[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 AND MILITARY 
 CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I do want to support S. 2182, the bill 
that is before us. The post-cold-war era has brought about tremendous 
changes in our security environment. Shaping our military forces to 
meet existing and future challenges requires strong leadership of the 
type that the senior Senators from Georgia and South Carolina have 
provided to the committee and to the Nation. As we draw down our 
military forces to the lowest levels since just prior to the outbreak 
of World War II, we must be mindful that the threats we face are still 
global in nature and that the readiness and training requirement of a 
smaller military must be more vigorous, and we must be able to meet the 
various threats we face.
  Mr. President, while I support and will vote for this bill, I am very 
concerned that continuing cuts in defense spending will leave us with a 
military force structure that lacks the manpower and materiel to defend 
the United States and its vital interests. This would be disastrous, 
not only for the United States but for our allies and for the peace and 
stability of the world.
  We Americans love peace, but one thing the post-cold-war era has 
taught us is that the world is still a dangerous place to live; that 
there are still acute threats to our security and peace that we must 
meet. The Persian Gulf war should have demonstrated clearly to the 
doubters the folly of imagining evil and aggression has been banished 
from the globe. The United States has never had the largest army in the 
world, although we certainly have the best. I doubt many Americans know 
that currently our country has the 12th largest standing army in the 
world. While I do not advocate that we have the world's largest army, I 
do think we need to keep in mind our national security presumptions are 
based on this 12th largest army having the capability of fighting and 
winning two major conflicts simultaneously.
  Who knows from where the threats will come in the future. But the 
magnitude of the challenge for our military forces can be imagined from 
recent history. We could find ourselves fighting a war on the Korean 
Peninsula or we could see renewed aggression by Saddam Hussein.
  Mr. President, one hopes that this scenario is unthinkable, but it is 
not. To depend on our slimmed down forces to meet these very real and 
very terrible threats is an extraordinary expectation, but it is one 
that our men and women in uniform can fight if we give them the support 
they need. The unequaled capabilities of our forces was displayed 
during Operation Desert Storm. Even after the cold war drawdown, our 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines remained the best trained, the best 
led and the most formidable fighting force in the world. But all that 
quality and superb capability is, I am afraid, at risk.
  The last 5-year plan from the Bush administration established a hard 
floor below which the consensus of military analysts agreed we could 
not go without dangerous diminution of our strength. But not only has 
this administration and this Congress made additional cuts in our 
defense budget, we face daunting budget shortfalls in the years ahead 
that threaten further dangerous reductions in our capabilities. 
According to the General Accounting Office, current defense level 
spending will fall as much as $150 billion short of what is needed to 
maintain force levels to provide the equipment we need to fight at 
optimum effectiveness. At current spending levels, not only must 
something give but that something could have profound consequences for 
our military's ability to fight and win.
  Consider just one sector of our force structure--air power. Unless we 
continue to upgrade our combat aircraft, with the most modern models of 
the F-16 and other proven fighters and with a new generation of high 
performance tactical aircraft, our troops on the ground and our ships 
at sea could pay a terrible price in the future. Unless we move ahead 
with deployment of badly needed, heavy air transport capability, the C-
17, our troops and essential materiel may not arrive at the point of 
conflict in the amount of time that we need.
  With the continuing phaseout of B-52's, only a limited number of B-
1's and the freeze of additional B-2 acquisitions, we have arrived at 
the cusp of a critical shortage of strategic bombing capability. The 
ability to strike at an enemy's nerve and supply center with strategic 
bombing is an essential component of our strategy to win major 
conflicts.
  Aircraft programs describe only one aspect of what we must do in 
order to keep our edge militarily. Correspondingly, vital Army, Navy, 
and Marine programs must be maintained or there could be dire 
consequences when we next ask our men and women to go into harm's way.
  But equipment only describes part of the quality of our force that we 
are jeopardizing. The people are the backbone of our military, and they 
are at risk, too. They are the best trained, most highly motivated and 
most capable in the world. In order to accommodate budget realities, we 
are encouraging thousands of skilled, combat-experienced soldiers, 
sailors, and pilots to muster out. When you consider what we invested 
in them and what they have invested in themselves, and the quality of 
their performance, the loss is staggering. We can maintain our 
capabilities with reduced numbers, but that means training is even more 
important. Our smaller, leaner forces cannot maintain their edge 
without the resources for constant intensive training, fuel, 
ammunition, and equipment. Cut training and resources and readiness 
decline in direct proportion. This is what is happening.
  Furthermore, this very serious situation is being exacerbated by 
spending for what is known as operations other than war. We are 
spending too little to equip and train our forces for war, but we are 
calling on them to take new responsibilities that have little or 
nothing to do with the vital job of protecting our Nation and its 
interests.
  Let me give some examples of how the diversion of forces to 
nonmilitary duty detracts from their primary mission to deter war and 
defend our country. One army infantry battalion from Fort Carson was 
about to be sent to Fort Irwin, CA, to the Army's national training 
center. There is no military training in the world short of war that 
