed Services
Committee, what we are saying to the Armed Services Committee is we
need to anticipate those situations that are high profile and highly
controversial, anticipate the type of questions that we would have on
those issues, and then anticipate what we need to answer in order to
move on the fitness or whether we should proceed with the
recommendations. That is what we are saying.
But, do you know what? There was talk about the Commander in Chief;
there was talk about the Navy. I would like to raise a question with
the Secretaries of the armed services personnel, whether it is the
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the
Air Force, which is when a nomination or a recommendation is coming
forward, anticipate the controversy; anticipate the questions; work
with the committee.
This committee has had a wonderful reputation for bipartisanship. The
relationship between Senator Nunn of Georgia and Senator John Warner of
Virginia, I believe, is a model of cooperation and civility that should
be a hallmark of this entire institution. We need less partisanship,
less bickering, and they have done that in the Armed Services
Committee.
Now when they look to the executive branch to send over those
nominations or recommendations on rank for retirement, they should
anticipate that and answer those questions. And that is what we are now
faced with here. Somehow or another, we did not close the loop on this.
It is not with joy that the women of the U.S. Senate keep raising
these issues. It is not with joy that we keep doing that. We respect
our U.S. military. And, on the brink of a possible military action, we
want to show our enthusiastic support for the U.S. military. We do not
want to be jackpotted. But we are continually jackpotted by the
bungling processes that come before us.
We honor and respect the men and women who make heroic sacrifices,
and some are on this floor and some have spoken earlier today who have
made incredible sacrifices. We are not hear to fussbudget. We are not
fussbudget Senators. We have to take these things seriously.
We thought when we raised the Kelso issue that we had changed the
culture. We did not change the culture because they very shortly
followed with this.
Now, once again, an admiral with a distinguished history of 35 years
of service is now here while we raise three pages of questions. The
questions that the gentlelady from the State of Washington has raised
are the questions that the Secretary of Navy should have raised and
gotten the answers; should have anticipated that when he came to the
distinguished chairman and the ranking Republican on that committee,
that they would have those questions. And that is what we are saying.
Anticipate the needs, anticipate the questions that would be raised in
high-profile cases.
Nominations have been held up or other recommendations have been held
up in the Foreign Relations Committee for Ambassadors, and so on. So we
should not be accused of holding something up. And we should not be
accused of being the problem.
Now this takes me to something else.
And I would like to compliment the gentlelady from the State of
Washington for the outstanding job that she has done to raise these
issues. As she said, she felt that she had the responsibility to raise
the questions--that is all we are doing--raise the questions and let us
get the answers and let us get on with it.
But what disturbed me is not only where the Secretaries of the U.S.
military continue not to anticipate what we would be raising on some of
these high-profile issues, but when we raise the issues, we become the
issue. And that is what has happened to the junior Senator from the
State of Washington. When she raised the issue, suddenly she became the
problem.
When we raise the issue, it looks like the Democratic women are the
problem. Madam President, we are not the gender cops of the U.S.
Senate. We do not see ourselves as the gender cops of the U.S. Senate.
But we do believe we need to stand sentry over making sure that
questions raised are questions answered. That is all we are saying.
I believe that what has happened to the junior Senator from the State
of Washington is not a very nice thing. She has been made the issue.
She has been hounded into letting this nomination go. Tart things were
said about her behind her back, to her face, and even on this floor.
This Senator knows the chain of command. She spoke about it in terms of
responsibility.
We are getting all jacked up and juiced up about being self-
righteous. All we are saying is, the reason we want this to be referred
to the committee is for questions to be answered.
But I come back to, yes, the Secretary of Defense and his
Secretaries, where there are high-profile cases with controversy there,
raise those questions and so on. And then when the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Committee says this is more than they
can handle, I believe we could handle them if they were handled first
at the executive branch and then, second, we need to anticipate them in
the committee.
Now we have just had an unfortunate thing occur on this floor about
the recognition. I would like to say to the distinguished Senator from
New Hampshire, who is one of the most active members of the Ethics
Committee and who I have been with and in circumstances requiring
integrity and judgment and so on, I can only attest to his, to his; and
also to his own deep commitment to the U.S. military. I regret that
there seems to be some confusion over recognition. I understand that
the Senator from Illinois took the chair in anticipation of my speaking
in support of this motion, and that I was to speak at this time.
But, Madam President, I do believe that it would be in the interest
of all concerned if we could conclude the debate on the pending request
of the junior Senator from Washington, that we vote on this, that it be
one way or the other; that one way or the other the Senate exercises
its will. And that we then conclude that and then move on to what needs
to be a robust, amplified, and extensive debate on the Haiti question.
So, Madam President, we are on the eve of Yom Kippur when all people
reflect on their souls, and I hope we will take this time over the next
few days to reflect on our own role in public policy, where we do our
best and where we serve. We ask, then, that we really cooperate in
terms of bringing certain issues to closure, being able to move forward
on this, having the debate.
And I note that on the floor is the distinguished chairman of the
committee. I would like to say to that Senator, we thank you for your
cooperation. I think you know what we have raised. We have discussed it
one other time, where the executive branch needs to beef up its
investigation on complaints. But we really do believe the Secretaries
of the various armed services should anticipate these concerns. I just
want to say to you: We do not want to be fussbudgets. As I said, we do
not see ourselves as gender cops.
Also, whether we are on the brink of a military action or whether we
are not, I can say as the dean of the Democratic women, we respect the
U.S. military. We so want to work with them. And one of the finest
opportunities I have had is being on the board of visitors of the U.S.
Naval Academy to help produce naval officers for the 21st century and
working with the Senator from Arizona on accomplishing that. And of
course we look forward to working with you on that.
Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Maryland, Madam President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Maryland. I can
assure her that our committee and I personally will continue to work
very diligently with the military services because I think they
recognize that they are going through a difficult transition. I think
they know that this transition is going to be several years in process.
I think they understand that they are going to have to act on sexual
harassment or sexual assault cases in a very timely, expeditious manner
and a thorough manner in fairness to all the parties, both the alleged
victims and the people who are accused and to our top ranking
officials.
That is a continuing process. It is far from perfect now. There are a
lot of improvements that have to be made, and I will certainly pledge
to continue to work with the Senator from Maryland along that line.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been noted. The
clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry. When a Senator is
seeking recognition on the floor on a debate, why are we going into a
quorum call?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum call is in progress.
Mr. SMITH. What is going on? Madam President, may the Senator from
New Hampshire call the quorum off so he can speak on the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has a right to
request the quorum call. The quorum call is in progress.
Mr. SMITH. I ask unanimous consent the quorum call be dispensed with,
Madam President.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I object but I will not object for long. I
object for a moment. I have to confer for a moment, and then I will
withdraw my objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The bill clerk resumed the call of the roll.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it so
ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I know the Senator from New Hampshire has
been on the floor for quite awhile and desires to be recognized. I know
he is on the floor seeking recognition. I hope the Chair will recognize
him. I know he has remarks on this nomination. I also know the Senator
from South Carolina has not made his remarks on the Mauz nomination. So
I hope that both of them will present their views.
Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader, the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, my understanding now is that the
Senator from New Hampshire, followed by the distinguished Senator from
South Carolina, and then followed by the Senator from Texas, all are to
address the Senate on the subject of the Mauz nomination.
Following the remarks of the Senator from Texas, a quorum call will
be called by either the chairman or whoever is acting in his behalf on
this side. We discussed this here. There is no time limitation on the
Senators. They are free to discuss it as long as they wish.
My request is that first Senator Smith be recognized to address the
Senate with respect to the Mauz nomination; that upon the completion of
his remarks, Senator Thurmond be recognized for the same purpose; and
that upon the completion of Senator Thurmond's remarks, Senator
Hutchison be recognized for the same purpose; that upon the
completion--perhaps I should inquire on the length of time. If he could
just give some idea.
Mr. SMITH. Approximately 15 minutes.
Mr. MITCHELL. Fifteen minutes?
Mr. SMITH. Approximately.
Mr. MITCHELL. Why do we not say the Senator be recognized for up to
20 minutes? That will give him plenty of time on that subject.
Mr. SMITH. That should be sufficient.
Mr. MITCHELL. And the Senator from South Carolina to be recognized
for 5 minutes. Then the Senator from Texas for up to 15 minutes,
following which there will be a quorum call, and I will then be
recognized following the quorum call.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleague.
Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
To the Senator from New Hampshire, the Senator is over 6 feet by, I
imagine, about 4 inches, and the Senator from Maryland is probably less
than 5 feet no inches. But the fact is, the Chair saw and heard the
Senator from Maryland prior to the Senator from New Hampshire, and that
is why the priority of recognition pursuant to our rules was given.
It is the Chair's hope that the Senator from New Hampshire takes no
personal affront or offense from the priority of recognition being
given under the rules based on the fact of the Chair having seen and
heard the Senator from Maryland previously.
The Senator from New Hampshire is now recognized for up to 15
minutes.
Mr. SMITH. Up to 20 minutes, Madam President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Up to 20 minutes.
privilege of the floor
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent
that a fellow in the office of Senator Hutchison, Colonel Dave Davis,
be allowed the privilege of the floor during this debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SMITH. Madam President, since you brought this up, the Record and
the recording will make very clear what happened. I do not wish to
pursue this in an argumentative manner, nor do I take it personally--I
do not think it is a personal matter--but I think the Record will very
clearly show that the Senator from Maryland was not seeking recognition
at the time that the Senator from New Hampshire was seeking
recognition.
The Record will also show during the time when two of your
predecessors were in the chair, the Senator from New Hampshire was on
the floor for approximately 2 hours seeking recognition while the
chairman, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator
Murray, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator
Boxer, who is on your side of the aisle, had recognition; Senator Nunn,
again was recognized on your side of the aisle; then Senator Mikulski
was recognized, and all of the time, all during that debate, I sought
recognition after each one of those individuals. So that is the Record.
The Record will also show that I called at least three times asking for
recognition from the Chair, and the Chair did not recognize me.
That is the Record. I do not wish to pursue it anymore on my time.
The Record speaks for itself, Madam President. I do not question
anybody's motives.
Madam President, with all of the hoopla here, I was simply trying to
get the floor to support my chairman in your party, by the way, Senator
Nunn, and to support the ranking member of this committee, on behalf of
the nomination of Admiral Mauz to retire in grade. That is all I have
been trying to do. I regret that it has taken so much time to get here
to do it. I think we ought to be a little bit more fair in terms of
recognition in the debate. There will be other opportunities at some
point in the future, maybe it might be January, it may be later--I hope
it is January--when this party will have the majority in the Senate.
I wish to caution my colleagues on what is becoming what I believe to
be a very unfair and increasingly damaging perversion of this whole
confirmation process. It is simply impossible for the Senate to look
over the shoulders of the UCMJ or all the decisions that are made
throughout the military and do our job, the very extensive job that we
have to do, from nominations to the budget and other things that we do
in the Armed Services Committee.
I wish to reaffirm my absolute support for the Senate's
constitutional prerogatives to advise and consent on this nomination or
any other nomination. The Senator from Washington has the perfect right
to recommit this. It is certainly within her prerogatives. I do not
question that. The advise and consent process is a fundamental element
of our system of checks and balances and each of us should take it very
seriously.
But, unfortunately, there has been a growing trend among Members of
this body to exploit the military nomination process in a manner that
runs very contrary to how the framers intended it. There seems to be
this lofty theory of accountability, accountability for some and not
accountability for others. And it has become standard fare for a select
few to slander and denigrate the service of our distinguished military
leaders, leaving their reputations tarnished and their career history
distorted in the Senate. We saw it with Admiral Kelso. We saw it with
Admiral Arthur. We are seeing it again today with Admiral Mauz, where a
very small minority is seeking--maybe not seeking, but in fact
accomplishing--the tarnishing of the 35-year career of an outstanding
military leader based on allegations which are, frankly,
unsubstantiated, and this cannot be allowed to occur.
That is why Chairman Nunn is out here today and why Senator Thurmond
is out here today, and others, speaking so strongly and forcefully,
because 22 members of the Armed Services Committee, of both political
parties, from the liberal to the conservative side, said that this
nomination should go forward--22 to zero. That is a fact. We do not
take this lightly. We do our job. And we did do our job. We did it. And
we did it well under the leadership of this chairman. Numerous meetings
were held and numerous investigations were held, and we looked into it.
I happened to look into it personally every step of the way.
Admiral Mauz has been nominated by the President of the United States
to retire in grade as a four-star admiral. The President made this
decision. The Secretary of Defense made this decision. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs made this decision. The Secretary of the Navy made
this decision. And the CNO made this decision.
Madam President, 22 members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
in a vote of 22 to nothing, made this decision. But that is not good
enough. We have to come out in the Chamber now and tarnish this
brilliant military leader, who had a brilliant military career, who
served his country well. Now he has to go out with this on his record,
because this will be part of the debate.
It is a textbook story. He has a long list of awards. And I will not
go through them all, but to begin with: Four Distinguished Service
Medals, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the
Bronze Star with a Combat ``V,'' the Meritorious Service Medal, three
Navy Achievement Medals, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Navy Unit
Commendation Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation Medal, Japanese Order
of the Rising Sun, and on and on and on, including eight relating to
service in Vietnam.
This is an impressive record. And, yes, if he was even remotely
guilty of some of the things that have been said about him in looking
the other way at harassment and this nonsense, he should be held
accountable, but that is not the case. The President knows it. The
Secretary of Defense knows it. The Secretary of the Navy knows it. That
is why his nomination is being recommended to retire in the four-star
grade. His reputation should not be destroyed in the Senate. It is
outrageous.
To those very few Members who are seeking to prevent Admiral Mauz
from retiring in grade, I say the burden of proof lies with you, not
with him. It lies with you. He has served his Nation for 35 years. His
career is an open book. His cards are on the table. He put them there.
On the contrary, those who are alleging this improper conduct and are
alleging that we did not do our job in the Armed Services Committee do
not have any substance for these allegations.
They are allegations. That is all they are. This is a critical point.
Those who are opposing the nomination are also criticizing this
committee, maybe not openly, but blatantly underlying that is the
message: We did not do our job. And I resent it, frankly. I resent it,
because I know how hard Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond and other
members of this committee worked to try to review it.
We have had nomination after nomination. Every single time any member
of that committee, any Member of the Senate, for that matter, has ever
raised an objection to anybody, I do not care if it is a lieutenant,
this chairman has given us the opportunity to be heard--every time,
every single time. Sometimes they are frivolous, too, but we are heard.
Never has he pushed a nomination through. From the most junior member
of the committee to the most senior member of the committee, they are
treated equally under this chairman.
The truth is that the committee thoroughly and methodically
investigated every single one of these allegations against Admiral
Mauz. Now, maybe some do not like the result, but the truth is they
were investigated and there is nothing there--nothing there, period.
The criticism being lodged against Admiral Mauz centers on his
alleged mishandling of a sexual harassment case. It has been debated he
is not involved in sexual harassment, lest some think he may be. He did
not condone it. He is a four-star admiral. He is trying to do his job
in the fleet to conduct the operations that a four-star admiral has to
do, and something happened down in his command. It was bad, no question
about it, and disciplinary action was taken.
If someone in one of our offices commits a crime tonight, is that our
fault? Is that our fault? Should we be held responsible? Maybe we
should resign because of it. That is the logic being used here. We are
totally accountable for everybody else's actions. Nobody is accountable
for their own actions.
The Senator from Washington is alleging that Admiral Mauz used his
position to protect those guilty of sexual harassment and to cover up
alleged improper handling. It could not be further from the truth.
These are very serious allegations. They are not supported by the
facts.
The truth is that an individual was harassed. We went through all of
that. I am not going to mention names. Admiral Mauz did not learn of it
until October 1992. We cannot micromanage every single decision in the
command of an admiral or a general or anybody else. It is impossible.
Anybody who even remotely understands the military would understand
that; even if you remotely understand it. When he learned of what
happened, he investigated it immediately, and even assigned a member of
his personal staff, his Special Assistant for Women's Affairs, to
assist with the investigation to ensure that the victim had direct
contact to Admiral Mauz at all times.
That did not end Admiral Mauz' involvement in this case. In fact,
upon reviewing the proposed inspector general's report, Admiral Mauz
was dissatisfied and he returned the report for more specific
accountability. He personally intervened at the flag level twice in an
effort to retain the victim in the Navy. He directed corrective action
to ensure that there was no repeat of the harassment in the Atlantic
Fleet or the Navy. I can say with all personnel in the Navy from the
highest levels--CNO on down--since I have been on this committee, and
since I have been in the Congress, there have been cases of sexual
harassment, and they have tried to look into them and to deal with them
fairly and appropriately. This admiral did the same. This is not
dereliction of duty.
And to bring Admiral Mauz back up before another hearing, the damage
will be done. It is being done now as we debate it on the floor of the
Senate. It should not be here being debated frankly on the floor of the
Senate. It can be. It has a right to be. But there is no reason, none,
for it to be here. It is just that somebody does not accept the
investigation.
So here is an opportunity to be macho here to show we are not going
to let anybody get away with sexual harassment. Nobody got away with
sexual harassment. Nobody got away with it. Admiral Mauz did not
tolerate it, and he ought to be commended instead of being challenged
on his integrity.
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda, thoroughly reviewed
this case and Admiral Mauz' involvement and determined that Admiral
Mauz did not suppress the evidence of any inquiry, did not fail to take
corrective action on behalf of the victim, nor did he fail to follow
proper procedures on inquiries into allegations; and, further, the CNO
determined the Atlantic Fleet did not cover up the nature and the
extent of these actions.
I do not profess to say that Admiral Mauz and 35 years of military
service made flawless judgments. Does anyone in the Senate consider
themselves flawless in their judgments in every decision that you have
ever made? He surely has not. I surely have not. I am speaking for
myself. But who among us could hold up such a standard? No one.
The issue before the Senate is whether his 35 years of service to our
Nation warrant retirement in a grade of a four-star admiral. That is
the issue. It is not a gift. He earned it. He earned the fourth star--
earned, not gift. Understand what the military means. Do you realize
what is happening out there today in this military situation? We have
people in some cases that have been home 3 or 4 weeks in the last year
while they have been in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cuba, and where else?
How much more do we ask of these people? They give their service to
their country.
They come to retire in the fourth star, in this case an admiral, and
what do we do? We beat him up on the floor of the Senate and try to get
a hearing to beat him up again. So he has to have that stigma with him
for the rest of his life. It is disgraceful. It has to stop. We are
losing good people in the U.S. Navy and all across the board in the
military because of this stuff--good people; people that fought these
wars and won these wars for us, who won the cold war for us.
I have several cases right now before me as a Senator, good people
being basically harassed out of the service. You talk about harassment,
being harassed out of the service because they are fed up with it, they
cannot take it anymore. He served 35 years, and to just be treated like
this. This is an honorable man.
My colleague from Washington and those who are joining her are saying
in effect if you are fortunate enough to survive the reductions in
force, serve your Nation with distinction, reach the pinnacle of
success in your field, Senators still may decide that politics is more
important than your reputation, and torpedo your retirement. It is
bullying. What can the man do? He has to answer. He has to come up
here, and he did answer. He answered through the proper channels--throw
out our constitutional obligations, throw them out the window----
Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. SMITH. I will not yield.
Mrs. BOXER. I want to make a----
Mr. SMITH. to be politically correct--Madam President, I would
appreciate order. We should accommodate our responsibilities fairly and
objectively. This is an outrage. It reflects very poorly on this
institution, and it must not be permitted to prevail. I am extremely
sensitive again to the underlying charges that somehow this committee
was derelict. One or two, you might make that charge, but 22 to 0,
including the chairman and the ranking member.
Let me conclude on the limited remarks that I agreed to, even though
there is no limit to this debate and I finally was recognized, by
urging my colleagues to reject this motion to recommit, reject this
motion to recommit and accept the fact that Chairman Sam Nunn and
Senator Strom Thurmond and 20 other members of this committee
thoroughly investigated these charges and found them wanting. They are
not worthy of the debate on the floor. He did nothing wrong. On the
contrary, he did everything right. He checked it out as he should. He
is a good admiral. He is a good soldier. He deserves to retire in that
fourth star without any negative stigma being thrown his way as he
leaves the military. Have the decency at least to allow this great
soldier the opportunity to do that.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
[Applause in the galleries.]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be no disturbance in the gallery or
the people will be removed by the Sergeant at Arms.
The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I previously have spoken on this
matter so I shall make very brief remarks.
I just want to say that I oppose the motion to recommit Admiral Mauz'
nomination. The Armed Services Committee has thoroughly reviewed each
allegation and voted 22 to nothing in favor of the nomination. There
are three issues:
Admiral Mauz' trip to Bermuda. This was investigated by the Navy, and
Admiral Mauz was censured by the Navy.
Next, Lieutenant Simmons was verbally harassed, which was wrong.
Admiral Mauz was three levels of command above Lieutenant Simmons.
The next is the Navy and the DOD investigated the allegations of
reprisal and found no wrongdoing on the part of Admiral Mauz. That was
proper. He was three levels above her.
Now, if she wanted to bring allegations against her commanding
officer, that is one thing. But to go above that and above that and
above that, and the admiral probably did not even know about the matter
because her commander should have handled that.
The next is, Master Chief Taylor says that Admiral Mauz influenced
the court-martial charges against him and reprisal for whistle blowing.
Again, the Navy and the DOD investigated and found no connection to
Admiral Mauz. He did not even know about this.
This nomination has been pending since May 10. This great man,
admiral in the Navy--the nomination was sent to us May 10. We spent 4
months on it. It is an injustice to a man like that to hold it up when
there is no real reason. He deserves to retire in grade.
I urge my colleagues to vote against the motion to recommit and to
vote in favor of Admiral Mauz' nomination to retire as an admiral. I
just want to say that he has had 35 years' service, valuable service,
during some of the most critical time in our Nation's history. He has
commanded riverboats in Vietnam, big ships of war, the U.S. 7th Fleet,
and is currently serving as commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic
Fleet involving about 140,000 people.
I just cannot imagine after these things have been investigated by
the Navy, and then further by the Defense Department, that it would
continue to go on and haunt this man. He deserves better. He is a great
patriot. We are proud of him. And I hope this nomination will go
through and not be recommitted.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Madam President, I am rising to speak against the
motion to recommit the nomination of Admiral Mauz. But let me say that
I do commend Senator Murray for having the courage to raise the
questions. I raised many of the same questions in committee. I have
worked with Admiral Boorda. I have had the questions answered to my
satisfaction, which is why I wanted to speak here today.
But Senator Murray did call me to raise concerns, to ask questions,
which I appreciate very much. I think she has handled this very
professionally, and I certainly know that sometimes it is difficult
when you are raising an issue, where there are competing and very valid
views. So I do want to commend her. But I have come to a different
conclusion from Senator Murray, such that I am satisfied that we do not
have to go back to the committee. I am on the committee and, as you
know, I have raised questions before and have gotten the answers that I
asked for. I have worked with the chairman of the committee, Senator
Nunn. He has been very forthcoming. I want to say that the committee
has, in every instance where there is a question about a nomination,
been very careful to inform members of the committee that there is a
question on the nomination. The committee has gone overboard to get
information. I have asked for information and I have received
information. I do commend the chairman of the committee, who has had a
tough time dealing with so many questions about so many nominations. I
know that in a future time we are going to talk about how we can
satisfy everyone in the nomination process and also protect the people
who are involved in questionable situations. So it is difficult, and I
commend the chairman and the ranking Member, and I also commend Senator
Murray.
Let me say that I have come to a different conclusion, because when I
asked the questions, I felt that Admiral Mauz really has done an
exemplary job of handling a very delicate situation. So let me speak on
a couple of the questions and then go forward.
We do know that Admiral Mauz has had a distinguished career, with
over 35 years of service to our Nation. When allegations are made
against a senior officer in Admiral Mauz's situation, the Armed
Services Committee must investigate the charges to determine if the
officer in question deserves the benefit of retirement at a higher
grade. In this case, my colleagues and I on the committee, after
reviewing the evidence and documentation and reexamining certain
aspects of it over a period of weeks and months, voted unanimously to
approve the nomination of Admiral Mauz to retire in grade. Clearly,
this was a poll and not a vote of the committee as a whole, but that
was because of the constraint of time and the difficulty of getting a
committee meeting when we were in, I believe, the health care debate at
the time.
I want to talk about a couple of the issues that have been mentioned.
First, there was one allegation about an official trip to Bermuda in
November 1992. Believing there was impropriety in the Admiral's
actions, CPO George R. Taylor registered an initially anonymous
complaint through the Navy's complaint hotline. Chief Taylor also
alerted ABC-TV news, which did produce an account of the event in the
news story. In this case, Admiral Mauz clearly made a mistake. Anyone
with a long and distinguished career certainly makes mistakes, and I
think that we have been able to weigh that lapse, and I think he has
paid for any indiscretion that was made.
The issue that concerns me here is the sexual harassment complaint
that was brought by Lt. Darlene Simmons, who was the victim of verbal
harassment of a superior officer while serving on the U.S.S. Canopus.
Admiral Mauz had an important and affirmative responsibility as
commander of the Atlantic Fleet. To have fallen short of the discharge
of his duties--to ensure a swift, thorough, and impartial
investigation, appropriate disciplinary action and effective followup--
would have been, in my view, a serious breach of his command
responsibilities. But the record reflects that Admiral Mauz's actions
were a model for effective leadership. Although he was fleet commander,
separated from Lieutenant Simmons by several levels of command, he
personally became involved to ensure that Lieutenant Simmons was
treated fairly.
When the harassment complaint reached his desk, Admiral Mauz assigned
a member of his staff, his Special Assistant for Women's Affairs,
Comdr. Cathy Miller, to investigate the incident. The investigation led
to the removal of the offending officer from the ship and his
subsequent retirement from the Navy.
In the wake of the disciplinary actions against the offending
individual, Admiral Mauz ordered additional instruction in handling
sexual harassment matters for the captain and officers of the Canopus.
He also took it upon himself to initiate two official messages to the
Atlantic Fleet. First, in April 1993, he directed that steps be taken
to eliminate sexual harassment. Subsequently, in September 1993, he
ordered that official inspections would henceforth include a review of
the effectiveness of efforts to combat sexual harassment. So it was
clearly not just the investigation itself, but a followup to make sure
that everyone knew of the seriousness of sexual harassment in the Navy,
and especially in the Atlantic Fleet, which was under the charge of
Admiral Mauz.
Finally, then, Admiral Mauz took steps to ensure that Lieutenant
Simmons would be protected against reprisal. After Lieutenant Simmons
took issue with a subsequent unfavorable fitness report that she
received, Admiral Mauz intervened with the Chief of Naval Personnel in
order to extend Lieutenant Simmons' tour of duty, provide for her
reassignment, and assure that she would have a full opportunity to
appeal the adverse findings. I think we must make clear that Lieutenant
Simmons remains on active duty today as a judge advocate general
officer. She is an attorney in the judge advocate general's office. So
the person that has made the charges is still in the Navy, while the
person accused of harassing her is no longer in the Navy.
There is an issue that has been brought up that is of great concern
to me, and that is the hospitalization of Lieutenant Simmons and
perhaps the allegation that she was hospitalized because of a sexual
harassment complaint. This is an issue which has concerned me in every
instance where I have read of it. I am concerned that on an allegation
that a service member makes, he or she is then referred for psychiatric
evaluation based on the fact that they have a problem that needs to be
looked at, as opposed to the fact that they have made an allegation.
But the facts in this case, which I have carefully reviewed, showed
that the hospitalization was motivated solely by medical reasons. A
referral was initiated by the ship's medical officer, a woman doctor,
despite the commanding officer's initial objections, and the
hospitalization was actually ordered by a physician on the hospital's
staff. Most important, Admiral Mauz was not aware of the
hospitalization until after Lieutenant Simmons was released from the
hospital.
(Mr. MATHEWS assumed the chair.)
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to say that because of my
concern for this type of possibility I specifically have asked Admiral
Boorda what is the policy now with regard to psychiatric examinations
after a sexual harassment charge. He has told me that it is not allowed
anymore, that in the past they tried to be careful to make sure that it
was not looked upon as any type of retaliation, but because of the
questions and because it is such a difficult situation, they now just
have a flat rule that there cannot be a psychiatric evaluation after a
sexual harassment charge.
I hope that we can have the ability for someone who wants counseling
after an occurrence like this to be able to have it, but I also think
we must make sure that no one is ever, against their will, put into a
psychiatric referral because of a charge. I think we have to walk a
very fine line here, and I believe that Admiral Boorda agrees with that
and is taking the steps that are necessary to make sure there is not
any kind of abuse of this possibility.
The facts as they bear on Admiral Mauz' performance are unequivocal:
He responded correctly and positively at every turn, and set an example
for others in command positions to follow. He discharged his duties in
this case in exactly the manner in which we would expect him to act and
I would want to encourage other commanders to look at what he did to
make sure that we follow every avenue that is necessary to look into
sexual harassment charges without in any way hurting the person who is
making the charges but also, of course, trying to make sure there is
integrity and equality in the process.
The matters we are discussing here today are serious ones, and the
committee took them very seriously. This nomination has been pending
for months. Whenever questions are raised about abuse of command
authority and administering justice within our military services, they
do deserve our full attention. The committee undertook a review of all
of the relevant information and a critical appraisal of Admiral Mauz'
performance. At the conclusion of the committee's work, it was our
recommendation that he merit the retirement in grade. And I am going to
support that nomination.
I do want to say that I think on the issue of investigation, here is
the key for a commanding officer, for a person that is not in the
direct line when a charge is made like this: I think the judgment that
we must make is the judgment of how the commanding officer handled the
chain of command to make sure that there was fairness in the process
and particularly that the person who is making the charge is handled
with complete fairness. I believe Admiral Mauz met our standard.
But I also want to say that I have talked to Admiral Boorda and other
commanding officers of our military services. They know that all of us,
including the chairman of our committee, the ranking member of our
committee, every member of the Armed Services Committee, know that it
is very important that we have integrity in our process. It is
difficult for members of the committee to come in and judge on a record
after the fact. But nevertheless, we have taken great pains to do that.
But I think we also must take as great pains to protect the officer,
such as Admiral Mauz, as we are trying to protect Lieutenant Simmons
here. I think he deserves the promotion into retirement, and I think
Admiral Boorda, as the Chief of Naval Operations, is doing everything
he can to try to make sure that occurrences of this kind do not happen,
but, if they do, that there is an investigation. I have said in the
past that I think one of the failures in the Navy has been the
investigation, but I am convinced that Admiral Boorda is taking steps
to assure that there will not be lapses in investigation.
I also commend Secretary Dalton for having these types of interests
uppermost in his mind for the U.S. Navy as well.
So I wanted to make my views known because I think there are a lot of
lives that we are affecting here today. I do hope that we can have a
vote quickly so that this can be handled today if at all possible so
that we will not have to go back over a week and come back and refresh
everyone's memories.
I think Senators should give the fairness of their judgment weight on
behalf of the Navy, and I think Admiral Mauz deserves this promotion
into retirement.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, my understanding is that there is an
agreement that we have a quorum call as soon as the Senator from Texas
has finished speaking.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may suggest the absence of a
quorum.
Ms. MIKULSKI addressed the Chair.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
Mrs. MURRAY. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The clerk continued to call the roll.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise to give a brief statement and ask
unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mrs. MURRAY. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The clerk continued to call the roll.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
The clerk continued to call the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Chair advises that a quorum
is not present in the Senate.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to instruct the Sergeant at Arms
to request the presence of absent Senators, and I ask for the yeas and
nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the motion to instruct.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell],
the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], and the Senator from Minnesota
[Mr. Wellstone] are necessarily absent.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from New York [Mr. D'Amato],
the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm],
and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield] are necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 74, nays 19, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 299 Ex.]
YEAS--74
Akaka
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durenberger
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Heflin
Hollings
Hutchison
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
Mathews
Metzenbaum
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Reid
Riegle
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Thurmond
Wofford
NAYS--19
Bond
Boren
Breaux
Brown
Craig
Faircloth
Grassley
Helms
Lott
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Smith
Specter
Stevens
Wallop
Warner
NOT VOTING--7
Campbell
D'Amato
Dole
Gramm
Hatfield
Inouye
Wellstone
So the motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With the addition of Senators voting who did
not answer the quorum call, a quorum is now present.
The Chair recognizes the Senate majority leader. The Senate will be
in order.
amendment no. 2583 to amendment no. 2582
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate with respect to Haiti)
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
it be read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment must be read first. The clerk
will read.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Maine [Mr. Mitchell], for himself and Mr.
Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2583 to amendment No.
2582.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the first colon and insert the following:
SEC. . SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED
STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI.
(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of the Senate
that the Armed Services Committee also consider the fact that
it is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) all parties should honor their obligations under the
Governor's Island Accord of July 3, 1993, and the New York
Pact of July 16, 1993;
(2) the United States has a national interest in preventing
uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
(3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to
support national reconciliation and further its interest in
preventing uncontrolled emigration.
(b) Limitation.--It is the sense of the Senate that funds
should not be obligated or expended in Haiti unless--
(1) authorized in advance by the Congress;
(2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed Forces
into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or evacuate
United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger
and the President reports as soon as practicable to Congress
after the initiation of the temporary deployment;
(3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti
is vital to the national security interests of the United
States, including but not limited to the protection of
American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to
seek and receive congressional authorization, and the
President reports, as soon as is practicable to Congress
after the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later
than 48 hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
(4) the President transmits to the Congress a written
report pursuant to subsection (c).
(c) Report.--It is the sense of the Senate that the
limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the
President reports in advance to Congress that the intended
deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
(1) if justified by United States national security
interests;
(2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been
taken to ensure that safety and security of United States
Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that United States
Armed Forces will not become targets due to the nature of
their rules of engagement;
(3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
(A) the proposed mission and objectives are most
appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than
civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
(B) the United States Armed Forces proposed for deployment
are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of
the proposed mission;
(4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the
deployment are established;
(5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for
ending the deployment has been identified; and
(6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of
the deployment are estimated.
(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United
States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued
deployment, introduction, or reintroduction of United States
Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, irrespective
of whether those Armed Forces are under United States or
United Nations command, but does not include activities for
the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly
related to the operations of United States diplomatic or
other United States Government facilities, or operations to
counter emigration from Haiti.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the amendment just read is identical in
substance to an amendment which the Senate approved on June 29, by a
vote of 93 to 4. The only changes are technical in nature and they
appear in the statement of the policy and in the sentence on
limitation. That is to make them conform to the procedural status in
which this amendment exists as opposed to the procedural status of the
amendment of June 29.
The Senate overwhelmingly approved this amendment, as I noted. Mr.
President, 53 Democrats and 40 Republicans voted for it; 1 Democrat and
3 Republicans voted against it; 3 Senators were absent.
It is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment and by its terms it expresses
the interest in the United States that all parties honor their
obligations under the Governor's Island accord of July 3 of last year
and the New York Pact of July 16.
All Senators will recall that under those agreements the military
dictators who illegally seized power in Haiti expressed a willingness
to relinquish power and to permit the democratically elected government
of that country to return. Subsequently, the military dictators reneged
on the agreement and that has led to the current situation in that
unfortunate country.
The amendment further expresses the interest of the United States in
preventing uncontrolled emigration from Haiti, which earlier this year
reached levels that created serious problems in some parts of our
country. The amendment then includes a limitation which provides that
funds should not be obligated or expended in Haiti unless first
authorized in advance by Congress. And the temporary deployment of
United States forces into Haiti is deemed necessary to protect or
evacuate United States citizens. And the deployment of the U.S. Armed
Forces is vital to the national security interests of the United
States.
In the alternative, the President can submit a report to Congress,
pursuant to a subsequent section and the subsequent section details the
provisions of such report.
Mr. President and Members of the Senate, we are in a unusual
parliamentary situation. We are in executive session under which we are
considering a nomination. The underlying amendment to the motion to
recommit that nomination and the amendment which I have just offered of
course represent legislative business. Not in my knowledge has this
ever occurred in the Senate; that is, an attempt to conduct legislative
business when the Senate is in executive session considering a
nomination.
We have asked the Parliamentarian to review the matter to determine
whether or not such a procedure is in order, and we will await a final
determination before attempting to proceed in that regard.
I think all Senators should be aware that if this process proceeds,
then the distinction between legislative and executive sessions will
have been obliterated and all matters regarding nominations and other
matters in executive session would then be open to some form of
legislative action. Wholly apart from the subject matter of the
discussion, which is a very serious and important one and which
deserves full and thorough debate by this Senate--that is the subject
of Haiti--from the standpoint of the integrity of this institution and
the procedures under which we operate, this is also a very serious
matter. And it is important that all Senators understand that, and, at
the appropriate time, I will have more to say on that subject.
For now the question, of course, is the situation that is set forth
in the underlying amendment and in the amendment which I have just set
forth.
Clearly, this is a serious matter. Clearly, it requires thorough
debate and consideration by the Senate. As we all know, in this
Congress, the Senate has already debated and voted seven times on the
subject of United States policy to Haiti. We are now doing so for the
eighth time, and I expect that there will be many more occasions, and
that is appropriate given the importance of the subject matter.
But I think the first point to be made is that everyone should
understand that there has been extensive debate and discussion in the
Senate, although it is correct that not every issue has been squarely
confronted and voted on until now in the Senate.
Second, of course, under the rules of the Senate, any Senator has the
opportunity to speak at any time on any subject, and many Senators have
availed themselves of that opportunity. So we have not only had seven
debates and seven votes on specific amendments, we have had very
extensive debate, outside of that context, as a large number of
Senators of both parties have expressed themselves on this important
matter.
Mr. President, I offered this amendment in behalf of myself and
Senator Nunn because I believe this is an appropriate expression of
what the Senate should do. I believe it is appropriate that the Senate
go on record, as it has previously, in urging all parties to honor the
obligations under the prior agreements that are set forth, in
describing our national interest with respect to emigration and in
expressing our view that funds should not be obligated in Haiti unless
the terms and conditions set forth in this amendment are met.
All Senators have had a chance to review this matter. As I said
earlier, 93 out of 97 Senators voted for it. My hope and expectation is
that there will be another substantial, indeed overwhelming, vote for
the amendment at this time because I think the reasons which led
Senators to vote for it in June exist today in a form that has not
abated.
And so I think it is appropriate that we deal with this subject as
expressed in this sense-of-the-Senate resolution at the appropriate
time.
Mr. President, I say to Members of the Senate, we are in an unusual
situation in another respect. Several weeks ago, I consulted with the
distinguished Republican leader and with many other Senators on the
Senate schedule. As we are all aware, a high holiday for persons of the
Jewish faith commences at sundown this evening and continues until
sundown tomorrow evening. It has been a longstanding practice of the
Senate, a custom honored in at least the 15 years since I have been in
the Senate and no doubt longer than that, that the Senate not conduct
business during that time.
Therefore, at the request of many Senators, and in accordance with
the practice that has been followed for many years, I announced several
weeks ago that the Senate would not have any rollcall votes or conduct
any business after 2 p.m. today, and also at the request of many
Senators, Republicans and Democrats--and from this there was no
dissent--that since the holiday ends on Thursday evening, I was
strenuously urged not to have a session on Friday because that would
require Senators to return for just that 1 day. And so the schedule was
set forth weeks ago, and there has not been any protest or disagreement
with that, to my knowledge, to this very moment. No Senator has come to
me and said, ``I disagree with the schedule. I think we should be in
session.'' Every single Senator who spoke to me--and there was a very
large number, both Democrats and Republicans--urged that I do what I
eventually did, and that is to say there would be no session on
Thursday or Friday and no business would be transacted after 2 p.m.
today. That is to say, no rollcall votes or other matters that would
require the presence of a Senator occur. That would not preclude debate
in the Senate after 2 p.m. today.
Yesterday, I met with the distinguished Republican leader to prepare
the schedule for today and for the remainder of the session. In the
discussion that we had, the subject of Haiti and how to handle it in
the Senate arose. I had requested that the Senate proceed to a vote on
the Department of Defense authorization bill, which was then the
pending matter, yesterday afternoon. The response I received from the
distinguished Republican leader was that a Republican colleague had
agreed to permit such a vote to occur yesterday afternoon provided I
agreed in exchange to have 6 hours of debate on the subject of Haiti
today after all of the votes, if any, which were to occur today had
occurred. The 6 hours was later amended by a request of our Republican
colleagues to 7 hours, and I agreed to that, and that order was
entered.
It was my understanding that pursuant to that agreement, we would
take up the subject of Haiti today and have the 7 hours for debate, and
that there would be no further action with respect to that matter or
any other matter today. Pursuant to a separate order entered last
evening, the Senate agreed to take up the nomination of Admiral Mauz of
the U.S. Navy. During the course of debate on that nomination, Senator
Murray made a motion to recommit the nomination to the Armed Services
Committee for purposes of holding a hearing, and subsequently Senator
McCain offered the now pending underlying amendment to include the
subject of Haiti.
The second-degree amendment which I have just offered, and which has
been stated, deals also with that subject. As I stated earlier, both of
those amendments--the underlying McCain amendment and the amendment
which I have offered--appear to be an attempt to legislate in executive
session on a nomination, something which at least to my knowledge has
not ever occurred and something which I have asked the Parliamentarian
to review.
So we now are in a situation where we will, of course, be prepared
and are prepared to debate this matter, as we had agreed yesterday, for
a period of time under an agreement which would have divided the time
equally between the parties in morning business.
The effect of this matter arising so late, and given the importance
of the matter, and given the 2 o'clock deadline which had been
established several weeks ago, made it, of course, a practical
impossibility that any vote would occur today on this subject.
I repeat, the request for, first, 6 hours of debate, and then 7 hours
of debate, was made initially by our Republican colleagues, and I
agreed to that. I think it is clear that on a subject of this
importance there ought to be at least that much debate, and possibly
more, before there is a vote. But the presentation of an amendment
dealing with the subject--obviously it was done late because that is
the only opportunity that was created when the motion to recommit was
made, but nonetheless it created a situation where there simply is no
feasible way to have a vote on this matter without the kind of debate
that is necessary and appropriate prior to 2 p.m. today. I do not know
the exact time that the McCain amendment was offered, but it was a
couple of hours ago, I estimate. It was sometime, I think, between 11
and 12--between 11 and 12 this morning--following the motion to
recommit by the Senator from Washington.
So, Mr. President, my belief now is that we should proceed to have
the debate on which we agreed yesterday, and which is the subject of an
order, and that it be conducted in a way that the time is equally
divided so that every Senator will have some opportunity to get his or
her view across. And the time can be allocated as between the two
parties in what I hope will be a fair and responsible way.
I note the presence of the acting Republican leader in the Chamber at
this time and wish to inquire of him as to whether it would not be
agreeable to proceed to a vote, to proceed to a debate under the terms
that we had agreed upon yesterday, that is to say, 7 hours would be
equally divided between the two parties under the control of the
majority leader and the acting Republican leader or their designees.
I so inquire, without losing my right to the floor.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, the witching hour is now past--2
o'clock--and I think we all understand we will continue to debate this
issue. After all, it is certainly a debatable motion. I am assuming it
is considered as a second-degree amendment to the first-degree
amendment of Senator McCain.
Obviously, the Republican leader is not present. I am not privy to
the full communications that took place with regard to what would
transpire today, but I think there may have been something in the way
of miscommunication rather than any intent to mislead the majority
leader.
The 7 hours of debate was constructed so that we could debate Haiti.
Since the issue was so volatile and would cause great delay with the
consideration of the Department of Defense legislation, it was
determined to process that properly; we could then debate the 7 hours'
worth on Haiti so as not to obstruct the DOD report.
The 2 o'clock hour, indeed, was adhered to, and we do adhere to it,
and the rest of the week's activity. We understand that. I would say
only that whatever miscommunication may have come from the 7 hours, and
that that would be the only issue, there was a similar miscommunication
with many on our side thinking that this would be an up and down vote
on Admiral Mauz. And then that changed and was altered by the motion to
recommit. There were some on our side who felt, perhaps, as I say, with
miscommunication, that, indeed, then opened it up again for discussion
of Haiti. And on that entry I would yield in a moment to the Senator
from Arizona.
But in any case, that up-and-down vote was not available, as the
floor managers had wished, and that was altered by the motion to
recommit. And then, of course, that made it open to an amendment.
But let me just conclude to the leader that many things have changed
since June when we adopted this exact language by a vote of 94 to 3.
Many things have changed. It is very important we have this national
debate. We have been trying to get that national debate because there
is not one of us here on either side of the aisle who does not know
that this invasion is imminent.
The President of the United States seems to wish to go forward with
it, without congressional participation, and many on our side of the
aisle have compiled the record of the debate during the gulf war and
just flipped it over, and now those same things are being said by those
on the other side of the aisle and the other side of the issue, just
flipping it over as to the necessity for congressional response before
the body bags are flown here to Dover Air Base, and I will not go into
that. That is something that is heavy on all of us.
But I think if we are going to go forward, and this was the Senator's
question, with regard to the 7 hours, it be appropriately divided and
alternated so that it does not just stack up with 2 hours and then--if
we can alternate that, that would be very important.
Then it was very difficult--and I am not going to get into the
unfortunate activity, but it was very difficult for those of us on our
side of the aisle and caused some of the anguish here when the occupant
of the chair earlier in the day refused to recognize one of our Members
who was here seeking recognition for many minutes. The Chair refused to
recognize that Member from our side of the aisle, who was intending to
participate in the debate, perhaps intending to offer a second-degree
amendment.
I do hope that that is not a portent of anything to come as we get
down into the crush of these next few weeks where tempers will be short
and it would be very difficult, but the rules are the rules, and no one
adheres to that more than our fine majority leader. But that was very
unfortunate, and that must not be, it cannot be, if we are to have the
comity and the coordination and cooperation we must have in what is
going to be a very fractious national session until we then recess for
the year sine die.
So we will be pleased to work with the leader with regard to the
allocation of time as long as it is done in an alternate fashion, back
and forth.
I did want the Record to be clear as to how we got here. I did not
know, nor did the leader know, exactly what would take place with
regard to this amendment. Certainly, this Senator was not aware until a
moment before I came to the floor. Therefore, I wanted that to be very
clear. I think the sponsor of the amendment would like to address that
issue. But I hope that is a response to the question, which was rather
lengthy.
Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader has the floor.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his comments. He
indicated that he and his colleagues are prepared for some comments
contrasting the current situation with the Persian Gulf situation, that
there has been a flip. I understand that, because we have also, on our
side. Many comments were made by Republican Senators at the time of
Panama and Grenada. And there was a flip there as well. If there is to
be one, in any case, I expect that will all be part of the debate that
is forthcoming.
What I propose now, Mr. President--and before presenting the request
formally I will describe it to the distinguished acting Republican
leader--what I suggest is that we agree to 7 hours equally divided,
under the control of the majority leader and the acting Republican
leader, or their designees; that the statements alternate beginning
with a Democratic Senator, then a Republican Senator, and then back and
forth, but that no statement exceed 30 minutes in length, so that you
do not get a situation where one person or one side talks for 2 hours
or 2\1/2\ hours, effectively foreclosing the other side until later in
the day.
I inquire of my colleague and my other colleagues whether that
appears to be an agreeable proposal.
Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I ask the
majority leader if I will be able to make a few remarks prior to that,
since my name was liberally mentioned concerning what has transpired
today. I do not object at all to the equal division. I would like to
make some additional comments to those made by the distinguished whip
before we go into that.
If the majority leader does not find that acceptable, that is fine
with me. My name was used liberally about the parliamentary procedures
that were employed by the majority leader. I would like to be able to
respond to that.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, may I suggest that the Senator would
have, under this proposal, a full 30 minutes to do so, following
remarks by one Democratic Senator.
Mr. McCAIN. The distinguished majority leader just said the first
speaker would be a Democrat. I would like to respond to the comments
made concerning what transpired here today since about 10 o'clock, when
I came on the floor, I say to the majority leader. I think I should
have the right to do that since words like unprecedented and things
like that were stated concerning procedures that took place today,
which this Senator initiated.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I inquire if there is leader time
allocated today.
