[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 127 (Tuesday, September 13, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
              FULL AND OPEN DEBATE URGED ON HAITIAN POLICY

                                 ______


                               speech of

                            HON. CURT WELDON

                            of pennsylvania

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, September 12, 1994

  Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, the following extraneous material was 
omitted from my speech of September 12, 1994:

 Memo from Dante Caputo, U.S. Special Envoy To Haiti to the Secretary 
               General of the U.N. Boutros Boutros-Ghali

     Attention: The Secretary General.
     From: Dante Caputo, RSSC.
       Over the past fifteen days, I had the pleasure of meeting 
     several times with U.S. Talbott and other officials of the 
     American State Department. I also had some meetings in Paris 
     with M. Alain Juppe, Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 
     Ottawa with Mr. Andre Oueller, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
     Moreover, I was able to have some informal conversations with 
     other areas of American political life.
       The conclusions that I am drawing today are as follows:
       1. The U.S. administration considers that an invasion of 
     Haiti is its best option.
       2. The principal objection to this type of action comes 
     from the fact that ``if it is easy to initiate this type of 
     action, it is more difficult to exit from it.''
       3. In order to resolve this dilemma, the U.S. 
     administration will seek to act in the following manner:
       (a) set up a unilateral action, a surgical action, with the 
     eventual participation of several countries in the region so 
     as to give it a certain legitimacy;
       (b) put President Aristide back in power
       (c) It will seek a quick replacement of the armed 
     intervention forces by the [illegible] whose mandate and 
     structure will have been redefined beforehand.
       4. This strategy would allow it to capitalize on the 
     experience with such an operation, transferring the political 
     cost on the UN.
       5. In the same fashion, the President of the United 
     States's main advisers, are of the opinion that not only does 
     this option constitute the lesser evil, but that is 
     politically desirable. Thus we think that the current 
     opposition of public opinion to an armed intervention will 
     change radically, once it will have taken place. The 
     Americans see in this type of action a chance to show, after 
     the strong media criticism of the administration, the 
     President's decision making capability and the firmness of 
     leadership in international political matters.
       6. The position of the friendly countries vis-a-vis this 
     strategy is the following:


                                 france

       France is opposed to the use of force be it multilateral or 
     unilateral. It is ready to participate in a MINUAH under the 
     terms foreseen in July, 1993, that is to say, technical 
     assistance and participation in forming a police force. In an 
     explicit manner, France is opposed to participating in 
     whatever activity that would imply direct police action.
       France considers that it is urgent that a meeting of the 
     Four friends take place at the department head or under 
     secretary level, preferably in New York.
       France insists as well on Argentina's participation as a 
     fifth friendly country given that it is a member of the 
     Security Council.


                                 canada

       Canada does not wish to participate in a multilateral armed 
     intervention force. Canada thinks that in the present 
     situation, there is probably no other alternative to that 
     which the U.S. administration will adopt. In this 
     perspective, according to Minister Ouellet, our problem will 
     consist of knowing how to ``manage'' this new reality. Canada 
     seems equally disposed to participate in a MINUAH whose 
     mandate will have been redefined. Canada also considers it 
     urgent to call a meeting of the Four Friends.
       7. The permanent U.S. Mission has undertaken the necessary 
     steps so that the Security Council comes to a decision very 
     soon on the MINUAH's mandate and structure.--May 23, 1994.
                                  ____


   [Report of a discussion of the Secretary General with his Special 
 Representative for Haiti at the United Nations Headquarters, Tuesday, 
                       May 24, 1994 at 6:30 p.m.]

       Present: The Secretary General, Mr. Gharekhan, Mr. de Soto, 
     Mrs. Green, and Mrs. Seguin-Horton.

