[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

                                 ______


                           THE ``CENTURION''

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, the Centurion, our new attack 
submarine, is a child of Congress. We initiated it, and we established 
affordability as the primary goal of development.
  Unfortunately, the design trade-offs that have shaped the gross 
characteristics of the ship have cast doubt on the affordability of the 
program.
  I ask that excerpts from the House and Senate Defense Appropriations 
reports be inserted in the Record at this point, so that I may comment 
on the language.
  The material follows:

                   Excerpt From House Report 103-562


                          new attack submarine

       The budget request includes $508 million in fiscal year 
     1995 for development of the New Attack Submarine (NAS). The 
     Department of the Navy has reported to the Congress that the 
     total development cost of the NAS is expected to be $3.5 
     billion and procurement costs are expected to be $57.8 
     billion. The Committee believes that an investment of this 
     scope must be very carefully reviewed to achieve the highest 
     possible return in capability at the most realistic cost. The 
     Committee further believes that a program of this magnitude 
     deserves special attention early in its development phase to 
     ensure that the Congress and the Department are fully aware 
     of financial implications for the future, in particular the 
     potential drain on budgetary resources available for other 
     Navy shipbuilding programs as well as overall Department of 
     Defense requirements.
       Much of the testimony and correspondence received by the 
     Committee this year has concentrated on preservation of the 
     submarine industrial base. The Committee recognizes the 
     importance of this aspect of the NAS program and also notes 
     that the end of the Cold War has not resulted in an end to 
     submarine mission requirements.
       At this time the Committee is prepared to offer a limited 
     endorsement of the role NAS plays in the Navy's overall plan 
     for preservation of the submarine industrial base. However, 
     the Committee is concerned that the current plan needs to be 
     refined to control total program cost while keeping open the 
     option for improvements to adequately address the threats of 
     the future.
       First and foremost, the Committee has added $100,000,000 to 
     the fiscal year 1995 budget request for Advanced Submarine 
     System Development (P.E. 0603561N). The funding is to be 
     dedicated to improvements in ``producibility'' with the 
     overall goals to be (1) a reduction in risk associated with 
     the program, (2) a reduction in follow-ship procurement cost 
     to no more than $1.2 billion versus the current estimate of 
     $1.54 billion, and (3) allow for future insertion of new 
     technology. Along these lines, the Committee directs the Navy 
     to incorporate full modular reconfigurability into the design 
     for NAS. Such reconfigurability at a minimum must allow for 
     insertion of large-scale new technologies that become 
     available or adapt the design to shifts in mission focus or 
     operating environment. Such modularity must also include 
     the ability to accept replacement of machinery plant, 
     entire propulsion plant (machinery and reactor), sail, and 
     the forward end, as well as insertion of special mid-hull 
     mission modules forward of the reactor plant.
       Second, the Committee recommends a reduction of 
     $137,322,000 for Ship Contract Design (P.E. 0604567N). This 
     is the total amount specified in project F2199 for New Design 
     SSN. The Committee has deferred embarking on the new design 
     effort until completion of producibility studies to reduce 
     future costs. The Committee further recommends a reduction of 
     $62,678,000 for New Design SSN Development (P.E. 0604558N) 
     for similar reasons. The Committee has recommended no 
     reduction to the funding request of $82,412,000 for S9G 
     nuclear propulsion plant development (P.E. 0603570N) since 
     this effort is essentially in its sixth year of development 
     and the Committee believes it is too late to re-think the 
     size and power of the system. However, the Committee directs 
     the Navy to use a portion of the funding requested to 
     continue efforts to find better and cheaper ways to produce 
     the propulsion plant.
       The Committee advises the Department of Defense that future 
     funding for NAS will be dependent upon the Secretary of 
     Defense certifying that the follow-ship procurement cost goal 
     of $1.2 billion in constant dollars will be met and that the 
     Navy cost estimate has been verified by an independent 
     Department of Defense cost estimate. In addition, the 
     Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to submit detailed 
     quarterly reports to the Congress on the efforts being 
     undertaken to reduce the cost of the submarine. The first 
     report is to be submitted on March 31, 1995.
                                  ____


