[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 126 (Monday, September 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995 AND MILITARY 
 CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995--CONFERENCE REPORT

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.


           reactivation of the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am very pleased that the conference 
committee on the DOD authorization bill has chosen to accept my 
proposal to reactivate a small, three-plane contingency group of SR-71 
reconnaissance aircraft. The SR-71 will be able to provide a timely, 
flexible, unique reconnaissance capability, at the call of our CINC's 
worldwide, which is not now available. I am also supportive of a range 
of development vehicles, unmanned aerial aircraft, or ``UAV's,'' which 
eventually can partly make up for the gaps in our intelligence which 
will be filled by the SR-71. But those vehicles are years away from 
fielding, and in the meantime this contingency group can provide 
invaluable special radar and optical intelligence that would not 
otherwise be available by any other means now in America's inventory, 
including our satellites and other aircraft such as the U-2. I say it 
is unique because it can defeat deception, as satellites cannot, and it 
can go anywhere, virtually invulnerable, as our other aircraft cannot.
  I believe that the previous administration made a mistake in 
prematurely retiring this system, in the hope that systems then under 
development would replace it. But those systems have not come along, 
and the proposal that I have made would be a frugal, stripped down, 
modest, contingency group, not a full-fledged 12-plane squadron as was 
the heart of the previous program. So we have the capability 
reactivated without high cost, a reinvestment in a proven capability 
that is well worth the money--particularly in comparison to the cost of 
the billions that we intend to invest in new systems that may, I 
emphasize may, be able to take up this intelligence task 5 to 10 years 
or so down the road.
  I understand that there are forces in the Air Force and the Pentagon 
opposed to this modest reactivation proposal. I suspect that their 
opposition is based on the fear that we may discover that the very 
expensive new systems they want to build might be jeopardized by this 
action. That is not the intent of the proposed new contingency group, 
but I am all for saving money on redundant and wasteful defense 
technologies, and if it is redundancy that we are buying, then we need 
to take a good second look at the billions planned for spending on new 
technologies. If the buzzword in the Pentagon is to spend money on new 
toys rather than using effectively and frugally the ones we have 
already paid for, then the American people would expect us to take a 
hard, close second look at the new spending plans.
  Mr. President, I say it was a mistake for the Bush administration to 
scrap the SR-71 prematurely and open up a gap in our reconnaissance 
capabilities. What were their reasons for scrapping this important 
capability?
  The primary reason given in 1989 and 1990 for terminating the SR-71 
program was cost. The operating costs for the 12-plane fleet were 
averaging $250 million each year, for a system that was not then being 
creatively or effectively employed. This reasoning seems faulty, 
however, in light of the enormous sums being spent on a new 
headquarters building for the National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], the 
agency that builds and operates the intelligence community's satellite 
systems. To terminate an operational system that to this day has not 
been surpassed in capability on the basis that it is too expensive to 
operate, while spending over $300 million just to house the NRO, not on 
actual intelligence collection systems, is like building the Taj Mahal 
of Garages when you just sold the car that was to be parked inside. 
This wasteful, extravagant, and secretive spending is more than three 
times the amount needed to keep a contingency capability of SR-71 alive 
to support military commanders in the field.
  Creating the 3-plane contingency force at a cost of $100 million, and 
maintaining it for some $50 million per year, which includes 1 month of 
operations with 10 mission flights, is far less expensive than 
developing and fielding new aircraft or satellite systems. After 
carefully studying the costs of this small program, and after including 
cost-reducing measures such as basing the contingency force with the 
NASA-operated research SR-71's in order to share common equipment, I am 
confident that this contingency group can be reactivated for $100 
million. Indeed, in the DOD appropriations bill, the costs for 
reactivating the program have been capped at that amount.
  A second reason given for the termination of the SR-71 program was 
that the system was no longer needed, since it was not being used well 
and newer systems were coming. We now know that the new systems have 
either been canceled or are still some years off. I concede that the 
SR-71 was not being effectively employed in the 1980's. But now that 