     Subject: The situation in Haiti. Possibilities for a military 
         intervention by the United States.
       The Secretary General says to Mr. Caputo that be well aware 
     of his last summary report.
       Mr. Caputo explains that he did not dare present any 
     options and policies to the Secretary General in this report. 
     The fact is that he had lately a large number of informal 
     consulations that are all going in the same direction: The 
     Americans will not be able to stand for much longer, until 
     August at the latest the criticism of their foreign policy on 
     the domestic front. They want to do something; they are going 
     to try to intervene militarily.
       The Secretary General wonders if President Aristide could 
     invoke Article 51 of the Charter in order to call for a 
     military intervention.
       Mr. de Soto says that the constitution prevents him from 
     doing to.
                                  ____


   Minutes From May 24 Meeting Between Dante Caputo and Boutros-Ghali

       Mr. Caputo thinks that after having asked for the 
     intervention, Mr. Aristide will condemn it. Moreover, the 
     United States, that wants to obtain the Security Council's 
     blessing, is now actively studying the means to accord a 
     legal protection to this affair.
       Mr. de Soto recalls that this idea recently provoked a 
     general protest among the OAS.
       What can the United Nations Secretariat do, either to avoid 
     or to encourage this intervention?, asks the Secretary 
     General.
       Mr. Caputo predicts a disaster. The United States will make 
     the UN bear the responsibility to manage the occupation of 
     Haiti. ``With Aristide as President during two or three 
     years, it will be Hell!'' It is not so much the armed 
     intervention itself that we have to avoid. What we do not 
     want, is to inherit a ``baby''. For the Americans' are fixing 
     to leave quickly. They would not intervene if they had to 
     remain.
       Mr. Gharekhan asks Mr. Caputo what he understands by 
     leaving ``quickly'' replies Mr. Caputo. Who is going to 
     replace the Americans?, asks the Secretary General.
       ``Us'', replies Mr. de Soto.
       France, according to Mr. Juppe, is opposed to it, confirms 
     Mr. Caputo. As for Canada, it is committed to strictly 
     limiting its contribution to the formation of a new Haitian 
     police.
       The Secretary General believes that in making an effort, 
     the United States will be able to manage to obtain 2,000 
     French-African troops and a few troops from the Caribbean.
       Mr. Caputo says that the United Nations would have to work 
     with a complex force and that it would be difficult for it to 
     mount an operation in a one-month period. Mr. Caputo knows 
     that Argentina, for example, is not very favorable to this 
     idea. He also doubts that Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela would 
     be tempted.
       This scenario would be fraught with consequences for the 
     United Nations as well as for this region of the world. Dante 
     Caputo emphasizes that it is harmful that at the conclusion 
     of the cold war, no other answer can be found for such a 
     crisis.
       In answer to the Minister's question about the consequences 
     of the American intervention in Panama, Dante Caputo replies 
     that it concerned a different time where the cold war was 
     still taking place. Today, we are right in expecting that 
     other types of means be activated. The United Nations will be 
     perceived as being impotent before the region's problems. 
     They will have to face up to a particularly difficult post-
     intervention situation.
       The Minister remarks that actually, despite the goodwill of 
     the United Nations, its credibility is jeopardized and the 
     [Haitian] military leaders are ``laughing at us''. The 
     Minister stresses the difficulties of a strict and effective 
     implementation of planned sanctions and expresses its doubt 
     over the possibility of a complete closing of the border.
       The Minister shares Dante Caputo's appreciation of the need 
     to make some arrangements in the event of a unilateral 
     intervention. However, the Minister continues to affirm that 
     Canada will not commit itself to hostile activities in Haiti. 
     Canada is ready to favorably consider a United Nations 
     request favoring a peace keeping operation with the view of 
     consolidating a democratic regime, aid programs, and 
     participation in a better equipped MUNUHA. Basically, the 