                   Excerpt from House Report 103-321

       Submarine plans--Over the next 5 years, in constant fiscal 
     year 1995 dollars, the Navy plans to spend $7,690,000,000 to 
     develop and produce the first new attack submarine and to 
     complete payment on the SSN-23. Over 10 years, the costs 
     would be $18,600,000,000. The Navy plans would develop the 
     new attack submarine as a lower cost alternative to the 
     seawolf program. The Navy argues, that production of one 
     Seawolf every other year is adequate to sustain the nuclear 
     submarine industrial base in the near term, but it must 
     purchase the new attack submarine to lower total costs and, 
     because continuing Seawolf production at this rate would be 
     insufficient to sustain a force structure of between 40 and 
     55 attack submarines in the long term. Further it argues, 
     that a new submarine design is needed to sustain the 
     industrial base for submarine design capability.
       Clearly the concerns expressed by the Navy while not 
     inconsequential are based on costs and future force structure 
     requirements. It appears, based on the 30-year life of the 
     Navy's SSN-688 class submarines, that a shortfall will not 
     begin until the middle of the second decade of the next 
     century, raising questions about the need to finance a new 
     low-cost alternative to the Seawolf during the current 5-year 
     plan. The quandary is how can DOD best protect the industrial 
     base at the lowest cost until it is time to purchase a 
     relatively large number of SSN-688 replacements.
       The cost of the Seawolf, at approximately $2,500,000,000, 
     is expensive. However, the first new attack submarine will 
     cost more than $3,100,000,000 to produce, in 1995 constant 
     dollars. This is about 25 percent more than the SSN-23 is 
     expected to cost. Furthermore, in conjunction with ordering 
     the first NAS, the Congress will need to provide an 
     additional $2,068,000,000 to complete development of this 
     alternative submarine. Recently, Deputy Secretary Deutch 
     instructed the Navy to reduce its NAS spending by 
     $1,000,000,000 over the 5-year plan. One alternative would be 
     to delay the NAS. The Committee finds that the NAS program 
     could be delayed 8 years and still satisfy the requirement to 
     maintain an acceptable attack submarine force structure. 
     However, this alone will not sustain the submarine industrial 
     base.
       If an alternative submarine construction program continued 
     during this 8-year period, the industrial base could be 
     sustained. The Committee notes, for example, that purchasing 
     one Seawolf every other year through 2004 while delaying 
     continued NAS development until 2003 would cost approximately 
     $4,700,000,000 over the 5-year plan, and $14,400,000,000 over 
     the next 10 years. This amounts to a savings of nearly 
     $3,000,000,000 over the next 5 years and nearly 
     $5,000,000,000 over the 10-year period compared to the 
     current plan. Such an approach would minimize the financial 
     burdens facing the Navy and the Defense Department over this 
     period, and could allow for the much needed recapitalization 
     in other areas, such as Marine Corps amphibious ships.
       The Committee shares the Navy's concern that the submarine 
     design base would not be entirely safeguarded by this type of 
     approach. The Committee believes continuation of a technology 
     demonstration program studying advanced submarine concepts, 
     especially with the objective of reducing the costs of the 
     new attack submarine would be a useful and cost-effective 
     method for sustaining these design skills. A $1,000,000,000 
     program over the 8-year period could offset this need. 
     Together, this approach would still save the Navy nearly 
     $2,400,000,000 over the next 5 years, including more than 
     $900,000,000 next year alone.
       The Committee directs the Navy to consider an alternative 
     to the new attack submarine program before going forward to 
     milestone III. The Committee expects this review to be 
     completed before the Navy will need to obligate more than 50 
     percent of the fiscal year 1995 development funding 
     associated with the new attack submarine. It therefore, 
     directs the Navy to withhold from obligating 50 percent of 
     the fiscal year 1995 new attack submarine funds until the 
     review has been completed and a report on the review has been 
     submitted to the congressional Defense committees.

                           *   *   *   *   *

       New attack submarine combat system.--The Committee supports 
     the Navy's stated goal of employing an open hardware and 
     software architecture to connect and operate the 15 command 
     and surveillance subsystems comprising the combat system for 
     the new attack submarine. This goal also attempts to maximize 
     affordability, flexibility, and performance of the combat 
     system. The Committee further believes that an open 
     competition for the combat system should ensure the greatest 
     possible use of open system interfaces and commercial 
     electronics.
       The Committee has been informed that the Navy is 
     reconsidering the strategy for developing this combat system. 
     Previous Navy plans to use only current combat systems as the 
     baseline for the new submarine's system were criticized 
     convincingly by an independent panel (the Reynolds panel) 
     chartered by the service. The Committee believes that 
     competition for the new attack submarine combat system at the 
     system level must be pursued to optimize private sector 
     expertise to develop and integrate an affordable, open system 
     architecture using advanced technology. Therefore, the 
     Committee prohibits the use of any fiscal year 1995 funds to 
     develop, modify, or otherwise evolve the current Navy 
     submarine combat systems as candidate systems for the new 
     submarine, except as part of a fully competitive process.
       The Committee further directs that no fiscal year 1995 
     funds shall be obligated for design, development, or 
     integration of a combat system for the new attack submarine 
     until the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (research, 
     development, and acquisition) reports to the congressional 
     defense committees on the service's revised strategy for a 
     competition for a combat system integrator. This report, 
     which shall be submitted no later than December 31, 1994, 
     also shall describe how the service is responding to the 
     specific recommendations and conclusions of the independent 
     panel with respect to development of the combat system.

  Mr. D'AMATO. Ultimately, the Centurion debate will turn on the 
definition of affordability. The Navy defines an affordable Centurion 
as anything less expensive than the Seawolf. Congress defines an 
affordable Centurion as a submarine that will fit within the 
shipbuilding and conversion budgets of the future, both the 
Congressional Research Service and the Pentagon's Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group have raised this issue. I believe ours is the proper 
perspective.
  If we want to avoid a repeat of the Seawolf debacle, we must impose 
budget discipline now. With the release of fiscal year 1995 funds, and 
the onset of detailed design, Congress will cede control of the cost 
and character of the Centurion to the Naval Sea Systems Command. Unless 
we tie the release of fiscal year 1995 funds to specific cost caps, we 
are likely to find ourselves anguishing over the termination of yet 
another unaffordable submarine in the not too distant future.

                          ____________________