[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
 ``WE AREN'T DOING MUCH TO KEEP THE PEACE'' ``IT'S UP TO US TO DEFUSE 
                        THE RWANDAN TIME BOMB''

 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, during the Labor Day recess, Prof. 
Ivo H. Daalder of the University of Maryland, and S. Frederick Starr, 
president of the Aspen Institute and former president of Oberlin 
College, had excellent op ed pieces on the situation in Rwanda.
  The reality is we are responding too late and too feebly to this kind 
of crisis.
  We must learn our lesson.
  I wish the Rwanda situation could be the end of this kind of crisis.
  We will face more crises along this line, and we have to learn to 
move more speedily and more effectively.
  In that connection, I am also asking to insert into the Record an op 
ed piece I did for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch commenting about how we 
got where we are and the inadequacy of our response.
  I ask to insert all three items into the Congressional Record at this 
point.
  The material follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1994]

                 We Aren't Doing Much to Keep the Peace

                          (By Ivo H. Daalder)

       In Central Africa, the United States launches a massive aid 
     operation to alleviate the suffering of 1.2 million Rwandan 
     refugees. But this only after the Clinton administration had 
     done nothing to stop the genocidal massacre of a half-million 
     people that led to the exodus in the first place. In Bosnia, 
     the United States and its four partners in the ``contact 
     group'' can only muster agreement on a weak plan for new 
     sanctions. This after the Bosnian Serbs responded to an 
     ultimatum to reach a settlement of the brutal conflict by 
     resuming the strangulation of Sarajevo, with U.N. 
     acquiescence at that.
       What's going on here? The most powerful nation on earth 
     stands paralyzed as the world around it is enveloped in 
     chaos. Writing in The Post [op-ed, July 31], Brian Atwood, 
     Clinton's Agency for International Development administrator, 
     suggests that this sudden emergence of chaos represents ``a 
     strategic threat that increasingly defines America's foreign 
     policy challenges.'' His proposed cure: ``crisis 
     prevention.''
       He's right, of course, But what are we to do with those 
     crises that are not prevented? Should we stand by and watch 
     as the terror accompanying chaos unfolds? Is sending 
     transport aircraft and small contingents of military forces 
     on humanitarian operations all the United States can do? 
     Should we deal only with the symptoms and not the causes of 
     today's multiplying crises?
       At one-quarter of a trillion dollars annually, the United 
     States spends more on its military than the rest of the world 
     combined. Yet even the limited use of these resources in 
     Rwanda is sufficient cause for the American military to fret 
     about the cost (at less than 0.2 percent of its annual 
     budget) and worry about the impact on the military's fighting 
     edge. No sooner were American forces on the ground in Goma, 
     Zaire, than Gen. Gordon Sullivan, the Army chief of staff, 
     cautioned that ``everyone has to recognize that the ultimate 
     purpose of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars.''
       And there's the nub of the problem. The failure of the 
     United States to act more forcefully in stemming chaos around 
     the world is not because of the incompetence of President 
     Clinton's leadership as Republicans charge, though 
     incompetent that leadership has been. Nor is it because of 
     the supposed reluctance of the American public to get 
     involved abroad. Polls have shown that most Americans support 
     U.S. intervention along with others to end genocide and other 
     massive violations of human rights. It is rather that the 
     political leadership in this country has accepted the 
     military's insistence that it cannot use even a small portion 
     of the military's abundant resources to engage in what are, 
     after all, small operations, for these are not ``the nation's 
     wars.''
       Becoming involved isn't part of the military's mission 
     statement: to fight not one, but two major wars nearly 
     simultaneously. But after the Cold War, where are these wars 
     to come from? Korea? Perhaps, and the United States should 
     stand ready to fight and win should war come on the 
     peninsula. The Persian Gulf? Maybe, but with the defeat of 
     Iraq and continued containment of Iran, not on a scale of 
     even three years ago. Both at the same time? Highly 
     improbable.
       In the meantime, chaos is all around us. Societies are 
     disintegrating, states are failing and innocent people 
     everywhere are the victims of terror, genocide and mass 
     starvation. The United States has the means to do something 
     about many of these crises. Once engaged, the U.S. military 
     performs the tasks of humanitarian relief superbly, and it 
     has unique capabilities to support these operations. The 
     United States also has a singular ability to lead, for once 
     it gets involved, others invariably follow.
       But the political leaders in Washington have failed to use 
     the means at their disposal. Like its predecessor, the 
     Clinton administration has blithely accepted the military's 
     longstanding view that the use of force is a question of all 
     or nothing. And since all is too risky and costly, Washington 
     has mostly done nothing. That's unconscionable and a betrayal 
     of the values Americans supposedly hold dear. It's also a 
     massive waste of resources. How long can we afford spending a 
     fifth of the nation's budget on capabilities we're not 
     willing to use?
       The fact is, the U.S. faces a critical choice in deciding 
     how to deal with the new strategic threat of chaos: Either we 
     use the military forces we have, or we don't. But if we're 
     just going to stand by watching chaos unfold, let's at the 
     least not waste billions on capabilities we never plan to 
     use.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1994]