     Minister concedes that only the United States can wrestle 
     with the [Haitian] military leaders.
       To improve our image relative to President Aristide, the 
     Minister believes that the President should participate in 
     the next meeting of the Four Friends. Regarding this meeting, 
     Dante Caputo maintains that it would be preferable if it be 
     held first of all without the President, and that he not 
     participate except after the meeting. In the perspective of 
     managing the post intervention situation, Dante Caputo thinks 
     that it is important that President Aristide can consider 
     himself to be an integral part of the Four Friends' action.
       According to the Minister, President Aristide's credibility 
     risks to be stained, if he restored after the U.S. 
     intervention.
       The Minister questions himself over the composition, nature 
     and on the willingness of the countries that would be ready 
     to participate in the MINUHA.
       Dante Caputo emphasizes that France expressed the wish to 
     participate in the formation of a police force in Haiti and 
     is reticent to do ``monitoring''. Ambassador Prochette then 
     recalls the difficulties encountered at the moment of 
     recruiting the components of the operation's police force in 
     1993. Dante Caputo remarks that the question of this police 
     force's role and mandate should be determined as a function 
     of the whole and notes that the countries interested in 
     taking part remain few, in addition to Canada, the United 
     States, Argentina, and France.
       The fundamental question remains the post-intervention 
     role, multilateral action being put aside, indicates Dante 
     Caputo. Ambassador Prochette replies that in effect, the 
     United Nations will not vote for this type of action, but 
     could be in favor of a ``green light'' for a coalition of 
     States that would invite countries interested in topping the 
     [Haitian] military leaders if a very serious incident 
     unfolded. Dante Caputo adds that this American initiative 
     could be blocked by an internal decision process.
       The Minister concludes the meeting by recalling that this 
     is an emergency, that Canada wants to play a role, and that 
     he will be guided by the advice and suggestions of Dante 
     Caputo.--Juliette Remy, May 23, 1994.
       The Secretary General recalls that in the past, the United 
     States was able to show that it could mount a multinational 
     force, if only in appearances. ``Must we say that we think 
     that a military intervention in Haiti would be negative?''
       According to Mr. Caputo, it must first be proposed that the 
     President of the Security Council ask for a closing of the 
     border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This measure 
     will have a certain economic and psychological impact.
       The Secretary General wonders how it is possible to really 
     close this border. A very clear commitment on the part of the 
     Dominican authorities must be required, replies Mr. Caputo. 
     The Secretary General think that the Dominican government 
     does not have the means to prevent infiltration.
       Mr. Caputo considers that the land or sea routes can be 
     controlled if the authorities accept to play the game. In 
     this regard, Mr. Caputo informs the Secretary General that 
     the Americans have proposed to him to accompany them tomorrow 
     to meet President Balaguer in Santo Domingo. Mr. Caputo has 
     not yet replied, but he thinks that he must accept this offer 
     in order to show that he is being active on the diplomatic 
     front.
       Replying to a question from the Secretary General, Mr. 
     Gharckhan makes the point that the Security Council 
     specifically mentioned the border in his presidential 
     declaration.
       Mr. de Soto thinks that the other friends of Haiti must be 
     made to participate at this meeting, if only through their 
     ambassadors in Santo Domingo.
       Nobody can tell if such an operation will succeed or fail, 
     notes the Secretary General.
       In addition to closing the border, continues Mr. Caputo, we 
     will have to keep the same political framework set up two 
     months ago if the United States requests.
       The Americans are still deeply divided on the Haitian 
     question, there are supporters and detractors of President 
     Aristide.
       Mr. de Soto wonders if in fact Mr. Caputo should not go to 
     Port au Prince to challenge the military leaders and try to 
     convince Mr. Cedras, who pretends to be a ``negotiator''.