Mr. MITCHELL. That will not be necessary. Mr. President, why do I not
make the request that the Senator from Arizona be recognized for 10
minutes, and that following his remarks, there be 7 hours of debate
equally divided, with the time under the control of the majority leader
or the minority leader or their designees; that the speakers alternate,
the Democratic Senators speaking first, a Republican Senator second,
and then alternating back and forth; but that in that sequence, no
Senator be permitted to speak for more than 30 minutes so as to ensure
fairness in allocation of time on each side.
Mr. NICKLES. Reserving the right to object, and I shall not, I ask
the majority leader, when will we have a chance to vote on either his
second-degree amendment or the underlying amendment?
Mr. MITCHELL. Next week.
Mr. NICKLES. Monday or Tuesday?
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I have not made a decision on that. For
one thing, we do not know how long the debate will be. There are many
Senators who have left or are leaving who may well want to speak on
this subject. Of course, that is exactly what happened to us on the DOD
authorization bill on Monday. We took it up on Monday. We had a few
hours of debate. We were told there were several Republican Senators
who were not here on Monday. They wanted to speak on it. We had to wait
until Tuesday.
So we do not know what Senators will be able to speak today, or how
many will want to speak for how long, and therefore we will have a vote
when all Senators have an opportunity to speak who wish to speak.
Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate the majority leader's answer, Mr.
President. So to further clarify, the 7 hours is not all inclusive.
Further debate could transpire on Monday or Tuesday, and this will be
the pending business when we return on Monday.
Mr. MITCHELL. Absent some agreement to the contrary, it will be the
pending business.
Mr. NICKLES. I thank the majority leader. This does not limit it to 7
hours. We can speak on this issue on Monday or Tuesday. We will not be
capping the total debate time.
Mr. MITCHELL. I did not intend the proposal to be the only time; we
will debate it today, and then when we get back into session, if any
other Senator wants to speak, he or she will be able to speak, absent
some agreement to the contrary.
Mr. NICKLES. I appreciate that.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I will not
object, but I would like 2 minutes simply to address the underlying
issue, which is the Mauz nomination, prior to beginning --about 2
minutes. I do not want to delay the Senator from Arizona, but I do
think we ought not to leave this simply hanging without some
explanation.
Mrs. MURRAY. I reserve my right for 5 minutes, as well.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I do not intend to debate.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, we have a situation where, in order to
accommodate several Senators earlier on the Mauz nomination, we
concluded that debate with statements by three Republican Senators.
Senator Murray had requested the opportunity to address the Mauz
nomination, as well. She was not able to do so because of the agreement
that we reached.
Why do I not ask at this time that Senator Nunn be recognized for 5
minutes on the Mauz nomination; that following his remarks, Senator
Murray be recognized for 5 minutes on the Mauz nomination; and then
Senator McCain be recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. McCAIN. I object. I ask that Senator Nunn's words come after
mine.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will not object. The majority leader is
trying to get an agreement. I really just wanted to make the point that
the Mauz nomination is the underlying business, and he is an individual
who may very well be involved in the debate we are talking about; that
is, the Haiti situation, if we intervene there. His nomination has been
pending 2\1/2\ months now. And the fact that the Haiti resolution has
been put on top of his nomination, which is the Senator's right, has
basically prevented this from being considered. I hope we can get to it
next week, either with or without Haiti.
But that is the underlying matter, and I think it is an important
matter. It has to do with the whole chain of people who will be
replacing him, and those who are replacing those who are replacing him.
So there are a lot of people in the Navy chain that are not present.
That was the only point I wanted to make. I did not want to debate it.
So I withdraw any objection or any request for time.
Mr. MITCHELL. I renew my request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
I say to the majority leader, before he leaves the floor, that I
always admire his skill; I always admire his capabilities, especially
in the area of manipulating the process here on the floor, the
parliamentary process. I have not seen anyone in the short time I have
been here as skillful as he is in successfully shepherding the
legislative agenda through this body. And there are several technical
statements that the majority leader made which I will reserve for
another time because I want to make the major thrust of my remarks in
saying to the majority leader that I am deeply, deeply, deeply
disappointed. He has used legislative procedures in which he is so
adept and efficient and skillful to prevent the Senate of the United
States to speak on the issue of the risk of the lives of young
Americans who are going to go into combat, and some of them are going
to die sooner or later.
The majority leader of the Senate by delaying, by keeping us in a
quorum call, by proposing to second-degree an amendment that was passed
last June that says in it ``There is not sufficient time to seek and
receive congressional authorization'' has successfully--and I
congratulate him--prevented the United States Senate from speaking on
this issue before an invasion takes place of Haiti and American lives
are lost.
I am not going to spend a lot of time quoting from the debate on the
Persian Gulf conflict. I am not going to waste this body's time talking
about this, but the majority leader said:
* * * the Founders knew that a legislative body could not
direct the day-to-day operations of a war.
But they also knew that the decision to commit the Nation
to war should not be left in the hands of one man. The clear
intent was to limit the authority of the President to
initiate war.
But yesterday the President said that, in his opinion, he
needs no such authorization from Congress. I believe the
correct approach was the one taken by the President 2 days
ago when he requested authorization. His request clearly
acknowledged the need for congressional approval.
Continuing to quote from the majority leader:
The Constitution of the United States is not and cannot be
subordinated to a U.N. resolution.
It is universal. If there is to be war in the Persian Gulf,
it should not be a war in which Americans do the fighting and
dying while those who benefit from our efforts provide token
help and urge us on. Yet, as things stand, that is how it
should be.
But in the event of war, why should it be an American war,
made up largely of American troops, American casualties, and
deaths? We hope there is no war, but if there is, we hope and
pray it will not be prolonged and with many casualties.
The majority leader of the Senate, on January 10, 1991, made a
compelling case, one of the most compelling cases I have ever seen.
Before our young men and women sail into harm's way, the Congress of
the United States speaks. The Congress of the United States, by the
Constitution--about which I happen to have some disagreement--but
clearly, on January 10, 1991, the majority leader sincerely and
strongly believed that.
Now, Mr. President, we all know that there is going to be an
invasion--estimates range from a matter of days--and it is perhaps the
most publicized invasion since the first Battle of Bull Run, where
residents proceeded south in their buggies to observe the conflict. We
know that there is going to be an invasion, and this body will be
silent. This body will be silent--an abrogation of our obligations
under the Constitution of the United States and to the people that sent
us here.
Mr. President, I can only express my deep disappointment and hope
that in the future, before this happens again, on both sides of the
aisle we recognize that we have our obligations. If we find ourselves
in a position, I say to the distinguished majority leader, where the
American people oppose that involvement, we should think very long and
very carefully, because there are some of us, including the present
occupant of the chair, that know that without the support of the
American people, military enterprises do not succeed. And 73 percent of
the American people, as of yesterday, oppose our involvement in Haiti.
When that invasion starts, Mr. President, I will hope and pray that
it succeeds, that not a single American life is sacrificed, and I will
not speak out. But prior to that invasion, I feel it is my obligation
to do so.
Finally, I express my deep and profound regret that the majority
leader of the Senate, exercising his authority, rightfully, without
abuse, has prevented this body from speaking on an issue of grave,
grave, grave national importance to this country and to the mothers and
fathers and husbands and wives of the men and women who will now sail
into harm's way without the approval of Congress.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, let me express my deep disappointment
that a Senator, knowing in advance that no vote could occur after 2
p.m., comes in here a couple of hours before the deadline and offers an
amendment which no other Senator has seen, which there has not been any
opportunity to scrutinize or analyze, and then suggest somehow that
there was a design to prevent that vote from occurring.
Every Senator knows this is a serious matter. Every Senator knows
that it deserves full and thorough debate, and every Senator knew that
there could not be any votes after 2 p.m. So when an amendment is
offered just a couple of hours before the deadline, with no advance
notice to anyone, there was a certain knowledge on the part of all
concerned that no vote would occur, that there would have to be the
opportunity for Senators to debate the matter. Therefore, the amendment
is not intended to get a vote. The amendment is intended to be able to
make a political argument. That is the situation we are in. Since this
amendment is offered in a procedure that is without precedent, it could
have been offered earlier in a procedure that is without precedent.
The fact of the matter is that the Senate is in session this week
only because I insisted that it be in session this week. The Republican
leader requested that the Senate not be in session this week. That
request was made to me repeatedly up to and through last week. And if I
had the plan, and if my intention was as stated by the Senator from
Arizona, I would simply have accepted the request of the Republican
leader and had no session. Not only would there then not have been a
vote, there would not even have been an opportunity for debate. There
would not have been opportunity for a single speech to be made on the
Senate floor criticizing others. That is all it would have taken.
I repeat: The Republican leader asked me not to have the Senate in
session this week. If I had the plan or design attributed to me by the
Senator from Arizona, all I had to do was accept the suggestion of the
Republican leader. And then the Senator from Arizona would not have had
this forum to make the speech he just made, or to offer the amendment
he has offered. So the facts of the matter directly contradict the
assertion made. The Senate is in session this week only at my
insistence, only because I would not accept the request of the
Republican leader to have the Senate out of session this week.
We can debate the issue, as we will now for the next several hours,
and as we should, but I hope we will keep the debate on the issues. I
repeat that this amendment is offered in a situation that is without
legislative precedent. It could have been offered in a situation
without legislative precedent yesterday, or the day before, when people
would have a chance to debate it and not wait until just prior to the
deadline at a time in which everybody knows it would be possible to
have the kind of debate and vote this issue warrants.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining of my 10
minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.
The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the fact of the matter is that there has
been no option this week to offer an amendment. The fact of the matter
is there would not have been any option to offer the amendment if it
had not been for the Senator from Washington proposing a motion to
recommit, which came as a surprise, I believe, on both sides of the
aisle.
There was no option this week to propose any amendment on the pending
invasion of Haiti. If there was, I will be pleased to hear about that
from the majority leader. If there was, I am sorry I missed it because
there was a number of us seeking that opportunity to try to get a vote
on the part of the Senate of the United States.
But laying that aside, I say to the distinguished majority leader and
my colleagues what we have ended up with, after all the discussion
about procedures or not procedures or who had what opportunity or who
did not have what opportunity, is the fact that there will be an
invasion without the endorsement of the Senate of the United States.
I suggest, in all due respect, that if the majority leader of the
Senate had wanted us to have a vote approving or disapproving the
invasion of Haiti, it would have happened.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I will just conclude by saying it seems
to me almost certain that the amendment offered is not in order. It is
in a situation for which there is no precedent and which I think will
be held out of order.
If an amendment is offered out of order today, it could have been
offered out of order yesterday; it could have been offered out of order
the day before. Being more or less out of order is insignificant.
I yield the floor and designate the Senator from Connecticut to
control the debate and allocate the time on the Democratic side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today I would like to begin this debate by
doing something that our colleagues who have spoken over the last few
days, weeks, and months have not done, and that is I would like to
spend a little time talking about Haiti, if I may, and what has
happened there about the murders and the rapes, the kidnappings, the
disappearances, about deep, deep fear, Mr. President, deep fear and
despair, and about democracy, democracy stolen, I might point out, in a
poor, impoverished, predominantly black nation some 125 or 150 miles to
the south of the borders of this country.
It has been almost 3 years now since the Aristide government was
overthrown by a military coup. Shortly after the coup occurred in 1991,
Secretary of State James Baker, articulating U.S. policy, stated and I
quote him: ``This coup must not and will not succeed.''
Since that time, Mr. President, U.S. policy has been driven by one
overriding objective, that is, one overriding objective initiated and
commenced under the Bush administration and by and large sustained and
supported during the Clinton administration. And that objective, as
stated by the Secretary of State in 1991 and continued up to now in
1994, was to restore democracy to Haiti by returning President Aristide
to power. This has been the objective, the stated objective of two
administrations, ironically a Republican and a Democratic
administration.
On December 16, 1990, Haitians went to the polls in their country and
chose as their President a priest by the name of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. The election of President Aristide, in the most free and fair
elections in that nation's history, I would tell you, Mr. President,
because I know this country, gave great hope, great hope to a watching
world and to the people of that nation that possibly they had seemed
finally to overcome a bitter, bitter legacy of repression and military
rule.
Sadly, Haiti's brief encounter with democracy would end almost as
soon as it had begun. In September of 1991, just 10 months later,
military and security forces overthrew the Aristide government and
resumed their iron grip on the people of Haiti.
For those who have followed the sad fortunes of Haiti over recent
years, Mr. President, the events of 1991 had a very familiar and
unsettling ring to them. Time and time again since the fall of Jean-
Claude Duvalier in 1986, the military has taken the reins of power in
Haiti. Time and time again the military has promised the international
community that reform and democratic rule were just around the corner.
Time and time again, Mr. President, the military has gone back on its
word.
First there was Gen. Henri Namphy, who assumed power in 1986 and was
rewarded, I might point out, with U.S. military aid after promising to
hold free and fair elections. Those elections, for those who may recall
this--I realize, Mr. President, the danger in talking about history
because we all think the world began yesterday. It is not what happened
now over the last 7 or 8 years here but what happened in the last week
or last 10 days, because that is all our collected attention can
encounter and hold at any one time. There is a little danger to go
back, but I want to remind some people that there is some history here.
Those elections, as I pointed out, that General Namphy allowed to
happen and quickly were canceled turned into a bloodbath in the
country.
Then there was a civilian in charge, Leslie Manigat, who was
handpicked by the military to lead the country in 1988. The Raegan
administration decided against imposing sanctions on Haiti in the hopes
that the military would allow the new President a measure of autonomy.
Those hopes were soon dashed by a military coup that was led by none
other than General Namphy himself, the very guy who said ``Give me the
military and support and we will allow for free and fair elections.''
Then there was Prosper Avril, who overthrew Namphy in yet another
coup 3 months later. General Avril also promised to hold elections and
even managed to convince the Bush administration to publicly defend his
record on human rights. He, too, went back on his word.
Then there was Herard Abraham, who took over from General Avril.
Abraham sat on his hands while opponents of democracy tried
unsuccessfully to disrupt the 1990 elections. After permitting the
supporters of Duvalier to plot the assassination of then President-
elect Aristide, he too was forced to step aside as commander of the
Haitian Armed Forces and allow then Col. Raoul Cedras--now people start
to register--to take his place. But like his predecessors, Raoul
Cedras' commitment to democracy was no more than his predecessors had
been and was short-term as commander in chief and solely self-serving
in his capacity as general of the Army.
So it should have come as no surprise when, about this time last
year--as General Cedras and others were to have stepped aside; that was
the commitment--the military reneged on yet another agreement to
restore democratic rule in Haiti. The Governors Island Accord called on
the military to take a number of steps toward democratic reform,
culminating with the return of President Aristide by October 30. But no
sooner was the ink dry on the accord, and no sooner had sanctions on
Haiti been lifted, than the military signaled its disdain for the
agreement and the commitments it had made. Most notably, the military
prevented the arrival of U.N.-sanctioned military personnel and engaged
in a number of serious human rights abuses including, I might point
out, the high-profile murders of several of President Aristide's close
associates and cabinet members.
While I know voices have been raised in opposition to the prospect
that the President may decide to use force, I would take serious issue
with anyone who would suggest that the President and his predecessor
had not tried all other options available to him short of force. Ever
since the overthrow of President Aristide in September 1991, this
administration and its predecessor has given the military regime in
Haiti every opportunity to seek a peaceful way out.
When the leaders of the Haitian military agreed to go to the
conference table last summer, the administration met with them in New
York City and helped to negotiate the Governors Island Accord--an
accord that would be violated by the Haitian military almost as soon as
it was signed.
When multilateral sanctions against Haiti failed to dislodge the
regime--let me point out, those sanctions began under the Bush
administration, not as complete as eventually imposed by the Clinton
administration, but the path was commenced by the previous
administration to impose sanctions as a result of the coup in that
country.
As a result of more tightening of those sanctions, a fuel and arms
embargo at the United Nations was supplemented by a worldwide embargo
on trade and a ban on noncommercial flights to Haiti.
When these sanctions also failed to change the course of events in
Haiti, the administration tightened the noose even further, adding a
ban on commercial flights and financial transactions between the United
States and Haiti and a freeze on the United States assets of all
wealthy Haitians. These sanctions also failed to convince the military
regime to step aside.
It has been an incremental approach, beginning in September 1991,
slowly ratcheting up, trying to find a way to resolve this problem. We
did not act precipitously. We did not seek a military solution to the
problem at the very outset.
Ambassador Albright, our Ambassador to the United Nations, summed up
the situation very succinctly, July 31, when explaining to the U.N.
Security Council, why it should in her words, ``authorize the use of
all necessary means'' to restore democracy to Haiti. She said in part:
This Council has pursued patiently a peaceful and just end
to the Haitian crisis. The Organization of American States
has pursued a parallel effort. Member states, including my
own, [speaking of the United States] have taken steps
independently to encourage the illegitimate leaders to leave.
Together, we--in the international community--have tried
condemnation, persuasion, isolation and negotiation. At
Governors Island we helped broker an agreement that the
military's leader signed but refused to implement. We have
imposed sanctions, suspended them, re-imposed them and
strengthened them. We have provided every opportunity for the
de facto leaders in Haiti to meet their obligations.
She concluded as follows:
The status quo in Haiti is neither tenable nor acceptable.
Choices must be made. And although the situation in Haiti is
complex, this choice is as simple as the choice between right
and wrong. Today, the Council has made the right choice--in
favor of democracy, law, dignity and relief for suffering
long endured and never deserved.
One need only watch the nightly news or read the newspapers to know
that the situation in Haiti has only gotten worse in recent months.
Before the U.N./OAS civilian mission was expelled in July, it tracked
and reported on a daily basis the unspeakable--the unspeakable and
sick--atrocities committed by the de facto regime and its supporters
earlier this year--nearly 400 murders, over 100 kidnapings--including
children, I might point out--and at least several hundred arrests and
beatings during the 6-month period in 1994 this operation was permitted
to operate in Haiti.
Now, I might add, there was a new element discovered recently, and
that is taking orphan children and using them as target practice. You
are talking about some of the worst elements in the world. This is 125
to 130 miles off our shores. This is not China. This is not Rwanda.
This is not some distant land. It is one that is almost in shouting
distance of this country that we have these problems, serious problems,
and some of the worst human rights violations going on anywhere in the
world.
These individuals are so vile and so shameless that they have
mutilated bodies, removed faces and left the corpses lying in full view
as further intimidation of an already frightened and demoralized
people. Nothing--absolutely nothing--is apparently sacred to them. Last
year, they went into church while services were ongoing and dragged a
prominent Aristide supporter outside and shot him in full view of the
congregation. And, just a few weeks ago they murdered another supporter
of President Aristide, this time a Catholic priest, Rev. Jean-Marie
Vincent.
It is not surprising that thousands of refugees have left Haiti in
search of our shores, desperate to escape the deteriorating political
conditions in their country--or that hundreds of thousands more live in
hiding within Haiti. At this moment there are more than 15,000
displaced Haitians in our custody at Guantanamo, Cuba. This is clearly
a temporary solution--a holding pattern. Ultimately, the only permanent
solution is a political solution in Haiti that is responsive to the
Haitian people. That is what President Aristide represents and that is
why I happen to believe it is so important that we make every effort to
try and seek his return.
Yet all of the efforts taken to date by Presidents Bush and President
Clinton have so far failed to restore democracy to Haiti. As my
colleagues know, it has been my judgment that sanctions, effectively
applied, coupled with a credible threat of force can be successful in
achieving our objectives. But at some point we will be left with two
choices if over time sanctions prove ineffective. We can do nothing,
and let the military continue its reign of terror in Haiti. Or we can
exercise the military option and seek to remove the dictators and the
tyrants, and give the people of Haiti a chance to build a nation once
again.
Each one of us debating here today has the luxury of expressing his
or her personal view without having the heavy burden of knowing that
any one of us individually affects the course of our Nation. The
President does not have that luxury. He and he alone has the heavy
burden of deciding the course the United States will take. And I am
convinced that whatever choice he makes with respect to the use of
force, it will only be made after he believes that he has exhausted all
other possibilities.
Mr. President, I am deeply offended at the suggestion some have made
that this President is considering, after all of these months, all of
these weeks, through two administrations to resolve this problem, that
the consideration of the use of force is political motivated.
What were the numbers today? Seventy-three, eighty percent? You would
have to be out of your mind to consider this a great political
advantage, given the public reaction to the situation, to engage in a
military operation, if he decides to do so. Quite the contrary; quite
the contrary.
But I happen to believe, and I think most of my colleagues here
understand, that being President is different than being a Senator or
being a Congressman. We can debate, discuss, and get on our planes and
go on home for a few days. This individual ultimately bears the
responsibility of making touch, tough decisions.
And we have exhausted a lot of options here. I would tell you, Mr.
President, I am not enthusiastic about the use of force at all. I hope
sanctions, well applied, would produce the desired results in time.
But I also understand that after a while, when you run out that
string and it does not produce the kind of results, that you may not be
left with any other options.
And to talk about this in terms of just how the polls are moving back
and forth--in fact, throughout history, on many occasions, what has
been terribly unpopular in foreign policy happened to have been right;
happened to have been right.
The Marshall plan, I do not think, had 30 percent support among the
American public when Harry Truman advocated it.
As I recall going back--some of my colleagues may provide some
additional statistical information on this--but at most times when the
threat of a foreign involvement was upon us, Americans historically and
for good cause and reason have been resistant to becoming involved and
engaged in so-called foreign entanglements.
Even foreign aid--if you stand up and vote for 5 cents in foreign aid
you run the risk of political reprisal at home because of how our
people feel about involvement in foreign nations. So it does not come
as any great surprise here that there is a great deal of resistance and
concern about whether or not we ought to go forward in Haiti with the
use of force.
But I think it is important that the American people understand that
there is a history to this fact situation. This just did not happen in
the last 6 weeks. I happen to believe there are some interests here
that are important. They are not as clear as a canal or a missile
pointed at us. There, there is no doubt or question about the dangers
to our country. But I believe--maybe I am in the minority, maybe a
minority of one--that democracy within our neighborhood is important.
It is a very important issue. We are seeing democracy emerge throughout
the hemisphere, fragile democracies struggling to be free. The people
of Haiti proved it: 70 percent of their people chose a leader. That
should not be taken lightly.
I know that goes on in other places around the world and that every
time there is a democracy threatened you cannot start talking about the
United States becoming militarily involved. But in this hemisphere, as
close as it is to us, with the threat of a wave of humanity coming to
our shores for good reason, that changes the equation. For Rwanda and
the People's Republic of China and other nations, that risk is not
there. They cannot get to our shores too easily. But a wave of humanity
from Haiti can come here.
So democracy stolen, democracy hijacked should have value. The
concern about the refugees coming to our shores should be a matter of
deep concern to all of us--not as immediate as the threat would be if
there were some hostility or some military aggression that we were
facing.
I might also point out, it has not been mentioned too often, Haiti is
a major transit point in drugs--a major transit point. These generals
down there live like potentates, not just because of what they are
stealing from their own people, but they are directly and deeply
involved in the drug trafficking that plagues our society. That, in and
of itself, Mr. President, I would not suggest is a justification. But
when I hear people say there is no justification here whatsoever--none
whatsoever--I disagree with that. I think there is a justification for
our involvement. That is why President Bush and Jim Baker made the
statements they did in 1991. They talked about it as being in our
interest to be concerned and care about what goes on in Haiti. And they
stated so repeatedly. This administration carried on basically the same
commitment in foreign policy.
The irony is this administration ends up having run out the string on
the diplomatic, political, and economic front and is left in this ugly
choice. I suspect, had the Presidential elections in 1992 turned out
differently and that George Bush was still the President of this
country, and we had no change in Haiti on the political front, we might
very well be standing here today debating whether or not President
Bush, in seeking possibly to use military force, deserved support if
that option were exercised. That is how longstanding this problem is
and how it has run out.
So again, I want to be very clear here. I am not--and I have stated
this--I am not enthusiastic about this option being exercised. But let
us not give comfort to the thugs in Haiti today in our debate. Let us
remember why this problem arose, who created this situation, and what
is happening to 6 million people as we stand here on the floor of this
body today. Do not give the comfort, do not give the kind of protection
to those who engage in the brutal human rights violations of these
desperate, poor, and helpless people. We may disagree about tactics.
But do not let these people leave convinced that we do not care, that
we are not going to do anything about this, that we are just going to
walk away from it, as some have suggested we ought to. ``It is just too
messy. It is just too complicated. It is just too unpopular. The
election is around the corner.''
All of these arguments do not go to the heart, the central question
of whether or not this country, our country, the United States of
America--we are not any other nation. We are the leader in the world
today, the unchallenged leader in the world. If we were just any other
country then maybe we could just wash our hands of it as many do in
Europe when it comes to Bosnia or problems in Africa--that many of them
helped create, I might add, in their colonial efforts over the years.
We are not those nations. We are special because we care about problems
like this.
It ought not to be something we are ashamed of or walk away from. Try
to effectuate the result, maybe through some different means, but let
us not forget our heritage as a people. Let us not forget our history.
Let us not forget we have stood up in the past when others have faced
hardship and difficulty.
There were those in 1941, while Europe was aflame, who felt there was
no validity in being involved in a foreign conflict. It took an attack
on Pearl Harbor to energize the opinion in this country to think
differently. But when we did, we made a significant and profound
difference in the world.
So I hope in this debate, while one can argue about the use of force
or not, do not let these thugs look to your words as some source of
comfort as they continue to thumb their noses at us and the rest of the
world in perpetuating the dreadful, frightening situation just a few
miles from our shores.
Mr. President, we are going to have a long afternoon here. I probably
have exceeded my time already. But I feel very strongly this issue is
one that deserves our careful consideration. I would just say I wish we
had voted on this as well. Others have raised the point. But I quickly
point out to my colleagues, I suspect every Congress since 1789 has
wanted Presidents to come before them and seek their approval for
foreign engagements. With the exception of George Bush and the Persian
Gulf, where he voluntarily asked the Congress to act, every other
President since Franklin Roosevelt after the declaration of war in
December 1941, have found reasons not to come up here.
I suspect that is going to be the situation here. We can decry that,
and I think there is a lot of legitimacy to that point. But the fact of
the matter is, at the end of the day, this action may be taken. If it
is, then I hope at least we will offer the kind of support and backing
to the American forces that they deserve in a difficult situation, and
hope and pray that it succeeds without the loss of any life. And that
if it is exercised, that is the military option, that it not only
succeeds without the kind of harm and difficulty that our military
people can face, but that democracy can be restored and that this
little, poor, country to the south of us will have a chance to
recapture the hopes it thought it had achieved with the first free
election ever in its history, of its first democratically chosen
President. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I would designate--as
acting leader of our party, I would designate Senator Helms as my
designee with regard to controlling the debate on our side of the
aisle, a fine ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
And Ms. Ann Sauer and Mike Tongour, my chief of staff, will be here to
assist in the allocation of time in accordance with the unanimous-
consent agreement. I now yield to Senator Roth for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to
send a succinct message to President Clinton concerning the projected
invasion of Haiti: ``Don't do it.''
The Commander in Chief of this Nation has every right to consider
placing the U.S. Armed Forces in harms way in order to protect the
security or economic interests of this Nation. In considering this
course of action, the President must also consider the crucial
importance of winning support in the Congress and explaining the case
for military action to the American people.
The invasion of Haiti fails on all counts. The situation in Haiti
poses no threat to the national security of the United States. I am
aware that some members of the Clinton administration have contended,
somewhat tortuously, that further floods of Haitian refugees constitute
a threat to our national security. But if this is true they know that
they can obviate the threat immediately by returning to the Bush policy
of turning back Haitian boats on the high seas, a policy to which
President Clinton wisely adhered until he gave in to pressure from
within his own party and abandoned it.
Nor does the Haitian situation constitute an economic threat to this
Nation. Indeed, so wrecked is the Haitian economy that it can barely be
said to exist, as such.
So far as congressional support is concerned, the White House has
apparently concluded that it has no chance of winning congressional
approval for military action against Haiti so it has decided to ignore
its constitutional responsibility to obtain an affirmative vote in
favor of military action. I draw the attention of my colleagues to the
fact that when President Reagan and George Bush initiated surprise
military action against Grenada and Panama, they did so on the basis
that United States lives were in danger.
Under these circumstances, they were acting within their legitimate
emergency powers in initiating that military action.
Opponments of the Grenada and Panama operations have objected to this
legitimization of military action. But the fact remains that the
legitimization was made and both the Reagan and Bush administration
were able to produce evidence to support their assertions. But no one
has attempted to suggest that United States lives are in danger in
Haiti, or that an element of surprise is called for in order to save
those lives.
Under these circumstances, President Clinton has no choice but to
adhere to his constitutional duty, as President Bush did prior to
launching Operation Desert Storm. He must formally seek the support of
the Congress in favor of a United States military intervention in Haiti
and if that support is not forthcoming, that action may not take place.
Quite frankly, I am amazed that we are here today discussing a
nonbinding sense-of-the-Senate resolution while the Clinton
administration prepares for war. The question should be: Does this body
approve an invasion of Haiti--Yes or no? And that vote should be fully
binding. I still hope that President Clinton will grasp this truth and
seek the approval of this body before undertaking any military action
against Haiti.
I have heard it asserted that all of this is justified because of
President Clinton's overriding need to maintain his international
credibility. We are told that, having threatened to invade Haiti so
often, President Clinton must now proceed or his international
credibility will be damaged beyond repair.
Mr. President, the credibility of this great Nation cannot, and must
not, be equated with the credibility of one man, even if he is the
President. President Clinton has, in my opinion, made some unwise
statements. It is not the duty of U.S. service men and women to lay
down their lives in order to protect him from the political
consequences of his statements.
I grant that abandonment of the Haiti operation at this time will, no
doubt, once again call President Clinton's credibility into question.
But these are problems which, I regret, he has brought upon himself. I
for one, have no doubt that the Saddam Hussein's of this world will
still know that, while the executive branch of the U.S. Government may
not have a firm grip on foreign policy, the American people still stand
ready and willing to defend their true interests--with force if
necessary--whenever they are threatened.
Moreover, once the military operation is completed, what then? Are we
going to imprison the active Haitian military and police force? Are we
to become an army of occupation until the scheduled Haitian elections
in 1996? Will we try to interpose our forces if Haiti's downtrodden
masses seek bloody revenge on their traditional persecutors? How is a
Haitian occupation force to be financed out of a military budget
severely stretched by budget cuts and multiplying international
commitments?
I fear that the Clinton administration has no convincing answers for
these all important questions. Under these circumstances, President
Clinton should not initiate a military invasion of Haiti, especially
without congressional approval and with little public support.
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Leahy). Who yields time?
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield as much as 10 minutes to the
distinguished Senator from New Mexico.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from New Mexico is
recognized for up to 10 minutes.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for
yielding time to me on this important issue.
I rise to urge the President to rethink his policy toward Haiti; in
particular, to rethink the idea of invasion that it is widely rumored
could take place as early as next week.
I see no rationale for taking this action, which will put at risk the
lives of thousands of young Americans. In my view, there is no
compelling national interest at stake that requires military action. As
the Washington Post editorial states this morning:
The national security/national interest case for the
evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhere
between exceedingly thin and preposterous.
The President and his national security team have simply not
convinced the public and they have not convinced their representatives
in the Congress that we should undertake an invasion of Haiti at this
time. They have boxed themselves into a corner by making a series of
threats to the thugs presently in control of Haiti, and evidently the
administration now feels compelled to carry out those threats to
preserve their credibility. This is a sorry reason to put American
lives at risk.
The main rationale that we hear for the invasion from administration
officials is that we cannot allow the ouster of President Aristide by
the thugs in the Haitian military to stand, and that having exhausted
various diplomatic and economic sanctions, the only course now is to
remove those thugs by force. In other words, the generation that grew
up criticizing Lyndon Johnson for his attempt to ``make the world safe
for democracy'' in Vietnam is now undertaking a new effort 30 years
later to bring democracy to Haiti.
Haiti clearly is not going to be Vietnam in terms of the cost of
American lives. By all reports, the military expects very few
casualties in this invasion. This seems to be one of the main
rationales for undertaking the invasion. But I would note that when
President Bush decided, in consultation with President-elect Clinton,
to undertake the humanitarian effort to feed the starving in Somalia,
it was also supposed to be without casualties. And instead, we found
ourselves drawn into the civil war and into the misguided efforts at
nation-building, which were only abandoned after a military
catastrophe.
If the President is undertaking this invasion to restore democracy,
when will we know that we have succeeded? It is easy to be drawn into
one of these so-called easy military actions; it is very hard to get
out.
We may well be no more successful at nation-building in Haiti this
time than we were the last time we sent marines 80 years ago.
After two decades of American military occupation, the country soon
sank once again to the depths of the Duvalier era. We may well be no
more successful in Haiti now than they were in Somalia last year or in
Vietnam three decades ago.
Mr. President, we cannot get into the practice in the post-cold-war
world of trying to remove dictators and install democracy by force of
arms. The very democrats that we install will be tainted from the first
day they take office, and we will be doing them no favors.
Mr. President, the tide of history is on our side. Democracy is on
the rise across the world. There is no competing successful model.
Patience will in the end be rewarded. We have to have the courage to
exercise restraint, to resist the easy victory that will bring up the
question of why we do not undertake the hard ones. If Haiti, why not
Cuba? If Haiti, why not Libya? If Haiti, why not Zaire or why not
Bosnia? The only answer is that Haiti, like Grenada before it, is easy
and close by and the others are hard or farther away.
I urge the President to change course and to stand down preparations
for the pending invasion. I urge the President to seek congressional
approval for his actions before he undertakes those actions. I believe
that a resolution of approval would be defeated if it were brought to a
vote. And I do not expect that the President's speech to the Nation
tomorrow evening will change the outcome of that vote.
The Congress and the American public already understand what the
President proposes to do in Haiti, and a majority of the Congress and
the public oppose the action. It is a very dangerous course for the
President to embark on military action with so little support. It is an
unwise course to risk American lives for so tenuous a national
interest. I hope that Congress will be given the opportunity to express
its will on this invasion before it occurs, and I hope the President
and his national security team will have the courage to change course.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Under the previous agreement, it would be customary now to go to the
Republican side of the aisle.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. I would yield so much time as he may need to the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Pell, of
Rhode Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no one on the Republican side of the aisle
is seeking recognition, the Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague from Connecticut.
Mr. President, for the last 3 years the international community has
wrestled with how to restore democracy in Haiti. There are no easy
solutions there and I, like many of my colleagues, have grappled over
the question of what is the best policy. I am deeply disturbed by the
horrendous human rights abuses in that small country and by the
military regime's blatant rejection of democracy and the commitments it
made under the Governors Island accord.
However, in my view there are not sufficient United States interests
to justify an invasion of Haiti and, in fact, I so advised the
President in a letter of July 22.
I believe President Clinton would be in a stronger position, too, if
he sought a formal authorization from Congress. I recognize, though,
that more often than not, Presidents have taken military action without
the prior authorization of Congress. I would point out, furthermore,
that although the President is not seeking prior authorization, the
administration has made every effort to consult with me and with the
Members of Congress, appearing at more than 75 hearings, briefings, and
meetings on this issue.
I commend the President for his success in marshaling the support of
the world community via the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of
force to restore democracy in Haiti and for putting together a
multinational force. If the President feels compelled to take this
step, it is best to do it in a multilateral forum with the support of
the international community.
While President Clinton and I may differ on the wisdom of using force
in Haiti, I know the President has the best interests of the United
States at heart.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today to state my grave concerns for
the imminent invasion of Haiti. I appreciate having this chance to
share my concerns, and I hope that President Clinton will give us a
chance by asking Congress before he commits our troops to an invasion
of Haiti.
President Clinton has been flip-flopping on our policy on Haiti ever
since he took office. But over time the threat of military intervention
has moved to the forefront. And now we are on the verge of sending
American troops to Haiti.
I am not alone in sounding alarm bells for this haphazard decision.
Montanans want to know why we are rushing into this situation. Why
are we putting American lives on the line? The administration has
failed to give sound reasons for why we have to get involved.
Where is our national interest in sending an invasion force of 20,000
troops? Seventeen other countries only think it is important enough to
send 1,500 troops. And that is just the first stage. And then the
second stage will be to restore order. What are our plans to disengage?
The last time we went in to take care of Haiti, we stayed for 19 years.
At the second stage, the United Nations are likely to replace the
invasion force and take over the operation. Remember, they were the
ones who came in while we were in Somalia. That mission ended in more
chaos than order before we were able to withdraw.
Another question: How much is this going to cost? Our defense budget
has been slashed and money for a Haitian invasion is not there. We have
already spent nearly $200 million to rescue Haitians. Polls show that
Americans are not in support of this invasion and they sure do not want
their tax money to go for paying for it. Montanans are absolutely
against this, and they have been.
While we are at it, let us look at another stated administration
goal; the need to restore democracy in Haiti. President Clinton has
made it a key goal to restore Aristide as President of Haiti. Aristide
was hardly the perfect picture of democracy during his time as
president. In fact, he ruled with a strong fist and often resorted to
violence against his people. That is not democracy and that is not what
Americans should fight to defend.
Let us not rush into a foolhardy invasion. We still have not
exhausted all of our policy options. And most of all, we should take
the time to reexamine the policies that are already in effect.
Something is obviously not working. For one thing, it is time to lift
the sanctions. Let us help the innocent victims of the tough economic
sanctions. They are the ones who are risking their lives by attempting
to cross the ocean in rickety boats. And they are the ones who have
been caught in the Clinton administration's ever-changing policy web.
I do not see any need for an invasion at this time. And the President
Clinton has not given good, hard reasons for this invasion that
convince me that this is the best, and only, course of policy.
united states policy toward haiti
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to express my opposition to
the current slide toward American military intervention in Haiti.
The White House is playing a dangerous game and American foreign
policy is starting to look a lot like the Waco of the Caribbean. Once
again, the administration is clearly exasperated and frustrated by a
standoff. And once again, the White House apparently believes that the
only way out of this box is through the use of force. This is an act of
sheer desperation on the part of the White House and it is a foreign
policy prescription for disaster.
The administration has always lacked a fundamental appreciation of
how to conduct foreign policy, and under what circumstances military
force should be used to achieve foreign policy goals. Military force is
not a good vehicle to help reform a political system or culture,
particularly one lacking any history of democracy and ranking among the
poorest countries in the world.
I challenge this administration to outline its specific goals in
Haiti and to explain how we plan to achieve them through the use of
force.
The simple fact is that we do not have a vital national security
interest at stake in Haiti. We are not fighting Soviet or Cuban
surrogates as we did in Grenada. We are not using force to defend vital
interests as we did against Noriega in Panama. We had a legitimate
stake in Panama's internal developments because of our interest in the
Panama Canal and our need for information about Noriega's involvement
in drug trafficking. The situation in Haiti is vastly different from
either Grenada or Panama, but the White House has been unable to
discern these important distinctions.
Secretary of State Christopher, in a Tuesday afternoon press
conference, stated that our general objectives in Haiti include the
restoration of civil law and the establishment of a free government.
However, he also insisted that the United States will not be involved
in nation-building. Secretary Christopher said that:
Now the aim of the multinational coalition, the aim of the
United States here, is not to be involved in nation building,
but to give the people of Haiti an opportunity to build their
institutions, to reclaim their country and have that
opportunity with respect to the building of their own
institutions.
I have some news for the administration: restoring civil order and
replacing a government is nation-building--pure and simple.
The administration has asserted that it does not have to come to
Congress prior to the introduction of troops because the President has
the authority to do so on his own. That is a constitutional debate that
has continued for over two centuries.
Mr. President, Congress is not obligated to sit by idly when an
administration embarks on a potentially dangerous and inappropriate use
of American military power. The use of force is the most important
decision a President can make because it places the lives of American
troops at risk.
While I believe that the President has the prerogative to use
military force in matters of national security, Congress also has a
role to play, and both are accountable to the American people. Members
of this Chamber have an obligation and a right to respond to the
inappropriate use of this executive branch prerogative. And in this
context, I am completely opposed to sending troops into Haiti.
Mr. President, the Clinton administration has some explaining to do.
We have heard bits and pieces from the administration about its
intentions in Haiti. Many of these statements have been contradictory,
including Sunday's confusion between Secretary Christopher and U.N.
Ambassador Madeline Albright concerning whether Lieutenant General
Cedras must leave the Caribbean island republic, in addition to
surrendering power.
It is clear that this administration lacks a coherent policy toward
Haiti. Holding an occasional State Department press conference to talk
briefly about Haiti--when it suits the needs of the administration--is
not a substitute for a rational formulation of American foreign policy.
And it is certainly no substitute for congressional support for this
action.
We are about to place American troops in harm's way and Congress has
neither seriously discussed the possible costs of an invasion nor
explored the possible consequences of this action. I would pose several
questions to the administration concerning United States intervention
in Haiti:
First, do we have an approximate timetable for how long a military
operation would last? The administration has given us no reason to
believe that there is any such estimate.
Second, what are the short- and long-term goals of the intervention
force in Haiti? There has been no clear explanation of the specific
political and military objectives.
Third, do we have any idea how long we plan to stay in Haiti and who
will oversee the political, economic, and military transition? The
administration has not provided us with clear answers.
Fourth, who will bear the financial costs of this so-called
multinational effort? We have not even begun to consider the financial
costs of an invasion, or the financial implications of maintaining a
large occupying force in Haiti.
Finally, is it actually worth the life of one American soldier to put
Aristide back into political power? Serious questions still exist about
Aristide's commitment to human rights, pluralism, and democracy.
Mr. President, let us face the facts. This administration has sought
to avoid discussing these issues in depth because it does not have any
answers at this time. Yet these critical questions deserve a response
before the President decides to intervene with American forces.
I would argue that it is time for the administration to review the
current policy options and available alternatives. I do not believe
that we have exhausted all diplomatic efforts. The administration
should reconsider a plan that calls for an immediate lifting of the
economic embargo if the current military leadership steps down and
allows free and fair elections to be monitored by international
observers. We should redouble our efforts to seek a compromise
agreement among all of the parties involved.
Mr. President, there is simply no way that the administration will be
able to establish a viable, functioning, and effective democracy in a
few short weeks after an invasion. Once we are in Haiti, we will be
there for a long time. We have attempted nation-building in Haiti
before, and after 19 years and major infrastructure projects, the
country slipped back into a state of civil disorder. We should have
learned what happens when you attempt to perform nation-building after
the debacle in Somalia.
The administration is playing a high stakes game that commits the
United States to an invasion of a sovereign nation and that opens up
the prospect of an indefinite stay for American forces on that island.
There is no consensus in Congress or among the American people for
intervening in Haiti, or for a prolonged occupation of that country.
Before we place our troops in imminent danger, the American people
deserve a clear and concise explanation of what we hope to achieve in
that country.
I urge the administration to reexamine its current policy on Haiti
and to come to Congress prior to an introduction of forces into Haiti.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, once again the Senate is addressing the
issue of United States foreign policy toward Haiti.
Once again, talk of invasion has risen.
The level of rhetoric coming out of the administration leads to one
conclusion: The inconsistent foreign policy of this administration will
result in the use of U.S. forces.
I do not support the administration's proposed invasion of Haiti. I
have demonstrated that opposition through several votes expressing
concern and opposition to the use of military action.
I do not enjoy finding myself in a position opposing the Commander in
Chief, but will do so.
If President Clinton insists on ignoring public and congressional
dissent and chooses to exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, I
will stand firmly in support of our troops.
Mr. President, this is not the first time the issue of the use of
force has been debated during my short tenure in the Senate.
As a Member of Congress and a U.S. Senator representing the people of
Idaho, I established a set of conditions that I look for in making a
decision to either support or oppose the use of our military. On the
top of that list is the opinion or sentiments of my fellow Idahoans.
In making my determination, I also look at what economic, security,
or national interests are at stake. I also review our policy or
strategy: When are we going in; why are we going in; what are our
objectives and goals and how will they be carried out?
These important questions have not been answered to my satisfaction.
In addition, as part of my decisionmaking process, I ask if all other
policy options have been exhausted. It is my position that there are
unexplored options that should be considered.
Through the auspices of a bipartisan commission, a range of viable
options could be considered and a sound and consistent policy
established that would lead us toward a welcome solution.
As I just mentioned, the implementation of a sound and consistent
policy is very important.
Mr. President, as the situation in Haiti has evolved, there have been
a number of efforts to restrict the President's use of force. I have
been gravely concerned about setting a precedent that would restrict
the authority of the Commander in Chief.
However, the continual lack of a clear U.S. foreign policy in trouble
spots around the world has led me to the conclusion that without clear
leadership, the Congress is left to micromanage foreign policy in order
to protect U.S. interests and security. This has not been a direction
that I have happily embraced, rather it has been a reluctant necessity.
Mr. President, this administration has repeatedly changed the
direction of its policy, often in the middle of implementing the
policy. In dealing with the refugee issue, candidate Clinton opposed
the Bush policy of direct repatriation of Haitian migrants. Then,
President-elect Clinton expressed support for that policy.
Finally, earlier this year, the President changed his position once
again in an effort to counter criticism from different groups that he
had not kept his promise to change the policy on dealing with Haitian
refugees.
While doing this flip-flop on the refugee problem, the administration
was also tightening sanctions on this very poor nation. As a result,
the administration's policy has encouraged more people to flee because
of severe economic depression.
There is no question that if you use sanctions to block the fragile
economy of that small island nation, people will attempt to flee its
shores--and that is exactly what has happened. Sanctions aimed at the
rich supporters and members of the junta government have fallen on the
backs of Haiti's poorest citizens.
In short, Mr. President, the administration's efforts to tighten
sanctions on Haiti seem unlikely to force out the military chief, Lt.
Gen. Raoul Cedras and his allies.
So where does that leave us?
I do not believe that we are left with only the option to invade. As
I mentioned before, it may require a bipartisan committee to review the
situation and alternative policy options so that we are resolved to
carry out a consistent policy.
In an effort to respond to growing concerns in the Congress and
concerns in the general population about a possible invasion of Haiti,
Senator Dole sponsored an amendment recently that would create a
bipartisan commission on the situation in Haiti.
I supported that amendment. However, it unfortunately did not pass.
The amendment was offered during debate on the 1995 foreign
operations appropriations bill and would have deterred, for now, the
imminent invasion.
The amendment would have established a bipartisan commission,
assigned to assess diplomatic and political conditions in Haiti. The
commission would have been required to report on its findings within 45
days after enactment. This amendment could have slowed the progression
toward invasion.
Prior to this, there were a number of earlier efforts to require the
President to consult the Congress before ordering an invasion of Haiti.
Three such attempts occurred this summer in the form of amendments to
bills moving through the Senate.
There was also a vote last fall on an amendment offered by Senator
Helms and dealing with the Haiti situation. Regrettably that amendment
also failed.
Mr. President, in addition to the concerns I have expressed here, I
am troubled that in the name of democracy, this administration is
planning to return to power a man who certainly does not hold
democratic principles in esteem.
Rather, this is a man who uses such practices as necklacing as a tool
of leadership. President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's commitment to human
rights and democratic principles is questionable at best. Judging by
reports I have reviewed, a number of incidents that occurred following
Aristide's election in December 1990, can only be described as gross
violations of human rights. A specific example of this violence was the
attack on the Papal Nuncio in January 1991.
If Aristide is restored to power, we will likely see the kind of
repression he imposed when he was initially elected and attempted to
wipe out those who dared to dissent from his opinions. Instability and
unrest are inevitable if he seeks to destroy those who supported his
ousting and the implementation of the junta government.
In light of this, I am very concerned about the aftermath of an
invasion.
If we are to occupy Haiti, will our service people be asked to serve
as domestic police? What authority will they be granted to maintain
order? Will that include the authority to quell domestic unrest?
