[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                CALLING FOR DEBATE ON INVASION OF HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
February 11, 1994, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  (Mr. WELDON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks and to include extraneous material.)
  Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to continue to express my grave 
concerns with the path that our President is taking us in regard to an 
invasion of the small country of Haiti. In USA Today, on August 31, 
General Sha- likashvili was asked to respond to the current 
situation in Haiti, and I quote him in saying, ``We need to understand 
that, despite the fact that the Haitians don't have a very credible 
military force, the possibility of casualties is certainly there. We 
should not be surprised at all by it. It's very important that this 
Nation understand that.''
  Mr. Speaker, I am not going to predict massive body bags coming back 
from Haiti like the liberals did before we went into Desert Storm. I 
do, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services, have full 
confidence in our troops and leadership, and I will support them 
wherever they are sent, but, Mr. Speaker, what is happening here is 
absolutely outrageous, to invade a country that poses no real or 
imagined threat to U.S. security, to supposedly restore democracy to a 
country that has never had a legitimate democracy, to restore a leader 
to power who has told us publicly not to invade. This President is 
poised to send 10,000 to 20,000 of our American young men and women 
into a war zone, but, if we look beyond that, in an article in the New 
York Times yesterday, September 11, quoting the administration on what 
they expect will occur, Clinton administration officials are saying 
they are worried about an invasion of Haiti which could set off a wave 
of assassinations and reprisals, and they are scrambling to create a 
police force that would maintain law and order after any military 
action.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, this is the same thing that got us into trouble in 
Somalia. We went in for a noble purpose, but we stayed too long. We got 
involved in nation building. Mr. Speaker, the administration now is 
clearly saying that is what we are going to do here. We are not just 
going to go in and restore Aristide to power. We are going to nation 
build. We are going to have our military set up a police department, 
and our military is going to serve as that police force, at least for 
an interim period of time, perhaps as much as 9 months, perhaps as much 
as several years. Top generals in our country are saying, according to 
the New York Times article, that they want to stop performing police 
functions as soon as possible and have American soldiers and military 
police do only specialized tasks like protecting airports and seaports 
and conducting 
counterinsurgency missions, 
but the administration, which foresees a permanent force of about 
3,000, has concluded that it is impossible to replace most of the 
Haitian military and police and is falling back in a model that was 
used in Panama.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people need to have a full public debate on 
where we are in regard to Haiti. We need to debate what our long-term 
goals are. We need to debate whether or not we even should be sending 
our troops to restore Aristide. We need to debate Aristide and his 
leadership itself or we are going to find ourselves in a prolonged 
effort, and then trying to get out in a very difficult manner to bring 
our troops back home. Mr. Speaker, the administration official said the 
American-dominated phase of the operation could end within 7 months, 
but we should plan on being there perhaps for as long as several years.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe that we are going to take this action 
without any debate or discussion in this institution. And make no 
mistake, Mr. Speaker; if we were to take a vote right now in this body, 
the results would be overwhelming, and they would not be in support of 
the President's announced policy.

  Mr. Speaker, I insert for the Record the entire article from the New 
York Times of September 11, 1994, entitled ``Looking Beyond an 
Invasion, U.S. Plans Haiti Police Force.''

               [From the New York Times, Sept. 11, 1994]

       Looking Beyond an Invasion, U.S. Plans Haiti Police Force

                (By Eric Schmitt with Michael R. Gordon)

       Washington, September 10.--Clinton Administration officials 
     say they are worried that an invasion of Haiti could set off 
     a wave of assassinations and reprisals, and are scrambling to 
     create a police force that would maintain law and order after 
     any military action.
       Senior Administration officials said the maintenance of 
     civil order after an invasion was the current focus of 
     preparations and a major concern.
       With a likely date for an invasion fast approaching, 
     President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore have telephoned 
     a dozen world leaders in the last two days mainly to recruit 
     international monitors to supervise an interim Haitian police 
     force, an Administration official said today.
       Although this is a crucial element of the Administration's 
     plan, American officials said other nations had so far 
     pledged only about 200 of the 500 monitors needed, and those 
     commitments, one State Department official said, ``are carved 
     in jello.''
       The Clinton Administration has also differed with the Rev. 
     Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the exiled President whom the 
     invasion would restore to power, over an American plan to 
     retrain and rehabilitate much of Haiti's security forces.
       Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff, met this week with Father Aristide in an effort to 
     smooth over a dispute about how many members of the police 
     should be drawn from the present Haitian security forces, 
     whose loyalty to Father Aristide is in question.
       What's more, American intelligence experts fear that the 
     most violent wave of attacks by the Haitian military against 
     pro-Aristide groups, as well as possible reprisals by anti-
     Aristide groups, would take place in the opening hours and 
     days of the invasion, well before any Haitian police force 
     could be trained and installed.
       That would leave the American military with the job it 
     wants least: maintaining order in a chaotic, strife-ridden 
     nation in which rival groups would be trying to settle old 
     scores.
       In planning for the invasion, the American military is not 
     skimping on force. The United States plans to send about 
     20,000 troops to restore Father Aristide, including Army 
     troops, marines and Air Force AC-130 gunships and A-10 attack 
     planes.
       But top commanders said overcoming Haiti's overmatched 
     military would be the easy part. The hard part will be 
     keeping the peace in a volatile setting where, according to 
     classified intelligence reports, ousted Haitian military 
     leaders are likely to kill supporters of Father Aristide to 
     alter the balance of power within Haiti and insure that they 
     do not play a role in a transitional government.