             It's Up to Us to Defuse The Rwandan Time Bomb

                        (By S. Frederick Starr)

       The cycle of horror in Rwanda is far from over. This became 
     clear last week to members of a presidential mission touring 
     the region. Led by Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ.) and C. Payne 
     Lucas of Africare, the multiracial delegation, of which I was 
     a part, inspected the vast refugee camps at Goma, Zaire; met 
     with leaders of the U.N.'s High Commissioner for Refugees and 
     visited hospital and aid facilities in the war-battered 
     Rwandan capital of Kigali. The group also met with the 
     president and prime minister of the new government formed by 
     the Popular Front of Rwanda and interviewed the president and 
     minister of defense of Burundi, the country adjoining Rwanda 
     that could be swept into the holocaust of remorseless killing 
     that cost some 1 million lives in Rwanda itself.
       True, the picture we saw had a few bright spots. Americans 
     can take pride in the way the U.S. armed forces and private 
     groups opened supply routes to Rwanada and provided water and 
     sanitation that cut the death rate at the sprawling refugee 
     camps from several thousand a day to barely 100. Beyond this, 
     the Tutsi-dominated government in Kigali seems ready to 
     welcome Hutus into positions of leadership and to discipline 
     members of its army who engage in reprisals against those 
     suspected of having participated in this April's genocide. 
     And in Burundi, a few sober voices genuinely seek 
     reconciliation and democracy as an alternative to a further 
     blood bath in their country.
       Yet we also detected danger signs on every side. More than 
     2 million Hutu refugees from Rwanda have created makeshift 
     ``cities'' not only in Zaire but in Tanzania, Uganda and 
     Burundi. Among them are thousands who participated in the 
     genocide. The former government of Rwanda never surrendered 
     and instead called for tactical retreat across the border. 
     Its leaders are now in the camps. They have enough money to 
     pay the 25,000-man Hutu army, which is also in the camps and 
     still partially armed. This government in exile also is able 
     to maintain a network of tens of thousands of militiamen 
     throughout the camp system. It clearly intends to return to 
     Rwanda and eventually reclaim the reins of power. Until then, 
     the Hutu army and militia forces have shown themselves to be 
     ready to murder anyone who sets out for home on his own.
       Many may soon choose to do so. The approach of the rainy 
     season is threatening to reverse recent gains in sanitation 
     in the camps. Disease-bearing flies already are resistant to 
     several powerful pesticides. Thus, the refugees are caught in 
     a deadly grip between their own exile government and the 
     forces of nature.
       The new government within Rwanda can offer little 
     encouragement to those in the camps who yearn to return to a 
     normal life rather than participate in a fresh round of 
     butchery. With neither electricity nor working telephones in 
     its half-deserted capital, it is incapable of providing even 
     the most rudimentary services to the traumatized population. 
     And if further strife erupts, can this Kigali government 
     really control its army of AK-47-wielding 16-year-olds?
       Burundi too, remains a tinderbox. Only last October some 
     100,000 people were slaughtered in this beautiful country 
     adjoining Lake Tanganyika. The international community 
     scarcely took notice. Members of the mission sensed that 
     Burundi's acting president, Pasteur Bizimungu, understands 
     the need for ethnic reconciliation and democracy in his 
     country. But only days before we arrived in the capital of 
     Bujumbura, there were rumors of a coup, and nightly murders 
     in both the city and the countryside have continued for 
     months. These acts of violence are the work of rival ethnic 
     bands, many inflamed by calls for genocide spread by a 
     clandestine Hutu radio station.
       What, if anything, can the United States do to avert 
     further horrors in Rwanda and Burundi? It already may be too 
     late, but at least five steps could make a difference.
       The former Rwandan army ensconced in the refugee camp near 
     Goma in Zaire must be disarmed. United Nations forces are not 
     authorized to carry out this mission, which will require the 
     cooperation of Zaire's dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko. The United 
     States must work to broker this deal, distasteful though it 
     may be.
       Leaders of the former government and army must be separated 
     from the camps at Goma in order to prevent further 
     intimidation of those seeking to leave peacefully and 
     repatriate themselves.
       The United States and other countries must provide the aid 
     to reestablish rudimentary infrastructures in Rwanda.
       Private organizations should redouble their efforts to 
     improve sanitation in the camps. The U.S. Air Force should 
     again be charged with ferrying supplies as needed.
       The United States must work with other countries to 
     establish an international tribunal to bring those 
     responsible for the genocide to justice. This is an essential 
     for social reconciliation among the ethnically divided 
     population of Rwanda. It would provide the strongest possible 
     signal to Burundi as well. The Rwandan government has 
     promised to cooperate with this effort, but genocide should 
     be the concern of all countries.
       Our government can and should undertake each of these tasks 
     in consort with other countries, whether through the United 
     Nations or other groupings. This should not be America's 
     responsibility alone, but with both practical and moral 
     issues at stake, the United States should be willing to 
     provide leadership. This country, after all, sat on the 
     sidelines while a million people were hacked to death in 
     April. Our passivity in turn crippled the United Nations' 
     ability to take action when it was most needed.
       Now our national attention has shifted to Haiti and Cuba, 
     as if we have somehow fulfilled our moral and political 
     obligations in Central Africa. Nothing could be further from 
     the truth. To walk away from Rwanda and Burundi would be to 
     admit that we have learned nothing from the other instances 
     of genocide in our century, whether in Armenia, under the 
     Third Reich or in Cambodia. It is time to say ``never again'' 
     and to mean it.
                                  ____