the static cold war era is over, the blossoming of smaller regional and 
ethnic conflicts around the globe has created many new requirements for 
conflict monitoring and humanitarian crisis planning. These 
requirements could be efficiently supported by limited numbers of SR-71 
aircraft flying a small number of well-planned missions. One of the 
lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War was that the SR-71 was needed 
to create maps and to monitor activity over large areas. Civilian 
satellite systems were pressed into service to support humanitarian air 
drops of food in Bosnia in 1993, but the greater resolution and finer 
detail achievable by the SR-71 cameras might have made greater 
precision in air drops achievable. Similar creative use of the SR-71 
could support humanitarian efforts in Rwanda and Zaire without drawing 
national collection systems away from other areas of interest.
  Finally, opponents of the SR-71 suggest that America's political 
authorities lack the will to use the SR-71 to overfly hostile 
territory. It is true that in 1991, a political decision was made not 
to overfly Iraq, despite the potential intelligence that might have 
been gathered for the United States and her allies. I do not believe 
that one decision, taken by one administration, should forever tie the 
hands of future administrations. It is far better for our national 
leaders to have the instrument at hand, to use if necessary, than to 
deny them the opportunity to use it by assuming that they will never 
have the political will to overfly a nation if our intelligence needs, 
and our combat forces at risk, demand it. I applaud the decision made 
by the conference committee to provide this contingency force, and to 
keep this tool in our intelligence arsenal.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I rise to express my deep concern 
regarding an ill-considered and dangerous provision contained in the 
defense authorization conference report.
  Section 1012 would grant immunity under U.S. law to agents and 
employees of the United States and foreign countries engaged in 
interdiction of aircraft suspected of illicit drug trafficking. This 
provision condones the shoot-down of civil aircraft and all but exempts 
American and foreign agents from responsibility under U.S. law if an 
innocent aircraft is accidentally shot down.
  This provision was passed in the Senate by voice vote without the 
benefit of hearings and in the face of significant opposition by 
affected organizations. Yet it reverses well-established U.S. policy, 
sets troubling precedents for U.S. and international law and 
contradicts key international conventions governing civil air safety--
conventions promoted by the United States and approved by this body.
  It has been argued that this provision is needed so that we can 
continue assisting Colombia and Peru in their fight against illicit 
drug trafficking. In fact, this provision is only needed if the United 
States is willing to condone shoot-down policies of foreign countries.
  Although the United States has provided intelligence to support 
Colombian and Peruvian drug interdiction efforts for years, 
circumstances surrounding this assistance have now dramatically 
changed. Both countries have adopted policies of shooting down civil 
aircraft suspected of illicit drug trafficking. Given this situation, 
the United States faced a choice: either not participate in such shoot-
downs, seek to dissuade Colombia and Peru to abandon their shoot-down 
policies, or seek an exemption from United States law to allow us to 
participate in civil aircraft shoot-downs.
  Even if we accept the administration's position that United States 
law prohibits United States officials from assisting foreign countries 
with drug interdiction if they adopt shoot-down policies, it is far 
from clear that section 1012 is the correct solution to the dilemma 
created by Colombia and Peru. By accepting their shoot-down policies 
without any serious effort to dissuade them, the United States has 
allowed Colombia and Peru to drive United States policy and thereby to 
shape United States law. This is unacceptable on its face. Instead, the 
United States should have made it clear to these countries that 
shooting down civil aircraft is unacceptable under any circumstances 
short of a direct military threat.
  In choosing to accept Colombia's and Peru's shoot-down policies, the 
administration has opened up a number of dangerous precedents. Perhaps 
most troubling, section 1012 blurs the line between law enforcement and 
national defense. By elevating drug trafficking to the level of a 
threat to national security--justifying the use of deadly force against 
civil aircraft--section 1012 fundamentally departs from accepted 
standards of international law and long-held U.S. policy.
  This is not a new issue. Four years ago, when faced with a similar 
proposal, the Bush administration stood firm in opposition to any law 
that would involve the United States in the shoot-down of civil 
aircraft.
  In testimony before a House subcommittee in 1990, the Transportation 
Department's general counsel, Mr. Phillip D. Brady, made the following 
observations:

       It has been the position of the United States and the world 
     aviation community that international law prohibits the use 
     of weapons against civilian aircraft not posing a clear and 
     present danger, in the military sense, to the security of a 
     nation.
       For many years we have opposed, for both legal and safety 
     reasons, other countries' occasionally announced intentions 
     to shoot at civil aircraft. Once such a practice begins, it 
     could have dangerous and widespread consequences that could 
     affect the safety of innocent people worldwide. As the world 
     leader in civil aviation, the United States would have more 
     to lose than any other country in the development of such a 
     practice.

  But now, after all these years, the Clinton administration has 
decided to overturn these precedents, and without any serious debate or 
discussion. The administration's own legal analysis highlights the 
import of such a departure. As this analysis points out: ``There are of 
course numerous policy implications from moving away from the existing 
`bright line' standard that only self-defense can justify a shoot-
down.'' These implications, however, have received only minimal 
consideration, and virtually none by Congress.
  In 1989, the Senate debated the issue of civil shootdown, but 
strictly in the context of U.S. drug enforcement efforts. At that time, 
the Senate voted twice on amendments to authorize U.S. Federal drug 
enforcement agencies to shoot at aircraft suspected of drugrunning. 
Although the first amendment passed on August 1, 1989, it was later 
dropped in conference. I voted against this amendment.
  Two months later, a revised version of this amendment was considered, 
and tabled. I voted against the tabling motion at that time for several 
reasons. First and foremost, the revised amendment contained stringent 
conditions and safeguards that would have made it almost impossible for 
a shootdown to occur, let alone one involving innocents. And second, 
the amendment would only have indemnified U.S. drug officials. It would 
not have involved the U.S. military in the shootdown policies of 
foreign countries. And it would not have made a national security 
argument to justify such actions. As it turns out, the Senate rejected 
even this revised approach.
  Today, I believe that abandoning our unconditional opposition to 
shooting down civil aircraft sends a very bad message, even if the 
rationale--interdicting the flow of illicit drugs--is a worthy one. By 
making a national security argument to justify such activity, we blur a 
line that was previously clear. By offering this exception to current 
practice, we invite others to do the same, perhaps for far less worthy 
reasons. Recall, after all, that the Soviet Union used a national 
security argument to justify the shootdown of KAL 007 in 1983.
  The only thing the families of the KAL 007 victims ever got was a 
promise from the United States and the international community that we 
would never condone, under any circumstances, the deliberate shootdown 
of a civilian aircraft. The law that the Clinton administration now 
seeks to undo is the only tangible compensation that these families 
ever received.
  If section 1012 is enacted, we will virtually eliminate legal 
recourse for the victims of an accidental shootdown in Colombia and 
Peru. By passing this law, we will encourage Colombia and Peru to 
become more aggressive in implementing their shootdown policies. 
Accidents happen all too often without American encouragement.
  Under section 1012, once the President certifies that ``the country 
has appropriate procedures in place to protect against the loss of 
innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
interdiction'' the United States is free to participate in such 
shootdowns. As a practical matter, no country has an adequate degree of 
protection against such accidents. Recall that the United States 
military itself--with the best procedures in the world to protect 
against the loss of innocent life--has been responsible for such 
accidents in the past. Why should we have greater confidence in 
Colombia and Peru? And why should we encourage them in this regard?
  Mr. President, I am not alone in expressing concern about this 
provision. A number of key organizations directly affected by section 
1012 have also voiced strong opposition. These concerns have been all 
but ignored by the administration and by Congress.
  The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association [AOPA] and the National 
Business Aircraft Association [NBAA] have repeatedly attempted to 
convince the administration to seek an alternative to participation in 
a civil shootdown policy. The American Association for Families of KAL 
007 Victims has also expressed outrage at this provision. For them, 
there is no excuse to condone, let alone participate in, a policy that 
involves the deliberate shootdown of civil aircraft. I ask unanimous 
consent that letters from each of these associations be included in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                               Aircraft Owners and


