[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 126 (Monday, September 12, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          DO NOT INVADE HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. WALKER. Madam Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
Kasich].
  Mr. KASICH. Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
  The problem we have here is that for years whenever the United States 
decided to be involved in any part of the world, it was always demanded 
that we have a vote. I do not know how many times we voted on Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, the whole issue of Central America. We demanded a vote 
when it came to Iraq and I myself told Secretary Baker that there was 
no way that we could conduct a war against Saddam Hussein without 
having a vote. The situation in Grenada where it took emergency action, 
the activity in Panama designed to capture Noriega, which then-
Congressman Les Aspin said we were dragging our feet on for too long, 
were exceptions to this rule. But when we were going to go to war 
against Saddam, we had the vote and we clearly should have the vote on 
Haiti, because what the vote would require is for the President to 
outline the compelling interests as to why we should go.
  If the President fails to do it, ladies and gentlemen, we will be on 
very thin ice, because in this very dangerous and sometimes confused 
world, we must have a set of principles to guide ourselves when we 
begin to commit U.S. forces to military action and threaten their 
safety.
  You better have a plan, you better tell people what the plan is, you 
better tell them what the chances of success are. You better have a way 
to get out once you have achieved your plan, your goals, and you had 
best rally the support of the American people. If you do not do those 
things, you are not going to have a success in foreign policy.
  Mr. WALKER. I want to congratulate the gentleman for his statement. I 
think that it is important to reflect on exactly what the gentleman has 
said here this evening. I do not think that any of us doubt that the 
President as commander in chief has the authority to commit our troops 
worldwide in emergency kinds of circumstances. That is something that a 
number of us have come to the floor over the years and suggested is the 
case. However, in the situation of Haiti, it is very clear that we are 
committing not only for a short duration but possibly for a long 
duration in that an occupation may be required. In those kinds of 
instances, it just does not make any sense, first of all, to not even 
brief the Congress. There has not even been a comprehensive briefing of 
Congress on the issues involved in Haiti by the President and by his 
administration.
  Second, it is important for there to be a vote indicating that 
Congress will support the actions as this situation moves forward. 
Without that vote, there is no assurance that Congress will continue to 
provide the money that will be necessary to sustain the operation. That 
will be a terrible thing for our troops, to commit them there, with no 
understanding of whether or not there is a willingness on the part of 
Congress to continue that occupation or not.
  I think the administration makes a tremendous mistake if they do not 
move forward with a vote here in the Congress.
  Mr. KASICH. If the gentleman will yield, I believe the reason the 
administration does not want to have a vote is that they do not believe 
they can win a vote. But also I believe they do not believe they can 
make a compelling case for why we ought to be involved in this.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, that is the point the gentleman makes that I 
think is so important. That is, that the administration in order to win 
votes in the Congress at the present time would have to make a 
compelling case. I think that any administration that is going to 
commit young men and young women's lives to an operation has the duty 
to make that kind of compelling case. If they were to come to Congress 
not having made their case, there is no doubt they would lose such a 
vote on the floor.

                              {time}  2050

  If they can make that case to Congress and can get the concurrence of 
Congress, then it seems to me they have at that point assured that 
there is a policy worth risking of American lives. But until that is 
done, I think you are going to have a hard time convincing Congress and 
a hard time convincing America that it is worth the lives of our troops 
for the mission that may be undertaken there.
  Mr. KASICH. I would suggest to the gentleman that when we looked at 
Bosnia and we saw the terrible things that were going on in Bosnia, 
when we began to take a look at, is there a compelling United States 
interest, is there a goal that we can achieve, is there an exit 
strategy, do the American people support this action, the conclusion 
was no, and that is precisely why we did not engage there.
  These rules serve a useful purpose. They allow us to make rational 
judgments about where the United States should involve itself, and as 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania said, where we are going to risk the 
lives of the U.S. military to achieve a goal.
  I would ask that this administration come to this House for purposes 
of having a vote.
  Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

                          ____________________