           [From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 28, 1994]

    Our National Responsibility--U.S. Should Work To Prevent Tragedy

                            (By Paul Simon)

       The world watches French troops leave southwestern Rwanda 
     in the care of U.N. peacekeeping forces, but few noted 
     another landmark turnover in the Rwanda saga. Aug. 20 marked 
     the departure of Canadian Major-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, who had 
     served as force commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in 
     Rwanda since its creation last October. He handed the 
     mission's baton to a fellow Canadian and major-general, Guy 
     Tousignant.
       Dallaire first came to Rwanda in June 1993 as chief U.N. 
     military observer to a country entering into a shaky peace. 
     Fourteen months and hundreds of thousands of lives later, he 
     leaves behind yet another shaky peace.
       Some say the atrocities in Rwanda were permitted to drag on 
     without international response because of U.N. ineptitude. In 
     fact, in Dallaire and his force, the United Nations had a 
     capable team that understood the situation in Rwanda but 
     whose hands were tied by decision-makers in New York and 
     Washington.
       The general's pleas for U.N. troop reinforcements fell on 
     deaf ears. His 2,500-strong force, employed to monitor 
     implementation of a peace agreement between the Rwandan 
     Patriotic Front and the government of President Juvenal 
     Habaryimana, had orders to engage in combat only in self 
     defense.
       When 10 Belgian peacekeepers were slaughtered in early 
     April, ``It ripped the heart out of the operation,'' said 
     Dallaire. Belgium and Bangladesh pulled out their troops. The 
     500 or so soldiers who remained, mostly Ghanaians, were 
     forced to look on helplessly as civilians were abducted and 
     murdered. At last, the Canadian had to admit that the lives 
     of his U.N. troops were in significant danger. By the end of 
     April, the U.N. Security Council voted to strip the mission 
     to a bare-bones force of 270.
       In a telephone conversation with Sen. James Jeffords, a 
     Vermont Republican, and me on May 12, Dallaire said that if 
     he could get 5,000 to 8,000 troops on the ground quickly he 
     could stabilize the situation inside Rwanda and bring an end 
     to the massacres. A few days later, the Security Council 
     finally agreed to an enhanced force of 5,500. U.S. concerns 
     over ``getting bogged down in another Somalia,'' however, led 
     to a further month-long delay in redefining the mission's 
     strategy and scope. On June 22, U.N. Secretary General 
     Boutros Boutros-Ghali told The New York Times that deployment 
     was still three months away.
       That report stunned me. I called the State Department, and 
     it said that the United States would be willing to fly a 
     battalion (800 men) of African forces to Rwanda, but that 
     there were technical hangups. The secretary general for the 
     Organization for African Unity, Salim Salim, visited my 
     office and appealed for help, saying he had commitments from 
     Mali, Ghana, Senegal, Tunisia and Ethiopia for the necessary 