       Mr. Caputo affirms that he is ready to go to Haiti. The 
     problem is that if his visit fails, and that if it is 
     accompanied by demonstrations by the BRAPH and by a definite 
     ``no'' from Mr. Cedras, we risk provoking an armed 
     intervention.
       Mr. Gharekahan thinks that, in effect, the Americans could 
     feel justified to intervene.
       According to Mr. de Soto, this would be the case if it were 
     already August, but if we try now, we still have time, he 
     says.
       Mr. Caputo declares that he likes this idea because the 
     United Nations seems to be making every possible effort on 
     the diplomatic front on the condition, of course, of 
     obtaining a meeting with Mr. Cedras. In reply to a question 
     from the Secretary General, he has the means to contact him.
       Moreover, Mr. Caputo points out that the French insist a 
     lot on including Argentina in the Group of the Secretary 
     General's Friends. Argentina, who was rather tepid two or 
     three months ago, now seems interested in the question.
       The French find in effect that the Argentina's presence 
     would allow a better balance .......... ............ 
     .......... .......... Security Council, among the Group of 
     Friends. Venezuela would not be excluded for as much.
       Aware of the risk of displeasing Brazil who is also a 
     member of the Security Council, the Secretary General 
     proposes to use the criteria of Argentina's active 
     participation in the search of a solutions to the Haitian 
     problem. Isn't Argentina a frigate that sails in the region 
     to check on the embargo's enforcement?
       Mr. Gharkaham believes that he remembers that Mr. Goulding 
     was totally opposed to this idea.
       In answer to the Secretary General's question, Mr. de Soto 
     says that Mr. Goulding thinks that including Argentina would 
     bother Brazil.
       Mr. Caputo suggests consulting Brazil.
       Mr. de Soto points out that Mr. Lulu da Silva, Brazil's 
     presidential candidate, has come out in favor of intervention 
     . . .
       Summarizing the situation, the Secretary General proposes 
     to act in the following manner: 1) Mr. Caputo reports 
     tomorrow at Santo Domingo to discuss the border; 2) He makes 
     contact with Mr. Cedras to set up an appointment with him; 3) 
     He goes to Haiti to strengthen his credibility; 4) The 
     Secretariat contacts Brazil to announce the decision to 
     invite Argentina to be part of the Group of Friends, 5) The 
     Secretariat invites Argentina.
       Mr. de Soto emphasizes that the MINUAH mandate exists. The 
     United States has met with officers from the [illegible] 
     Department for Peace Keeping to study means of renewing, 
     redefining, and strengthening the Mission. Replying to the 
     Secretary General, Mr. de Soto indicates that the initial 
     mandate foresees 700 to 800 men. The United States is in the 
     process of broadening the scope of MINUAH to a mission, not 
     only of technical assistance, but also one of peace keeping. 
     This would thus be a way to discourage the United States to 
     intervene in showing them how difficult it is to set up the 
     Mission that it would like to see following its intervention.
       Mr. Gharakhan thinks that the Secretariat cannot highlight 
     this difficulty since the United States has the means to 
     obtain the necessary troops.
       According to Mr. de Soto, the Security Council's hacking 
     can be politically costly to the United States in sofar as it 
     will cause the United States to make concessions.
       The Secretary General points out that the United States can 
     even choose to leave forces behind.
       Mr. de Soto says that the closest analogy is the one of 
     Panama. The United States knows that the Latin American 
     countries will protest out of principle while at the same 
     time they will be relieved to get rid of Mr. Cedras.
       Suggesting to proceed by stages, the Secretary General 
     concludes that they agree on the five points mentioned above. 
     These points already will allow for movement. Mrs. Green, 
     having asked if Mr. Aristide was going to be contacted, the 
     Secretary General replies in the affirmative. He agrees to 
     telephone Mr. Aristide. He suggests to put off until later 
     the more substantial reflections on the question, but keeps 
     in mind the fact that there is a risk of escalation. It 
     should not be forgotten that the Haitian people suffer 
     because of those sanctions.--Fabienno Seguin-Horton, May 25, 
     1994.