equals this training experience for our soldiers. But that battalion, 
unfortunately, will not be trained this year. Instead, they were sent 
to Guantanamo Bay to assist with the Cuban refugees.
  Clearly, someone has to do this mission. It may be that it is 
soldiers on active duty that need to do it. But let us understand the 
cost. These infantry soldiers have lost an invaluable training 
experience at the National Training Center which may not be replaced. 
What is the impact on the individual soldier who joined the Army to do 
the things soldiers do? The answer is simple. He or she sets up tents 
in Cuba, fights fires in Idaho, takes part in peacekeeping in Somalia, 
refugee assistance in Rwanda and disaster relief in the United States. 
What they do not do is train in their military skills. A soldier, 
sailor, pilot, or marine that is not trained in military skills cannot 
be morally asked to take part in a major regional conflict.
  The policy of diverting our active military personnel to firefighting 
and police tasks is a policy which I do not think we have fully 
considered, and it is diverting resources from our defense budget and 
adversely impacting on the training posture of our forces. We must 
debate this policy fully in order to determine the proper role of our 
Armed Forces in peacetime and the resources of our armed services in 
peacetime.
  As we look at a military which is becoming increasingly hollow, it is 
helpful to reflect on the circumstances which prevailed in 1950. When 
North Korea launched the Korean war 44 years ago, the first United 
States forces to arrive on the scene were under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Smith. And they were known therefore as ``Task Force 
Smith.'' The soldiers of Task Force Smith were brave soldiers. But they 
were disastrously ill-equipped and having spent the preceding years in 
peacetime occupation duty, completely unprepared to accomplish their 
military duties. The Army had not been modernized and their antitank 
projectiles literally bounced off North Korean tanks. Task Force Smith 
suffered horrendous casualties.
  What had become of the military which had defeated the Japanese and 
the German military just 5 years earlier? Like today, our military was 
diverted for every mission possible except military training. And like 
today, calls for modernization had gone unheeded. They did not call it 
``Operations Other Than War'' then, but occupation duty. The result was 
the same. The soldiers who were sent to Korea to face the North Koreans 
were untrained and ill-prepared for the enemy they faced, and thousands 
of them died as a result.
  When the current military drawdown began, Army Chief of Staff, 
General Sullivan, recalled those dark days at the beginning of the 
Korean war. And he warned that there must not be any more Task Force 
Smiths. By this he meant that never again should we send soldiers into 
combat unless they are well trained and properly equipped with the best 
weapons available.
  But despite General Sullivan's commitment, the fact is that there is 
every chance that very soon we may be in danger of repeating the 
mistakes which created the conditions where a Task Force Smith could be 
committed to fight in a battle they cannot win.
  I voted for the 1995 Defense Authorization Act with some very serious 
misgiving about the level of funding. My concern has only grown since 
that vote. Soon after the Defense Authorization Act passed, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, announced in a memorandum that 10 of 
the military's top programs were slated for either elimination or 
delay.
  Included among the systems on Deutch's now famous list are the Air 
Force's F-22 fighter, and the Marine Corps' B-22 Osprey, the Army's 
Advanced Field Artillery System, and the Apache helicopter. These 
systems are considered critical to the overall defense modernization 
effort and to our defense industrial base. But because the military has 
been engaged in every mission other than their primary mission, funds 
are now critically short, and the Pentagon has signaled its intention 
to barter the military modernization requirements of the future for 
near term savings. This is at least partially attributable to this 
administration's commitment of our military to missions unrelated to 
the main purpose for which we have raised our military, and that is to 
defend our country.
  Mr. President, in closing, I must state my deep concern for the 
continued decline in our defense expenditures. We cannot continue to 
coast on our cold war buildup, nor on our gulf war laurels. The 
military strength which we put in place then is becoming increasingly 
hollow. Readiness is beginning to suffer, and now the critical 
modernization needed for the future is being mortgaged to pay for 
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations. All are 
worthy in and of themselves but they take money and resources away from 
our military's primary mission of defending our country.
  We should talk about our humanitarian missions, and we should fund 
them separately. But I fear we are now repeating the mistakes that we 
made in the 1930's, the 1950's, and the 1970's. By the end of the 
current 5-year security plan, our defense spending will have declined 
by 40 percent in real terms since 1985--almost half. Yet, there are 
those in this Congress and this administration who would cut even 
deeper. The first responsibility of our Federal Government is to 
provide for the common defense. If we continue our current force 
reductions we risk failing in that responsibility with consequences too 
terrible to imagine for our children and grandchildren.
  I will support the authorization bill now before the Senate, but we 
must reassess what we are doing. In my view, we are verging on a 
reckless stripping of our military capabilities. We should downsize our 
forces but we cannot do so in a way that diminishes our readiness. We 
must do all we can, as General Sullivan, said to make sure there are no 
more Task Force Smiths. Never again should we send our soldiers into 
combat ill-trained, poorly equipped, and unprepared. Soldiers died in 
Korea because they were unprepared. Sailors died at Pearl Harbor 
because we were complacent. And Americans will die needlessly again 
unless we are vigilant.
  Mr. President, on April 19, 1951, Gen. Douglas MacArthur appeared 
before a joint session of Congress. One of the memorable lines he 
delivered was:

       In war there is no substitute for victory.

  As we again face a future full of uncertainty and potential dangers, 
we should remember that in peace there is no substitute for 
preparedness.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I would like to ask the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, to clarify the intent of the 
conferees to S. 2182, the DOD authorization bill, with regard to 
section 3411 of this conference report.
  But first, I would like to make a general statement on this 
provision--which incorporates authority under the Civil Defense Act 
into the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act.
  Emergency management in this Nation needs a new Federal charter, 
building on the Stafford Act, to clarify Federal, State and local 
responsibilities and shift the emphasis from the civil defense focus of 
the cold war to domestic emergencies and natural disasters. The Civil 
Defense Act was enacted in 1950 at the start of the cold war. At that 
time, Joseph Stalin ruled the former Soviet Union and nuclear weapons 
had just entered the Soviet arsenal. For the next 30 years, the threat 
of attack was the driving force behind the civil defense program.
  But in 1981, Congress amended the Civil Defense Act to permit States 
to spend their Federal civil defense funds to prepare for natural 
disasters if it did not detract from attack-related civil defense 
preparedness. And since 1981, we have witnessed dramatic changes in the 
world and the balance of power.
  Our civil defense has the new focus of emergency management. It 
provides the infrastructure of people and resources that exist today to 
save lives and protect property when disaster strikes. Civil defense 
today means emergency management.
  In the past several years, we have witnessed the effects of the most 
devastating disasters in the history of the United States including 
Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki, the Loma Prieta and Northridge 
earthquakes, the Midwest floods of 1993, the wildfires in my State of 
Montana and throughout the West, and the most recent floods in Alabama, 
Florida, and Georgia this summer. These recent natural disasters 
demonstrate that civil defense has a national mission of emergency 
management. The real threat to the American people today comes from 
tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, floods, hurricanes, chemical spills, and 
daily threats which are clear and present in thousands of communities 
across the Nation.
  In each disaster cited, the level of response was closely tied to the 
capabilities of the State and local governments that are supported 
through the funding that has been authorized by the Civil Defense Act.
  Mr. President, civil defense funding is the major Federal source of 
financial assistance to maintain the baseline emergency management 
infrastructure at the State and local level. This financial lifeline is 
critical to building stronger, more consistent emergency management 
programs to save lives and protect property.
  The emergency preparedness measures being transferred to the Stafford 
Act by this conference report have helped to develop the local 
infrastructure of both people and resources. This merging of authority 
is critical to the successful implementation of the disaster assistance 
and mitigation elements of the Stafford Act.
  This shifting of authority is important in that it moves us a step 
forward in making the Stafford Act a home to all of the legislative 
steps necessary for a comprehensive response--from preparedness and 
training, mitigation, response, and recovery. We are shaping and adding 
to a piece of legislation that will supplement the capabilities of 
local jurisdictions and States to both prepare and respond. And they 
will be able to find the authority to do so in one act--the Stafford 
Act.
  The previous scattering of disaster authorities has made it 
cumbersome for the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], and its 
counterparts in the States, to coordinate and combine their efforts. 
Through this action we are clarifying legislation and improving our 
emergency management system.
  I would like to inquire of the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee--with the repeal of the Civil Defense Act and 
transfer of this act's authority to the Stafford Act--is it the intent 
of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee to 
consolidate legislative oversight in this area within the jurisdiction 
of the Environment and Public Works Committee?
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Montana for his question.
  Mr. President, a strengthened emergency management structure at the 
State and local level can prevent many emergencies from becoming major 
disasters. This emergency management infrastructure can be improved and 
strengthened by incorporating the Civil Defense Act authorities into 
the Stafford Act. The consolidation of authority for emergency 
management into the Stafford Act will streamline the congressional 
oversight role over disaster programs.
  It is the understanding of the conferees that the Office of 
Management and Budget will transfer the civil defense program from the 
national security budget function to a domestic discretionary budget 
account. Along with the shift in legislative authority, the conferees 
expect a corresponding shift in funding, since the program will no 
longer have an overriding defense purpose.
  The emergency management and preparedness authorities under the 
Stafford Act are already within the jurisdiction of the Environment and 
Public Works Committee. As we move from a focus on nuclear attack 
