[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 126 (Monday, September 12, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                      A STRONG DEFENSE FOR AMERICA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. LIVINGSTON. Madam Speaker, despite the doubling of President 
Bush's reductions in defense spending since entering office, President 
Clinton has always promised the American people that he would provide 
our soldiers, allies, and the American people with defense against 
missile attacks from the likes of North Korea, Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar 
Qadhafi, various Iranians, and other lost souls throughout this world 
who have access to high and capable technology that might threaten the 
United States.
  No longer do we face a threat from the Soviet Union, thankfully, 
since the collapse of the evil empire of communism. No longer do we 
expect the onslaught of some 10,000 or 15,000 missiles, or 35,000 
warheads.
  However, it is quite possible that we would, at some point in the 
coming years, face the possibility of one or two incoming ballistic 
missiles or nuclear-tipped air breathing missiles or the like, and the 
fact is that we understand that confidential arms control talks are 
currently going on in Geneva, and have been for the last year, and that 
President Clinton's State Department and Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency are unilaterally giving away our country's ability to test and 
deploy effective missiles defenses.
  Mr. Speaker, under the guise of clarifying the 1972 ABM Treaty--which 
I would submit does not exist, because that was a treaty between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union does not 
exist, so there is no ABM treaty--but under the guise of clarifying 
that treaty, Clinton administration officials have agreed to proposals 
from the Russian republic, and have offered some of their own, that 
would prevent us from testing or deploying sea-based, air-based, space-
based, and many ground-based theater missile defenses. At the very 
least, they would restrict those defenses.
  Mr. Speaker, these programs include such programs as the Navy's sea-
based theater missile defense program, including the upper tier 
program; the Air Force boost phased intercept program, the space-based 
programs, and more advanced Army theater high altitude area defense 
systems. These are the systems that we are developing that will keep 
incoming missiles from hitting American people.
  President Clinton has not told the American people, but the fact is 
that today, mid-September, 1994, we do not have the capacity to 
intercept an incoming ballistic missile in any reasonable fashion in 
this Nation, which means that if an incoming nuclear-tipped warhead 
were to come by way of outer space into the continental United States, 
millions of Americans could die. It is that simple.
  The Navy theater missile defense, including the upper tier program, 
has been called one of the most promising and effective near-term 
missile defense programs we could deploy by Ambassador Hank Cooper, 
President Bush's missile defense director.
  There are various other systems that are ongoing which have proven, 
likewise, very, very capable. Within the matter of a very short period 
of time, perhaps two or three years at most, we could actually develop 
systems which could intercept those missiles and save millions of 
Americans from being wiped out in a nuclear holocaust.
  Madam Speaker, I would like to incorporate in my remarks a column by 
Mr. Frank Gaffney from the Center for Security Policy, which elaborates 
on the concern that I have that right now the Clinton administration is 
negotiating away the speed, the range, the number, the capacity of our 
current systems, or the systems that we are developing, so we will not 
necessarily be able to intercept those incoming nuclear or chemically 
or biologically equipped warheads.
  That worries me, Madam Speaker, worries me greatly, worries me that 
we have already in those negotiations conceded interim limits on sea-
based theater missile defense missiles. We have already conceded the 
prohibition of space-based theater missile defense interceptors and 
missiles. We have already prohibited bomber deployment of air-based 
theater missile defense missiles. We have already prohibited nuclear-
tipped theater missile defense missiles. We have already limited air-
based theater missile defense missile volume.
  Those are technical terms, but basically they mean we have conceded 
already that we will unilaterally not develop that which is technology 
capable for us to develop, and we will bind our hands, and we will not 
intercept missiles with certain capacities or capability, even though 
we have that capability to develop those defenses. That is tying our 
hands behind our backs and allowing somebody to hit us right in the 
nose.
  Madam Speaker, on the table and not yet agreed to, but possibly which 
might be agreed to before Boris Yeltsin comes to meet with President 
Clinton in a summit within a matter of a few weeks, are the possibility 
of limiting velocity of air-based theater missile defenses, a 
possibility of limiting land-based theater missile defense systems to a 
very low velocity, the possibility of limiting all theater missile 
defense interceptor missile systems in velocity, and the possibility of 
limiting interceptor ranges of air-based theater missile defense 
systems.