Mr. President, many questions remain unanswered in the
administration's pursuit of an invasion of Haiti. Once our military has
prevailed in ousting the junta government, where do we go from there?
Mr. President, how is order established and how is it maintained?
And, finally, when and how do we leave? These are all very important
questions that have not been answered--they are questions, Mr.
President, that must be answered.
I do not relish the position I am in, opposing the actions of our
Commander in Chief. However, I cannot support the use of our Armed
Forces in a situation that does not meet any reasonable test for
military involvement.
Let me reiterate, Mr. President, I will fully support our troops in
Haiti if the President chooses to exercise the military option. I have
no doubt in the ability of our forces to prevail in an invasion. We
have a fine group of men and women who have dedicated their lives to
serving the United States.
Mr. President, there is a final point that I would like to make. The
United States is the remaining superpower in the community of sovereign
nations. How we use our military in this instance may affect our
ability to exercise policy options in other areas of concern that are
far more critical to U.S. national interests and security.
Mr. President, it is my hope that this debate will serve to deter our
present course and set us on the course of a consistent policy that
will allow us to be a leader and continue to pursue a cornerstone of
U.S. foreign policy, which is to support democracy.
aristide undeserving of u.s. military support
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the administration obviously is hopeful
that Jean-Bertrand Aristide will become a small ``d'' democrat sometime
before the President orders American troops to invade Haiti. The
problem is, neither Mr. Aristide's philosophy nor his background
indicates that he is motivated by democratic values or principles.
Consider whom the man looks to as models for his philosophy. In his
autobiography, Aristide identifies his role models as being Che
Guevara, the Cuban Communist revolutionary; Salvador Allende, the
Marxist President of Chile; and Robespierre, the 18th century French
revolutionary who was an architect of the bloody reign of terror in
France.
Sure, Mr. President, Aristide speaks of ``beauty, dignity, respect,
and love,'' but his heroes are history's synonyms of brutality and
violent revolution. No doubt, Robespierre, who so effectively used the
guillotine to silence his adversaries, would approve of executions by
necklacing--that cruel, bloodthirsty ultimate in horror in which
gasoline-filled tires are hung around the necks of victims and ignited.
Aristide has no relationship whatsoever with democracy; he is neither
a peacelover nor a peacemaker. He is a mean-spirited revolutionary and
an anti-American demagog. Just as his heroes endeavored to create
totalitarian governments, they like Aristide had no commitment to
democracy nor respect for human rights. Aristide's philosophy and
record cannot and should not be overlooked as a factor in any decision
involving calling on United States troops to invade Haiti.
Mr. President, the distinguished and courageous newspaper, Human
Events, has stripped Aristide of his phony piety. Human Events has
spelled out Aristide's record for all to see. The very able editor of
Human Events, Allan Ryskind, understands that militants, Aristide being
no exception, see nothing wrong with resorting to violence to attain
power. Mr. Ryskind went to Aristide's own writings to determine exactly
what Mr. Aristide supports. I am astounded that the President of the
United States is said to be willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops to
restore Aristide to power.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that portions of Allan
Ryskind's article, ``Has Aristide Changed His Extremist Stripes?''
published in the July 29 issue of Human Events, be printed in the
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Has Aristide Changed His Extremist Stripes--Aristide's Revealing
Autobiography
Indeed, in his autobiography, published just two years ago,
Aristide comes across as a full-blown leftist revolutionary.
In the English-language edition, published by the Maryknoll
Order's Orbis Books in 1993, Aristide says (page 125) that
his foes would like to label him ``a follower of Fidel
Castro, an admirer of the Sandinistas * * * an imitator of
Salvador Allende [the late Marxist-Leninist leader of Chile]
or of the Shining Path [Peru's Maoist revolutionaries].''
Astonishingly, Aristide then refuses to flatly deny the
charges of his enemies. ``Rather than searching for models,''
he explains (page 126), ``I prefer to welcome those ideas
that rest on the values of beauty, dignity, respect and love.
Che Guevara * * * certainly incorporated some of those
values, as did Allende. They were sincere men, like so many
others * * * I feel more affection and sympathy for them than
I do for many others.''
Che Guevara, of course, was the Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary who helped Fidel Castro impose communism in
Cuba and got killed in Bolivia attempting to spread Marxist
revolutions throughout the hemisphere. Salvador Allende was
the late Marxist-Leninist ruler of Chile, deposed in a
military coup in 1973.
In his autobiography, Aristide also makes it clear he
favors ``liberation theology,'' the violent, Marxist
philosophy that has gripped so many revolutionaries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, that he rejects ``western
democracies'' and that he worships historical figures such as
Robespierre.
In chapter 15, titled ``Convictions,'' Aristide is asked in
a question and answer format--it is unclear who's doing the
questioning--if he sees himself as resembling the notorious
revolutionary leader who unleashed a reign of terror in
France in the late 1700s.
Aristide replied (page 184): ``There is no question that
there are common denominators between us and the makers of
the French Revolution: 1789 is an essential reference point
as is 1793 [the beginning of Robespierre's rule]. The memory
of the heroes of the rights of humanity should always be in
our minds, as their texts are in our hands. Robespierre
himself denounced the `patripockets.' From Saint-Just to Abbe
Gregoire, how much I owe to the makers of the Revolution!''
Aristide's fanaticism was underscored last week in a
revealing Washington Post profile of the man the Clinton
Administration hopes to restore to power in Haiti. Written by
Daniel Williams, the piece does not suggest any reason to
believe that Aristide is a ``changed man,'' as some of his
supporters have been saying.
Williams, who interviewed Aristide in his Washington, D.C.
apartment, allows that Aristide ``is a very untypical
beneficiary of American muscle not to mention blood. He is
more the kind of leader U.S. governments frequently opposed
during the Cold War; he certainly would have been labeled
anti-American. * * *
``He is a populist who used mob power to intimidate
political critics. During his brief stay in office, he spoke
glowingly of the `necklace,' the burning tire ignited around
the neck of victims of street execution. * * *
``Aristide, ordained in 1982 as a Catholic priest, is a
disciple of liberation theology, an interpretation of the
Bible as a revolutionary document. `The Gospel in its raw
form,' he once said, `could act like a stick of dynamite.'''
Though in his effort to get U.S. support he has proposed a
moderate program for Haiti. Williams noted that Aristide
won't apologize for his past remarks or try to explain them
away, insisting they are irrelevant.
Nor does he reveal any inclination to compromise with his
political opponents.
``From his exile,'' said Williams, ``Aristide has resisted
naming a new prime minister and shelved his own plans to form
a `government of concord.'
``Last winter, U.S. officials tried to persuade Aristide to
build a broad cabinet to include political opponents.
Aristide refused, claiming such a move would effectively
marginalize him.''
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to any
United States invasion of Haiti. I have just returned from Idaho and
while I was home I did not meet one person advocating a United States
invasion of Haiti. Instead, I met a number of Idahoans who expressed
concern and opposition to an American invasion of Haiti. I could not
agree more with my constituents.
If this administration thinks the American people want to put our
troops at risk in order to restore President Aristide to power, then I
urge these policymakers to get out of Washington and meet with the
American people. The American people have considered this question and
an overwhelming number of Americans oppose a United States invasion of
Haiti. And they do so because there is absolutely no United States
national interest that requires the use of American military power in
Haiti.
I hope President Clinton will listen to our warnings and turn back
from the policy of preparing to invade Haiti. I believe it will be a
mistake for United States forces to invade Haiti because there is no
objective in Haiti that is worth the cost of one American life. If the
United States invades Haiti what will the President tell the American
men, women, and children who lose a loved one in Haiti? What goal will
the administration cite to justify this loss? I do not want to see
grieving parents asking us if their child died in vain.
There is no doubt that United States military forces can successfully
invade and conquer Haiti. The real questions facing us are: What do we
do once we have conquered Haiti and how do we get out? Once we have
taken over Haiti we will be faced with an enormous nationbuilding task.
In Haiti, we will find a poverty stricken people. Analysts have looked
at this enormous nationbuilding task and they estimate that the United
States might be required to stay in Haiti for months or even years. In
addition, we do not know how Haitian people will view our presence. In
short, we will be faced with a potentially dangerous, international
welfare case with no hope that we can get out anytime soon.
As my colleagues know, I have been actively involved in bringing an
end to the United States military and diplomatic presence in Somalia.
This exercise demonstrated that the U.S. has a very difficult time
leaving once we send our troops into a country. The last time the
United States invaded Haiti, it took us 19 years to withdraw. We must
not make that mistake again.
Before a President considers putting the lives of U.S. military
personnel at risk, we need to determine that our national interests are
involved. When President Reagan invaded Grenada there was a clear and
imminent threat to United States citizens. When President Bush toppled
Manuel Noriega in Panama, there had been attacks on American citizens
in Panama. When President Bush liberated Kuwait, he stopped Saddam
Hussein from seizing the Persian Gulf and a large percent of the
world's oil reserves. In each of these cases, there was a compelling
reason for the President's action. Today, however, there is no such
compelling reason to invade Haiti.
I am not adverse to the United States using force when it's
warranted. There was a time during the Reagan era when nations of the
world knew they couldn't mess with the United States. If you did, you
might be the recipient of a smart bomb or a Tomahawk missile. I think
that's healthy. We should use our military forces sparingly, but if
some other country has done something to merit the use of force, it
should be done rapidly and effectively. It should not be done simply to
prove that we have the strength to do it, and certainly not because the
administration wants to prove it's finished bluffing.
Mr. President, I urge President Clinton to step back from this abyss.
Time is on our side. We must not put our troops at risk in order to
restore the reliability of this administration. It is a travesty that
our reliability now seems in such disrepair that it now requires
rebuilding. This is no way to conduct foreign policy. We can do better
than this.
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise to address the troubling issue of
a possible impending invasion of Haiti by United States military
forces.
It is unfortunate, Mr. President, that those of us on this side of
the debate must feel compelled to preface our remarks by making certain
disclaimers and caveats. But such has been the nature of the criticism
against the position that many in my party have taken regarding such an
invasion, so some clarifications and reassurances to the President and
to the public seem necessary.
Let it be firmly understood that this Senator at least, as well as my
Republican colleagues, do not challenge the President's authority, if
national security requires it, to invade Haiti or indeed to take any
other appropriate action involving the United States military. That is
his charge and his right, to act with full authority in the interest of
national security as the Commander in Chief of the U.S. military
forces.
That should be clearly understood, and I would remind my colleagues
that previous resolutions offered on this side of the aisle, even as
they would have required consultation with Congress before deploying
United States forces in Haiti, would have made appropriate exemptions
for the event that the President deemed our vital ``national security''
interests to be at stake.
So let that be understood. President Clinton enjoys full support from
this side of the aisle, just as previous Republican Presidents have,
for his authority to use his powers as the Commander in Chief to act on
behalf of vital U.S. interests.
But that is the rub, isn't it? The singular lack of an assault on our
national security. I do not believe that there would be this kind of
showdown between the President and congressional leaders if we faced an
Iran-style hostage situation, or if we faced, as we did in Iraq, an
international aggressor straddling a large fraction of the world's
precious energy reserves. But instead we are not facing any of those
obvious challenges to our national security, nor to the security of our
private citizens.
Furthermore, we do not face a military situation in which surprise
and secrecy seems to be deemed by the administration as essential to
preserving the lives of American soldiers. We are not facing a
situation where we have the necessity of remaining silent on this issue
so as to preserve the ignorance of the Haitian junta. In other words,
we do not have a situation where the President is seeking to use the
most extensive powers he has a Commander in Chief to launch a sudden
and secret assault, the war-making powers of Congress notwithstanding.
No, Mr. President. Indeed we see quite the contrary. we have seen
every manner of verbal hint and threat from the administration that an
invasion will come if the Haitian military does not abdicate. The
administration clearly intends to force the Haitian military out of its
position of power, if not by invasion, then by the threat of it. The
military action envisioned here clearly has the character of a willful
entrance into warmmaking, quite distinct from an urgent and time-
sensitive military rescue mission or urgent national security action.
We well recall when President Bush laid out for Saddam Hussein the
consequences of his action in invading Kuwait. ``This will not stand''
it was an ultimatum much like today's that seems to be coming from the
Clinton administration. And President Bush was told by Congress that he
must come before us and make his case for the use of force. Which, he
did. And his arguments carried the day, because he was able to
demonstrate a clear and demonstrable threat to the international order,
and was able to generate the requisite support from the American people
and their elected representatives.
If President Bush was so obliged, certainly President Clinton is as
well. Indeed I cannot see any reason for the President to claim an
exemption from this necessity, that was not available to President Bush
when he faced the aggression of Saddam Hussein. The only credible
argument I can see advanced within the administration against
congressional authorization is based on the apparent fact that he does
not, indeed, have the support either of the American people or of the
Congress for this action.
Having said that, let me reiterate: I have an open mind. If the
President can make a convincing case that this action is worth American
blood, I am listening. But it seems bizarre to me that we would even be
contemplating such an action when no such case has been made.
We hear that democracy has been ``hijacked'' in Haiti, which indeed
it has, by military thugs. And this is certainly ample reason to apply
sanctions and economic pressure against the Haitian military junta. But
what is it, Mr. President, that distinguishes Haiti from the many other
nondemocratic governments around the world? Of course we support and
argue for democratic processes everywhere, and we support the rights of
people for self-determination. We do not always, however, shed American
blood in that cause. We are not contemplating an invasion of Burma. We
are not, to my knowledge, contemplating an invasion of Cuba. Haiti is
not the only country--not even the only Caribbean country--where
democracy has been hijacked. Why Haiti?
Is it the case that there is so clear a choice between the virtue of
the Aristide Presidency and the evil of the existing military junta?
Mr. President, I respect to overwhelming electoral victory won by
President Aristide. But is President Clinton, and the Government of the
United States, so confident that his return will mean a respect for
democratic norms, and a respect for individual human rights, that we
are willing to stamp the ``made in USA'' label on the Aristide
government from this day forward? Because, make no mistake--once
Aristide is installed at American gunpoint, he will be considered our
``client'' in the eyes of Haitians, Americans, and in the eyes of the
world. Let no one mistake that inevitable result.
I therefore cannot support the use of American military force in
Haiti, at least--at the very least--until a compelling, not contrived,
case is made that the situation in Haiti poses a direct threat to our
national security, in a way that Cuba or Burma or any other ``outlaw
regime'' does not. The President ought to know, as well as any American
citizen does, how inappropriate, how unworkable it is to ask Americans
to fight and die for confused and uncertain objectives.
And finally, let me make absolutely clear: No one is suggesting that
the President decide against an invasion solely because of popular
opposition to the idea. Foreign policy, and military policy, cannot be
made by pollsters. But leadership requires more than acting in defiance
in popular opinion. In matters of war, the Nation must be led, it must
be rallied, if our aims are to be met. We have not seen that kind of
leadership from this administration on this issue, and until we do,
this Senator has no choice but to oppose the use of United States
military force in Haiti.
I would like now to address this subject of making the specific case
for war in Haiti. I assume that one of the reasons offered in
justification of an invasion of Haiti will be the need to stop illegal
immigration from Haiti. I have an abiding interest in this issue,
arising from my position as ranking member on the Immigration
Subcommittee.
I want to specifically address Haitian illegal immigration, and that
problem--and it is a problem--as a justification for an invasion of
that tiny country.
Illegal immigration from Haiti is indeed a problem, but it is a small
problem compared to illegal immigration to this country from Cuba, from
China, from Mexico, and from other Central American countries including
the Dominican Republic which shares with Haiti the island of
Hispaniola.
No one is suggesting that we invade any of those countries to stop
illegal immigration, and in my view, it is pretty difficult to justify
an invasion of Haiti on that basis.
Justification for an invasion aside, we do not need to invade Haiti
to deter illegal immigration from that country.
We have had a number of Caribbean nations offer their territory for
``holding centers'' for Haitian illegal immigrants--places where
persons leaving Haiti could stay until they felt it was safe to return
to their country.
I assume those offers of locations for holding centers are still
open, and establishing holding centers to provide temporary safe haven
to the Haitians outside the United States, is the solution to illegal
immigration from Haiti. We do not need an invasion.
Experience has shown us rather clearly that if we do not allow
illegal boat people, whether they be from Haiti, or from Cuba, to enter
the United States, no matter what their claim to safe haven may be, the
boat flow will dry up.
All we need to do is by our words, and by our actions, clearly
establish the policy that attempting to enter the United States without
proper authority will not give boat people an opportunity to live in
the United States until his or her claim for asylum is determined.
However, if potential illegal immigrants do not believe we mean it
when we say they cannot come, and the Clinton administration's
remarkable confusion on the issue has given them good reason not to
believe us, they will continue to try to come.
The answer to illegal immigration from Haiti is not an invasion, but
a clear, firm, consistent, and persevering policy which does not permit
the entry into the United States of persons attempting to come on
vessels without proper immigration documents.
I would close, therefore, by reiterating the point that a convincing
case for invasion has not yet been made, and certainly not with respect
to resolving problems of illegal immigration. Until and unless other
convincing justifications arise, this Senator must continue to oppose
risking American lives in a military invasion of Haiti.
I ask that an article by Charles Krauthammer, ``To Die for
Aristide?'', be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, July 22, 1994]
To Die for Aristide?
(By Charles Krauthammer)
Unless Haiti's military rulers panic and flee in the face
of Bill Clinton's threats--it would be a first--we will have
to invade to get them out. The administration has neatly
maneuvered itself into a corner from which there is no other
escape. It could, of course, declare its entire Haiti policy
misbegotten from Day One. It could admit that the restoration
of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, hardly a vital American interest,
is not worth the bones of a single American grenadier. But
there is no chance of such an admission.
The invasion will have to go forth. Before it does, before
the first American dies, it is worth asking why. What
national interest do we have in Haiti?
Among the welter of interests offered by Clinton, the only
one with any real resonance is refugees. A tidal wave of
refugees washing up on Florida shores is something the United
States cannot tolerate.
This would be a perfectly reasonable rationale--if the
refugee exodus were not the direct consequence of Clinton's
own policies. The refugee flow shows a striking mathematical
relationship between Clinton's ever-changing asylum policies
and the numbers of Haitians taking to their boats.
In May, responding to the pressure of Randall Robinson's
hunger strike, Clinton declared a new U.S. policy on Haitian
refugees. It offered the possibility of asylum hearings to
any Haitian who could make it by boat to a U.S. ship. On June
16, it took effect. Surprise: Within two weeks, refugees were
arriving at the rate of more than 1,000 a day. On July 4
alone, 3,247 were picked up.
On July 5, overwhelmed, Clinton reversed course. Henceforth
refugees who took to sea would no longer be considered for
asylum in the United States but sent instead to third
countries. Surprise: A week later, the number of refugees
fell almost 90 percent.
Clearly, these wild fluctuations in refugee flow are not a
function of Haiti's military repression--the repression
continues unabated--but of the prospect of admission to the
Promised Land. People genuinely in fear of their lives are
not terribly fastidious about where they are granted safe
haven. Yet large numbers of Haitians--once they realized that
they would end up not in Florida but in Grenada or Antigua or
even, God forbid, Benin--have apparently decided that Haiti
is the better place for them.
Our interest in preventing a flood of refugees is
incontrovertible. But the refugee crisis is Clinton's own
creation. It is exacerbated by sanctions that have done
nothing but further impoverish the most impoverished nation
in the hemisphere. And it is inflamed by an administration
that periodically, as between June 16 and July 5, makes the
possibility of asylum far easier for Haitians than for, say,
Chinese boat people who, when intercepted at sea, are almost
automatically turned away.
The other reason offered for invading Haiti is that we
stand for democracy. Coming from Democrats, this is a
touching concern. They spent the better part of the 1980s
vilifying the Nicaraguan contras, who were trying to restore
democracy to their country too. (In the end, they did.) In
that case, moreover, all that was being asked as military
aid. Today it is American blood.
But apart from hypocrisy, there is illogic. Democracy alone
cannot be reason enough for American intervention--or we
should be intervening in half the world. There must also be
some strategic rationale. The strategic threat in Nicaragua
was that it might be turned into a forward base for a hostile
superpower. (That was during the Cold War--a time, Clinton
now laments, of unusual moral clarity.) What possible
strategic threat emanates from Haiti?
Moreover, intervening to install Jean-Bertrand Aristide in
the name of democracy is quite a stretch. Yes, he was elected
president of his country. But many dictators and psychopaths
have been elected as well. Juan Peron won election (twice!).
So did Hitler.
Aristide is no Hitler, but he quite admires Robespierre,
who ranks high among history's bloodthirsty executioners. ``I
am inclined to see in you a certain resemblance to
Robespierre,'' he writes in a self-interview in his
autobiography. ``Robespierre was called `the incorruptible.'
That is a rare quality in politics, and it doesn't always
make for a long term in office.'' The parallel is meant to be
both obvious and flattering.
Accordingly, Aristide incited mobs to intimidate judges and
(democratically elected) legislators. He spoke rhapsodically
in praise of the ``necklace,'' the burning tire used to
murder political opponents, the modern revolutionary's
improvement of the guillotine: ``It is beautiful, it looks
sharp. It is fashionable, it smells good,'' he, as president,
told a crowd in September 1991.
And then there is the matter of his anti-Americanism. The
United States, he writes in the chapter ``My Convictions,''
is one of the ``gang of four'' ``enemies of Haitian people.''
His affection for Che Guevara, his references to American
imperialism, have been muted of late, for good reason. He now
lives in Washington and will ride the backs of U.S. Marines
into Port-au-Prince. But it is a curious American policy that
seeks to advance American interests at the risk of American
lives by installing an anti-American demagogue.
American Marines patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince
to keep Robespierre in power--this, after Somalia and Bosnia
and Korea, will be Clinton's great demonstration of
muscularity. Makes you pine for flabbiness.
A U.N. LICENSE TO INVADE HAITI
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the U.N. Charter is not a social science
experiment. It is a treaty about the use of force. Chapter VII of the
charter prescribes the authority of the Security Council to deal with
``threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.'' It is not about nation-building.
Let me be clear: I do not support an invasion of Haiti. I do believe
that the United States has an interest in promoting democracy and
stability in Haiti. We have done more than any other country to restore
the legally elected Government of Haiti. I support those efforts. They
should continue.
But Haiti is not--simply put--a threat to the peace or to the United
States sufficient to justify a chapter VII invasion. In the words of
the New York Times, ``Washington recklessly stretched the boundaries of
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security'' in
order to obtain Security Council authorization for an invasion.
An invasion would endanger the lives of American service men and
women in the cause of a most uncertain mission--nation-building. Not a
theoretical concern.
It also jeopardizes one of the finest achievements of American
statecraft--the U.N. Charter. To cite again the New York Times:
Having taken its lumps trying to be a world police force,
the U.N. has now fallen into the unhealthy habit of licensing
great-power spheres of influence. In recent weeks the
Security Council has commissioned France to send troops to
Rwanda and endorsed Russia's ``peacekeepers'' in Georgia. Now
the U.S. is authorized to lead an invasion of Haiti. Such
crude power politics damages the U.N.'s standing as an
organization valuing the sovereignty of all its member
states.
This is no small issue. Hard cases make bad law. Haiti is indeed a
hard case. The human rights abuses there are extraordinary. We are
trying to help. But what law do we create by invading under the
authority of chapter VII? What will we say 6 months from now if Russia
engages in a police action to protect Russian nationals in the Baltics
or Ukraine?
The people of Haiti need and should receive our continued support in
their struggle to restore their elected government. But Haiti is no
more a threat to the United States and has no less a democratic
government than numerous other regimes. Is the military dictatorship in
Haiti less democratic and more dangerous to the United States than
Colonel Qadhafi's regime in Libya, a terrorist state which blew Pan Am
103 out of the sky and murdered score upon score of Americans? Is it
less democratic and more threatening to the United States than other
terrorist states such as Syria, Sudan, and Iran? The military
dictatorship in Burma threw those chosen in its last election in prison
and murdered thousands of others. Burma is probably the source of most
of the heroin which reaches the United States. Is it more democratic
and less a threat to the United States than Haiti?
Frankly, while the situation in Haiti is deplorable, Haitian refugees
are a problem for the United States, not a threat to our national
security. Indeed. Haiti is not even a threat to the Dominican Republic
with which it shares the island of Hispaniola, much less the sole
remaining superpower in the world.
I have served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and have
represented the United States as President of the Security Council.
Save on the sternest instructions of the President himself, I would
never have countenanced a Security Council resolution authorizing the
invasion of Haiti under chapter VII of the charter.
In closing, I must make clear that if troops are sent into the field
by the Commander in Chief that they must be fully supported. In asking
them to put their lives at stake we must ensure that they are given the
means to adequately perform the task at hand and are protected from
undue risk.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire New York Times
editorial of August 2, 1994 be printed in the Record and I yield the
floor.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Aug. 2, 1994]
A U.N. License to Invade Haiti
If it persuades Haiti's military leaders to leave on their
own, then Sunday`s U.N. Security Council resolution
authorizing a U.S.-led invasion will have done some good. The
resolution contains no deadline, and the Clinton
Administration has no plans for an imminent military strike.
Perhaps only the threat of force will convince Haiti's top
soldiers they should depart. They viscerally oppose the
social and economic changes they believe President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide would make if he returns. And they are
reportedly profiting handsomely from the status quo.
But the threat to use force implies a willingness actually
to use it if the military leaders hold fast, and an invasion
of Haiti under present circumstances would be a big mistake.
Meanwhile, the Administration's strained interpretation of
the U.N. Charter to classify the Haitian situation as a
threat to regional peace and security damages the U.N.'s
legitimacy and invites trouble.
The resolution, orchestrated by Washington envisions
several countries taking part in any invasion, but the
operation would remain under direct U.S. military and
political control. Presumably, the Clinton Administration
will heed its constitutional duty and seek previous
Congressional approval, which it may not get. But even a
properly authorized invasion would add to the long string of
dubious U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean basin
during the past century, including a 19-year occupation of
Haiti itself.
Some of these actions had nobler ends than others. But very
few did any lasting good and each poisoned U.S. relations
with the rest of the hemisphere. Significantly, one of the
two Latin American members of the Security Council, Brazil,
abstained Sunday, while the non-members Mexico, Uruguay,
Venezuela and Cuba all spoke out against an invasion. The
other Latin member, Argentina, voted yes.
Even though President Aristide implicitly endorsed the
resolution, an invasion could weaken his domestic legitimacy
while diminishing Haiti's sovereignty. And despite plans to
quickly hand off peacekeeping authority to a more broadly
based U.N. force, an invasion would saddle the U.S. with
political responsibility for controlling the violent
vendettas that might erupt once the present repressive
structure is disarmed.
To justify the use of U.N. force, Washington recklessly
stretched the boundaries of what constitutes a threat to
international peace and security under Chapter Seven of the
U.N. Charter. Gen. Raoul Cedras's violation of the pledges he
made in the Governors Island agreements last year is
legitimately an international issue. So is the tide of
refugees and systematic violation of human rights. But none
of these issues now rise to the threshold necessary to
justify invasion. On many of the same grounds, Cuban emigres
might well lobby the Clinton Administration to seek U.N.
authorization for invading Cuba.
Having taken its lumps trying to be a world police force,
the U.N. has now fallen into the unhealthy habit of licensing
great-power spheres of influence. In recent weeks the
Security Council has commissioned France to send troops to
Rwanda and endorsed Russia's ``peacekeepers'' in Georgia. Now
the U.S. is authorized to lead an invasion of Haiti. Such
crude power politics damages the U.N.'s standing as an
organization valuing the sovereignty of all its member
states.
Licensing big-power armies was justified in cases like the
Persian Gulf war and the Korean War where the necessary level
of force could only be supplied by major military powers. But
it is surely not justified in Haiti, with a 7,000-man regular
army and a comparable number of lightly armed paramilitary
troops.
The Clinton Administration, under attack from critics on
the left and right for alleged timidity in deploying U.S.
military power, now reveals a dangerously low threshold for
using force in Haiti.
Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, in the strongest terms, I oppose
President Clinton's apparently unstoppable course of preparing for a
United States invasion of Haiti.
The test for military action against another country must be the
national interest of the United States. No American interest would be
served by invading Haiti. While the regime of General Cedras is
deplorable, the troubles of Haiti are internal to itself. As a matter
of foreign policy, it is appropriate for the United States to encourage
democracy elsewhere in the world. But encouraging democracy does not
give our country license to send in American troops wherever democracy
does not exist. The test of military force must be national interest,
not a general interest in improving the governments of other countries.
The Clinton administration points to Haitians fleeing that country by
boat in an attempt to reach the United States. In large part, they are
fleeing terrible economic conditions which have been worsened by the
Clinton administration's tightened economic embargo. The stated purpose
of the administration is to tighten the embargo, cause Haitians to flee
their country, arrest them on the high seas and transmit them to
detention camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This does not constitute the
kind of national interest necessary to justify the use of military
force.
After many weeks of bluster, the Clinton administration claims that
the United States would lose its credibility if it did not follow
through with an invasion of Haiti. But loss of credibility is the fault
of the administration's incompetence in the first place. The loud
speaking diplomacy of President Clinton should not propel the United
States toward the inexorable use of our military.
The best policy for our country to follow would be to abandon the
planned invasion, lift the embargo--which is hurting poor Haitians and
sending them to their boats--and terminate recognition of Cedras's
regime.
I have often spoken and written of the importance of establishing a
bipartisan foreign policy. In dealing with the world, Americans should
speak with one voice. Members of Congress of both parties should be
quick to support Presidents in the conduct of foreign policy and
reluctant to substitute our own views for those of the executive
branch.
However, the ground beneath a bipartisan foreign policy is undercut
when the basis for proposed action is the political needs of a
President in an election year rather than the requirements of the
country as a whole.
When the invasion occurs, there will be predictable efforts to appeal
to the pride of Americans in a successful mission by our military. Yet
there would be little source of pride when the strongest country in the
world invades one of the weakest. And any short-term pride, however,
misplaced, will soon be supplanted by what will become America's long-
term stake in the internal affairs of Haiti and in the conduct of the
Aristide regime.
Finally, and most importantly, an invasion of Haiti without a
declaration of war by Congress violates Congress's responsibility in
declaring war. There is no possible basis for argument that the use of
military force against Haiti is simply a police action, for it is not.
This is not a matter of saving American lives that are endangered, as
was the case in Grenada, or bringing to justice a person perpetrating
crimes against America as was the case in Panama. This is the use of
military force for the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs
of another country. It will not be a police action, it will be a war.
It will be a war which cannot be justified by any standard of national
interest and which will be clear violation of the constitutional powers
of Congress.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. I yield myself 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 30
minutes.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, just a short time ago, the Senator from
Connecticut [Mr. Dodd]--I believe I am correctly quoting him--indicated
the President, and he alone, has a very heavy burden. I would like to
respectfully submit that I object to the notion that the President
alone carries a heavy burden. That really is at the heart of the debate
that is taking place this afternoon and, I am sure, will continue in
the days ahead. Congress also has a heavy burden to bear, and what we
are suggesting is that Congress is not either being asked or required
to bear that heavy burden of responsibility.
Mr. President, when our parents and we as parents send off our sons
and daughters to the military, we expect a number of things. We expect
them to be well trained. We expect them to be well disciplined. We
expect them to be well led. We expect them to be well cared for. We
expect that they will be used prudently and wisely, with careful
consideration given before they are ever sent off to face the dangers
of war.
I will recall during the debate on the Persian Gulf war a really
poignant moment in my office. I was absolutely deluged with thousands
of letters and thousands of phone calls and people coming into my
office demanding that they have an opportunity to speak to me before I
voted on whether to send their sons or daughters off to war. I will
never forget a session where a delegation from Mothers Against War met
with me in my office for some time. It was very emotional. And they
said:
You cannot send our sons and daughters off to fight this
war. It is not in our national security interests. You,
Senator Cohen, will have the blood of our sons on your hands
if you vote in this fashion.
So it was a pretty heavy responsibility we had at that time. Some of
us voted to authorize the President to go to war and some voted against
it.
Mr. President, as the United States military forces poise themselves
to invade Haiti, it seems to me there are two questions facing the
Congress and the President. One is whether military intervention in
Haiti would be a wise policy, and the second is the constitutional
issue of who answers the first question. Who determines whether it is
wise or not. Perhaps President Clinton could persuade me and Congress
and the American people that his plan to intervene is wise. Perhaps he
will be as persuasive as the Senator from Connecticut is passionate.
But he has not yet persuaded us. Indeed, I do not think he has even
seriously attempted to persuade us, to make his case. Apparently, he
intends to do so tomorrow evening. But it appears also that he does not
intend to attempt to persuade us out of fear that he might fail and
then be faced with launching an invasion against the expressed will of
Congress. Given the most recent polls showing--I think the Senator from
Connecticut indicated--some three-fourths of the American people are
opposed to military intervention into Haiti, it is clear the President
will have a very heavy burden to bear if he is going to persuade the
American people and Congress that there should be an invasion.
There are only two ways for the President to respond to the gulf
between his plans and congressional and public opinion. He can either
engage Congress, and thus indirectly the public, in a meaningful dialog
followed by a vote. Or he can roll the dice, proceed with military
intervention without congressional authorization and hope that it is
successful enough that the public and congressional critics will then
lend their support.
The President, it seems to me, is pursuing the latter option. I think
it is regrettable because in my opinion it is both politically unwise
and inconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution. It is
unwise because the President will have assumed complete responsibility
for the outcome. If the operation is successful, then he will receive
the credit whether the Congress gave its approval or not. But if it is
unsuccessful, if things go awry, if U.S. forces get bogged down in a
long-term engagement in Haiti, the President will not have had the
benefit of sharing the burden of responsibility with a Congress that
had voted its prior approval of the operation. Instead, Members of
Congress, including those of his own party I might add, will quickly
turn on him. They will recount the many analyses that have been done
that warned an invasion will make a very bad situation worse, and
bemoan the administration's naivete, perhaps even its arrogance.
Such second guessing would not be possible for Members of Congress
who, forced to vote, had cast their lot with the President.
Beside being bad politics, invading without congressional
authorization is also contrary to the Constitution. While the President
is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Constitution
reserves unto Congress the power to declare war.
I wanted to take the floor this afternoon to make these points
because I made the same arguments to President Bush when he was
contemplating the very initial stages of conducting warfare in the
Persian Gulf, Operation Desert Storm. I, along with a number of my
colleagues, went to the White House on several occasions with many
Members, and I stood up and expressed my opinion. I said:
Mr. President, you must come to Congress to get authority.
If you disagree that the Constitution requires you to do so,
set that aside for a moment. I think it is clear that the
Constitution requires you to, but set that aside. If you do
not have us on record before the bullets start flying, the
blood starts flowing, the bodies start dropping, and the body
bags come home and are received at Andrews or Dover, if you
do not have us on record before that happens, then surely you
can count on one thing: We will be in full flight chasing
public opinion which will be racing in the complete opposite
direction of your policy. You must put us on record. You must
have us as your advocates. You must force us to share the
responsibility. Otherwise, you are out there all alone with
little support, and we guarantee you even that support will
evaporate if things go awry.
Mr. President, at that time there were some very important Members of
Congress in the Senate and in the House who stated that President Bush
had an absolute obligation to come before the Senate and the House. My
colleague from Maine, my good friend, the majority leader, said the
following:
Mr. President, for two centuries Americans have debated the
relative powers of the President and Congress. Often this has
been an abstract argument. But today the debate is real.
The men who wrote the Constitution had as a central purpose
the prevention of tyranny in America. They had lived under a
British king. They did not want there ever to be an American
king. They were brilliantly successful. In our history there
have been 41 Presidents and no kings.
Well, now there are 42 Presidents, and hopefully no kings. My
colleague from Maine said:
President Bush was not required to seek the approval of
Congress to order (the deployment of forces to the Persian
Gulf area), and he did not do so. But if he now decides to
use those forces in what would plainly be war, he is legally
obligated to seek the prior approval of Congress.
I think Senator Mitchell was absolutely correct at that time. The
same arguments obtain to President Clinton.
Senator Biden is also someone I have a great deal of confidence in as
a leading voice on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as chairman
of the Judiciary Committee. He said the following:
Yet President Bush has claimed that his power as Commander
in Chief gives him the authority, acting alone, to start a
war. His Secretary of Defense has said, ``We do not believe
the President requires any additional authorization from the
Congress for committing U.S. forces to achieve our objective
in the gulf.'' His Secretary of State has said, ``The
President has the right, as a matter of practice and
principle, to initiate military action.'' To put it simply,
these views are at odds with the Constitution. They may
accurately describe the power of leaders of other countries,
but they do not describe the power of the President of the
United States.
Senator Biden went on to say:
Finally, we have been told that the congressional debate on
war could tie the President's hands or limit his discretion.
To this charge, I have one simple response--exactly right.
Americans once lived under a system where one man had
unfettered choice to decide by himself whether we could go to
war or not go to war, and we launched a revolution to free
ourselves from the tyranny of such a system.
Senator Kennedy also spoke passionately and vigorously on the Persian
Gulf war. He said:
What is clear is that President Bush has not the right to
go to war on his own. Article II of the Constitution makes
the President the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, but
Article I gives Congress, and only Congress, the power to
declare war.
During that debate, Senator Kennedy offered a letter that was signed
by 241 of the Nation's most distinguished law professors. And, in sum,
they said, ``The Constitution thus requires the President meaningfully
to consult with Congress and receive its affirmative authorization
before engaging in acts of war.''
I could at some length quote other more extensive statements by these
individuals and many of our colleagues. But I think it is unnecessary
to do so at this time.
Some are going to argue that the impending invasion of Haiti is
something other than war and therefore this provision of the
Constitution really does not apply. Our Ambassador to the United
Nations argues that this would be a ``police action,'' not a war. I
wonder whether those young men who are now poised to go into Haiti
think that is simply a police action with two aircraft carriers sailing
off the coast.
Officials of the Justice Department argue that it would not be ``a
major military action,'' and therefore Congress has no right or duty to
demand a say. That is our Justice Department. It is not a major
military act of war, only a minor one, therefore Congress has no role.
Mr. President, this really raises the question of who is to determine
whether a premeditated offensive military intervention is a war or
something else--a war, police action, conflict? The clear implication
of Ambassador Albright's and the Justice Department's argument is that
only the President can make such a determination; only the President
can decide what is a war, what is a conflict, what is a police action,
or what is a minor war.
Well, that is an interesting argument. I would refer my colleagues to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's 1990 decision,
Dellums versus Bush, a lawsuit filed by our House colleagues. I believe
there were some 53 of them who joined in that particular court action.
But let me just repeat a part of what the court had to say:
If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any
particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast,
does not constitute warmaking but only an offensive military
attack, the Congressional power to declare war will be at the
mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive. Such an
``interpretation'' would evade the plain language of the
Constitution, and it cannot stand.
So no matter what euphemisms are employed, the simple fact is that we
are about to wage war. We are about to engage in an act of war.
The Senator from Connecticut has made a passionate plea that it is
justified under concerns about the rape, pillage, torture, and the
horrendous abuses of human rights not too far from our shores, and that
is one argument to be made. But I do not think it is a controlling one,
because if you apply that logic, we can apply it also to Cuba, where we
also have outrageous abuses of human rights and torture, a country also
flooding our shores with people trying to flee that dictatorship.
We are also going to hear from the Justice Department and others the
argument that this is no different than interventions in Grenada or
Panama, which were not authorized in advance by Congress. And the
implication is that if you ignore the Constitution on one occasion, or
two, that gives you license to ignore it on each and every following
occasion.
I think we can draw some distinctions between the case of Haiti and
that of Panama and Grenada. There was a sense of urgency, an emergency,
certainly, with respect to Grenada, prompted by the killing of Maurice
Bishop and the resulting unstable situation. I think prompt action was
required, and obtaining congressional authorization would have been
impractical under those situations, especially without raising the
already high risk to the Americans who were in Grenada. In contrast,
the Clinton administration has been publicly threatening to invade
Haiti for months. There is no great urgency that would preclude a
congressional debate and a congressional vote.
In both Grenada and Panama, the primary objective was to protect the
American citizens in those countries. In Grenada, the Americans were
believed to be endangered by an unstable situation, while in Panama,
Americans were already the target of assault and murder. In contrast,
the executive branch's own assessments do not indicate any untoward
threats to American citizens. The greater danger to Americans in Haiti
may be in the form of an American invasion in Haiti.
The United States also had some strong national security interests
that justified our military intervention there, quite unlike the case
of Haiti. I think having such strong interests does not waive the
requirement for congressional approval for military intervention, but
it helps to explain better the context and the rationale behind
President Bush's decision.
Finally, Grenada and Panama were quick operations, which few analysts
believe will be the case in Haiti. The fighting in Grenada lasted only
about 8 days, and all of the troops were withdrawn after 7 weeks. The
fighting in Panama lasted about 4 days, with all of the forces
withdrawn after 8 weeks. In contrast, most analysts estimate that after
a few days of fighting to overcome whatever organized resistance there
might be in Haiti, the United States troops would be required to remain
for well over a year, possibly as long as a decade.
Based on these factors, the invasion of Haiti more closely resembles
the gulf war against Iraq than the invasions of Grenada and Panama. It
is not an emergency. It is being pursued for foreign policy objectives,
not to rescue Americans whose lives are in danger. After a quick period
of hostilities, there will be a years-long deployment in order to
maintain order and support for the local people we might favor. Like in
the war against Iraq, congressional authorization is clearly required.
None of the credible or even usual arguments for unilateral
Presidential employment of military force exists in the case of Haiti--
not one. It is not an emergency. It is being pursued for foreign policy
objectives, not to rescue Americans. And we can expect a short period
of hostilities followed by a long commitment on our part. It requires
congressional authorization.
Another argument we hear is that the United Nations has given its
approval to an invasion, so congressional authorization is not
required. I saw that in today's Washington Post by one of the leading
political scientists/constitutional authorities. Well, the Senate has
rendered its view on that question. Last month, by a vote of 100 to 0,
the Senate categorically rejected the notion that the United Nations
resolution satisfies the requirements of the Constitution or the War
Powers Act. So I hope we will not hear any of that argument made in
this Chamber, that now that the United Nations has acted, Congress no
longer is required to act.
I want to bring to my colleagues' attention an article by the
syndicated columnist, Samuel Francis in which he asks:
What is wrong with the following sentence: ``The Security
Council authorized the United States today to lead a
multinational invasion to drive out the military rulers of
Haiti and restore exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to
power''?
Then he goes on to answer his own question:
If you don't know what's wrong with that, the lead sentence
of the Washington Post's lead story (on August 1), maybe
another sentence will give you a clue: ``The Congress shall
have power * * * to declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and
water * * *.''
Sentence number two, as it happens, comes not from the
Washington Post morning edition, but out of something the
people once thought was a rather more enduring document--the
Constitution of the United States. And now, thanks in part to
the Clinton administration, we know it was not so enduring
after all.
Of all the powers that characterize the sovereignty of a
nation, the power to make war is the most basic.
Let me paraphrase the remainder because some of this is acerbic: But
those in the administration seem to have spent much of their weekend
making certain it was the United Nations and not the U.S. Congress that
exercised this power.
Mr. President, the reason the Framers put the power to decide whether
to go to war in the hands of Congress was to ensure that one person
could not put American lives and treasure at risk for spurious reasons.
The case of Haiti, in my judgment, highlights the wisdom of the
Constitution's allocation of power.
The administration's argument for intervening, when you strip off all
the varnish, comes down to this: Our credibility is now on the line.
Our credibility is on the line. There are abuses taking place down
there that is a subversion of democracy. They are close to our shores,
and our credibility is now on the line. We have been beating the drum
so loudly, if we do not act now, nobody will ever take us seriously.
That seems to be the driving force behind this impetus now to go to
war. There is something to be said for the argument about taking us
seriously, that credibility is something that we should treasure.
Unfortunately, the administration has painted itself into a corner by
its own action. Let me respectfully suggest that the administration's
credibility will be little enhanced by sending the most powerful
military in the world to invade the most impoverished country in the
Western Hemisphere.
In my view, if the administration feels the need to demonstrate its
credibility and its willingness to use force, perhaps it should do so
in a venue in which American national interest are genuinely at stake,
such as in North Korea. There we have real national security interests.
Putting the Congress at the center of the decision to go to war was
intended precisely to ensure that we would go to war only when the
representatives of the people were persuaded that our interests
justified the costs and the chances of success were sufficient to
justify the risks. That is what Senator Biden was saying during the
debate before the Persian Gulf war, and he was right. We do not want
this President, or any other President, to have a totally free hand to
send our sons and daughters into war without consultations and without
authorization. On an emergency, yes; to protect American lives, on an
emergency basis, yes. To rescue another country's democratically
elected president--not without authorization from us.
Mr. President, the events of the past year have demonstrated the
practical wisdom of not leaving such assessments to the President and
his advisers. It was just 11 months ago that President Clinton ordered
the U.S.S. Harlan County to set sail toward Haiti with 200 lightly
armed troops. And he did so even though the Departments of Defense and
State could not agree on the mission they would perform or how they
would respond to resistance. He did so even though the intelligence
community warned that there would be resistance. The President's
principal advisor on Haiti at that time dismissed the concerns
expressed by Members of Congress by declaring:
Suddenly Chicken Little says the sky is falling, but there
is no problem of major proportion. Somebody's making it sound
very dramatic. These are all minor issues. We're moving on
course.
Mr. President, indeed, they moved on course until the Harlan County
reached the docks of Port-au-Prince and found a rock-throwing rabble on
the docks, and the President of the United States ordered our troops to
turn around and return to the United States.
Now, as we approach the first anniversary of this event, the
President once again is about to order troops to go to Haiti.
The administration seems to be saying that if the Congress would only
remain silent and play along, the military leadership in Haiti will be
intimidated enough to flee on its own and our invasion force will face
no opposition.
Mr. President, that may be one of the calculations involved. The
calculation may be that the administration decided that if they put two
aircraft carriers off the coast of Haiti, threaten to put in 20,000 or
25,000 troops, heavily armed tanks, sophisticated weaponry, those thugs
who now govern and control that small, tortured country will simply
take flight.
I hope that is the case. I hope that is the case. But if that is part
of the game plan, it has never been conveyed to us. To my knowledge,
there has been no consultation of what the administration intends, not
even with a select group of leaders. I am not even suggesting that they
have to talk to the entire Congress. But to my knowledge, genuine
consultations have been held with not even the big eight, not the
Senate majority and minority leaders, not the House leaders, not the
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee leaders, not the Armed
Services Committees leaders, not the Intelligence Committee leaders.
To my knowledge, there has been no such consultation, no conveyance
of what are the original intent or plans or options they might have in
mind.
Mr. President, a decade ago, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
set forth a list of criteria to help us decide when military force can
be used effectively and when it cannot. In his speech, he said:
Some theorists argue that military force can be brought to
bear at any crisis. Some of these proponents of force are
eager to advocate its use in even limited amounts simply
because they believe if there are American forces of any size
present they will somehow solve the problem.
Somehow, U.S. military forces will ``restore democracy'' to a country
that, while it has had a free election, has never known democracy.
I doubt it, Mr. President, I seriously doubt it.
Mr. President, I inquire how much time I have remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, last year, Air Force magazine warned about
the administration's attitude toward the use of military force--and I
am quoting:
These people are not dealing in abstract concepts. They are
tinkering with deadly force. If their notions become policy,
we may learn all over again that it is much easier to get
into a fight than it is to get out of one.
I think it is worth remembering that we slid into the Vietnam
quagmire not because of a lack of intelligence but an excess of
arrogance--arrogance regarding America's ability to impose its will,
even where our interests were limited; and arrogance regarding the
Executive's primacy over the Congress.
Arrogance and power is a dangerous brew. We must resist the
temptation to drink this hemlock masquerading as the nectar of the
gods.
Mr. President, let me associate myself with something that the
Senator from Connecticut has said. I agree with him completely that
suggestions that President Clinton has some ulterior motive, that
somehow he is seeking to gain a bounce in popularity, is cynical beyond
words. I do not think it is true.