                                           Pilots Association,

                                     Frederick, MD, June 23, 1994.
     Hon. Robert S. Gelbard,
     Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. Gelbard: The Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
     Association will vigorously oppose any action by the United 
     States government which would condone or encourage the use of 
     deadly force against civilian aircraft.
       We represent the interests of 325,000 members nationwide 
     who take advantage of general aviation aircraft to fulfill 
     their personal and business transportation needs. AOPA 
     members are law-abiding citizens who share the Clinton 
     Administration's desire to curb the use of general aviation 
     aircraft as a tool in the illegal drug trade. But condoning 
     the use of deadly force against civilian aircraft is 
     irresponsible and fundamentally wrong.
       Those in Washington who applaud the so-called ``shootdown'' 
     policies of the Colombian and Peruvian governments cannot 
     have forgotten that wo civilian airliners were shot down in 
     recent years after they were mistaken for military aircraft. 
     Trained military personnel using the most advanced equipment 
     have demonstrated with tragic results that it is possible for 
     a relatively slow-moving airliner to be mistaken for a fast-
     moving military jet fighter. Considering these horrifying 
     events--one of which involved our own armed forces--how can 
     anyone feel assured that a twin engine Cessna carrying 
     Members of Congress on an overseas fact-finding mission will 
     never be mistaken for an identical twin engine Cessna full of 
     drug smugglers?
       There are obvious alternatives to the use of deadly force 
     which are equally effective, and the consequences of mistake 
     are far less likely to result in injury or death. For 
     example, we as pilots know that whatever goes up must come 
     down. Aircraft suspected of drug smuggling activity are going 
     to return to solid ground, one way or another. Utilizing the 
     same modern technology and superior intelligence information 
     which makes it possible to identify a suspected aircraft in 
     the first place, it is merely necessary to continue tracking 
     such an aircraft to its point of destination and apprehend 
     the occupants and their cargo on the ground.
       Because of potential multi-national jurisdictional issues, 
     we recognize that additional international agreements might 
     be required to facilitate this approach. We are confident 
     that the State Department is capable of securing the 
     necessary cooperation of other nations in the war on drugs.
       And surely any foreign government with sufficient resources 
     and firepower to shoot unarmed civilian aircraft out the sky 
     also has the wherewithal to arrest criminals once they have 
     landed. Aside from reducing the possibility of tragic 
     mistake, it seems to us that such an approach has the added 
     advantage of preserving evidence and potential witnesses who 
     may be able to help lead authorities to their superiors in an 
     international drug smuggling cartel.
       We commend those elements of the Clinton Administration 
     which news reports indicate are opposed to encouraging the 
     use of deadly force against civilian aircraft. In the zeal to 
     curtail the debilitating presence of illegal drugs in our 
     society, the United States as the leader of the free world 
     must exercise common sense and maintain its adherence to 
     fundamental moral and legal concepts.
       We would appreciate an opportunity to meet with you to 
     discuss our concerns. In the meantime, thank you for 
     considering our views.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Phil Boyer,
                                                        President.
                                  ____



                                      AOPA Legislative Action,

                                                   Washington, DC.