     troops, but no means to get them to Rwanda. His sense of 
     urgency was not shared by many.
       In the meantime, Dallaire stretched our thinking about what 
     a U.N. force can do with minimal resources. He came up with 
     his own definition of the rules of engagement--between 
     traditional peacekeeping and more muscular peace enforcement. 
     His lightly armed forces undertook daring rescue operations 
     of civilians across frontlines; he and his staff were 
     tenacious negotiators. He experimented with joint patrols of 
     U.N. and Patriotic Front soldiers to enhance his limited U.N. 
     capacity, allowing a measured transfer of security 
     responsibility.
       The United States at last fully reacted to Rwanda--after 
     hundreds of thousands of deaths--when television pictures of 
     the refugees' plight brought the issue into the living rooms 
     of America. Dallaire was then given the opportunity to make 
     his appeal for more troops in person to Defense Secretary 
     William Perry, who, to his credit, visited Rwanda. Suddenly 
     what had been insurmountable administrative and legal 
     obstacles to the deployment of African forces to join the 
     U.N. mission were set aside in the interest of saving lives.
       Dallair supported the Clinton administration's decision to 
     move U.S. troops into the region to enhance and safeguard 
     Kigali airport and to set up water purification systems, both 
     critical steps in the humanitarian response. He remained 
     frustrated, however, by the U.S. reluctance to play a larger 
     role. The United States kept its troop mission narrow, in 
     light of post-Somalia considerations about troop security and 
     ``mission creep,'' as well as concern about congressional 
     reaction.
       Meanwhile, thousands of relief agency personnel and U.N. 
     troops are operating throughout Rwanda without incident. Many 
     critical needs such as overland distribution of aid and 
     rehabilitation of utilities--items that will increase 
     stability and encourage people to return home--still go unmet 
     for lack of adequate personnel and resources. Approximately 
     2,000 U.S. troops are in the region, many sitting on their 
     hands.
       Rwanda shows us that we need to rethink our mechanisms for 
     crisis response and--more important--crisis prevention. We 
     must examine the changing role for the U.S. military in these 
     efforts, and that means re-evaluating the perceived threats 
     to our national security. If, as I believe, the greatest 
     threat to the world today is instability, then the U.S. role 
     within the United Nations potentially represents the greatest 
     hope for stability. Our continued failure to quicken and 
     strengthen the U.N. mechanism exposes our Achilles heel to 
     would-be aggressors. U.S. leadership and resources are 
     critical to creating an effective multilateral crisis 
     response.
       Our political leadership must make a case to the American 
     people that deterring these situations is a cause worth our 
     involvement--sometimes with our troops, sometimes without. We 
     owe it to a future Gen. Dallaire--and to the hundreds of 
     thousands of Rwandans who might have been saved.

                          ____________________