I think the President of the United States is convinced that he has
to go to war to restore democracy in Haiti. He believes it is in our
national security interests to do so.
I disagree with that assessment, but I believe he is sincere in that
conviction of his own.
But what I am respectfully suggesting is whether one challenges the
motives of the President, which I think is uncalled for, whether one is
convinced he is acting out of the most sincere motivations, ultimately
the debate that has to take place must occur right in this Chamber and
in the House of Representatives.
This President, I believe, will make a mistake in going forward
without our expressed endorsement. As I indicated before, he may get a
temporary success out of this invasion. We, I think, could be expected
to overcome any significant force within a matter of a few days at
most. But that is only the beginning of the problem.
Then it is maintaining order until stability is restored. Then it is
maintaining a presence until the institutions of democracy are built
and sustained. Then it is part of another peacekeeping operation for
months and perhaps longer, maybe years.
Mr. President, this President and no President can engage our forces
for that kind of a long-term commitment without us playing a coequal
role.
That is the key part of this debate. We can differ as the Senator
from Connecticut and I may differ on the wisdom of it. But,
nonetheless, the only recourse that the President should have in this
circumstance is to turn to us.
If we reject the President, so be it. We have expressed the will of
the American people not to put our sons' and daughters' lives on the
line, put them in jeopardy, however few they may be.
But you can also anticipate that any kind of a military operation is
going to involve risk, that some people will die, some people will die.
We ordinarily would then be called upon to justify to their parents why
it was important, why it was imperative that we spilled their sons' and
daughters' blood in order to save the lives and a standard of well-
being for another nation.
That burden the President has to carry, not just over a public
address over television one night, he has the burden to come here and
persuade us. I believe if he can make the case, he may be able to
change people's minds on this matter.
Perhaps he will be able to be as persuasive as the Senator from
Connecticut has been passionate. But if he cannot persuade us, then
there is no reason he should go in. And if he ignores what we are
saying and suffers a great foreign policy misadventure, I believe it
will inflict mortal damage to his Presidency. That is something I do
not want to see. I do not want to see the President embarrassed by a
resolution. I do not want to see him embarrassed by a failure, and I do
not want to see his Presidency undermined by his going forward without
congressional approval and then facing the consequences standing by
himself.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, we have no one prepared to speak at this
point on this side. I will be glad to yield from the other side's time
a half hour, or whatever time the Senator from Indiana wishes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What amount of time does the Senator from
Indiana seek?
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I would like to yield myself 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized for 15
minutes.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I sat through what I thought was the
unfortunate procedural debate that took place just a couple hours ago
in this Chamber.
It is clear that there are a number of us who believe the press
reports and the administration's own comments that an invasion of Haiti
is imminent. Spokesmen for the administration have said that there are
no other options, all other recourses to solve the problem in Haiti,
all those recourses have been tried and failed, and, therefore, the
only option left is an invasion.
Many of us do not accept that argument, do not believe that argument,
do not think that is true. And we have been pressing for a debate on
the issue with an expression of the Senate's will before such an
invasion takes place.
This is, in a last desperate hope of sending a signal to the
President and to the administration that they are following a misguided
and wrong course of action, an attempt to send a signal that the
Senate, in a bipartisan way, does not believe that an invasion should
take place, in hopes that the administration would change its mind,
would step back and try to come to a different conclusion, and would
perhaps be willing to once again examine some other options.
The reason we are concerned about an invasion is that we do not
believe a case has been made to the American people nor a case made to
their elected representatives, either the U.S. Senate or the House of
Representatives, by the President or this administration, for an
invasion, an imposition of a so-called democratic regime under Mr.
Aristide; an imposition that can only be made by force--gunboat
liberalism, in a sense, of building a new democracy where no democracy
exists or has existed for a long, long time.
It is clear that the leadership was not anxious to move to a vote on
this matter, probably because they did not have the votes to prevail
and it would be difficult for the administration to accept, perhaps at
a time when the invasion is imminent; an expression of disapproval, not
only from Republicans in the Senate but probably from a number of
Democrats, judging from statements that have been made on this floor in
just the last few days and other statements that have been made public
by a number of Democrats and Democrat leaders.
Senator McCain has all week been looking for an opportunity to offer
an amendment or a sense-of-the-Senate resolution or some vehicle by
which this Senate could express its will on this matter, for several
reasons.
One, because we have a constitutional obligation to advise the
President of the United States, provide consent to his actions, because
we believe the Constitution requires a congressional authorization
before the United States sends its young men and women into war. We
understand that there is a decades-long dispute over whether or not the
President has authority to do this as Commander in Chief without the
consent of or the authorization of the Congress. Constitutional
scholars have argued this for some time. Clearly, in cases of
emergency; clearly, in cases where the national security of the United
States is in peril and time does not warrant or allow for congressional
deliberation and debate; clearly, in situations like that, the
President, as Commander in Chief, has not only the right but the
obligation to commit U.S. forces.
But that is clearly not the case in the situation that we face today.
We have been discussing this for months. The administration has been
engaged in a public relations campaign to lay the groundwork for an
invasion. We read about it in the papers every day and watch it on
television, and we have been talking about it now for weeks. We watch
as the forces are being assembled and the ships sailing.
So there was plenty of time to consult with the Congress, had the
administration wanted to consult with the Congress. It clearly does not
want to consult with the Congress. And they do not want to consult with
the Congress because they are certain that Congress is not going to
accept their position on this issue, and they do not want an
embarrassing defeat.
They have had time to consult with the United Nations. They have had
time to consult with the leaders of the countries that some Americans
have never even heard of that are now joining us, or supposedly joining
us, in this effort with this invasion. But they have not had time to
consult with the Congress.
I serve on the Armed Services Committee. We have not been briefed by
any member of this administration on what the plans are or
justification for this invasion. My understanding is that, just
yesterday, the chairman and ranking member met with the Secretary of
Defense. I do not know what was discussed. I do not know if you could
classify that as consultation or not. But it is, I believe, an
objective, fair statement to say that most Members of the U.S. Senate
have not been consulted at all.
With the actions taken by the Senate leadership and Senator Mitchell
today, a vote on this matter has been precluded until, at earliest,
next week. If an invasion takes place before that time, the
administration will then have acted without congressional
authorization. And perhaps that is the intent. I do not know when the
invasion is supposed to occur.
But it is clear that the administration and the Democrat leadership
in this Senate did not want a debate and vote on this matter this week.
They did not want that to precede the President addressing the Nation
tomorrow, and perhaps an invasion shortly thereafter.
Procedurally, they have placed us in a position where we will not
have that vote. We are able to debate it here to an empty Chamber,
virtually, at a time when the Senate will be shortly in adjournment,
with no opportunity tomorrow or Friday to come back and seek a vote on
this matter.
And so Senator McCain has been procedurally boxed out. He saw an
opportunity, he seized the opportunity, and we thought for a moment
there might be an opportunity for the Senate to express its will and
the will of the people, as we represent those people and best
understand what their wishes are.
The polls show 73 percent oppose this invasion. I think it is much
higher than that. The expressions that I have received from the people
I represent in Indiana certainly are higher than 73 percent. I cannot
find the 27 percent that support an invasion of Haiti.
So the case has not been made. And we know from history, we know from
experience, that unless the American people support an action involving
sending our young men and women into combat and putting their lives at
risk, that that is ultimately not going to succeed.
The President, for, I believe, constitutional reasons, but also for
policy reasons and political reasons, ought to be seeking the support
of the American people and the Congress first before he reaches a
conclusion on whether or not to invade Haiti. Or he at least ought to
make a strong case. And that has not been done, either.
It is only in just the last few days that any attempt at defining a
justification for an invasion of Haiti has been made.
Today's New York Times, September 14, has this headline: ``Democrats
Hope to Avoid an Embarrassing Vote on Haiti.''
A spokesman for the Democrat leadership said a vote in the
House probably could not be escaped early next week. What the
White House and Democratic leaders want to avoid is a clear
vote on whether to authorize the President to order an
invasion. As matters stand now, Mr. Clinton would lose such a
vote by a wide margin.
That is a report from the New York Times.
So it is no secret as to why the majority leader went to such
extraordinary lengths to preclude the Senate from coming to a vote.
They did not want to lose that vote and now procedurally we are
precluded from coming to that vote.
Mr. President, I have a friend I have known for a long time.
Obviously, you do not base conclusions on foreign policy on the basis
of one individual's opinions. But this is a friend who has lived in
Haiti for 35 years. He is not a businessman. And, as he states in his
letter, he has nothing to gain financially either way on this decision
by the United States.
But I would like to quote from a letter he wrote me recently, because
I think he makes the case as to why an invasion is not in the best
interests of the United States and why it is a false conclusion to
authorize an invasion.
He writes:
Dear Dan: Thank you for lending your support to a non-
invasion of Haiti. I recall you speaking on the floor and
saying, ``why are we doing this?'' Indeed, why? I believe
that question is at the core of everything. No one seems to
know the justifiable cause behind the invasion ehetoric. I am
very much aware of the surface reasons as supplied by the
White House, Aristide's lawyers and lobbyists, Madeleine
Albright, liberal senators and the media. But they all wither
away under close scrutiny as having no substance.
The emerging middle class, once identified by small
industrial ventures, and providing jobs for tens of
thousands, is finished. This was to have been the foundation
upon which democracy would be built in time, as a process,
not legislated by Washington, the lobbyists and the
international community. These were young Haitian
businessmen, Haiti's new blood, the majority of whom studied
in the States and returned with democratic ideals. Their
dreams were shattered when Aristide exercised his dictatorial
powers and promoted a non-democratic environment. Knowing
Aristide's intentions was one thing. Clinton pursuing and
supporting this same policy and insisting on a return to
``democratic'' rule is quite another thing.
He goes on to say that--it is not ironic that someone who knows Haiti
far better than I concludes that it was Mr. Aristide's policies that
denied and suppressed the democratic movement in Haiti and now we are
attempting through force to insert Mr. Aristide back into power, the
very person who by many Haitians is perceived to be the one who is
denying the democratic process.
My friend goes on to say:
These young businessmen, many of whom are my friends, are
the first ones to say there was no democracy under Aristide.
They don't blame the military, General Cedras in particular,
for the present chaotic situation, they rightfully put the
blame at the feet of President Clinton and Aristide.
An invasion of Haiti by Clinton led forces would be a
disaster. Haiti, a peaceful country, is at war with no one.
There is no civil war. Haiti is not a threat to this
hemisphere in general, and to the United States in
particular. The U.S. interests in Haiti are the refugees. The
solution is quite simple. The embargo and sanctions must be
lifted. Air travel must be restored. People are not fleeing
military and political repression, rape and violations of
human rights. They are fleeing a devastating economic
situation created by the embargo. It's a self-perpetuating
thing. Clinton's policy is fomenting the very thing he wants
to avoid.
An invasion is no substitute for a policy that's broken or
as a face saving measure. Thanks for listening.
I doubt that 1 American in 100 if not 1 in 1,000 can explain what the
justification is for an invasion of Haiti. Mr. Aristide is not the kind
of individual the United States should be putting its credibility
behind and installing by force into a nation which does not want him
back and which does not believe he can lead that country to democracy.
We are committing 20,000 or more young American men and women in
uniform. We are putting them at risk of life and limb. And we are doing
so for at most a dubious purpose.
Those of us who were here during the Persian Gulf war participated in
the process of understanding the basis and justification for U.S. use
of force in the Persian Gulf. That was authorized by this Congress, it
was to the President's benefit to have that authorization. This has not
been authorized by the Congress nor understood by the American people.
And I think it is a tragic mistake that the President is about to
embark on.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). The Senator has yielded himself 15
minutes. Does he yield himself further time?
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, it is my understanding I was next on our
side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from
Oklahoma that the agreement is to alternate from side to side. But the
Chair notes there is no Democrat seeking recognition and it has been
the procedure this afternoon that, if one side does not have somebody
seeking recognition, the other side just takes another turn. How much
time did the Senator from Oklahoma wish to yield himself?
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield myself 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from Indiana
for an outstanding speech. I hope my colleagues, and I hope the
American people, had a chance to listen to it. I also wish to
compliment our colleague, Senator McCain, from Arizona, for his sense-
of-the-Senate resolution and for his ability to get it at least entered
into the debate.
I noted earlier in the debate today that Senator Mitchell said this
could have been offered earlier. Frankly, the bill that we had before
us earlier was the Department of Defense conference report, which was
not amendable; it could not have been amended. So I just mention that.
Many of us have stated time and time again we wanted to debate this
issue. It has been reported--I know Senator Mitchell mentioned, we
voted on seven resolutions dealing with Haiti. I would call those to
the attention of this body. Four of those resolutions passed
overwhelmingly. All of those were sense-of-the-Senate or sense-of-the-
Congress resolutions basically telling the President of the United
States, ``Do not invade Haiti.'' Granted they had some caveats and they
had some exceptions. I know this one which Senator Mitchell has
introduced as a second-degree amendment to Senator McCain's amendment
gives the President an out. He said it is a sense of the Senate that
limitation in this amendment should not apply if the President reports
in advance to Congress that the intended deployment of United States
forces into Haiti is justified by United States national security
interests.
Evidently, this President feels that he can define that very broadly.
As a matter of fact, in a news conference with the Indian Prime
Minister on May 19, he gave six instances where our national interests
are involved--six justifications for invasion of Haiti; five are: Haiti
is in our backyard, the United States has a million Haitian Americans,
there are several thousand Americans in Haiti, drugs are coming through
Haiti to the United States, and the United States faces continuous
possibility of a massive flow of Haitian migrants to the United States.
Mr. President, all five of those are not justifications. Not one of
those is justification to risk thousands and thousands of American
lives on invading Haiti--not one. You can go through the list:
It is in our backyard. There are other countries in our backyard.
That does not mean it poses a national security threat to the United
States.
The United States has a million Haitian Americans. Well, we have
millions of Mexican-Americans. There is no reason or justification of
an invasion for that reason.
Several thousand Americans are in Haiti. Their lives are not in
jeopardy. This invasion or potential invasion jeopardizes their lives.
Certainly, the administration's action jeopardizes their lives more
than anything from the past.
Drugs are coming through Haiti to the United States. It just so
happens that happens in Bermuda, it happens in the Bahamas, it happens
in Mexico. Are we going to invade those countries as well? Actually, I
think the amount of drugs coming through Haiti is less than from most
of those countries. Again, this is no justification whatsoever for
invading.
The United States faces the possibility of a massive flow of Haitian
migrants to the United States--only because of this administration's
policies where they have been clamping down the economic vice that is
really not hurting the military in Haiti. It is hurting the Haitian
people.
And then this administration's vacillating policy of how they will
handle the migrants. Are we going to accept them in? Are we going to
handle their cases on ships? Are we going to allow them to stay in the
country? Are we going to return them? Where is the safe harbor going to
be? The administration's statements during the campaign; their change
of those statements and change in policy because Randall Robinson went
on a hunger strike--all of this vacillation has greatly increased the
desire of a lot of people in Haiti to come to the United States. But
those are by the administration's own actions and none of which would
justify military invasion of Haiti.
The real point is, I hear time and time again, the sixth
justification is we want to restore democracy to Haiti. I just
will read a comment from a Wall Street Journal article dated June 16,
entitled ``From Port-au-Prince to Gucci Gulch.'' I will just read the
first couple of paragraphs of this article by Christopher Caldwell.
President Clinton appears to be seriously considering using
U.S. troops to return exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to power. Taken on their face, the stated reasons
for his pro-Aristide policy--stemming the flow of refugees
and drugs and improving human rights--are absurd. The refugee
flow is due to U.S. economic sanctions; Haiti's role in drug
shipments is dwarfed by its neighbors; and Mr. Aristide
flagrantly violated human rights during his brief reign.
The administration policy amounts to blind subservience to
Mr. Aristide's agenda. It's a warning of what can happen when
virtually the entire budget of a sovereign nation is funneled
into a massive Washington lobbying and public relations
campaign.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this entire article be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1994]
From Port-au-Prince to Gucci Gulch
(By Christopher Caldwell)
President Clinton appears to be seriously considering using
U.S. troops to return exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to power. Taken on their face, the stated reasons
for his pro-Aristide policy--stemming the flow of refugees
and drugs and improving human rights--are absurd. The refugee
flow is due to U.S. economic sanctions; Haiti's role in drug
shipments is dwarfed by its neighbors; and Mr. Aristide
flagrantly violated human rights during his brief reign.
The administration policy amounts to blind subservience to
Mr. Aristide's agenda. It's a warning of what can happen when
virtually the entire budget of a sovereign nation is funneled
into a massive Washington lobbying and public relations
campaign.
After the September 1991 coup that ousted Mr. Aristide,
President Bush issued an executive order that Haitian
government funds frozen in the U.S. be delivered to Mr.
Aristide. While the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have
imposed no oversight requirements, the rough amounts of the
money Mr. Aristide can tap are known. According to State and
Treasury sources, the funds contain upwards of $50 million,
and Mr. Aristide's forces have spent more than $30 million so
far. Disbursals from the U.S. Treasury started at $500,000 a
month and have risen steadily, to their current point of $5.6
million to $5.9 million per quarter.
What is happening to all that money is unclear: During the
brief premiership of Robert Malval last autumn, the U.S.-
based newspaper Haiti Observateur was leaked a copy of the
Aristide government's fourth-quarter budget for 1993, which
showed $740,000 per month budgeted for Mr. Malval's
ministerial cabinet. The scrupulous Mr. Malval, who was a
major Aristide supporter, claims he never received a penny.
That $2.2 million has never been accounted for.
The democratically elected Haitian Chamber of Deputies in
April asked Secretary of State Warren Christopher for a
thorough accounting of Mr. Aristide's expenditures. The
request has not even been acknowledged. While it's true that
Mr. Aristide is spending Haitian, not U.S. funds, his
finances should be of concern to U.S. taxpayers. The handover
of Haitian assets to Mr. Aristide violates the Haitian
constitution and possibly international law. ``When this is
all over,'' says one American consultant to Haitian
interests, ``the Haitians are going to sue us for the money
Aristide has spent, and we're going to have to pay it all
back.''
Since his arrival in the U.S., Mr. Aristide has used those
funds for a public relations blitz. Miami attorney Ira
Kurzban gets a six-figure salary as Mr. Aristide's lawyer.
Another lawyer, Haitian-American Mildred Trouillot, is paid
$6,000 a month, plus rent, expenses and office space. Mr.
Aristide also engaged the services of Rabinowitz, Boudin,
Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman to defend him against a $10
million suit filed in Brooklyn by the widow of Roger
Lafontant, a Haitian coup leader slain in prison in 1991,
allegedly by Aristide supporters. The law firm was paid tens
of thousands of dollars out of the Haitian treasury before
the suit was finally thrown out.
Mr. Aristide's PR is coordinated by the firm of McKinney &
McDowell, which charges $175-per-hour for its services.
However, the Aristide budget printed by the Haiti Observateur
has no money earmarked for public relations. That led the
newspaper's editor, Raymond Joseph, to speculate that the
Aristide government has been fabricating its outlays to dupe
the U.S. into releasing frozen funds.
But Mr. Aristide's most effective representative in the
U.S. has been former Rep. Michael Barnes (D., Md.). As
chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee in the
1980s, Mr. Barnes was among the most outspoken leaders of the
congressional effort to thwart supply of the Nicaraguan
Contras. Today, Mr. Barnes is all for U.S. intervention--in
Haiti.
Mr. Barnes has used his connections to give the Aristide
government a beachhead inside U.S. foreign policy, and earn
his current firm, Hogan & Hartson, compensation that started
at $55,000 a month. (In March, perhaps reacting to the
Aristide government's straitened circumstances, the firm cut
its retainer in half.) Mr. Barnes has claimed to charge Mr.
Aristide half his going rate, but that still adds up to big
money: $303,237.60 for billings between Sept. 29 and Dec. 7,
1993, to take the last period for which records are
available. (Mr. Barnes did not return repeated calls seeking
comment.)
According to an Aristide source, when associates of the
exiled president expressed unhappiness with Mr. Barnes' work
in late 1992, Mr. Barnes was able to play his trump card--his
access to the incoming administration. He had run the Clinton
campaign in Maryland. What's more, deputy national security
adviser Samuel R. ``Sandy'' Berger, who is in charge of Haiti
policy at the National Security Council, is by all
accounts a close friend of Mr. Barnes. Just four months
after Mr. Berger left his partnership at Hogan & Hartson
to take up his administration post, Mr. Barnes pulled up
stakes at Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn and took his
account to Hogan & Hartson. This potentially brings
millions into a firm that Mr. Berger will have every right
to rejoin after his White House stint.
Dealing with Haiti at all may have become a serious ethical
violation on Mr. Berger's part. The issue was first broached
by Rep. Frank Wolf (R., Va.), after an article in the
National Journal raised questions about Mr Berger's
negotiating most-favored-nation status for China after having
lobbied for Payless Shoes, a major Chinese trading partner.
Then-White House counsel Bernard Nussbaum found no conflict.
Nonetheless, he said in a May 12, 1993, letter, Mr. Berger
``has a `covered relationship' with Hogan & Hartson for a
year after severing his relationship with that firm, and [we]
would be required to undertake the same inquiry if Hogan &
Hartson represented a party in a particular matter.''
Five days after the letter was written, Michael Barnes
brought the Haiti account to Hogan & Hartson. Since Mr.
Berger's ``covered'' status with Hogan & Hartson didn't
expire until Jan. 19, 1994, an inquiry should have been
opened into his Haiti role, and Mr. Berger should have
recused himself from Haiti policy until his covered period
expired. It is unlikely that any such inquiry was ever
launched, for by Nov. 14, 1994, the Washington Post was
describing Mr. Berger as the ``principal driver of the U.S.
policy of supporting Aristide's return.''
According to Justice Department records, Hogan & Hartson
had direct phone contact with Mr. Berger during this period
to discuss the ``restoration of democratically elected
government in Haiti.'' (White House counsel Lloyd Cutler
later wrote me that Mr. Berger did consult both the White
House counsel and the NSC's legal adviser, and that both
approved his participation.)
All of these questionable dealings should, at the very
least, give Americans pause as President Clinton continues
his campaign to return Mr. Aristide to power.
Mr. NICKLES. But, Mr. President, there are another couple of
paragraphs that talk about a former Member of the House, Mr. Barnes,
Michael Barnes, and his public relations firm Hogan & Hartson, was
given compensation which started at $55,000 a month. They received over
$303,000 for billings between September 29 and December 7, 1993.
Mr. President, that is hundreds of thousands of dollars of PR money
that Mr. Aristide's group is paying for Mr. Barnes and, I guess, his
access to this administration. And now this administration is taking
the total case of restoring Mr. Aristide to power.
I think we have to look at why are we doing that, and why Mr.
Aristide gets all this money from funds that were locked up for Haiti,
how in the world can they afford to pay that kind of money, and then
why would we be following that kind of agenda--and who is Mr.
Aristide--for all the purported reasons that the President mentioned on
May 19, our reasons for going into Haiti, none of which justify an
invasion.
Our national security interests are not at stake, are not in
jeopardy. Lives are not threatened. Yet we are going to be threatening
the lives of countless U.S. soldiers, and I say U.S. soldiers. It is
not a U.N. force, it is a U.S. force. Those are United States men and
women who will be on the ships, who will be invading Haiti, who will be
risking their lives. For what? To restore Mr. Aristide to power. Is he
an Abraham Lincoln, a George Washington of Haiti? Is this the real
democrat, the savior? I do not think so.
I am looking at a Washington Post article dated January 24, 1993. It
says:
Haiti Suspect Savior: Why President Aristide's Return From
Exile May Not Be Good News.
I do not think it is good news, but yet this administration has made
their entire foreign policy on Haiti the restoration of Mr. Aristide as
President of Haiti. We hear some people say, ``Well, he was elected.''
Well, so was his predecessor. His predecessor, ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier,
was elected; we did not have our foreign policy to keep him in power at
all costs, but he was elected. Mr. Milosevic of Serbia was elected. He
is a tyrant, but is it our foreign policy to put him back into power--
he is already in power--but to keep him there? No, that should not be
our policy. Hitler was elected. Mistakes happen in elections, and if
you look at some of the statements Mr. Aristide has made, I think you
would agree that maybe some mistakes were made there.
I do not find him as a true democrat in the legends of Washington or
Lincoln or Jefferson. As a matter of fact, I see some of the statements
that he has made, and it bothers me. I also note that when he was a
priest, he was expelled from the order. He was expelled. He was
defrocked because ``He is protagonist of destabilization.'' That was
back in December 1988. The church kicked him out. They did not want him
as a church leader because he was a ``protagonist of destabilization.''
I have that article, as well.
I want to allude to a couple of the statements made in this
Washington Post article. I read the Washington Post on occasion. I do
not always agree with it. I notice they made some comments on Mr.
Aristide. This is the individual we are going to be risking American
lives to reinstate in power. But he is no real democrat, as I can see:
In speeches, Aristide called on his followers to attack
freely anyone who dared disagree with him. This included even
organizations such as the labor union CATH, which had
supported Aristide's election but later criticized some of
his actions.
Aristide actually urged his followers to engage in the
hideous practice of ``necklacing''--slapping a petrol-soaked
tire around the neck of a political opponent and igniting it,
thus burning the victim alive. On September 27, 1991, shortly
before he was overthrown by the military, the former Haitian
President--
Mr. Aristide.
told a mass rally that if they could see ``a faker who
pretends to be one of our supporters * * * just grab him.
Make sure he gets what he deserves * * * with the tool you
have now in your hands [the burning tire] * * *. You have the
right tool in your hands * * * the right instrument * * *.
What a beautiful tool we have. What a nice instrument. It is
nice, it is chic, it is classy, elegant and snappy. It smells
good, and wherever you go, you want to smell it.
Mr. President, this is a statement not made 10 years ago, this is a
statement not made 20 years ago, this is a statement made in 1991, and
we are talking about trying to reinstate this person as the President
of Haiti?
I also happened to sit in on the classified briefing where many of us
heard this. I am just reading from the Washington Post right now. I
cannot believe that this administration would risk American lives to
reinstate Mr. Aristide to power. I do not know why they would do it.
But I think it is a serious mistake.
Congress has spoken seven times and, basically, has said, ``Mr.
President, don't do this.'' You can look at every one of these Senate
resolutions. We had a few that said, ``Mr. President, you can't do it;
no funds would be allowed.'' It was law, and those were not passed
because a lot of people do not want to tie the President's hands that
tightly.
Every sense-of-the-Senate resolution that says, ``Let's not invade
until you get congressional authorization''--and, granted, some of them
had caveats, unless it was an emergency or national security interest--
those passed overwhelmingly. But the President has ignored those,
totally ignored them.
So the Senator from Arizona comes up with a resolution that says,
``Wait a minute. Let's not risk the lives of any American soldiers to
reinstate Mr. Aristide.'' Senator Mitchell offers a second-degree
amendment, in other words, to wipe out the McCain amendment because he
does not want us to vote on the McCain amendment, and for good reason,
because if we have an up-or-down vote on the McCain amendment--and some
of us are going to work very diligently to see that we do--but if we
have an up-or-down vote on the McCain amendment, it is going to be
adopted. It is going to be adopted. That is the reason we are not going
to have a vote.
I know this holiday was scheduled, and I heard Senator Mitchell say,
``Well, this came up a couple of hours before.'' But it would not take
our colleagues very long--the McCain resolution is one page--it would
not take us long to determine how to vote on that. I certainly wish we
would stay here, even on this religious holiday, and vote on Friday, if
necessary, but I wish we would vote on it before we make this mistake.
I think we have to look at what we are doing. Let us say we reinstate
Mr. Aristide. What is going to happen then? He has a lot of opponents.
Not just the generals, but a lot of people have opposed him. In the
past, when he was in power, he had a lot of his opponents locked up.
Some were killed.
In the same article, I will just mention a couple more:
Aristide supporters may claim reliance on mob violence was
needed to counteract the military, but Aristide's mob also
killed other antimilitary politicians, such as Sylvio Claude,
the founder of the Democratic Christian Haitian Party--a man
who had been jailed and tortured by Duvalier but was a
political opponent of Aristide. Although Claude sought
shelter in a police station, he was turned over to the mob
and burned to death.
The Catholic Church was a central target of Aristide's more
violent supporters. Monsignor William Murphy wrote a graphic
account of events in January 1991 when, according to Murphy,
``* * * a group of thugs, supporters of newly elected
President Aristide, went on a rampage. They destroyed the old
cathedral, gutted the archbishop's house * * * and then went
on to the nunciature, the home of the Pope's representative.
There, they completely destroyed the building, attacked the
nuncio and his priest-secretary, broke both legs of the
priest and roughed up and stripped the nuncio * * * who was
saved only by the intervention of a neighbor.
And I could go on. In the same article it says:
U.S. Government officials cite extensive evidence showing
that Aristide personally gave the order to kill Roger
Lafontant, the Duvalierist who was incarcerated in the
National Penitentiary after his conviction for leading a coup
attempt in January 1991.
* * * Lafontant was killed by his jailers on the night
Aristide was overthrown.
Mr. President, this concerns me. How in the world could we risk U.S.
lives to put Mr. Aristide back in power? This is his proven track
record. And if we put him back in power, what is going to happen when
we have these types of conflicts in the future? Are we going to have to
maintain U.S. forces and police personnel to be in some type of a
policing action for not only months but years? What are we going to do
when the mobs reignite and start killing somebody? What are we going to
do if somebody tries--we are going to be engaged in a policing action
possibly for years and years.
How much will it cost? I have not heard anybody talk about the cost,
but I happen to be concerned about that, too. I know the Senator from
Arkansas hopefully is.
According to the New York Times, we already invested about $200
million in this operation to rescue Haitians fleeing the country by
boat, and it is estimated we will spend another $400-some million if we
invade. That is about $600-some million. So this is expensive.
Who is going to pay for that? Are we going to ask other Caribbean
nations to pay for that? I doubt that.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, the
Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I hope I have laid out a case that this
is a serious, serious mistake. I do not believe that the reinstatement
of Mr. Aristide into Haiti is worth the life of one --one--American
soldier. Yet, this President is willing to risk the lives of a lot of
American soldiers. And it seems to be a foregone conclusion, if you
listen to statements now by the Secretary of State and by our U.N.
representative, that this is going to happen. I heard my colleague from
Maine, Senator Cohen, say he hopes maybe they will leave under this
ominous force that is now presented before them. I hope and think that
a rightful thinking person might do that.
But I hate to think that we might lose any lives to reinstate
somebody like Mr. Aristide. I think that is a serious mistake. I do not
want to see us obligated for years again with the risk of loss of life,
with the tying up of military forces and personnel.
It is embarrassing to me to think that we have to do this, and then
also find out we even have to call up reserves, or at least it was
reported that reserves may be called up to help make this action
happen. For the invasion of Haiti?
Mr. President, I have not even touched on the constitutional
questions, but the Constitution clearly says Congress has the right and
the power and the authority to declare war, not the President of the
United States.
This is not a national security interest. This is not Panama, this is
not Grenada, and this is not the Persian Gulf.
Frankly, this is clearly a war action, when you are talking about a
couple of aircraft carriers, several combat ships, 20,000 troops, all
the U.S. troops. This is not a multinational police-keeping force. This
is the invasion of another country. This does require congressional
authorization. The President does not have it.
Not to let us even have a vote on this resolution, and a real
resolution that says that we do not favor this action, I think is a
serious mistake. Senator Mitchell says we can return to it on Monday. I
have a little sneaky suspicion that Monday is going to be too late. I
hope we do not lose lives in the process. Mr. President, I hope and
pray that we do not lose lives in the process, and that if this action
is commenced, I hope and pray every single American soldier will be
able to return healthy and we do not have the body bags coming back,
especially for what we are gaining, because I do not see a national
interest. I do not see national support. The support is not there for
good reason. It is not in the national interest to make this action
happen, and it is certainly not in the national interest to restore Mr.
Aristide.
Mr. President, I will just conclude with the fact that we are going
to spend, are spending hundreds of millions of dollars. We are risking
and jeopardizing United States leadership and prestige.
More importantly, we are risking thousands of U.S. lives. For what?
Maybe for political gains, maybe to fulfill the desires of a lobbying
firm and ``Gucci Gulch'' makes hundreds of thousands of dollars, maybe
to make Randall Robinson happy or the Black Caucus happy. But it is not
in the United States' interest. The case has not been made for an
invasion of Haiti. I believe it is a serious mistake, and I hope
Congress would have a chance to express itself.
The United Nations got to vote. The United Nations had a vote on
authorizing this. I think the Congress should vote as well, and I hope
that we will have a vote before the invasion will occur. And I hope the
vote will occur on Monday and no later than Monday.
I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record the article I quoted
from the Washington Post.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 24, 1993]
Haiti's Suspect Savior; Why President Aristide's Return From Exile May
Not Be Good News
(By Lally Weymouth)
Before his inauguration, well aware that thousands of
Haitians were planning to set sail for America in direct
response to his perceived campaign promises, Bill Clinton
reversed course and adopted the Bush administration policy he
had bashed resoundingly--ostensibly on humanitarian grounds--
during the campaign. The president-elect announced that
Haitians trying to reach U.S. shores would be forcibly
returned to Haiti.
Human rights groups have attacked Clinton for the reversal.
Their chief hope now with regard to Haiti is that the
incoming administration will restore disposed President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide to power. A leftist priest, Aristide was
chosen president of Haiti in a free election in December
1990. Seven months later, he was ousted from office in a
military coup.
After the coup, the Bush administration, in coordination
with the Organization of American States, slapped a harsh
embargo on Haiti. A senior Bush foreign policy official
explains that the action was meant to remind the militaries
of other Carribean and Latin American countries that coups
don't pay.
Not surprisingly, however, the Haitian people became the
primary victims of the embargo. While Aristide lived nicely
in Washington--enjoying access to thousands of dollars in
frozen Haitian assets made available to him by the U.S.
government--Haiti, already the poorest country in this
hemisphere, saw the loss of thousands of jobs as companies in
electronic assembly, clothing manufacture and other light
industry sold out to Haitian businessmen or moved operations
elsewhere.
Before the Clinton administration sets out to restore
Aristide to power, newly appointed officials would be wise to
study carefully the true character of Aristide's short, but
brutal, tenure in office. Not only did he abuse democratic
practices but Aristide condoned and even encouraged violence.
The State Department 1991 human rights report said that
under Aristide there were fewer instances of abuse by the
military but ``the government proved to be unwilling or
unable to restrain popular justice through mob violence. . .
.''
In his speeches Aristide called upon his followers to
attack freely anyone who dared disagree with him. This
included even organizations such as the labor union CATH,
which had supported Aristide's election but later
criticized some of his actions.
Aristide actually urged his followers to engage in the
hideous practice of ``necklacing''--slapping a petrol-soaked
tire around the neck of a political opponent and igniting it,
thus burning the victim alive. On Sept. 27, 1991, shortly
before he was overthrown by the military, the former Haitian
president told a mass rally that if they should see ``a faker
who pretends to be one of our supporters . . . just grab him.
Make sure he gets what he deserves . . . with the tool you
have now in your hands [the burning tire] . . . You have the
right tool in your hands . . . the right instrument . . .
What a beautiful tool we have. What a nice instrument. It is
nice, it is chic, it is classy, elegant and snappy. It smells
good and wherever you go, you want to smell it.''
A few days later an Aristide-inspired mob attacked Sylvio
Claude, the founder of the Democratic Christian Haitian Party
(PDCH)--a man who had been jailed and tortured by Duvalier
but was a political opponent of Aristide. Although Claude
sought shelter in a police station, he was turned over to the
mob and burned to death.
The Catholic Church was a central target of Aristide's more
violent supporters. Monsignor William Murphy wrote a graphic
account of events in January 1991 when, according to Murphy,
`` . . . a group of thugs, supporters of newly-elected
President Aristide, went on a rampage. They destroyed the old
cathedral, gutted the archbishop's house . . . and then went
on to the nunciature, the home of the pope's representative.
There, they completely destroyed the building, attacked the
nuncio and his priest-secretary, broke both legs of the
priest and roughed up and stripped the nuncio . . . who was
saved only by the intervention of a neighbor.''
According to senior U.S. government officials, Aristide
also participated in a cover-up of the killing of five
teenagers on July 26, 1991. Members of an anti-gang unit
claimed the killings occurred when they became involved in a
struggle with the youths as they tried to escape.
Photographs, however, showed that the young men were severely
beaten and shot at point blank range by several weapons. The
Haitian armed forces--in particular Interim Commander-in-
Chief Raoul Cedras--demanded that the incident be
investigated. But Aristide, who had been building his own
security forces outside the military chain of command, tried
to block the investigation and sided publicly with one of the
officers involved in the slaying.
U.S. government officials cite extensive evidence showing
that Aristide personally gave the order to kill Roger
Lafontant, the Duvalierist, who was incarcerated in the
National Penitentiary after his conviction for leading a coup
attempt in January 1991.
When Lafontant was tried in July 1991, a mob of Aristide
supporters assembled outside the courtroom carrying tires and
gasoline cans and threatening to kill the judge in the case
if Lafontant were not given a life sentence. As a result,
Lafontant received a life sentence although the Haitian
constitution sets the maximum penalty for his alleged crime
at 15 years. Aristide praised his followers for their
efforts, asking whether, without the threat of necklacing,
``don't you think that the sentence handed down would have
been 15 years?'' Lafontant was killed by his jailers on the
night that Aristide was overthrown.
After the coup, Cedras became chief of staff. He is,
nevertheless, credited by U.S. officials with saving
Aristide's life the night of the coup. In a December
interview, Cedras said he also has information that Aristide
intended to have other political prisoners killed, not just
Lafontant: ``He [Aristide] gave the orders to kill around 20
people, but they had the courage to execute only
Lafontant.''.
During Aristide's short rule, says Canadian journalism
professor Gerard Etienne, a Haitian-born staunch opponent of
Duvalier who conducted a detailed study of Aristide's rule,
soldiers were regularly assassinated and several military
posts were burned. Aristide, according to Etienne, not only
failed to denounce these brutal slayings, but ``backed them
up by his silence and his demagogic tirades. . . .''
In August 1991, Haitian legislators met to deal with the
government's abuses. They planned to question Prime Minister
Rene Preval--who, according to the State Department human
rights report, had personally interrogated political
prisoners and denied them recourse to legal counsel--and then
to consider censuring him. Before parliament met, shots were
fired outside the headquarters of the National Front for
Change and Democracy (FNCD)--a political party that had
originally supported Aristide but had begun to criticize some
of his actions. The home of an FNCD legislator was also
stoned.
When the parliament met, its members found themselves
surrounded by about 2,000 demonstrators, many carrying
burning tires. Under the threat of the mob, the legislators
decided to recess.
Cedras says he did his best to keep order in Haiti during
the 1990 elections that brought Aristide to power. Moreover,
he recalls trying subsequently to cooperate with Aristide.
``But we could never really find out why he behaved the way
he did,'' said Cedras. ``He spent seven months violating the
constitution of this country which he was there to
guarantee.''
After Aristide was overthrown by the military on Sept. 30,
1991, the army soon appointed a civilian government, headed
by Prime Minister Marc Bazin. Since then, efforts have been
made--with U.S. assistance--to arrive at a negotiated
settlement between Aristide, the army and Bazin.
The closest the two sides came to an agreement was the
Washington Accord reached 11 months ago. But the accord
reached a stumbling block after Aristide changed his mind on
a central element--amnesty for the armed forces leadership.
Negotiations dragged on, and Aristide proved to be in no
hurry to make a deal.
During the transition, the threat that thousands of Haitian
boat people might descend on Florida quickened the
negotiating pace. The two sides appear to have approached a
solution--amnesty would be granted to the army in return for
a recognition of Aristide's right to return to power. In
theory, both sides have agreed to accept a large team of
international monitors that would hopefully reduce the
widespread human rights violations currently being committed
by the army and prevent future abuses by Aristide's
supporters should he return.
The challenge for Haiti and its U.S. friends is to turn to
building institutions that can sustain a measure of
democracy. Helping Aristide regain power may make sense as a
way of stemming the flow of Haitian immigrants to Florida.
But it is foolish to assume that he represents a return to
human rights and democratic rule for that impoverished
island.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am anticipating the arrival of a couple of
our colleagues on this side who wish to be heard on the issue. Pending
their arrival, let me just take a minute or so if I can. Let me
reiterate what I said a while ago, Mr. President.
If I had my druthers here, I prefer that the President come to the
Congress, and we have a chance to vote on these matters, not because I
necessarily believe that a vote is required for the President to act,
but because I think there is value in having a debate and even perhaps
a resolution.
I must say, Mr. President, having said that, to listen to some of the
comments being made today by some of our colleagues about their deep
concern and commitment to having resolutions every time there is a
matter like this, the history and the record show a quite different
reaction when confronted with different fact situations involving the
use of U.S. military forces.
Now, the way I read the history of these issues is as follows: If
someone agrees with a certain action to be taken, then the necessity,
as he or she perceives it, for the Congress to vote is probably less.
If one disagrees with a potential action, then the demand for
congressional involvement seems to increase. What is lacking is
consistency in the comments on these issues over time, when you go back
and review the history of congressional reaction to recent involvements
by various Chief Executive officers of our country.
Now, one can start to split hairs about Grenada and Panama. In
Panama, Mr. President, we knew for months that Panama would likely
involve a military involvement. That was not any overnight decision by
President Bush. We were pursuing General Noriega for months and
insisting over and over again that we were going to take action if
necessary in order to protect our interests.
Now, I recall that I received a call about 1 o'clock in the morning
from then Secretary of State Jim Baker informing me that the planes
were basically on their way, or had landed. I supported the action in
Panama. Yet I do not recall any similar outcry about the failure of
Congress to act even though we were more than aware that there was a
strong possibility our Armed Forces would be used in achieving our
desired goals in Panama.
Now, you can go back, and I have looked back, to 1975, 20 years, and
there are some 31 different examples where Presidents, Republicans and
Democrats alike, have committed U.S. forces, some in situations I could
make a strong case that the President had no other choice but to act
immediately because the emergency demanded it. But many, Mr. President,
many were ones where we were involved for some time in the issue
leading up to a decision to take military action.
Let me just cite that we had President Bush--and I happened to agree
with him on this--in August 1990 committing thousands of U.S. forces to
the Persian Gulf. Now, we voted in January 1991 as to whether or not
the President ought to have authority to use force. But with the
decision to send hundreds of thousands of people to the Persian Gulf to
defend Saudi Arabia from further expansion by the Iraqis into that
area, certainly placed United States forces in harm's way without any
question--the Scud missiles proved that later on. I seem to recall--
maybe I am wrong--some of these same noises that I hear from this side
today insisting that we vote on Haiti were just awfully silent during
those days.
Now, again, I am not suggesting that we ought not to vote. I happen
to think we should. I think it is important to do so. But I have to say
it just does not strike me as being terribly consistent.
Let me quote some of the comments that were made during that time.
Politics does stop at the water's edge. If I were Saddam
Hussein, I would be doing handsprings of joy with things that
are being published and said about it.
Here were people being critical. That is our minority leader Bob
Dole.
I do not believe the President requires any additional
authorization from Congress.
Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, December 1990.
No doubt about it, the President's policy is working. The
last thing we need are more timid signals from Congress.
Bob Dole, our minority leader, on the Persian Gulf.
Again, it depends where you come out on some of these issues, that
all of a sudden people find the necessity of congressional involvement.
I recall, Mr. President, having been involved in Central American
issues in the mid-1980's, that any time I offered a resolution or
various other proposals, I would be very significantly criticized by
some of my colleagues because I was tinkering with the President's
authority to conduct foreign policy.
Now, I may have taken objection to the notion that I was tinkering. I
certainly thought it my right as a Member of this body to express my
views on whether or not I thought American tax dollars ought to be
expended in various involvements in which we were engaged.
All I am suggesting here is that as people listen to this debate, it
might be worthwhile to reflect, refresh their memories about some of
the same people making entirely different statements when it came to
the question of whether or not Congress ought to give prior approval to
a President's decision to commit U.S. forces. All Presidents, it
seems--I have gone back 20 years, but other than Thomas Jefferson, who
requested the Congress to give him approval before committing our
forces to take on the Barbary pirates in about 1804, I do not recall
too many other Presidents other than Franklin Roosevelt, in 1941,
requesting a declaration of war from Congress. Since him, we had police
actions in North Korea; 50,000 people died there--more.
Vietnam, police action--you can go down the long list. All of our
Presidents have been reluctant to come up here and to seek approval
from Congress in the conduct of foreign policy. Some have suggested
over the last several weeks that we probably ought to revisit this war
powers debate. I agree with that because there are some very
significant rules. Clearly, the power to declare war rests with the
legislative branch. Clearly, the powers of Commander in Chief rest with
the President of the United States. There is a huge gap between
declarations of war and performing your functions as Commander in
Chief.
It is our obligation, it seems to me, with all of these examples that
we are all painfully familiar with over at least the last 20 years
where Presidents of different parties have exercised their authority as
Commander in Chief without first coming to Congress for authorization.
Now we all of a sudden decide this President in this fact situation
which some may happen to disagree with, that this is an outrage. I did
not hear that same sense of outrage, as I say, even a few short years
ago when other Presidents have sought to commit forces.
Ronald Reagan, I remember, in 1982 sent the Marines to Lebanon.
Tragically that ended in ultimate disaster. We had to hightail it out
of there. There was no doubt about it. This was a longstanding
conflict. It was not a surprise decision. It was debated between March
and the summer of 1982, and ultimately he sent them in. I do not recall
anybody standing around, with all due respect, on this side of the
aisle, Mr. President, saying President Reagan ought to come up here and
get the approval of this body before subjecting those marines to the
dangers of Lebanon. Tragically, it was a great misfortune.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. DODD. I am glad to yield to my colleague.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I am enjoying this. My friend from
Connecticut is being articulate and appropriate as always. I am
wondering if he is indeed waiting for another speaker to come to the
floor and the other speaker is delayed.
My question is answered by the arrival of the other speaker. I thank
the Senator.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I will finish my remarks. And then I think
my colleague from Massachusetts will be finished shortly. I appreciate
that.
Mr. BENNETT. I was asking, if the other speaker was not coming, if I
could proceed. Since the Senator from Massachusetts has arrived and it
is the Democrats' turn, I will appropriately listen to my friend from
Massachusetts with great interest.
Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague from Utah very much.
I do not want to dwell on this point. But I do think it needs to be,
for the purpose of the record, stated clearly. I have heard, again it
is bipartisan, objection to the idea that we commit forces to Haiti.
But I cannot sit here silently in the face of some of the statements
that are being made about prior congressional approval when previous
Presidents, not in the distant past, Mr. President, but only a few
short years ago, were up here denying that they needed to have
authority from this body in order to commit U.S. forces. I will not
mention Panama.
Grenada again was a bit more spontaneous because of the kidnaping and
assassination of Maurice Bishop. We had medical students there in
Grenada. I would argue that, one, the proximity of time was one where
President Reagan probably did not have to meet the obligation that is
being insisted upon here. But clearly Panama was. There is no question
about it. There were months involved in debating Panama before we sent
the troops, as I say, between the summer of 1990 and the actual
decision in January 1991. And the Persian Gulf, clearly months. Yet I
do not recall the kind of demand for prior congressional approval.
Last, I want to make one additional point and then I will yield to my
colleagues.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record at
this juncture the remarks made on October 2, 1991, before the
Organization of American States by our then-Secretary of State, James
Baker. I will just read them and ask unanimous consent they be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Attack on Democracy in Haiti
(By Secretary Baker)
[Address before the Organization of American States (OAS), Washington,
DC, Oct. 2, 1991]
Today, the international community and this Organization of
American States are being tested. A small group of willful,
violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation;
they have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government
elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just 9
months ago.
Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere
in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle
and sacrifice and the support of the international community,
they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy
under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand
united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the
assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no
legitimacy and will not succeed. I commend the Secretary
General for the speed with which he has acted, first to
convene the Permanent Council, then to convene this meeting.
The elections is Haiti were held with unprecedented
international support. The OAS, the United Nations, and the
democratic community helped oversee and verify that this
electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand
Aristide is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He
and his government have and deserve our support.
This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate
claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer
mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the
elections; the OAS mission was a strong symbol of this
hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development
the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this
hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to
establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this
table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in
Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This
hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of
guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any
``sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic order in
any member state.'' Today, that mechanism faces its first
test, and it is imperative that we agree--for the sake of
Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the
hemisphere--to act collectively to defend the legitimate
government of President Aristide. Words alone will not
suffice.
This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt
where the United States stands as a member of this proud
organization. The United States condemns this assault on
Haiti's democratically elected government and the violence
committed against innocent Haitians. We demand the immediate
restoration of President Aristide's constititional rule. We
have suspended all foreign assistance to Haiti. We do not and
we will not recognize this outlaw regime.
My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in
uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political
persuasion--to desist from all violent actions. Surely this
week's events show that violence only begets more violence,
and the way to justice lies in the rule of law, not in
recourse to violence.
Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft
resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to
take the best elements in each to produce the strongest
possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common
denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti.
By sending a mission from this body to Haiti, led by the
Secretary General, we will send an important message to those
who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people: This
junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the democratic
community. Until President Aristide's government is restored,
this junta will be treated as a parish throughout this
hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without
a future.
Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce
the message already sent by the United States, Canada,
Venezuela, France, and the European Community. And this
meeting must remain open in order to show that this
hemisphere will not lose interest or forget the suffering of
Haiti's people.
If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional
steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The
path they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is
restored, Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation
of the international community in promoting development and
alleviating poverty.
My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the
rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our
interests do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that
stands poised to achieve what the world has never seen
before; the fulfillment of democratic rights across two
continents. This is the hemisphere that is building a future
of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. This is the
hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the New
World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, ``to offer to man a land
of liberty.'' That is the future we are defending, and the
people of Haiti are and must continue to be part of that
community. This is a moment of darkness, but this coup must
not and will not succeed. I believe the people of Haiti will
regain their liberty. I believe this hemisphere will meet its
test.
This Organization of American States must not and will not
rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, let me for my colleagues read a couple of
poignant paragraphs about this Haiti policy and how it just did not all
of a sudden occur on January 20, 1993, the day President Clinton was
inaugurated. This goes back to the previous administration. Here is
President Bush's Secretary of State Jim Baker speaking about Haiti.
Today the international community and this Organization of
American States are being tested. A small group of willful,
violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation.
They have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government
elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just nine
months ago.
He goes on down to excoriate what these thugs did and talks about
ripping out of Haiti their duly elected President. To listen to some of
my colleagues talk it was as if they were Haitian. I do not know
whether I would have voted for President Aristide or not were he a
candidate and I was a Haitian. It is not our business to decide whether
or not we like people other nations elect as their heads of state. But
no one has contradicted the fact that 70 percent of the people of that
country in the freest and fairest election ever held in the nation of
Haiti chose this man to be their President. That is their business, not
ours.
To be sitting here and suggesting somehow that because we do not like
this guy or we do not particularly care for his speeches--Mr.
President, I should tell you, and I will state this in the way for
someone to challenge me. I spent more time than any other person I know
in this body reviewing the record on President Aristide through our
intelligence community and the various files; hours going over it. I
must tell you, Mr. President, putting aside whether one likes Mr.
Aristide's policies or not, I have rarely seen such an assassination on
a person's character done to the extent it was done on this man.
I would invite my colleagues to do what I did and read the record,
and to go back and listen to the people who knew this individual. Read
the transcripts and the files. Read the memos. Read the cables coming
out of Haiti from Ambassador Adams, President Bush's Ambassador in
Haiti from the time Aristide was elected to the time of the coup. The
remarks that are being attributed to President Aristide and the
character assassination just do not hold up under the scrutiny of an
examination of that file.
But going back to the point here, whether or not we like President
Aristide is not the issue. He was elected by an overwhelming majority
of that people and then summarily thrown out by the very people now who
want to sustain power, the very ones involved in the drug trafficking
and the ones engaged in the blatant, violent human rights violations.
Let me also go further in my quotation of James Baker's speech that
day because I think there are some important paragraphs.
This hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
I would point out that the Organization of American States has taken
a strong position with regard to Haiti, as has the United Nations. That
is not committing us to use force but it is worthy of note that the
entire world unanimously have indicted the Haitian Government for what
they have done.
Jim Baker goes on further in his remarks and he talks about the
various sanctions. I will not take up the time to read all of this. But
I goes down and lists the various things that we are going to be
doing--cutting off assistance, suspending various things--to show that
we mean business.
Then President Bush's Secretary of State says the following:
If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional
steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know the path
they have chosen leads nowhere.
He further says that once democracy is restored, we would be willing
to provide some help.
Jim Baker did not say that day that if this fails other additional
steps will be taken including the use of military force. He did not say
that. He would have been terribly unwise to do so. I do not think those
words were chosen idly. When the then Secretary of State under the
previous administration is talking about what happened in Haiti, he
says that, if these steps do not succeed, the economic sanctions, we
must consider additional steps. I do not recall people expressing any
great outcry at the time when the Bush administration properly indicted
the military leadership of Haiti that stripped that nation of its
democratically elected Government. In fact, most of us applauded the
Bush administration. When they started with the sanctions--all of us,
in my view, will remember it as I remember it--we agreed with that.
As I said earlier today, when you start that process and run that
string out, you get to what Jim Baker talked about--additional steps. I
would suggest to you today that, if President Bush had been reelected
in November 1992 and the diplomatic and political efforts had not
succeeded, instead of President Clinton considering the use of military
force, I suspect that President Bush in 1994 would be considering the
use of force because that is what Jim Baker committed that
administration to, in my view, if all of those other steps had failed.
We do not know that for certain. Obviously, a lot of other things
could have happened along the way. But I think in describing this
situation, where we are today, to go back and review that history is
important. There has been a longstanding effort through two
administrations to try and resolve this problem.
I will conclude by saying this to you, Mr. President: I sincerely
hope that the de facto military leadership of Haiti will decide in the
next few days to live up to the commitments they made in Governors
Island, that they made to the Bush administration, to this
administration, and to the United Nations, and to the OAS, and pack
their bags and give us a chance to restore this democracy and get this
country back on its feet again.
I hope my colleagues, in talking about Haiti, will not offer any
comfort to these guys. They do not deserve it. Disagree about the use
of force; disagree, if you will, about sanctions and so forth, but do
not let these leaders and others pretend we do not care about what they
are doing. It is an outrage what they are doing to the people of their
nation. Their violent, vile assassinations and mutilations of people
ought to offend everybody in this Chamber, regardless of our
differences over what tactics ought to be used.
As the most important deliberative body in this great Nation, it is
important that we send a message--and they watch and listen, by the
way, to what we say and do--that we do not support what they are doing
and are adamantly opposed to it, and that we are determined
collectively to find a way to change that situation.
I hope we do not have to use force. That has been my position all
along, that using force ought to be the last thing considered. But do
not deny this President entirely the ability to exercise his office as
President of the United States and Commander in Chief. Let us come back
and debate this question of war powers and declarations of war and the
role of a Commander in Chief. But let us not apply such a rigid
standard here.
This issue is not all black and white. It falls into a gray area. It
is a difficult one. I agree with the statements made earlier by Senator
Cohen of Maine. Yes, the burden falls here as well on all of us as to
how we vote on matters that commit young men and women to war in this
Nation. I will repeat what I said earlier. It certainly falls to a
severe and profound degree on the President of the United States--any
President--and whatever else one may think about this President,
whether you like him or not, to suggest somehow that he is pondering
the use of military force and committing young men and women in a
potentially life-threatening situation because of some desire to do
better on the local elections in November is a cynical, cynical,
cynical comment and statement to make.
I do not believe any American President has ever engaged in that kind
of a tactic. To attribute it to this one, in my view, is unfair and
undermines our democratic process. Debate, argue, fight, disagree, but
let us also understand what is at stake here. I hope in the coming days
we might have a chance to vote on this. I really believe that. That has
been my position consistently throughout the years here, and I will not
change it for this fact situation.
But, again, I find it somewhat disingenuous that the people who stood
here and berated some of us who suggested we have votes earlier on
other issues and are now demanding that we have one here, fail to look
at their own record and the history that goes back when other
Presidents have committed troops--or threatened to--because they found
it to be in the interest of this Nation.
With that, I will yield the floor. I yield to my colleague from
Massachusetts whatever time he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized
for up to 30 minutes.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, there is not one of us in the Senate who
does not approach a subject such as this with enormous concern for
country, for those who might go into harm's way, for the principles
that are at stake. And I think it is fair to say that the Senator from
Connecticut and I have no illusions about where this debate begins at
this point in time in this country.
It is sad. It is probably regrettable that there has not been more
debate, that there really has not been a more intense focus on the
connection of Haiti to the United States, to the hemisphere, and to our
interests. It is regrettable that at the moment, when Americans are
beginning to focus most on Haiti, there is perhaps the least
understanding. I regret that there has not been a greater effort to try
to explain our interests so that the American people can understand
them. I do not think that this is the best of situations in the waning
moments of confrontation of one kind or another.
I also think that it is absolutely vital that we try to maintain a
base of reality in this discussion so that we assist the American
people in really discerning the facts. I have heard a lot of talk about
war, a lot of revisionist history here about Panama and Grenada, and I
think it is very important for us to understand what we are really
talking about. Under both legal and, frankly, commonsense definitions
if we were to engage in military action in Haiti, it would not be war.
I think many of us still remain hopeful that we will not have to
engage in military action. I know I share with the Senator from
Connecticut a deep aversion to military action by the United States in
this hemisphere. We all know the history, and we all understand the
difficulties. But we also ought to recognize that this is not a case,
as it was in most of history, of the United States acting alone. This
is not some freewheeling, trigger-happy, potential involvement of U.S.
forces to protect a business. This is not an effort to protect United
Fruit. This is an internationally sanctioned effort by the friends of
Haiti, by the United Nations, by the OAS, and others, all of whom have
been deeply involved over a period of almost 3 years in focusing on a
renegade group of thugs who have stolen a democracy.
My colleagues have used the word ``war.'' Under any technical
definition, war is a state of open armed hostilities between political
units or states, or nations. And a state of war cannot, by definition,
exist between countries, unless they both have their own government and
the governments are involved.
We all know that the Government of Haiti was duly elected by its
people with 68 percent of the vote. The Government of Haiti is
President Aristide, and the Government of Haiti is asking the United
States of America for help.
The group of people against whom we might conceivably proceed with
our Armed Forces are a small group of thugs who have stolen a
government and who have no standing in the international community to
fit under any ``declarations of war'' or otherwise.
I have heard allusions to Vietnam in the course of this debate. But
we ought to remember that there were maybe 3, almost 4 years of
involvement of American troops in Southeast Asia before we even got to
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
I would be the last person in the United States to suggest that that
is good or that that ought to be replicated. But there is not one iota
of a breathe of a plan here that suggests that we are somehow going to
be involved for a long period of time. There is, in fact, every
indication to the contrary that the United Nations is going to be
involved, that international peacekeepers would be involved, that if
U.S. forces were involved, they would be withdrawn as rapidly as
possible, and that an exit strategy is as central to this question as
an entry strategy.
I have also heard arguments being made about no consultation. Again,
we ought to have honesty and candor on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
There has been no end of consultation with the U.S. Senate and the
Congress.
I have a list here of hearings and briefings on Haiti just to this
Congress. The list is not exhaustive, but it reflects State Department
organized consultations, I will run down the list.
As recently as this month, Defense Secretary Perry was meeting with
House and Senate Republican leadership. The day before that senior
administration officials were meeting with the House and Senate
Democratic leadership. A few days before that, State Department
officials were briefing the House Appropriations Committee. National
Security Adviser Lake and Special Adviser Gray briefed the House
Intelligence Committee in August. And so the line of consultation goes,
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Ambassador
Albright, and others.
I ask unanimous consent that the full list of consultations be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Hearings and Briefings on Haiti, 103d Congress
This list is not exhaustive but primarily reflects State
Department organized consultations. In addition, senior
Administration officials have made numerous phone contacts
with various Members of Congress over the past year.
13 September 1994 Meeting. Defense Secretary Perry met with
House and Senate Republican leadership to discuss recent
developments on Haiti policy.
12 September 1994 Meeting. Senior Administration officials
met with House and Senate Democratic Leadership to discuss
recent developments on Haiti policy.
30 August 1994 Briefing. State Department officials briefed
staff of the House Appropriations Committee on Migrant and
Refugee Assistance funding.
18 August 1994 Briefing. National Security Advisor Lake and
Special Advisor Gray briefed the House Intelligence Committee
on Administration Haiti policy.
16 August 1994 Briefing. ARA DAS Patterson briefed House
Foreign Affairs Committee staff on sanctions enforcement in
the Dominican Republic.
12 August 1994 Briefing. State Department officials briefed
House and Senate appropriations staff on Haiti refugee
funding.
11 August 1994 Briefing. OAS Ambassador Colin Granderson
met with Senate staff to discuss the current human rights
situation in Haiti.
5 August 1994 Meeting. Special Advisor Gray met with House
and Senate members of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy
Caucus to discuss Haiti.
4 August 1994 Hearing. Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs of
staff Chairman Shalikashvilli testified before the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.
4 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher, Ambassador
Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, and AID
Administrator Atwood met with members of the Congressional
Black Caucus on Haiti and other foreign policy issues.
3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with
Senator Byrd to discuss Haiti and other foreign policy
issues.
3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with
Minority Leader Michel and Minority Whip Gingrich to discuss
Haiti and other foreign policy issues.
3 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary Christopher met with
Majority Leader Gephardt to discuss Haiti and other foreign
policy issues.
2 August 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed
Republican members: Goss; Chris Smith; Livingston; Fowler,
Ros-Lehtinen; Hobson; Shaw; Mica; Boehlert; Houghton; Coble;
Hunter; Bateman; Hutchinson; and buyers.
2 August 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed
Majority Leader Gephardt.
2 August 1994 Meeting. Secretary of State met with Rep.
Berman on Haiti and other issues.
29 July 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Issues. State and
Justice briefed HFAC and House Judiciary Committee staff.
28 July 1994 Briefing. State DAS George Ward briefed SFRC
and CJS on the UN Security Council Resolution on Haiti.
27-28 July 1994 Briefings. Haiti Resolution; 5 Day Advance
Notice. State DAS Chapman briefed HFAC, CJS, HASC, SFRC,
SFRC, House and Senate Appropriations, and Sen. Dole's staff.
21 July 1994 Briefing. Deputy Secretary Talbott briefed
Sen. Nunn.
21 July 1994 Meeting. Deputy Secretary Talbott spoke with
Rep. Richardson regarding his trip to Haiti.
21 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senator
Wellstone.
21 July 1994 Meeting. Special Advisor Gray met with the
Senate Democratic Policy Committee.
21 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Rep.
Major Owens.
20 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Rep.
Porter Goss.
19 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor on Haiti William
Gray briefed HFAC members in a closed session.
14 July 1994 Briefing. Assistant Secretary of State Gati
and officials from CIA and Justice brief Senate Select
Intelligence Committee on Haiti and Iran.
13 July 1994 Briefing. Secs. Christopher, Perry, Ambassador
Albright, National Security Advisor Lake, and General
Shalikashvili briefed the Senate and House Leadership
``Consultative Group'' (leadership, chairs and ranking of
HFAC/SFRC; HASC/SASC; Intelligence; Appropriations--full
committee/DoD/Foreign Operations/Commerce, State, Justice)
separately.
13 July 1994 Hearing. OAS Ambassador Babbitt and State DAS
Skol testified on Dominican Republic elections and Haiti
before the HFAC subcommittee on Western Hemisphere.
13 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly State official
Bob Loftis briefed SASC staff.
13 July 1994 Briefing. Coast Guard officials briefed House
Merchant Marine committee members and staff.
13 July 1994 Briefing. State officials briefed House
Appropriations staff on Emergency Refugee and Migrant
Assistant.
12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, State DAS Ward
briefed HFAC staff.
12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, Ambassador
Dobbins briefed senior House staff.
12 July 1994 Briefing. Peacekeeping Monthly, State DAS
George Ward briefed SFRC staff.
7 July 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed majority
and minority SFRC staff.
7 July 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed HFAC
chairman Lee Hamilton.
5 July 1994 Phone Calls. State officials made phone calls
to Congressional staff of SFRC and HFAC, and Judiciary on
``safehaven'' policy.
28 June 1994 Hearing. U.S. Policy Towards Haiti Special
Advisor Gray, Assistant Secretary of State Shattuck, State
DAS McKinley testified before SFRC Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs.
28 June 1994 Meeting. Secretary of State met with Speaker
Foley on Haiti and other issues.
20 June 1994. State and DoD officials briefed HFAC staff on
Dominican Republic elections and the Administration's
sanctions-monitoring efforts.
16 June 1994 Briefing. State, DoD, and CIA officials
briefed SSCI staff on drug trafficking in Haiti.
15 June 1994 Hearing. Haitian Asylum-seekers; State DAS
Brunson McKinley testified before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees
on legislation on Haiti introduced by Reps. Meek and Dellums.
8 June 1994 Hearing. Special Advisor Gray testified before
House Foreign Affairs Committee.
8 June 1994 Briefing. Assistant Secretary of State Watson
briefed Senator Bob Graham on Haiti and other regional
issues.
1 June 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Processing; State and
Justice staff brief HFAC staff.
26 May 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed Reps.
Dixon, Richardson, and Reed prior to their trip to Haiti.
26 May 1994 Briefing. Ambassador Dobbins briefed Rep.
Rangel.
25 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Intelligence Community Briefing
(closed) HPSIC Members and Staff. Briefers: CIA/NIO Lattrel,
INR, others.
24 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Pre-trip Intelligence Community
Briefing, Rep. Dixon and HPSCI staff. Briefers: CIA, INR,
DIA, DEA, NSA, JCS/J-2.
18 May 1994 Briefing. State and INS officials briefed
Senate Judiciary committee staff on Haitian refugee
processing.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed House
Democratic Leadership.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senate
Democratic Leadership.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed
Congressional Black Caucus.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed Senate
Republican Leadership.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Special Advisor Gray briefed House
Republican Leadership.
17 May 1994 Briefing. Acting Refugee Policy Director Oakley
and INS Commissioner Meissner briefed Reps. Mazzoli, Canady,
and Lamar Smith on Haiti refugee processing.
12 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Policy. House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Immigration; RP & INS.
3 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti Refugee Issues: HFAC Staff with
RP, ARA, and INS.
3 May 1994 Briefing. Haiti. Senator Dodd and other SFRC
Members. Briefers: Acting Secretary Talbott and NSC Sandy
Berger.
24 March 1994 Meeting. Assistant Secretary of State
Shattuck met with Rep. Joe Kennedy regarding Haiti.
8 March 1994 Hearing. Haiti. SFRC Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere. Witness: Ambassador Pezzullo.
2 March 1994 Meeting. Ambassador Swing met with Rep.
Torricelli on recent events in Haiti.
9 February 1994 Hearing. Ambassador Pezzullo and AID
Assistant Administrator Schneider met with HFAC members in a
closed session to brief Members on humanitarian relief.
14 January 1994 Meeting. Assistant Secretary of State
Watson met with Sen. Dodd to discuss recent developments in
Haiti.
9 November 1993 Briefing. Haiti: HFAC Western Hemisphere
Members Briefing; (Amb. Pezzullo).
3 November 1993 Briefing. Haiti (closed); HPSCI Members &
Staff. Briefers: State/CIA/DIA/DOD.
27 October 1993 Briefing. Haiti-Intelligence; House
Republican Policy Committee Members. Briefers: CIA, DIA.
20 October 1993 Hearing. Roundtable on Haiti; HFAC.
20 October 1993 Briefing. Recent Events in Haiti: House
Intelligence Committee. Included State Department witnesses.
21 July 1993 Hearing. Recent Developments in Haiti; HFAC W.
Hemisphere Subcommittee.
21 July 1993 Hearing. Governor's Island Implementation;
HFAC.
18 June 1993 Briefing. Haiti; Reps. Torricelli and HFAC
staff. Briefer: Amb. Pezzullo.
26 May 1993 Briefing. Assistance from Haiti; Sen. Leahy.
Briefers: ARA Pezzulo & Watson.
18 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; SACFO Minority Staff.
Briefers: ARA-Pezullo, AID.
13 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; SACFO Minority Staff.
Briefers: ARA--Pezullo, AID.
13 May 1993 Briefing. Haiti; HAC Foreign OPS Subcommittee
and Associate Staff. ARA/Pezzullo, AID, and DOD.
3 May 1993 Briefing. Situation in Haiti/Request for
Contingency Fund; SACFO Majority and Minority Staff Briefers:
ARA-Pezzullo, AID-Williams.
10 March 1993 Briefing. Haiti; for HAC Foreign OPS Minority
Staff w/ Majority Staff.
9 March 1993 Briefing. Haiti; for HAC Foreign OPS Minority
and Majority Staff. Briefer: ARA/?
27 January 1993 Vote. Haiti; HAC Foreign Ops Subcommittee
Staff. ARA/ Gelbard.
12 January 1993 Briefing. Update on Haiti; Senate Judiciary
Committee Staff Briefers: ARA/RP/INS.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, in addition to that, we have heard
arguments a moment ago from the Senator from Arizona that somehow there
is some setup here to avoid a vote.
Let us be fair. The majority leader has said this and I think most
Senators know it is fact. The 2 o'clock deadline on voting was set long
before we even left for our recess a month ago or 3 weeks ago. Every
Senator knew that as of 2 o'clock today we would not be able to vote.
And it was only by agreement with the Republicans that we were allowed
to have two votes last night that cleared some business, and the
agreement was it was an exchange for 7 hours of debate on Haiti at
their request.
So the entire parliamentary situation in which we find ourselves was
frankly dictated to us by the Republicans who would not let us vote
unless there was the commitment to 7 hours of debate.
By happenstance, a motion was made in the course of that debate that
opened up the possibility for an amendment. The Senator from Arizona
seized that opportunity and offered an amendment. Now that Senator and
others are complaining that the second-degree amendment offered by the
majority leader has precluded any opportunity for the Senate to vote
today on their amendment. But that is not true, because the majority
leader's amendment was not even offered until we had reached the
previously scheduled hour beyond which votes would not occur.
So to somehow play politics with this issue, always politics, and to
suggest to the American people that there is some conspiracy to prevent
a vote does a disservice to the quality of debate and the obligations
of all of us in the U.S. Senate. That is not what has happened here.
I would prefer to have a vote. It is consistent with everything I
have ever said since I fought in Vietnam. I know this country is
stronger if it sends people into combat when the Congress agrees. I
know that the American staying power will last longer if we have had a
healthy debate and we have come to a resolution and the American people
are part of it. I have personally suggested historically that I do not
like American troops going off into harm's way unless there is that
consent. But we do not always get our druthers in the course of human
events.
For whatever reasons, Mr. President, it sometimes falls to the
President of the United States to make a judgment under the Commander
in Chief power that the fathers of this country, in their wisdom, gave
to the President in the Constitution. We have a War Powers Act and
still hold the President accountable if in fact the President exercises
that authority, and we have checks and balances by which we gain
control over whatever judgments the President might make with respect
to that use of power.
But no one in the U.S. Senate can legitimately make the argument that
the President does not have that power, and that is why again and again
when the issue of curtailing the power has come before the Senate with
respect to Haiti and elsewhere we, as Senators, have upheld that power
of the President.
And that is the lonely decision that my friend from Connecticut
referred to earlier, I am not suggesting disrespectfully that Congress
does not have a role--of course, it does--but I am simply suggesting
the reality: that there are times when the buck stops at the desk of
the President of the United States who has to make a decision.
What is the quality of that decision that the President has to make
and in what context is the President making it?
I would ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to search
their consistency compass and perhaps their conscience when they come
to the floor to debate Haiti because this policy was not begun by Bill
Clinton. This policy was set in place by a person whose stewardship as
Secretary of State I respect enormously, one of the better players on
the international scene, and that is Jim Baker. And it was set in place
by a President of the United States who had a string of successes in
foreign policy and whom this Nation came to respect for his acumen in
foreign policy and his accomplishments.
Lest anybody question to what degree President Bush and Jim Baker put
this policy in place, I want to remind them with Jim Baker's words, and
I read.
Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere
in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle
and sacrifice and the support of the international community,
they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy
under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
The test we face is clear: To defend democracy; to stand
united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the
assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no
legitimacy and will not succeed. . . . The elections in Haiti
were held with unprecedented international support. The OAS,
the United Nations, and the democratic community helped
oversee and verify that this electoral process was open,
free, and fair.
I quote Jim Baker.
Jean-Bertrand Aristide is the democratically elected
President of Haiti. He and his government have and deserve
our support.
That was the Republican policy when they held the Presidency and when
they believed that they would be reelected and continue to conduct the
foreign policy of this country. It is only with the defeat of that
President and the ascendancy of a Democratic President that suddenly
our Republican friends have found new routes of policy and new reasons
to doubt Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the democratic election.
Let me continue on with Jim Baker's words spoken October 2, 1991,
before the Organization of American States. He said:
This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate
claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer
mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the
elections; the OAS mission was a strong symbol of this
hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development
the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this
hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to
establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this
table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in
Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This
hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
Mr. President, I am skipping through some of this, but I want to read
another important paragraph of Secretary Baker's statement.
Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft
resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to
take the best elements in each to produce the strongest
possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common
denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti.
By sending a mission of this body to Haiti, led by the
Secretary General, we will send an important message to those
who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people.
And here are the most important words of all.
This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the
democratic community. Until President Aristide's government
is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah
throughout this hemisphere--without assistance, without
friends, and without a future.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full statement of
Secretary Baker before the Organization of American States be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Oct. 1, 1991]
Attack on Democracy in Haiti
(By Secretary Baker)
Today, the international community and this Organization of
American States are being tested. A small group of willful,
violent men have betrayed their uniform and their nation;
they have seized power in Haiti, usurping the government
elected by a clear mandate of the Haitian people just 9
months ago.
Two centuries ago, the people of Haiti led this hemisphere
in the struggle for independence. This year, with struggle
and sacrifice and the support of the international community,
they won their democratic rights. Today, with their democracy
under attack, the people of Haiti look for our reaction.
The test we face is clear: to defend democracy; to stand
united as a community of democracies; to make clear that the
assault on Haiti's constitutional government has no
legitimacy and will not succeed. I commend the Secretary
General for the speed with which he has acted, first to
convene the Permanent Council, then to convene this meeting.
The elections in Haiti were held with unprecedented
international support. The OAS, the United Nations, and the
democratic community helped oversee and verify that this
electoral process was open, free, and fair. Jean-Bertrand
Aristide is the democratically elected President of Haiti. He
and his government have and deserve our support.
This organization, more than any other, has a legitimate
claim to speak to this crisis. The OAS election observer
mission in Haiti did more than help in the conduct of the
elections; the OAB mission was a strong symbol of this
hemisphere's commitment to the path of democratic development
the Haitian people have chosen. Thousands of citizens of this
hemisphere struggled and died, were exiled and jailed, to
establish democracy. Indeed, many of you sitting at this
table are veterans of that struggle. Let the coup plotters in
Haiti--and any who dream of copying them--know this: This
hemisphere is united to defend democracy.
Last June, the General Assembly took the historic step of
guaranteeing that this body would convene to respond to any
``sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic order in
any member state.'' Today, that mechanism faces its first
test, and it is imperative that we agree--for the sake of
Haitian democracy and the cause of democracy throughout the
hemisphere--to act collectively to defend the legitimate
government of President Aristide. Words alone will not
suffice.
This is a time for collective action. Let no one doubt
where the United States stands as a member of this proud
organization. The United States condemns this assault on
Haiti's democratically elected government and the violence
committed against innocent Haitians. We demand the immediate
restoration of President Aristide's constitutional rule. We
have suspended all foreign assistance to Haiti. We do not and
we will not recognize this outlaw regime.
My government also calls on all the people of Haiti--in
uniform or in civilian life, regardless of political
persuasion--to desist from all violent actions. Surely this
week's events show that violence only begets more violence,
and the way to justice lies in the rule of law, not in
recourse to violence.
Now is the time for us to act. There are a number of draft
resolutions in circulation. We urge the drafting committee to
take the best elements in each to produce the strongest
possible draft. We must not settle for the lowest common
denominator if we are to keep faith with the people of Haiti.
By sending a mission from this body to Haiti, led by the
Secretary General, we will send an important message to those
who have taken power in Haiti and to the Haitian people: This
junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the democratic
community. Until President Aristide's government is restored,
this junta will be treated as a pariah throughout this
hemisphere--without assistance, without friends, and without
a future.
Multilateral assistance must also be suspended to reinforce
the message already sent by the United States, Canada,
Venezuela, France, and the European Community. And this
meeting must remain open in order to show that this
hemisphere will not lose interest or forget the suffering of
Haiti's people.
If these steps do not succeed, we must consider additional
steps. Those who pretend to govern Haiti should know: The
path they have chosen leads nowhere. But once democracy is
restored, Haiti will again receive the generous cooperation
of the international community in promoting development and
alleviating poverty.
My colleagues, our immediate purpose today is to defend the
rights and noble aspirations of the people of Haiti, but our
interests do not stop there. This is the hemisphere that
stands poised to achieve what the world has never seen
before: the fulfillment of democratic rights across two
continents. This is the hemisphere that is building a future
of free trade from Alaska to Argentina. This is the
hemisphere whose nations are cooperating to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction. We are fulfilling the promise of the New
World, enshrined in the OAS Charter, ``to offer to man a land
of liberty.'' That is the future we are defending, and the
people of Haiti are and must continue to be part of that
community. This is a moment of darkness, but this coup must
not and will not succeed. I believe the people of Haiti will
regain their liberty. I believe this hemisphere will meet its
test.
This Organization of American States must not and will not
rest until the people of Haiti regain their democracy.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is sad to see so many of our colleagues
now coming to the floor with a totally different policy than the policy
they supported under President Bush and suggesting to the American
people that now we ought to have a whole different set of standards
applied to Haiti.
It is even more incredible to listen to the new policy. We heard it
from the Senator from Indiana, who came to the floor quoting somebody
from Haiti, and saying that we ought to lift the embargo, not worry
about the democratic issue, not worry about the military junta that has
taken over because no American lives are being threatened.
That is so contrary to what President Bush and Jim Baker established
as policy and to what they supported.
It takes us right back to the crime bill, Mr. President, where they
voted for a crime bill that had a certain amount of money in it, more
than the crime bill that came back, and then they voted against a crime
bill that has less money than the crime bill they voted for with more
money, and argue against the amount of money in the crime bill that
they are voting. If ever George Orwell was going to be alive and well
and happy with doublespeak, it is in what comes out of Washington.
Mr. President, I repeat again, I hope we do not have to go into
Haiti. But people ought to think about what the policy is that follows
through with what George Bush and Jim Baker said. If you lift the
embargo and simply do not pay any attention and do not worry about
their democratic election, what is the message to any country that
aspires to a democratic election? And, more importantly, what is the
message to the despots and thugs willing to challenge those elections?
That our words are only words? That nothing means anything? That you
can risk lives? That you can listen to the United States talk tough
about human rights and about the rights of people to have a democratic
process, but when push comes to shove we are willing to be shoved?
I am not advocating that you ought to run around the world and
intervene everywhere. I am not advocating that even in this hemisphere
the circumstances in every situation are the same.
We have heard comparisons with Panama and comparisons with Grenada,
and we will hear them. Frankly, we should make a judgment solely on the
issue of Haiti. Because each and every country will not present us with
the exact same set of circumstances.
But I would ask my colleagues to measure whether or not the
circumstances in Grenada in their totality cannot be compared with the
totality of the circumstances in Haiti? I would not point to one
particular concern in Haiti as sufficient to demand that we hold out
military force as a legitimate threat. But when you take the
conglomerate of what has happened in Haiti, I believe you have a very
different situation.
Mr. President, since ousting Haiti's first democratically elected
leader in September, we have been engaged in a test of wills between
the thugs who threw out President Aristide and stole the democracy and
the international community.
If my colleagues want to be fair about analyzing our options here,
they should make a judgment about all of the efforts that we have made
to try to get them to step down. For over 3 years now, we have been
engaged in a dialog. They even acknowledged their illegitimacy by
agreeing in New York at Governor's Island that they ought to step down,
and then they went back on that agreement. Notwithstanding that, we
have continued to be patient and give them an opportunity to come to
their senses. But they have not. They have, in fact, dug in deeper and
consolidated their power.
Mr. President, I ask how much time is remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). The Senator has 9 minutes
remaining.
Mr. KERRY. Am I entitled, under the rules, to ask for or to be
yielded additional time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I advise the Senator that it would take a
unanimous-consent request to extend your time.
Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to extend my
time by 10 minutes, if possible.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. It is my
understanding that the procedure that we are following is that, at the
conclusion of the statement by the Senator from Massachusetts, another
Democrat would then be recognized, and I am told it would probably be
the Senator from Florida, Mr. Graham, after which, the time would then
come back to this side and I would be recognized.
Is that the correct procedure?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would advise the Senator from Utah
that the next speaker will be from your side.
Mr. BENNETT. It will not be from the Democratic side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. It will be from your side. And it will
probably be Senator Bennett.
Mr. BENNETT. I understand.
Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not object.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I am reminded of the debate that we had over Iraq,
during which time we were consistently told by Republicans that any
kind of dissent somehow strengthened the hand of Saddam Hussein and
weakened the ability of the President of the United States to be able
to work his will.
There are countless quotes from that debate on the floor. Among them,
I remember Dick Cheney telling us he did not believe the President
required any additional authorization from Congress. Jim Baker said to
us, in December 1990, ``If we are to have any chance of success, I must
go to Baghdad with the full support of the Congress and the American
people behind the message of the international community.''
The minority leader said that, ``The success of Saddam's agreeing to
release all foreign hostages came despite attempts by many in Congress
to `tie the President's hand behind his back.'''
He also said, ``No doubt about it. The President's policy is working.
The last thing we need are more timid signals from Congress.''
So we all understand there is a relationship between our debates and
the message we send.
Regrettably lacking from our colleagues on the other side in this
debate on Haiti is a condemnation of the military junta. Regrettably
lacking is a condemnation of the human rights abuses. Regrettably
lacking is the condemnation of the usurpation of democracy.
So the message that goes to Gen. Raoul Cedras and company is that
they can find a sense of safety because Americans are not somehow
committed to their removal.
Now, Americans are rightfully, absolutely, appropriately asking: What
are our interests in Haiti? Why should we be concerned about this? What
is it we have to do? What interests does the United States have in
risking anybody in any kind of operation in Haiti? And I think it is
essential that those questions be answered, not only for the public but
obviously for those involved in this operation on the ground.
You have to review a small amount of what happened in Haiti through
the years to understand why there is an interest, Mr. President. Haiti,
in many respects, is the orphan of this hemisphere. Unlike a lot of
other nations in the region, it is not Hispanic in origin. Its people
are predominantly poor, largely uneducated, and they are of African
origin. Throughout the history of Haiti, they have been brutally
repressed by a small, wealthy ruling elite. There are deep-seated
hatreds between that ruling elite and the masses. And those hatreds
have given birth to a whole culture of violence and a politics of
instability. Indeed, their history is filled with coups and civil wars
and with brutal dictators like the Duvaliers who have used people like
the Ton-Ton Macoutes, their thugs in arms, to keep people in check. And
now you have the so-called ``attaches,'' who serve the same function in
the present regime--to repress Haiti's people.
The fact is, despite this incredible oppression, the Haitian people
said that they were willing to take the risk to have an election. And 4
years ago, in December 1990, they did so and for the first time since
independence in 1804 they were allowed to participate in a free and
fair election. For the first time in the history of Haiti the power of
the people really did prevail.
We all know the outcome of that and we know where we find ourselves
today. But we cannot turn our back on the fact that what happened,
happened under the watchful eye and with the participation of, the
international community. The United Nations, the Organization of
American States, and individual nations, including ours, all provided
observers. And that experiment came to a sudden halt only when the
promise of reform became too real for some of the military thugs to
tolerate. So they took power.
Since then, those who sought democracy have been murdered and beaten,
arbitrarily arrested, detained and tortured. Many have disappeared
without a trace. Women have been raped as a matter of intimidation and
policy. Children have been kidnapped from their homes and impressed
into forced labor. In recent months the campaign of intimidation has
taken on new levels, astonishing even by Haitian standards.
Murder and mutilation have become commonplace. Bodies without heads
or faces have been left in the street to rot, and sometimes those who
have gone out into the street to try to retrieve them have been killed,
cut down in broad daylight to lie there and become another rotting
corpse for people to see and be intimidated by.
We know the litany of the high profile assassinations calculated to
intimidate: Reverend Jean-Marie Vincent shot most recently, last month;
Antoine Izmery, a pro-Aristide activist, killed during a church service
last year; respected lawyer and Minister of Justice, Guy Malary,
assassinated in broad daylight just before Haitian thugs rioted against
the docking of the U.S.S. Harlan County last October.
Mr. President, despite each of these instances, I wonder if my
colleagues really understand the full measure of suffering of our
neighbors, the Haitians. International human rights monitors and the
State Department have documented dozens upon dozens of cases of
politically motivated rape. Last October the U.N.-OAS human rights
monitoring mission documented the rape of a 13-year-old girl in June by
military personnel, the rape of the wife of a City Soleil activist by
uniformed men in July, and the rape of a 16-year-old girl by a soldier.
According to Human Rights Watch, a woman north of Port-au-Prince bled
to death after being raped by soldiers in late December.
Human Rights Watch has also documented a case that took place on
February 7 of this year, when two of Haiti's paramilitary thugs invaded
the home of a family that had been denounced as Aristide supporters by
an unidentified detractor. The husband was tied up and forced to watch
as his wife was raped on the front porch.
A recent Washington Post article quoted a young Haitian woman named
Florence who was raped by 3 thugs seeking her boyfriend. She said: They
looked for him everywhere, under the bed, the table, then they beat my
mother and father and told me to lie on the floor, and then they raped
me.
That is only one of the tools of these tyrants.
The most helpless members of Haitian society, orphan children, are
targets of the military's heinous campaign of repression. Children have
been forced to sleep in the weeds because there is no shelter, and they
are afraid to stay on the streets. A recent New York Times article
quoted a Haitian who runs an orphanage saying that children disappear
and their bodies are found later, often with their hands bound, in the
streets. In the words of one young Haitian boy quoted in the same
article, ``They do not know that if they kill us they help us. I do not
care if the Macoutes kill me because it only brings an end to my
suffering.''
Perhaps the best example of the disregard that this regime has for
human life is the story of a gentleman--if you can call him that--
called Norelus Mandelus, a military commander who has dubbed himself
the Saddam Hussein of Haiti. Among the many atrocities he has committed
was the cutting off of a victim's ear during a vicious beating and
forcing the victim to eat his own ear, and then carving his initials in
the victim's flesh. Mandelus received a mere reprimand when later it
was learned, through priests, that the person victimized, or one of the
people victimized, was related to an officer who was senior to him.
In this atmosphere of terror, it is little wonder that thousands of
Haitians have taken to the seas. And if we do nothing, then thousands
of other Haitians will take to the boats and continue to flood the
shores of this country, providing the international community with the
spectacle of desperation on the high seas.
After fits and starts we finally adopted a policy for safe haven. But
that does not offer them a future, Mr. President.
For the poor masses, political retribution is the most frightening,
but it is not the only problem. Economic mismanagement and sanctions
have ground the economy to a halt. Businesses are closed. Unemployment
stands at 80 percent. And inflation is out of sight. We understand what
this embargo is doing and we understand that there are limits to how
long that should go on.
While the majority of Haitians have been struggling to survive, the
military strongmen have been making money selling fuel, smuggled in, in
defiance of the embargo, and running the drug trade in Haiti for the
Colombian kingpins. As chairman of the Narcotics and Terrorism
Subcommittee, I can say to my colleagues in the Senate without any
doubt that the linkages of the Haitian kingpins to the Cali cartel and
to drug running are beyond dispute, provable beyond a reasonable doubt.
In fact, they kicked out a DEA agent last year because he was getting
too close to information, and they threatened his family. Is that not a
threat to an American citizen? Is this not a threat to American
interests, that drug kingpins are permitted to continue to help and
assist in the flow of narcotics into the streets of America? No, the
drug trade through Haiti is not as big as Mexico. No, it is not as big
as Colombia. But it is one of the links in a long network, and the
question ought to be legitimately asked whether we ought to turn
around, lift the embargo, congratulate them for their ability to avoid
all international sanction, and allow them to continue to fill the
streets of America with these illegal substances?
When do we come to our common senses? One of the reasons we removed
Noriega was drugs. One of the reasons we went to Somalia was
starvation. One of the reasons we went to Grenada was chaos. And in
Haiti you have all of them. But, suddenly the principles are different.
Suddenly the standards are different. And one has to be left asking if
it is not because the cultural ties to Haiti are not perceived by so
many Americans as being as strong.
Mr. President, I am not going to dwell on the issue of drugs or each
of these individual interests because my time is going to run out. That
Haiti's leaders are involved in the drug trade is beyond question. We
estimate that there is a sum of approximately $100 million a year they
put away into bank accounts as a consequence of the fruits of their
illicit traffic in this country.
Drugs are an important source of income for their leaders--although
cut back now, obviously, because of the situation. But I assure you if
we follow the advice of some of our colleagues who just want to lift
the embargo and not worry about democracy, they will be empowered to do
a lot more.
Many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have argued that
United States interests in Haiti simply do not warrant the use of
force. I say to them: You have a choice. You have a fundamental choice
here.
You can give meaning to the words of Secretary Baker and President
Bush, to all of our efforts to encourage democracy and to try to
encourage the Haitians to be able to make it on their own. Or you can
abandon them. Because that is the alternative policy. And in abandoning
them we will abandon a host of other interests that we have in the
world.
Mr. President, believe me I understand it is not easy to ever ask any
young American to put his or her life at risk in any circumstance. But
we are duty-bound to ask ourselves whether or not our interests in
Haiti are not equal to or greater than the interests we have in a host
of other places where young American military personnel are at risk
today? We have Americans risking their life and limbs to protect the
Iraqi Kurds.
We have Americans who risked their lives to prevent a coup against
President Aquino in the Philippines. We have Americans who have risked
their lives, and are continuing to do so, in Rwanda for humanitarian
purposes. We have Americans who are risking their lives in order to
enforce safe zones in Bosnia. Yet, here we have Haiti, this tiny
country close to our own Nation, affecting our own Nation with would-be
refugees coming to our shores seeking asylum, running away from a tiny
group of dictators whose illegitimate rulers are empowered by the
unwillingness of some in this Nation to assume our responsibility to
lead and confront them.
I respectfully suggest to my colleagues that there are times when
withholding the threat of force because of the possibility that you may
have to use that force, causes you to lose the capacity to achieve the
goals that you have set out for yourself as a nation.
Earlier, I heard my colleague from Connecticut talk about the
tradition of this country. We have an extraordinary tradition. We are,
indeed, every bit the great Nation that we talk about. And many people
over the course of history have given their lives in an effort to try
to bring to other people what some people lost their lives in bringing
to us. We should not forget that our own country did not just emerge
completely on its own without help from other people who were willing
to assist us, and that was in a revolution. That is not what we are
even talking about in this situation.
Mr. President, I believe that we have an obligation under the United
Nations, under the Organization of American States, under our own
history, to try to keep faith with what we have set out to do in
Haiti--to restore democracy. While I do not advocate that we run around
the world doing this, that we engage in this enterprise helter-skelter
and willy-nilly in parts of Central America, Latin America, or
elsewhere, I believe that the circumstances arising in Haiti are
sufficiently exigent to permit us to hold out this potential use of
force at this moment in time with the hope, obviously, that in the
final analysis we will not be called on to use it.
Mr. President, I will have more to say at some later time on this
subject. My colleague has graciously allowed me a little extra time. I
know I have not used it all. I want to express my gratitude to him for
allowing me to do so.
I reserve the balance of whatever time I do have.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. COHEN. I yield 15 minutes to Senator Bennett.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I understand we have come back to the
order that was previously there. I was willing to accommodate, but I am
told I probably should not, so I apologize to my colleague from
Florida, given these instructions and procedures.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Utah for
15 minutes.
Mr. BENNETT. Thank you. Mr. President, I do not want to multiply all
of the arguments that have been made here as to the wisdom or ill
wisdom of the invasion. But I do have some points that I think are
valid and that we may be losing sight of here.
I will confine those quotations that I make to sources that are not
considered Republican sources because we have had a lot of quotation
back and forth. I want to quote from people who normally are expected
to side with the President and with the Democrats.
I start, if you will, with the New York Times. The New York Times is
not known as a particularly friendly journal, as far as the Republicans
are concerned. The New York Times ran this editorial this week which
was headed: ``Congress Must Vote on Haiti,'' and began with this
paragraph:
To invade Haiti without prior congressional approval would
short circuit the United States Constitution. It would also
leave the President with sole political responsibility if the
operation turns sour. Yet that is just what the Clinton
administration now suggests it might do.
It goes on to say later in the editorial:
In 1991, Democrats in both Houses insisted that President
Bush get prior congressional approval for Operation Desert
Storm. Now, misplaced fealty drives many of those same
Democrats to relieve President Clinton of the same
responsibility. That is poor Government and poor
partisanship, too. Democrats would do better to protect Mr.
Clinton from enmeshing himself in a military action where
most Americans see no compelling national interest at stake
and in which the first casualties are likely to bring bitter
recrimination.
This, again, I remind you, Mr. President, is from the New York Times.
There has been much made on the floor here today about the fact that
as Commander in Chief, President Bush put our troops in harm's way in
Saudi Arabia without any objection from this body, long prior to the
time when we debated and voted.
I would like to comment my reaction to that. I was not a Member of
the body at the time that happened, but like all citizens, I watched
very closely. I think the Commander in Chief, when invited by a
friendly power, as Saudi Arabia is, to place our troops on their soil,
has the constitutional power to respond to that invitation without
coming to Congress for any formal declaration.
But to take those troops, once they are in place in that friendly
power, and then order them to cross an international border in an
invasion against a hostile power does, in my view, require clear
constitutional authority from the Congress. I know there were some in
the Republican Party who said in support of their President, ``No, the
Congress is not required to vote in this fashion.'' I know there were
some in the Bush administration who argued thus. And we have had them
all quoted on the floor today. I do not agree, and I did not prior to
coming to the Senate.
If I may be personal for just a moment, my opponent in the 1992 race
was then a Member of Congress. He filed a suit against the President
saying the President could not proceed in Iraq without getting
congressional approval first. And many of my supporters in Utah said,
``This is a great political issue. You can attack him for having
attacked Bush on this very popular war.''
I said, ``I will not raise it in the campaign, because I think he was
right.'' President Bush had no right, in my view, to invade Iraq
without congressional authority, and I was delighted that President
Bush took the step to seek that authority before proceeding.
On that comment, I would turn to another source, not usually thought
of as a Republican journal, the Washington Post, in their editorial
today. They make this comment about the wisdom of going into Haiti.
They are not involved politically or in a partisan fashion, the comment
that I wish I had written myself, one of those lines that I could not
do better than. They say:
The national security/national interest case for the
evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhere
between exceedingly thin and preposterous. If there is a
better case than that, the administration should be willing
to make it to the public and to Congress. It should be
willing to seek consensus and consent for spending the money
and taking the chances with American lives no matter how
pitiable the Haitian's military resources or how good the
odds of succeeding may seem to the planners. A Government
that calls up reserves for military action has an obligation
to do these things.