                 Oppose Shooting Down Civilian Aircraft

       AOPA Legislative Action is opposed to any action by the 
     United States government which would encourage the use of 
     deadly force against civilian aircraft. Language included in 
     the Senate version of the defense authorization bill would 
     condone the use of deadly force against civilian aircraft by 
     Colombia and Peru, which seek to use U.S. intelligence 
     information for the purpose of shooting down aircraft 
     suspected of illegal drug smuggling activity.
       We represent thousands of pilots nationwide who take 
     advantage of general aviation aircraft to fulfill their 
     personal and business transportation needs. Our members are 
     law-abiding citizens who share the desire of lawmakers to 
     curb the use of general aviation aircraft as a tool in the 
     illegal drug trade. But condoning the use of deadly force 
     against civilian aircraft is fundamentally wrong.
       Those who are attracted by the so-called ``shootdown'' 
     policies of the Colombian and Peruvian governments must 
     remember that two civilian airliners were shot down in recent 
     years after they were mistaken for military aircraft. Trained 
     military personnel using the most advanced equipment have 
     demonstrated with tragic results that it is possible for a 
     relatively slow-moving airliner to be mistaken for a fast-
     moving military jet fighter. In addition, the Defense 
     Department recently disclosed details of the cascading series 
     of communications failures which resulted in the accidental 
     shooting down of two U.S. Army helicopters by American F-15 
     fighters which mistook them for Iraqi aircraft. The Iraqi 
     incident illustrates the potential for tragedy which exists 
     any time deadly force is applied, let alone against civilian 
     aircraft.
       Considering these horrifying events--some involving our own 
     armed forces--it is impossible to assure that a twin engine 
     Cessna carrying Members of Congress on an overseas fact-
     finding mission will never be mistaken for an identical twin 
     engine Cessna full of drug smugglers.
       There are obvious alternatives to the use of deadly force 
     which are equally effective, and the consequences of mistake 
     are far less likely to result in injury or death. For 
     example, using the same modern technology and superior 
     intelligence information which makes it possible to identify 
     a suspected aircraft in the first place, it is merely 
     necessary to continue tracking such an aircraft to its point 
     of destination and apprehend the occupants and their cargo on 
     the ground.
       If the United States desires to continue sharing 
     intelligence and providing other assistance to Colombia and 
     Peru, it should seek assurances from the governments of those 
     countries with respect to their shootdown activities. 
     Preferably, Colombia and Peru would assure our government 
     that they would engage in no more shootdowns of civilian 
     aircraft. A less desirable alternative would be an assurance 
     that Colombia and Peru would make no use of information or 
     other aid provided by the United States in effecting 
     shootdowns.
                                  ____

                                                 National Business


                                   Aircraft Association, Inc.,

                                                   Washington, DC.

 NBAA Deeply Concerned With Clinton Administration Proposal To Assist 
Foreign Governments Which Have ``Shootdown'' Drug Interdiction Programs

       June 30, 1994, Washington, DC.--The National Business 
     Aircraft Association (NBAA) expressed deep concern today with 
     the announcement late last week of President Clinton's 
     proposal to allow U.S. officials to provide tracking data to 
     foreign governments that want to shoot down suspected drug-
     smuggling flights.
       ``The President's proposal, which requires Congressional 
     approval, raises serious aviation safety issues,'' said NBAA 
     President Jack Olcott. ``We agree with the protocol drafted 
     in 1984 by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
     (ICAO) which stated that, in part, `. . . every State must 
     refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil 
     aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the 
     lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not 
     be endangered.' The potential for tragic error resulting in 
     the loss of innocent lives is too great to warrant support 
     for the `shoot down' approach to drug interdiction. In fact 
     and unfortunately, recent history has proven this point,'' he 
     continued.
       ``Furthermore, we are proud of the excellent record of NBAA 
     Member Companies with regard to the drug issue. To our 
     knowledge, no NBAA Member Company aircraft has ever been 
     found to have been involved in the smuggling of drugs.'' He 
     added, ``Whether it be Colombia, Peru, or any other country, 
     no foreign government should receive a signal from the United 
     States Government that the `shoot down' approach is 
     acceptable. And, specifically, NBAA is deeply concerned with 
     the added risk to international flight operations of NBAA 
     Member Companies as they endeavor to compete in the global 
     marketplace should this proposal be approved by Congress.''
       Olcott concluded, ``It is our sincere hope that President 
     Clinton will reconsider his decision and that Congress will 
     reject the proposal if he fails to.''
       NBAA represents the aviation interests of approximately 
     3,400 companies which own and operate general aviation 
     aircraft as an aid to the conduct of their business, or are 
     involved with business aviation. NBAA Member Companies earn 
     annual revenues in excess of $3 trillion--a number that is 
     about half of the Gross National Product--and employ more 
     than 16 million people worldwide.
                                  ____

                                      The American Association for


                                  Families of KAL 007 Victims,

                                  New York, N.Y., August 15, 1994.
     Subject: S-2182.