   Notes of May 19 Meeting Between Dante Caputo and Canadian Foreign 
                        Minister, Andre Ouellet

       Present: Mr. Stanley E. Gooch, Assistant Vice Minister, 
     Latin American and Caribbean Desk; Mrs. Louise Prechette, 
     Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations.
       After being warmly welcomed by the Minister, Dane Caputo 
     stresses, first of all, the different options for a solution 
     and relates, for the Minister's benefit, the reactions 
     observed in Paris and Washington. The first option consists 
     of waiting for sanctions put in place to produce the desired 
     effect: the military leaders' departure. In this regard, 
     France and the United States have the same worry of seeing 
     that the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti be 
     hermetically sealed.
       However, stresses Dante Caputo, the United States would not 
     be ready to wait several months for this to produce the 
     desired effect. The second option, consists of using the 
     sanctions as an instrument to support a political strategy. 
     France is in favor of such a scenario and, in this regard, 
     supports the idea of a high level meeting of the Secretary 
     General's four Friends Countries. The third option consists 
     of using unilateral force, multilateral force, or a 
     combination of the two. France is opposed to this. Concerning 
     the United States position, such as laid out by Strobe 
     Talbot, Dante Caputo thinks that time is short, and that the 
     situation today cannot last beyond July. Dante Caputo 
     emphasizes that Haiti represents a test case for which the 
     United States has to have found a solution before November. 
     The United States supports the return of a reinforced MINUAH 
     (Self defense, protecting sites) without specifying the 
     probable means for the [Haitian] military leaders' departure.
       Dante Caputo gives his personal impression of the strategy 
     that the United States would get ready to implement. 
     According to him, the United States cannot wait any longer to 
     obtain the benefits of an action in favor of Haiti for a just 
     cause; it would intervene punctually in order to then cede 
     its place to the MINUAH.
       This scenario would be fraught with consequences for the 
     United Nations as well as for this region of the world. Dante 
     Caputo emphasized that it is a shame that at the end of the 
     Cold War, another response cannot be given to a crisis of 
     this type.
       To the minister's question on the consequences of the 
     American intervention in Panama, Dante Caputo responded that 
     it was a different time, when the Cold War was still a 
     reality. Today, one has the right to expect other types of 
     means to be implemented. The United Nations will be perceived 
     as being powerless regarding the problems of the region. It 
     would have to deal with a particularly difficult post-
     intervention situation.
       To the minister's question on the existence of another 
     alternative, Dante Caputo answered that the U.S. has served 
     as a restraint for a diplomatic solution, creating a 
     situation where intervention has become almost inevitable.
       The minister remarked that in fact, despite the good will 
     of the United Nations, its credibility is being questioned 
     and the military is ``laughing at us.'' The minister 
     underlined the difficulties of a strict and effective 
     implementation of the sanctions planned and shared his doubt 
     regarding the possibility of a total closure of the border.
       The minister shared Dante Caputo's view regarding the need 
     to take steps in the case of a unilateral intervention. 
     Nevertheless the minister stated that Canada will not engage 
     in activities hostile to Haiti. Canada is ready to favorably 
     study a U.N. request for a peacekeeping operation, with a 
     view to consolidating a democratic regime, assistance 
     programs, and participation of a better equipped U.N. Mission 
     for Haiti. Basically, the minister conceded that just the 
     U.S. can engage in arm wrestling with the military.
       In order to improve our image regarding President Aristide, 
     the minister felt that the president should participate in 
     the upcoming meeting of the four friendly nations. Regarding 
     this meeting, Dante Caputo stated that it would be preferable 
     for it to take place initially without the president and that 
     he not participate except subsequent to the meeting. In the 
     perspective of the question of the post-intervention 
     situation, Dante Caputo felt that it is important that 
     President Aristide be able to consider himself an integral 
     part of the action of the four friendly nations.
       According to the minister, if he is reestablished after the 
     U.S. intervention, President Aristide's credibility risks 
     being blemished.
       The minister asked about the composition, nature and will 
     of the countries that would be willing to participate in the 
     U.N. Mission for Haiti.
       Dante Caputo emphasized that France has expressed the 
     desire to participate in the formation of the police in Haiti 
     and shows a reluctance to doing monitoring, Ambassador 
     Frechette then recalled the difficulties encountered at the 
     time of recruitment of the elements of the police for the 
     1993 operation. Dante Caputo remarked that the question of 
     the role and mandate of these policemen should be determined 
     according to the panorama and noted that the countries 
     interested in participating are few, namely Canada, the U.S., 
     Argentina and France.
       The basic question is the post-intervention role, 
     multilateral action being rejected, Dante Caputo indicated. 
     Ambassador Frechette responded that in fact, the U.N. will 
     not vote for this type of action but it could be in favor of 
     a ``green light'' for a coalition of states that would invite 
     the countries interested in removing the military from 
     government, if a very serious incident took place. Dante 
     Caputo added that this American initiative could be blocked 
     by an internal decision-making process failing.
       The minister concluded the meeting by recalling that there 
     is urgency, that Canada is anxious to play a role and that it 
     will be guided by the advice and suggestions of Dante Caputo. 
     In the probable case where the sanctions did not have an 
     immediate effect and worked in favor of the military, the 
     minister remarked that it would then be necessary to explain 
     why the sanctions are being maintained against Haiti.--
     Juliette Remy, May 23, 1994.