[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   KING HUSSEIN AND THE ROAD TO PEACE

 Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, as citizens of the world's 
only superpower it is sometimes difficult for us as Americans to relate 
to the traditional problems of statecraft. For over two centuries, we 
were protected by two oceans, and subsequently by the status of being a 
nearly unchallengeable superpower.
  Indeed, one of the most searing experiences of our lifetime was to 
recognize--in Vietnam--that even our power had its limits.
  For most of the world, the United States exists in a state of 
unimaginable geopolitical luxury. They know that in order to relate to 
their struggles, we have to invest an enormous effort of the 
imagination. And too often, we fail to make that effort.
  I think that our foreign policies are often weaker as a result of 
this failure of sympathetic imagination--and I would like today to 
discuss one particular area in which I have noticed this problem.
  The Middle East is legendary for the harshness and complexity of its 
politics. In this political landscape, survival itself is a virtue, an 
indication that one has the strength and the prudence to do what's 
necessary to keep oneself alive.
  The State of Israel is an excellent case in point. Surrounded by 
hostile forces, this island of democracy has succeeded through sheer 
toughness in bringing its region to the brink of a lasting peace. Our 
country's emotional ties to the Sate of Israel have made its struggles 
relatively well known to Americans, though even here our appreciation 
is somewhat short of being adequate. Another example of strength of 
character in this region has received even less attention. I am 
referring to the statesmanship of Hussein ibn Talal, the Hashemite King 
of Jordan.
  It is my contention that the historic Rabin-Arafat peace accord of 
1993--and the whole peace process that is currently making progress in 
the region--would not have been possible without the quite, deliberate, 
and often misunderstood leadership of King Hussein.
  The secret meetings with Israeli officials are now well known. But 
the interest of King Hussein in a comprehensive peace long predates 
these relatively recent contacts.
  As long ago as the 1950's, Hussein was being branded a ``tool of the 
West'' by confrontational pan-Arab nationalists like Nasser of Egypt. 
And by the late 1960's, radical Palestinian activists were using the 
territory of Jordan as a staging area for guerrilla raids into Israel.
  It is against this background of Arab suspicions King Hussein put 
down the PLO forces with full-scale military action. In 1970 and 1971, 
he succeeded in driving the radicals out of Jordan.
  His actions brought him to the brink of war with Syria--but he knew 
that that was a chance worth taking. Though he had treated his 
Palestinian subjects liberally, he judged correctly that there was no 
future for guerrilla warfare against Israel. And he would not let 
Jordan be a party to it.
  The Arab community punished him by denying him a role as spokesman 
for the Palestinians. Again, he judged this a chance worth taking. By 
expelling the Palestinians, he let the Israeli presence in the region 
ripen into a fait accompli, decreasing the risk in an eventual 
recognition of Israel's right to exist.
  If King Hussein had launched himself into a primarily rhetorical 
role, he could easily have expanded his own regional importance, but at 
the expense of both the long-term interests of the Palestinians and the 
long-range prospects for peace in the region.
  The true statesman must make time his greatest ally. And King 
Hussein's foreign policy has indeed been based on the principle that 
was best expressed in English by Shakespeare: ``Ripeness is all.''
  In 1979, recognizing the political lay of the land, he was 
unreceptive to the idea of playing a role in the Camp David peace 
process. This established his bona fides with the Arabs.
  But 3 years later, in 1982, he was willing to take on a role in the 
Reagan Middle East peace proposals. On President Reagan's behalf, King 
Hussein entreated the PLO to accept U.N. Resolution 242 and recognize 
Israel, or at least allow Jordan to negotiate with Israel on its 
behalf.
  The emotional climate in which Hussein undertook this initiative is 
perhaps best illustrated by Abu Jihad's shout to reporters: ``What's in 
it for the PLO?''
  This is psychologically illuminating. At a time when the PLO was 
concerned about itself, King Hussein was concerned about the 
Palestinians.
  By this time, he was strong enough to risk failure--so that when 
Yasser Arafat backed out of the proposed joint Jordanian-Palestinian 
delegation, thereby dooming the Reagan plan, King Hussein was confident 
that this would not be he end of the peace process.
  Events have proved him correct. And now that the glimmer of hope for 
the Middle East is getting stronger--and self-rule for the Palestinians 
is becoming a reality, along with the recognition by the Arab nations 
that Israel has the right to exist in peace--let us take a moment to 
thank somebody who played a largely unsung role in making it happen.
  Future generations in the Middle East should be grateful to King 
Hussein for his perseverance. And we in the West would do well to study 
the example of this Jordanian King who was born in a Jewish hospital, 
and helped bring to fragile birth a new era in the history of the 
Middle East.

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