     Hon. Malcolm Wallop,
     U.S. Senate, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wallop: We just become aware of the above Bill 
     which we understand is up for a vote.
       Section 1012 would grant immunity to authorized employees 
     and agents of the United States and of foreign countries 
     engaged in interdiction of aircraft used in illicit drug 
     trafficking.
       We urge you to vote against this amendment to Bill S. 2182.
       Eleven years ago we lost 269 of our loved ones precisely 
     because Korean Airlines Flight 007 was interdicted for 
     security reasons by the then Soviet authorities.
       By passing this amendment we would set indeed a bad example 
     to the world allowing the destruction of civilian aircraft. 
     In fact passage of this bill would encourage drug traffickers 
     to fill their planes with civilians, and dare our authorities 
     to shoot them down. How would we know who are the innocent 
     and who are the guilty passengers on such planes?
       It cannot be the policy of our Government to grant anybody 
     immunity for a decision to terminate a civilian flight, for 
     whatever reason.
       Thank you for your attention.
           Respectfully,
                                              Hans Ephraimson-Abt,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, those who oppose section 1012 do not want 
U.S. military personnel or other U.S. Government employees to be liable 
under U.S. law for merely doing their assigned duties. Nor do they want 
the United States to be soft on drug trafficking. What they are saying 
is that U.S. participation in a civil aircraft shootdown policy is not 
the only alternative and certainly not the best one. Unfortunately, the 
alternatives have not even been considered by Congress.
  Given the legitimate concerns that have been raised, and the fact 
that section 1012 overturns decades of U.S. policy, it is irresponsible 
at best for Congress to pass this section without hearings and full 
debate. This is not a slight modification. It is a large hole in U.S. 
policy and international practice.
  Mr. President, I realize that the Senate is unlikely to defeat the 
defense authorization conference report based solely on this provision. 
I, for one, however, will vote against this conference report largely 
as a result of this provision. I hope that it will never be implemented 
and that in the future the Congress will come to its senses and rethink 
this dangerous approach.


   REGARDING THE THEATER AIR CONTROL IMPROVEMENT [TACSI]. SMITH. Mr. 
 President, I wonder if I might engage the distinguished chairman and 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee in a brief colloquy. It 
 is my understand that the conferees approved a $7.6 million reduction 
 to the TACSI program, despite the full funding of the budget request 
   for this program in both the House and Senate authorization bills.