preparedness to a risk-based, all-hazards approach, it makes sense for 
the Environment and Public Works Committee to also have oversight 
responsibilities for the new authority created by this conference 
report--specifically, title VI of the Stafford Act.
  However, should the President's fiscal year 1996 budget request not 
reflect a shift in funding from the defense budget function into the 
domestic discretionary budget account, or if Congress does not agree to 
such a shift, the Armed Services Committee should retain jurisdiction.
  Again, I thank the chairman of the Environment and Public Works 
Committee for his question. I look forward to working with my colleague 
as we move forward in streamlining the process of emergency management.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee. I would also like to congratulate him and members of the 
Armed Services Committee for their tremendous work on this conference 
report.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I will vote against the fiscal year 1995 
Defense authorization conference report because I feel that it does not 
provide adequate funds to protect our national interests in a still 
dangerous world.
  This marks the 10th consecutive year that we have reduced our defense 
budget. In that time, we have cut our defense expenditures by 34 
percent. We have reduced our military personnel by 23 percent, our ship 
procurement by 80 percent, and our aircraft procurement by 86 percent. 
In the next 5 years we will not have an adequate bomber force or 
strategic lift capability to fight two wars simultaneously.
  Most disturbingly, we have reduced our readiness. In a quest to 
obtain immediate savings we have drastically cut our personnel and 
maintenance accounts. Our service's Chiefs of Staff have told us that 
readiness is declining from the gulf war and that cuts in base 
operations funding have reduced the standard of living of our troops, 
and forced us to reduce training.
  We have reduced benefits for servicemen and women. We have reduced 
their pay increase and their retirement benefits. Some 17,000 members 
of our Armed Services now receive food stamps.
  And this budget does nothing to redress these shortfalls. In fact, if 
we continue to pursue Clinton defense budgets, this situation will 
dramatically worsen. This year's budget, and the budgets of the next 4 
years, do not adequately pay for the programs and benefits that this 
administration says we need to protect national security. Secretary 
Perry has admitted to a budget shortfall of $20 billion as a result of 
underfunded inflation costs. Other credible sources have estimated $60 
billion and $100 billion. Regardless, these cuts force our commanders 
to make difficult choices between combat training and quality-of-life, 
between readiness and modernization.
  Already in Washington State we have had two EA-6B squadrons grounded 
at Whidbey because of lack of funds--one squadron for 100 days, and 
another for nearly a month. Last month, the Pentagon threatened the 
delay or death of nine defense programs, three of which have been 
contracted out to Boeing. Mr. President, these are the signs of a 
hollow force. Already, today's Washington Post reports that the 
administration plans to call up a few hundred reservists in order to 
invade Haiti. What does this say of our ability to deal with nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea?
  Furthermore, we are continuing to use our defense budget for 
nondefense purposes, such as environmental cleanup, defense conversion, 
peacekeeping, disaster relief, and drug interdiction. Since the end of 
the gulf war, we have used our military to protect Kurds and Marsh 
Arabs, to assist Floridians after Hurricane Andrew, to bring food to 
Somalia, to blockade Haiti, to drop supplies into Bosnia, and to pick 
up refugees off of Haiti and Cuba. This report includes $3.09 billion 
to help displaced military personnel, defense contractors and their 
communities adjust to the decline in defense spending. It includes 
$1.47 billion for 1994 to cover humanitarian operations in Somalia, 
Bosnia, Haiti, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere.

  All of these programs are fine, but we cannot fund them all with 
scarce defense budget dollars. Last year, the GAO concluded that:

       For fiscal years 1990 through 1993, DOD allocated at least 
     $10.4 billion to domestic activities. This figure, however, 
     understates the full amount spent because data on such 
     activities are incomplete.

  We simply cannot use our defense budget in this manner and modernize 
our Forces and maintain readiness. Earlier this month, General 
Shalikashvili said:

       The military is beginning to eat into its readiness to 
     fight. Some units are already being forced to cancel training 
     due to lack of funds. The time has come to stop warning that 
     readiness is going to be jeopardized and focus on the 
     problems that are here right now.

  This Defense authorization conference report does not adequately 
address this readiness problem or the shortfall. As we continue to face 
threats around the world, and consider employing force in areas like 
Haiti and Bosnia, it is imperative that we act on requirements rather 
than arbitrary budget figures, and pass an honest defense budget. I 
will vote against this conference report and I urge my colleagues to do 
the same.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair, in his capacity as a Senator from 
the State of Tennessee, asks unanimous consent that the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  Hearing no objection, the quorum call is rescinded.

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