                              {time}  2040

  This does not make sense, nor does it make sense to possibly prohibit 
testing of theater missile defenses during certain phases of incoming 
or target missile flight. Yet we are negotiating the prohibition of 
such testing. Nor does it make sense to limit the theater missile 
defense which has recently been proposed by Russia and more details are 
being compiled on that.
  Madam Speaker, I would urge the President and the administration and 
the State Department and everyone answerable to President Clinton not 
to negotiate away the capacity of the American people to defend 
ourselves against incoming missiles.
  Madam Speaker, I include for the Record the decision brief from the 
Center for Security Policy and Treaty Proposals to Restrict Theater 
Missile Defense, as follows:

   More Steps on the Slippery Slope Toward Terminating U.S. Theater 
                        Missile Defense Options

       Washington, D.C.:--In recent months, the Clinton 
     Administration has made steady progress in negotiating away 
     what little latitude remains to the United States in 
     developing effective defenses against missile attack. Since 
     the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty essentially precludes 
     useful strategic defense (i.e., those against 
     intercontinental-range missiles), as long as the United 
     States continues to be bound by this treaty, the best hope 
     for acquiring militarily useful and efficient anti-missile 
     capabilities has been through theater missile defense (TMD) 
     which are not constrained by the Treaty. Thanks to Clinton 
     diplomatic initiatives with the Kremlin, however, this option 
     is also about to be permanently foreclosed.


     The Latest ``Breakthrough''--More Erosion in the U.S. Position

       The vehicle for accomplishing such an undesirable goal has 
     been negotiations nominally aimed at developing amendments to 
     the ABM Treaty that would define the differences between 
     limited strategic missile defenses and ``unconstrained'' TMD 
     systems. In practice, the result of these negotiations has 
     been to develop what amounts to a new Anti-Theater Ballistic 
     Missile Treaty--a document that not only defines but bans the 
     most promising means of defending against shorter-range 
     missile attacks.
       The latest developments in these negotiations occurred as a 
     result of meetings held during the week of 11 July when the 
     Clinton Administration dispatched a high level team to 
     Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk to present a new U.S. position on 
     defining TMD demarcation. The American delegation, led by the 
     director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John 
     Holum, informed its interlocutors that the U.S. was prepared 
     to accept Moscow's standing demand for stringent limitations 
     on the velocities permitted theater anti-missile 
     interceptors. (This concession would round out an earlier, 
     disastrous decision undertaken unilaterally by the Clinton 
     team permanently to ban space-based theater missile 
     defenses).
       Specifically, the United States would agree to 3 kilometer/
     second as an upper limit for deployed ground- and sea-based 
     systems. The Holum team announced, however, that it wanted to 
     preserve the option to test higher velocity systems 
     for ``ascent-phase'' defense. (This going-in position 
     would have protected the right to test the Navy's 
     promising ``Upper Tier'' program, but not to deploy it.) 
     At the same time, the U.S. indicated it was amenable to 
     operational restrictions regarding range, payload, and 
     size of an interceptor that would so limit the defensive 
     capabilities of higher velocity ascent-phase interceptors 
     as to render them essentially useless.


                the russian response: par for the course

       The Russians are clearly determined to settle for nothing 
     less than restrictions that will preclude promising American 
     defensive technologies. As the Center noted in its 30 June 
     analysis of these negotiations, Moscow appears motivated by 
     two considerations:
       ``[First,] they already have deployed reasonably effective 
     defenses against short-range missile attack--and even some 
     longer-range missiles--while the U.S. has not. Such a 
     strategic situation has traditionally been viewed by Moscow 
     as a desirable one and the Russians have gone to great 
     lengths in their propaganda and diplomatic machinations to 
     perpetuate it.
       ``[Second,] the Russians also have another, more practical 
     motivation for demanding the negotiation of limits that would 
     principally have the effect of precluding advanced American 
     theater defense programs. By constraining or precluding 
     particularly those U.S. systems that can be easily 
     retrofitted into existing weapons platforms, Moscow will 
     eliminate competition for the potentially lucrative 
     international market in such defenses. Russian officials have 
     described this market as a ``gold mine''; Moscow clearly 
     would like to ensure that its SA-10, SA-12, S-300 and other 
     air-defense/ATBM systems remain best positioned to exploit 
     it.''
       It is hardly surprisingly, therefore, that the Kremlin 
     reacted to the Administration's proposal by allowing that it 
     represented progress, but did not go far enough in limiting 
     TMD systems under the ABM Treaty. For its part, the 
     Administration was astonished that Moscow would want still 
     more constraints. Therefore, Washington pushed to hold 
     further discussions in the form of an ``experts meeting'' 
     held in Geneva during the last week of July.