Mr. President, I will not pursue the question of whether or not going
into Haiti is a good or a bad idea. I do want to come down hard on the
issue of whether or not the President of the United States has the
right to invade a sovereign country that has not attacked us, that has
not put any of our forces under any military threat, and where there is
no emergency circumstance of American citizens at danger--as was, in my
view, the case in Grenada--cold-bloodedly, after careful calculation,
without coming to the Congress for approval.
In my view, the Constitution is clear and the President of the United
States, be he a Republican or a Democrat, does not have that
constitutional authority. I think it very, very clear.
Going back to the Washington Post on that issue, the same editorial,
I quote:
President Clinton insists he won't ask Congress for
authorization to invade Haiti. The shortcut spares him the
possibility of repudiation for a venture that appears more
dubious and unpopular by the day. But it cheats on the
separation of powers as defined in the Constitution. It
threatens to undercut not just the quick operation planned
against the thugs in Port-au-Prince but the prolonged
occupation meant to follow on its promises to bring a
political disaster upon the administration for misreading the
popular mood on the process as well as the substance of its
policy.
The New York Times, quoting the Constitution, saying the President
should not proceed without getting congressional approval.
The Washington Post, quoting the Constitution, saying the President
should not proceed without getting authority. As I say, I agree with
them, and I would agree with them if the President were a Republican,
and I did agree with them when the President was a Republican even
though I did not have this forum in which to make that point.
Now we have heard from the Senator from Connecticut about Jim Baker,
the Senator from Massachusetts has repeated that quote, and I am
perfectly willing to grant them that Secretary Baker made statements
which would logically lead to the conclusion of military action at some
point if he were not satisfied with what eventually happened. But I do
not believe that Secretary Baker made statements that ruled out coming
to Congress for constitutional authority if invasion was the final
decision. And, indeed, if President Bush had been elected and Secretary
Baker were now saying it is time to invade Haiti but we do not need to
get congressional approval for that, I would be standing on this floor,
I believe, complaining that the Secretary of State and the President
were ignoring the Constitution.
As I say, I have the record of having taken that position with
respect to President Bush and the debate that occurred during my
campaign. I feel very strongly about this issue. I think the
Constitution is very clear. And I ask the rhetorical question, what is
the hurry? We are being told, well, we will not have time because the
invasion is coming, the invasion is probably going to take place this
weekend and the Senate will not have a chance to vote prior to the time
that the troops are in Haiti.
I do not know that there is any more urgency to invade Haiti this
weekend than next weekend. I think the President has the clear
constitutional obligation to come here, and I call on him to say to the
ships at sea, say to the people who are in motion, the Constitution is
clear, if we are going to invade a sovereign country in a cold,
calculated, deliberate fashion, not in the heat of reacting to bullets
that are flying, not in the emergency, but after a careful, calculated
buildup that has been going on for months, if we are now going to
invade another sovereign nation for whatever reason, however valuable,
under the Constitution we need to get congressional authority, just as
we did prior to the invasion of Iraq.
In my opinion--having not been here I can say this--I think we should
have done it prior to the action that was taking place in Panama. I
think this is a very clear constitutional issue that we cannot ignore.
Finally, Mr. President, I make this comment. We have consulted with
the United Nations and achieved a formal resolution endorsing this kind
of action. We are being told that. We have consulted, we being the
administration, with the OAS and gotten their approval. If the
President of the United States can find the time to get formal approval
and resolution from the United Nations, if he can find the time to get
formal approval and resolution from the Organization of American
States, why can he not find the time to get formal approval from the
Congress of the United States, as, in my opinion, he has the clear
constitutional obligation to do?
So I conclude, Mr. President, as I began. In my opinion, the
Washington Post described this circumstance as well as anybody can when
they say the arguments in favor of it, and I quote again, ``hover
somewhere between exceedingly thin and preposterous.''
But even if the arguments are stronger than that, indeed, more
particularly if the arguments are stronger than that, the President has
the obligation to make those arguments in the constitutionally
established forum, and the people of the United States, as the Founding
Fathers set up, have the check and balance to respond to those
arguments through congressional action as we did in the case of going
beyond the defensive action in Saudi Arabia to the formal invasion in
Iraq. We have the obligation to do the same thing in this circumstance,
and I urge the President to delay the invasion in Haiti for at least 1
week until he takes advantage of that opportunity that the delay would
give him and complies with what is to me a very clear requirement in
the Constitution of the United States.
I yield the floor.
Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Simon). The Senator from Connecticut is
recognized.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I yield such time, I guess within the 30-
minute time frame, as the distinguished Senator from West Virginia so
desires.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized
for up to 30 minutes.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for his courtesy in yielding me this time.
Mr. President, the Senate is in executive session, is it not?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. BYRD. And pending before the Senate is the nomination of Adm.
Henry H. Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy, to be admiral, with the pending question
immediately before the Senate an amendment in the second degree to an
amendment in the first degree, both of which amendments deal with the
Haitian situation?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BYRD. As I understand it, both of these amendments are sense-of-
the-Senate amendments. Is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me direct my comments initially to the
parliamentary situation.
I am concerned very much that we may be about to go down a very
slippery slope because of the procedure that is being utilized here to
attach, or to attempt to attach a legislative amendment, namely, an
amendment dealing with a possible invasion of Haiti--both amendments
being sense-of-the-Senate amendments--the attempt to attach legislative
amendments to an executive matter, the matter in this case being a
nomination.
Mr. President, from the beginning of the Republic, as far as I can
recall, there has never been a legislative amendment added to a
nomination. From the very beginning, the Senate rules have kept
legislation, on the one hand, and executive business--in other words,
treaties and/or nominations--on the other hand, separate. There has
always been that wall between the two.
Mr. President, the Senate rules were adopted in April of 1789. There
were 19 rules adopted in April 1789, and the next day or the day after,
there was a 20th rule adopted. But before the Senate rules were
adopted--and even they were taken in great measure from the rules under
which the First and Second Continental Congresses acted, and the
Congress of the Confederation as well.
Before the Senate rules were adopted by which we operate today, the
Constitution of the United States was adopted. The Constitution of the
United States preceded the U.S. Senate, of course, preceded the
Presidency, the executive branch, and preceded the judiciary.
The Constitution itself established this wall between legislative
business on the one hand and executive business on the other. Senators
only need to read the Constitution to understand that. If Senators will
examine section 5 of article I of the Constitution, in the first
paragraph, they will read as follows:
Each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each
shall constitute a Quorum to do Business;
The Constitution is saying there that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business. It is thereby saying that a
majority of each House may pass legislation, because to do business is,
in large measure, as far as these two bodies are concerned, to pass
legislation--to debate, to amend, and to pass or to reject legislation.
So the Constitution, article I, section 5, states clearly that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Therefore, a majority of each House can enact legislation.
Now, I urge Senators to look at section 2 of article II of the
Constitution. I read therefrom:
He--
Meaning the President of the United States.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; and he--
Meaning the President.
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law.
On the one hand the Constitution is saying legislation can be enacted
by a majority vote, but approval of the resolution of ratification of
treaties will require two-thirds.
Also, the language that I have read, article II, section 2, confines
the advice and consent powers with respect to treaties and nominations
to the Senate. The other body is not given a voice in either the
approval of the resolution of ratification of treaties or the
confirmation of nominations.
So, this Constitution of the United States--created before this
Senate existed, and by which the Senate came into being--established
the wall between legislation on the one hand and executive business on
the other. The wall is created by the Constitution. And the Senate,
from time immemorial, has recognized and respected that constitutional
wall of separation between executive business and legislative business.
The Senate prints a ``Calendar of Business.'' On that Calendar of
Business are legislative matters. On a separate calendar is found the
title ``Executive Calendar.'' And in that calendar are to be found
treaties and nominations. For example, there are two treaties to be
found on page 2 of the Executive Calendar for today. Then beginning on
page 3, there are nominations. So treaties and nominations are kept
separate.
Mr. President, I hope that Senators who are listening will pay
careful attention to what I am saying. I hope that those who are not
listening will perchance read the Record before we have any vote with
regard to any point of order that may be made in respect to the pending
amendments.
This is a slippery slope that we are on. Prometheus stole fire from
the heavens and gave it to the sons of men. Zeus punished Prometheus,
and gave to Pandora, the wife of Epimetheus the brother of Prometheus,
a box in which all of the evils of mankind were enclosed and warned
that the box not be opened. Pandora opened the box out of curiosity,
and all of the evils escaped. Only hope remained.
We are opening up Pandora's box if we go down this slippery slope.
Let us say for a moment that a point of order is made against these
legislative amendments because it is not in order to offer them to a
motion to recommit, with instructions, an executive nomination. And the
Chair, let us say, rules that the point of order is well taken. The
Senate by a simple majority vote can appeal and overrule the Chair.
Where are we then? Pandora's box will have been opened. If we ever set
that precedent here, we will rue the day. If the Senate decides that a
legislative matter may be attached to a nomination--the Constitution
provides that only the Senate will act to confirm nominees--where does
that leave the House? The House is given no part, under the
Constitution, in the confirmation of the nominees. But if legislation
is attached in the Senate, where does that leave the House? The House
expects to be a party, under the Constitution, to the enactment of
legislation.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BYRD. No, not yet, thanks. But I will yield.
The House is not a party to the confirmation of nominees.
Suppose the Senate decides that a legislative matter may be attached
to a treaty. So let us attach the health bill or the crime bill, or
whatever. A treaty requires a two-thirds vote for passage. Amendments
to a treaty only require a majority vote. So we could attach the crime
bill. The Senate could attach campaign finance reform. Where does that
leave the House? It has a voice, according to the Constitution, in the
enactment of legislation. But it has no voice in the approval of the
resolutions of ratification of treaties, which require a two-thirds
vote. So we open all kinds of constitutional Pandora's boxes.
Let us say that the Senate decides that we can attach a legislative
amendment. If the Senate so decides, what is to keep a Senate committee
from doing the same thing? We will have taken a step in that direction,
and the next step will be for a legislative committee that has
jurisdiction over a nomination to do the same thing. Various and sundry
committees have jurisdiction over nominees, depending upon what
committee has jurisdiction over the legislation creating the office to
which an individual is being appointed. If the Senate adopts such a
procedure, who can say that the next step will not be that the
Committee on Armed Services, or the Committee on Commerce, or the
Committee on the Judiciary will decide that on the next nomination that
the committee reports out, a piece of legislation will be attached that
the leader has had difficulty in bringing up in the Senate. If the
majority on that committee has the votes and can attach that
legislation to that nomination, the nomination will be reported to the
Senate and the nomination will go on the Executive Calendar.
I do not know whether Senators are aware of it--I assume most of them
are--but a motion to go to the Executive Calendar is not debatable.
Many Senators may not be aware of the fact that I was a Senate leader
when the precedent was established that a motion could be made to go to
any specific item on the Executive Calendar. Therefore, Mr. President,
I could stand on my feet and say: Mr. President, I move that the Senate
go into executive session to consider the nomination of John Doe on the
Executive Calendar, No. 123, or whatever it is, and that would not be
nondebatable. I established that precedent, that a motion was in order
to go to any particular item on the calendar. Before I established that
precedent, when the Senate went into executive session, it had to go to
the top item on the calendar and work itself down, unless unanimous
consent were given to do otherwise. But the precedent has long been
set, and a nondebatable motion is in order to go to any item on that
executive calendar.
Should the wall of separation be breached, if a committee having
jurisdiction over a nomination wishes to attach legislation to the
nomination and has the votes to do it, then that nomination will be
reported to the Senate, and put on the calendar. When that nomination
is called up--and it can be called up without debate--that piece of
legislation will be before the Senate. The majority leader has been
fussing and fuming, with some justification, about the need to be able
to take up a matter in the Senate without debate or with only a brief
time for debate, 1 or 2 hours, whatever.
At the present time, a motion to proceed to legislative business is
debatable and subject to a filibuster. But, if the Senate approves a
precedent here of allowing legislative matters to be attached to
executive business, then, of course, vice versa, the converse will
ultimately also become the rule. Nominations and treaties will be
attached to legislation. One would expect that development to flow in
time's due course.
Let us take this step down that slippery slope now and the stage will
have been set for the next step for committees to start reporting out
nominations and attaching legislation. The majority leader will then
have his nondebatable motion to proceed to take up legislation. He will
only need to make the nondebatable motion to go to that particular item
on the Executive Calendar and he will have his legislation as a part of
that nondebatable motion.
Our friends on the other side in the minority surely do not want
that. Senators already have great flexibility in the Senate in offering
amendments. There is no rule of germaneness in the Senate. You can call
up any amendment you want to. It does not have to be germane. There is
a little reference to germaneness in Rule XVI dealing with
appropriations bills, but it is only a majority point of order, and
nobody pays much attention to it. Otherwise, there is no rule of
germaneness in the Senate. Senators already have all kinds of leeway to
offer amendments to bills. Surely we do not want to take down that wall
of separation between executive business and legislative business in
order to offer an amendment. We ought not do it. That will create very
difficult far reaching problems.
So let us not breach this wall of separation. I hope that if a vote
comes on such point of order, Senators will uphold the Chair if it
comes to that, because the Chair will surely rule that the pending
legislative amendments are not in order. And in the interest of the
Senate as an institution, and in support of the Constitution, Mr.
President, I hope that Senators will at least weigh what I have said
and, hopefully, they will agree that this is not the thing to do. We
would be cutting off our nose to spite our face.
Briefly, as to the resolutions themselves, I believe that Members
will agree that I am very zealous in my defense of the prerogatives of
this institution.
I believe most of them will agree that I also try to be just as
zealous in upholding the Constitution.
In this situation, I think that the President should have the
approval of this body before he launches an invasion of Haiti under the
current circumstances. I think he has the inherent authority to take
such action in an emergency. He has to have that authority, because if
Congress is not in town and this country is invaded or the lives of
Americans or American fighting men and women are put in jeopardy, the
President would have to act. He has the implied constitutional
authority to take action without prior congressional approval and to
use the military forces of this country in an imminent emergency, but
after such action is taken, there will come a time when the Congress
will have a voice. It can by its actions authorize, explicitly or
implicitly, his use of the military. It can cut off funds.
I hope that Senators will remember that it was I who took the lead in
dealing with Somalia by legislation that set a deadline--I believe it
was March 31--and required that, if the President felt he needed an
extension beyond that time, he had to come back and make his case here,
and that, regardless of any other act, no funds would be available in
that operation after that deadline, set as March 31, no funds.
There is the real bite, the money, the power of the purse. I have
stood on my feet scores of times in this Senate and defended the
legislative control over the purse.
That is what means business. Money is what talks, and the Congress
can cut off the funds. Then all of the President's lawyers can argue
all they wish. He has to have money to keep a war going, to keep the
police action going. He has to have money, and only the Congress can
appropriate, in accordance with the Constitution. I have argued that
time and time again. So I do not need to go over it again here today.
But let nobody kid themselves that either of these sense-of-the-
Senate amendments is going to stop the President. Sense-of-the-Senate
amendments just express the sense of the Senate. That is it, period.
They have no teeth. They do not cut off any money. They do not have the
effect of law. Let us not kid ourselves that either of these amendments
is going to stop the President if, in his judgment, he decides that it
is in the best interests of this country--no matter how much I may
disagree with him--that he has to take action to invade, he will
invade.
There will come a time, however, when Congress will have its bite at
the apple, and it can lay down the limit, as we did in the legislation
on Somalia--go this far, but no farther. If you want to go farther,
come back to the Congress for further authorization and funds. And no
funds may be spent after that date regardless of any other act.
Congress has, in the final analysis, the hammer. Do not kid yourself.
That is why I have stood on my feet many times and opposed efforts to
shift power of the purse to the executive branch. I will always defend
Congress' control over the power of the purse. It is a mighty power. I
will not cede it to any Executive by line-item veto or enhanced
rescissions or anything else. There is where the buck counts and there
is where it stops. Congress can draw that line and say no more money.
That is the end of it.
Senators, do not kid yourselves that either of these amendments is
going to stop the President if he decides to invade Haiti. By the way,
on previous occasions I have voted against the same amendment that Mr.
Mitchell and Mr. Nunn offered today. I voted against it on June 29,
1994. As Mr. Mitchell stated earlier today there were four votes
against it. I was the only Democrat. There were three Republicans and
one Democrat, and mine was the Democratic vote, who voted against it.
And on June 29, 1994, when that vote occurred, Mr. Mitchell said that
that amendment was identical ``in form and substance to an amendment
adopted by the Senate by a vote of 98 to 2 a few months ago.''
I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 5
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. The vote of 98 to 2 to which the majority leader referred
occurred on October 21, 1993. And of the two votes cast against that
amendment at that time, mine was one of the votes.
Those were sense-of-the-Senate amendments. They will not amount to
anything. I voted against both of them, partly because they would not
amount to anything. And there were other reasons which I explained at
the time. I will vote against the pending Mitchell amendment, and I
will vote against the amendment by Mr. McCain if it comes to a vote.
They do not amount to anything. When we pass something, let us pass
something that means something. Neither of these Senate amendments is
binding.
This debate, as I have listened to it, has not been altogether
constructive. A lot of it amounts to second guessing. I do not know
that we are going to invade Haiti. I do not know that the President
intends to invade this week or next week or the next one. I do not
know.
But there may be some very delicate negotiations going on. I do not
know that they are not going on. I have every right to assume that
negotiations are going on or that they will perhaps be going on, who
knows, maybe even now, perhaps tomorrow, perhaps Friday, perhaps
Saturday. I hope we are not giving aid and comfort to Cedras and his
thugs by what we are saying here today.
When Senators want to say that the President should have approval,
under the present circumstances, before he invades Haiti, count me in.
I, too, say he requires congressional approval. But these sense-of-the-
Senate amendments are not going to stop him. If the President of the
United States, in his judgment, feels we should invade, he will do it,
and a sense-of-the-Senate amendment will not stop him.
I think there is the larger issue. I hope the American people who are
listening do not believe that the pending amendments are going to be a
real effort to stay the President's hand. I have never thought much of
sense-of-the-Senate amendments. They usually serve no purpose with
regard to reality except a political purpose but only to put people on
the record. They will look good on 30-second TV spots.
They are not worth a hill of beans when it comes to reality.
I think the President should get the approval of Congress before
acting to invade in the current situation. I certainly do not blame any
Senator for standing up here and expressing his opposition to any
invasion of Haiti without congressional approval. But, the larger
issue, as I see it, is the ability of this President, or any President,
to use the threat of an invasion.
By the way, I think there has been entirely too much of that already.
I think we have threatened and threatened to the point that the
argument is now being used that we have to go into Haiti, or else the
credibility of our country will suffer.
But I think the President has to have the use of a threat of an
invasion as a tool of foreign policy and as a tool of negotiation. If
he is trying to negotiate, he may want to hold over the heads of the
other side the likelihood of an invasion. It is a legitimate tool in
his negotiation arsenal.
Do we want to pull the rug out from under an effort to remove the
offensive Haitian regime through any other means but an invasion? That
may be the result of what we are unwittingly doing here today.
The President will speak to the Nation Thursday night. Let us hear
him out. Let us hear him out and see what he has to say. And he can get
a clear understanding from reading this Record that if an invasion is
ordered, nothing precludes this body--nothing will preclude this
Senator, if I am living and able to stand on my feet, nothing will
prevent me or any other Senator from offering legislation to draw a
line in the sand. I did it in the case of Somalia. Who did it then?
Most everybody else was silent. I did it. What is going to keep me from
doing it again? I am going to protect the prerogatives of this
institution under the Constitution.
If an invasion is ordered, then nothing precludes this body from
passing binding legislation to curtail the length of such an invasion
and to define its mission and to cut off the funds after a certain
date. Let the lawyers in the executive branch contemplate that this
Congress will have a voice, and I will probably be one who will be
lending my voice to whatever action appears to be appropriate at that
time.
But let us hear the President out. Let us see what he has to say. Do
not tie his hands here with this kind of a debate on amendments that
are meaningless, except for political purposes to put somebody on
record. This is not to question the integrity or the good faith of any
Member. I can understand why Members want to stand up here and go on
record. But let us exercise a little caution. We may be hurting our own
cause by engaging in so much debate on meaningless amendments at this
point. Let us first hear what the President has to say to the people of
the Nation tomorrow.
Mr. President, I had offered to yield to my friend from Maine and I
am out of time, but if he wishes me to yield.
Mr. COHEN. I think at a later time. I thank the Senator.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank all Senators.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Mr. COHEN. I now yield to the Senator from Georgia such time as he
may consume, up to 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for up
to 30 minutes.
Mr. COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. President.
The Senate has not resolved this constitutional question as posed by
the eloquent Senator from West Virginia.
I will proceed to discuss the procedures and amendments that are
before us.
Before I begin my discussion, though, I would like to clarify very
strongly the suggestions that were made a little earlier on the floor
by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry], who was suggesting that
there was linkage between the former administration and the former
President in the conduct of the affairs of an invasion.
Former Secretary Baker and former President Bush, I did not hear all
the quotations, were cited as somehow being the beginning of this
process. And this simply is not accurate.
I have in my possession a personal letter from the former President.
I will read only one paragraph of it, but I want to make it absolutely
clear that the former President is not in support of the policy of an
invasion of Haiti. You cannot make linkage from the timeframe in which
the former President and his Cabinet were engaged with Mr. Aristide and
others to this moment. I will read this and then I will set this aside.
I remain unalterably opposed to the use of U.S. force in
Haiti. It would be disastrous for our relations with the rest
of this hemisphere and there is no guarantee at all that
military intervention will bring peace and stability to Haiti
for long.
That is a direct quote from former President George Bush, dated July
28, 1994. And so I hope that whatever is trying to be characterized as
an extension of the policy of that administration to be in support of
the concept of an invasion be put aside and be made clear for all
people and this Senate.
Mr. President, throughout the course of the debate, we have heard,
almost without precedent, linkage of precedents: What about Grenada?
What about Panama? What about the Persian Gulf?
I do not choose to engage in the constitutional arguments related to
that, nor to the relation of one to the other. I am not sure that can
be accomplished.
But, because of the unique nature of this crisis in our hemisphere,
this problem in our hemisphere, the issue of whether or not we should
use force in Haiti is one of broad public knowledge now. This is not
something that occurred over the weekend or in the middle of the night;
something that was not expected. All America has been engaged in this
debate. It is a subject, due to our modern communications, for which
most Americans are reasonably knowledgeable.
There is an understanding of the dilemma: The problems that are being
suffered by the people of Haiti; the fact that this is a country in our
own hemisphere; that refugees are impacting the United States.
They are really not very many secrets about this issue. It is one of
those issues for which a broad population has a reasoned and
knowledgeable feel for the subject. We have been debating it for
months. And somewhere between 6 to 8 out of 10 Americans have come to a
conclusion that the circumstances in Haiti are not reason enough to put
an American son or daughter in harm's way.
And I am puzzled. I am puzzled in light of the overwhelming view of
our people that we would each day inch closer to an invasion --inch
closer to putting Americans in harm's way even in the face of
overwhelming public, not just opinion, but knowledge.
Here is a question. I have not heard much said about the fact that we
have 3,000 Americans in Haiti right now. Over half of this population
are under 18 years of age. Here is the question. Are they safer if we
begin hostilities in Haiti and land thousands of troops and engage in a
firefight? Or are they less safe? If you were going to engage in a
firefight in this situation, should they have been left there or
removed, ordered to be removed?
I contend that no rational person could conclude that the
inauguration of hostile activities, military activities, could do
anything but put those lives in more jeopardy than they are today.
Nothing could make you rationally believe they will be safer.
Another question. What is this Clinton doctrine that we are
establishing by this act, if it were to be carried out? What is the
message that we are sending to the hemisphere? These kinds of
activities establish precedents. We are in a new era. We are in a
defining era. We are defining our relations around the world. So what
are we saying? Are we saying to the hemisphere--and maybe even the
world--that every time there is a domestic crisis, that a democracy
falls because of a military action confined to a given country, that
the U.S. Marines will be sent in to reestablish democracy? Is that what
we are going to do?
You do not have to reflect long that over the last 25 years this
circumstance has happened almost 10 different times. If you were just
visiting this country and you read the criteria that were being
enumerated as the rationale for this invasion and you had been subject
to no other facts and you were asked what is it we are about to do, the
probable answer would be you are about to invade Cuba--where there is a
dictatorship, where human rights violations have occurred for decades,
where there is oppression, where there is destabilization in the
hemisphere and even of our own policy. What doctrine do we establish by
the enumeration of the criteria we have been given to date? Maybe there
will be a revelation that we see Thursday evening, but the criteria
that we have been given to date would suggest that a domestic crisis in
our hemisphere is grounds for military intervention.
In one of the discussions that I had with a very distinguished member
of this administration I was assured that if intervention ever did
occur, it would be comforted by broad hemispheric support; that it
would be an international force. America simply cannot accept the fact
that you have 12,000 to 20,000 U.S. armed personnel and 266 police
officers from Belize or the Bahamas as justification of the
accumulation of an international force. It would almost be better if
that were left aside--alone.
It is reported that this invasion would cost in the range of one-half
billion. I do not know what happened to the America first concept, but
we would be spending in the range of one-half billion dollars to
accomplish the initial phases of this activity. Who is to know what the
costs would be of nation building? These things have real effects. I
read a little-noted column that appeared in one of my periodicals as to
the effect on Fort Benning: The budget cuts to meet the Department of
Defense mandate could delay repairs of the air-conditioning system in
the infantry hall; force layoffs of some of the post's 113 temporary
employees--a hiring freeze; will cut off locally funded training of
civilians, in many cases halt paying soldiers to go elsewhere on
temporary active duty assignments.
These things have consequences right here at home, in my State, in
all of your States. These are enormous sums of money. They have to come
from somewhere. This is where they come from. Employees lose their
jobs. People do not get hired. Construction does not take place.
Training does not take place.
These are the consequences, the costs of pursuing an activity that
the Nation says, ``Don't do, Mr. President.'' This is probably the
reason they do not want him to do it, because they know we have been
paying an inordinate burden and they know that costs us here at home.
I am not going to be long. There has been so much said about this.
But I will say that the idea that has been alluded to--I am going to
say it briefly--the idea that we would go to the United Nations in
search of confirmation for what we are doing and not come to the
Congress I do not believe is a rational process nor do I believe the
American people will find that comforting.
So I am anxious, as the Senator from West Virginia said, to hear the
President tell us. But I just hope and pray we do not have to pay the
price of the loss of any American son or daughter over the crisis as it
exists today. I do not believe you can substantiate a national risk. I
do not believe there are American citizens at risk. I do not believe
this meets longstanding criteria for the use of military force.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am about to yield to my colleague from
Alabama. I just point out briefly, if I can, the statements being
made--and I certainly do not disagree at all, I have said as much--
about the congressional approval before the prior use of force except
in absolute emergency situations. I remind my colleagues--you can go
back through the Record. Unfortunately, you find here a great deal of
inconsistency in terms of some of these remarks and positions people
have taken regarding what action Congress should have taken before the
President of the United States should use force. Again, I do not
disagree here. I think, frankly--we voted twice here almost
unanimously. I agree with Senator Byrd the sense-of-the-Senate
resolutions lack the kind of teeth that an appropriation decision can
have regarding any President's ability to act. But nonetheless I think
it is pretty much universally held here that we would like the
opportunity to vote on these matters.
But if you go back through the Record, and there are some 30
different examples in the last 20 years, you are going to find Members
running into their own remarks about when they thought it was
appropriate to have prior congressional approval and when it was not.
It is usually based on whether or not you thought the particular fact
situation was an appropriate one or not.
Having said that, Mr. President, let me yield whatever time the
distinguished Senator from Alabama wishes, within the confines of the
30 minutes.
May I inquire, by the way, Mr. President, how much time remains on
this side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has approximately 1 hour and 13
minutes.
Mr. DODD. And on the other side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One hour and fifty minutes.
Mr. DODD. Fifty?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. 5-0.
Mr. DODD. How much time does my colleague desire?
Mr. HEFLIN. Ten minutes.
Mr. DODD. I yield up to 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Alabama.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ford). The Senator from Alabama.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, the ongoing debate over the threatened
military invasion of Haiti has come down largely to an either-or
proposition. Those who support military intervention emphasize
political and humanitarian concerns, and believe that economic
sanctions will not work and will continue to place unacceptable burdens
on Haiti's poverty-stricken population.
They stress the need for the United States to maintain--or regain--
international and regional leadership as a trustworthy supporter of
democracy, which they equate with the return of President Aristide.
They note that the Haitian military is small, poorly trained and
equipped, and unable to oppose American forces. Their view is of a
short-term military operation, with a longer nation-building period to
establish a new government infrastructure.
Most proponents recommend that the United States seek international
participation in any military actions, and act with the authority of
the United States or the Organization of American States, or the United
Nations.
Those who oppose a military invasion of Haiti at this time have grave
concerns about proposals for direct military action. They cite the
reluctance of our allies to participate; stretched resources; and the
possibility of a nation-building project with no foreseeable end. Our
experience in Somalia has no doubt contributed to this cautious
approach. Indeed, our previous involvement in Haiti from 1915 through
1934 showed the futility of establishing a lasting, stable, and
democratic government there.
The arguments against an invasion of Haiti are persuasive and I am
opposed to a military land invasion. When we hear talk of restoring
democracy in Haiti, we are really hearing an oxymoron: This poor island
nation has never had any democracy to be restored. It is important to
distinguish between the democratic methods by which officials like
President Aristide come to power from an actual democratic form of
government. One is a process, an election method; the other is a way of
life. Haiti did finally enjoy the process, but certainly not the way of
life, and it is questionable if it ever would have, even if President
Aristide had remained in power.
Additionally, whenever we contemplate military action, we must take
into account each and every member of the Armed Forces who would be
required to put their lives on the line. American casualties must be
anticipated, whether through hostile action or by accident. While
significant casualties through actual combat during a landing would
likely be minimal, the characteristics of such an invasion would,
nevertheless, make them almost inevitable. This would be a particular
threat if the Haitian military were to blend into the general
population and continue sporadic attacks on American Forces. U.S.
Forces might also have to contend with terrorists still loyal to ``Baby
Doc'' Duvalier, who have recently enjoyed a resurgence. While at odds
with the present Haitian military, his terrorist organization has a
strong dislike for President Aristide.
Haitian casualties would also increase if President Aristide's
supporters began to exact retribution upon supporters of the current
regime, placing Americans squarely in the middle. Although the
possibility of extended and substantial Haitian resistance is
considered slim, sporadic harassment, sniping, and sabotage would
require a significant commitment of forces to quell and would
necessarily delay the establishment of a fully democratic civil regime.
In my judgment, many of the concerns on both sides of the argument
are valid. I do not believe, however, that an either-or debate
addresses the real issues in Haiti nor the real reasons used to justify
an invasion. Instead, there are concrete steps that we can take which
will ultimately garner the desired results--the removal of Haiti's
illegitimate military dictators and a resolution to the refugee
problem. While they may take longer to accomplish than with a military
land invasion, these steps would be acceptable to the American people.
Conversely, no one in this Chamber would argue that an invasion--land
invasion--has the support of the public at this time, since it is not
clear, beyond the immigration issue, what our national interests there
are.
First, we must make the current economic embargo more enforceable. An
effective naval blockade and a multinational military force along the
border with the Dominican Republic would virtually cut off what little
imports are getting through to Haiti now. The Dominican Republic has
made efforts to cooperate with such efforts. This needs to be
substantially beefed up.
There are not a great number of roads that go from the Dominican
Republic into Haiti. They are limited. These can be substantially
blocked. You look also at the fact that you have to transport supplies
through vehicles and other things to make some substantial impact, and
I believe that a much-beefed-up Border Patrol there, using troops from
many nations, can substantially enforce the embargo.
A naval blockade which operates near the shore can effectively stop
small boat traffic between Haiti and the Dominican Republic with little
danger to the lives of American service members. Frigates and the
modern versions of PT boats can be effectively used. Our aircraft
carriers and their support forces are uniquely well qualified to help
in such an operation. Air fields that could be used in the Dominican
Republic and other surrounding islands could be effectively used for an
airport in regard to patrolling. The embargo should be given time to
work effectively. No arbitrary timetable should force us to invade and
abandon the measures we already have in place.
Second, we must institute immediate and comprehensive immigration
reform. The United States cannot take into its borders each and every
refugee and immigrant, even if they are from within our hemisphere.
Immigration reform is long overdue.
Third, we can work with our allies in Latin American countries to
help resolve the refugee problem, which is largely driving our Haiti
policy. Latin America benefits tremendously from our Caribbean Basin
initiative, these nations should accept a certain number of these
refugees, and when you divide it out among all of the more than 20
Caribbean Basin initiative countries, you can find that they could take
a large number of these refugees. Countries who refuse to cooperate
could see certain trade incentives granted through the Caribbean Basin
initiative withdrawn. We have provided great incentives for Latin
American nations to cooperate with the United States. I think, however,
they should be reminded of these incentives rather than being
threatened with their withdrawal.
This three-pronged strategy would make the current regime in Haiti
understand that we are serious about their departure, while at the same
time safeguarding the lives of our young men and women in uniform.
These are all credible alternatives to a military invasion, which if
pursued in conjunction with each other would ultimately succeed, in my
judgment. For those calling for an immediate invasion, I ask, what is
the urgency? Can we not effect a change in Haiti without hastily
risking American lives?
I want to take a moment to remind my colleagues of an amendment to
the Foreign Operations appropriations bill for 1995 that passed this
body by a vote of 93 to 5. It expresses the sense of the Senate that no
funds appropriated under the act or any other act should be expended in
Haiti unless: First, authorized by Congress; second, is necessary to
protect or evacuate United States citizens from a situation of imminent
danger; or third, the deployment is vital to United States national
security interests.
This sense of the Senate amendment sets forth more conditions under
which military action may be taken, but based only on these three
provisions, it is clear that a military invasion of Haiti should not
occur.
It has been said over and over again, but bears repeating: The United
States cannot and should not serve as the world's police force.
Certainly, we should be a supporter, encourager, and, where possible,
promoter or democracy around the world. But we should not and cannot be
its enforcer throughout the world, even if the place in question is in
our back yard.
The fundamental bottom line of the use of American military land
forces, any where in the world, must be in our own national interest.
Again, what is our national interest in Haiti beyond solving the
refugee problem--a problem that can be addressed through immigration
reform and the cooperation of our Latin American allies? Let us give a
100-percent effort toward enforcing the embargo rather than risking
American lives. At the minimum, we should fully debate the issue in
Congress, and every supporter of an invasion be put on record as
explaining why an invasion of Haiti is in our interests, or why, on the
other hand, they oppose such an invasion.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky as
much time as he may consume up to 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ford). The Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the Senator from Maine.
Mr. President, the reason the public is so strongly opposed to an
invasion is there are far more questions than answers about the step
that the administration is planning to take.
Like other members, I have been informed of the President's decision
to carry out a military invasion of Haiti. When this mistake will be
made remains somewhat unclear, but the fact that it is a mistake to
invade without answering some very basic questions is absolutely clear.
In the past, I have been a stalwart supporter of Presidential
prerogative in the conduct of foreign affairs, in fact have repeatedly
voted to guarantee the President maximum flexibility in Somalia,
Bosnia, as well as Haiti.
But I was so troubled by the administration's inability to answer
some fundamental questions about this imminent action that I cannot in
good conscience support the President's determination to move forward.
Let me review the questions that I believe must be resolved prior to
any serious consideration of an invasion.
First, why are we going in?
Deputy Secretary Talbott tells me there are five reasons: democracy,
human rights, refugees, the post-cold-war order, and American
credibility.
Given those criteria, I asked him why we were not invading Cuba. He
had two answers. First, in Haiti we were protecting the outcome of an
election--there was a principle at stake. Well, I believe democracy is
as important as every Member of this Chamber, but we start down a
slippery slope if we are engaging in military action to defend the
outcome of elections rather than our national security interests. It is
a very short step from defending Mr. Aristide's right to office, to
intervening if we feel a nation's elections have not been free and
fair. Do we really want to change this Nation's image from that of
election monitors to election mercenaries?
Mr. Talbott's second reason why Haiti and Cuba differed involved a
so-called risk-benefit analysis. He pointed out Cuba had a standing
army of 170,000 men--Haiti has only 7,000. I am not sure about the
accuracy of his Cuban Army figure, but I find it shocking that we only
consider invading weaker nations. This is a dangerous mind set sending
a signal around the world which compromises the credibility of the
threat of force and our ability to secure vital national interests.
As to the legitimacy of the remaining arguments about the need to
establish guidelines for conduct in the post-cold-war world and
demonstrating American leadership, I am not sure Haiti should serve as
a proving ground. If there are doubts about American credibility, they
are certainly of the Administration's making. Who can forget the tragic
events surrounding the arrival of the U.S.S. Harlan? The image of an
American ship turned back by a small band of thugs armed with sticks
was truly a low point in American history.
I do not think we should risk lives in a misguided effort to recover
from the Administration's self-inflicted wounds and sagging
international reputation.
I find myself not only questioning the five reasons offered as the
very premise for this invasion, I am deeply worried about the plans and
tactics as they have been briefed to me. Let me turn to other questions
that remain unanswered on the eve of invasion.
What are our immediate invasion objectives? Ambassador Albright has
said the military junta must leave office and the island. She is
publicly contradicted by Secretary Christopher who has said this past
weekend that they only need to leave office.
There is an obvious follow-on question: after we figure out what we
do with Army Commander General Cedras, his Chief of Staff, General
Biamby, and police commander, Colonel Francois, are there other members
of the military who we are interested in ousting? In our conversation,
Deputy Secretary Talbott often referred to the ``bad guys''--I guess I
am still unclear who all the bad guys are. Here again, I think this is
a question that should be answered before, not after, an invasion.
Not only can the administration not agree on the limited initial
objectives, it is unclear who will be in charge of executing
the invasion.
We know that the President went to the United Nations to approve
using all necessary means to facilitate the departure of the military
junta in keeping with the Governor's Island accords. I was told that
this was indeed a United Nations operation for which the United States
will provide the overwhelming element of force. But I am haunted by the
shadow of Somalia and Bosnia where fuzzy command and control lines
between United States troops and U.N. commanders complicated the task
and cost American lives. When the Secretary welcomes the participation
of 17 nations, without defining their roles or missions, I see the
potential for chaos. I find myself questioning whether this is a
political coalition or a serious military force.
The basic question of who is in charge should be answered before we
go into Haiti, not after. Our soldiers should not be the sorry victims
of another on-the-job U.N. learning experience.
So, proceeding along the time-line of invasion, let us assume 20,000
Americans have now landed in Haiti. As soon as the situation
stabilizes, I have been told we will turn over security to a local
police force supervised by 500 international observers or monitors.
Well, we all know from Somalia that stabilizing a situation sometimes
takes longer than a day or two.
Questions bearing on the security of our soldiers must be addressed
before we go into Haiti, not after. It is likely that 20,000 young men
and women will be asked to restore and maintain security in a hostile
environment. While I do not overestimate the military threat posed by
the Haitian military, I am troubled by the prospect of Americans
patrolling the violent slums of Port-au-Prince. Who is the enemy? When
can they open fire? What are the rules of engagement?
Our Nation was shocked to learn American marines were unarmed in
Beirut. We could not believe the U.S.S. Harlan had to withdraw because
our soldiers were not armed or equipped to handle any kind of security
crisis. Families and friends deserve to know before we send in soldiers
that they are well equipped, well prepared and fully capable of
protecting themselves from hostile fire. Again, we need to know the
terms of engagement in advance, not once the invasion is underway.
I hope we will quickly reach the point where we can turn over
security to a local police force supervised by international monitors.
So, the obvious question needing an answer is who will make up both the
local and international contingents.
The first answer I got was horrifying. The administration intends to
draw some police from the ranks of the refugees at Guantanamo. If
indeed these refugees are the legitimate victims of political
persecution and possible torture, they strike me as precisely the wrong
people to be recruiting. At a minimum, they are justifiably angry about
the circumstances which forced them to flee Haiti, and I would not be
the least surprised if revenge was very much on their collective mind.
Turning Haitians from Guantanamo into a professional constabulary is
like arming the Crips and the Bloods to patrol the streets of Los
Angeles.
As to the international police monitors, I have heard that the
Israelis may contribute 30 men, but otherwise no one has specifically
offered to accept these responsibilities. We know we need 500 police
monitors; the administration just does not know who is willing to
perform those duties.
I hope we are not anticipating an extended, risky peacemaking role
for American men and women. But if the administration cannot answer who
will volunteer to become peace enforcement officers, I fear the burden
will fall to the United States. As with all my other questions, I think
the administration should answer this question before we invade, not
after.
Mr. President, I would like to tell my constituents that the
administration has exhausted every policy option and it is in America's
interests to join forces with an international coalition to restore
democracy in our back yard.
I want to offer that assurance to a confused and deeply divided
public. But I cannot.
As we anticipate a major invasion and use of American military force,
too many vital questions remain unanswered: Who will command and
control the lives of American soldiers in this U.N. operation? Once we
land in Haiti, who is the enemy and what are the terms of engagement?
Will we end up in yet another misguided nation building, peace
enforcement mission in the name of restoring Aristide to office?
In January 1991, President Bush asked Congress for approval to use
force to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. By any measure it was
one of the most illuminating and remarkable debates I have experienced
in my years in the U.S. Senate--a difficult decision for all of us.
I would like to call my colleagues' attention to some of the concerns
raised at that time by Members on the other side of the aisle. Some of
my colleagues understandably questioned the strength and stability of
the coalition when it actually came under fire.
Senator Biden declared,
The truth is that the alleged coalition consists, at least
at this point, of little more than a few self interested . .
. governments who are all too ready to see American forces
committed to battle for reasons which have absolutely nothing
to do with the new world order about which we hear so much.
His comments were echoed by Senator Kennedy, who commented,
We have arrayed an impressive military coalition . . . but
when the bullets start flying, 90 percent of the casualties
will be American. It is hardly a surprise that so many other
nations are willing to fight to the last American to achieve
the goals of the United Nations. It is not their sons and
daughters that will do the dying.
Fortunately, casualties were low. With clear U.S. leadership, the
coalition worked together effectively. This time, as the invasion date
looms, who is participating, the actual number of troops they will
commit, their mandate and mission all remain unresolved? Perhaps, we
should heed the early warnings of Senators Kennedy and Biden.
In addition to the strength of the coalition, there appeared to be
near unanimous concern about the wisdom of taking a nation to war when
the country was divided.
Senator Harkin noted, ``If the country is divided on this issue, it
is because the President has not made his case to the American
people.''
Senator Bradley said, ``I can tell you the country is deeply divided.
When a country is not totally united, it is not a good time to go to
war.''
My colleague, Senator Leahy, chairman of the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee warned us that, ``Politically, morally, and even
militarily, we must not go to war if it is not supported by the
American people. Vietnam proved that truth.''
Senator Kennedy agreed telling us that President Bush had missed the
tragic lesson of Vietnam and ``that it is a grave mistake to take a
divided America to war. Unless and until the American people support a
war the Congress has no business authorizing war.''
Many Members have already pointed out that recent polls reflect that
73 percent of Americans oppose this invasion, and virtually everyone is
confused as to the President's purpose. We all hope he will clarify his
agenda and unite this Nation in his address to the Nation.
But whether he is able to or not, I believe it is in the interests of
this President and the Presidency to seek and support a full debate in
the Congress of his intention to use force to reinstate President
Aristide and restore democracy to Haiti. I deeply respect the
Constitution and Presidential prerogative and do not wish to encroach
on the constitutional powers of the Executive Office.
I share the frustration of a majority of my colleagues who believe we
are being denied an opportunity to debate and vote on a matter
affecting the lives of 20,000 American men and women.
Let me close with an eloquent statement made by a colleague during
the debate over the Persian Gulf:
The issue of the President's willingness to comply not just
with what Congress decides but with the Constitution itself
has been the source of serious and unnecessary confusion and
has complicated the country's ability to come to grips with
this crisis. The plain sense of our Constitution, supported
by the full weight of history and jurisprudence, says that
the President was never meant to have the power to order this
Nation to war: that this power was vested in Congress after
the most careful deliberation by our Founders for reasons
that are absolutely as valid now as they were then.
This was advice offered in 1991 by then-Senator Gore.
Whether one agrees with this constitutional division of power,
President Bush understood that it was important to secure the support
of the public and their representatives in Congress prior to engaging
in war in the gulf.
President Bush drew a distinction between the events precipitating
intervention in Grenada and Panama and those surrounding the decision
to deploy force in the Persian Gulf. In Grenada and Panama crises
erupted and military action was in response to urgent threats to
American citizens and interests. In Grenada, 53 days elapsed from the
time we launched Operation Urgent Fury to the withdrawal of troops. In
Panama, Just Cause troops were in and out in 58 days.
Haiti has been in crisis for decades, the most recent cycle beginning
in September 1991. After working this problem for 18 months, the
current administration plans will leave several thousand troops in
Haiti through 1996. In Haiti, there has not been and there is not now
an immediate emergency that could arguably stand in the way of the
Senate's careful and serious consideration of this issue.
I think it would be tragic if we were denied the opportunity to vote
prior to the President committing Americans to another U.S. operation.
Whether we are denied the chance to express our views and judgment
with a vote, we still have an obligation to the 20,000 Americans who
will be deployed in harm's way--we have a responsibility to their
friends and families--to make sure questions are asked and answered, we
must challenge the administration's plans, and guarantee that they are
thinking as clearly about the security of American soldiers as they are
about their perception of American political leadership and
credibility.
Mr. President, in summary there are basic questions which must be
answered before an invasion of Haiti would seem to make any sense
whatsoever. I, like many of us, have had a conversation with Secretary
Talbot in the last 24 hours. Actually, it was a conversation at some
length. We went over the questions that seem to this Senator--and I
think to most Senators--to be appropriate for discussion. The questions
which the administration has not answered it seems to me, at the very
least are the following:
First, why are we invading? Mr. Talbot says democracy, human rights,
refugees, the post-cold-war world, and U.S. credibility. Democracy,
human rights, refugees, the post-cold-war world and U.S. credibility.
That is why, Secretary Talbott says, we are invading.
Now, these are far too generic criteria, far too generic. Actually,
they apply to Cuba, which raises the obvious: Why are we not invading
Cuba? The same criteria apply to that other Caribbean nation nearby.
We also need to know what are our immediate invasion objectives?
Ambassador Albright says the junta must leave office and the island--
and the island. Secretary Christopher says that they just have to leave
office.
Now, once we decide the immediate objectives, we need to have a
better understanding of who is in charge. This is a U.N. operation, Mr.
President. We all know the price of committing U.S. soldiers to U.N.
command. The administration has not yet established clear lines of
command and control.
Now, of course, they would say 17 nations have signed up to
participate, but we obviously need to know before we invade what their
roles and missions are. If the 17 nations are going to have troops
there, what are they going to do? Well, we are told that once the
situation is stabilized, we will turn over security to a local police
force monitored by 500 international observers. We need to know before
we invade what are the rules of engagement for American troops as they
try to establish a stable situation. We need to be sure that we are not
once again engaging in peace enforcing without a full understanding of
the consequences.
We need to know whether anyone has committed to monitor the police.
Has anyone agreed to serve in the police force?
Well, the questions could go on and on. A number of them have
obviously been asked here today. What is particularly troubling, Mr.
President, is that we are on the eve of an invasion and we have few
answers, very few answers. And so it is not surprising that the public
is so confused.
In the wake of this absence of explanation, I suppose it is not
surprising that 73 percent of the American public oppose the invasion.
I do not want to make the argument, Mr. President, I will not make the
argument, that just because the public at the outset is opposed to the
invasion it still might not be in America's best interest. That
argument was made by some with regard to the Persian Gulf war to
justify their opposition to that war. But certainly, when 73 percent
are opposed, at the very least the President should give us and give
the American public--and hopefully he will do that tomorrow night--some
clear indication of how our national security interests are involved in
invading Haiti.