                       ``The Issue Is Disorder''

       The Clinton Administration recognizes that the American 
     troops will initially have primary responsibility for 
     ``restoring basic civil order,'' a senior official said. But 
     top generals want to stop performing police functions as soon 
     as possible and have American soldiers and military police do 
     only specialized tasks, like protecting airports and seaports 
     and conducting counterinsurgency missions.
       ``The issue has never been the invasion,'' an official 
     said. ``The issue is disorder right after the invasion. This 
     could make what happened in Panama look like chicken feed.'' 
     He was referring to the looting and chaos that followed the 
     United States invasion of Panama in December 1989.
       Since the military ousted Father Aristide in September 
     1991, more than 3,000 Haitians have been killed, human rights 
     groups say. Still, American experts argue that for all of the 
     human rights abuses in Haiti, the Haitian military rulers 
     have refrained from allowing more widespread killings in 
     recent months for fear of triggering an American invasion and 
     that the worst may be yet to come.
       One reason the Pentagon is planning such a large invasion 
     force of 20,000, a senior Administration official said today, 
     is to shock the Haitian into submission and to control the 
     entire country.
       ``The key is not just to invade the country--it is to sit 
     on the country,'' a Government official said.


                         ``Hit Lists'' Reported

       The Clinton Administration has already received 
     intelligence reports indicating that some local Haitian 
     security forces have ``hit lists'' of local leaders they 
     think would side with Father Aristide and of others they fear 
     might lead mobs against them, Administration officials said.
       American intelligence has also reported that the Haitian 
     security forces might light fires in Cite Soleil, a major 
     slum in Port-au-Prince, and other strongholds of support for 
     Father Aristide. According to one intelligence report, the 
     security forces plan to blame American troops for the fires.
       A top official said the White House and Pentagon were 
     seriously concerned about the possibility of widespread 
     disorder and killing.
       ``It could go both ways,'' a Government official said. 
     ``You could have Government types going out and trying to 
     kill Malval and supporters of Aristide and Aristide 
     supporters seeking retribution.'' He was referring to Robert 
     Malval, the powerless caretaker Prime Minister appointed by 
     Father Aristide.
       Officials declined to discuss their plans to protect 
     supporters of Father Aristide, but acknowledged that 
     establishing order would initially be an American 
     responsibility.
       No one can be sure of the scale of the violence, but 
     experts say that the extent of the killings will depend on 
     the ability of the United States and other forces to move 
     quickly to prevent assassinations, engage in effective crowd 
     control and build an effective security structure.
       Recognizing the potential for disorder, Administration 
     officials say that building a credible police force is a top 
     priority. Building the force, however, is easier said than 
     done.
       One major concern is the makeup of the force. American 
     officials said that Father Aristide was distrustful of 
     rehabilitating much of the existing security forces, and has 
     initially said that no more than 1,500 of the police force 
     should be drawn from the existing Haitian security forces.


                           panama as a model

       But the Administration, which foresees a permanent force of 
     about 3,000, has concluded that it is impossible to replace 
     most of the Haitian military and police and is falling back 
     on the model used in Panama of rehabilitating existing 
     security forces.
       In the meeting with General Shalikashvili, a senior 
     Administration official said, Father Aristide softened his 
     demand but he would still be directly involved in approving 
     which Haitians serve in the police force.
       One worry is that the Haitian security forces may flee, 
     making it hard to recruit a force in Haiti. Another is 
     finding and training Haitians outside the country. The 
     Administration may recruit Haitian citizens in the United 
     States and Canada and in refugee camps at Guantanamo Bay, 
     Cuba, to serve with the interim police and work as 
     interpreters and guides for American troops. Among the 1.6 
     million members of the United States military, only 124 speak 
     Creole, the language most Haitians speak.
       Another major problem is recruiting the international 
     monitors who would help supervise the police, much as the 
     United States did with the new police force in Panama after 
     the invasion there.
       ``A major challenge is getting international police and 
     monitors,'' said a senior Defense Department official. ``We'd 
     like to keep the U.S. military out of the policing business 
     as much as possible.''
       In the last two days, Mr. Clinton has telephoned nine 
     foreign leaders and Mr. Gore three to round up support for 
     monitors.
       ``If you're a warm body and have police connections, we'll 
     chase you,'' one American diplomat said.


                           canada offers 100

       Canada has offered 100 monitors and trainers, but only if 
     they are deployed under the United Nations banner and not an 
     American-led invasion force. American, Canadian and United 
     Nations officials are to meet in New York in the next several 
     days to work out a compromise. President Clinton called Prime 
     Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel on Thursday to request 
     police monitors.
       A senior official said he hoped that the interim Haitian 
     police force would begin to operate in ``a week or more,'' an 
     estimate that some Government officials say is overly 
     optimistic.
       Even as the United States helps establish an interim force, 
     it plans to begin training a permanent civilian force. But 
     training Haitian expatriates through a tiny Justice 
     Department program could take four to six months. And the 
     program of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to train as many 
     as 100 Haitians at its academy in Saskatchewan will take 
     three months.
       While the new Haitian police are trying to maintain order, 
     the American-dominated force in Haiti would serve as backup 
     ``if there was rioting or looting that was more than the 
     Haitian police force could handle,'' a senior Administration 
     official said. ``We'd be like the National Guard in Los 
     Angeles that would be called upon. The idea is the large 
     force would also be a deterrence to that kind of thing.
       A senior official said that American forces would try to 
     capture Haitian military leaders, but would not conduct a 
     manhunt as they did in Panama and Somalia if the leaders 
     escaped.
       Administration officials said the American-dominated phase 
     of the operation should end within seven months, with many of 
     the key invasion forces withdrawn within weeks. After that, a 
     6,000-member United Nations peacekeeping force would take 
     over. It would include about 3,000 American troops and would 
     stay in Haiti until Father Aristide's presidential term 
     expires in February 1996.

                          ____________________