                              more erosion

       On 25 July, the U.S. acting representative to the Standing 
     Consultative Commission, Stanley Riveles, took up the mission 
     of explaining the ``logic'' behind the U.S. position 
     initially laid out by the Holum's delegation earlier that 
     month.\3\ After two weeks of exploring the Clinton 
     Administration's latest capitulation to its demands, Moscow 
     insisted on even more.
       On 8 August, the Russian team presented a proposal 
     creatively worded to look like an acceptance of the U.S. 
     position. In fact, it amounted to a repackaging of the 
     Kremlin's original demand for 3 kilometer/second velocity 
     limits across the board (i.e., for land-, sea-, and air-based 
     theater missile defense systems). The Russian position boils 
     down to an insistence on an interceptor velocity limit of 3 
     kilometer/second in testing and/or deploying any TMD systems 
     with the exception of a limited number of higher-velocity 
     tests for ``ascent phase'' defense concepts. In effect, this 
     low limit would kill U.S. plans for Navy's ``Upper Tier'' 
     missile defense, and every other advanced TMD program the 
     U.S. currently has under development. The Russians also 
     proposed additional, ill-defined restrictions on deployed 
     systems--such as range and operating mode--that would affect 
     all U.S. TMD systems and further hamper effective missile 
     defenses.
       Riveles either did not recognize that the Russian proposal 
     was even more restrictive than the U.S. position on the 
     table--or, like many others in the Clinton Administration, 
     supports measures to preclude missile defenses of virtually 
     any kind. That same night he transmitted Moscow's proposal to 
     Washington and asked for permission to accept it! The Russian 
     proposal circulated through the interagency process on 9 
     August.
       Perhaps concerned that such a swift and abject capitulation 
     would reinforce criticism of how it is conducting these 
     negotiations, the Clinton team declined to approve Riveles' 
     request for instructions, directing him instead to return to 
     Washington on 12 August for consultations. An interagency 
     meeting on the subject is scheduled for 29 August.
       If past experience is any guide, it is a safe bet that the 
     upshot will be further erosion in the U.S. position--if not 
     outright acceptance of the latest Russian demands. The 
     Administration's hope apparently continues to be that some 
     deal on theater missile defenses could be signed at the late 
     September summit meeting in Washington between President 
     Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.