I, for one, am willing to listen, but I must tell you, Mr. President
and my colleagues, it seems to me, as others have probably said, it is
not worth a single life, not worth a single life of any American
soldier unless the President can make a national security argument.
It is too bad we are not having this debate in the context of some
kind of resolution of approval. In my view--and I think any careful
student of this would reach the same conclusion--the fact situation
does not fit the pattern in Grenada. It does not fit the pattern in
Panama, where there was an urgent crisis that involved the use of
American troops.
We have been discussing this for 18 months, Mr. President. This is a
thoroughly premeditated invasion. There is apparently an absence of any
Americans in Haiti in distress. There is no rational basis upon which
the President could not conclude that this premeditated invasion,
discussed for over 18 months, should not be submitted to the Congress
for some kind of approval resolution.
Where is the emergency? Where is the national security interest of
the United States? In the absence of an emergency, in the absence of a
security interest, or a national security interest on the part of the
United States, why are we sending American troops into harm's way? A
very, very important question.
I, for one, would be open to listening to the President make a
national security interest argument. I asked Secretary Talbot for that
argument yesterday. It is clear the administration cannot make such an
argument because it is perfectly obvious to any, even most casual
observer of international affairs that our national security interests
do not lie in Haiti.
I wonder about the propriety of establishing the principle that we
should go about the world restoring deposed regimes as a matter of
American foreign policy.
My goodness. If our goal is to restore deposed regimes, I suspect
there will be a long list. Who is going to be in charge of the
Government in Haiti, it seems to me, is a question for the Haitians,
which is not an endorsement of deposing any particular regime. But the
question clearly remains, is it in America's national security interest
to restore deposed regimes in countries that have no bearing on
America's national security interest? That is what is before us.
So, Mr. President, even though President Clinton believes, I suppose,
that this will be a largely successful adventure, hopefully involving
no loss of life on our side, you still have to ask the question: At
what expense do we engage in this kind of activity? I do not have
before me the cost of this to date. But it is substantial already.
There seems to be no constituency for it in the United States outside
of possibly a very narrow constituency with a rather provincial concern
in this particular country; no broad American interest in this.
So, Mr. President, I think it is particularly ill advised. I think
the American public will resent that the American Congress, elected by
them, has not been asked for approval of this deployment of American
troops.
So it is too bad that we have come to this point. I wish the
President had chosen to do the otherwise. But this is where we are.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham].
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I at this late hour will limit myself to
discussing two questions in this debate expecting that we will have
opportunities in the next few days or weeks to discuss the other
aspects of our relationship to the circumstances in Haiti.
But I would like to talk first about what are the United States
national interests in Haiti which justify our participation in an
international use of force; second, is this in fact a political
military adventure which is related to the special circumstances of the
current administration?
Before I discuss the first question, I would like to try to put this
in some context. For the last almost half century, the United States
has had a foreign policy which was driven by the nature of our
enemies--during World War II, the Axis Powers; and since the end of
World War II, the Soviet Union. Our foreign policy essentially was a
policy of asking the question: Who are our friends and who are our
enemies? We supported our friends and we opposed our enemies. We also
had a policy that was based on the concept of containment of the Soviet
Union, to avoid the Soviet Union extending its reach beyond the borders
that were established at the end of World War II.
The Soviet Union now has collapsed. America no longer has the easy
touchstone to determine what its foreign policy objectives are going to
be--questions such as: Does this nation support our enemy; does this
nation have hostile military capabilities and intentions directed
towards the United States? These no longer can be the sole criteria by
which the United States judges what its foreign policy objectives in
this new era should be.
Let me suggest what I think should be at least two of our guiding
principles. One of those principles is that we have a very significant
national interest in the deepening, nurturing, and maturing of
democratic institutions. We know that democratic institutions, states
which are elected and given legitimacy by their people, are very
unlikely to enter into hostile combat with other democratic states that
have a similar legitimacy. We also know that states that have
democratic governments tend to be stable and predictable, and that they
are the governments that are most likely to respect the rights of their
own people and provide political and economic systems that will give to
their people the greatest breadth of opportunity. Those are the kinds
of nations that the United States has a very strong national interest
in promoting and protecting.
Second, in this new cold-war era, I believe in the principle that
there will be an assumption of special responsibility based on
geographic proximity. One of the reasons that I have been reticent for
the United States to become overly involved in Bosnia is because I
think Bosnia is primarily a European issue. I believe that European
democracies should shoulder the first line of responsibility as it
relates to the world's concern about the conditions and incidents that
are occurring in that beleaguered country.
Just as I believe that it is appropriate that we look to countries
such as England and France to have the primary responsibility in
Bosnia, I believe that it is to the United States that the world
appropriately looks for leadership within the Western hemisphere. This
has historically been an area of special concern to the United States.
The Monroe Doctrine was one of the first principles of American foreign
policy. It is an area in which we have a special knowledge, affinity,
and a mutuality of future interests.
We spent much of last year debating the North American Free Trade
Agreement. In my judgment, that agreement is but a harbinger of what is
likely to follow, and that is a closer economic integration among the
nations of the Western Hemisphere. For that goal to be realized, it is
in our interest that we have democratic countries within the Western
Hemisphere with which we can deal.
So those two principles--the United States has a fundamental national
interest in the protection and advancement of the concept of democracy,
and that we have a special role and responsibility in terms of the
democracies of the Western Hemisphere--form the backdrop for the
discussion as to what are the particular United States interests in
Haiti. I would suggest, Mr. President, that those interests, interests
which in my judgment equate to a sufficient U.S. national interest to
justify our participation in an international force to restore
democracy to Haiti, include the following:
The protection of a democratic government. Haiti has had a very sad,
stressful 200-year history. It was not until 1990 that there was an
internationally recognized free and fair election held in that country.
That election took place after some three decades of despotic rule.
That newly elected government, which received the international stamp
of legitimacy, resulted in one candidate receiving over two-thirds of
the vote. That candidate, President Aristide, assumed his elected
office in February 1991. He served for less than 8 months. It was this
month of September in 1991 when he was deposed by an old-style military
coup d'etat.
I believe that Haiti stands for more than just an individual, elected
President Aristide, and it stands for more than just the democracy of
that one nation. It stands for our commitment to the protection of
democracies within this hemisphere.
The United States is a member of the Organization of American States
which, just a few weeks before this military coup, had adopted a
resolution in which all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, all
of the democracies of the Western Hemisphere, had jointly committed
themselves to the protection of the concept of democracy among the
member States.
I believe that there is a very serious message to be sent if the
United States abandons that commitment. That message is that other
democracies are likely to find little beyond rhetorical support if they
become threatened. We have in this hemisphere many democracies which
are relatively new and fragile. In fact, 25 years ago, if you had
counted the number of democracies in the Western Hemisphere, you could
have done so on the fingers of your hand.
Today, all of the nations of the Western Hemisphere are democracies,
with the exception of two--Cuba and Haiti. But in those new
democracies, there are many sons and grandsons of the former military
dictators who are waiting in the barracks for their opportunity to
assume what they often consider to be their rightful national
leadership. Haiti will be a test of whether there is a resolve to
protect these fragile democracies against a potential domino of efforts
and military coups.
It is significant, Mr. President, that since Haiti, there have been
three attempts to depose democracies within the Western Hemisphere.
Fortunately, two of those failed, and a third is being reborn. Those
are just indicators of what would happen if Haiti were to be allowed to
become permanently under the rule of a military dictator.
A second issue which I believe makes this important to the United
States is the tremendous rise in human rights abuses in Haiti. Haiti is
a country which, unfortunately, has had a history of human rights
abuses. But never in that long two centuries history have the abuses
reached the level that they have in the last 3 years.
The United States State Department has, this week, released a report
on human rights abuses in Haiti. It is significant that the report was
issued by the United States State Department and not by the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, which had been the agency that had been observing
and reporting on human rights abuses in Haiti. The reason that the
United Nations is no longer issuing the reports is because this
dictatorial regime has kicked out U.N. human rights observers. They
have denied to the world the opportunity to personally see, understand,
and report on what is happening to the people of Haiti.
The report issued by the State Department gives some of the following
information that illustrates what is occurring in that country: Over
3,000 Haitian civilians, including many who were political supporters
of President Aristide, have been killed during this 3-year reign of
terror; over 300,000 persons have been driven into hiding; military and
paramilitary forces have used politically motivated rape, aimed at
terrorizing opponents of the regime as well as of the general
population.
Though the democratically approved constitution of 1987 calls for the
establishment of a police force separate from and independent of the
military, the armed forces have retained control of the police
function. They have effectively turned a security institution into an
institution of terror.
The consequences of the loss of democracy, the consequences of human
rights abuses in Haiti are not restricted to that island. We in the
United States, Mr. President, are feeling some of the resonance of
those evil deeds. We have seen a surge in refugees from Haiti. We have,
today, at our naval station in Guantanamo, Cuba, over 14,000 Haitians
who have left their country and have sought safe haven at our naval
base. We are opening bases throughout the Caribbean for the refugees
who have left the tyrannies of Cuba and Haiti. This immigration crisis
has had a direct impact on the United States, and as long as this
regime stays in power, it will constitute a continuing threat to the
United States.
A second area of consequence to the United States is the fact that
Haiti has become a significant transshipment point for drugs.
Essentially, the military dictators have sold the sovereignty of Haiti
to the drug cartels of Latin America, so that that country can be used
for the purposes of refueling, storage, and other important steps that
facilitate the transport of drugs into the United States.
Mr. President, American credibility is on the line in terms of our
actions in Haiti. We have tried for the better part of 3 years through
negotiations, through diplomacy, through international intervention,
through economic sanctions and embargoes to create a condition in which
the military coup leaders would voluntarily cede power to President
Aristide. After almost 36 months, none of those have worked, and none
of them show any reasonable prospect of working in the future.
In my judgment, that brings us to a fork in our national credibility
road. One of those forks leads to acquiescence, to accommodation,
essentially to capitulation and surrender to the coup in Port-au-
Prince. The other is to put behind our words the strength of the
international community with a credible threat and a willingness to use
force. By not following through on our commitments to restore democracy
to Haiti, the United States would be abandoning its efforts to oust the
illegitimate, sadist regime and would be capitulating on its commitment
to the restoration of democracy.
The consequences of this policy of inaction are a continued and
tragic escalation in human rights abuses, renewed immigration crises,
the expansion of the renegade regime's use of state powers, drug
trafficking, and other illegal activities.
Mr. President, I recognize that it is a matter of judgment,
particularly when we are without the kind of easy standards to direct
our international behavior that we had prior to the fall of the Soviet
Union. It is a matter of judgment as to whether those factors equal a
sufficient United States national interest to warrant the use of the
United States military force in a multinational effort to restore
democracy to Haiti. My judgment tells me that that test has been met.
Mr. President, let me turn to the second question, and that is, is
this national interest being manipulated by the current administration
for its own purposes?
The fact is that many in Congress have attempted to paint America's
foreign policy toward Haiti as the Clinton policy, initiated and
developed solely by the current administration.
Mr. President, history will not support that characterization. The
American policy toward Haiti was not born with the Clinton
administration. It is a bipartisan response to a September 1991 coup
developed during the Bush administration and continued by the Clinton
administration. President Bush made clear from the outset that the
restoration of the Aristide government is an important goal of United
States foreign policy.
In the month after the coup, President Bush made the following
statement:
Grave events in Haiti that are continuing to disrupt the
legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected
government * * * continue to constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States.
Those are not the words of Bill Clinton. Those are the words of
George Bush.
The President, however, was not alone in stating the United States
interests in Haiti.
On October 2, 1991, the then Secretary of State James Baker addressed
the Organization of American States. Our colleague, Senator Kerry of
Massachusetts, has placed in the Record the full statement by the
Secretary of State on that occasion. Therefore, I will not repeat but a
portion of that statement. The Secretary of State stated:
This junta is illegitimate. It has no standing in the
democratic community. Until President Aristide's government
is restored, this junta will be treated as a pariah
throughout this hemisphere--without assistance, without
friends, and without a future.
The Secretary of State continued:
If these steps--
The steps that the Organization of American States was committed to
take--
do not succeed, we must consider additional steps. Those who
pretend to govern Haiti should know: The path they have
chosen leads nowhere.
Mr. President, this is a policy which has had strong support, both
with a Republican administration, which presided over the Haitian
crisis for the better part of 16 months, and now a Democratic
administration, which has presided over this for an additional 20
months.
Mr. President, there is only one group that will take heart by a
vacillation in the United States resolve to restore democracy to Haiti,
and that one group are the people who stole democracy in Haiti.
I submit to the Senate what I consider to be some words of wisdom
that were uttered on January 12, 1991, at another time when American
resolve was being tested, and this was the question of whether the
United States would authorize the President to use force in repelling
the invasion of Kuwait and occupation of that country by Iraq. One of
our colleagues made the following statement:
Mr. President, I am prayerfully hopeful that, if we act
affirmatively today in supporting the President, we can yet
have a peaceful solution in the Middle East. I believe there
is only one thing that we can do that might bring Saddam
Hussein to his senses, and that is to use our vote today to
affirm the leadership of our President, to assure that
America speaks with one clear voice for peace. * * * Now is
not the time at this late hour, at this critical moment, to
change the position of the United States of America. Now,
more than ever, we must speak with one clear voice, and
ultimately, that is the voice of the President.
I commend my colleague, the senior Senator from Texas, for his wisdom
on January 12, 1991, and I submit that wisdom is valid today.
If we have any hope of resolving this crisis without the use of
force, it is to convince the military leaders in Haiti that we are
prepared to use force. If they believe that their choices are limited
to a voluntary exit from Haiti or an involuntary exit from Haiti, I
believe there is some chance that we might be able to end this crisis
without the use of force.
That was the theory that was advanced by the Senator from Texas as it
related to Saddam Hussein. Unfortunately, the theory did not work in
Iraq. I believe that it might work in Haiti but only if we show that
resolve.
So, Mr. President, I believe that this is not a Clinton initiative.
It is not a Bush initiative. It is not a Republican or Democratic
initiative. It is an American commitment to some principles that are
going to be critically important in this country in the post-cold-war
era. How this crisis is resolved will set the stage for how many other
crises are resolved. How this crisis is resolved will underscore how
America's credibility will be seen in the years ahead, whether we will
have the opportunity to live in the world and particularly in a
hemisphere of democracies, peace, economic growth, and prosperity. A
sense of common purpose will in significant part be determined by the
actions that we are taking on this issue in that small, distressed
nation of Haiti.
I urge that we show a resolve and a recognition of the significance
of the decision that we are making, and that we support the President
in the actions that he has taken; that we support this Nation in terms
of the defense of our national interest represented in Haiti, and the
symbol that it will be for the future of democracy in the Western
Hemisphere.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may consume to the
Senator from Virginia, not to exceed 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized for up
to 30 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank my
distinguished colleague from Maine.
Mr. President, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from
Florida. Senator Graham and I have worked together and collaborated on
many issues. We serve together on the Intelligence Committee.
Just yesterday, the Senate adopted a resolution with respect to the
former Yugoslavia, primarily relating to the situation in the conflict
between the Moslems and the Serbs, and we worked hand in hand together
on that.
It is interesting how I will now speak to a goal which is quite
opposite from that of my good friend from Florida, but I wish to say to
him I respect his position, as I hope he will respect the one that I
take.
I think the fact that the two of us have worked together and our work
product was adopted yesterday exemplifies the fact that this Chamber is
divided on this issue. It is not along partisan lines, as my colleague
said. It is along the lines of each individual drawing on the
respective experiences we have had.
Mr. President, I just want to pick up on a line from my distinguished
colleague from Florida about the future and how this action, should it
be undertaken in the form of a military invasion using primarily U.S.
forces, will have very long-range implications for our country.
My colleague from Florida says it establishes U.S. credibility. That
is a point on which I respectfully differ. I think the United States
has credibility second to none in the world as of this very moment.
My concern is that it establishes a precedent--and I see my
distinguished friend from Connecticut here--a precedent in that
hemisphere of which he has extensive knowledge. We have traveled
together in that hemisphere of Central America, the Caribbean, South
America. Are we saying to those countries we, the United States, must
make the judgments in relation to their governments?
I have listened carefully to my distinguished friend from Connecticut
on this very subject many times, and I am deeply concerned that this
will have negative long-range implications, rather than positive, to
our diplomacy and relationships to those countries.
Mr. President, I have supported the President on a number of his
foreign policy decisions, and I support what he is undertaking right
this minute in terms of resolving this problem as it relates to
diplomacy and other means. I acknowledge and I express my respect for
the President and his principal advisers for the manner in which they
have kept this Senator fully informed on a daily basis.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, of which I am privileged to serve
as vice chairman, is at this very moment conducting a lengthy hearing
on the implications of a military force from the United States being
utilized to solve the problems in Haiti and what the ramifications
would be.
Fortunately, there were several Senators present and, indeed, I think
the knowledge of the consequences of this are now becoming widespread
within the Senate. I urge all Senators to try to avail themselves of
this information.
Therefore, I conclude by saying I express appreciation to the
administration for keeping me fully informed in my capacity as vice
chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
Nevertheless, I have at each opportunity expressed my nonconcurrence
in the use of United States military forces at this point in time,
given the facts of the situation, to try to remove the three principal
persons down there, Cedras and two others, who are the ostensible
leaders at this time in Haiti. I think it is unwise, and I give the
following reasons.
All of us are moved by the tragedies in Haiti. Indeed, the President,
as reported on this evening's news, was given pictures of the tragedies
that are taking place. We recognize that. We have compassion for the
people in that tragic land. But, nevertheless, there are many places in
the world where similar human rights violations are taking place and,
indeed, in a more widespread manner. So that is not sufficient reason
of itself.
We must have, as a nation, a clear and convincing national security
interest. And how many times have we heard that statement here in the
past months and years in this Chamber? It has become the very
foundation of the policy that this Chamber has tried to explain to our
constituents.
I feel that the administration has made an effort but, thus far, they
have not succeeded in establishing, to my satisfaction and to many of
my constituents, a case where U.S. national interest is in jeopardy--in
jeopardy to the extent that we should utilize our military forces.
During briefings to the Congress, administration officials have said
that the United States has an interest in restoring democracy in Haiti.
Why, of course, we have that interest. We would like to see democracy
spread through many places on our globe. But that alone, or in
conjunction with the human rights violations, is not sufficient
justification for the use of United States military force at this time.
The administration has also stated that we must have an interest in
the stability in the Caribbean. We concur in that. But this Senator
fails to see how that situation in Haiti is contributing to a degree of
instability that would justify the use of our military forces at this
time.
I draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the contiguous
nation, the Dominican Republic, just this spring had a free and open
election at the same time that much of the insurrection and human
rights violations were taking place in Haiti. So far as we know, that
election was not contested in the sense that it was fraudulent or
affected by what was taking place in Haiti. And, therefore, that is an
example of how in this region, in my judgment, there has not been that
degree of instability that would justify the use of military force at
this time.
I have always believed in and I strongly defend a President's
constitutional right to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as
he sees fit in pursuing the security interests of this country. That is
clearly laid down in the Constitution. I have participated, with many
others, through the years in the debates on the War Powers Act and many
other debates. So in no way do I interpret the resolution by the
distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, Senator Cohen and
others as in any way infringing on the President's power and right.
It is, rather, an effort to say, ``Mr. President, given the facts as
they exist at this moment, there is every reason to involve the
Congress of the United States and most particularly the U.S. Senate,
given our own special constitutional powers, in trying to assess along
with you, Mr. President, whether or not we should have at this time a
justification to utilize our military forces.''
Indeed, the leaders of this Chamber, the distinguished Senator from
Maine and the distinguished Senator from Kansas, Senator Dole, the
minority leader, have each said that it is in the interest of this
country that the Congress be given an opportunity. And I regret that
this was not more fully made available to the Senate today to reach
some point where we could have had a vote on this question.
I clearly hope that any President, absent situations where timing is
so critical and consultation cannot precede execution of military
operations, would seek prior congressional expression on the use of
military force. It may not have to be specific authorization, but at
least the opportunity for a congressional expression. Certainly in this
case, at this point in time, at this very moment, there is not the
urgency that requires the President to act without an expression by the
Congress.
Pollings should not conduct our foreign policy. Nevertheless, those
of us privileged to serve our constituents must take into account their
viewpoints. The polls indicate very strongly that the American people
do not support at this time, given the facts, any use of United States
military force in the form of an invasion of Haiti. It is essential,
therefore, that an informed debate continue. And we have had debate.
But we must continue that debate in the Congress, most particularly in
the Senate, to indicate the position that we should take as a body,
given the facts as they exist at this time. I personally do not agree
with the goals to be achieved through the use of military action at
this point in time.
Mr. President, we should not forget the history of United States
military involvement in Haiti as we contemplate a possible use of our
forces.
In 1915, the United States became involved in Haiti when the
President of Haiti executed 167 political prisoners, provoking citizen
outrage in that island nation. Angry Haitians attacked their President,
dismembered him, and paraded parts of his body through the streets--
again, the long history of the Haitian people inflicting incredible
violence on one another. The United States intervened to restore
justice within 6 weeks, and we were literally running the country in
1915.
The United States occupied and indeed ran the country for 19 years.
In 1934, a commission President Hoover appointed to look into the
situation found that after the 19 years, and I quote from that
commission report, ``The social forces that created instability still
remain--poverty, ignorance, and the lack of tradition and desire for
orderly, free government.''
Mr. President, history has a way of repeating itself. It is still
that situation today.
Mr. President, I have worked with the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee and other members in assessing the situation
that took place in Somalia. Indeed, I accompanied the Senator from
Michigan [Mr. Levin], to Somalia as a part of the responsibilities of
the committee to write a report, which report will soon be completed.
But I bring to the attention of the Senate that last year, on October
3, United States Army Rangers found themselves fighting for their lives
in the dusty streets of Mogadishu--in an operation that had begun
months earlier, with the best of intentions, primarily to feed those
impoverished people. That operation initially had the support of the
American people and the Congress. But, over time--and we will spell
this out in the Armed Services Committee report--United States policies
became less and less clear, and suddenly we ended up with 18 U.S. Army
Rangers killed and 83 wounded in a battle that raged on for 2 days,
October 3 and 4. How well all of us remember that.
Congress, almost immediately, insisted that our troops be withdrawn.
Congress questioned the right of our President to exercise his
constitutional authority with respect to the deployment of our troops
in that country.
And only by the narrowest of margins--and I was with the majority in
supporting the President, the right of the President to make the
determination and to set the timetable for withdrawal, which was March
1994, that is this year, rather than an earlier date sought by many of
our colleagues, which was December of 1993. I felt that would be an
abrogation of the President's constitutional authority, and I supported
our President in his right to set the timetable in that situation to
withdraw our troops.
Mr. President, I hope we have not already forgotten those lessons in
Somalia. Certainly this Senator has not. Last May, specifically May 12,
the Armed Services Committee held hearings on the raid of October 3 and
4. The father of one of the young rangers who gave his life in that
battle in open testimony to our committee made a very moving statement
which I shall never forget. I would like to quote directly from the
record of the statements made by that father, Lt. Col. Larry Joyce,
U.S. Army, retired, a man who had been a careerist himself. He was the
father of Sgt. James Casey Joyce. Colonel Joyce said as follows, and I
quote him:
Our purpose here should be to tell every American who and
what contributed to this tragic episode. No matter how much
the President and his advisers would like us to forget it,
along with the heroes who gave their lives in Mogadishu last
October, we should also let everyone, especially the
policymakers, know the consequences of foreign policy that is
developed haphazardly and implemented by amateurs. Too
frequently, policymakers are insulated from the misery they
create. If they could be with the chaplain who rings a
doorbell at 6:20 in the morning to tell a 20-year-old woman
she is now a widow, they would develop their policies more
carefully.
Other parents testified that day about the loss of their loved ones.
It was not testimony given in acrimony. It was testimony given by
parents who, for generations, have sent their sons and daughters
forward in the uniform of our country in the cause of peace. They
simply ask, Mr. President, of the Congress, their elected leaders, of
their President, and of the policymakers, to think very, very carefully
each time before we send from our shores the men and women in the Armed
Forces to assume risks which could well involve loss of life or serious
injury.
That is precisely why we are gathered here in this Chamber tonight.
That is why earlier today it was hoped that the Senate could make some
formal expression on this issue, but that, for reasons that have been
explained, was denied us.
We must not forget the lessons of Somalia. Before we commit our young
men and women to battle, we must assure the objectives are vital to our
national security interests, that they are attainable with military
force, and that we know how we will get our forces out. That is all
important. Just remember, 1915 to 1934, the last time we endeavored
this mission.
Perhaps there are reasons which the administration has which might
make the invasion of Haiti acceptable to the Congress and the American
people. We will learn, hopefully, tomorrow night perhaps facts that are
not known to us in this Chamber as of this time. But thus far, I say
most respectfully to our President of the United States, that the
administration has not made their case on this point.
I recall, as I am sure all of us do, the debate we had before the
utilization in a combat status of our forces in the Persian Gulf. The
distinguished Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, and I led that debate on our respective sides. I supported
the President, drafted the resolution which was eventually adopted by
only five votes in this Chamber, and my good friend from Georgia, the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, opposed very vigorously, and
for credible reasons, the use of force in the gulf.
But this Chamber reverberated for those several days in a very fine
debate, perhaps one of the finest that we have had in recent memory,
and we spoke as a body. We supported our President and, as we know,
that military action in the minds of most Americans was justified and
was successful.
I only hope that we would proceed along much the same lines in this
case.
I listened this morning, almost painfully, as the President's Chief
of Staff tried to draw a parallel--distinction first and then a
parallel and then a distinction--between what took place in the Persian
Gulf operation and what might take place in Haiti.
I most respectfully disagree with the Chief of Staff when he said you
cannot use the procedure followed in the gulf as a precedent for this,
and he tried to justify it on the basis of the relative small military
force under the control of the three principals that the whole world
wants out of Haiti.
We have covered in great detail that military force in the
Intelligence Committee in the past hour. It is well known to all of us.
It is not highly classified. It is relatively small. And their weaponry
is somewhat archaic, their training in the past few years has been
sporadic. But we cannot justify this military action simply because we
may only experience several casualties. One casualty--one casualty--is
vital to one family, it is vital to this Senator, it is vital to all of
us. We cannot justify this military action simply because the poorly
trained force and the poorly equipped force in Haiti might not inflict
the casualties we experienced in the gulf operation. That is no basis
whatsoever for rationalizing a justification for this invasion.
I hope the Chief of Staff reconsiders the statements that he made
publicly earlier today on that.
So I conclude, Mr. President, that this is a very troubled world that
we are in today. Several months ago, I spoke on the floor and showed a
chart where today there are 64 areas in which there are very
substantial human rights violations, in which there is conflict, in
which Armed Forces are involved in this world, that 64 as compared to
perhaps half that number a mere 5 to 6 years ago. But the United States
cannot, nor should it, assume the responsibility we can resolve all
those problems.
The simple fact that this nation, Haiti, so troubled, so tragically
suffering at this moment, is nearer to our shores than Rwanda, than
parts of the former Yugoslavia, some of the troubled areas in Southeast
Asia, that alone is not justification. The fact that it is in this
hemisphere--we have been suffering since the adoption of the Monroe
Doctrine of the Big Brother attitude toward the smaller countries in
this hemisphere. We cannot do that.
So, therefore, there are many reasons--many reasons--why we should
not undertake the use of military force at this time. And until the
President of the United States can put forth a clear and convincing
case that it is in our national security interest, not just to save
democracy, not just to stem the flow of a tragic immigration to our
shores, but in the security interests, then and only then can we
undertake the responsibility that we have to look our constituents
squarely in the eye, and particularly those who may suffer a loss
occasioned by a casualty, then and only then can our forces be
deployed.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. SASSER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Moseley-Braun). The Senator from
Tennessee.
Mr. SASSER. Madam President, tomorrow evening the President of the
United States goes before the American people to present his case for
the military invasion of Haiti. And perhaps, given the President's
considerable persuasive powers, he can justify a very grave action for
which, frankly, there is no present consensus among the American
people. It is not going to be an easy case to make. The American people
justly demand an unambiguous statement of our policy before risking the
lives of American troops, and I demand that statement also. I believe
strongly that we must bring to this potential military action the same
standards of national security interest, constitutional conformity, and
public support that we have demanded on prior occasions.
Like most Americans, I will listen tomorrow night to the President
with an open mind. But I feel compelled to state that at this time I
vigorously oppose this invasion of Haiti. Like most Americans, I am
deeply skeptical about the need to put our troops in harm's way in
Haiti or the wisdom of forcibly imposing democracy on a complex culture
that has little or no history of democratic principle.
Before we invade, there must be a clear statement from the President
on our reasons for going in and, most importantly, our plan for getting
out. Without a unified sense of national purpose, we get the ambiguity
that leads to disasters like those we experienced in Beirut. Without a
strong sense of purpose and a plan for extricating ourselves, we have
muddles like what occurred in Somalia. Without clear guidelines before
us, we are on the verge of committing our Nation's blood and treasure,
and I do not think that is a wise policy to follow.
Now, since the early 1980's, we have tried to design rules of thumb
that could be used to determine whether the use of military force is
justified and whether it is in our national interest. There is general
agreement on four of these rules.
First, military force should only be used as a last resort. And
diplomatic and economic solutions should be fully exhausted before we
ask our men and women to risk their lives.
Second, military force should be used only when there is a clear-cut
military objective. We should not send military forces to achieve vague
political goals. We learned our lesson on that, I hope, in the late
1960's and early 1970's.
Third, military force should be used only when we can determine the
point at which our military objective has been achieved. In other
words, we need to know when we can bring our troops home.
Fourth, military force should be used only in an overwhelming
fashion. We should get it done quickly with as little loss of life as
possible.
And, finally and perhaps as important as all of the rest, there must
be popular support behind the military operation.
Now, based on these criteria, it appears that the operation in Haiti
as currently planned by the administration only meets one of these five
tests, and that is No. 4, the use of overwhelming force.
At present, the administration has failed to muster, in my view, a
cogent case on the other four.
First, it is far from clear that we have exhausted all of our
diplomatic and economic options, and the question comes: Has patience,
strength, and the international isolation of the thugs in Port-au-
Prince truly failed, or have we simply grown weary of waiting for
pressure and diplomacy to achieve its desired end?
Second, I think, most importantly, the administration's objective, at
least to this Senator at this point, for this use of force is, to say
the least, fuzzy.
Are we sending troops simply to oust General Cedras, or are we
sending troops to restore democracy in Haiti? Is this a vital interest,
or merely an important concern?
Do we truly believe that the military dictatorship in Haiti presents
a threat to this country's security? I think not.
Third, achieving any goal larger than capturing General Cedras or
forcing Cedras and all of his hooligan comrades out, we must
understand, is going to take years.
Do we really have full confidence in President Aristide's ability to
lay the foundation for democratic institutions and to build on that? I
do not think we do. Or are we in fact writing a blank check for
perpetual military occupation by American troops in Haiti? It appears
to me it would be difficult to decide when, if ever, our forces will
have accomplished their objective, if, indeed, their objective is to
establish democracy.
I remind my colleagues, as they have been reminded before--most
recently by my friend and colleague, the distinguished Senator from
Virginia--the last time we intervened, in 1915, it took 19 years to
extricate the marines from Haiti.
Now, the world has changed a lot since those days of musketry and
campfires. That was 80 years ago. But the cultural cross-currents in
Haiti--bred from years of dictatorship and poverty--are maybe more
pronounced and more perplexing today than they were in 1915.
On September 13, the New York Times wrote an editorial which I think
summed up the other side of the problem. The editorial said this:
A century of Latin intervention should have taught
Washington you cannot enforce democracy at gunpoint.
Continuing, the editorial said:
Haitians elected Father Aristide and still support him, but
even his legitimacy may not survive being installed by
foreign troops.
In other words, a military effort to impose democracy might actually
strengthen the forces of chaos and tyranny. We have seen it happen
before.
Now, Madam President, I come from a State where patriotism runs deep.
It is called the Volunteer State because of the great number of young
men who volunteered in service to their country, beginning first in the
early 19th century and continuing to today. I come from a State where
love of country is a value that is treasured from the barracks of the
Army base of the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell to a
schoolhouse in the mountains of east Tennessee.
Our young men and women have answered their country's call without
reservation. They are not complainers. And our military cemeteries bear
witness to their loyalties to our Nation. But I do not think they see
the reason for this particular action.
According to reports, there are plans for invasion with about 20,000
U.S. military personnel to be involved along with 260 personnel from
the Caribbean nations. They say, according to the administration, that
Belgium, the Dutch, France, Britain, and Israel have all indicated a
willingness to play a part in the postinvasion policing. But here
again, I think in the final analysis this appears to be solely an
operation by the U.S. Government.
President Eisenhower once said at a press conference, so the syntax
is not totally perfect:
If we ever come to a place that I feel that a step of war
is necessary, it is going to be brought about not by any
impulsive individualistic act of my own. But I am going
before the Congress in the constitutional method set up in
this country and lay the problem before them, with my
recommendation as to whatever it may be.
I think President Eisenhower was quite right in that statement. The
Constitution and the War Powers Resolution are clear when it comes to
consulting Congress before introducing American Armed Forces into
hostilities or imminent hostilities.
Many of us stood on this floor and debated that President Bush do the
same before he put American forces in harm's way in the Persian Gulf
region. I think we can ask no less of President Clinton in this
instance.
We cannot abdicate our responsibility to the American people. They
are trusting in our leadership and our ability to exercise good
governance here. They are praying that we will watch over their sons
and daughters and their husbands and wives who might be called upon to
put their lives on the line.
So, Madam President, I would sum up my statement simply by saying
this: I oppose this invasion. The burden of proof, a very heavy burden
of proof indeed, will be on the President next evening to convince the
American people and this Senator that it is in our national interest to
do so at this time.
Second, I urge the President to bring this matter before the Congress
of the United States and let the elected representatives of the people
here in the Senate have some input before putting our troops in harm's
way and launching what I think is an ill-advised military expedition.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Madam President, it has been a very long day, as the Chair
knows better than anyone. I remember this morning, when we were
debating another subject, the current Presiding Officer was then in the
chair and is winding up there tonight after a long day. But there are
important matters that I think must be discussed tonight.
The Senator from Tennessee noted that the President would be making a
very important speech tomorrow night. The President will have a
considerable burden in terms of expressing clearly to the American
people what our national interest and our national goals are in Haiti.
And he particularly has the obligation to explain this to the military
people and the families that are directly involved, or soon may be
involved.
Madam President, as significant American preparations are under way
for an invasion of Haiti, and as the wisdom of the administration's
policy is the subject of heated debate here in the Senate and
elsewhere, I think we need to step back and consider carefully the
implications of the present course.
Although I do not expect the administration to change that course
now--and I think the people in Haiti, leaders in Haiti, need to
understand that--I also suggest it is not too late to consider whether
there exists a reasonable and viable alternative that could bring
relief to the people of Haiti without launching a military invasion.
While it is still possible that Haiti's military leaders will depart
the country--and I hope that will happen--thereby obviating the
necessity or the perceived necessity for an invasion on the part of the
administration, the likelihood of an invasion grows with each passing
day, and leaders in Haiti need to understand that. This invasion would
mark the first time in many years that we have utilized large numbers
of American troops at considerable cost and some risk to restore
democracy in a failed state.
This invasion also would raise again an important issue of democracy
here at home; that is, the relationship between the constitutional
power of the President as Commander in Chief and the constitutional
power of the Congress to declare war. That clash has been taking place
for all of our history and is likely to continue for a long time to
come.
But these two issues--restoring democracy in Haiti, which is the
announced goal, and the way we go about deciding whether to use U.S.
forces for that goal--are intertwined in my own mind. Building
democracy in Haiti is going to be a lengthy, expensive proposition. It
clearly will cost hundreds of millions of dollars, if not several
billion dollars. It will take years, if not decades, to develop a
soundly rooted democracy in Haiti. The process will be tenuous long
after our invasion force has been withdrawn.
Of course, we will prevail militarily if we invade. We will prevail
quickly and at relatively low risk. While we do not have strategic
surprise--there has been entirely too much conversation about intent
for that to still be a possibility--there are reasons for such
conversation, which relate to the hope of getting the illegitimate
Haitian military leaders out of there without invading. I know that is
the administration's hope. So we do not have strategic surprise, but we
have not lost tactical surprise, which is enormously important. And we
must do all we can to ensure that we achieve that tactical advantage
which can save American lives.
Madam President, I have complete confidence in our military leaders,
their planning, and the skills of our superb troops. There is no doubt
about the military outcome. It would be quick; it would be decisive; it
would be overwhelming.
However if, as the administration states, establishing democracy in
Haiti is its principal goal, this will require the long-term support of
the American people, as well as the United States Congress. The
American people must clearly understand in advance our national
interest and our national goals regarding Haiti. The President, before
he takes military action, clearly must establish our national interest.
He must clearly explain our goals. He must clearly explain what we
would define as success, and thereby explain our exit strategy, when we
are going to get out. But not by date; I think trying to predict when
we will leave a military engagement by date is always a mistake. But at
least by a definition of what we would consider success. These
ingredients are necessary.
Madam President, while our risk militarily is low--the Haitian
military is not very capable, and in my view it is not likely there
would be any organized resistance for any long period of time. I say
``organized''--there certainly could be sporadic resistance, and
certainly no one can assure there will not be casualties. Casualties in
any kind of operation of this size are almost inevitable. Certainly, I
hope and pray that if an invasion occurs, it would bring minimal harm
to our own military personnel.
But the bottom line is that the President, as the Commander in Chief,
must explain clearly to the Nation, and particularly to our military
personnel and their families, what our national stake is, what our
national interests are, and clearly what our goal is. I have long felt
and have said publicly on numerous occasions that the administration's
goals in Haiti and my goals differ somewhat. In fact, my goals differ
in rather important ways from the goals that have been articulated by
the Clinton administration.
I believe that our goals should be, first, to alleviate the suffering
of the Haitian people, which is considerable and growing; second, to
prevent uncontrolled Haitian immigration to the United States; and,
third, to shift our near-term policy focus away from restoring
democracy solely through President Aristide's return, to building
democracy by vitalizing political and economic structures in Haiti,
with President Aristide's return deferred until that process takes
hold.
If our national goal is to build democracy in Haiti, our focus should
be on the establishment of a democratic process as specified in the
Haitian Constitution. They have a constitution. It was adopted in 1987.
It specifies the way their own people envision their democracy. That
Constitution is important. Certainly, it is important if what we are
restoring is real democracy.
I have felt that our options to achieve these goals--these are my
goals, the ones I have stated on many occasions publicly and
privately--came down to three various options in broad terms: First, to
return President Aristide on the shoulders of United States military
power, which appears to be the administration's present course of
action or present intent; second, to continue the status quo by
tightening sanctions and increasing pressure on General Cedras and his
colleagues, which until just a few weeks ago was the administration's
policy; and third, to defer President Aristide's return pending
development of a political consensus in Haiti, which we would help
foster with the help of the international community, that could begin
to build democracy and allow President Aristide to return without
United States military intervention and without long-term United States
military protection.
Obviously, Madam President, from what I have already said, the third
course of action is my preference, but that would require more patience
on the part of the Aristide supporters in this country, more patience
on the part of Aristide and his supporters in Haiti, and more patience
than has been displayed in the last week or so by the Clinton
administration.
Given the administration's current position, which is clearly moving
toward military intervention, the issue of the role of Congress--which
has been debated today--in approving an invasion must be addressed.
In terms of the President's power under the Constitution, I regard an
invasion of Haiti as somewhere between the Persian Gulf war, for which
congressional approval was sought, and the military operations in
Grenada and Panama, for which congressional approval was not sought.
A Haitian invasion will not require major war, which was the case
when we attacked Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf in 1991. So that is
the difference between this anticipated action and the Persian Gulf
war. This is not going to be a major war. It may be a major challenge
after the initial stage, but the initial military action, even though
it certainly has some risk and unfortunately is likely to entail some
casualties, it is not what I think anyone would define as a ``major''
war. Yet, it resembles the Persian Gulf situation in that a threat
requiring immediate action is not involved. It also resembles the
Persian Gulf in that the initiative is in our hands, as far as military
action is concerned, and there is ample time for planning, for a
debate, and for congressional action. That is where the similarity is
with the Persian Gulf war, in my mind. The situations in Grenada in
1983, and in Panama in 1989, did involve threats which the
administration at that time clearly felt and stated to the American
people were emergencies that required quick responses. Grenada and
Panama were similar to the current situation in Haiti, in that these
operations entailed relatively low-risk military operations and could
not be defined properly, in my view, as full-scale war, although
certainly casualties were likely to and indeed did occur.
Madam President, should the President seek the approval of Congress
for United States military force in Haiti? My answer is yes. Legal
scholars can debate the constitutional issue, and like other military
interventions that have not had congressional approval, the matter
probably will be debated, if it occurs, without clear result for a long
period of time.
As a practical matter, however, I believe the President should obtain
the support of Congress for a United States-led invasion of Haiti. The
problems in Haiti defy short-term solutions. They will not be resolved
in days or even in months. The invasion will set an important precedent
regarding the use of United States military force to instill democracy
in a failed state. At least it will be a modern-day precedent.
Haiti has virtually no democratic tradition. President Aristide is
only the second popularly elected Haitian chief of state. The first
elected chief of state was ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The Haitian economy
is in ruins, and the basic welfare of its people is in peril. Without
Congressional support for building democracy for an extended time,
certainly long after our invasion force has been withdrawn, without
that continued support by the Congress and the American people, this
goal of restoring democracy is unlikely to be achieved. A short-term
American response will increase the likelihood of Haitian domestic
violence, political turmoil, and the return of uncontrolled Haitian
emigration to the United States. A short-term approach and a goal to
restore democracy, in my view, are incompatible.
I do not, however, believe Congress should attempt to prohibit by law
an invasion of Haiti. I have supported a sense-of-the-Senate resolution
which said that the President should come forward for congressional
approval. I will continue to support that next week--the pending
resolution that the majority leader put down, the one we have already
passed, which had some 94 votes. But clearly the Senator from Arizona
[Mr. McCain], and the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], and others, voted
for that resolution, and I believe Senator McCain, who has been on the
floor today giving his, I am sure, heartfelt views on this situation,
made the statement very emphatically, and I think correctly, that to
bar in law a President from invading Haiti is a very bad precedent and
should not be done. He argued against that, as did I. The majority of
the Senate on two occasions, I believe, agreed we should not bar in law
that activity from occurring.
There are a couple of reasons for that, Madam President. First, as a
practical matter, if Congress were to pass prohibitive legislation by
law, as opposed to a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, the President
could always veto such legislation, and he would probably do so.
Second, a law prohibiting an invasion of Haiti--and if one is proposed
next week, I will not support it--by singling out one country would
treat Haiti differently from every other country in the world and would
badly undermine whatever remaining credibility there is in the War
Powers Resolution. Such action would certainly undermine the Clinton
administration for the remainder of its term in office. It would badly
undermine U.S. foreign policy.
This would establish a dangerous precedent, and it would have
repercussions far beyond Haiti. It could have perceptions in places far
more dangerous to our security and to military personnel, like North
Korea. I will not favor barring by law this kind of action, in spite of
my words of caution and my words of reservation here this evening--and
indeed my specific words that the President should seek approval before
he undertakes this activity, if he does.
Madam President, in effect, if we tried to bar by law an invasion of
Haiti at this point in time, what we would be saying is that the
President can invade any other country in the world. He could invade
Russia, China, Iran, or Mexico, and he could do them simultaneously,
and there would be no bar to that, as long as he complied, of course,
with the War Powers Resolution. But that resolution does not bar
initial deployments. We would be saying that there is one country in
the world in which the President cannot take military action. It would
be a sign of weakness on our part that would haunt us in many areas of
the globe and could very well cost far more American lives than would
be at stake in an invasion of Haiti. So I do not choose that course,
and I hope we will not favor that course when we start voting next
week.
If an invasion occurs, we still must face the reality--and I hope the
administration will think carefully about this, as I do not believe
that enough attention has been given to this aspect of the situation--
we must face the reality that the return of President Aristide, while
desirable in itself, is not synonymous with the establishment of
democracy. A democracy is more than one individual, even an individual
elected by a majority of the people. Democracy rests on institutions,
not on an individual office holder.
The Haitian Constitution, overwhelmingly approved by the Haitian
people in 1987, requires that all of the Chamber of Deputies and one-
third of the Senate in Haiti be elected not later than December of
1994. That is this year. There is a mandated election in the Haitian
Constitution for no later than December of this year.
That is an important point. The Congress of the United States and
other parliamentary bodies are not very popular. We know that. But what
kind of democracy can we have with no Congress? Would anyone in this
country, despite the low esteem in which the polls show Congress is
held, want to turn all the Government of the United States and its
powers over to the President, any President, whether it is President
Clinton, President Reagan, President Bush, President Carter, President
Ford, or Presidents further back in history?
Madam President, you cannot have a democracy without a parliament.
That is the key. That is the key, much more than one individual. The
parliament is a much more permanent body. Something can happen to one
individual, either health, tragedy, assassination. It can happen
overnight. There has been too much focus on one Haitian official,
President Aristide, as important as his return is. And I do think his
return is important at the appropriate point, and I will speak a little
more to that in a moment.
Madam President, if the administration proceeds with military
intervention, it must first obtain a clear, firm commitment from
President Aristide, prior to any invasion, that he will abide fully by
the Haitian Constitution and in particular will facilitate free and
fair parliamentary elections by the end of 1994, as required by the
Haitian Constitution itself.
The Haitian Constitution specifies that Parliament is an essential
branch of the Haitian Government, and it prohibits the President from
ruling by decree without parliamentary review.
This is the essence of democracy. If we are going there to restore
democracy, this should be, in my view, the major, not secondary, but
the major point of emphasis--the elections that are required by the
Haitian Constitution.
Madam President, we also, I believe, must obtain before any kind of
invasion occurs President Aristide's firm commitment regarding fair and
equitable access to the Haitian news media for those participating in
the parliamentary elections; appointment of a broadly acceptable
government that is duly approved by parliament as specified by the
Haitian Constitution; prevention of illegal reprisals against
Aristide's political opponents and enemies, except under due course and
due rule of law, under a justice system as called for in the Haitian
Constitution; establishment of an independent judicial system as well
as a professional police force.
These are the institutions that will tell whether Haiti has a
democracy.
Madam President, I recognize that this approach may not satisfy
President Aristide's supporters in the United States, including his
supporters in the U.S. Congress. Let me assure them that I share their
desire to restore President Aristide to his proper place in Haiti. He
was elected. I believe, however, it is in everyone's best interests,
including those of President Aristide, that he succeed as a democratic
leader. It is in everyone's best interests that President Aristide work
cooperatively with a freely elected, representative parliament, as a
President who observes fully the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution of his own country, which legitimizes his own rule.
Madam President, there is a strategy that to me would have been
preferable to an all-out invasion, and even at this late date still
would be preferable to invasion, in my view. Under this strategy, the
United States would present the illegitimate military leaders in
Haiti--Cedras, Francois and Biamby--with a final ultimatum requiring
their agreement within a specific deadline.
The proposal would have three time-linked elements.
First, Cedras and associates would have to leave Haiti voluntarily.
Second, the United States and the international community would
undertake to ensure that free, fair parliamentary elections take place
in accord with the legitimate Constitution of Haiti.
Third, President Aristide would return to Haiti, but he would return
after the parliamentary elections, not later than the end of this year.
This is not perfect solution. Anyone looking for a perfect solution
in Haiti I think is looking for something that does not exist. But
neither is a full-scale, U.S.-led military invasion.