  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from New Hampshire is correct.
  Mr. SMITH. I recognize the need to reduce spending wherever possible, 
but I am concerned that this cut may produce unintended harm to the Air 
Force Mission Support System [AFMSS] program, which is the mission, 
planning portion of the TACSI Program. As my colleagues know, AFMSS 
consolidates many different and costly mission planning systems into 
one standard system, consistent with the policy of establishing 
migration systems in defense procurements. I fear that a reduction of 
this nature will negatively impact our operational warfighting 
capability.
  Could the distinguished chairman and ranking member comment on this 
issue?
  Mr. NUNN. I would be happy to respond. I am aware of the importance 
of the AFMSS Program, and share my colleague from New Hampshire's 
commitment to preserving our Nation's warfighting capabilities. I can 
assure the Senator that, while the conferees did strive to achieve 
budget savings, it was not the intent of the conferees to reduce 
funding for the AFMSS portion of the TACSI Program.
  Mr. THURMOND. The distinguished chairman is correct. The reduction of 
$7.6 million was not done with any prejudice toward the AFMSS Program. 
Rather, it was an effort on the part of the conferees to avoid creating 
so-called hollow budget authority, since the House and Senate Defense 
appropriations bills each reduced the overall funding level for the 
TACSI Program.
  Mr. SMITH. I thank my colleagues for this clarification, and for 
their support of this important program.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to have been a part of the 
conference with the House of Representatives on the fiscal year 1995 
Defense authorization bill and to have worked under the able leadership 
of the distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Nunn. I have advocated for some time now that the Senate should 
enact a law which would require the United States to lift unilaterally 
the arms embargo imposed on Bosnia. The amendment which the minority 
leader, Senator Dole, and I offered to the Defense authorization bill 
when it was on the floor on July 1, 1994. That amendment failed by a 
50-to-50 tie vote. A Nunn-Mitchell amendment expressed a sense of the 
Congress on this subject; this amendment was passed with a 52 to 48 
vote. The House of Representatives entered conference with an amendment 
similar to the Dole-Lieberman amendment which had passed the House with 
a 66-vote margin.
  During the authorization conference, I worked to achieve compromise 
language which would have required unilateral lifting of the embargo 
consistent with both Dole-Lieberman and the House position. The 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee offered an innovative and 
thoughtful proposal which attempted to bridge the gap between the two 
positions. I felt that this proposal took important steps with regard 
to the arms embargo, but it stopped short of requiring, as the last 
step of the process it established, that the President unilaterally 
lift the embargo if efforts to attain approval of the U.N. Security 
Council for a multilateral lifting failed. Ultimately, the efforts of 
those of us in the conference who favored adding to it a unilateral 
lifting of the embargo failed and the language offered by the Senator 
from Georgia was accepted as the final conference language by the 
conferees on August 10.
  While I supported and signed the conference report on the Defense 
authorization bill, I am making this statement so that the record 
accurately reflects my concern over the final language adopted on 
Bosnia by the conference.
  I should note that there have been subsequent developments on this 
issue. During consideration of the Defense appropriations bill on 
August 11, 1994, I joined once again with the Senate Republican leader 
and offered an amendment requiring the unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo no later than November 15, 1994. This amendment was agreed to 
by the Senate by a vote of 58 to 42. An amendment by Senators Nunn and 
Mitchell which was identical to the language agreed to in the Defense 
authorization conference was also agreed to, by a vote of 56 to 44. 
Consistent with the position I took in conference, I voted for the 
amendment on August 11 because I believe it provides the necessary 
preliminary steps to a unilateral lifting of the embargo as required by 
the Dole-Lieberman amendment.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the Senate has now considered the 
conference report on the Department of Defense authorization bill. This 
is an important measure, although it is relatively noncontroversial, 
and I anticipate, when we finally have a vote on it, it will be 
approved by a substantial margin.
  It had been my hope that the Senate would complete the debate on this 
measure today, and that we could have a vote tomorrow morning. We then 
were asked by our Republican colleagues not to have any votes tomorrow 
until after the respective party lunches and conferences, and I 
therefore agreed to that. I announced earlier today in response to that 
request that there would be no votes prior to 2:30 tomorrow.
  We then were further asked for additional time to permit Senators who 
were not present today to be present tomorrow to debate that Department 
of Defense authorization bill, and I have agreed to that. The time 
requested was approximately 4 hours, and if we come in at 10 and have 
the usual recess for the luncheon period, the vote would then occur at 
about 4:30.
  Accordingly, Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the vote 
on the Department of Defense authorization bill occur at 4:30 p.m. 
tomorrow, and that the time prior to that be equally divided between 
the two parties for debate on the matter in the usual form.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am going to have to object, but I do 
want to say to the leader that we are hopeful we can acquire approval 
to have the vote some time tomorrow afternoon. It is my understanding 
that Senator McCain will be here at 10 o'clock in the morning. It will 
be a debate to begin at 10 o'clock and he will be here to discuss the 
pending matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I regret that we were not able to get 
the agreement. I hope that we will be able to tomorrow, that we will be 
able to vote on this matter tomorrow. It is an important bill on which 
we must complete action.

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