                       meanwhile, on capitol hill

       In light of a requirement added to the FY1995 Defense 
     authorization bill that requires any ``substantive change'' 
     to the ABM Treaty to be submitted to the Senate for its 
     advice and consent, the Clinton Administration has been 
     quietly lobbying Senators to minimize any opposition its 
     give-away on missile defenses might encounter. Robert Bell, a 
     member of the National Security Council staff and former 
     Senate staffer, has spent a considerable amount of time 
     meeting with certain Republican Senators trying to convince 
     them that the Clinton Administration truly is committed to 
     effective theater missile defense, notwithstanding its track 
     record in negotiating with the Russians.
       This argument largely rests on the contention that the 
     Army's Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has 
     been fully protected by the emerging agreement and its 
     development and deployment will be facilitated by the success 
     of these negotiations. Actually, as noted in the Center's 30 
     June Decision Brief:
       ``Even the Army's THAAD system . . . will very likely wind 
     up being constrained by the 3 kilometers/second interceptor 
     velocity limitation. The Demonstration and Evaluation 
     (DEMVAL) version of the THAAD system now under development 
     has an interceptor velocity of 2.4 kilometers/second--reduced 
     from 2.6 km/sec a few months ago. Even if the so-called 
     ``Objective System'' intended ultimately to be deployed can 
     be constrained to velocities less than the limit, future 
     growth options to give the THAAD interceptor more capability 
     will be foreclosed.''
       Under such circumstances it is not clear that THAAD will 
     have sufficient capability and cost-effectiveness to secure 
     the necessary sustained support required for its procurement 
     and deployment. Indeed, some of the strongest supporters of 
     missile defenses have concluded that any THAAD likely to 
     emerge from these negotiations will not be worth having.
       Even though all 44 Republican Senators signed a letter on 
     22 March 1994 indicating that if the negotiations were to 
     ``add constraints on TMD interceptors and sensor 
     characteristics . . . precluding a class of TMD . . . it is 
     unlikely that we would be able to support any such 
     agreement,'' Bell has reported having ``some success'' with 
     the targets of his lobbying. He has, for example, told his 
     superiors in the White House that Senator John Warner is `in 
     my pocket'' and will accept the Administration's capitulation 
     on effective missile defenses.
       Fortunately, other influential legislators have begun to 
     register their strong opposition to the Clinton effort to 
     garrotte what remains of U.S. options to defend against 
     missile attack. In two similar letters to President Clinton, 
     over 50 senior members of the House of Representatives--
     including most of that chamber's Republican leadership--have 
     forcefully objected to any action that would negotiate away 
     America's right to effective theater missile defenses. For 
     example, a letter signed by Reps. Newt Gingrich, Dick Armey, 
     Henery Hyde, Floyd Spence and thirty-five other Members of 
     Congress observed:
       ``We know of no compelling argument for limiting our 
     freedom to pursue theater defense options with the very best 
     technology we are capable of developing . . . No one can now 
     anticipate the technical accomplishments we may be able to 
     achieve in the future. Nor can we know what missile threats 
     to our theater forces will emerge over the next 10, 20 or 30 
     years. That is why it would be short-sighted in the extreme 
     to accept limits now, after the end of the Cold War, in the 
     context of an ABM Treaty of declining relevance and whose 
     provisions were never intended to limit theater defenses.''


                            The Bottom Line

       Before the Clinton Administration takes any further steps 
     down the proverbial ``slippery slope'' represented by 
     negotiating new limits on missile defenses with the Russians, 
     the Congress and the American people need to be heard from. 
     The majority appear adamantly opposed to perpetuating the 
     Nation's present, absolute vulnerability to short-range 
     missile attack--a stance incidentally shared, at least 
     rhetorically, by President Clinton himself. Their interests 
     should not be disserved, and their intelligence insulted, by 
     new agreements that will deny the United States the most 
     effective (and perhaps any) theater missile defense options.
                                  ____


          Treaty Proposals to Restrict Theatre Missile Defense


                     Initial U.S. Proposal in 1993.

       1--Limit to 5km per second the velocity of target (or 
     incoming) missiles.


                    Proposals currently on the table

       1--``Interim'' limit of 3km/per second on sea-based TMD 
     missiles. (Navy Upper Tier velocity is currently 4 & \1/2\ 
     km/s)
       2--Limit velocity of air based TMD defense. (i.e. Boost 
     Phase Intercept (BPI)]
       3--Limit land based TMD systems to3km/s 
     velocity. (THAAD system currently 2.6km/s)
       4--Limit all TMD (or interceptor) missile systems to 3km/s 
     velocity. Would leave only limited land systems as viable 
     options)
       5--Limit interception range of air based TMD missiles.
       6--Prohibit space based TMD interceptors/missiles.
       7--Prohibit heavy bomber deployment of air based TMD 
     missiles.
       8--Prohibit nuclear tipped TMD missiles.
       9--Limit re-entry angle of incoming missiles.
       10--Limit air based TMD missile volume.
       11--Prohibit testing of TMD systems during certain phases 
     of incoming (or target) missile flight.
       12--Limits on TMD (unspecified) to be proposed by Russia.

                          ____________________