There are all sorts of problems with that option which we seem to be
heading toward, not military problems, not problems in the very
beginning, but problems the longer we are there, problems of Haitian-
on-Haitian violence, problems that may involve the people who are not
for Aristide if he is returned immediately on the backs of the U.S.
military, feeling that they should become refugees so that they are not
in danger of their lives. If we are not very careful, we may simply
swap one set of people who are trying to escape Haiti with another set
of refugees.
The step I am suggesting would not foreclose the option of President
Clinton and the administration to undertake an invasion if the Haitian
military leaders refuse to go along with this overall plan and if they
refuse to leave, which they must. Based on the present, clear intent of
the Clinton administration to invade, this proposal would be considered
by Cedras and company against the certainty of military intervention if
they refuse to agree. And if they do not believe an invasion is certain
if they remain in Haiti, they certainly should. They must have begun by
now to realize the consequences that are coming.
I believe that this step has important advantages as compared to a
kick-the-door-down, invade-now approach.
First, this overall approach would recognize that democracy is a
popularly approved process, based on a legitimate Constitution. That
would be the first principle that we would make absolutely clear.
Democracy, as I have said, involves more than one election of one
President. This is the wisdom embodied in our own Constitution, framed
to prevent domination by one man or one institution. This wisdom is
also embodied in the Haitian Constitution of 1987 under which President
Aristide was elected.
Second, this approach would facilitate the repatriation of the
thousands of Haitian refugees currently detained, and increasingly
restive, at our Guantanamo Bay Naval Base on Cuba, which I think could
become a ticking time bomb if it has not already. It would also help
avoid a new wave of Haitian refugees which would probably be made up of
President Aristide's opponents, which could follow even a successful
U.S. invasion. It might not happen in a week or a month, but if
retribution starts being dished out to those who opposed Aristide,
inevitably it will happen.
Third, it would enable President Aristide to rule democratically, in
full accord with the Haitian Constitution. And it would provide before
he started asserting his rule, which is clearly his right under the
election that was held before he was removed from office--that there
would be another election and the people would be able to speak. There
would be assurance to both pro-Aristide and anti-Aristide groups there
that they would have a full voice in who was going to exercise
authority over them from the parliament. It would establish a check and
balance mechanism. If you do not have that check and balance device,
there are very few examples in world history of any kind of successful
democracy. This also would make clear to the Haitian people that the
United States stands for broad democratic institutions and processes
and not one-man rule.
Fourth, this approach would offer Cedras and his colleagues--if they
chose to agree to this option, which I still hope they will--something
they do not have now. It would offer them a departure scenario in which
they could assert with accuracy that their supporters and those who
fear and oppose Aristide, whether or not such attitudes are legitimate,
will have an immediate chance to participate fully in Haiti's political
and economic recovery.
Finally, in my view, this step could reduce the risk of loss of
American and Haitian lives that an invasion inevitably will put at
risk.
Madam President, in concluding, if we invade Haiti--and I do believe
that an invasion is a virtual certainty, unless Haiti's present
military rulers wake up to reality--I want to make it abundantly clear
that in spite of my reservations, in spite of the fact that I have
serious questions about whether we are on the right course, I will
fully support our American military personnel who are at risk.
Those who are tonight preparing for possible military action should
understand that at least this Senator will support them fully once they
are committed. Once they are committed, the debate, as far as I am
concerned, about the appropriate course of action is concluded, because
our men and women will then be at risk.
I think it is up to all of us to support them, and up to the American
people to support them. We do not have to support the policy to support
the troops. But supporting the troops is absolutely essential, I think,
for not only this contingency but for the broader interests America has
in the world. And we do have broader interests, we do have much more
important interests, including, as we all know, the situation in Korea
and the situation in other dangerous parts of the world.
Madam President, I am confident my colleagues in Congress and the
American people will also support our troops, whatever they are called
on to do, in the due course of their responsibilities.
If an invasion takes place, we must define democracy in Haiti in
terms of the constitutional processes there. We must assure--and I
think this has to be done before an invasion occurs, if it is going
to--that President Aristide both agrees with and abides by the lawful
processes set forth in the Haitian constitution.
Finally, we should convey to the Haitian people that the United
States and the other friends of Haiti cannot by themselves resolve
Haiti's domestic problems. In the final analysis, Madam President,
whether there is democracy and prosperity in Haiti will depend on the
Haitian people.
I thank the Chair and I yield the floor
Mr. SARBANES addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
Madam President, we have now begun a debate on a matter of great
import. There are really two questions. One is the substance of the
policy and the other is the process by which the policy decision will
be made. It is important to consider not only the substance of policy
but to recognize that the process you follow can give you a greater or
lesser opportunity to explore the substance of a policy.
On Haiti, I do not think the case has been made for the substance of
administration policy and I think that is the belief across the
country. If the public support does not exist for the course of action
which the President appears to be set upon.
There has not been a clear definition of what the rationale and
strategy are: The reasons and conditions under which we are prepared to
use force; the specific objectives that military action would be
designed to accomplish; an evaluation of the potential costs of an
invasion in both human and economic terms; the national interests that
are at stake; the reasons why such a course of action is preferable
over other alternatives; and the larger question of how we would
declare that the mission has been accomplished and be able to disengage
our forces. I point out that the last time the United States went into
Haiti, we stayed there for 19 years.
Let me turn to the question whether the President should seek and
receive congressional authorization; in other words, the question of
whether the President--any President--acting alone, can commit 20,000,
25,000 or 30,000 American troops to the invasion of a country without
coming to the Congress, to the elected representatives of the American
people, and obtaining their judgment on that question.
This is not a matter of protocol. This is a basic matter of how
decisions are to be made under our Constitution and in our democracy.
It is also a matter of what is the best and wisest way to arrive at
decisions and judgments? The checks and balances system so integral to
our system of government was premised on the proposition that from the
interaction required by checks and balances would come better policy.
If policy is made by only one individual, where is the independent
questioning that may well be necessary in order to identify pitfalls or
oversights in the policy? Our democracy has proceeded over the
centuries on the premise that out of the interaction between
independent branches of government better policy would emerge and
errors would be avoided.
Only yesterday, the New York Times, in a powerful editorial, and
again this morning, the Washington Post in another strong editorial
addressed this issue. I ask unanimous consent that both of those
editorials be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SARBANES. The Times, in the opening sentence of its editorial,
said, ``To invade Haiti without prior congressional approval would
short-circuit the United States Constitution.'' It then went on to say,
``Neither of the situations usually cited as justifying independent
action by the Commander in Chief--military crisis or unexpected threat
to national security--exists in this case. To the contrary,
congressional deliberation is both practical and desirable, and there
is plenty of time for it.''
The Washington Post just this morning, commenting on the President
saying that he will not ask Congress for authorization to invade Haiti
went on to say that this shortcut ``cheats on the separation of powers
as defined in the Constitution.''
The Constitution, of course, vests in the Congress the power to
declare war. Yet the President, under the Constitution, is the
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. From these two provisions and
the overlap in responsibilities has come controversy of long duration
as to their respective rules of the President and the Congress.
I encourage Members to ponder the question of whether the President,
acting alone, should, in effect, be able to commit the Nation to
hostilities?
I know efforts are made to draw a distinction between police actions
and an all-out war, and there may be some merit to those distinctions.
But where does the line lie along that scale? It seems to me that, the
wiser course--and I have been consistent in arguing for this position
previously on the floor--is that the Executive needs to come to the
Congress and seek its authority in order to engage in these military
operations.
A range of very probing, critical questions have been raised about
the substance of the administration's policy. I share the concern which
is expressed in that questioning, some of which were very articulately
put just previously here on the floor by my colleagues, Senator Sasser
from Tennessee and Senator Nunn from Georgia. Those questions have not
been answered. The consultation with the Congress has not, thus far,
brought about a clear and comprehensive statement of policy and the
rationale for it.
The administration has, unfortunately, created self-imposed deadlines
which enhance the pressure to move forward, even though such a course
may well be ill-advised. We are told that they must go ahead and do
this because they have asserted they will do it and if they fail to do
so, it will reflect badly upon them. Well, of course, that sequence
should have been carefully considered before the initial assertion was
made.
A debate on the Haiti issue would be difficult, there is no question
about it. But the issue is difficult and it is important. Many believe
that we must continue to pursue a course of action that will enhance
the international ostracism of the regime there. The U.N. monitors that
are to be on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti in
order to see that the embargo is being thoroughly enforced are not yet
fully in place. Other possibilities for resolution short of military
action have not been fully explored, as the Senator from Georgia
indicated in the course of his statement to this body only a few
moments ago.
There is a history of intervention in Latin America. It is not as
though we are facing this issue for the first time. That intervention
does not give you promising lessons in terms of the ability to bring
about democracy at gunpoint. Obviously, we all have very strong
reactions to the brutal conduct of Haiti's generals--the torture,
killings and gross abuse they impose upon their own people. But the
question of whether that should result in an American military
intervention is of a different order of magnitude, and particularly
when the question is whether it should be done by the Chief Executive
acting alone, acting solely.
It is interesting that the administration went to the Security
Council to seek its approval but has not come to the Congress to seek
the Congress' approval. The case must be made by the administration to
the Congress and to the American people. Otherwise, we are transforming
the nature of our constitutional democracy.
Obviously, there is the inclination to be supportive of the
President. Obviously, if American troops in the end are involved, the
American people will support our forces. But the questions need to be
asked now ahead of any such involvement. After it takes place, one will
rally in support of our men and women who have been placed in harm's
way. So the questions need to be raised and they need to be debated now
which, of course, the Senate is now in the course of doing.
So, Madam President, it is clearly in the best interest, in my view,
of the President himself to come to the Congress to seek its
authorization, and then to have a full debate here. Maybe in a clear
comprehensive presentation, the administration can lay out a justifying
rationale. As I have indicated, I have not seen that rationale to date.
I do not think the consultations which have taken place have provided
it. I think the assertions that have been made for the sweep of
executive power are excessive and I, therefore, hope that the President
and his advisers will take heed of the responses coming from the
elected representatives of the American people in the Congress and from
the people themselves with respect to this very grave and serious
matter.
We have been through this before. We had an extended debate on Iraq.
There was the insistence on the part of many of us that the President
had to come to Congress for authority. Presidents--all Presidents
apparently--constantly assert that this is not necessary; that they
have a broad, sweeping power to commit forces as they choose. But in
that instance, the President did come to the Congress and an extended
debate took place here on the substance of the policy, the rationale
was thoroughly debated and a vote was taken. And by a narrow margin,
authorization was given for that action.
But that is how the constitutional system is supposed to work. That
is what the checks and balances are all about. We did not establish a
system of a single executive leader who would make all of these
judgments solely of his own accord without interacting with the
legislative body in order to obtain a broader judgment. This was, of
course, debated at great length at our Constitutional Convention.
The fact that over the years Presidents have taken such solo actions
does not invalidate the argument made here that this is not the
arrangement that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution.
So I strongly urge the President to come to the Congress to seek its
judgment on the policy he is proposing, to lay out his rationale. As I
have indicated, it is my view that the rationale that has been put
forth does not justify the actions he is proposing to take. That is a
matter that ought to be decided in an interaction between the executive
and the legislative branches of our government after a full debate in
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Clearly, there is not congressional agreement at this time or broad
public support for the action that the President is proposing, and
that, in and of itself, is a matter of serious and grave proportions.
Let me also make the observation that the projected operation is
essentially an American one. Caribbean nations have committed 266
troops to join in the operation. They now are going through some quick
training. The number of American troops that is being talked about now
is 20,000, but the number changes from time to time. Obviously, we can
overwhelm Haiti militarily, although as in all such actions, there are
risks to our fighting men and women.
The next question becomes, then what? Will they continue to remain
exposed in a dangerous situation?
Will the United States remain entangled and how, after having gone
through all of this, will we ever be able to extricate our forces?
Secondly, what precedent does it establish for similar actions
elsewhere? What is the rationale that warrants going into Haiti that
would not warrant going into a number of other countries that are
experiencing similar abysmal and, indeed, terrorist conduct on the part
of illegal holders of authority?
We understand situations in which it can be asserted that the
national security interests of the United States are endangered or
threatened, and obviously in those situations we have to respond with
force if it is necessary in order to protect those interests. But no
one is making that case here. Therefore, the question becomes how do
you separate this action as a precedent from other similar actions
which people could easily call upon us to make? What role is it that we
will be assuming in the worldwide context on the basis of assuming this
role in Haiti?
I close by quoting again from the editorials cited earlier in my
statement and set out in full below. From the New York Times:
To invade Haiti without prior Congressional approval would
short-circuit the United States Constitution.
And from the Washington Post:
It cheats on the separation of powers as defined in the
Constitution.
Exhibit 1
[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1994]
Congress Must Vote on Haiti
To invade Haiti without prior Congressional approval would
short-circuit the United States Constitution. It would also
leave the President with sole political responsibility if the
operation turns sour. Yet that is just what the Clinton
Administration now suggests it might do.
Neither of the situations usually cited as justifying
independent action by the Commander in Chief--military crisis
or unexpected threat to national security--exists in this
case. To the contrary, Congressional deliberation is both
practical and desirable, and there is plenty of time for it.
The Constitution vests the power to declare war in Congress
while giving the President command of the armed forces. Those
overlapping responsibilities have fueled generations of
controversy.
Beyond indulging a natural tendency to press against a
vaguely defined constitutional boundary, recent Presidents
have invoked practical arguments for bypassing Congress, like
the need for speedy response or tactical surprise. Under the
threat of a missile-launched nuclear Armageddon on 20
minutes' warning, the idea of protracted Congressional
deliberation could be made to look like an absurd 18th-
century anachronism.
Cold-war Presidents also argued that military actions taken
under the authority of treaty commitments or U.N. resolutions
are not really wars, but ``police actions'' or ``troop
redeployments,'' and thereby exempt from constitutional
requirements.
For years Congress was happy to avoid responsibility. But
Presidential excesses in Vietnam drove Congress to reclaim
some of its authority in the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
This required Presidents to get timely Congressional approval
whenever they placed U.S. troops at risk. Since then,
Presidents have disputed the resolution's authority but
sometimes fulfilled its provisions.
In 1991, Democrats in both houses insisted that President
Bush get prior Congressional approval for Operation Desert
Storm. Now, misplaced fealty drives many of those same
Democrats to relieve President Clinton of the same
responsibility.
That is poor governance and poor partisanship too.
Democrats would do better to protect Mr. Clinton from
enmeshing himself in a military action where most Americans
see no compelling national interests at stake and in which
the first casualties are likely to bring better
recrimination.
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide still represents Haiti's
legitimate government. But sending the Marines to restore him
to power makes no sense even if, as some military experts
predict, that turns out to be an afternoon's work.
A century of Latin interventions should have taught
Washington that it cannot enforce democracy at gunpoint.
Haitians elected Father Aristide and still support him, but
even his legitimacy may not survive being installed by
foreign troops.
It is frustrating to watch Haiti's generals sneer at
sanctions, play games with U.N. and systematically shoot down
democratic leaders in cold blood. Their conduct warrants
international ostracism and economic sanctions until they
yield power, then generous and muscular support for the
elected government that replaces them.
But the conditions that warrant an American invasion--
conditions that include broad public support and
Congressional agreement--are not in place at this time. Mr.
Clinton should not abuse his powers and risk damage to his
Presidency by plunging ahead.
____
[From the Washington Post, Sept. 14, 1994]
Haiti: Consensus and Consent
President Clinton insists he won't ask Congress for
authorization to invade Haiti. The shortcut spares him the
possibility of repudiation for a venture that appears more
dubious and unpopular by the day. But it cheats on the
separation of powers as defined in the Constitution. It
threatens to undercut not just the quick operation planned
against the thugs in Port-au-Prince but the prolonged
occupation meant to follow. And it promises to bring a
political disaster upon the administration for misreading the
popular mood on the process as well as the substance of its
policy.
Administration spokesmen trot out justifications of
presidential prerogative familiar--and stale--from decades of
political usage. The constitutional scholars shred these
claims. The basic point of law remains that the Founding
Fathers plainly meant the legislature to have a meaningful
say in military action beyond the immediately defensive. A
succession of wary presidents has resisted imposition of
rigid consultation under the Vietnam-era War Powers
Resolution, and there is reason for this. But a succession of
wise presidents has understood the advantage to the country--
and to presidents--of voluntarily bringing Congress in on
decisions entailing a recourse to force and an exposure of
Americans to battlefield peril.
In this instance, the administration conveys the impression
that it has adequately ``consulted'' Congress and informed
the public by assorted briefings and statements. Our
impression is that the presentation as well as the reception
of administration policy has been piecemeal and cluttered. No
single clear and comprehensive conception of policy exists of
the sort you would expect in a formal presidential
presentation. As a result, the administration heads toward an
early self-imposed deadline in a public fog. It actually
seems to be believe that its request for an enabling
resolution in the U.N. Security Council moots the obligation
or reason to seek the political company of the U.S. Congress,
let alone the understanding and consent of a properly
informed public. Imprudently, especially for a commander in
chief short on military credentials or standing, it counts on
the public to rally around if bullets begin to fly and the
usual accidents of war occur.
The right precedent lies in President Bush's request of
Congress to authorize force, by a majority vote in both
houses, in the Persian Gulf in 1991. The issue was difficult
and hot, and Mr. Bush--having resisted but been pushed into
seeking that authority--took a real chance. It paid off in
the impetus the vote gave his policy and standing and in the
cover it offered if the operation had failed. Had Congress
rebuffed him, meanwhile--and President Clinton cannot ignore
this possibility--he could have laid off responsibility for
the consequences. With a Democrat in the White House.
Republicans are notably more eager, and Democrats less, to
bring the legislation into the act. But the principle of
shared accountability remains the same, and of course, the
concept of a commander in chief's needing to be able to
respond to military danger too speedily to countenance the
delay has no relevance whatever in this instance.
The national security/national interest case for the
evidently planned action seems to us to hover somewhat
between exceedingly thin and preposterous. If there is a
better case than that, the administration should be willing
to make it to the public and to Congress. It should be
willing to seek consensus and consent for spending the money
and taking the chances with American lives, no matter how
pitiable the Haitians' military resources or how good the
odds of succeeding may seem to the planners. A government
that calls up reserves for military action has an obligation
to do these things.
Mr. SARBANES. Madam President, I yield the floor and suggest the
absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sarbanes). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Illinois.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I thank the Chair.
At the outset, I would like to thank the Senator for taking the Chair
to give me a moment to speak on the issue of Haiti, one that has
greatly concerned me and certainly the people of Illinois over the last
year or so and one that certainly has been the subject of much debate
in this Chamber today.
A lot of the debate, Mr. President, has been confusing because there
is a lot of conversation from every possible aspect. The issue of where
we are and what we should do has been considered by the Members of this
body. But I think the issue we are facing now boils down to essentially
two things: What, if anything, should we do and how to do it.
At the outset, I would note that in spite of all the conversation,
our present policy is still one of negotiation. Our present policy is
still one of diplomatic intervention. The President of the United
States has not yet announced a change of that policy. The President of
the United States has not yet ordered an invasion or military action.
In fact, Mr. President, we are in this debate assuming--and rightly
so--that there will be such an announcement and that announcement will
take place tomorrow, Thursday, but the fact is at this moment in time
the policy has not been changed. An invasion may be imminent but it
certainly has not been articulated by the President.
And so, taking for a moment the notion that we are looking at and
expecting the President tomorrow night to announce his plan, or his
proposal, to launch a military action against the dictatorship in
Haiti, the question then becomes the propriety of that decision, what,
if anything, should we do.
I have heard conversation today from a number of our colleagues
suggesting that we do nothing. I am reminded of that old saw that the
only thing necessary for evil to succeed is for good men, and I would
add women, to fail to oppose it.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that there is little question that we
are facing evil in the activities of the coup leaders in Haiti, evil in
regard to human rights abuses that have occurred there, and the tragedy
of what has happened to the Haitian people, and what we have seen, the
spectacle of people at Guantanamo, coming across to escape persecution
and the kind of issues, which I will speak to at length, discussed in
the recently published human rights in Haiti publication by the U.S.
State Department, in which they at great length talk about the actual
situation on the ground, if you will, in Haiti. And again, I will get
to that more specifically later on in my discussion this evening.
But there is no question in my mind, or, frankly, I suspect, in
anyone else's, that what we are talking about is not a nice group of
people who have taken over the leadership of Haiti.
No one on this floor today has been willing to stand up for the
present dictator in Haiti. No one has spoken fondly of Mr. Cedras or
his efforts on behalf of the Haitian people of his commitment to the
blessings of liberty, of what a democrat he is. No one wants to say
anything nice because there is nothing nice to say.
Our Members have not, frankly, ducked and have not wanted to talk
about the dirty little secret in all of this--that our uncertainty and
the uncertainty of the trumpet that is being blown here, if you will,
gives no small amount of comfort and succor and protection to Cedras,
Francois, and others. It seems to me, Mr. President, that we have an
obligation to admit, to call it like we see it, and to face up to the
fact that we really are facing a tragedy in Haiti and a tragedy that
has been brought about by the actions of the military dictatorship
there.
The major objection that I have heard on the floor in all of the
conversations today has been that the United States does not have a
defined national interest in Haiti. Where are our interests? We have
heard time and time again the President has not adequately explained
it. I will point out in the first instance that the President has not
yet spoken on this issue. Frankly, part of the value of this debate is
hopefully we will get a chance to hear all sides and to get the
information and the American people will get a chance to evaluate and
weigh the facts themselves. The American people, in my opinion, rightly
do not want war. I mean none of us want war. Frankly, in Illinois, the
invasion of Haiti is not a popular matter.
But, it seems to me, the issue before us is not what is popular as
much as it is what is right. What is the right thing to do? What can we
be proud of? What gives this great country honor? Those are the kinds
of concerns that I think we need to face as we go forward in this
debate.
I would like to suggest, Mr. President, that from my perspective I
can see at least four very direct and specific interests of the United
States in getting rid of this military dictatorship in Haiti, four
specific interests that are identifiable to me. Those four interests
are, just very briefly, the drug trade, immigration, democracy, and
human rights. I would like to speak about each of those things.
In the first instance, with regard to the drug trade, there is a joke
almost--I do not know if it is a joke to call it the right thing. But
the kids on the street, the ``boys in the hood,'' if you will, say
things like ``you cannot buy a Cuban cigar on the streets but you can
buy cocaine.''
The fact of the matter is that the Haitian dictatorship is making
money, lots of it, from being a transshipment point for the drug trade.
It was estimated that they have made in excess of $100 million in the
last year alone pouring drugs into our communities that are killing our
kids; that is, killing our kids, destroying our communities, and
wrecking the very fiber of this Nation. It seems to me that threat, the
threat of a continued drug trade, the deterioration of our communities
that comes from that gives us a direct national interest in Haiti, and
what happens there and the leadership there. Certainly, that was our
interest, and that was the stated interest when we decided to go into
Panama back in 1990. The whole idea was Manuel Noriega was directly
involved in the drug trade, and that involvement was seen as a direct
threat to the United States.
Here we have a situation that is no less obscure. In fact, it is
probably more advisable than even Mr. Noriega's involvement. And the
yet the whole issue of the drug trade has not really been talked about
a whole lot on this floor. I think it has to be. I think it should be
because we have a vital national interest in protecting our community
from people profiteering over shipping poison across the shores into
the United States.
The second has to do with immigration. Certainly, while there has
been a temporary lull in the boat people, and certainly, if anything,
we all saw people coming across and dying in droves trying to flee the
repression and the human rights abuses and the economic deprivation in
Haiti at the present time. The fact of the matter is that Guantanamo
has become, if you will, a holding ground for the Haitians that have
tried to escape and have not been able to.
We have not made a decision, quite frankly, as to whether to let
those people in the country, making them immigrants fleeing from
political persecution or encourage them to go back home. They certainly
cannot go back home in the present circumstance.
So the question comes, what do we do? Are we going to let the
dictators that have destroyed democracy in Haiti control our
immigration policy and violate altogether our borders and set up a
situation that puts us in an impossible situation that we cannot
control, making American taxpayers, if you will, responsible for
warehousing people for whom there is no obvious answer in terms of
immigration policy?
That, it seems to me, is the second direct national interest that I
would rather see the Attorney General of the United States control U.S.
immigration policy than Mr. Cedras and Mr. Francois.
The third has to do with restoring Haitian democracy. The
consideration has been accurate here about the fact that Haiti does not
have the 200-year or 300-year experience with democracy as does this
country. They are trying. They tried with the election of President
Aristide to begin to develop a brandnew baby democracy, if you will, a
fragile democracy, that democracy that was just getting itself off the
ground.
President Aristide won the election in Haiti with better than 70
percent of the vote--and I would add parenthetically that the Presiding
Officer did a little better than that last night in the Maryland
primaries. But the fact is that 70 percent of the vote is considered a
very healthy vote, indeed. The people of his country elected him
president. He was kicked out by people by the end of a gun wielded by
this military coup.
So the question becomes, do we have a direct interest in restoring
democracy as high flown as that might sound? When it happens, to begin
with, then-Secretary of State Jim Baker, and I quote, said:
This coup must not and will not succeed.
Here we are almost 2 years later, more than 2 years later, debating
the coup that must not and would not succeed. It apparently has
succeeded at least long enough, too long in my opinion, and it seems to
me that if we are serious about protecting democracy, restoring
democracy, giving democracy a chance in that tiny country right off our
borders, we have an obligation to go in and to let the dictators know
that they just cannot get away with having taken democracy hostage and
having it shut down in Haiti.
Certainly, the Clinton administration shares the Bush
administration's commitment to restore democracy in Haiti because the
President knows that if the Haitian military coup is allowed to stand,
the stability of other fledgling democracies in the region will be
threatened.
So again, that is a third national interest that I think should be
fairly clear to all involved.
Fourth, Mr. President, I believe that our country has a real interest
in promoting human rights and in responding to the terrible rights
abuses that have occurred so close to our shores.
I would like really to share with the Members of this body the report
on human rights abuses in Haiti. It makes for terrible reading. But I
really would like to have it introduced as part of the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Human Rights in Haiti, United States Department of State, September 13,
1994
This is the third interim report on the condition of human
rights in Haiti to be prepared by the Department of State in
1994. Since publication of the annual ``Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices in 1993'' in February 1994, the
Department prepared and released two reports on Haiti, in
April and July of 1994. This third report is more detailed
and comprehensive than its predecessors. It attempts to fill
the void created by the compulsion in July of this year of
the UN/OAS's jointly sponsored International Civilian Mission
(ICM), which monitored human rights conditions throughout
Haiti.
summary
The human rights situation in Haiti under the illegal
Cedras regime is comparable to the notorious regime of
Francois ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The military and the de facto
government promote repression and terror, sanctioning
widespread assassination, killing, torture, beating,
mutilation and rape. The regime's actions openly defy the
international community, which has repeatedly condemned these
gross human rights violations.
The increasing repression and terrorism in Haiti is
perpetrated at various levels by military, police and
civilian groups reporting to the Cedras regime. The military
controls the de facto government, the police, the police
attaches, the Chefs de Section, and the nominally independent
FRAPH, known variously as the Revolutionary Front for
Advancement and Progress in Haiti, or the Armed Revolutionary
Front of the Haitian People.
Though the democratically approved constitution of 1987
calls for the establishment of a police force separate from
the military, the armed forces have retained control of
policing functions. The police attaches are quasi-official
agents of the security apparatus, who conduct low level
surveillance of the populace, enforce repression, and
organize vigilante action. The Chefs de Section constitute
the rural branch of the military structure, and answer to the
army's departmental commanders. The regime directs,
encourages or permits these organizations and individuals to
violate human rights with impunity.
The central authorities set the tone and provide general
direction for official terrorism, but do not necessarily
oversee each violent act. Repression is, in effect,
decentralized with the result that the lower ranks of the
security apparatus commonly regard their positions as private
sinecures. They regularly exploit their authority to extort
from the local populace, enhance their own social standing,
and settle scores for themselves or their friends. This
particular brand of Haitian terror, much used by Francois
Duvalier in his time, gave rise to his creation of the
notorious Tonton Macoutes. As the case of military commander
Norelus Mandelus (see below) illustrates, the military is
capable of controlling the violence, but encourages or
permits it because it suits their purposes.
To monitor the human rights performance of the de facto
government, the UN and the OAS co-sponsored the International
Civilian Mission (ICM), which was first deployed in Haiti in
1993, and again in 1994. The ICM found considerable evidence
of rampant human rights abuse in Haiti from the time of its
arrival to July 1994, when the de facto government asserted
that the ICM's presence in Haiti had not been legally
authorized, and expelled it.
recent human rights reporting
Although the U.S. embassy has not been able to replicate
the outstanding work of the nearly 90 full time ICM monitors
who were resident throughout the country until July, it has
significantly stepped up its human rights monitoring efforts
since the ICM's departure. In addition to spot reporting, the
embassy's interagency team reports weekly on the
deteriorating human rights situation.
since the ouster of president aristide
The Cedras regime came to power in September 1991 when it
staged a violent coup against the eight-month-old,
democratically-elected government of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. In the immediate aftermath of the coup the new
regime killed at least 300 to 500 people, targeting Aristide
supporters specifically. As we approach the third anniversary
of the coup against the Aristide government, the human rights
situation has worsened. To maintain its rule, the regime has
instilled a pervasive climate of fear through widespread
assassination and other killings, torture, mutilation, rape,
and steady harassment. According to the February 7, 1994
report of the UN Special Rapporteur for Haiti, as many as
3000 Haitian civilians, including many Aristide supporters,
have been killed under the Cedras regime. Other reports
indicate that at least several hundred more have been killed
since then. Indeed, the present situation reflects a degree
of terror comparable to that of the Duvalier regimes.
the most recent high profile cases
The August 28 assassination of President Aristide's
colleague, the Rev. Jean-Marie Vincent, is the most recent
demonstration of the de facto regime's determination to
silence its opponents. The priest was shot to death by
unidentified gunmen as he drove up to the gates of his
order's compound in the Turgeau area of Port-au-Price.
Several other political assassination attempts have failed
in recent months. Former Senator Reynold Charles was wounded
when shot by unidentified gunmen but escaped death. Gunmen
attacked the home of Senator Clarck Parent and his sister
(the Mayor of Petionville) but fled when the blind senator
fired his pistol into the air. Rather than launch credible
investigations into these events, the de facto government
dismissed them as the acts of parties interested in
discrediting the regime.
These assassinations and attempted assassinations are but
the latest in a lengthy series of killings of high level
opposition figures. In September of 1993 prominent pro-
Aristide activist Antoine Izmery was killed when a band of
armed men attacked him during a church service; on October
14, 1993, the respected Haitian lawyer and Minister of
Justice Guy Malary was assassinated in downtown Port-au-
Prince. The Cedras regime has shown scant interest in
investigating these deaths.
On September 9, 1994, the New York Times reported specific
instances of political terror being directed at orphans, many
of whose parents were themselves victims of the de facto
regime. These killings have reportedly been accompanied by
persecution of the orphanage staffs, resulting in the closure
of many orphanages.
the rule of terror
The regime's human rights record demonstrates its intention
not only to eliminate its opponents, but to subjugate the
general populace and suppress and intimidate any potential
opposition as well. A recent Human Rights Watch report
estimates that as many as 300,000 persons have been driven
into hiding. Widespread torture, rape, beatings, and the
extortion of money from people arrested for no reason, serve
to cow and demoralize the public.
The evidence of mass intimidation is ample and widely
corroborated. A delegation from the Inter-American Commission
for Human Rights (IACHR) that visited Haiti from May 16 to
May 20, 1994 found that the human rights situation in Haiti
had ``deteriorated seriously'' since their last visit in
August 1993. The delegation was able to document 133 cases of
extrajudicial killings between February and May of 1994
alone, and there is reason to believe there were many more
beyond the scope of their investigations. It also found that
the regime was leaving severely mutilated corpses on the
street simply to terrorize the populace.
The IACHR delegation uncovered evidence that the wives and
relatives of the regime's opponents were being raped and
otherwise sexually abused. It identified numerous cases of
arbitrary detention, disappearances, and torture. The
delegation attributed full responsibility for the
deteriorating situation to the de facto authorities.
In its press release of July 27, 1994, the IACHR
characterized human rights abuse in Haiti as ``flagrant and
systematic'' and attributed it to ``the continuing unlawful
exercise of power by the Haitian military and its
appointees.'' It further pointed out the collapse of
responsible governmental institutions, referring to ``the
total ineffectuality of the judiciary or other mechanisms to
prevent or punish human rights violations,'' and noted that
violators ``act with outright impunity.''
In July 1994, Human Rights Watch issued a report
documenting dozens of cases of rape aimed at terrorizing not
only the opponents of the regime, but the general populace as
well. And the ICM, for its part, documented sixty-six cases
of politically motivated rape by the military and para-
military forces in the first five months of 1994 (before the
ICM's expulsion from Haiti by the military).
a litany of human rights abuses
A sampling of the mounting incidence of rape, torture, and
mutilation illustrates the serious deterioration of the human
rights situation over the past year:
On August 6, 1993, uniformed soldiers and police invaded
the home of a suspected Aristide supporter, raping the wife
and arresting the husband, whom they tortured and released.
On August 14, 1993, police, military, and attaches invaded
the home of another suspected Aristide supporter. They killed
a two-year-old child, molested two young women, and stole
valuables.
In October 1993 the ICM report on human rights documented
the rape of a 13-year-old girl by military personnel in
Bayeux (near Cap Haitien in the north) in June; the wife of a
Cite Soleil activist by uniformed men in July; and a 16-year-
old girl by a soldier in Derec (near Ft. Liberte in the
northeast).
On December 27, 1993, a fire in the Cite Soleil
neighborhood of Port-au-Prince destroyed some 200 dwellings,
killed four people and injured 61. There is evidence that
FRAPH set the fire in retaliation for the killing of one of
its members.
According to Human Rights Watch, on January 9, 1994 a woman
from Cabaret (a coastal town north of Port-au-Prince) bled to
death as a result of having been raped by soldiers in late
December.
Amnesty International reports that on January 15, a 17-
year-old boy was shot by the FRAPH because he was suspected
of being connected to a children's home established by
Aristide.
Human Rights Watch reports that on January 29 a pro-
Aristide student activist was raped by two FAD'H attaches as
she walked home.
On February 3, the military surrounded a house occupied by
pro-Aristide activist youth and opened fire, killing eight or
nine youths.
On the same day, the military fabricated an attack by
Aristide supporters to justify terrorizing and beating
residents near Les Cayes on the southern peninsula. One
elderly man was beaten to death, and the military
subsequently attacked those who attended his funeral.
Human Rights Watch reports that on the evening of February
7, 1994, two attaches invaded the home of a family that had
been denounced by an unidentified detractor. They tied up the
husband and raped his wife on the front porch.
On March 23, plainclothes military and FRAPH members
harassed and physically abused five ICM monitors in the
central plateau town of Hinche. The ICM reported increased
lawlessness in the region, with FRAPH members and soldiers
shooting up neighborhoods and committing burglary and
extortion with impunity.
In late March, international monitors reported FRAPH
members and soldiers shooting up neighborhoods and committing
burglary and extortion with impunity. The U.S. embassy
reported a general increase in violence, including rape,
against the families of the regime's critics.
On April 18, soldiers opened fire on slum-dwellers in the
pro-Aristide area of Raboteaux in Gonaives, killing roughly
30 people.
On May 23, a dozen right-wing gunmen--probably members of
FRAPH-- hunted down and brutally killed four Aristide
supporters in Cite Soleil.
On June 14, soldiers and armed civilians raided a church
office in Laborde, arresting and severely beating the
director of the College of Notre Dame and his parents.
On June 21, an employee of the Petionville mayor's office
was severely beaten and another imprisoned for unwittingly
violating a new decree that the Haitian flag not be lowered
until the ``international oppression'' of Haiti ends.
On June 24, an explosion in the house of a local
representative of a labor organization killed two girls.
On June 30, the bodies of five men appeared on the streets
of Port-au-Prince. All had been shot with their hands tied
behind their backs. As with many killings, the exact
motivation is unknown; the absence of effort by the military
or police to prevent or investigate such killings lead us to
assume that they and others took place with the approval or
outright participation of the military and their allies.
The embassy also confirms that on August 18 the FAD'H
arrested up to 40 people in the southern peninsula town of
Cavaillon over an incident involving the lowering of the
Haitian flag. As of August 23, as many as 30 remained
incarcerated.
Several prisoners are reported to have died in police
custody in Les Cayes, and beatings and torture are common.
REPORTING FROM THE EMBASSY HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM SINCE JULY 1994
After the expulsion of the UN/OAS human rights monitors,
the U.S. embassy stepped-up its own human rights reporting.
Extensive coverage of the countryside by embassy reporting
teams since July 1994 has found a dramatic increase in human
rights violations.
The Central Province (near Hinche) had long been the home
of popular movements until they were silenced by the brutal
repression of the regime's local authority, Col. Gideon.
After the Colonel was reassigned to the Southwest Province
(around Les Cayes) repression in that area immediately
increased. Indiscriminate searches and arbitrary arrests were
commonplace. There have been reports that several people in
the Les Cayes region have been arrested simply for listening
to Voice of America broadcasts.
In Les Cayes, the summer saw the appearance in a southern
coastal town of Norelus Mandelus, a military commander who
characterized himself as the Saddam Hussein of Haiti. Among
other atrocities, Norelus cut off a victim's ear during a
vicious beating and forced him to eat it, and then carved his
initials in the victim's flesh. Military authorities
tolerated this behavior until a priest and seminarian who
were among the victims of Norelus' indiscriminate beatings
turned out to be relatives of a higher ranking officer.
Norelus apparently received a minor reprimand before being
reassigned.
In a flagrant example of an arbitrary arrest, authorities
in Miragoane imprisoned Lavalas activist Gardy Leblanc,
reportedly for ridiculing the new para-military civilian
guard during their drills. The officer in command of the
Miragoane police office refused embassy personnel access to
Mr. Leblanc. The officer said that he was under orders not to
talk to the embassy representatives and that Leblanc was
being held pending orders from his commander. After repeated
inquiries from the embassy, Leblanc was reportedly released.
Last month, the embassy reporting team found that low-level
repression and terror is common in coastal Aquin, just east
of Les Cayes. Many people were incarcerated and all were
subject to harassment by the authorities. A local nun
described to the embassy some of the injuries she had treated
for prisoners tortured by their captors.
In the town of Gressiers, a short distance west of Port-au-
Prince, several bodies of murder victims were found in a
shallow grave. The bodies were partially exposed and were
easily discovered.
On the morning of August 1, 1994, the police beat several
persons who were awaiting the opening of the U.S. refugee
processing center in Port-au-Prince. No evidence was found
that the victims provoked the action.
flouting international concern
Ever since the time of the coup, the international
community has repeatedly condemned Haiti's de facto regime.
The de facto government's response has been to increasingly
isolate itself from the international community. The regime
reneged on the terms of the Governor's Island Agreement, and
has subsequently rejected all efforts by the international
community to bring about a peaceful resolution of this
crisis. Just this month, the regime refused to meet the
special representative of UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutrous-Ghali. It has long been clear that they are the
cause of the horrendous human rights situation in Haiti, and
it is now becoming clearer that they have no intention of
working with the international community to resolve this
crisis.
The escalating human rights crisis in Haiti has received
intense attention in the OAS, the UN, and other international
fora. Most recently, the UN Security Council, recognizing
that appropriate diplomatic channels had not resolved the
crisis, approved Resolution 940 which authorizes the removal
of the de facto government by all necessary means. From this
authorization, the United States has worked to form an
international coalition to implement Resolution 940.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I would like to just read a little
bit of the summary from the report. This report came about--it was a
function of the International Civilian Mission as well as of the United
Nations and the OAS sponsorship. This is a report by the State
Department. They said:
The human rights situation in Haiti under the illegal
Cedras regime is comparable to the notorious regime of
Francois ``Papa Doc'' Duvalier. The military and the de facto
government promote repression and terror, sanctioning
widespread assassination, killing, torture, beating,
mutilation and rape. The regime's actions openly defy the
international community, which has repeatedly condemned these
gross human rights violations.
The increasing repression and terrorism in Haiti is
perpetrated at various levels by military, police and
civilian groups reporting to the Cedras regime. The military
controls the de facto government, the police, the police
attaches, the Chefs de Section, and the nominally independent
FRAPH, known variously as the Revolutionary Front for
Advancement and Progress in Haiti, or the Armed Revolutionary
Front of the Haitian People.
And then it goes on to talk about something else. I want to
read a little bit here:
The Cedras regime came to power in September 1991 when it
staged a violent coup against the eight-month old
democratically-elected government of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the new
regime --
Meaning Cedras' group.
killed at least 300 to 500 people, targeting Aristide
supporters specifically.
This is the third anniversary of the coup.
Then they go on to talk about some of the high-profile cases of the
killings and tortures.
The August 28 assassination of President Aristide's
colleague, the Reverend Jean-Marie Vincent, is the most
recent demonstration of the de facto regime's determination
to silence its opponents. The priest was shot to death by
unidentified gunmen as he drove up to the gates of his
order's compound in the Turgeau area of Port-au-Prince.
They are killing priests, Mr. President. It seems to me that you have
to go a long way to want to stand by and be associated in any way with
that kind of action.
In addition to killing priests, there was a litany of human rights
abuses.
A sampling of the mounting incidence of rape, torture and
mutilation illustrates the serious deterioration of the human
rights situation over the past year:
On August 6, 1993, uniformed soldiers and police invaded
the home of a suspected Aristide supporter, raping the wife
and arresting the husband, whom they tortured and released.
On August 14, 1993, police, military, and attaches invaded
the home of another Aristide supporter. They killed a 2-year-
old child, molested two young women, and stole valuables.
In October 1993, the ICM report on human rights documented
the rape of, one, a 13-year-old girl by military personnel in
Bayeaux; two, the wife of a Cite Soleil activist by uniformed
men in July; and three, a 16-year-old girl by a soldier in
the Northeast.
On December 27, 1993, a fire destroyed some 200 dwellings. It was
determined that the fire was set.
Amnesty International reports on January 15, a 17-year-old
boy was shot to death by the FRAPH because he was suspected
of being connected to a children's home established by
Aristide.
Mr. President, this report goes on and on and on and gets just more
and more gruesome as you go forward. I will not belabor the point,
except to say that it seems to me that we have identifiable, specific
national interests in seeing to it that these kinds of human rights
abuses are not allowed to be continued under the leadership of this
military dictatorship.
The question becomes what should we do about it, and the process.
Certainly, I think you know I care a lot about process. I talk about it
a lot. It is critically important because process, after all, is the
foundation on which we maintain democratic institutions.
I want to talk for a moment about the fact that this administration--
the President--has given peace a chance. The fact of the matter is,
with the Governor's Island accord, with the appointment of former
Congressman Gray, with Madeleine Albright's efforts, with the
international efforts, with the conversations and constant
deliberations with the United Nations, OAS, the Caribbean community,
they have tried peace. Two resolutions have been passed by the U.N.
Security Council of late. Resolution No. 917 authorized the use of
sanctions. Resolution No. 940 authorized the use of force.
With regard to the sanctions specifically, Mr. President, I am making
this speech now having all along said, ``let us use sanctions, let us
not use military intervention, let us resort to weapons as an absolute
final, last-ditch thing we can do. Try every possible diplomatic means
and economic means at our disposal.''
The sanctions have been tried, and they have been put on, and they
have been squeezed tight and enforced. Unfortunately, Mr. President,
the reality is--and it is the decision that the President is having to
face--the sanctions really are cutting to the core of the social and
economic fabric in Haiti. Poor people, people who cannot make it
otherwise, are feeling the impact of the sanctions, while the very
wealthy, the military elite, the dictators and their wives and their
families, have been able to withstand the sanctions in large part
because they can transfer money internationally, and they can fly to
Miami to shop, and they can live their lives in their villas and
compounds without real concerns. So the sanctions have not been as
effective as they were, for example, in South Africa. I was very proud
to have been part of the sanctions effort in South Africa, because I
thought it would make a difference, and it did.
Here the sanctions really have had limited utility, because it is
such a blunt instrument and unfortunate under the circumstances, since
the military leadership feels they can wait us out, that we will blink
first, and the effect has been, if you will, arguably
counterproductive.
So, Mr. President, the President of the United States may well
conclude that direct intervention is the course that we need to take.
He has not said that yet, but it is likely that he will. And so the
question becomes for all of us as Senators: What about the War Powers
Act and what is our appropriate role in all of that?
Well, of course, Mr. President, I think it is altogether appropriate
that, as Senators, we certainly want to protect our prerogatives under
the Constitution. We certainly want to make certain that the law gets
followed in this regard, that we do the right thing in terms of the
constitutional separation of powers and the checks and balances.
But I would like at this point to associate myself with the remarks
of the Senator from Georgia, when he pointed out we are not talking
about a war. We are not talking about a war; we are talking about an
action that is more like the action in Panama or Grenada than it is
even the Persian Gulf.
So, in that regard, I believe that while the debate over the War
Powers Act has continued for years, and will no doubt continue--and
Congress is rightly concerned about our appropriate role under the
Constitution--the fact is that this struggle in this debate, which is a
very important one, should not be used to hamstring this President any
more than it was allowed to hamstring previous Presidents who were
faced with making very difficult decisions in equally difficult
circumstances.
The reality of it is that none of us was elected President of the
United States. We do not have the entire picture. We have the picture
as we read it in the newspapers and as we get briefed by the State
Department. And we, of course, have the benefit of our own logic and
common sense and judgment. I do not in any way mean to suggest that
this debate should not happen and the debate around our prerogatives
and rightful role should not happen. I think it is an important and
healthy debate.
Mr. President, I say at this time that until the President of the
United States decides what to do, the most important thing that we can
do in this body is to say very clearly that our foreign policy will
follow our values, that we will act as a Nation when human lives are at
stake, as surely as we will act when oil or our economic interests are
at stake; that the most important thing we can do is to sound a sure
trumpet, to be very clear, to let the military dictators know--who,
hopefully, are watching C-SPAN or CNN and hearing some parts of this--
that we will not let them pull the chain of the greatest country on the
Earth on behalf of something that is so clearly wrong; that we will not
allow them to set an example for Korea or any other place on this
planet where dictatorship will overwhelm democracy, where the few will
make life miserable and take advantage of and commit human rights
abuses against the many; where the dictators and their ilk will rape a
country, will take the lifeblood out of a country in order to further
their own personal pecuniary financial gain. That is what we have here.
So I think, Mr. President, it is important that the Congress not send
the signal--and those are so important--that we not send the signal out
there, whether it is to our domestic media or to the military in Haiti,
or frankly anywhere else in the world, that we are confused about what
our values are, that we are confused about what our national interest
is, or that we are confused in our support for this President doing the
best job he can to conduct our foreign policy, because that is the job
that under the Constitution he is charged with doing.
So, Mr. President, again, in conclusion, I would say that I am
looking forward, as we all are, to the President's speech tomorrow
night. This is a very tough, tough issue. No one likes to be involved
in this. I mean, of all the issues that we get to deal with here in the
U.S. Senate, I daresay these kinds of issues having to do with war and
peace are the toughest. I have a 17-year-old son. I am not at all
anxious ever to want to commit American forces to do something that
will require being around things that will kill people.
These are very grave and serious matters. But at the same time, it
seems to me that if our Nation is to stand for anything and if my 17-
year-old son's life and my life and our lives as Americans are to have
meaning, they have to have meaning with honor. We have to stand for
something, and we have to let the world know that when we say
something, we give our word, when we make speeches and make
pronouncements about the lofty principles that we hold dear, that they
are not just conversation, that those principles have real meaning to
us; that we really do believe that democracy has a value; we really do
believe that human rights have a value; we really do want to make
certain that the drug trade is stopped; we really do want to see to it
that people can stay in their own homes.
We have values in this country, and those values form the bedrock
foundation of our policy both domestic and foreign.
So, Mr. President, in conclusion, I yield the floor, and I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum having been suggested,
the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DODD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________